Information Notice 1996-63, Potential Safety Issue Regarding the Shipment of Fissile Material: Difference between revisions

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{{#Wiki_filter:K) JIM MCKNIGHT UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY
{{#Wiki_filter:K) JIM MCKNIGHT


COMMISSION
UNITED STATES


===OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY AND SAFEGUARDS===
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, DC 20555 December 5, 1996 NRC INFORMATION


NOTICE 96-63: POTENTIAL
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY AND SAFEGUARDS


SAFETY ISSUE REGARDING
WASHINGTON, DC 20555 December 5, 1996 NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 96-63:                  POTENTIAL SAFETY ISSUE REGARDING THE


THE SHIPMENT OF FISSILE MATERIAL
SHIPMENT OF FISSILE MATERIAL


==Addressees==
==Addressees==
All U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
All U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission licensees authorized to possess special nuclear


Commission
material in unsealed quantities greater than a critical mass.
 
licensees
 
authorized
 
to possess special nuclear material in unsealed quantities
 
greater than a critical mass.


==Purpose==
==Purpose==
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information notice to alert


Commission (NRC) is issuing this information
addressees to an issue with potential safety significance regarding shipments using the fissile


notice to alert addressees
material exemption provisions and general licenses. It is expected that recipients will review this


to an issue with potential
information for applicability to their facilities and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar


safety significance
problems. However, suggestions contained in this information notice are not NRC requirements;
therefore, no specific action nor written response is required.


regarding
==Description of Circumstances==
An NRC licensee recently informed NRC of a potential situation where one of the fissile material


shipments
exemptions in 10 CFR 71.53 would not have provided adequate criticality safety if large amounts


using the fissile material exemption
of an exempt concentration of fissile material were to be transported in the presence of a special


provisions
moderating material (i.e., beryllium). A recent contract was awarded to the licensee to process


and general licenses.
weapons-usable enriched uranium materials. The waste product, a uranium-beryllium filtercake, met the fissile exemption provisions in 10 CFR 71.53 and 49 CFR 173.453. The presence of


It is expected that recipients
beryllium in significant quantities in NRC-regulated fissile exempt shipments is extraordinary, and


will review this information
was not considered in the development of the fissile exemptions in the regulations. NRC has


for applicability
reviewed and verified the licensee's calculations, and has concluded that the current regulations


to their facilities
need to be revised to preclude criticality in fissile exempt shipments made under 10 CFR 71.53, and fissile shipments made underthe general licenses in 10 CFR 71.18 and 10 CFR 71.22. This


and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems.
information notice is being issued to provide additional, timely notice, to licensees, of this


However, suggestions
potential safety issue, while the regulatory revisions are made.


contained
Discussion


in this information
The licensee proposed to employ the provision in 10 CFR 71.53(d), or the parallel provision in the


notice are not NRC requirements;
U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) regulations, 49 CFR 173.453(d).
therefore, no specific action nor written response is required.Description


of Circumstances
J//1
961204021              on                                                      jl4Pqt


An NRC licensee recently informed NRC of a potential
PDR ETE OO~tc                                    99


situation
IN 96-63 December 5, 1996 Section 71.53(d) exempts fissile material from the requirements in 10 CFR 71.55 and 71.59 (i.e.,
the additional requirements placed on fissile packages and shipments to preclude criticality),
provided the package does not contain more than 5 grams (0.18 ounces) of fissile material in


where one of the fissile material exemptions
any 10-liter (610-cubic-inch) volume. The fissile exemptions appearing in 10 CFR 71.53 are


in 10 CFR 71.53 would not have provided adequate criticality
assumed to provide inherent criticality control for all practical cases in which fissile materials


safety if large amounts of an exempt concentration
exist at or below the applicable regulatory limits (i.e., independent calculations would generally


of fissile material were to be transported
not be expected nor required). Consequently, the fissile exemptions generally do not place limits


in the presence of a special moderating
on the types of moderating or reflecting material present in fissile exempt packages, nor the


material (i.e., beryllium).
number of fissile exempt packages that can be shipped in a single consignment, and do not


A recent contract was awarded to the licensee to process weapons-usable
require that a transport index (see 10 CFR 71.4) be assigned to packages for criticality control.


enriched uranium materials.
Further, the fissile material exemptions and general license provisions allow any licensee to


The waste product, a uranium-beryllium
make shipments without first seeking NRC approval.


filtercake, met the fissile exemption
A fairly realistic computer model of the enriched uranium-beryllium oxide waste packages, as


provisions
loaded for shipment into a sea-land container, and at 0.5 grams per liter, could not be


in 10 CFR 71.53 and 49 CFR 173.453. The presence of beryllium
demonstrated to provide adequate nuclear criticality safety. Because the current regulations


in significant
would allow the possibility of criticality in fissile exempt shipments, and since there is no


quantities
assurance that such shipments will not occur, NRC intends to revise 10 CFR Part 71 to address


in NRC-regulated
exclusion of beryllium and other special moderating material (e.g., deuterium and graphite) in the


fissile exempt shipments
shipment of fissile materials, and to limit the amount of fissile exempt material that can be


is extraordinary, and was not considered
transported in a single consignment.


in the development
NRC has contacted the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the DOT on this issue. DOE is a


of the fissile exemptions
shipper of fissile material, which could include the special moderating materials in question.


in the regulations.
NRC and DOT are coordinating the revisions to their respective regulations.


NRC has reviewed and verified the licensee's
NRC notes that very few licensees are involved in the shipment of fissile materials with beryllium, graphite, or deuterium. However, for those licensees that are involved in such shipments, it is


calculations, and has concluded
important that programs be assessed to ensure that adequate criticality safety is provided where


that the current regulations
fissile materials are transported with materials known or expected to have moderating properties


need to be revised to preclude criticality
greater than water. As demonstrated by the licensee in this case, the existing fissile material


in fissile exempt shipments
exemptions cannot be presumed, without independent analysis, to preclude nuclear criticality in


made under 10 CFR 71.53, and fissile shipments
all cases.


made underthe general licenses in 10 CFR 71.18 and 10 CFR 71.22. This information
I)                                    :K,)
                                                                              IN 96-63 December 5, 1996 This information notice requires no specific action nor written response. If you have any


notice is being issued to provide additional, timely notice, to licensees, of this potential
questions about the information in this notice, please contact the individual listed below, or the


safety issue, while the regulatory
appropriate NRC regional office.


revisions
Charles J. Haighney, Actirt Dire


are made.Discussion
Spent Fuel Project Office


The licensee proposed to employ the provision
Office of Nuclear Material Safety


in 10 CFR 71.53(d), or the parallel provision
and Safeguards


in the U.S. Department
Technical contact:      Earl P. Easton, NMSS


of Transportation (DOT) regulations, 49 CFR 173.453(d).
(301) 415-8520
                        e-mail: exe@nrc.gov


J//1 961204021 on jl4Pqt PDR ETE OO~tc 99 IN 96-63 December 5, 1996 Section 71.53(d) exempts fissile material from the requirements
Attachments:
 
1. List of Recently Issued NMSS Information Notices
in 10 CFR 71.55 and 71.59 (i.e., the additional
 
requirements
 
placed on fissile packages and shipments
 
to preclude criticality), provided the package does not contain more than 5 grams (0.18 ounces) of fissile material in any 10-liter (610-cubic-inch)
volume. The fissile exemptions
 
appearing
 
in 10 CFR 71.53 are assumed to provide inherent criticality
 
control for all practical
 
cases in which fissile materials exist at or below the applicable
 
regulatory
 
limits (i.e., independent
 
calculations
 
would generally not be expected nor required).
 
Consequently, the fissile exemptions
 
generally
 
do not place limits on the types of moderating
 
or reflecting
 
material present in fissile exempt packages, nor the number of fissile exempt packages that can be shipped in a single consignment, and do not require that a transport
 
index (see 10 CFR 71.4) be assigned to packages for criticality
 
control.Further, the fissile material exemptions
 
and general license provisions
 
allow any licensee to make shipments
 
without first seeking NRC approval.A fairly realistic
 
computer model of the enriched uranium-beryllium
 
oxide waste packages, as loaded for shipment into a sea-land container, and at 0.5 grams per liter, could not be demonstrated
 
to provide adequate nuclear criticality
 
safety. Because the current regulations
 
would allow the possibility
 
of criticality
 
in fissile exempt shipments, and since there is no assurance


that such shipments
2. List of Recently Issued NRR Information Notices


will not occur, NRC intends to revise 10 CFR Part 71 to address exclusion
o          k')~          Gu              A          7-


of beryllium
Attachment I


and other special moderating
IN 96-63 December 5, 1996 Page 1 of I


material (e.g., deuterium
LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED


and graphite)
NMSS INFORMATION NOTICES
in the shipment of fissile materials, and to limit the amount of fissile exempt material that can be transported


in a single consignment.
Info


NRC has contacted
rmation                                        Date of


the U.S. Department
Notice No.       Subject                      Issuance          Issued to


of Energy (DOE) and the DOT on this issue. DOE is a shipper of fissile material, which could include the special moderating
96-57      Incident-Reporting Require-        10/30/96          All U.S. Nuclear Regulatory


materials
ments Involving Intakes,                              Commission licensees


in question.NRC and DOT are coordinating
During a 24-Hour Period


the revisions
that May Cause a Total


to their respective
Effective Dose Equivalent


regulations.
in Excess of 0.05 Sv (5 rem)
96-54      Vulnerability of Stainless          10117/96          All material licensees


NRC notes that very few licensees
Steel to Corrosion When


are involved in the shipment of fissile materials
Sensitized


with beryllium, graphite, or deuterium.
96-53      Retrofit to Amersham 660            10/15/96          All industrial radiography


However, for those licensees
Posilock Radiography                                  licensees


that are involved in such shipments, it is important
Camera to Correct Incon- sistency in 10 CFR Part 34 Compatibility


that programs be assessed to ensure that adequate criticality
96-52      Cracked Insertion Rods              09/26/96          All U.S. Nuclear Regulatory


safety is provided where fissile materials
on Troxler Model 3400                                Commission portable gauge


are transported
Series Portable Moisture                              licensees and vendors


with materials
Density Gauges


known or expected to have moderating
96-51      Residual Contamination              09/11/96          All material licensees


properties
Remaining in Krypton-85 Handling System After


greater than water. As demonstrated
Venting


by the licensee in this case, the existing fissile material exemptions
96-47      Recordkeeping, Decommis-            08/19196          All U.S. Nuclear Regulatory


cannot be presumed, without independent
sioning Notifications for                            Commission licensees


analysis, to preclude nuclear criticality
Disposals of Radioactive


in all cases.
Waste by Land Burial


I):K,)IN 96-63 December 5, 1996 This information
Authorized Under Former


notice requires no specific action nor written response.
10 CFR 20.304, 20.302, and Current 20.2002


If you have any questions
v>
                                                                        Attachment 2 IN 96-63 December 5, 1996 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED


about the information
NRC INFORMATION NOTICES


in this notice, please contact the individual
Information                                        Date of


listed below, or the appropriate
Notice No.            Subject                      Issuance    Issued to


NRC regional office.Charles J. Haighney, Actirt Dire Spent Fuel Project Office Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards
96-62          Potential Failure of the            11/20/96    All holders of OLs


Technical
Instantaneous Trip Function                      and CPs for nuclear


contact: Earl P. Easton, NMSS (301) 415-8520 e-mail: exe@nrc.gov
of General Electric RMS-9                        power plants


Attachments:
Programmers
1. List of Recently Issued NMSS Information


Notices 2. List of Recently Issued NRR Information
96-61          Failure of a Main Steam Safety      11/20/96    All holders of OLs or


Notices o k')~ Gu A 7- Attachment
Valve to Reseat Caused by an                    CPs for nuclear power


I IN 96-63 December 5, 1996 Page 1 of I LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED NMSS INFORMATION
Improperly Installed Release                    reactors


NOTICES Info rmation Notice No.Date of Issuance Subject Issued to 96-57 96-54 96-53 Incident-Reporting
Nut


Require-ments Involving
96-60          Potential Common-Mode Post-        11/14/96    All holders of OLs or


Intakes, During a 24-Hour Period that May Cause a Total Effective
Accident Failure of Residual                    CPs for nuclear power


===Dose Equivalent===
Heat Removal Heat Exchangers                    reactors
in Excess of 0.05 Sv (5 rem)Vulnerability


of Stainless Steel to Corrosion
96-59          Potential Degradation of           10/30/96    All holders of OLs or


===When Sensitized===
Post Loss-of-Coolant                            CPs for nuclear power
Retrofit to Amersham 660 Posilock Radiography


Camera to Correct Incon-sistency in 10 CFR Part 34 Compatibility
Recirculation Capability                        reactors


Cracked Insertion
as a Result of Debris


Rods on Troxler Model 3400 Series Portable Moisture Density Gauges Residual Contamination
96-58          RCP Seal Replacement with          10/30/96    All holders of OLs or


Remaining
Pump on Backseat                                CPs for pressurized-water


in Krypton-85 Handling System After Venting Recordkeeping, Decommis-sioning Notifications
reactors


for Disposals
96-57          Incident-Reporting Require-        10/29/96    All U.S. Nuclear


of Radioactive
ments Involving Intakes,                        Regulatory Commission


Waste by Land Burial Authorized
During a 24-Hour Period                          licensees


Under Former 10 CFR 20.304, 20.302, and Current 20.2002 10/30/96 10117/96 10/15/96 09/26/96 09/11/96 08/19196 All U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
That May Cause a Total


Commission
Effective Dose Equivalent


licensees All material licensees All industrial
in Excess of 0.05 Sv


radiography
(5 rems)
OL = Operating License


licensees All U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
CP = Construction Permit


Commission
IN 96-63 K>                                            v2    December 5, 1996 This information notice requires no specific action nor written response. If you have any


portable gauge licensees
questions about the information in this notice, please contact the individual listed below, or the


and vendors All material licensees All U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
appropriate NRC regional office.


Commission
ChaSes J.Haugfey


licensees 96-52 96-51 96-47 v>Attachment
Charles J. Haughney, Acting Director


2 IN 96-63 December 5, 1996 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED NRC INFORMATION
Spent Fuel Project Office


NOTICES Information
Office of Nuclear Material Safety


Date of Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to 96-62 96-61 96-60 96-59 96-58 Potential
and Safeguards


Failure of the Instantaneous
Technical contact:      Earl P. Easton, NMSS


Trip Function of General Electric RMS-9 Programmers
(301) 415-8520
 
                              e-mail: exeenrc.gov
Failure of a Main Steam Safety Valve to Reseat Caused by an Improperly
 
Installed
 
Release Nut Potential
 
Common-Mode
 
Post-Accident Failure of Residual Heat Removal Heat Exchangers
 
Potential
 
Degradation
 
of Post Loss-of-Coolant
 
Recirculation
 
Capability
 
as a Result of Debris RCP Seal Replacement
 
with Pump on Backseat Incident-Reporting
 
Require-ments Involving
 
Intakes, During a 24-Hour Period That May Cause a Total Effective
 
===Dose Equivalent===
in Excess of 0.05 Sv (5 rems)11/20/96 11/20/96 11/14/96 10/30/96 10/30/96 10/29/96 All holders of OLs and CPs for nuclear power plants All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors All holders of OLs or CPs for pressurized-water
 
reactors All U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
 
Commission
 
licensees 96-57 OL = Operating
 
License CP = Construction
 
Permit
 
K>IN 96-63 v2 December 5, 1996 This information
 
notice requires no specific action nor written response.
 
If you have any questions
 
about the information
 
in this notice, please contact the individual
 
listed below, or the appropriate
 
NRC regional office.ChaSes J. Haugfey Charles J. Haughney, Acting Director Spent Fuel Project Office Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards
 
Technical
 
contact: Earl P. Easton, NMSS (301) 415-8520 e-mail: exeenrc.gov


Attachments:
Attachments:
1. List of Recently Issued NMSS Information
      1. List of Recently Issued NMSS Information Notices
 
Notices 2. List of Recently Issued NRR Information


Notices 96-63.IN*See Previous Concurrence.
2. List of Recently Issued NRR Information Notices


OFC SFPO* I c SFPO* l c SFPO* I c NRR/OECB*
96-63.IN                              *See Previous Concurrence.
I c OGC* lc TEditor I NAME RLewis:LMG


EEaston SShankman
OFC        SFPO*      Ic  SFPO*    l c    SFPO* I c      NRR/OECB*      I c    OGC*    lc    TEditor I


AEChaffee
NAME      RLewis:LMG        EEaston        SShankman          AEChaffee           ENJenson          EKraus*
DATE        10/10/96        10/10/96        10/10/96            10/10/96            11/25/96        11/25/96 OFC    lIMOB      lI    SFP          t                I    l-            I                  I


ENJenson EKraus*DATE 10/10/96 10/10/96 10/10/96 10/10/96 11/25/96 11/25/96 OFC lIMOB l I SFP t I I l- I NAME KRamsey CJH_ ney DATE 1/27/96 W215196 Ia; v4 i _ _C_ CO E E CO E N L S R O C C =COVER E = COVER & ENCLOSURE N = NE) CQPT
NAME     KRamsey         CJH_ ney


IN 96-##KJ i2 October ##, 1996 present in fissile exempt packages, nor the number of fissile exempt packages that can be shipped in a single consignment, and do not require that a transport
DATE      1/27/96         W215196                                                  Ia;v4        i            _ _
                                                        N L S R


index (see 10 CFR 71.4) be assigned to packages for criticality
CO E & ENCLOSURE                              OC


control. Further, the fissile material exemptions
C_  CO


and general license provisions
C =COVER  E                        EE= COVER                                  N = NE) CQPT


allow any licensee to make shipments
IN 96-##
                                KJ                                          i2    October ##, 1996 present in fissile exempt packages, nor the number of fissile exempt packages that can be


without first seeking NRC approval.A fairly realistic
shipped in a single consignment, and do not require that a transport index (see 10
      CFR 71.4) be assigned to packages for criticality control. Further, the fissile material


computer model of the enriched uranium-beryllium
exemptions and general license provisions allow any licensee to make shipments without


oxide waste packages, as loaded for shipment into a sea-land container, and at 0.5 grams per liter, could not be demonstrated
first seeking NRC approval.


to provide adequate nuclear criticality
A fairly realistic computer model of the enriched uranium-beryllium oxide waste packages, as loaded for shipment into a sea-land container, and at 0.5 grams per liter, could not be


safety. Because the current regulations
demonstrated to provide adequate nuclear criticality safety. Because the current


would allow the possibility
regulations would allow the possibility of criticality in fissile exempt shipments, and since


of criticality
there is no assurance that such shipments will not occur, NRC intends to revise 10
      CFR Part 71 to address exclusion of beryllium and other special moderating material (e.g.,
      deuterium and graphite) in the shipment of fissile materials, and to limit the amount of


in fissile exempt shipments, and since there is no assurance
fissile exempt material that can be transported in a single consignment.


that such shipments
NRC has contacted the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the DOT on this issue. DOE


will not occur, NRC intends to revise 10 CFR Part 71 to address exclusion
is a shipper of fissile material, which could include the special moderating materials in


of beryllium
question. NRC and DOT are coordinating the revisions to their respective regulations.


and other special moderating
NRC notes that very few licensees are involved in the shipment of fissile materials-with


material (e.g., deuterium
beryllium, graphite, or deuterium. However, for those licensees that are involved in such


and graphite)
shipments, it is important that programs be assessed to ensure that adequate criticality
in the shipment of fissile materials, and to limit the amount of fissile exempt material that can be transported


in a single consignment.
safety is provided where fissile materials are transported with materials known or expected


NRC has contacted
to have moderating properties greater than water. As demonstrated by the licensee in this


the U.S. Department
case, the existing fissile material exemptions cannot be presumed, without independent


of Energy (DOE) and the DOT on this issue. DOE is a shipper of fissile material, which could include the special moderating
analysis, to preclude nuclear criticality in all cases.


materials
This information notice requires no specific action nor written response. If you have any


in question.
questions about the information in this notice, please contact the individual listed below, or


NRC and DOT are coordinating
the appropriate NRC regional office.


the revisions
Charles J. Haughney, Acting Director


to their respective
Spent Fuel Project Office


regulations.
Office of Nuclear Material Safety


NRC notes that very few licensees
and Safeguards
 
are involved in the shipment of fissile materials-with
 
beryllium, graphite, or deuterium.
 
However, for those licensees
 
that are involved in such shipments, it is important
 
that programs be assessed to ensure that adequate criticality
 
safety is provided where fissile materials
 
are transported
 
with materials
 
known or expected to have moderating
 
properties
 
greater than water. As demonstrated
 
by the licensee in this case, the existing fissile material exemptions
 
cannot be presumed, without independent
 
analysis, to preclude nuclear criticality
 
in all cases.This information
 
notice requires no specific action nor written response.
 
If you have any questions
 
about the information
 
in this notice, please contact the individual
 
listed below, or the appropriate
 
NRC regional office.Charles J. Haughney, Acting Director Spent Fuel Project Office Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards


Attachments:
Attachments:
1. List of Recently Issued NMSS Information
        1.     List of Recently Issued NMSS Information Notices
 
Notices 2. List of Recently Issued NRR Information
 
Notices Contact: Earl P. Easton, NMSS (301) 415-8520 e-mail: exe@nrc.gov
 
S:WPROJRXL1FIZ.IN
 
See Previous Concurrence.
 
OFC SFPON* c SFPO l c SFPO
 
* c NRR/OECBh*
I c OGCN lc TEditor I NAME RLewis:LMG
 
EEaston SShankman
 
AEChaffee
 
ENJenson EKraus *DATE I 10/10/96 I 10/10/96 I 10/10/96 I 10/10/96 1 11/25/96 1 11/25/96 I--OFC IMOB I SFP lL,/ I l _NAME KRamseyeK
 
CJHa_ _ _DATE 1I9 196 12- ?79 _6 _,,___. __ _ ________C -COVER E = COVER & LNULUbUKIt
 
N = Nu iurO
 
>-considerations


and shipping experience
2.      List of Recently Issued NRR Information Notices


indicate that the criticality
Contact:        Earl P. Easton, NMSS


of fissile exempt packages is not an immediate
(301) 415-8520
                        e-mail: exe@nrc.gov


threat to worker and public health and safety, the possibility
S:WPROJRXL1FIZ.IN                          See Previous Concurrence.


of criticality
OFC        SFPON*      c    SFPO      l c  SFPO *    c  NRR/OECBh*    I c    OGCN    lc    TEditor I


in fissile exempt shipments
NAME        RLewis:LMG        EEaston        SShankman        AEChaffee            ENJenson      EKraus *
DATE    I 10/10/96 I 10/10/96      I--
                                            I 10/10/96 I      10/10/96        1 11/25/96      1 11/25/96 OFC        IMOB      I      SFP                          I        l              _        lL,/
NAME      KRamseyeK CJHa_                            _      _
DATE      1I9 196        12- ?79            _6                                _,,___.    __  _ ________
    C - COVER                            E = COVER & LNULUbUKIt                N = Nu iurO


has prompted NRC to revise 10 CFR Part 71, to address the possible inclusion
>-
        considerations and shipping experience indicate that the criticality of fissile exempt


of beryllium
packages is not an immediate threat to worker and public health and safety, the possibility


and other special moderating
of criticality in fissile exempt shipments has prompted NRC to revise 10 CFR Part 71, to


material (e.g., deuterium
address the possible inclusion of beryllium and other special moderating material (e.g.,
        deuterium and graphite) in the shipment of fissile materials, and to limit the amount of


and graphite)
fissile exempt material which can be transported in a single consignment.
in the shipment of fissile materials, and to limit the amount of fissile exempt material which can be transported


in a single consignment.
NRC staff has also contacted the Department of Transportation (DOT) on this issue, as


NRC staff has also contacted
DOT regulations contain a parallel provision to 10 CFR 71.53 (i.e., 49 CFR 173.453).


the Department
NRC and DOT are coordinating the revisions to their respective regulations.


of Transportation (DOT) on this issue, as DOT regulations
In practice, operating and administrative limits and procedures should prevent the


contain a parallel provision
collection of fissile materials in amounts or geometries which could achieve criticality as a


to 10 CFR 71.53 (i.e., 49 CFR 173.453).NRC and DOT are coordinating
result of any single change in the conditions necessary for criticality safety. Nevertheless, NRC notes that until the expedited regulatory revisions are made, good practice would be


the revisions
for licensees to exercise caution in deciding whether to ship: (1) fissile materials with


to their respective
materials known or expected to have moderating properties greater than water; or (2)
        single consignments of fissile exempt packages in excess of 290 grams of uranium-235 or


regulations.
180 grams of other fissile radionuclides. As demonstrated by the licensee in this case, the


In practice, operating
existing fissile material exemptions cannot be presumed, without independent analysis, to


and administrative
preclude nuclear criticality in all cases.


limits and procedures
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If you have any


should prevent the collection
questions about the information in this notice, please contact the technical contact listed


of fissile materials
below, or the appropriate NRC Regional Office.


in amounts or geometries
William D. Travers, Director


which could achieve criticality
Spent Fuel Project Office


as a result of any single change in the conditions
Office of Nuclear Material Safety


necessary
and Safeguards
 
for criticality
 
safety. Nevertheless, NRC notes that until the expedited
 
regulatory
 
revisions
 
are made, good practice would be for licensees
 
to exercise caution in deciding whether to ship: (1) fissile materials
 
with materials
 
known or expected to have moderating
 
properties
 
greater than water; or (2)single consignments
 
of fissile exempt packages in excess of 290 grams of uranium-235 or 180 grams of other fissile radionuclides.
 
As demonstrated
 
by the licensee in this case, the existing fissile material exemptions
 
cannot be presumed, without independent
 
analysis, to preclude nuclear criticality
 
in all cases.This information
 
notice requires no specific action or written response.
 
If you have any questions
 
about the information
 
in this notice, please contact the technical
 
contact listed below, or the appropriate
 
NRC Regional Office.William D. Travers, Director Spent Fuel Project Office Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards


Attachments:
Attachments:
1. List of Recently Issued NMSS Information
        1.       List of Recently Issued NMSS Information Notices
 
Notices 2. List of Recently Issued NRR Information
 
Notices Contact: Earl P. Easton, NMSS (301) 415-8527 S:IPROJIRXLFIZ.IN
 
See Previous Concurrence.
 
OFC lSFPO l -SFPO l f-0 e-O NRR/OECB l OGC l TEDITOR I NAME RLeg -sAG EEas aman b affee WReamer EKraus lATVS I J.JIIAIg -I -&.10 & I 0 I la;: I a lIda I I , -I I /on LO#% IV. I(V U l TO'I 1J1_IU 1 v IU Iva % I I I Ef %I OFC DWM I IMOB l SFPO I SFP NAME RJohnson KRamsey CJHaughney
 
WDTravers DATE I/ /96 / /96 / /96 I /96 l C = COVER E = COVER & ENCLOSURE
 
N = NO COPY 2 IN 96-##/ H October ##, 1996 shipped in a single consignment, and do not require that a transport
 
index (see §71.4) be assigned to packages for criticality
 
control. Further, the fissile material exemptions
 
and general license provisions
 
allow any licensee to make shipments


without first seeking NRC approval.A fairly realistic
2.       List of Recently Issued NRR Information Notices


computer model of the enriched uranium-beryllium
Contact:            Earl P. Easton, NMSS


oxide waste packages, as loaded for shipment into a sea-land container, and at 0.5 grams per liter, could not be demonstrated
(301) 415-8527 S:IPROJIRXLFIZ.IN                                  See Previous Concurrence.


to provide adequate nuclear criticality
OFC      lSFPO          l    -    SFPO l          f-0    e-O    NRR/OECB l          OGC l          TEDITOR I


safety. Because the current regulations
NAME        RLeg  -sAG                EEas            aman          b      affee      WReamer          EKraus


would allow the possibility
lATVS


of criticality
LO#% IV.


in fissile exempt shipments, and since there is no assurance
I  J.JIIAIgU


that such shipments
I(V


will not occur, NRC intends to revise 10 CFR Part 71, to address exclusion
-    ITO'I- l  &.10
                                              &  I I 0 la;:      I


of beryllium
1J1_IUa 1lIdav    IIU I ,
                                                                                            Iva %
                                                                                                  -  II    I


and other special moderating
I I/on


material (e.g., deuterium
Ef %I


and graphite)
OFC        DWM        I          IMOB        l    SFPO        I        SFP
in the shipment of fissile materials, and to limit the amount of fissile exempt material which can be transported


in a single consignment.
NAME        RJohnson              KRamsey          CJHaughney          WDTravers


NRC staff has contacted
DATE        I/ /96                    /  /96          / /96                I /96                                    l


the U.S. Department
C = COVER                                  E = COVER & ENCLOSURE                          N = NO COPY


of Energy (DOE) and the DOT on this issue.DOE is a shipper of fissile material, which could include the special moderating
2


materials
IN 96-##
                                                                        /H        October ##, 1996 shipped in a single consignment, and do not require that a transport index (see §71.4) be


in question.
assigned to packages for criticality control. Further, the fissile material exemptions and


NRC and DOT are coordinating
general license provisions allow any licensee to make shipments without first seeking NRC


the revisions
approval.


to their respective
A fairly realistic computer model of the enriched uranium-beryllium oxide waste packages, as loaded for shipment into a sea-land container, and at 0.5 grams per liter, could not be


regulations.
demonstrated to provide adequate nuclear criticality safety. Because the current


NRC notes very few licensees
regulations would allow the possibility of criticality in fissile exempt shipments, and since


are involved in the shipment of fissile materials
there is no assurance that such shipments will not occur, NRC intends to revise


with beryllium, graphite, or deuterium.
10 CFR Part 71, to address exclusion of beryllium and other special moderating material


However, for those licensees
(e.g., deuterium and graphite) in the shipment of fissile materials, and to limit the amount


that are involved in such shipments, it is important
of fissile exempt material which can be transported in a single consignment.


that programs be assessed to ensure that adequate criticality
NRC staff has contacted the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the DOT on this issue.


safety is provided where fissile materials
DOE is a shipper of fissile material, which could include the special moderating materials in


are transported
question. NRC and DOT are coordinating the revisions to their respective regulations.


with materials
NRC notes very few licensees are involved in the shipment of fissile materials with


known or expected to have moderating
beryllium, graphite, or deuterium. However, for those licensees that are involved in such


properties
shipments, it is important that programs be assessed to ensure that adequate criticality


greater than water. As demonstrated
safety is provided where fissile materials are transported with materials known or expected


by the licensee in this case, the existing fissile material exemptions
to have moderating properties greater than water. As demonstrated by the licensee in this


cannot be presumed, without independent
case, the existing fissile material exemptions cannot be presumed, without independent


analysis, to preclude nuclear criticality
analysis, to preclude nuclear criticality in all cases.


in all cases.This information
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If you have any


notice requires no specific action or written response.
questions about the information in this notice, please contact the individual listed below, or


If you have any questions
the appropriate NRC Regional Office.


about the information
Charles J. Haughney, Acting Director


in this notice, please contact the individual
Spent Fuel Project Office


listed below, or the appropriate
Office of Nuclear Material Safety


NRC Regional Office.Charles J. Haughney, Acting Director Spent Fuel Project Office Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards
and Safeguards


Attachments:
Attachments:
1. List of Recently Issued NMSS Information
      1.       List of Recently Issued NMSS Information Notices
 
Notices 2. List of Recently Issued NRR Information


Notices Contact: Earl P. Easton, NMSS (301) 415-8520 e-mail: exe@nrc.gov
2.      List of Recently Issued NRR Information Notices


S:IPROJIRXLIFIZ.IN
Contact:         Earl P. Easton, NMSS


*See Previous Concurrence.
(301) 415-8520
                      e-mail: exe@nrc.gov


OPP3 OFC SFPO* I c SFPO* lc SFPO* I c NRR/OECB*  
S:IPROJIRXLIFIZ.IN                            *See Previous Concurrence.                    OPP3 OFC       SFPO*       Ic    SFPO*   lc SFPO* I c       NRR/OECB*     I c   OG               TE TOR I
I c OG TE TOR I NAME RLewis:LMG


EEaston SShankman
NAME    RLewis:LMG            EEaston   SShankman           AEChaffee        _____enson            EKraus


AEChaffee
DATE  I    /196                / /96      1  1/96            I/196        1      196          I  /196


_____enson
===OFC      DWM        I      IMOB      l        I===
                                              FlO        Sl      FPO        I                  jI


EKraus DATE I /196 / /96 1 1/96 I /196 1 196 I /196 OFC DWM I IMOB l FlO I Sl FPO I jI NAME RJohnson KRamsey CJHaughney
NAME     RJohnson           KRamsey         CJHaughney       WDTravers


WDTravers DATE I/ /96 I /96 1 /196 / /96 J .I.. ==_C = COVER E = COVER & ENCLOSURE N = NU COPlY}}
DATE I/       /96             I /96       1   /196             / /96       J                 . I..       ==_
    C = COVER                           E = COVER & ENCLOSURE                           N = NU COPlY}}


{{Information notice-Nav}}
{{Information notice-Nav}}

Latest revision as of 04:40, 24 November 2019

Potential Safety Issue Regarding the Shipment of Fissile Material
ML031050508
Person / Time
Site: Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant  Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 12/06/1996
From: Haughney C
NRC/NMSS/SFPO
To:
References
IN-96-063, NUDOCS 9612040215
Download: ML031050508 (9)


K) JIM MCKNIGHT

UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY AND SAFEGUARDS

WASHINGTON, DC 20555 December 5, 1996 NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 96-63: POTENTIAL SAFETY ISSUE REGARDING THE

SHIPMENT OF FISSILE MATERIAL

Addressees

All U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission licensees authorized to possess special nuclear

material in unsealed quantities greater than a critical mass.

Purpose

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information notice to alert

addressees to an issue with potential safety significance regarding shipments using the fissile

material exemption provisions and general licenses. It is expected that recipients will review this

information for applicability to their facilities and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar

problems. However, suggestions contained in this information notice are not NRC requirements;

therefore, no specific action nor written response is required.

Description of Circumstances

An NRC licensee recently informed NRC of a potential situation where one of the fissile material

exemptions in 10 CFR 71.53 would not have provided adequate criticality safety if large amounts

of an exempt concentration of fissile material were to be transported in the presence of a special

moderating material (i.e., beryllium). A recent contract was awarded to the licensee to process

weapons-usable enriched uranium materials. The waste product, a uranium-beryllium filtercake, met the fissile exemption provisions in 10 CFR 71.53 and 49 CFR 173.453. The presence of

beryllium in significant quantities in NRC-regulated fissile exempt shipments is extraordinary, and

was not considered in the development of the fissile exemptions in the regulations. NRC has

reviewed and verified the licensee's calculations, and has concluded that the current regulations

need to be revised to preclude criticality in fissile exempt shipments made under 10 CFR 71.53, and fissile shipments made underthe general licenses in 10 CFR 71.18 and 10 CFR 71.22. This

information notice is being issued to provide additional, timely notice, to licensees, of this

potential safety issue, while the regulatory revisions are made.

Discussion

The licensee proposed to employ the provision in 10 CFR 71.53(d), or the parallel provision in the

U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) regulations, 49 CFR 173.453(d).

J//1

961204021 on jl4Pqt

PDR ETE OO~tc 99

IN 96-63 December 5, 1996 Section 71.53(d) exempts fissile material from the requirements in 10 CFR 71.55 and 71.59 (i.e.,

the additional requirements placed on fissile packages and shipments to preclude criticality),

provided the package does not contain more than 5 grams (0.18 ounces) of fissile material in

any 10-liter (610-cubic-inch) volume. The fissile exemptions appearing in 10 CFR 71.53 are

assumed to provide inherent criticality control for all practical cases in which fissile materials

exist at or below the applicable regulatory limits (i.e., independent calculations would generally

not be expected nor required). Consequently, the fissile exemptions generally do not place limits

on the types of moderating or reflecting material present in fissile exempt packages, nor the

number of fissile exempt packages that can be shipped in a single consignment, and do not

require that a transport index (see 10 CFR 71.4) be assigned to packages for criticality control.

Further, the fissile material exemptions and general license provisions allow any licensee to

make shipments without first seeking NRC approval.

A fairly realistic computer model of the enriched uranium-beryllium oxide waste packages, as

loaded for shipment into a sea-land container, and at 0.5 grams per liter, could not be

demonstrated to provide adequate nuclear criticality safety. Because the current regulations

would allow the possibility of criticality in fissile exempt shipments, and since there is no

assurance that such shipments will not occur, NRC intends to revise 10 CFR Part 71 to address

exclusion of beryllium and other special moderating material (e.g., deuterium and graphite) in the

shipment of fissile materials, and to limit the amount of fissile exempt material that can be

transported in a single consignment.

NRC has contacted the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the DOT on this issue. DOE is a

shipper of fissile material, which could include the special moderating materials in question.

NRC and DOT are coordinating the revisions to their respective regulations.

NRC notes that very few licensees are involved in the shipment of fissile materials with beryllium, graphite, or deuterium. However, for those licensees that are involved in such shipments, it is

important that programs be assessed to ensure that adequate criticality safety is provided where

fissile materials are transported with materials known or expected to have moderating properties

greater than water. As demonstrated by the licensee in this case, the existing fissile material

exemptions cannot be presumed, without independent analysis, to preclude nuclear criticality in

all cases.

I) :K,)

IN 96-63 December 5, 1996 This information notice requires no specific action nor written response. If you have any

questions about the information in this notice, please contact the individual listed below, or the

appropriate NRC regional office.

Charles J. Haighney, Actirt Dire

Spent Fuel Project Office

Office of Nuclear Material Safety

and Safeguards

Technical contact: Earl P. Easton, NMSS

(301) 415-8520

e-mail: exe@nrc.gov

Attachments:

1. List of Recently Issued NMSS Information Notices

2. List of Recently Issued NRR Information Notices

o k')~ Gu A 7-

Attachment I

IN 96-63 December 5, 1996 Page 1 of I

LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED

NMSS INFORMATION NOTICES

Info

rmation Date of

Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to

96-57 Incident-Reporting Require- 10/30/96 All U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

ments Involving Intakes, Commission licensees

During a 24-Hour Period

that May Cause a Total

Effective Dose Equivalent

in Excess of 0.05 Sv (5 rem)

96-54 Vulnerability of Stainless 10117/96 All material licensees

Steel to Corrosion When

Sensitized

96-53 Retrofit to Amersham 660 10/15/96 All industrial radiography

Posilock Radiography licensees

Camera to Correct Incon- sistency in 10 CFR Part 34 Compatibility

96-52 Cracked Insertion Rods 09/26/96 All U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

on Troxler Model 3400 Commission portable gauge

Series Portable Moisture licensees and vendors

Density Gauges

96-51 Residual Contamination 09/11/96 All material licensees

Remaining in Krypton-85 Handling System After

Venting

96-47 Recordkeeping, Decommis- 08/19196 All U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

sioning Notifications for Commission licensees

Disposals of Radioactive

Waste by Land Burial

Authorized Under Former

10 CFR 20.304, 20.302, and Current 20.2002

v>

Attachment 2 IN 96-63 December 5, 1996 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED

NRC INFORMATION NOTICES

Information Date of

Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to

96-62 Potential Failure of the 11/20/96 All holders of OLs

Instantaneous Trip Function and CPs for nuclear

of General Electric RMS-9 power plants

Programmers

96-61 Failure of a Main Steam Safety 11/20/96 All holders of OLs or

Valve to Reseat Caused by an CPs for nuclear power

Improperly Installed Release reactors

Nut

96-60 Potential Common-Mode Post- 11/14/96 All holders of OLs or

Accident Failure of Residual CPs for nuclear power

Heat Removal Heat Exchangers reactors

96-59 Potential Degradation of 10/30/96 All holders of OLs or

Post Loss-of-Coolant CPs for nuclear power

Recirculation Capability reactors

as a Result of Debris

96-58 RCP Seal Replacement with 10/30/96 All holders of OLs or

Pump on Backseat CPs for pressurized-water

reactors

96-57 Incident-Reporting Require- 10/29/96 All U.S. Nuclear

ments Involving Intakes, Regulatory Commission

During a 24-Hour Period licensees

That May Cause a Total

Effective Dose Equivalent

in Excess of 0.05 Sv

(5 rems)

OL = Operating License

CP = Construction Permit

IN 96-63 K> v2 December 5, 1996 This information notice requires no specific action nor written response. If you have any

questions about the information in this notice, please contact the individual listed below, or the

appropriate NRC regional office.

ChaSes J.Haugfey

Charles J. Haughney, Acting Director

Spent Fuel Project Office

Office of Nuclear Material Safety

and Safeguards

Technical contact: Earl P. Easton, NMSS

(301) 415-8520

e-mail: exeenrc.gov

Attachments:

1. List of Recently Issued NMSS Information Notices

2. List of Recently Issued NRR Information Notices

96-63.IN *See Previous Concurrence.

OFC SFPO* Ic SFPO* l c SFPO* I c NRR/OECB* I c OGC* lc TEditor I

NAME RLewis:LMG EEaston SShankman AEChaffee ENJenson EKraus*

DATE 10/10/96 10/10/96 10/10/96 10/10/96 11/25/96 11/25/96 OFC lIMOB lI SFP t I l- I I

NAME KRamsey CJH_ ney

DATE 1/27/96 W215196 Ia;v4 i _ _

N L S R

CO E & ENCLOSURE OC

C_ CO

C =COVER E EE= COVER N = NE) CQPT

IN 96-##

KJ i2 October ##, 1996 present in fissile exempt packages, nor the number of fissile exempt packages that can be

shipped in a single consignment, and do not require that a transport index (see 10

CFR 71.4) be assigned to packages for criticality control. Further, the fissile material

exemptions and general license provisions allow any licensee to make shipments without

first seeking NRC approval.

A fairly realistic computer model of the enriched uranium-beryllium oxide waste packages, as loaded for shipment into a sea-land container, and at 0.5 grams per liter, could not be

demonstrated to provide adequate nuclear criticality safety. Because the current

regulations would allow the possibility of criticality in fissile exempt shipments, and since

there is no assurance that such shipments will not occur, NRC intends to revise 10

CFR Part 71 to address exclusion of beryllium and other special moderating material (e.g.,

deuterium and graphite) in the shipment of fissile materials, and to limit the amount of

fissile exempt material that can be transported in a single consignment.

NRC has contacted the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the DOT on this issue. DOE

is a shipper of fissile material, which could include the special moderating materials in

question. NRC and DOT are coordinating the revisions to their respective regulations.

NRC notes that very few licensees are involved in the shipment of fissile materials-with

beryllium, graphite, or deuterium. However, for those licensees that are involved in such

shipments, it is important that programs be assessed to ensure that adequate criticality

safety is provided where fissile materials are transported with materials known or expected

to have moderating properties greater than water. As demonstrated by the licensee in this

case, the existing fissile material exemptions cannot be presumed, without independent

analysis, to preclude nuclear criticality in all cases.

This information notice requires no specific action nor written response. If you have any

questions about the information in this notice, please contact the individual listed below, or

the appropriate NRC regional office.

Charles J. Haughney, Acting Director

Spent Fuel Project Office

Office of Nuclear Material Safety

and Safeguards

Attachments:

1. List of Recently Issued NMSS Information Notices

2. List of Recently Issued NRR Information Notices

Contact: Earl P. Easton, NMSS

(301) 415-8520

e-mail: exe@nrc.gov

S:WPROJRXL1FIZ.IN See Previous Concurrence.

OFC SFPON* c SFPO l c SFPO * c NRR/OECBh* I c OGCN lc TEditor I

NAME RLewis:LMG EEaston SShankman AEChaffee ENJenson EKraus *

DATE I 10/10/96 I 10/10/96 I--

I 10/10/96 I 10/10/96 1 11/25/96 1 11/25/96 OFC IMOB I SFP I l _ lL,/

NAME KRamseyeK CJHa_ _ _

DATE 1I9 196 12- ?79 _6 _,,___. __ _ ________

C - COVER E = COVER & LNULUbUKIt N = Nu iurO

>-

considerations and shipping experience indicate that the criticality of fissile exempt

packages is not an immediate threat to worker and public health and safety, the possibility

of criticality in fissile exempt shipments has prompted NRC to revise 10 CFR Part 71, to

address the possible inclusion of beryllium and other special moderating material (e.g.,

deuterium and graphite) in the shipment of fissile materials, and to limit the amount of

fissile exempt material which can be transported in a single consignment.

NRC staff has also contacted the Department of Transportation (DOT) on this issue, as

DOT regulations contain a parallel provision to 10 CFR 71.53 (i.e., 49 CFR 173.453).

NRC and DOT are coordinating the revisions to their respective regulations.

In practice, operating and administrative limits and procedures should prevent the

collection of fissile materials in amounts or geometries which could achieve criticality as a

result of any single change in the conditions necessary for criticality safety. Nevertheless, NRC notes that until the expedited regulatory revisions are made, good practice would be

for licensees to exercise caution in deciding whether to ship: (1) fissile materials with

materials known or expected to have moderating properties greater than water; or (2)

single consignments of fissile exempt packages in excess of 290 grams of uranium-235 or

180 grams of other fissile radionuclides. As demonstrated by the licensee in this case, the

existing fissile material exemptions cannot be presumed, without independent analysis, to

preclude nuclear criticality in all cases.

This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If you have any

questions about the information in this notice, please contact the technical contact listed

below, or the appropriate NRC Regional Office.

William D. Travers, Director

Spent Fuel Project Office

Office of Nuclear Material Safety

and Safeguards

Attachments:

1. List of Recently Issued NMSS Information Notices

2. List of Recently Issued NRR Information Notices

Contact: Earl P. Easton, NMSS

(301) 415-8527 S:IPROJIRXLFIZ.IN See Previous Concurrence.

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IN 96-##

/H October ##, 1996 shipped in a single consignment, and do not require that a transport index (see §71.4) be

assigned to packages for criticality control. Further, the fissile material exemptions and

general license provisions allow any licensee to make shipments without first seeking NRC

approval.

A fairly realistic computer model of the enriched uranium-beryllium oxide waste packages, as loaded for shipment into a sea-land container, and at 0.5 grams per liter, could not be

demonstrated to provide adequate nuclear criticality safety. Because the current

regulations would allow the possibility of criticality in fissile exempt shipments, and since

there is no assurance that such shipments will not occur, NRC intends to revise

10 CFR Part 71, to address exclusion of beryllium and other special moderating material

(e.g., deuterium and graphite) in the shipment of fissile materials, and to limit the amount

of fissile exempt material which can be transported in a single consignment.

NRC staff has contacted the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the DOT on this issue.

DOE is a shipper of fissile material, which could include the special moderating materials in

question. NRC and DOT are coordinating the revisions to their respective regulations.

NRC notes very few licensees are involved in the shipment of fissile materials with

beryllium, graphite, or deuterium. However, for those licensees that are involved in such

shipments, it is important that programs be assessed to ensure that adequate criticality

safety is provided where fissile materials are transported with materials known or expected

to have moderating properties greater than water. As demonstrated by the licensee in this

case, the existing fissile material exemptions cannot be presumed, without independent

analysis, to preclude nuclear criticality in all cases.

This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If you have any

questions about the information in this notice, please contact the individual listed below, or

the appropriate NRC Regional Office.

Charles J. Haughney, Acting Director

Spent Fuel Project Office

Office of Nuclear Material Safety

and Safeguards

Attachments:

1. List of Recently Issued NMSS Information Notices

2. List of Recently Issued NRR Information Notices

Contact: Earl P. Easton, NMSS

(301) 415-8520

e-mail: exe@nrc.gov

S:IPROJIRXLIFIZ.IN *See Previous Concurrence. OPP3 OFC SFPO* Ic SFPO* lc SFPO* I c NRR/OECB* I c OG TE TOR I

NAME RLewis:LMG EEaston SShankman AEChaffee _____enson EKraus

DATE I /196 / /96 1 1/96 I/196 1 196 I /196

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NAME RJohnson KRamsey CJHaughney WDTravers

DATE I/ /96 I /96 1 /196 / /96 J . I.. ==_

C = COVER E = COVER & ENCLOSURE N = NU COPlY