IR 05000458/2011006: Difference between revisions

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{{Adams
{{Adams
| number = ML111741385
| number = ML112430218
| issue date = 06/23/2011
| issue date = 08/31/2011
| title = IR 05000458-11-006, on April 25 Through May 12, 2011, River Bend Station, Biennial Baseline Inspection of the Identification and Resolution of Problems, Identification and Resolution
| title = Redacted Version of Non-concurrence - River Bend Station - NRC Problem Identification and Resolution Inspection Report 05000458/2011006
| author name = Hay M
| author name = Barrett A
| author affiliation = NRC/RGN-IV/DRS
| author affiliation = NRC/RGN-IV
| addressee name = Olson E W
| addressee name =  
| addressee affiliation = Entergy Operations, Inc
| addressee affiliation =  
| docket = 05000458
| docket = 05000458
| license number = NPF-047
| license number =  
| contact person =  
| contact person =  
| document report number = IR-11-006
| document report number = IR-11-006
| document type = Inspection Report, Letter
| document type = Non-Concurrence Process
| page count = 27
| page count = 5
}}
}}


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=Text=
=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:Mr. Eric Site Vice President Entergy Operations, Inc. River Bend Station 5485 US Highway 61 St Francisville, LA 70775 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REG!ON IV 612 EAST LAMAR BLVD, SUITE 400 ARLINGTON, TEXAS 76011-4125 June 23, 2011
{{#Wiki_filter:NON-CONCURRENCE PACKAGE RIVER BEND STATION - NRC PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND RESOLUTION INSPECTION REPORT 05000458/2011006 August 31,2011 This NCP document is a redacted version to protect personal privacy within the deliberative proces NRC FORM 757        U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION NRCMD101SC NON-CONC SECTION A - -TO BE COMPLETED  .._--_...
BY NON-CONCURRING ...
INDIVIDUAL - - - - ---- TlTLE OF DOCUMENT        *--fAD.h,~A.s ACCESSION ~!O ..
1~,!~,~.'~~.::~:::~_!,:'ynoN -)'lRC Pi&RREPORT 05000458/2011006 uv ...... UtV!r.::I'II I ..;>rV!'1,,::H..Jr\
I ___ .. __ -_~/~. _
I ;:'I"UI~;:'U" I"MUI'lt: I~ JI Michael Hay, Chief, TSB DRS        I 817-276-6527 .,
I-:N-;-;A:7M';-;E""'O;;;-F;::--;-;N-;;O:i:-Ni-c-C"'O:;-;N-;-;C;:;:U';-;R::-;:R:;-;CIN~G;::-;;:IN-;T-DO;-;;IV:-;;I-;:;D;-;UA-;-;L;-------------------------;-;P'iLH~ONE fJ Andrew J. Barrett  _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ... _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ..*....l _ _ _ _ * _ _ _ _ _, - - -_ _ _ . 225-635-3193 I 1-1 DOCUMENTAUTHOR  !;l] DOCUMENT CONTRIBUTOR  o DOCUMENT REVIEWER  o ON CONCURRENCE iORGANIZATION -- -...  -  .. - - - - - -...
TITLE Resident Inspector - River Bend Station
- - - ' - - ...  . . . - - - _....
_ _ _,-I R~~jon iV, Div~~ion of ReactorProjects,!~C_ _ _ __
REASOt~S FOR I~ON-CONCURRENCE During the Biennial Problem Identification and Resolution inspection at River Bend Station, we identified that the licensee had found door sealing deficiencies in the control room envelope. The deficiencies were identified in consecutive performances of the surveillance procedure "Control Room Habitability Assessment," which is performed on an 18 month frequency. The surveillance test procedure satisfies the technical specification 5.5.14 requirements Iu lIluinlain the CRE I boundary in its design condition including configuration control and preventive maintenance. During the performance orthe surveillance in 2008, the licensee documented the following deficiencies for doors cn 116-22 and CB 116-23: "Air Leaks Auj weather strip CR-RBS-2008-0531I WR- J 39913 WR 139914," During the second performance of the lest (note, assessment I procedure performed by a different engineer) in 2010, the licensee documented the following deficiency for door cn 116-22:
"Gap is even, air leaks around door, but is negligible. Wrote CR-RBS-2010-1 148." The work requests and condition report documented in 2008 were closed to a work order, This work order was given a priority of 5 (the lowest priority level) and left unplanned. In 2010, CR-RBS-2010-1148 was closed to the same work order. The inspectors found that over one year later, the work order had yet to be planned, and the issue with the door seals on CB-116-22 had not been fully evaluated. To this day, the licensee has not fully evaluated or addressed the door sealing deficienc NEI 99-03, "Control Room Habitability Assessment," contains the NRC endorsed standards for evaluating deficiencies in control room envelopes to meet the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.197. The following information provided in the appendices of NEI 99-03 detail the standards for detecting deficiencies in the control room envelope:
Appendix H. System Assessment 3.4.4 (page H-7)
Doors in Contra! Room Boundary Door Seals can be a potentiul significant source of in-leakage. Experience has indicated that the door to door frame (sides and top of door) and the noor (bottom of door) can be significant leak locations. The inspection should ensure not only the integrity of the seals, but verify that the door is properly compressing the seal Table H-! Determination of Vulnerability Susceptibl!ity System Component  Determining lnleakage Vulnerabilities Envelope Doors I). Determine that there are no  dcfcct~ in the doors.


SUBJECT: RiVER BEND STATION -NRC PROBLEM IDENTiFICATION AND RESOLUTION INSPECTION REPORT 05000458/2011006
I
          ';jj CONTINUED IN SECTION D Use ADAMS Template NRC-006    PRINTED 0'1 RECYCL::D PAPER


==Dear Mr. Olson,==
NRC FORM 757    U,S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION NRC MO 10.1se PROCESS OF DOCUMENT    iA.DAMSACCESSION N I BEND ST AnON - NRC PI&R REPORT 05000458/2011 B - TO BE COMPLETED BY NON-CONCURRING INDIVIDUAL'S SUPERVISOR
On May 12, 2011, the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed a team inspection at your River Bend Station. The enclosed report documents the inspection findings, as discussed on May 12, 2011, with you and other members of your staff. The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to identification and resolution of problems, safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your operating license. The team reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.
      : N/A (THIS SECTION SHOULD ONLY BE CO~~_LETED ~F SUPERVISOR~S DIFF~~~~"JT THAN .DOCUME_N_:_SPONS~~_.)_ _
II Vince Gaddy fIT-L-E-"-" . - - - - - - - - - . - - - - - -  .- IPHONE NO.


The team also interviewed a representative sample of personnel regarding the condition of your safety conscious work environment.
Branch Chief ORGANllATION---*----------------------------'---** -----
I 817-860-8144 Plant Branch C. Division of Reactor Proiects
--_._------ '---"--- --~'--- --- - - - - - -.. - - - - - - - - - - - 1 COMMENTS FOR THE DOCUMENT SPONSOR TO CONSIDER
,......".,
I HAVE NO COMMENTS rJ LJ I HAVE THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS
    ---------------
i  CONTiNUED iN SECTION 0 PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER


This report documents one self-revealing violation of very low safety significance (Green). This finding was determined to involve a violation of NRC requirements.
NRC FORM 757      U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  I NRC MD 10 ~S8 (3-2009)
NON-CONCURRENCE PROCESS ITITLE OF DOCUMENT RIVEIl!3~.~P'...?TAT10N - NRC Pl&R 05000458120 Ii 006 I,ADAMS ,!.,CCESSION N i
        .. 1.... -. __ ._________--1
    :.---------------.
SECTION 0: CONTINUATION PAGE
    ----------  .'-'
CO~HtNUAT\ON OF SECTIO~,J bll A n L, B [J c t). D,,,,ml,, th" Ih' dooc "", (Ineludlog "'''p') '" 0" ""k,d, ' " oot missing "d hon pcop,'O ). Determine that doors are properly compressed or fitting against the door seal ). Determine that door latches are functioning properly to maintain the door securely close ). Determine that door frames are properly seale Appendix J. Control Room Envelope Sealing Program 3.1 Doors and Door Seals The deDI' should fit properly in the frame, with hinges securely attached. Door sweep should be in continuous contact with the Iloor or threshold for the entire width of the door. The gasket or seal should be an approved type, be [rce of cracks and shuuld form ;j contact seal 3round the entire perimeter uf the dour. The door nlld frnme should be free of breaks or open hOles, With IConclusion:
IThe nonconcurring inspector contends that an additional observation should be included in the report under Section 3, IAssessment. Effectiveness of Corrective Action Program documenting the untimely actions to fully address a deficient condition that could potentially impact tile integrity of the con[rol room envelope:. This is reinforced by the failure to ensure that the control room envelope was maintained to the standards as presented in NEI-99-03 ..
NkC FORM "lS7 1~)*'/utE:il  Use ADAMS Template NRC-OOo  PRrr[fED ON PEGYCLED Pf.PER


Additionally, one identified violation, which was determined to be of very low safety significance, is listed in this report. However, because of the very low safety significance of the violation and because it was entered into your corrective action program, the NRC is treating this violation as a noncited violation consistent with Section VI. A. 1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. If you contest this noncited violation, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region IV, 612 E. Lamar Blvd., Suite 400, Arlington, Texas, 76011-4125; the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at River Bend Station. In additionf jf you disagree 'va,/jth the chaiacterization of any finding in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the Regional Administrator, Region IV, and the NRC Resident Inspector at River Bend Station. The information you provide will be considered in accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter 0305. Mr. Eric Site Vice President Entergy Operations, Inc. River Bend Station 5485 US Highway 61 St Francisville, LA 70775 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REG!ON IV 612 EAST LAMAR BLVD, SUITE 400 ARLINGTON, TEXAS 76011-4125 June 23, 2011
NRC Y-ORM 757      u.s. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSiON NRC M[;J 10 ';::,R (3*2009)
NON-CONCURRENCE PROC TITLE OF DOCUMENT      ADAMS ACCESSION N River Bend
.--
Station - NRC PI&R REPORT 05000458/2011006
?ECTION C - TO BE COMPLETED BY DOCUMENT SPONSOR INAME Michael TITLE        PHONE N Branch Chief        8! 7-276-6527 ORGANIZATION Project Support Branch 1, Division of Reactor Safety ACTIONS TAKEN TO ADDRESS NON-CONCURRENCE (This section should be revised, as necessary, to reflect the final outcome of the non-concurrence process, including a complete discussion of how individual concerns were addressed.)


SUBJECT: RiVER BEND STATION -NRC PROBLEM IDENTiFICATION AND RESOLUTION INSPECTION REPORT 05000458/2011006
Multiple meetings were conducted with myself, Andy Barrett, Harold Walker, and Bob Hagar to discuss the issue. Bob Hagar was the team lead for the PIR inspection, and Harold Walker, a technical expert in NRRJDivision of Safety Systems/Containment and Ventilation Branch provided technical suppor These discussions focused on assessing the adequacy of the licensee's actions following their identi!1cation of control room envelope (eRE) door seals that had leakag Based on our discussions I was not able to conclude that the licensee 'was inappropriately handling the issue or that a currt~llt  f safety concern existed. The licensee had evaluated the door sealleabge as "negligible," thereby implying that this condition was not a condition adverse to quality requiring prompt corrective actions. eRE leakage surveillance test results in 2008 and 2010 indicated that the overall leakage of the CRE was less than 4 percent of the allowable leakage. In addition, the surveillance results in 2010 showed no decrease in safety margin, in fact the test results showed slightly better result I I agree the licensee could have handled the issue better. Their evaluation of door leakage could have been more thorough, the work requests could of been prioritized higher and performed sooner, or they could of concluded based on the negligible leakage no actions were currently neede CONTINUED IN SECTION D SIGNATU~E - D#CUMENT SPONSOR
 
~ 0(. fA  r INON-CONCURRING iN-~IVIDUAL (To be completed by document sponsorwh_n process is, mp!ete. ie., after documem i:.~igned)
==Dear Mr. Olson,==
CONCURS    'WANTS NCP FORM PUBLIC
On May 12, 2011, the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed a team inspection at your River Bend Station. The enclosed report documents the inspection findings, as discussed on May 12, 2011, with you and other members of your staff. The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to identification and resolution of problems, safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your operating license. The team reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.
  )t NON-CONCURS    WANTS NCP FORM ~JON-PUBLIC WITHDRAWS NOhi-COI\lCURRENCE (Ie., discontinues process)
 
NRC FORM 757 13*2009)   Use ADAMS Template NRC-006  PRINTED UN RECYCLED PAPER
The team also interviewed a representative sample of personnel regarding the condition of your safety conscious work environment.
 
This report documents one self-revealing violation of very low safety significance (Green). This finding was determined to involve a violation of NRC requirements.
 
Additionally, one identified violation, which was determined to be of very low safety significance, is listed in this report. However, because of the very low safety significance of the violation and because it was entered into your corrective action program, the NRC is treating this violation as a noncited violation consistent with Section VI. A. 1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. If you contest this noncited violation, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region IV, 612 E. Lamar Blvd., Suite 400, Arlington, Texas, 76011-4125; the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at River Bend Station. In additionf jf you disagree 'va,/jth the chaiacterization of any finding in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the Regional Administrator, Region IV, and the NRC Resident Inspector at River Bend Station. The information you provide will be considered in accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter 0305.
 
Entergy Operations, Inc. -2 -In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web-site at www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html(the Public Electronic Reading Room). Docket: 50-458 License: NPF-47
 
Sincerely,Michael Hay, Chief Technical Support Branch Division of Reactor Safety
 
===Enclosure:===
Inspection Report 05000458/20110006
 
===w/Attachments:===
Attachment A, Supplemental Information Attachment 8, Information Request -February 16, 2011 cc: w/
 
===Enclosure:===
Distribution via Ustserv Entergy Operations, Inc. -2 -In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web-site at www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html(the Public Electronic Reading Room). Docket: 50-458 License: NPF-47
 
Sincerely,Michael Hay, Chief Technical Support Branch Division of Reactor Safety
 
===Enclosure:===
Inspection Report 05000458/20110006
 
===w/Attachments:===
Attachment A, Supplemental Information Attachment 8, Information Request -February 16, 2011 cc: w/
 
===Enclosure:===
Distribution via Ustserv Docket: License: Report: Licensee:
Facility:
Location:
Dates: Team Leader: Inspectors:
Approved By: u.s. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION IV 05000458 NPF-47 05000458/2011006 Entergy Operations, Inc. River Bend Station 24 miles NNW of Baton Rouge, Louisiana April 25 through May 12, 2011 Robert C. Hagar, Senior Project Engineer Jeremy Groom, Resident Inspector Andy J. Barrett, Resident Inspector Gabriel W. Apger, Operations Examiner Michael Hay, Chief Technical Support Branch Division of Reactor Safety -1 -Enclosure Docket: License: Report: Licensee:
Facility:
Location:
Dates: Team Leader: Inspectors:
Approved By: u.s. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION IV 05000458 NPF-47 05000458/2011006 Entergy Operations, Inc. River Bend Station 24 miles NNW of Baton Rouge, Louisiana April 25 through May 12, 2011 Robert C. Hagar, Senior Project Engineer Jeremy Groom, Resident Inspector Andy J. Barrett, Resident Inspector Gabriel W. Apger, Operations Examiner Michael Hay, Chief Technical Support Branch Division of Reactor Safety -1 -Enclosure SUMMARY OF FINDINGS IR 05000458/2011006; April 25 through May 12, 2011; River Bend Station, Biennial Baseline Inspection of the Identification and Resolution of Problems, Problem Identification and Resolution The inspection was performed by a regional senior project engineer, a regional operator examiner, and two resident inspectors.
 
One noncited violation of very !o\N significance was identified during this inspection.
 
Additionally, one licensee-identified finding of very low safety significance is documented in this report. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, or Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, "Significance Determination Process." The cross-cutting aspect is determined using Inspection Manual Chapter 0310, "Components Within the Cross Cutting Areas." Findings for which the significance determination process does not apply may be Green or be assigned a severity level after NRC management review. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 4, dated December 2006. Identification and Resolution of Problems The team reviewed approximately 500 condition reports, work orders, engineering evaluations, root and apparent cause evaluations, and other supporting documentation to determine if problems were being properly identified, characterized, and entered into the corrective action program for evaluation and resolution.
 
The team reviewed a sample of system health reports, self-assessments, trending reports and metrics, and various other documents related to the corrective action program. Overall, the team determined that the licensee's program for identifying, prioritizing, and correcting conditions adverse to quality was effective.
 
With few exceptions, the licensee identified conditions adverse to quality at a low threshold, properly classified and evaluated those conditions, and developed appropriate corrective actions. The licensee appropriately evaluated industry operating experience for relevance to the facility and had entered applicable items in the corrective action program. The licensee used industry operating experience when performing root cause and apparent cause evaluations.
 
In addition, the licensee performed effective quality assurance audits and self-assessments, as demonstrated by self-identification of poor corrective action program performance and identification of ineffective corrective actions. A. NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings Cornerstone:
Mitigating Systems * Green. The inspectors reviewed a self-revealing green noncited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, "Corrective Actions," for the licensee's failure to take corrective action to address service-induced failures of Gould J-series relays. In response, the licensee initiated condition report CR-RBS-20 10-06032 to ensure that appropriate levels of preventive maintenance are performed on high-critical components.
 
-2-Enclosure SUMMARY OF FINDINGS IR 05000458/2011006; April 25 through May 12, 2011; River Bend Station, Biennial Baseline Inspection of the Identification and Resolution of Problems, Problem Identification and Resolution The inspection was performed by a regional senior project engineer, a regional operator examiner, and two resident inspectors.
 
One noncited violation of very !o\N significance was identified during this inspection.
 
Additionally, one licensee-identified finding of very low safety significance is documented in this report. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, or Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, "Significance Determination Process." The cross-cutting aspect is determined using Inspection Manual Chapter 0310, "Components Within the Cross Cutting Areas." Findings for which the significance determination process does not apply may be Green or be assigned a severity level after NRC management review. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 4, dated December 2006. Identification and Resolution of Problems The team reviewed approximately 500 condition reports, work orders, engineering evaluations, root and apparent cause evaluations, and other supporting documentation to determine if problems were being properly identified, characterized, and entered into the corrective action program for evaluation and resolution.
 
The team reviewed a sample of system health reports, self-assessments, trending reports and metrics, and various other documents related to the corrective action program. Overall, the team determined that the licensee's program for identifying, prioritizing, and correcting conditions adverse to quality was effective.
 
With few exceptions, the licensee identified conditions adverse to quality at a low threshold, properly classified and evaluated those conditions, and developed appropriate corrective actions. The licensee appropriately evaluated industry operating experience for relevance to the facility and had entered applicable items in the corrective action program. The licensee used industry operating experience when performing root cause and apparent cause evaluations.
 
In addition, the licensee performed effective quality assurance audits and self-assessments, as demonstrated by self-identification of poor corrective action program performance and identification of ineffective corrective actions. A. NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings Cornerstone:
Mitigating Systems * Green. The inspectors reviewed a self-revealing green noncited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, "Corrective Actions," for the licensee's failure to take corrective action to address service-induced failures of Gould J-series relays. In response, the licensee initiated condition report CR-RBS-20 10-06032 to ensure that appropriate levels of preventive maintenance are performed on high-critical components.
 
-2-Enclosure The performance deficiency was the licensee's failure to take adequate corrective actions to address service-induced failures of the high-critical, duty-cycle Gould J-series relay designated as EHS-MCC16B6D-33X1.
 
This performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor and was therefore a finding because it impacted the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of equipment performance and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences.
 
This finding had very iow safety significance because the finding was not a design or qualification deficiency confirmed not to result in a loss of operability, did not represent a loss of system safety function, did not represent a loss of safety function for a single train for greater than its technical specification allowed outage time, and did not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding or severe weather initiating event. Because the apparent cause of this finding was the licensee's misclassification of the failed relay within the preventive maintenance optimization program in 2008, and because the licensee's performance in that program was not reflective of current licensee performance, no cross-cutting aspect was assigned to this finding (Section 40A2.5). B. Licensee-Identified Violations One violation of very low safety significance, which was identified by the licensee, has been reviewed by the inspectors.
 
Corrective actions taken or planned by the licensee have been entered into the licensee's corrective action program. This violation and corrective action tracking number (condition report number) are listed in Section 40A7. -3 -Enclosure The performance deficiency was the licensee's failure to take adequate corrective actions to address service-induced failures of the high-critical, duty-cycle Gould J-series relay designated as EHS-MCC16B6D-33X1.
 
This performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor and was therefore a finding because it impacted the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of equipment performance and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences.
 
This finding had very iow safety significance because the finding was not a design or qualification deficiency confirmed not to result in a loss of operability, did not represent a loss of system safety function, did not represent a loss of safety function for a single train for greater than its technical specification allowed outage time, and did not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding or severe weather initiating event. Because the apparent cause of this finding was the licensee's misclassification of the failed relay within the preventive maintenance optimization program in 2008, and because the licensee's performance in that program was not reflective of current licensee performance, no cross-cutting aspect was assigned to this finding (Section 40A2.5). B. Licensee-Identified Violations One violation of very low safety significance, which was identified by the licensee, has been reviewed by the inspectors.
 
Corrective actions taken or planned by the licensee have been entered into the licensee's corrective action program. This violation and corrective action tracking number (condition report number) are listed in Section 40A7. -3 -Enclosure REPORT DETAilS 4. OTHER ACTIVITIES (OA) 40A2 Problem Identification and Resolution (71152) The team based the following conclusions on the sample of corrective action documents that were initiated in the assessment period, which ranged from July 10, 2009, to the end of the on-site portion of this inspection on May 12, 2011 . . 1 Assessment of the Corrective Action Program Effectiveness a. Inspection Scope The team reviewed approximately 500 root and apparent cause evaluations, work orders, engineering evaluations, and other supporting documentation, from approximately 15,000 that had been issued between July 10, 2009, to May 12, 2011, to determine if problems were being properly identified, characterized, and entered into the corrective action program for evaluation and resolution.
 
The team also reviewed a sample of system health reports, operability determinations, self-assessments, trending reports and metrics, and various other documents related to the corrective action program. The team evaluated the licensee's efforts in establishing the scope of problems by reviewing selected logs, work requests, self-assessment reports, audit reports, system health reports, action plans, and results from surveillance tests and preventive maintenance tasks. A team member reviewed work requests and attended the licensee's periodic Condition Review Group and the management review committee meetings to assess the reporting threshold, prioritization efforts, and significance determination process, as well as observing the interfaces with the operability assessment and work control processes when applicable.
 
The team's review included verifying the licensee considered the full extent of cause and extent of condition for problems, as well as how the licensee assessed generic implications and previous occurrences.
 
The team assessed the timeliness and effectiveness of corrective actions, completed or planned, and looked for additional examples of similar problems.
 
The team conducted interviews with plant personnel to identify other processes that may exist where problems may be identified and addressed outside the corrective action program. The team also reviewed corrective action documents that addressed past NRC-identified violations to verify that the corrective action addressed the issues as described in the inspection reports. The inspectors reviewed a sample of corrective actions closed to other corrective action documents to verify that corrective actions were still appropriate and timely. The team considered risk insights from both the NRC's and River Bend Station's risk assessments to focus the sample selection and plant tours on risk significant systems and components.
 
The team selected their samples from issues that involved the following risk-significant systems: -4-Enclosure REPORT DETAilS 4. OTHER ACTIVITIES (OA) 40A2 Problem Identification and Resolution (71152) The team based the following conclusions on the sample of corrective action documents that were initiated in the assessment period, which ranged from July 10, 2009, to the end of the on-site portion of this inspection on May 12, 2011 . . 1 Assessment of the Corrective Action Program Effectiveness a. Inspection Scope The team reviewed approximately 500 root and apparent cause evaluations, work orders, engineering evaluations, and other supporting documentation, from approximately 15,000 that had been issued between July 10, 2009, to May 12, 2011, to determine if problems were being properly identified, characterized, and entered into the corrective action program for evaluation and resolution.
 
The team also reviewed a sample of system health reports, operability determinations, self-assessments, trending reports and metrics, and various other documents related to the corrective action program. The team evaluated the licensee's efforts in establishing the scope of problems by reviewing selected logs, work requests, self-assessment reports, audit reports, system health reports, action plans, and results from surveillance tests and preventive maintenance tasks. A team member reviewed work requests and attended the licensee's periodic Condition Review Group and the management review committee meetings to assess the reporting threshold, prioritization efforts, and significance determination process, as well as observing the interfaces with the operability assessment and work control processes when applicable.
 
The team's review included verifying the licensee considered the full extent of cause and extent of condition for problems, as well as how the licensee assessed generic implications and previous occurrences.
 
The team assessed the timeliness and effectiveness of corrective actions, completed or planned, and looked for additional examples of similar problems.
 
The team conducted interviews with plant personnel to identify other processes that may exist where problems may be identified and addressed outside the corrective action program. The team also reviewed corrective action documents that addressed past NRC-identified violations to verify that the corrective action addressed the issues as described in the inspection reports. The inspectors reviewed a sample of corrective actions closed to other corrective action documents to verify that corrective actions were still appropriate and timely. The team considered risk insights from both the NRC's and River Bend Station's risk assessments to focus the sample selection and plant tours on risk significant systems and components.
 
The team selected their samples from issues that involved the following risk-significant systems: -4-Enclosure Reactor Protection System Standby Service Water Emergency 480 Volts AC Normal Service Water Division 1 and Division 2 Diesel Generators 125 Volts DC High Pressure Core Spray Turbine Plant Component Cooling Reactor Core Isolation Cooling Normal 128 kVolts AC 120 VAC Instrument Air Diesel Room Ventilation Division 3 Diesel Division 1 and Division 2 4160 Volts AC Safety Relief Valves Auxiliary Building Ventilation Service Water Cooling Residual Heat Removal Fire Protection Water 230 KV Power Division 3 4160 Volts AC Reactor Pressure Vessel Level Instrumentation Feedwater To assess whether selected problems had been effectively addressed, the team also expanded their review to include five years of evaluations involving Gould J1 0 electrical relays and recirculation pump seal leakage. To assess whether problems had been identified and entered into the corrective action program, the team conducted a walkdown of Station Service Water and Emergency Diesel Generator systems. b. Assessments 1. Assessment
-Effectiveness of Problem Identification The team concluded that, generally, the licensee had correctly identified deficiencies that were conditions adverse to quality and had entered those conditions into their corrective action program in accordance with the licensee's corrective action program guidance and NRC requirements.
 
The team determined that the licensee had identified problems at a low threshold.
 
Also, the team found no indication of processes where problems may be identified and addressed outside the corrective action program. However, the team made the following observations about the effectiveness of licensee problem identification:
II For the existence of water inside vaults associated with cables within the scope of 10 CFR 50.65, the licensee had not initiated a condition report. This issue was entered into the corrective action program as CR-HQN-2011-0491. -5 -Enclosure Reactor Protection System Standby Service Water Emergency 480 Volts AC Normal Service Water Division 1 and Division 2 Diesel Generators 125 Volts DC High Pressure Core Spray Turbine Plant Component Cooling Reactor Core Isolation Cooling Normal 128 kVolts AC 120 VAC Instrument Air Diesel Room Ventilation Division 3 Diesel Division 1 and Division 2 4160 Volts AC Safety Relief Valves Auxiliary Building Ventilation Service Water Cooling Residual Heat Removal Fire Protection Water 230 KV Power Division 3 4160 Volts AC Reactor Pressure Vessel Level Instrumentation Feedwater To assess whether selected problems had been effectively addressed, the team also expanded their review to include five years of evaluations involving Gould J1 0 electrical relays and recirculation pump seal leakage. To assess whether problems had been identified and entered into the corrective action program, the team conducted a walkdown of Station Service Water and Emergency Diesel Generator systems. b. Assessments 1. Assessment
-Effectiveness of Problem Identification The team concluded that, generally, the licensee had correctly identified deficiencies that were conditions adverse to quality and had entered those conditions into their corrective action program in accordance with the licensee's corrective action program guidance and NRC requirements.
 
The team determined that the licensee had identified problems at a low threshold.
 
Also, the team found no indication of processes where problems may be identified and addressed outside the corrective action program. However, the team made the following observations about the effectiveness of licensee problem identification:
II For the existence of water inside vaults associated with cables within the scope of 10 CFR 50.65, the licensee had not initiated a condition report. This issue was entered into the corrective action program as CR-HQN-2011-0491. -5 -Enclosure When the licensee conducts "tabletop" training sessions before they conduct emergency drills, and then addresses performance-related weaknesses or issues through coaching and mentoring without initiating corresponding condition reports, they miss opportunities to use their corrective action program to identify possible trends in those weaknesses and issues, and to develop possible improvements in associated training programs to address those trends. This issue was entered into the corrective action program as CR-RBS-2011-040S1.
 
e In the same sample of ten measuring and test equipment nonconformance reports, the inspectors found five reports for which the licensee had not completed an independent review, even though those reports involved circumstances that, according to licensee procedures, warranted an independent review. This issue was entered into the corrective action program as CR-RBS-2011-4055. " Prior to this inspection, the licensee had not identified that instructions in Procedure ADM-0029, "Control of Measuring and Test Equipment (M&TE) and the Tool Room Process," Step 10.2.1, for dispositioning measuring and test equipment nonconformance reports were not consistent with similar instructions in Step 5.7.4 [4] of fleet Procedure EN-MA-105, "Control of Measuring and Test Equipment (M&TE)." This issue was entered into the corrective action program as CR-RBS-2011-4055. " For six status items in the radiation protection logs that warranted initiation of a condition report according to licensee procedures, the licensee had not initiated corresponding condition reports. This issue was entered into the corrective action program as CR-RBS-2011-03961.
 
2. Assessment
-Effectiveness of Prioritization and Evaluation of Issues The licensee generally had performed adequate assessments of conditions adverse to quality during this assessment period. The team noted that the immediate and prompt operability assessments reviewed had been completed in a timely manner, except as noted below. For this assessment, the team made the following related observations: " Although the condition described in CR-RBS-201 0-04526 warranted classification as a Category A condition for which a root cause evaluation would be performed, the licensee classified that condition in Category B and completed an apparent-cause evaluation.
 
This condition report did not include the licensee's basis for claSSifying that condition in Category B rather than Category A. This issue was entered into the corrective action program as CR-RBS-2011-04132. " For the condition described in CR-RBS-201 0-05224, the leak rate determined by the licensee's apparent cause evaluation (a "pencil-sized stream") vilas not consistent with the leak rate that had been used in the jicensee's reportability evaluation (30 drops/minute).
 
According to the licensee's procedures, the licensee should have initiated a new condition report to document that new -6 -Enclosure When the licensee conducts "tabletop" training sessions before they conduct emergency drills, and then addresses performance-related weaknesses or issues through coaching and mentoring without initiating corresponding condition reports, they miss opportunities to use their corrective action program to identify possible trends in those weaknesses and issues, and to develop possible improvements in associated training programs to address those trends. This issue was entered into the corrective action program as CR-RBS-2011-040S1.
 
e In the same sample of ten measuring and test equipment nonconformance reports, the inspectors found five reports for which the licensee had not completed an independent review, even though those reports involved circumstances that, according to licensee procedures, warranted an independent review. This issue was entered into the corrective action program as CR-RBS-2011-4055. " Prior to this inspection, the licensee had not identified that instructions in Procedure ADM-0029, "Control of Measuring and Test Equipment (M&TE) and the Tool Room Process," Step 10.2.1, for dispositioning measuring and test equipment nonconformance reports were not consistent with similar instructions in Step 5.7.4 [4] of fleet Procedure EN-MA-105, "Control of Measuring and Test Equipment (M&TE)." This issue was entered into the corrective action program as CR-RBS-2011-4055. " For six status items in the radiation protection logs that warranted initiation of a condition report according to licensee procedures, the licensee had not initiated corresponding condition reports. This issue was entered into the corrective action program as CR-RBS-2011-03961.
 
2. Assessment
-Effectiveness of Prioritization and Evaluation of Issues The licensee generally had performed adequate assessments of conditions adverse to quality during this assessment period. The team noted that the immediate and prompt operability assessments reviewed had been completed in a timely manner, except as noted below. For this assessment, the team made the following related observations: " Although the condition described in CR-RBS-201 0-04526 warranted classification as a Category A condition for which a root cause evaluation would be performed, the licensee classified that condition in Category B and completed an apparent-cause evaluation.
 
This condition report did not include the licensee's basis for claSSifying that condition in Category B rather than Category A. This issue was entered into the corrective action program as CR-RBS-2011-04132. " For the condition described in CR-RBS-201 0-05224, the leak rate determined by the licensee's apparent cause evaluation (a "pencil-sized stream") vilas not consistent with the leak rate that had been used in the jicensee's reportability evaluation (30 drops/minute).
 
According to the licensee's procedures, the licensee should have initiated a new condition report to document that new -6 -Enclosure information had made the reportability evaluation questionable.
 
However, the licensee did not initiate that condition report. This issue was entered into the corrective action program as CR-RBS-2011-03834.
 
.. For the condition described in CR-RBS-201 0-05088 (a heater in a ventilation system not delivering an adequate amount of power), the licensee's reportability evaluation was incomplete, in that the evaluation had concluded that oscillations in heater power were normal, but had failed to consider the low-power condition of the heater. Subsequent analysis demonstrated that the low-power condition had not been reportable.
 
This issue was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as CR-RBS-2011-03786.
 
.. The operability evaluation in CR-RBS-201 0-01717 was incomplete, in that the licensee had addressed a small oil leak in the reactor core isolation cooling pump by determining that the leak rate with the pump not running was low enough that pump operability would not have been affected, but had not evaluated the leak rate with the pump operating.
 
A subsequent evaluation determined that the leak rate with the pump operating did not affect operability of the pump. This issue was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as CR-RBS-20 11-3854. .. According to licensee procedures, the condition in CR-RBS-2009-03080 (repetitive maintenance items and adverse trends in nuisance alarms from the fire protection computer)
warranted classification as a Category C condition, which would have required action to correct the condition.
 
However, the licensee classified the condition as Category 0, which required only trending the condition with no action to correct it. This condition report did not include the licensee's basis for classifying that condition in Category 0 rather than Category C. This issue was entered into the corrective action program as CR-RBS-201104131.
 
* For the condition described in CR-RBS-2008-04711 (inadvertent distribution of radioactive materials foilowing automatic initiation of the standby-gas treatment system), the licensee's evaluation had been incomplete, in that the licensee had failed to consider a previous evaluation that had determined that installing sock filters on certain drain lines would not be acceptable during surveillance testing. As a result, the corrective actions developed in CR-RBS-2008-04711 had included installing sock filters on those drain lines to prevent further contamination, and those sock filters had remained on the drain lines during two recent surveillance tests. The licensee's subsequent evaluation determined that installation of the sock filters had not invalidated the surveillance test results. This issue was entered into the corrective action program as CR-RBS-2011-03818.
 
3. Assessment
--Effectiveness of Corrective Action Program Overall. the team concluded that the licensee had generally deve!oped appropriate corrective actions to address piOblems.
 
However, the team identified the following two examples of conditions adverse to quality where the licensee had failed to identify or take appropriate corrective action: -7 -Enclosure information had made the reportability evaluation questionable.
 
However, the licensee did not initiate that condition report. This issue was entered into the corrective action program as CR-RBS-2011-03834.
 
.. For the condition described in CR-RBS-201 0-05088 (a heater in a ventilation system not delivering an adequate amount of power), the licensee's reportability evaluation was incomplete, in that the evaluation had concluded that oscillations in heater power were normal, but had failed to consider the low-power condition of the heater. Subsequent analysis demonstrated that the low-power condition had not been reportable.
 
This issue was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as CR-RBS-2011-03786.
 
.. The operability evaluation in CR-RBS-201 0-01717 was incomplete, in that the licensee had addressed a small oil leak in the reactor core isolation cooling pump by determining that the leak rate with the pump not running was low enough that pump operability would not have been affected, but had not evaluated the leak rate with the pump operating.
 
A subsequent evaluation determined that the leak rate with the pump operating did not affect operability of the pump. This issue was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as CR-RBS-20 11-3854. .. According to licensee procedures, the condition in CR-RBS-2009-03080 (repetitive maintenance items and adverse trends in nuisance alarms from the fire protection computer)
warranted classification as a Category C condition, which would have required action to correct the condition.
 
However, the licensee classified the condition as Category 0, which required only trending the condition with no action to correct it. This condition report did not include the licensee's basis for classifying that condition in Category 0 rather than Category C. This issue was entered into the corrective action program as CR-RBS-201104131.
 
* For the condition described in CR-RBS-2008-04711 (inadvertent distribution of radioactive materials foilowing automatic initiation of the standby-gas treatment system), the licensee's evaluation had been incomplete, in that the licensee had failed to consider a previous evaluation that had determined that installing sock filters on certain drain lines would not be acceptable during surveillance testing. As a result, the corrective actions developed in CR-RBS-2008-04711 had included installing sock filters on those drain lines to prevent further contamination, and those sock filters had remained on the drain lines during two recent surveillance tests. The licensee's subsequent evaluation determined that installation of the sock filters had not invalidated the surveillance test results. This issue was entered into the corrective action program as CR-RBS-2011-03818.
 
3. Assessment
--Effectiveness of Corrective Action Program Overall. the team concluded that the licensee had generally deve!oped appropriate corrective actions to address piOblems.
 
However, the team identified the following two examples of conditions adverse to quality where the licensee had failed to identify or take appropriate corrective action: -7 -Enclosure Condition report CR-RBS-2010-02476 identified that corrective actions associated with CR-RBS-201 0-01587 had been delayed because they had incorrectly been closed to a global preventive maintenance task that was later closed. This issue was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as CR-RBS-2011-04097.
 
to The licensee developed CR-RBS-2010-02362 corrective action #14 to implement a vendor recommendation to install capacitors to reduce "chattering" of certain relays in circuits associated with oil heaters of the control building chillers, and thereby improve the reliability of those relays. However, the licensee inappropriately closed that corrective action to a system health report, and, as a result, did not implement that recommendation.
 
This issue was entered into the corrective action program as CR-RBS-2011-04208 . . 2 Assessment of the Use of Operating Experience a. Inspection Scope The team examined the licensee's program for reviewing industry operating experience, including reviewing the governing procedure and self assessments.
 
The team reviewed a sample operating experience notifications that had been issued during the assessment period to assess whether the licensee had appropriately evaluated the notifications for relevance to the facility.
 
The team then examined whether the licensee had entered those items into their corrective action program and assigned actions to address the issues. The team reviewed a sample of root cause evaluations and corrective action documents to verify if the licensee had appropriately included industry-operating experience.
 
b. Assessment Overall, the team determined that the iicensee was adequately evaluating industry operating experience for relevance to the facility, based on reviewing a sample size of 17 industry operating experience notifications.
 
The team concluded that the licensee was evaluating industry operating experience when performing root cause and apparent cause evaluations.
 
Both internal and external operating experience were being incorporated into lessons learned for training and pre-job briefs . . 3 Assessment of Self-Assessments and Audits a. Inspection Scope The team reviewed a sample size of 83 licensee self-assessments, surveillances, and audits to assess whether the licensee was regularly identifying performance trends and effectively addressing them. The team reviewed audit reports to assess the effectiveness of assessments in specific areas. The team evaluated the use of self-and third party assessments, the role of the quality assurance department, and the role of the performance improvement group related to licensee performance.
 
The specific assessment documents reviewed are listed in the attachment. -8 -Enclosure Condition report CR-RBS-2010-02476 identified that corrective actions associated with CR-RBS-201 0-01587 had been delayed because they had incorrectly been closed to a global preventive maintenance task that was later closed. This issue was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as CR-RBS-2011-04097.
 
to The licensee developed CR-RBS-2010-02362 corrective action #14 to implement a vendor recommendation to install capacitors to reduce "chattering" of certain relays in circuits associated with oil heaters of the control building chillers, and thereby improve the reliability of those relays. However, the licensee inappropriately closed that corrective action to a system health report, and, as a result, did not implement that recommendation.
 
This issue was entered into the corrective action program as CR-RBS-2011-04208 . . 2 Assessment of the Use of Operating Experience a. Inspection Scope The team examined the licensee's program for reviewing industry operating experience, including reviewing the governing procedure and self assessments.
 
The team reviewed a sample operating experience notifications that had been issued during the assessment period to assess whether the licensee had appropriately evaluated the notifications for relevance to the facility.
 
The team then examined whether the licensee had entered those items into their corrective action program and assigned actions to address the issues. The team reviewed a sample of root cause evaluations and corrective action documents to verify if the licensee had appropriately included industry-operating experience.
 
b. Assessment Overall, the team determined that the iicensee was adequately evaluating industry operating experience for relevance to the facility, based on reviewing a sample size of 17 industry operating experience notifications.
 
The team concluded that the licensee was evaluating industry operating experience when performing root cause and apparent cause evaluations.
 
Both internal and external operating experience were being incorporated into lessons learned for training and pre-job briefs . . 3 Assessment of Self-Assessments and Audits a. Inspection Scope The team reviewed a sample size of 83 licensee self-assessments, surveillances, and audits to assess whether the licensee was regularly identifying performance trends and effectively addressing them. The team reviewed audit reports to assess the effectiveness of assessments in specific areas. The team evaluated the use of self-and third party assessments, the role of the quality assurance department, and the role of the performance improvement group related to licensee performance.
 
The specific assessment documents reviewed are listed in the attachment. -8 -Enclosure b. Assessment The team concluded that the licensee had an adequate self-assessment process . . 4 Assessment of Work Environment a. Inspection Scope The inspection team conducted informal individual interviews with 23 individuals.
 
The interviewees represented various functional organizations and ranged across contractor, staff, and supervisor levels. The team conducted these interviews to assess whether conditions existed that would challenge the establishment of a safety conscious work environment at the River Bend Station. b. Assessment Because the team encountered no indication of an issue related to the safety conscious work environment during their interviews with site personnel, the team concluded that the licensee had maintained a safety conscious work environment.
 
.5 Specific Issues identified During this Inspection Failure to Take Corrective Action for Service-Induced Failures of Gould J-series Relays Introduction.
 
The inspectors reviewed a self-revealing green noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, "Corrective Actions," for the licensee's failure to take corrective action to address service-induced failures of Gould J-series relays. Description.
 
On October 9,2008, River Bend Station personnel initiated CR-RBS-2008-05915 to document that valve SWP-MOV4B, standby service water to drywell unit coolers, had failed in the open position.
 
That valve supplies service water to the drywell unit coolers and has a safety function to close during a loss-of-coolant accident.
 
A lower-tier apparent-cause evaluation performed by the licensee had determined that the valve had failed due to a coil failure for relay EHS-MCC2B-5A-33X.
 
The licensee had also determined that the relay had failed because it had been in service beyond its expected lifetime.
 
The River Bend preventive maintenance template for Gould J10 control relays had established a replacement interval based on not exceeding the expect service life for the given service conditions. (For relays the licensee had classified as high-critical, high-duty-cycle, they had established a 21-year replacement period.) To address extent-of-condition concerns, the licensee had implemented a replacement project for Gould relays deSignated as high-duty-cycle, critical.
 
Corrective Action 7 to CR-RBS-2008-05915 had established work orders for 127 relays classified as high-duty-cycle, high-critical.
 
Based on work orders that had been generated, the licensee closed CR-RBS-2008-05915 on November 26, 2008. By July 2009, the licensee had completed work to replace the relays they had classified as high-duty-cyc1e, high-cf!t!caL -9 -Enclosure b. Assessment The team concluded that the licensee had an adequate self-assessment process . . 4 Assessment of Work Environment a. Inspection Scope The inspection team conducted informal individual interviews with 23 individuals.
 
The interviewees represented various functional organizations and ranged across contractor, staff, and supervisor levels. The team conducted these interviews to assess whether conditions existed that would challenge the establishment of a safety conscious work environment at the River Bend Station. b. Assessment Because the team encountered no indication of an issue related to the safety conscious work environment during their interviews with site personnel, the team concluded that the licensee had maintained a safety conscious work environment.
 
.5 Specific Issues identified During this Inspection Failure to Take Corrective Action for Service-Induced Failures of Gould J-series Relays Introduction.
 
The inspectors reviewed a self-revealing green noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, "Corrective Actions," for the licensee's failure to take corrective action to address service-induced failures of Gould J-series relays. Description.
 
On October 9,2008, River Bend Station personnel initiated CR-RBS-2008-05915 to document that valve SWP-MOV4B, standby service water to drywell unit coolers, had failed in the open position.
 
That valve supplies service water to the drywell unit coolers and has a safety function to close during a loss-of-coolant accident.
 
A lower-tier apparent-cause evaluation performed by the licensee had determined that the valve had failed due to a coil failure for relay EHS-MCC2B-5A-33X.
 
The licensee had also determined that the relay had failed because it had been in service beyond its expected lifetime.
 
The River Bend preventive maintenance template for Gould J10 control relays had established a replacement interval based on not exceeding the expect service life for the given service conditions. (For relays the licensee had classified as high-critical, high-duty-cycle, they had established a 21-year replacement period.) To address extent-of-condition concerns, the licensee had implemented a replacement project for Gould relays deSignated as high-duty-cycle, critical.
 
Corrective Action 7 to CR-RBS-2008-05915 had established work orders for 127 relays classified as high-duty-cycle, high-critical.
 
Based on work orders that had been generated, the licensee closed CR-RBS-2008-05915 on November 26, 2008. By July 2009, the licensee had completed work to replace the relays they had classified as high-duty-cyc1e, high-cf!t!caL -9 -Enclosure On January 16, 2011, valve SWP-MOV55B failed closed. That valve is the Division 2 standby service water return valve to the cooling tower inlet The licensee initiated CR-RBS-2011-00393 to document this issue, During troubleshooting, the licensee found that the valve's control power fuses had failed because the Gould J10 control relay identified as EHS-MCC16B6D-33X1 had shorted out. During an equipment performance evaluation, the licensee discovered that during a preventive maintenance optimization program in 2008, SWP-MOV55B had been misclassified as a non-critical component instead of a high-critical component. (According to licensee Procedure EN-DC 153, "Preventive Maintenance Component Classification," the relay should have been classified as high-critical and high-duty-cycie,)
Consequently.
 
because the relay had been classified as non-critical, the licensee had not established a recurring preventive maintenance task to periodically replace the relay, The inspectors discovered that the subject relay had been in service for 26 years, well beyond its expected lifetime of 21 years, The inspectors also determined that because this relay had been misclassified, it had not been identified in the scope of the corrective actions identified in CR-RBS-2008-05915.
 
Consequently, no corrective actions had been implemented to address service beyond its expected life, and the component had been allowed to run to failure. As corrective action to address the misclassification of components within the preventive maintenance optimization system, the licensee initiated condition report CR-RBS-201 0-06032 to ensure that appropriate levels of preventive maintenance are performed on high-critical components.
 
Analysis, The performance deficiency was the licensee's failure to take adequate corrective actions to address service-induced failures of the high-critical, high-duty-cycle Gould J-series relay designated as EHS-MCC2B-5A-33X.
 
This performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor and was therefore a finding because it impacted the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of equipment performance and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences, in that this performance deficiency allowed a coil failure that rendered valve SWP-MOV4B inoperable.
 
The inspectors used Manual Chapter 0609,04, "Phase 1 -Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings," to determine that this finding has very-low safety significance because the finding was not a design or qualification deficiency confirmed not to result in a loss of operability. does not represent a loss of system safety function, does not represent a loss of safety function for a single train for greater than its technical specification allowed outage time, and does not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding or severe weather initiating event The inspectors determined that the apparent cause of this finding was the licensee's misclassification of the failed relay within the preventive maintenance optimization program in 2008. The inspectors considered that the licensee's performance in that program was not reflective of current licensee performance.
 
so no cross-cutting aspect was assigned to this finding. Enforcement.
 
Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, "Corrective Actions," requires, in part, that measures shall be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality are promptly identified and corrected.
 
Contrary to the above, on November 26, 2008, the licensee failed to correct a condition adverse to quality, in that the plant configuration that allowed relay EHS-MCC2B-5A-33X to run to failure was a condition
-10 -Enclosure On January 16, 2011, valve SWP-MOV55B failed closed. That valve is the Division 2 standby service water return valve to the cooling tower inlet The licensee initiated CR-RBS-2011-00393 to document this issue, During troubleshooting, the licensee found that the valve's control power fuses had failed because the Gould J10 control relay identified as EHS-MCC16B6D-33X1 had shorted out. During an equipment performance evaluation, the licensee discovered that during a preventive maintenance optimization program in 2008, SWP-MOV55B had been misclassified as a non-critical component instead of a high-critical component. (According to licensee Procedure EN-DC 153, "Preventive Maintenance Component Classification," the relay should have been classified as high-critical and high-duty-cycie,)
Consequently.
 
because the relay had been classified as non-critical, the licensee had not established a recurring preventive maintenance task to periodically replace the relay, The inspectors discovered that the subject relay had been in service for 26 years, well beyond its expected lifetime of 21 years, The inspectors also determined that because this relay had been misclassified, it had not been identified in the scope of the corrective actions identified in CR-RBS-2008-05915.
 
Consequently, no corrective actions had been implemented to address service beyond its expected life, and the component had been allowed to run to failure. As corrective action to address the misclassification of components within the preventive maintenance optimization system, the licensee initiated condition report CR-RBS-201 0-06032 to ensure that appropriate levels of preventive maintenance are performed on high-critical components.
 
Analysis, The performance deficiency was the licensee's failure to take adequate corrective actions to address service-induced failures of the high-critical, high-duty-cycle Gould J-series relay designated as EHS-MCC2B-5A-33X.
 
This performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor and was therefore a finding because it impacted the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of equipment performance and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences, in that this performance deficiency allowed a coil failure that rendered valve SWP-MOV4B inoperable.
 
The inspectors used Manual Chapter 0609,04, "Phase 1 -Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings," to determine that this finding has very-low safety significance because the finding was not a design or qualification deficiency confirmed not to result in a loss of operability. does not represent a loss of system safety function, does not represent a loss of safety function for a single train for greater than its technical specification allowed outage time, and does not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding or severe weather initiating event The inspectors determined that the apparent cause of this finding was the licensee's misclassification of the failed relay within the preventive maintenance optimization program in 2008. The inspectors considered that the licensee's performance in that program was not reflective of current licensee performance.
 
so no cross-cutting aspect was assigned to this finding. Enforcement.
 
Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, "Corrective Actions," requires, in part, that measures shall be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality are promptly identified and corrected.
 
Contrary to the above, on November 26, 2008, the licensee failed to correct a condition adverse to quality, in that the plant configuration that allowed relay EHS-MCC2B-5A-33X to run to failure was a condition
-10 -Enclosure adverse to quality, and the licensee failed to identify and correct that condition.
 
Consequently, on January 16, 2011, the subject relay failed in service and rendered valve SWP-MOV4B inoperable.
 
Because this finding had very low safety significance, and because the licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as CR-RBS-2011-04064, this finding is being treated as a noncited violation in accordance with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy: NCV 05000458/2011006-01, "Failure to Take Corrective Action for Service-Induced Failures of Gould J-series Relays." 40A6 Meetings Exit Meeting Summary On May 12, 2011, the team presented the inspection results to Mr. Eric Olson (the site Vice President)
and other members of the licensee staff. The licensee acknowledged the issues presented.
 
The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary.
 
No proprietary information was identified.
 
40A7 Licensee-Identified Violations The following violation of very low safety significance (Green) was identified by the licensee and is a violation of NRC requirements which meets the criteria of Section 2.3.2 of the NRC Enforcement Policy for being dispositioned as a noncited violation.
 
Failure to Incorporate Key Assumptions into an Abnormal Operating Procedure The licensee identified a non cited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1, "Procedures," for their failure to incorporate into Procedure AOP-50, "Station Blackout," instructions to open Division I and II equipment room doors within 30 minutes of a station blackout event. The corresponding assumption is used in calculations that determine the licensee's coping during a station blackout.
 
This violation has Green risk significance because the finding was not a design or qualification deficiency confirmed not to result in a loss of operability, does not represent a loss of system safety function, does not represent a loss of safety function for a single train for greater than its technical specification allowed outage time, and does not screen as potentially risk-significant due to a seismic, flooding or severe weather initiating event. In CR-2009-05598 the licensee documented the change in AOP-50 that requires the doors to be opened within 30 minutes. -11 -Enclosure adverse to quality, and the licensee failed to identify and correct that condition.
 
Consequently, on January 16, 2011, the subject relay failed in service and rendered valve SWP-MOV4B inoperable.
 
Because this finding had very low safety significance, and because the licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as CR-RBS-2011-04064, this finding is being treated as a noncited violation in accordance with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy: NCV 05000458/2011006-01, "Failure to Take Corrective Action for Service-Induced Failures of Gould J-series Relays." 40A6 Meetings Exit Meeting Summary On May 12, 2011, the team presented the inspection results to Mr. Eric Olson (the site Vice President)
and other members of the licensee staff. The licensee acknowledged the issues presented.
 
The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary.
 
No proprietary information was identified.
 
40A7 Licensee-Identified Violations The following violation of very low safety significance (Green) was identified by the licensee and is a violation of NRC requirements which meets the criteria of Section 2.3.2 of the NRC Enforcement Policy for being dispositioned as a noncited violation.
 
Failure to Incorporate Key Assumptions into an Abnormal Operating Procedure The licensee identified a non cited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1, "Procedures," for their failure to incorporate into Procedure AOP-50, "Station Blackout," instructions to open Division I and II equipment room doors within 30 minutes of a station blackout event. The corresponding assumption is used in calculations that determine the licensee's coping during a station blackout.
 
This violation has Green risk significance because the finding was not a design or qualification deficiency confirmed not to result in a loss of operability, does not represent a loss of system safety function, does not represent a loss of safety function for a single train for greater than its technical specification allowed outage time, and does not screen as potentially risk-significant due to a seismic, flooding or severe weather initiating event. In CR-2009-05598 the licensee documented the change in AOP-50 that requires the doors to be opened within 30 minutes. -11 -Enclosure SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION KEY POINTS OF CONTACT Licensee Personnel T Bordelon, Specialist, Corrective Actions & Assessments F. Hurst, Emergency Plan Instructor K. Huffstatler, Senior Licensing Specialist M. Jurey, Quality Assurance Auditor D. Lorfing, Manager, Licensing M. Mitchell, Engineer S. Phillips, Specialist, Corrective Actions & Assessments J. Roberts, Director, Nuclear Safety & Assurance J. Schlesinger, Engineer D. Vines, Manager, Corrective Actions & Assessments D. Wells, Employee Concerns Program Coordinator NRC Personnel P. Elkmann, Senior Emergency Planning Inspector V. Gaddy, Branch Chief G. Larkin, Senior Resident Inspector H. Walker, Senior Reactor Systems Engineer LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED Opened and Closed 05000458/2011006-01 NCV Failure to Take Corrective Action for Service-Induced Failures of Gould J-series Relays (Section 40A2.5) LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED Section 40A2: Identification and Resolution of Problems CALCULATIONS NUMBER E-143 E-144 TITLE Standby Battery "ENB-SAT01A" Duty Cycle, Current Profile and Size Verification 1=t-.11:l I:l A T('\11:l n ** t" ("", ... 1", (" **
......... '-'-.....,.1 "t \J t...., L...o"Yf.Y
......, , ..... 1\,;;) ,"",ut J , I Ville; Cit fU ufLC Verification -1 -REVISION 10 '" u Attachment A SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION KEY POINTS OF CONTACT Licensee Personnel T Bordelon, Specialist, Corrective Actions & Assessments F. Hurst, Emergency Plan Instructor K. Huffstatler, Senior Licensing Specialist M. Jurey, Quality Assurance Auditor D. Lorfing, Manager, Licensing M. Mitchell, Engineer S. Phillips, Specialist, Corrective Actions & Assessments J. Roberts, Director, Nuclear Safety & Assurance J. Schlesinger, Engineer D. Vines, Manager, Corrective Actions & Assessments D. Wells, Employee Concerns Program Coordinator NRC Personnel P. Elkmann, Senior Emergency Planning Inspector V. Gaddy, Branch Chief G. Larkin, Senior Resident Inspector H. Walker, Senior Reactor Systems Engineer LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED Opened and Closed 05000458/2011006-01 NCV Failure to Take Corrective Action for Service-Induced Failures of Gould J-series Relays (Section 40A2.5) LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED Section 40A2: Identification and Resolution of Problems CALCULATIONS NUMBER E-143 E-144 TITLE Standby Battery "ENB-SAT01A" Duty Cycle, Current Profile and Size Verification 1=t-.11:l I:l A T('\11:l n ** t" ("", ... 1", (" **
......... '-'-.....,.1 "t \J t...., L...o"Yf.Y
......, , ..... 1\,;;) ,"",ut J , I Ville; Cit fU ufLC Verification -1 -REVISION 10 '" u Attachment A
G13.18.3.6*009 Division III 125 VDC Battery Sizing, Load Circuit 3 Voltage Drop, Short Circuit, Charger Verification and Cable Verification G13.18.3.6*021 DC System Analysis, Methodology
& Scenario 1 Development PROCEDURES NUMBER TITLE REVISIONS ADM-0099 Performance Improvement Using Fundamentals 5 EN-DC-132 Control of Engineering Documents 5 EN-DC-153 preventive maintenance component classification 5 EN-DC-346 Cable Reliability Program 1 EN-FAP-U-003 Corrective Action Review Board (CARB) Process 2 EN-FAP-OP-OO6 Operator Aggregate Impact lndex Performance 0 Indicator EN-HR-138 Executive Review Board Process 2 EN-Ll-102 Corrective Action Process 1,2,&16 EN-Ll-108 Event Notification And Reporting 4 EN-U-118 Root Cause Analysis Process 13 EN-U-118-06 Common Cause Analysis (CCA) 1 EN-L1-119 Apparent Cause Evaluation (ACE) Process 11 EN-Ll-119-0 1 Equipment Failure Evaluation 0 EN-MA-126 Control of Supplemental Personnel 12 EN-MA-126-01 New to Nuclear Workforce Orientation 0&2 EN-OP-104 Operability Determination Process 5 EN-OP-115 Conduct of Operations 10 EN-QV-132 Site Executive Protocol Group ENS-TQ-110 Emergency Preparedness Training Program 15 EN-TQ-114 Licensed Operator Requalification Training Program 5
'-''-'.,,:H..IlltJI.IVf t -2-Attachment A G13.18.3.6*009 Division III 125 VDC Battery Sizing, Load Circuit 3 Voltage Drop, Short Circuit, Charger Verification and Cable Verification G13.18.3.6*021 DC System Analysis, Methodology
& Scenario 1 Development PROCEDURES NUMBER TITLE REVISIONS ADM-0099 Performance Improvement Using Fundamentals 5 EN-DC-132 Control of Engineering Documents 5 EN-DC-153 preventive maintenance component classification 5 EN-DC-346 Cable Reliability Program 1 EN-FAP-U-003 Corrective Action Review Board (CARB) Process 2 EN-FAP-OP-OO6 Operator Aggregate Impact lndex Performance 0 Indicator EN-HR-138 Executive Review Board Process 2 EN-Ll-102 Corrective Action Process 1,2,&16 EN-Ll-108 Event Notification And Reporting 4 EN-U-118 Root Cause Analysis Process 13 EN-U-118-06 Common Cause Analysis (CCA) 1 EN-L1-119 Apparent Cause Evaluation (ACE) Process 11 EN-Ll-119-0 1 Equipment Failure Evaluation 0 EN-MA-126 Control of Supplemental Personnel 12 EN-MA-126-01 New to Nuclear Workforce Orientation 0&2 EN-OP-104 Operability Determination Process 5 EN-OP-115 Conduct of Operations 10 EN-QV-132 Site Executive Protocol Group ENS-TQ-110 Emergency Preparedness Training Program 15 EN-TQ-114 Licensed Operator Requalification Training Program 5
'-''-'.,,:H..IlltJI.IVf t -2-Attachment A
EN-WM-107 Post Maintenance Testing 3 OSP-0029 Log Report -Auxiliary, Reactor and Fuel Buildings 46 RLEC-EP-115 Emergency Response Organization Tabletop Training 13 STP-309-0601 Division I ECCS Test 36 CONDITION REPORTS CR-HON-2009-00738 CR-HON-2009-01184 CR-HON-2010-00013 CR-HON-2010-00067 CR-HON-2010-00386 CR-RBS-2001-01414 CR-RBS-2002-02028 CR-RBS-2004-01920 CR-RBS-2004-03160 CR-RBS-2005-0 1141 CR-RBS-2005-01448 CR-RBS-2005-03985 CR-RBS-2006-04478 CR-RBS-2007
-01706 CR-RBS-2007
-02102 CR-RBS-2007
-03092 CR-RBS-2007
-03243 CR-RBS-2007
-04505 CR-RBS-2007
-04669 CR-RBS-2007
-04698 CR-RBS-2007
-05548 CR-RBS-2008-02558 CR-RBS-2008-02844 CR-RBS-2008-03339 CR-RBS-2008-03449 CR-RBS-2008-03556 C R-RBS-2008-03634 CR-RBS-2008-03641 CR-RBS-2008-03854 CR-RBS-2008-03911 CR-RBS-2008-03911 CR-RBS-2008-04378 CR-RBS-2008-04379 CR-RBS-2008-04386 CR-RBS-2008-04711 CR-RBS-2008-05311 CR-RBS-2008-05915 CR-RBS-2008-07013 CR-RBS-2009-00043 CR-RBS-2009-00196 CR-RBS-2009-00352 CR-RBS-2009-01593 CR-RBS-2009-01626 CR-RBS-2009-01677 CR-RBS-2009-02588 CR-RBS-2009-02623 CR-RBS-2009-02681 CR-RBS-2009-02742 CR-RBS-2009-02764 CR-RBS-2009-02888 CR-RBS-2009-02894 CR-RBS-2009-03080 CR-RBS-2009-03094 CR-RBS-2009-03175 CR-RBS-2009-03176 CR-RBS-2009-03208 CR-RBS-2009-03212 CR-RBS-2009-03218 CR-RBS-2009-03222 CR-RBS-2009-03226 CR-RBS-2009-03231 CR -RBS-2009-03233 CR-RBS-2009-03233 CR-RBS-2009-03292 CR-RBS-2009-03341 CR-RBS-2009-03401 CR-RBS-2009-03460 CR-RBS-2009-03519 CR-RBS-2009-03520 CR-RBS-2009-03629 CR-RBS-2009-03743 CR-RBS-2009-03747 CR-RBS-2009-037 4 7 CR-RBS-2009-03752 CR-RBS-2009-03768 CR-RBS-2009-03771 CR-RBS-2009-03828 CR-RBS-2009-03901 CR-RBS-2009-03907 CR-RBS-2009-03963 C R -RBS-2009-04059 CR-RBS-2009-04096 CR-RBS-2009-04096 CR-RBS-2009-04102 -3 -Attachment A EN-WM-107 Post Maintenance Testing 3 OSP-0029 Log Report -Auxiliary, Reactor and Fuel Buildings 46 RLEC-EP-115 Emergency Response Organization Tabletop Training 13 STP-309-0601 Division I ECCS Test 36 CONDITION REPORTS CR-HON-2009-00738 CR-HON-2009-01184 CR-HON-2010-00013 CR-HON-2010-00067 CR-HON-2010-00386 CR-RBS-2001-01414 CR-RBS-2002-02028 CR-RBS-2004-01920 CR-RBS-2004-03160 CR-RBS-2005-0 1141 CR-RBS-2005-01448 CR-RBS-2005-03985 CR-RBS-2006-04478 CR-RBS-2007
-01706 CR-RBS-2007
-02102 CR-RBS-2007
-03092 CR-RBS-2007
-03243 CR-RBS-2007
-04505 CR-RBS-2007
-04669 CR-RBS-2007
-04698 CR-RBS-2007
-05548 CR-RBS-2008-02558 CR-RBS-2008-02844 CR-RBS-2008-03339 CR-RBS-2008-03449 CR-RBS-2008-03556 C R-RBS-2008-03634 CR-RBS-2008-03641 CR-RBS-2008-03854 CR-RBS-2008-03911 CR-RBS-2008-03911 CR-RBS-2008-04378 CR-RBS-2008-04379 CR-RBS-2008-04386 CR-RBS-2008-04711 CR-RBS-2008-05311 CR-RBS-2008-05915 CR-RBS-2008-07013 CR-RBS-2009-00043 CR-RBS-2009-00196 CR-RBS-2009-00352 CR-RBS-2009-01593 CR-RBS-2009-01626 CR-RBS-2009-01677 CR-RBS-2009-02588 CR-RBS-2009-02623 CR-RBS-2009-02681 CR-RBS-2009-02742 CR-RBS-2009-02764 CR-RBS-2009-02888 CR-RBS-2009-02894 CR-RBS-2009-03080 CR-RBS-2009-03094 CR-RBS-2009-03175 CR-RBS-2009-03176 CR-RBS-2009-03208 CR-RBS-2009-03212 CR-RBS-2009-03218 CR-RBS-2009-03222 CR-RBS-2009-03226 CR-RBS-2009-03231 CR -RBS-2009-03233 CR-RBS-2009-03233 CR-RBS-2009-03292 CR-RBS-2009-03341 CR-RBS-2009-03401 CR-RBS-2009-03460 CR-RBS-2009-03519 CR-RBS-2009-03520 CR-RBS-2009-03629 CR-RBS-2009-03743 CR-RBS-2009-03747 CR-RBS-2009-037 4 7 CR-RBS-2009-03752 CR-RBS-2009-03768 CR-RBS-2009-03771 CR-RBS-2009-03828 CR-RBS-2009-03901 CR-RBS-2009-03907 CR-RBS-2009-03963 C R -RBS-2009-04059 CR-RBS-2009-04096 CR-RBS-2009-04096 CR-RBS-2009-04102 -3 -Attachment A
CR-RBS-2009-04204 CR-RBS-2009-04254 CR-RBS-2009-04411 CR-RBS-2009-04417 CR-RBS-2009-04429 CR-RBS-2009-04440 CR-RBS-2009-04658 CR-RBS-2009-04658 CR-RBS-2009-04681 CR-RBS-2009-04681 CR-RBS-2009-04718 CR-RBS-2009-04722 CR-RBS-2009-04725 CR-RBS-2009-04733 CR-RBS-2009-04734 CR-RBS-2009-04894 CR-RBS-2009-05000 CR-RBS-2009-05298 CR-RBS-2009-05337 CR-RBS-2009-05340 CR-RBS-2009-05365 CR-RBS-2009-05374 CR-RBS-2009-05394 CR-RBS-2009-05501 CR-RBS-2009-05573 CR-RBS-2009-05573 CR-RBS-2009-05598 CR-RBS-2009-05621 CR-RBS-2009-05658 CR-RBS-2009-05682 CR-RBS-2009-05750 CR-RBS-2009-05751 CR-RBS-2009-05758 CR-RBS-2009-05768 CR-RBS-2009-05795 CR-RBS-2009-05797 CR-RBS-2009-05811 CR-RBS-2009-05837 CR-RBS-2009-05865 CR-RBS-2009-05883 CR-RBS-2009-05885 CR-RBS-2009-05948 CR-RBS-2009-06011 CR-RBS-2009-06013 CR-RBS-2009-06031 CR -RBS-2009-06031 CR-RBS-2009-06031 CR-RBS-2009-06057 CR-RBS-2009-06058 CR-RBS-2009-06069 CR-RBS-2009-06078 CR-RBS-2009-06078 CR-RBS-2009-06078 CR-RBS-2009-06097 CR-RBS-2009-06148 CR-RBS-2009-06148 CR-RBS-2009-06151 CR-RBS-2009-06235 CR-RBS-2009-06316 CR-RBS-2009-06325 CR-RBS-2009-06331 CR-RBS-2009-06393 CR-RBS-2009-06419 CR-RBS-2009-06425 CR-RBS-2009-06460 CR-RBS-2009-1667 CR-RBS-2009-1670 CR-RBS-2009-1675 CR-RBS-2009-1676 CR-RBS-2009-3747 CR-RBS-2009-3862 CR-RBS-2009-3963 CR-RBS-2009-4096 CR-RBS-2009-4296 CR-RBS-2009-4350 CR-RBS-2009-4658 CR-RBS-2010-00017 CR-RBS-2010-00069 CR-RBS-201 0-001 01 CR-RBS-2010-00196 CR-RBS-2010-00237 CR-RBS-2010-00280 CR-RBS-2010-00424 CR-RBS-2010-00465 CR-RBS-2010-00483 CR-RBS-2010-00538 CR-RBS-2010-00558 CR-RBS-2010-00575 CR-RBS-2010-00596 CR-RBS-2010-00660 CR-RBS-2010-00680 CR-RBS-2010-00731 CR-RBS-2010-00736 CR-RBS-2010-00739 CR-RBS-2010-00762 CR-RBS-2010-00778 CR-RBS-2010-00783 CR-RBS-2010-00802 CR-RBS-2010-00811 CR-RBS-2010-00819 CR-RBS-2010-00824 CR-RBS-2010-01140 CR-RBS-20i 0-0"1 i 48 CR-RBS-20iO-01193 CR-RBS-2010-01205 CR-RBS-2010-01428 CR-RBS-2010-01566 CR-RBS-2010-01587
-4-Attachment A CR-RBS-2009-04204 CR-RBS-2009-04254 CR-RBS-2009-04411 CR-RBS-2009-04417 CR-RBS-2009-04429 CR-RBS-2009-04440 CR-RBS-2009-04658 CR-RBS-2009-04658 CR-RBS-2009-04681 CR-RBS-2009-04681 CR-RBS-2009-04718 CR-RBS-2009-04722 CR-RBS-2009-04725 CR-RBS-2009-04733 CR-RBS-2009-04734 CR-RBS-2009-04894 CR-RBS-2009-05000 CR-RBS-2009-05298 CR-RBS-2009-05337 CR-RBS-2009-05340 CR-RBS-2009-05365 CR-RBS-2009-05374 CR-RBS-2009-05394 CR-RBS-2009-05501 CR-RBS-2009-05573 CR-RBS-2009-05573 CR-RBS-2009-05598 CR-RBS-2009-05621 CR-RBS-2009-05658 CR-RBS-2009-05682 CR-RBS-2009-05750 CR-RBS-2009-05751 CR-RBS-2009-05758 CR-RBS-2009-05768 CR-RBS-2009-05795 CR-RBS-2009-05797 CR-RBS-2009-05811 CR-RBS-2009-05837 CR-RBS-2009-05865 CR-RBS-2009-05883 CR-RBS-2009-05885 CR-RBS-2009-05948 CR-RBS-2009-06011 CR-RBS-2009-06013 CR-RBS-2009-06031 CR -RBS-2009-06031 CR-RBS-2009-06031 CR-RBS-2009-06057 CR-RBS-2009-06058 CR-RBS-2009-06069 CR-RBS-2009-06078 CR-RBS-2009-06078 CR-RBS-2009-06078 CR-RBS-2009-06097 CR-RBS-2009-06148 CR-RBS-2009-06148 CR-RBS-2009-06151 CR-RBS-2009-06235 CR-RBS-2009-06316 CR-RBS-2009-06325 CR-RBS-2009-06331 CR-RBS-2009-06393 CR-RBS-2009-06419 CR-RBS-2009-06425 CR-RBS-2009-06460 CR-RBS-2009-1667 CR-RBS-2009-1670 CR-RBS-2009-1675 CR-RBS-2009-1676 CR-RBS-2009-3747 CR-RBS-2009-3862 CR-RBS-2009-3963 CR-RBS-2009-4096 CR-RBS-2009-4296 CR-RBS-2009-4350 CR-RBS-2009-4658 CR-RBS-2010-00017 CR-RBS-2010-00069 CR-RBS-201 0-001 01 CR-RBS-2010-00196 CR-RBS-2010-00237 CR-RBS-2010-00280 CR-RBS-2010-00424 CR-RBS-2010-00465 CR-RBS-2010-00483 CR-RBS-2010-00538 CR-RBS-2010-00558 CR-RBS-2010-00575 CR-RBS-2010-00596 CR-RBS-2010-00660 CR-RBS-2010-00680 CR-RBS-2010-00731 CR-RBS-2010-00736 CR-RBS-2010-00739 CR-RBS-2010-00762 CR-RBS-2010-00778 CR-RBS-2010-00783 CR-RBS-2010-00802 CR-RBS-2010-00811 CR-RBS-2010-00819 CR-RBS-2010-00824 CR-RBS-2010-01140 CR-RBS-20i 0-0"1 i 48 CR-RBS-20iO-01193 CR-RBS-2010-01205 CR-RBS-2010-01428 CR-RBS-2010-01566 CR-RBS-2010-01587
-4-Attachment A
CR-RBS-2010-01587 CR-RBS-2010-01592 CR-RBS-2010-01594 CR-RBS-2010-01667 CR-RBS-2010-01692 CR-RBS-2010-01717 CR-RBS-2010-01731 CR-RBS-2010-01763 CR-RBS-2010-01765 CR-RBS-2010-01775 CR-RBS-2010-01783 CR-RBS-2010-01808 CR-RBS-2010-01817 CR-RBS-2010-01821 CR-RBS-2010-01825 CR-RBS-2010-01831 CR-RBS-20i 0-01846 CR-RBS-2010-01849 CR-RBS-20 10-01850 CR-RBS-2010-01981 CR-RBS"2010-02048 CR-RBS-2010-02099 CR-RBS-2010-02177 CR-RBS-20 10-02362 CR-RBS-2010-02423 CR-RBS-2010-02468 CR-RBS-201 0-02475 CR-RBS-2010-02503 CR-RBS-2010-02527 CR-RBS-2010-02577 CR-RBS-2010-02732 CR-RBS-2010-02737 CR-RBS-201 0-02747 CR-RBS-2010-02771 CR-RBS-2010-02772 CR-RBS-2010-02775 CR-RBS-2010-02919 CR-RBS-2010-02920 CR-RBS-201 0-03104 CR-RBS-2010-03153 CR-RBS-2010-03170 CR-RBS-2010-03224 CR-RBS-2010-03584 CR-RBS-2010-03594 CR-RBS-2010-03629 CR-RBS-201 0-03744 CR-RBS-2010-03807 CR-RBS-2010-03826 CR-RBS-2010-03948 CR-RBS-2010-04013 CR-RBS-2010-04126 CR-RBS-201 0-04174 CR-RBS-2010-04186 CR-RBS-2010-04186 CR-RBS-201 0-04274 CR-RBS-2010-04318 CR-RBS-2010-04372 CR-RBS-2010-04491 CR-RBS-2010-04526 CR-RBS-2010-04959 CR-RBS-2010-04959 CR-RBS-201 0-04974 CR-RBS-201 0-051 05 CR-RBS-2010-05133 CR-RBS-2010-05224 CR-RBS-2010-05225 CR-RBS-2010-05244 CR-RBS-2010-05264 CR-RBS-2010-05270 CR-RBS-2010-05354 CR-RBS-2010-05371 CR-RBS-2010-05372 CR-RBS-2010-05391 CR-RBS-2010-05440 CR-RBS-2010-05540 CR-RBS-2010-05611 CR-RBS-2010-05627 CR-RBS-2010-05686 CR-RBS-2010-05766 CR-RBS-2010-05766 CR-RBS-20 1 0-05895 CR-RBS-2010-05912 CR-RBS-2010-06015 CR-RBS-2010-06053 CR-RBS-2010-06059 CR-RBS-2010-06099 CR-RBS-2010-06125 CR-RBS-2010-06168 CR-RBS-2010-06343 CR-RBS-2010-06498 CR-RBS-2010-06638 CR-RBS-2010-06658 CR-RBS-2010-06661 CR-RBS-2010-06683 CR-RBS-2010-06684 CR-RBS-2010-06689 CR-RBS-2010-06697 CR-RBS-2010-06754 CR-RBS-2010-06775 CR-RBS-2010-06823 CR-RBS-2010-6247 CR-RBS-2011-00053 CR-RBS-2011-00059 CR-RBS-20i 1-00147 CR-RBS-2011-00224 CR-RBS-2011-00393 CR-RBS-2011-00393 CR-RBS-2011-00575
-5-Attachment A CR-RBS-2010-01587 CR-RBS-2010-01592 CR-RBS-2010-01594 CR-RBS-2010-01667 CR-RBS-2010-01692 CR-RBS-2010-01717 CR-RBS-2010-01731 CR-RBS-2010-01763 CR-RBS-2010-01765 CR-RBS-2010-01775 CR-RBS-2010-01783 CR-RBS-2010-01808 CR-RBS-2010-01817 CR-RBS-2010-01821 CR-RBS-2010-01825 CR-RBS-2010-01831 CR-RBS-20i 0-01846 CR-RBS-2010-01849 CR-RBS-20 10-01850 CR-RBS-2010-01981 CR-RBS"2010-02048 CR-RBS-2010-02099 CR-RBS-2010-02177 CR-RBS-20 10-02362 CR-RBS-2010-02423 CR-RBS-2010-02468 CR-RBS-201 0-02475 CR-RBS-2010-02503 CR-RBS-2010-02527 CR-RBS-2010-02577 CR-RBS-2010-02732 CR-RBS-2010-02737 CR-RBS-201 0-02747 CR-RBS-2010-02771 CR-RBS-2010-02772 CR-RBS-2010-02775 CR-RBS-2010-02919 CR-RBS-2010-02920 CR-RBS-201 0-03104 CR-RBS-2010-03153 CR-RBS-2010-03170 CR-RBS-2010-03224 CR-RBS-2010-03584 CR-RBS-2010-03594 CR-RBS-2010-03629 CR-RBS-201 0-03744 CR-RBS-2010-03807 CR-RBS-2010-03826 CR-RBS-2010-03948 CR-RBS-2010-04013 CR-RBS-2010-04126 CR-RBS-201 0-04174 CR-RBS-2010-04186 CR-RBS-2010-04186 CR-RBS-201 0-04274 CR-RBS-2010-04318 CR-RBS-2010-04372 CR-RBS-2010-04491 CR-RBS-2010-04526 CR-RBS-2010-04959 CR-RBS-2010-04959 CR-RBS-201 0-04974 CR-RBS-201 0-051 05 CR-RBS-2010-05133 CR-RBS-2010-05224 CR-RBS-2010-05225 CR-RBS-2010-05244 CR-RBS-2010-05264 CR-RBS-2010-05270 CR-RBS-2010-05354 CR-RBS-2010-05371 CR-RBS-2010-05372 CR-RBS-2010-05391 CR-RBS-2010-05440 CR-RBS-2010-05540 CR-RBS-2010-05611 CR-RBS-2010-05627 CR-RBS-2010-05686 CR-RBS-2010-05766 CR-RBS-2010-05766 CR-RBS-20 1 0-05895 CR-RBS-2010-05912 CR-RBS-2010-06015 CR-RBS-2010-06053 CR-RBS-2010-06059 CR-RBS-2010-06099 CR-RBS-2010-06125 CR-RBS-2010-06168 CR-RBS-2010-06343 CR-RBS-2010-06498 CR-RBS-2010-06638 CR-RBS-2010-06658 CR-RBS-2010-06661 CR-RBS-2010-06683 CR-RBS-2010-06684 CR-RBS-2010-06689 CR-RBS-2010-06697 CR-RBS-2010-06754 CR-RBS-2010-06775 CR-RBS-2010-06823 CR-RBS-2010-6247 CR-RBS-2011-00053 CR-RBS-2011-00059 CR-RBS-20i 1-00147 CR-RBS-2011-00224 CR-RBS-2011-00393 CR-RBS-2011-00393 CR-RBS-2011-00575
-5-Attachment A
CR-RBS-2011-00604 CR-RBS-2011-00658 CR-RBS-2011-00682 CR-RBS-2011-00811 CR-RBS-2011-00833 CR-RBS-2011-00897 CR-RBS-2011-00899 CR-RBS-2011-00899 CR-RBS-2011-01053 CR-RBS-2011-01107 CR-RBS-2011-01185 CR-RBS-2011-01313 CR-RBS-2011-01333 CR-RBS-2011-01430 CR-RBS-2011-01850 CR-RBS-2011-01967 CR-RBS-2011-02402 CR-RBS-2011-02460 CR-RBS-2011-02498 CR-RBS-2011-02S25 CR-RBS-2011-03196 CR-RBS-2011-03296 CR-RBS-2011-03751 CR-RBS-2011-03818 CR-RBS-2011-03856 CR-RBS-2011-03872 CR-RBS-2011-03961 CR-RBS-2011-04022 CR-RBS-2011-04046 CR-RBS-2011-04054 CR-RBS-2011-04055 ASSESSMENTS LO-RLO-2008-00116 LO-RLO-2009-00041 LO-RLO-2009-00042 LO-RLO-2009-00060 LO-RLO-2009-00082 LO-RLO-2009-00102 LO-RLO-2009-00112 LO-RLO-2009-0 103 LO-RLO-2009-0124 LO-RLO-2009-0174 LO-RLO-2010-00020 LO-RLO-2010-00021 LO-RLO-2010-00035 LO-RLO-2010-0014 LO-RLO-2010-0016 LO-RLO-2010-0035 LO-RLO-2010-0041 LO-RLO-RBS-2009-139 LO-RLO-RBS-2009-140 LO-WTRBS-2011-00062 WORK ORDERS 071809 164528 164529 166223 179835 181114 192284 194016 198181 200986 201677 209393 209974 209975 211306 211412 213965 218725 221072 226485 223065 229594 229595 234052 234056 234057 234610 235805 235807 235808 238291 244247 249847 254023 258980 263705 266777 267260 267260 267262 267262 267341 268782 270028 271559 272015 -6 -Attachment A CR-RBS-2011-00604 CR-RBS-2011-00658 CR-RBS-2011-00682 CR-RBS-2011-00811 CR-RBS-2011-00833 CR-RBS-2011-00897 CR-RBS-2011-00899 CR-RBS-2011-00899 CR-RBS-2011-01053 CR-RBS-2011-01107 CR-RBS-2011-01185 CR-RBS-2011-01313 CR-RBS-2011-01333 CR-RBS-2011-01430 CR-RBS-2011-01850 CR-RBS-2011-01967 CR-RBS-2011-02402 CR-RBS-2011-02460 CR-RBS-2011-02498 CR-RBS-2011-02S25 CR-RBS-2011-03196 CR-RBS-2011-03296 CR-RBS-2011-03751 CR-RBS-2011-03818 CR-RBS-2011-03856 CR-RBS-2011-03872 CR-RBS-2011-03961 CR-RBS-2011-04022 CR-RBS-2011-04046 CR-RBS-2011-04054 CR-RBS-2011-04055 ASSESSMENTS LO-RLO-2008-00116 LO-RLO-2009-00041 LO-RLO-2009-00042 LO-RLO-2009-00060 LO-RLO-2009-00082 LO-RLO-2009-00102 LO-RLO-2009-00112 LO-RLO-2009-0 103 LO-RLO-2009-0124 LO-RLO-2009-0174 LO-RLO-2010-00020 LO-RLO-2010-00021 LO-RLO-2010-00035 LO-RLO-2010-0014 LO-RLO-2010-0016 LO-RLO-2010-0035 LO-RLO-2010-0041 LO-RLO-RBS-2009-139 LO-RLO-RBS-2009-140 LO-WTRBS-2011-00062 WORK ORDERS 071809 164528 164529 166223 179835 181114 192284 194016 198181 200986 201677 209393 209974 209975 211306 211412 213965 218725 221072 226485 223065 229594 229595 234052 234056 234057 234610 235805 235807 235808 238291 244247 249847 254023 258980 263705 266777 267260 267260 267262 267262 267341 268782 270028 271559 272015 -6 -Attachment A
WORK REQUESTS 019324 193739 225078 229253 243412 172738 193741 226399 230256 187156 223193 227375 232119 191107 225041 227381 232343 EFFECTIVENESS REVIEW PLANS 07-0493 07-1606 07-4922 08-0130QA TRENDINGfTRACKING REPORTS ON-SITE REVIEW COMMITTEE TRACKING DOCUMENTS LO-WTRBS-2009-0047 AUDIT REPORTS NUMBER QA-19-2010-RBS-1 QA-01-2009-RBS-1 QA-01-2010-RBS-1 QA-1 0-201 O-RBS-1 QA-14/15-2009-RBS-1 QA-12/18-2009-RBS-1 QA-07-2010-RBS-1 QA-3-2009-RBS-1 QS-2009-RBS-018 LO-WTRBS-2010-0270 LO-WTRBS-2011-0067 TITLE DATES Training March 31,2010 Fitness for Duty/Personnel Access Data August 7,2009 System Fitness for Duty/Access Authorization August 20,2010 Maintenance August 20,2010 Combined Radiation Protection and December 17,2009 Radwaste Combined Operations and Technical August 3,2009 Specifications Emergency Plan April 12 -May 24,2010 Corrective Action Program June 26,2009 Follow-Up Surveillance of the Yellow August 18-21, 2009 Problem Identification and Resolution (PI&R) Rating in the First Quarter 2009 Oversight Report -7 -Attachment A WORK REQUESTS 019324 193739 225078 229253 243412 172738 193741 226399 230256 187156 223193 227375 232119 191107 225041 227381 232343 EFFECTIVENESS REVIEW PLANS 07-0493 07-1606 07-4922 08-0130QA TRENDINGfTRACKING REPORTS ON-SITE REVIEW COMMITTEE TRACKING DOCUMENTS LO-WTRBS-2009-0047 AUDIT REPORTS NUMBER QA-19-2010-RBS-1 QA-01-2009-RBS-1 QA-01-2010-RBS-1 QA-1 0-201 O-RBS-1 QA-14/15-2009-RBS-1 QA-12/18-2009-RBS-1 QA-07-2010-RBS-1 QA-3-2009-RBS-1 QS-2009-RBS-018 LO-WTRBS-2010-0270 LO-WTRBS-2011-0067 TITLE DATES Training March 31,2010 Fitness for Duty/Personnel Access Data August 7,2009 System Fitness for Duty/Access Authorization August 20,2010 Maintenance August 20,2010 Combined Radiation Protection and December 17,2009 Radwaste Combined Operations and Technical August 3,2009 Specifications Emergency Plan April 12 -May 24,2010 Corrective Action Program June 26,2009 Follow-Up Surveillance of the Yellow August 18-21, 2009 Problem Identification and Resolution (PI&R) Rating in the First Quarter 2009 Oversight Report -7 -Attachment A
QS-2009-RBS-022 Followup Surveillance of the 2009 Corrective Action Program Audit October 21-29,2009 ENGINEERING CHANGES EC 12578 EC 26327 EC-26030 EC-05628 NUMBER SIMULATOR DISCREPANCY REPORTS 09-0011 09-0020 10-0094 SYSTEM HEALTH REPORTS 10-0114 Residual Heat Removal System, 4th Quarter 2010 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling, 4th Quarter 2010 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling, 1 st Quarter 2011 High Pressure Core Spray, 1 51 Quarter 2011 Standby Liquid Control, 4th Quarter 2010 230KV Electrical Distribution, 4th Quarter 2010 Standby Service Water, 4th Quarter 2010 MISCELLANEOUS DOCUMENTS TITLE ER-RB-2005-0342-000, Functional Impairment of Auxiliary Building Floor Drains File No. RBF-07-0070, Response to Generic Letter 2007-01 River Bend Station -Unit 1 Docket Number 50-458 License Number NPF-47 File No. G.1.495, G9.5, G9.33.4, River Bend Station -Unit 1 Docket Number 50-458 License Number NPF-47 Updated Response to Generic Letter 89-13, "Service Water System Problems Affecting Safety-Related Equipment" Preventative Maintenance Basis Temp!ate, EN-Relay -Control -8 -REVISION o o o o 09-0013 REVISION/DATE o May 3,2007 October 21, 1998 3 Attachment A QS-2009-RBS-022 Followup Surveillance of the 2009 Corrective Action Program Audit October 21-29,2009 ENGINEERING CHANGES EC 12578 EC 26327 EC-26030 EC-05628 NUMBER SIMULATOR DISCREPANCY REPORTS 09-0011 09-0020 10-0094 SYSTEM HEALTH REPORTS 10-0114 Residual Heat Removal System, 4th Quarter 2010 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling, 4th Quarter 2010 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling, 1 st Quarter 2011 High Pressure Core Spray, 1 51 Quarter 2011 Standby Liquid Control, 4th Quarter 2010 230KV Electrical Distribution, 4th Quarter 2010 Standby Service Water, 4th Quarter 2010 MISCELLANEOUS DOCUMENTS TITLE ER-RB-2005-0342-000, Functional Impairment of Auxiliary Building Floor Drains File No. RBF-07-0070, Response to Generic Letter 2007-01 River Bend Station -Unit 1 Docket Number 50-458 License Number NPF-47 File No. G.1.495, G9.5, G9.33.4, River Bend Station -Unit 1 Docket Number 50-458 License Number NPF-47 Updated Response to Generic Letter 89-13, "Service Water System Problems Affecting Safety-Related Equipment" Preventative Maintenance Basis Temp!ate, EN-Relay -Control -8 -REVISION o o o o 09-0013 REVISION/DATE o May 3,2007 October 21, 1998 3 Attachment A
Preventative Maintenance Basis Template, EN-Relay -Protective Preventative Maintenance Basis Template, EN-Relay -Timing Preventative Maintenance Basis Template, RBS Protective Relay -Lock Out Relay Series 3 3 o 4 Preventative Maintenance Basis Template, Control Relay -Gould "J" 2 Series River Bend Station Quarterly Trend Report 3 rd Quarter 2010 MAI-366755, E12-PC002B December 15, 2002 Position Paper, Fleet Position Paper for Battery Cell Surveillance September 29, 2009 Requirements for Specific Gravity RCP-NLOI-COURSE PLAN, initial Non-Licensed Operator Course Pian 2 RCTB-HZM-Notify, Hazardous Material Shipping Emergency Notification 0 TEAR-RBS-2009-0797, Evaluate CR-RBS-2009-03233 and CR-RBS-April 20, 2011 2009-03208 for Training Implications TEAR-RBS-2009-0804, Add CR-RBS-2009-03292 to Fuel Handler April 20, 2011 Training TEAR-RBS-2009-0940, Add CR-RBS-2009-03218 (Accidental Start of SWC-P1 B) to Applicable Training Material as OE TEAR-RBS-2009-1230, Develop Initial and Reoccurring Training for the Operations Shift Managers and Control Room Supervisors for Responsibilities As Defined in 49CFR Subpart I for 24 Hour Emergency Contact Information Associated With Radioactive Material Shipping Response April 20, 2011 April 28, 2011 MEASURING
& TEST EQUIPMENT (M&TE) NON-CONFORMANCE NOTIFICATIONS M&TE ID No. AVC-001A1 M&TE ID No. BMT-015A M&TE ID No. DIM-388A M&TE ID No. HPM-110A M&TE ID No. KTC-088A M&TE ID No. LRM-011A M&TE !D No. MOV-191A M&TE ID No. ROA-034A TITLE -9 -REVISION/DATE January 20, 2011 February 6, 2011 January 26, 2011 March 7, 2011 November 22, 2010 April 11, 2011 February 10, 2011 December 2,2010 Attachment A Preventative Maintenance Basis Template, EN-Relay -Protective Preventative Maintenance Basis Template, EN-Relay -Timing Preventative Maintenance Basis Template, RBS Protective Relay -Lock Out Relay Series 3 3 o 4 Preventative Maintenance Basis Template, Control Relay -Gould "J" 2 Series River Bend Station Quarterly Trend Report 3 rd Quarter 2010 MAI-366755, E12-PC002B December 15, 2002 Position Paper, Fleet Position Paper for Battery Cell Surveillance September 29, 2009 Requirements for Specific Gravity RCP-NLOI-COURSE PLAN, initial Non-Licensed Operator Course Pian 2 RCTB-HZM-Notify, Hazardous Material Shipping Emergency Notification 0 TEAR-RBS-2009-0797, Evaluate CR-RBS-2009-03233 and CR-RBS-April 20, 2011 2009-03208 for Training Implications TEAR-RBS-2009-0804, Add CR-RBS-2009-03292 to Fuel Handler April 20, 2011 Training TEAR-RBS-2009-0940, Add CR-RBS-2009-03218 (Accidental Start of SWC-P1 B) to Applicable Training Material as OE TEAR-RBS-2009-1230, Develop Initial and Reoccurring Training for the Operations Shift Managers and Control Room Supervisors for Responsibilities As Defined in 49CFR Subpart I for 24 Hour Emergency Contact Information Associated With Radioactive Material Shipping Response April 20, 2011 April 28, 2011 MEASURING
& TEST EQUIPMENT (M&TE) NON-CONFORMANCE NOTIFICATIONS M&TE ID No. AVC-001A1 M&TE ID No. BMT-015A M&TE ID No. DIM-388A M&TE ID No. HPM-110A M&TE ID No. KTC-088A M&TE ID No. LRM-011A M&TE !D No. MOV-191A M&TE ID No. ROA-034A TITLE -9 -REVISION/DATE January 20, 2011 February 6, 2011 January 26, 2011 March 7, 2011 November 22, 2010 April 11, 2011 February 10, 2011 December 2,2010 Attachment A
M& TE No. TQW-330A M&TE ID No. WLS-519A DRAWINGS NUMBER 0222.111-000-017 0222. 111-000-043 February 14, 2011 April 11, 2011 Engineering Change Markup EC 27430 -Reactor Recirculation Pump Assembly Engineering Change Markup EC 19651 -Assembly Drawing N-7500 Seal Cartridge 833-PC001A and 833-PC-001 B -10-REVISION 300 301 Attachment A M& TE No. TQW-330A M&TE ID No. WLS-519A DRAWINGS NUMBER 0222.111-000-017
 
0222. 111-000-043 February 14, 2011 April 11, 2011 Engineering Change Markup EC 27430 -Reactor Recirculation Pump Assembly Engineering Change Markup EC 19651 -Assembly Drawing N-7500 Seal Cartridge 833-PC001A and 833-PC-001 B -10-REVISION 300 301 Attachment A
Information Request -February 16, 2011 Biennial Problem Identification and Resolution Inspection
-River Bend Station Inspection Report 2011-006 This inspection will cover the period from July 10, 2009, to May 13, 2011. All requested information should be limited to this period unless otherwise specified.
 
To the extent possible, the requested information should be provided electronically in Adobe PDF or Microsoft Office 2007 format, and placed on a compact disc or a DVD. In addition, please load the documents into IMS Certrec. Lists of documents should be provided in Microsoft Excel (2007) or a similar sortable format. A supplemental information request will likely be sent prior to April 25, 2011. Please provide the following no later than March 21, 2011. These documents should cover the time period from July 10, 2009, to March 1, 2011. 1. Document Lists Note: for these summary lists, please include the document/reference number, the document title or a description of the issue, initiation date, and current status. a. Summary list of all corrective action documents related to significant conditions adverse to quality that were opened, closed, or evaluated during the period b. Summary list of all corrective action documents related to conditions adverse to quality that were opened or closed during the period c. Summary lists of all corrective action documents which were upgraded or downgraded in priority/significance during the period d. Summary list of all corrective action documents that subsume or "roll up" one or more smaller issues for the period e. Summary lists of operator workarounds, engineering review requests and/or operability evaluations, temporary modifications, and control room and safety system deficiencies opened, closed, or evaluated during the period f. Summary list of plant safety issues raised or addressed by the Employee Concerns Program (or equivalent)
g. Summary list of all Apparent Cause Evaluations completed during the period h. Summary list of all Root Cause Evaluations planned or in progress but not complete at the end of the period -1 -Attachment B Information Request -February 16, 2011 Biennial Problem Identification and Resolution Inspection
-River Bend Station Inspection Report 2011-006 This inspection will cover the period from July 10, 2009, to May 13, 2011. All requested information should be limited to this period unless otherwise specified.
 
To the extent possible, the requested information should be provided electronically in Adobe PDF or Microsoft Office 2007 format, and placed on a compact disc or a DVD. In addition, please load the documents into IMS Certrec. Lists of documents should be provided in Microsoft Excel (2007) or a similar sortable format. A supplemental information request will likely be sent prior to April 25, 2011. Please provide the following no later than March 21, 2011. These documents should cover the time period from July 10, 2009, to March 1, 2011. 1. Document Lists Note: for these summary lists, please include the document/reference number, the document title or a description of the issue, initiation date, and current status. a. Summary list of all corrective action documents related to significant conditions adverse to quality that were opened, closed, or evaluated during the period b. Summary list of all corrective action documents related to conditions adverse to quality that were opened or closed during the period c. Summary lists of all corrective action documents which were upgraded or downgraded in priority/significance during the period d. Summary list of all corrective action documents that subsume or "roll up" one or more smaller issues for the period e. Summary lists of operator workarounds, engineering review requests and/or operability evaluations, temporary modifications, and control room and safety system deficiencies opened, closed, or evaluated during the period f. Summary list of plant safety issues raised or addressed by the Employee Concerns Program (or equivalent)
g. Summary list of all Apparent Cause Evaluations completed during the period h. Summary list of all Root Cause Evaluations planned or in progress but not complete at the end of the period -1 -Attachment B
2. Full Documents, with Attachments a. Root Cause Evaluations completed during the period b. Quality assurance audits performed during the period c. AI! audits/surveillances performed during the period of the Corrective Action Program, of individual corrective actions, and of cause evaluations d. Corrective action activity reports, functional area self-assessments, and NRC third party assessments completed during the period (do not include INPO assessments)
e. Corrective action documents generated during the period for the following:
1. NCV's and Violations issued to RBS ii. LER's issued by RBS f. Corrective action documents generated for the following, if they were determined to be applicable to RBS (for those that were evaluated but determined not to be applicable, provide a summary list): i. NRC Information Notices, Bulletins, and Generic Letters issued or evaluated during the period ii. Part 21 reports issued or evaluated during the period iii. Vendor safety information letters (or equivalent)
issued or evaluated during the period iv. Other external events and/or Operating Experience evaluated for applicability during the period g. Corrective action documents generated for the following:
i. Maintenance preventable functional failures which occurred or were evaluated during the period ii. Adverse trends in equipment, processes, procedures, or programs which were evaluated during the period iii. Action items generated or addressed by plant safety review committees during the period iv. Problems related to Emergency Diesel Generators since July 2009. -2 -Attachment B 2. Full Documents, with Attachments a. Root Cause Evaluations completed during the period b. Quality assurance audits performed during the period c. AI! audits/surveillances performed during the period of the Corrective Action Program, of individual corrective actions, and of cause evaluations d. Corrective action activity reports, functional area self-assessments, and NRC third party assessments completed during the period (do not include INPO assessments)
e. Corrective action documents generated during the period for the following:
1. NCV's and Violations issued to RBS ii. LER's issued by RBS f. Corrective action documents generated for the following, if they were determined to be applicable to RBS (for those that were evaluated but determined not to be applicable, provide a summary list): i. NRC Information Notices, Bulletins, and Generic Letters issued or evaluated during the period ii. Part 21 reports issued or evaluated during the period iii. Vendor safety information letters (or equivalent)
issued or evaluated during the period iv. Other external events and/or Operating Experience evaluated for applicability during the period g. Corrective action documents generated for the following:
i. Maintenance preventable functional failures which occurred or were evaluated during the period ii. Adverse trends in equipment, processes, procedures, or programs which were evaluated during the period iii. Action items generated or addressed by plant safety review committees during the period iv. Problems related to Emergency Diesel Generators since July 2009. -2 -Attachment B
3. Logs and Reports a. Corrective action performance trending/tracking information generated during the period and broken down by functional organization b. Corrective action effectiveness review reports generated during the period c. Current system health reports or similar information d. Radiation protection event logs during the period e. Security event logs and security incidents during the period (sensitive information can be provided by hard copy during first week on site) f. Employee Concern Program (or equivalent)
logs (sensitive information can be provided by hard copy during first week on site) g, List of Training deficiencies, requests for training improvements, and simulator deficiencies for the period 4. Procedures 5. a. Corrective action program procedures, to include initiation and evaluation procedures, operability determination procedures, apparent and root cause evaluation/determination procedures, and any other procedures which implement the corrective action program at RBS. b. Quality Assurance program procedures c. Employee Concerns Program (or equivalent)
procedures d. Procedures which implement/maintain a Safety Conscious Work Environment Other a. List of risk significant components and systems b, Organization charts for plant staff and long-term/permanent contractors Note: "Corrective action documents" refers to condition reports, notifications, action requests, cause evaluations, and/or other similar documents, as applicable to RBS. As it becomes available, but no later than March 21, 2011, this information should be uploaded on the Certrec IMS website and inform Mr. Michael Vasquez by email at MichaeLVasquez@nrc.gov.
 
Paper documents or electronic documents on CD I DVD may be sent via overnight carrier to: -3-Attachment B 3. Logs and Reports a. Corrective action performance trending/tracking information generated during the period and broken down by functional organization b. Corrective action effectiveness review reports generated during the period c. Current system health reports or similar information d. Radiation protection event logs during the period e. Security event logs and security incidents during the period (sensitive information can be provided by hard copy during first week on site) f. Employee Concern Program (or equivalent)
logs (sensitive information can be provided by hard copy during first week on site) g, List of Training deficiencies, requests for training improvements, and simulator deficiencies for the period 4. Procedures 5. a. Corrective action program procedures, to include initiation and evaluation procedures, operability determination procedures, apparent and root cause evaluation/determination procedures, and any other procedures which implement the corrective action program at RBS. b. Quality Assurance program procedures c. Employee Concerns Program (or equivalent)
procedures d. Procedures which implement/maintain a Safety Conscious Work Environment Other a. List of risk significant components and systems b, Organization charts for plant staff and long-term/permanent contractors Note: "Corrective action documents" refers to condition reports, notifications, action requests, cause evaluations, and/or other similar documents, as applicable to RBS. As it becomes available, but no later than March 21, 2011, this information should be uploaded on the Certrec IMS website and inform Mr. Michael Vasquez by email at MichaeLVasquez@nrc.gov.
 
Paper documents or electronic documents on CD I DVD may be sent via overnight carrier to: -3-Attachment B
Michael Vasquez U.S. NRC Region IV 612 E. Lamar Blvd. Suite 400 Arlington, TX 76011 Please note that the NRC is not currently able to accept electronic documents on thumb drives or other similar digital media. Note: After the request above was sent to RBS, Robert Hagar replaced Michael Vasquez as the team lead. -4 -Attachment B Michael Vasquez U.S. NRC Region IV 612 E. Lamar Blvd. Suite 400 Arlington, TX 76011 Please note that the NRC is not currently able to accept electronic documents on thumb drives or other similar digital media. Note: After the request above was sent to RBS, Robert Hagar replaced Michael Vasquez as the team lead. -4 -Attachment B
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Latest revision as of 15:25, 12 November 2019

Redacted Version of Non-concurrence - River Bend Station - NRC Problem Identification and Resolution Inspection Report 05000458/2011006
ML112430218
Person / Time
Site: River Bend Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 08/31/2011
From: Antonio Barrett
NRC Region 4
To:
References
IR-11-006
Download: ML112430218 (5)
v • d • e


Text

NON-CONCURRENCE PACKAGE RIVER BEND STATION - NRC PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND RESOLUTION INSPECTION REPORT 05000458/2011006 August 31,2011 This NCP document is a redacted version to protect personal privacy within the deliberative proces NRC FORM 757 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION NRCMD101SC NON-CONC SECTION A - -TO BE COMPLETED .._--_...

BY NON-CONCURRING ...

INDIVIDUAL - - - - ---- TlTLE OF DOCUMENT *--fAD.h,~A.s ACCESSION ~!O ..

1~,!~,~.'~~.::~:::~_!,:'ynoN -)'lRC Pi&RREPORT 05000458/2011006 uv ...... UtV!r.::I'II I ..;>rV!'1,,::H..Jr\

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I ;:'I"UI~;:'U" I"MUI'lt: I~ JI Michael Hay, Chief, TSB DRS I 817-276-6527 .,

I-:N-;-;A:7M';-;E""'O;;;-F;::--;-;N-;;O:i:-Ni-c-C"'O:;-;N-;-;C;:;:U';-;R::-;:R:;-;CIN~G;::-;;:IN-;T-DO;-;;IV:-;;I-;:;D;-;UA-;-;L;-------------------------;-;P'iLH~ONE fJ Andrew J. Barrett _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ... _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ..*....l _ _ _ _ * _ _ _ _ _, - - -_ _ _ . 225-635-3193 I 1-1 DOCUMENTAUTHOR  !;l] DOCUMENT CONTRIBUTOR o DOCUMENT REVIEWER o ON CONCURRENCE iORGANIZATION -- -... - .. - - - - - -...

TITLE Resident Inspector - River Bend Station

- - - ' - - ... . . . - - - _....

_ _ _,-I R~~jon iV, Div~~ion of ReactorProjects,!~C_ _ _ __

REASOt~S FOR I~ON-CONCURRENCE During the Biennial Problem Identification and Resolution inspection at River Bend Station, we identified that the licensee had found door sealing deficiencies in the control room envelope. The deficiencies were identified in consecutive performances of the surveillance procedure "Control Room Habitability Assessment," which is performed on an 18 month frequency. The surveillance test procedure satisfies the technical specification 5.5.14 requirements Iu lIluinlain the CRE I boundary in its design condition including configuration control and preventive maintenance. During the performance orthe surveillance in 2008, the licensee documented the following deficiencies for doors cn 116-22 and CB 116-23: "Air Leaks Auj weather strip CR-RBS-2008-0531I WR- J 39913 WR 139914," During the second performance of the lest (note, assessment I procedure performed by a different engineer) in 2010, the licensee documented the following deficiency for door cn 116-22:

"Gap is even, air leaks around door, but is negligible. Wrote CR-RBS-2010-1 148." The work requests and condition report documented in 2008 were closed to a work order, This work order was given a priority of 5 (the lowest priority level) and left unplanned. In 2010, CR-RBS-2010-1148 was closed to the same work order. The inspectors found that over one year later, the work order had yet to be planned, and the issue with the door seals on CB-116-22 had not been fully evaluated. To this day, the licensee has not fully evaluated or addressed the door sealing deficienc NEI 99-03, "Control Room Habitability Assessment," contains the NRC endorsed standards for evaluating deficiencies in control room envelopes to meet the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.197. The following information provided in the appendices of NEI 99-03 detail the standards for detecting deficiencies in the control room envelope:

Appendix H. System Assessment 3.4.4 (page H-7)

Doors in Contra! Room Boundary Door Seals can be a potentiul significant source of in-leakage. Experience has indicated that the door to door frame (sides and top of door) and the noor (bottom of door) can be significant leak locations. The inspection should ensure not only the integrity of the seals, but verify that the door is properly compressing the seal Table H-! Determination of Vulnerability Susceptibl!ity System Component Determining lnleakage Vulnerabilities Envelope Doors I). Determine that there are no dcfcct~ in the doors.

I

';jj CONTINUED IN SECTION D Use ADAMS Template NRC-006 PRINTED 0'1 RECYCL::D PAPER

NRC FORM 757 U,S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION NRC MO 10.1se PROCESS OF DOCUMENT iA.DAMSACCESSION N I BEND ST AnON - NRC PI&R REPORT 05000458/2011 B - TO BE COMPLETED BY NON-CONCURRING INDIVIDUAL'S SUPERVISOR

N/A (THIS SECTION SHOULD ONLY BE CO~~_LETED ~F SUPERVISOR~S DIFF~~~~"JT THAN .DOCUME_N_:_SPONS~~_.)_ _

II Vince Gaddy fIT-L-E-"-" . - - - - - - - - - . - - - - - - .- IPHONE NO.

Branch Chief ORGANllATION---*----------------------------'---** -----

I 817-860-8144 Plant Branch C. Division of Reactor Proiects

--_._------ '---"--- --~'--- --- - - - - - -.. - - - - - - - - - - - 1 COMMENTS FOR THE DOCUMENT SPONSOR TO CONSIDER

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I HAVE NO COMMENTS rJ LJ I HAVE THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS

i CONTiNUED iN SECTION 0 PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER

NRC FORM 757 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION I NRC MD 10 ~S8 (3-2009)

NON-CONCURRENCE PROCESS ITITLE OF DOCUMENT RIVEIl!3~.~P'...?TAT10N - NRC Pl&R 05000458120 Ii 006 I,ADAMS ,!.,CCESSION N i

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SECTION 0: CONTINUATION PAGE

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CO~HtNUAT\ON OF SECTIO~,J bll A n L, B [J c t). D,,,,ml,, th" Ih' dooc "", (Ineludlog "p') '" 0" ""k,d, ' " oot missing "d hon pcop,'O ). Determine that doors are properly compressed or fitting against the door seal ). Determine that door latches are functioning properly to maintain the door securely close ). Determine that door frames are properly seale Appendix J. Control Room Envelope Sealing Program 3.1 Doors and Door Seals The deDI' should fit properly in the frame, with hinges securely attached. Door sweep should be in continuous contact with the Iloor or threshold for the entire width of the door. The gasket or seal should be an approved type, be [rce of cracks and shuuld form ;j contact seal 3round the entire perimeter uf the dour. The door nlld frnme should be free of breaks or open hOles, With IConclusion:

IThe nonconcurring inspector contends that an additional observation should be included in the report under Section 3, IAssessment. Effectiveness of Corrective Action Program documenting the untimely actions to fully address a deficient condition that could potentially impact tile integrity of the con[rol room envelope:. This is reinforced by the failure to ensure that the control room envelope was maintained to the standards as presented in NEI-99-03 ..

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NRC Y-ORM 757 u.s. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSiON NRC M[;J 10 ';::,R (3*2009)

NON-CONCURRENCE PROC TITLE OF DOCUMENT ADAMS ACCESSION N River Bend

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Station - NRC PI&R REPORT 05000458/2011006

?ECTION C - TO BE COMPLETED BY DOCUMENT SPONSOR INAME Michael TITLE PHONE N Branch Chief 8! 7-276-6527 ORGANIZATION Project Support Branch 1, Division of Reactor Safety ACTIONS TAKEN TO ADDRESS NON-CONCURRENCE (This section should be revised, as necessary, to reflect the final outcome of the non-concurrence process, including a complete discussion of how individual concerns were addressed.)

Multiple meetings were conducted with myself, Andy Barrett, Harold Walker, and Bob Hagar to discuss the issue. Bob Hagar was the team lead for the PIR inspection, and Harold Walker, a technical expert in NRRJDivision of Safety Systems/Containment and Ventilation Branch provided technical suppor These discussions focused on assessing the adequacy of the licensee's actions following their identi!1cation of control room envelope (eRE) door seals that had leakag Based on our discussions I was not able to conclude that the licensee 'was inappropriately handling the issue or that a currt~llt f safety concern existed. The licensee had evaluated the door sealleabge as "negligible," thereby implying that this condition was not a condition adverse to quality requiring prompt corrective actions. eRE leakage surveillance test results in 2008 and 2010 indicated that the overall leakage of the CRE was less than 4 percent of the allowable leakage. In addition, the surveillance results in 2010 showed no decrease in safety margin, in fact the test results showed slightly better result I I agree the licensee could have handled the issue better. Their evaluation of door leakage could have been more thorough, the work requests could of been prioritized higher and performed sooner, or they could of concluded based on the negligible leakage no actions were currently neede CONTINUED IN SECTION D SIGNATU~E - D#CUMENT SPONSOR

~ 0(. fA r INON-CONCURRING iN-~IVIDUAL (To be completed by document sponsorwh_n process is, mp!ete. ie., after documem i:.~igned)

CONCURS 'WANTS NCP FORM PUBLIC

)t NON-CONCURS WANTS NCP FORM ~JON-PUBLIC WITHDRAWS NOhi-COI\lCURRENCE (Ie., discontinues process)

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