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| | issue date = 03/04/1998 | | | issue date = 03/04/1998 |
| | title = LER 98-001-00:on 980203,automatic Start of HPCS EDG Was Noted.Caused by Operator Error.Operations Crew Stabilized Plant at Approximately 75% Reactor Power & Investigation of Event Was initiated.W/980304 Ltr | | | title = LER 98-001-00:on 980203,automatic Start of HPCS EDG Was Noted.Caused by Operator Error.Operations Crew Stabilized Plant at Approximately 75% Reactor Power & Investigation of Event Was initiated.W/980304 Ltr |
| | author name = BEMIS P R, PFITZER B | | | author name = Bemis P, Pfitzer B |
| | author affiliation = WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM | | | author affiliation = WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM |
| | addressee name = | | | addressee name = |
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| =Text= | | =Text= |
| {{#Wiki_filter:CATEGORYREGULsRYINFORMATION DXSTRIBUT SYSTEM(RXDS)ACCESSION NBR:9803110369 DOC.DATE: | | {{#Wiki_filter:CATEGORY REGULs RY INFORMATION DXSTRIBUT SYSTEM (RXDS) |
| 98/03/04NOTARIZED: | | ACCESSION NBR:9803110369 DOC.DATE: 98/03/04 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET FACIL:50-397 WPPSS Nuclear Project, Unit 2, Washington Public Powe 05000397 AUTH. NAME. AUTHOR AFFILIATION PFITZER,B. Washington Public Power Supply System BEMIS,P.R. Washington Public Power Supply System RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION |
| NODOCKETFACIL:50-397 WPPSSNuclearProject,Unit2,Washington PublicPowe05000397AUTH.NAME.AUTHORAFFILIATION PFITZER,B.
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| Washington PublicPowerSupplySystemBEMIS,P.R. | |
| Washington PublicPowerSupplySystemRECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION | |
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| ==SUBJECT:== | | ==SUBJECT:== |
| LER,98-001-00:on 980203,automatic startofHPCSEDGwasnoted.Causedbyoperatorerror.Operations crewstabilized plantatapproximately 75%reactorpower&investigation ofeventwasinitiated.W/980304 ltr.DISTRIBUTION CODE:IE22TCOPIESRECEIVED: | | LER,98-001-00:on 980203,automatic start of HPCS EDG was noted. Caused by operator error. Operations crew stabilized plant at approximately 75% reactor power & investigation of event was initiated.W/980304 ltr. |
| LTR)ENCLiSIZE:TITLE:50.73/50.9 LicenseeEventReport(LER),IncidentRpt,etc.rNOTES:RECIPIENT IDCODE/NAME PD4-2PDINTERNAL: | | DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22T COPIES RECEIVED: LTR ) ENCL i SIZE: |
| ACRSAEOD/SPD/RRAB NRR/DE/ECGB NRR/DE/EMEB NRR/DRCH/HICB NRR/DRCH/HQMB NRR/DSSA/SPLB RES/DET/EIB EXTERNAL:
| | TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event rReport (LER), Incident Rpt, etc. |
| LSTLOBBYWARDNOACPOORE,W.NRCPDRCOPIESLTTRENCL111111111111111111111111RECIPIENT IDCODE/NAME POSLUSNY,C BFILECENTE/D~EBNRR/DRCH/HHFB NRR/DRCH/HOLB NRR/DRPM/PECB NRR/DSSA/SRXB RGN4FILE01LITCOBRYCE,JHNOACQUEENER,DS NUDOCSFULLTXTCOPIESLTTRENCL112211111111111111111111ENOTETOALL"RIDS"RECIPIENTS:
| | NOTES: |
| PLEASEHELPUSTOREDUCEWASTE.TOHAVEYOURNAMEORORGANIZATION REMOVEDFROMDISTRIBUTION LISTSORREDUCETHENUMBEROFCOPIESRECEIVEDBYYOUORYOURORCANIZATION, CONTACTTHEDOCUMENTCONTROLDESK(DCD)ONEXTENSION 415-2083FULLTEXTCONVERSION REQUIREDTOTALNUMBEROFCOPIESREQUIRED:
| | RECIPIENT COPIES RECIPIENT COPIES ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL PD4-2 PD 1 1 POSLUSNY,C 1 1 INTERNAL: ACRS 1 1 B 2 2 AEOD/SPD/RRAB 1 1 FILE CENTE 1 1 NRR/DE/ECGB 1 1 /D~E B 1 1 NRR/DE/EMEB 1 1 NRR/DRCH/HHFB 1 1 NRR/DRCH/HICB 1 1 NRR/DRCH/HOLB 1 1 NRR/DRCH/HQMB 1 1 NRR/DRPM/PECB 1 1 NRR/DSSA/SPLB 1 1 NRR/DSSA/SRXB 1 1 RES/DET/EIB 1 1 RGN4 FILE 01 1 1 EXTERNAL: L ST LOBBY WARD 1 1 LITCO BRYCE,J H 1 1 NOAC POORE,W. 1 1 NOAC QUEENER,DS 1 1 NRC PDR 1 1 NUDOCS FULL TXT 1 1 E |
| LTTR25ENCL25 IVASHIXG'I OXI'I'III. IGl>Ohi'I:.It SL'I'I'IX SYS'I'I:.XI I?o.ihu'c>8~Ri<%1<<<<<l, Ii'<<'i<i<t<',i<a< | | NOTE TO ALL "RIDS" RECIPIENTS: |
| <i9.452-n<)(i<<< | | PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE. TO HAVE YOUR NAME OR ORGANIZATION REMOVED FROM DISTRIBUTION LISTS OR REDUCE THE NUMBER OF COPIES RECEIVED BY YOU OR YOUR ORCANIZATION, CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK (DCD) ON EXTENSION 415-2083 FULL TEXT CONVERSION REQUIRED TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 25 ENCL 25 |
| March4,1998G02-98-044 DocketNo.50-397DocumentControlDeskU.S.NuclearRegulatory Commission Washington, D.C.20555Gentlemen:
| | |
| | IVASHIXG' IOX I'I 'III. IG l>Ohi'I:.It SL'I'I'IX SYS'I'I:.XI I? o. ihu'c>8 ~ Ri<%1<<<<<l, I i'<<'i<i<t<',i<a< <i9.452-n<)(i<<< |
| | March 4, 1998 G02-98-044 Docket No. 50-397 Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Gentlemen: |
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| ==Subject:== | | ==Subject:== |
| NUCLEARPLANTWNP-2,OPERATING LICENSENPF-21,LICENSEEEV1PlTREPORTNO.98-001-00 Transmitted herewithisvoluntary LicenseeEventReportNo.98-001-00 forWNP-2.Thisreportissubmitted inresponsetotherecommendations contained inNUREG-1022.
| | NUCLEAR PLANT WNP-2, OPERATING LICENSE NPF-21, LICENSEE EV1PlT REPORT NO. 98-001-00 Transmitted herewith is voluntary Licensee Event Report No. 98-001-00 for WNP-2. This report is submitted in response to the recommendations contained in NUREG-1022. |
| Shouldyouhaveanyquestions ordesireadditional information regarding thismatter,pleasecallmeorMr.PaulInserraat(509)377-4147.
| | Should you have any questions or desire additional information regarding this matter, please call me or Mr. Paul Inserra at (509) 377-4147. |
| Respectfully, CP.BeisiPresident, NuclearOperations 1DropPE23Enclosure cc:EWMerschoff, NRCRIVKEPerkins,Jr.,NRCRIV,WCFOCPoslusny, Jr.,NRRPDRobinson, Winston&StrawnNRCSr.ResidentInspector, MD927N(2)INPORecordsCenter-Atlanta,GADLWilliams, BPA,MD3999803i'10369 980304PDRADQCK05000397PDRff!fill!II!III!lfillfllllfffll fffffff LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LZR)FACILITYNAME(1)WashintonNuclearPlant-Unit2DOCKETNUMBERI2)50-397PAGE(3)1OF4TITLE(4)VOLUNTARY REPORTOFAUTOMATIC STARTOFHPCSDGDUETOOPERATORERROREVENTDATEIS)LERNUMBERI6)REPORTDATE(7)OTHERFACILITIES INVOLVED(B)MONTHDAYYEARYEARSEQUENTlAL NUMBERREV.NUMBERMOMrHPAYFAClLHYNAMEDOCKETNUMBER02039800030498FACrLITYNAMEN/A05000OPERATING HOOBTHISREPORTISSUBHITTEO PURSUANTTOTHEIKQUIREHENTS OF10CFR5:(Checkoneormore)Ili)20.402(h) 20.405(a)(1) | | Respectfully, C |
| Qi20.405(a)(1) 0B20.405(a)
| | P .Be is i President, Nuclear Operations 1 Drop PE23 Enclosure cc: EW Merschoff, NRC RIV NRC Sr. Resident Inspector, MD927N (2) |
| (1)(iii)20.405(a)(1)(iv) 20.405(a)(1)(v) 20.405(c) 50.36(c)(1)50.36(c)(2) 50.73(a)(2) | | KE Perkins, Jr., NRC RIV, WCFO INPO Records Center - Atlanta, GA C Poslusny, Jr., NRR DL Williams, BPA, MD399 PD Robinson, Winston & Strawn 9803i'10369 980304 PDR ADQCK 05000397 PDR ff!fill!II!III!lfillfllllfffll fffffff |
| I50.73(a)(2)(ii)50.73(a)(2)(iii)50.73(a)(2)
| | |
| (iv)50.73(a)(2)(v) 50.73(a)(2)(vii) 50.73(a)(2)(vill)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(viii) | | LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LZR) |
| (B)50.73(a)(2)(x) 73.71(b)73.71(c)OTHERVoluntary (NUREG1022)NAMEBillPfitzer,Licensing EngineerLICENSEECONTACTFORTHISLER(12)TELEPHONE NUMBER(IncludeAreaCode)509-377-2419 COMPLETEONELINEFOREACHCOMPONENT fAILUREDESCRIBED I)iTHISREPORT(13)CAUSEsvsvrMCOMPONENT lAvlJFAClVRER REPORTABLE TONPRDSCAUSECOMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE TONPRDSSUPPLFMENTAL REPORTEXPECTED(14)YEScornle)edEXPECTEDSUBMISSION DATE.NOFXPECTEDMONTHDAYYEARABSTRACT:
| | FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER I2) PAGE (3) |
| On2/03/98,duringtheperformance ofsurveillance testing,withtheplantinOperating Mode1,acontrolroomoperatormistakenly trippedthesupplybreakerfor4160velectrical busSM-2byinadvertent operation ofthebreakerhandswitch.
| | Washin ton Nuclear Plant - Unit 2 50-397 1 OF 4 TITLE (4) VOLUNTARYREPORT OF AUTOMATICSTART OF HPCS DG DUE TO OPERATOR ERROR EVENT DATE IS) LER NUMBER I6) REPORT DATE (7) OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (B) |
| Thisresultedinthelossofelectrical busSM-2whichwasaccompanied bytrippingofcondensate pumpCOND-P-1B, condensate boosterpumpCOND-P-2B, condenser circulating waterpumpCW-P-1BandthesupplybreakertobusSM-4,andautomatic startingoftheHighPressureCoreSprayemergency dieselgenerator (HPCSDG).LossofCOND-P-1B andCOND-P-2B initiated areactorwaterleveltransient whichwasmitigated bypromptOperations crewactiontoreducetotalcoreflowtoapproximately 60millionIb-mass/hr byuseoftheReactorRecirculation system.Allplantequipment operatedasdesignedduringtheevent.Immediate actionsweretakenbytheOperations crewtostabilize theplantatapproximately 75%reactorpower,andaninvestigation oftheeventwasinitiated byconvening anIncidentReviewBoardORB).Thecauseoftheeventwashumanerrorandfailuretoselfcheck,inthatthecontrolroomoperatorerroneously trippedthesupplybreakerforelectrical busSM-2,whichinturncausedthelossofbusSM-4andthestartoftheHPCSDG.Thiseventisvoluntarily reportedsincetheHPCSDGisnotanEngineered SafetyFeatureatWNP-2.Thesafetysignificance ofthiseventisconsidered minimal.
| | MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR SEQUENTlAL REV. MOMrH PAY FAClLHYNAME DOCKET NUMBER NUMBER NUMBER FACrLITYNAME 02 03 98 00 03 04 98 N/A 05000 OPERATING HOOB THIS REPORT IS SUBHITTEO PURSUANT TO THE IKQUIREHENTS OF 10 CFR 5: (Check one or more) Ili) 20.402(h) 20.405(c) 50.73(a)(2) (iv) 73.71(b) 20.405(a)(1) Qi 50.36(c) (1) 50.73(a)(2)(v) 73.71(c) 20.405(a)(1) 0B 50.36(c)(2) 50.73(a)(2)(vii) OTHER 20.405(a) (1) (iii) 50.73(a)(2) I 50.73(a)(2)(vill)(A) |
| FACILITYNAMEI1)LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LERTEXTCONTINUATION DOCKET))UMBERI2)YEARLER))UMBERI6)SDQVENTIALNUMBERREYIsIorr IRJHBCRPAGEI3)Washington NuclearPlant-Unit250-39798001002OF4TEXT(Ifmorespaceisrequired, useadditional copiesofNRCForm366A)()7)EvenDescritionOnFebruary3,1998,whileoperating inMode1at100%power,controlroompersonnel weremakingpreparations toperformtheDivision1Emergency DieselGenerator semi-annual operability surveillance (OSP-ELEC-S701).
| | Voluntary 20.405(a)(1)(iv) 50.73(a) (2)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(viii) (B) (NUREG 1022) 20.405(a)(1)(v) 50.73(a) (2)(iii) 50.73(a)(2)(x) |
| Inaccordance withthesurveillance procedure, thedesignated ControlRoomOperator(CRO2)hadshiftedthepowersourceforelectrical boardSM-1fromtransformer TR-Ntotransformer TR-S,withasecondControlRoomOperator(CRO3)actingasapeercheckerfortheevolution.
| | LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12) |
| Asoneofthefinalstepsintheevolution, theprocedure directedthecontrolswitchforbreakerCB-Nl/1,thenormalsupplybreakertoelectrical busSM-1,tobeplacedintheTRIPpositiontoensuretheswitchescutcheon greenflagisdisplayed.
| | NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code) |
| Justpriortothisstep,CRO3(thepeerchecker)responded toanunrelated controlroomannunciator, andCRO2(theperformer) momentarily turnedawayfromthecontrolpaneltoreviewtheimpending stepsoftheprocedure.
| | Bill Pfitzer, Licensing Engineer 509-377-2419 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT fAILURE DESCRIBED I)i THIS REPORT (13) |
| Afterreviewing theprocedure, CRO2returnedhisattention tothecontrolpanelandincorrectly selectedandmanipulated thecontrolswitchforbreakerCB-Nl/2,thenormalsupplybreakertobusSM-2.Uponmanipulation ofthehandswitch, CB-Nl/2tripped,de-energizing SM-2.Theselection andoperation ofthehandswitch forCB-Nl/2wasperformed inerrorbyCRO2.De-energization ofSM-2causedautomatic trippingofthepumpsassociated withthebus,i.e.,condensate pumpCOND-P-1B, condensate boosterpumpCOND-P-2B, andcondenser circulating waterpumpCW-P-1B.Theconsequent reduction inreactorfeedwater flowresultedinreactorwaterlevelloweringatarateofabout25inchesperminute.PromptactionbytheOperations crewtolowertotalcoreflowtoapproximately 60million1b-mass/hr usingtheReactorRecirculation system,thusreducingreactorpowerlevel,successfully stabilized theplantatapproximately 75%power.Powerwasimmediately returnedtobusSM-2bymanualclosureofthealternate supplybreakerfromtransformer TR-S.Additionally, themomentary lossofbusSM-2causedthede-energization ofelectrical busSM-4,whichinturnresultedinautomatic startingoftheHPCSDGduetoSM-4undervoltage.
| | CAUSE svsvrM COMPONENT lAvlJFAClVRER REPORTABLE CAUSE COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE TO NPRDS TO NPRDS SUPPLFMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14) FXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR YES NO corn le)ed EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE . |
| Normalpowerwassubsequently returnedtobusSM-4whentheOperations crewre-closed thesupplybreakersfromSM-2andmanuallytrippedtheHPCSDG.BecausetheHPCSDGisnotconsidered anEngineered SafetyFeatureatWNP-2,thisreportisbeingvoluntarily submitted pertherecommendation ofNUREG1022.Thiseventwouldotherwise requireamandatory reportpertherequirements of10CF50.73(a)(2)(iv).
| | ABSTRACT: |
| Immediate Corrective ActionAvoluntary 4-hourreportoftheHPCSDGautostartwasmadeinaccordance with10CFR50.72(b)(2)(ii). | | On 2/03/98, during the performance of surveillance testing, with the plant in Operating Mode 1, a control room operator mistakenly tripped the supply breaker for 4160v electrical bus SM-2 by inadvertent operation of the breaker handswitch. This resulted in the loss of electrical bus SM-2 which was accompanied by tripping of condensate pump COND-P-1B, condensate booster pump COND-P-2B, condenser circulating water pump CW-P-1B and the supply breaker to bus SM-4, and automatic starting of the High Pressure Core Spray emergency diesel generator (HPCS DG). |
| Afterthetransient wasstabilized, aProblemEvaluation Requestwasinitiated andanIncidentReviewBoard(IRB)wasconvened.
| | Loss of COND-P-1B and COND-P-2B initiated a reactor water level transient which was mitigated by prompt Operations crew action to reduce total core flow to approximately 60 million Ib-mass/hr by use of the Reactor Recirculation system. All plant equipment operated as designed during the event. |
| FACILITYNAME(I)LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATION DOCKETNUMBER(2)YEARLERNUMBER(6)SEQVEHTIAI NVHBERREVISIOHWHBBRPAGE(3)Washington NuclearPlant-Unit250-397980013OF4TEXT(Ifmorespaceisrequired, useadditional copiesofNRCForm366A)(17)RootCauseThecauseoftheeventwashumanerror.AAerhavingreviewedtheimpending stepsofthebustransferprocedure, CRO2incorrectly selectedthehandswitch forbreakerCB-Nl/2switchandplaceditintheTRIPpositionwithoutadequateself-checking.
| | Immediate actions were taken by the Operations crew to stabilize the plant at approximately 75% reactor power, and an investigation of the event was initiated by convening an Incident Review Board ORB). |
| Acontributing causeofthiseventwasfailuretoobtainapeercheck.AAerhavingcompleted thebulkoftheprocedure usingpeerchecks,CRO2considered theremaining portionoftheprocedure oflesserconcernanddiscontinued obtaining peercheckspriortoactionsteps.Anadditional contributing causeofthiseventwasthatpeercheckingstandards havenotbeenproperlycommunicated byOperations management.
| | The cause of the event was human error and failure to self check, in that the control room operator erroneously tripped the supply breaker for electrical bus SM-2, which in turn caused the loss of bus SM-4 and the start of the HPCS DG. |
| Furtherorrective ActionOperations supervision willconductanddocumentappropriate counseling toaddressthehumanperformance error(s)associated withthisevent.Astationwidestanddownwasconducted onFebruary3,1998,toreviewthiseventaswellasotherrecenthumanperformance errorinitiated events.AnentryintotheOperations NightOrderswasmadeonFebruary3,1998,reiterating expectations regarding theOperations Observation program,procedure usage,prejobbriefs,selfchecking, andpeerchecks.ShiftManagerswillevaluatecrewmembersforbuy-inandadherence toroutineself-checking.
| | This event is voluntarily reported since the HPCS DG is not an Engineered Safety Feature at WNP-2. The safety significance of this event is considered minimal. |
| Individuals thatdonotexhibittheproperuseofself-checking techniques willbegivenone-on-one reinforcement ofthetechniques, emphasizing thevalueofself-checking. | | |
| Operations management expectations regarding peerchecksandself-checking willbedocumented intheappropriate Operating Instruction(s). | | LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME I 1) DOCKET ))UMBER I 2) LER ))UMBER I 6) PAGE I 3) |
| TheOperations Observation programwillberevisedtoprovideinstruction toreinforce management's expectations forpeerchecksandself-checking.
| | YEAR S DQV EN T I AL REYIsIorr NUMBER IRJHBC R Washington Nuclear Plant - Unit 2 50-397 98 001 00 2 OF 4 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) ()7) |
| AssesmenofafeonseuencesTheconsequences ofthiseventwereminimized bypromptoperatoractiontomitigateandstabilize theresultant reactorwaterleveltransient.
| | Even Descri tion On February 3, 1998, while operating in Mode 1 at 100% power, control room personnel were making preparations to perform the Division 1 Emergency Diesel Generator semi-annual operability surveillance (OSP-ELEC-S701). In accordance with the surveillance procedure, the designated Control Room Operator (CRO2) had shifted the power source for electrical board SM-1 from transformer TR-N to transformer TR-S, with a second Control Room Operator (CRO3) acting as a peer checker for the evolution. As one of the final steps in the evolution, the procedure directed the control switch for breaker CB-Nl/1, the normal supply breaker to electrical bus SM-1, to be placed in the TRIP position to ensure the switch escutcheon green flag is displayed. |
| Additionally, thedesignbasisoftheplantenvelopes lossofelectrical powerconditions suchasthisevent.AreviewoftheWNP-2Probabilistic SafetyAnalysisshowsthatlossofbusSM-2isanegligible contributor totheoverallcoredamagefrequency. | | Just prior to this step, CRO3 (the peer checker) responded to an unrelated control room annunciator, and CRO2 (the performer) momentarily turned away from the control panel to review the impending steps of the procedure. |
| Forthesereasons,thesafety FACILITYNAME(I)LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATION DOCKETNUMBER(2)YEARLERNUMBER(6)SEQUENTIAL NUMBERRCVISIONNlNBCRPAGE(3)Washington NuclearPlant-Unit250-39798001004OF4TEXT(Ifmorespaceisrequired, useadditional copiesofNRCForm366A)((7)consequences ofthiseventareconsidered minimal.However,itisrecognized thatpersonnel performance iscriticaltosuccessful plantoperations.
| | After reviewing the procedure, CRO2 returned his attention to the control panel and incorrectly selected and manipulated the control switch for breaker CB-Nl/2, the normal supply breaker to bus SM-2. Upon manipulation of the handswitch, CB-Nl/2 tripped, de-energizing SM-2. The selection and operation of the handswitch for CB-Nl/2 was performed in error by CRO2. |
| SimilarEventLER96-002documented anequipment operatoropeningapotential transformer fusecompartment, resulting inelectrical busSM-8transferring toalternate powersupply,andautomatic startingofEDG-2.LER95-002documents Operations personnel manipulation ofthewrongleveronthemainturbinefrontstandard, resulting inamainturbinetripandreactorscram.}}
| | De-energization of SM-2 caused automatic tripping of the pumps associated with the bus, i.e., condensate pump COND-P-1B, condensate booster pump COND-P-2B, and condenser circulating water pump CW-P-1B. The consequent reduction in reactor feedwater flow resulted in reactor water level lowering at a rate of about 25 inches per minute. Prompt action by the Operations crew to lower total core flow to approximately 60 million 1b-mass/hr using the Reactor Recirculation system, thus reducing reactor power level, successfully stabilized the plant at approximately 75% power. Power was immediately returned to bus SM-2 by manual closure of the alternate supply breaker from transformer TR-S. |
| | Additionally, the momentary loss of bus SM-2 caused the de-energization of electrical bus SM-4, which in turn resulted in automatic starting of the HPCS DG due to SM-4 undervoltage. Normal power was subsequently returned to bus SM-4 when the Operations crew re-closed the supply breakers from SM-2 and manually tripped the HPCS DG. |
| | Because the HPCS DG is not considered an Engineered Safety Feature at WNP-2, this report is being voluntarily submitted per the recommendation of NUREG 1022. This event would otherwise require a mandatory report per the requirements of 10CF50.73(a)(2)(iv). |
| | Immediate Corrective Action A voluntary 4-hour report of the HPCS DG auto start was made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(2)(ii). |
| | After the transient was stabilized, a Problem Evaluation Request was initiated and an Incident Review Board (IRB) was convened. |
| | |
| | LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) |
| | TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (I ) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3) |
| | YEAR SEQVEHTIAI REVIS IOH NVHBER WHBBR Washington Nuclear Plant - Unit 2 50-397 98 001 3 OF 4 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17) |
| | Root Cause The cause of the event was human error. AAer having reviewed the impending steps of the bus transfer procedure, CRO2 incorrectly selected the handswitch for breaker CB-Nl/2 switch and placed it in the TRIP position without adequate self-checking. |
| | A contributing cause of this event was failure to obtain a peer check. AAer having completed the bulk of the procedure using peer checks, CRO2 considered the remaining portion of the procedure of lesser concern and discontinued obtaining peer checks prior to action steps. |
| | An additional contributing cause of this event was that peer checking standards have not been properly communicated by Operations management. |
| | Further orrective Action Operations supervision will conduct and document appropriate counseling to address the human performance error(s) associated with this event. |
| | A station wide stand down was conducted on February 3, 1998, to review this event as well as other recent human performance error initiated events. |
| | An entry into the Operations Night Orders was made on February 3, 1998, reiterating expectations regarding the Operations Observation program, procedure usage, prejob briefs, self checking, and peer checks. |
| | Shift Managers will evaluate crew members for buy-in and adherence to routine self-checking. Individuals that do not exhibit the proper use of self-checking techniques will be given one-on-one reinforcement of the techniques, emphasizing the value of self-checking. |
| | Operations management expectations regarding peer checks and self-checking will be documented in the appropriate Operating Instruction(s). |
| | The Operations Observation program will be revised to provide instruction to reinforce management's expectations for peer checks and self-checking. |
| | Asses men of afe onse uences The consequences of this event were minimized by prompt operator action to mitigate and stabilize the resultant reactor water level transient. Additionally, the design basis of the plant envelopes loss of electrical power conditions such as this event. A review of the WNP-2 Probabilistic Safety Analysis shows that loss of bus SM-2 is a negligible contributor to the overall core damage frequency. For these reasons, the safety |
| | |
| | LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) |
| | TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (I) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3) |
| | YEAR SEQUENTIAL RCVIS ION NUMBER NlNBCR Washington Nuclear Plant - Unit 2 50-397 98 001 00 4 OF 4 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) ((7) consequences of this event are considered minimal. However, it is recognized that personnel performance is critical to successful plant operations. |
| | Similar Event LER 96-002 documented an equipment operator opening a potential transformer fuse compartment, resulting in electrical bus SM-8 transferring to alternate power supply, and automatic starting of EDG-2. |
| | LER 95-002 documents Operations personnel manipulation of the wrong lever on the main turbine front standard, resulting in a main turbine trip and reactor scram.}} |
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Category:LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (SEE ALSO AO
MONTHYEARML17292B7421999-07-20020 July 1999
LER 99-001-00:on 990628,ESF Signal Closed All Eight MSIVs While Plant Was Shutdown.Caused by Failure of Relay RPS-RLY-K10D.Subject Relay Was Replaced & Tested on 990630. with 990720 Ltr
ML17292B4451998-10-27027 October 1998
LER 98-012-01:on 980715,failure to Comply with Requirements of TS SR 3.8.4.7 Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Work Practices.Training Session Was Held with Personnel.With 981027 Ltr
ML17284A7561998-09-0303 September 1998
LER 98-013-00:on 980805,ESF Actuations Were Noted Due to Deenergization of Vital Electrical Bus SM-8.Caused by Inadequate Direction in Troubleshooting Plan.Will Conduct Training for Engineering Personnel.With 980903 Ltr
ML17284A7571998-09-0202 September 1998
LER 98-014-00:on 980807,completion of TS 3.8.1.F Required Shutdown Due to Inoperability of EDG-2 Was Noted.Caused by Degraded Voltage Regulator for DG-2.Replaced Voltage Regulator & Associated Scrs.With 980902 Ltr
ML17284A7551998-09-0202 September 1998
LER 98-015-00:on 980808,discovered Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Leak During Shutdown Conditions.Caused by Leakage from Socket Weld (Fwb 63) on Elbow Connection.Failed Piping Connection Was Replaced.With 980902 Ltr
ML17284A7311998-08-17017 August 1998
LER 98-012-00:on 980716,determined That 24-month SR 3.8.4.7 Had Not Been Fulfilled within Specified Frequency.Caused by Inadequate Work Practices.License Requested & Received Enforcement Discretion Re Battery Svc test.W/980817 Ltr
ML17284A7121998-07-23023 July 1998
LER 98-006-01:on 980520,discovered Discrepancies in Low Voltage Bus Calculations During Review of 10CFR50,App R Calculations for High Impedance Faults.Caused by Inadequate Work Practices.Implemented Procedural Changes
ML17284A6951998-07-17017 July 1998
LER 98-011-00:on 980617,ECCS Pump Room Flooding Was Noted Due to FP Sys Pipe Break.Caused by Inadequate Design of FP Sys.Detailed Review of FP Sys Design Was Conducted. W/980717 Ltr
ML17284A6961998-07-15015 July 1998
LER 98-010-00:on 980615,TS Required Shutdown Due to Inoperability of TIP Sys Isolation Valve Was Noted.Caused by Improper Installation of TIP Tubing.Reattached Affected Tubing & Inspected Other TIP tubing.W/980715 Ltr
ML17284A6731998-07-0101 July 1998
LER 98-009-00:on 980606,nuclear Steam Supply Shutoff Sys Group 3 & 4 Isolations During Testing Was Noted.Caused by Procedural Deficiency.Counseled Individuals Involved in preparation.W/980701 Ltr
ML17284A6651998-06-24024 June 1998
LER 98-007-00:on 980530,inadvertent Full Scram & Division 1 ECCS Injection Was Noted.Caused by Failure to Meet Mgt Work Practice Expectation When Encountering Deficient Procedure. Incident Review Board Convened to Review event.W/980624 Ltr
ML17284A6641998-06-24024 June 1998
LER 98-008-00:on 980531,inadvertent Full Scram During RPV Leak Testing in Mode 4 Was Noted.Caused by Change in Mgt Techniques.Revised Procedures to Take Into Account Addl Water Head in Pressure Sensing lines.W/980624 Ltr
ML17284A6631998-06-19019 June 1998
LER 98-006-00:on 980520,discovered Discrepancies in Low Voltage Bus Calculations During Review of App R Calculations for High Impedance Fault Analysis.Caused Indeterminate. Implemented Procedural Changes Involving Operator Action
ML17284A6551998-06-0404 June 1998
LER 98-005-00:on 980506,potential for Failure of RHR Sys Valve to Close on Isolation Signal Was Noted.Caused by Design Deficiency.Caution Tag Was Placed on RHR-V-40 Control Switch to Inform Plant Operators of limitation.W/980604 Ltr
ML17284A6421998-06-0101 June 1998
LER 98-004-00:on 980502,determined That Primary Containment Penetration Overcurrent Protection Does Not Meet Reg Guide 1.63 Requirements.Caused by Inadequate Design Changes. Installed Addl Fuse in RHR-MO-9 circuit.W/980601 Ltr
ML17292B3281998-04-0909 April 1998
LER 98-002-00:on 980311,reactor Scram & Plant Transient Occurred,Due to Failed Closed Main Steam Isolation Valve. Caused by Loss of Pneumatic Actuating Supply Pressure. Problem Evaluation Request Written for Failure of MS-V-22D
ML17292B3291998-04-0909 April 1998
LER 98-003-00:on 980311,WNP-2 Experienced SCRAM Signal as Result of Low Rpv.Caused by Less than post-SCRAM Operational Strategy for Resetting SCRAM Signal in Conditions.Changes in post-SCRAM Operational Strategy implemented.W/980409 Ltr
ML17292B2661998-03-0404 March 1998
LER 98-001-00:on 980203,automatic Start of HPCS EDG Was Noted.Caused by Operator Error.Operations Crew Stabilized Plant at Approximately 75% Reactor Power & Investigation of Event Was initiated.W/980304 Ltr
ML17292B1111997-11-10010 November 1997
LER 97-011-00:on 971010,HPCS Battery Charger Failed.Caused by Failure of a Phase Firing Control Circuit Board Due to Aging During 7 Yrs of Use.Hpcs Sys Was Immediately Declared inoperable.W/971110 Ltr
ML17292B1151997-11-0707 November 1997
LER 97-010-00:on 970906,discovered That TS SR 3.4.5.1 for Identified Portion of RCS Total Leakage Would Not Be Able to Perform within Time Limits of SR 3.0.2.Caused by Inadequate Methods.Method of Meeting SR 3.4.5.1 Established
ML17292B0641997-09-24024 September 1997
LER 97-004-01:on 970327,plant Operators Manually Scrammed Reactor as Required by TS Due to Indication of Entry Into Region a of power-to-flow Map.Caused by Inadequate Attention to Detail.Established Event Evaluation teams.W/970924 Ltr
ML17292B0241997-08-18018 August 1997
LER 97-009-00:on 970717,discovered Error in Recently Performed Inservice Testing procedure,OSP-TIP/IST-R701. Caused by Procedure Inadequacy.Plant Procedure OSP/TIP/IST-R701 Will Be changed.W/970818 Ltr
ML17292B0291997-08-15015 August 1997
LER 97-008-00:on 970716,wire Seal Used to Lock Containment Instrument Air Pressure Control valve,CIA-PCV-2B,found Not Intact.Cause of Misadjustment of CIA-PCV-2B Unknown.Event Will Be Communicated to Plant employees.W/970815 Ltr
ML17292B0201997-08-15015 August 1997
LER 97-S01-00:on 970718,failure to Take Compensatory Measure for Inoperative Microwave Security Zone Occurred. Caused by Personnel Error.Training Will Be Conducted W/ Appropriate Members of Security force.W/970815 Ltr
ML17292A9481997-07-23023 July 1997
LER 97-007-00:on 970611,voluntary Rept of Automatic Start of DG-1 & DG-2 Was Experienced.Caused by Undervoltage Condition on Electrical Busses SM-7 & SM-8.Circulating Water Pump CW-P-1C Control Switch Placed in pull-to-lock.W/970723 Ltr
ML17292A9201997-06-26026 June 1997
LER 97-006-00:on 970527,non-performance of Surveillance Requirement 3.6.1.3.2 for Blind Fanges,Was Noted.Caused Because Misunderstanding of Intent of Specs.Added Five Structural Assemblies for SP.W/970626 Ltr
ML17292A8331997-04-28028 April 1997
LER 97-004-00:on 970327,plant Operators Manually Scrammed Reactor as Required by TS Due to Entry Into Region a of power-to-flow Map Following Planned Trip of Single Mfp. Event Evaluation teams,established.W/970428 Ltr
ML17292A8311997-04-28028 April 1997
LER 97-005-00:on 970327,valid Reactor Scram Signal Received Due to Low Water Level Condition During Preparations for SRV Testing.Caused by Risks & Consequences of Decisions Not Completely Identified.Restored Water level.W/970428 Ltr
ML17292A8251997-04-21021 April 1997
LER 97-003-00:on 970320,notification of Noncompliance W/Ts as TS SRs for Response Time Testing Were Not Being Met for Specified Instrumentation in Rps,Pcis & Eccs.Requested Enforcement Discretion for One Time exemption.W/970421 Ltr
ML17292A7431997-03-20020 March 1997
LER 97-002-00:on 970218,determined That Rod Block Monitor (RBM) Calibr Values Were Not Set IAW Tech Specs.Caused by Calibr Procedures Inadequacies.Revised & re-performed RBM Channel Calibr procedures.W/970330 Ltr
ML17292A7401997-03-13013 March 1997
LER 97-001-00:on 970211,reactor Water Cleanup Sys Blowdown Flow Isolation Setpoint Was Slightly Above TS Allowable Valve Occurred Due to Calculation Error.Lds Fss LD-FS-15 LD-FS-16 Were Declared inoperable.W/970313 Ltr
ML17292A6641997-01-22022 January 1997
LER 96-009-00:on 961220,miscalculation of Instantaneous Overcurrent Relay Settings Resulted in Inoperability of safety-related Equipment.Caused by Utilization of Inappropriate Design.Testing Was completed.W/970122 Ltr
ML17292A6461997-01-0606 January 1997
LER 96-008-00:on 961205,failure to Comply with TS Action Requirement for Emergency Core Cooling Sys Actuation Instrumentation Occurred Due to Unidentified Inoperability Condition.Pmr initiated.W/970106 Ltr
ML17292A6371996-12-19019 December 1996
LER 96-007-00:on 961122,electrical Breakers Were Not Seismically Qualified in Test/Disconnect Position.Circuit Breaker Mfg Did Not Consider Raced Out Breaker Position During Testing.Relocated Circuit breakers.W/961217 Ltr
ML17292A4121996-08-0808 August 1996
LER 96-006-00:on 960709,average Power Range Monitor Rod Block Downscale Surveillance Not Performed Prior to Entry Into Mode 1.Caused by long-standing Misinterpretation of Requirements of Tss.Procedures revised.W/960808 Ltr
ML17292A3801996-07-24024 July 1996
LER 96-004-00:on 960624,plant Was Manually Scrammed by Control Room Personnel Due to Reactor Water Level Transient Experienced During Testing of Digital Feedwater Sys.Caused by Programming Error.Sys Was corrected.W/960724 Ltr
ML17292A3771996-07-24024 July 1996
LER 96-005-00:on 960624,determined Missed Surveillance Test Re Channel Check of Average Power Range Monitor.Caused by Inadequate Procedures.Revised Surveillance Procedure Re When APRM Checks Must Be performed.W/960724 Ltr
ML17292A3641996-07-12012 July 1996
LER 96-003-00:on 960615,required Surveillance Test Not Performed When Required by TS 3.4.1.3.Caused by Inadequate Procedures.Implementing Surveillance Procedure & Reactor Plant Startup Procedures revised.W/960712 Ltr
ML17292A3361996-06-20020 June 1996
LER 96-002-00:on 960504,critical Bus SM-8 Lost Power When Supply Breaker 3-8 Tripped.Caused by Personnel Error. Operators Counselled & Procedures revised.W/960620 Ltr
ML17292A2861996-05-24024 May 1996
LER 96-001-00:on 960425,inadvertent ESF Actuations Occurred Due to Tripping of Temporary Power Supply to IN-3.Caused by Personnel Error.Operations Restored to IN-3 Loads & Reset ESF actuations.W/960524 Ltr
ML17291B0891995-10-19019 October 1995
LER 95-011-00:on 950919,failed to Comply W/Ts SR for RCIC Sys Due to Analysis Deficiency That Resulted in Inadequate Surveillance Test Procedure.Surveillance Procedure Revised to Correct deficiency.W/951019 Ltr
ML17291A9021995-07-0707 July 1995
LER 95-010-00:on 950609,HPCS DG Declared Inoperable Due to Discovery That TS Test Method Incomplete.Caused by Inadequate Testing Procedure.Test Procedure for HPCS DG Reviewed & Special Test Procedures written.W/950707 Ltr
ML17291A9031995-07-0707 July 1995
LER 95-009-00:on 950607,inadvertent MSIV Closure Occurred During Surveillance Test Due to Poor Communication Between Test Team.Determined That MSIV Closure Not Valid Because Closure Not Triggered by Plant conditions.W/950707 Ltr
ML17291A8501995-06-0808 June 1995
LER 95-006-01:on 950405,reactor Scram Occurred During Surveillance Testing Due to Protective Sys Relay Failure. Replaced Failed Relay Before Plant Startup
ML17291A8101995-05-12012 May 1995
LER 95-008-00:on 940125,TS Wording Lead to Potential TS Violation.Caused by Lack of Clarity in Ts.Submitted Improved TS for Plant to Provide Addl clarity.W/950512 Ltr
ML17291A7841995-05-0505 May 1995
LER 95-007-00:on 950222,emergency Diesel Start Occurred Due to Voltage Transient on BPA Grid.Confirmation Was Received at 17:51 H That Disturbance Had Originated in BPA Grid
ML17291A7801995-05-0404 May 1995
LER 95-006-00:on 950405,main Turbine Trip Occurred During Performance of Surveillance Test Due to Protective Sys Relay Failed.Replaced Failed Relay Before Plant startup.W/950504 Ltr
ML17291A7851995-05-0303 May 1995
LER 95-005-00:on 950222,inoperable IRM Had Been Relied Upon to Meet TS Requirements During Reactor Startup.Caused by Lack of Neutron Source to Test Instrumentation. Sys Knowledge Gained Will Be incorporated.W/950503 Ltr
ML17291A7071995-03-25025 March 1995
LER 95-004-00:on 950226,malfunction in Main Turbine DEH Control Sys Caused All Four High Pressure Turbine Governor Valves to Rapidly Close.Caused by Blown Fuse.Suspected Faulty Circuit Card replaced.W/950325 Ltr
ML17291A7011995-03-20020 March 1995
LER 95-002-00:on 950218,automatic Reactor Scram Occurred. Caused by Erroneous Positioning of Control During Performance of Scheduled Periodic Functional Test.Control repositioned.W/950320 Ltr
1999-07-20
[Table view]
Category:RO)
MONTHYEARML17292B7421999-07-20020 July 1999
LER 99-001-00:on 990628,ESF Signal Closed All Eight MSIVs While Plant Was Shutdown.Caused by Failure of Relay RPS-RLY-K10D.Subject Relay Was Replaced & Tested on 990630. with 990720 Ltr
ML17292B4451998-10-27027 October 1998
LER 98-012-01:on 980715,failure to Comply with Requirements of TS SR 3.8.4.7 Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Work Practices.Training Session Was Held with Personnel.With 981027 Ltr
ML17284A7561998-09-0303 September 1998
LER 98-013-00:on 980805,ESF Actuations Were Noted Due to Deenergization of Vital Electrical Bus SM-8.Caused by Inadequate Direction in Troubleshooting Plan.Will Conduct Training for Engineering Personnel.With 980903 Ltr
ML17284A7571998-09-0202 September 1998
LER 98-014-00:on 980807,completion of TS 3.8.1.F Required Shutdown Due to Inoperability of EDG-2 Was Noted.Caused by Degraded Voltage Regulator for DG-2.Replaced Voltage Regulator & Associated Scrs.With 980902 Ltr
ML17284A7551998-09-0202 September 1998
LER 98-015-00:on 980808,discovered Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Leak During Shutdown Conditions.Caused by Leakage from Socket Weld (Fwb 63) on Elbow Connection.Failed Piping Connection Was Replaced.With 980902 Ltr
ML17284A7311998-08-17017 August 1998
LER 98-012-00:on 980716,determined That 24-month SR 3.8.4.7 Had Not Been Fulfilled within Specified Frequency.Caused by Inadequate Work Practices.License Requested & Received Enforcement Discretion Re Battery Svc test.W/980817 Ltr
ML17284A7121998-07-23023 July 1998
LER 98-006-01:on 980520,discovered Discrepancies in Low Voltage Bus Calculations During Review of 10CFR50,App R Calculations for High Impedance Faults.Caused by Inadequate Work Practices.Implemented Procedural Changes
ML17284A6951998-07-17017 July 1998
LER 98-011-00:on 980617,ECCS Pump Room Flooding Was Noted Due to FP Sys Pipe Break.Caused by Inadequate Design of FP Sys.Detailed Review of FP Sys Design Was Conducted. W/980717 Ltr
ML17284A6961998-07-15015 July 1998
LER 98-010-00:on 980615,TS Required Shutdown Due to Inoperability of TIP Sys Isolation Valve Was Noted.Caused by Improper Installation of TIP Tubing.Reattached Affected Tubing & Inspected Other TIP tubing.W/980715 Ltr
ML17284A6731998-07-0101 July 1998
LER 98-009-00:on 980606,nuclear Steam Supply Shutoff Sys Group 3 & 4 Isolations During Testing Was Noted.Caused by Procedural Deficiency.Counseled Individuals Involved in preparation.W/980701 Ltr
ML17284A6651998-06-24024 June 1998
LER 98-007-00:on 980530,inadvertent Full Scram & Division 1 ECCS Injection Was Noted.Caused by Failure to Meet Mgt Work Practice Expectation When Encountering Deficient Procedure. Incident Review Board Convened to Review event.W/980624 Ltr
ML17284A6641998-06-24024 June 1998
LER 98-008-00:on 980531,inadvertent Full Scram During RPV Leak Testing in Mode 4 Was Noted.Caused by Change in Mgt Techniques.Revised Procedures to Take Into Account Addl Water Head in Pressure Sensing lines.W/980624 Ltr
ML17284A6631998-06-19019 June 1998
LER 98-006-00:on 980520,discovered Discrepancies in Low Voltage Bus Calculations During Review of App R Calculations for High Impedance Fault Analysis.Caused Indeterminate. Implemented Procedural Changes Involving Operator Action
ML17284A6551998-06-0404 June 1998
LER 98-005-00:on 980506,potential for Failure of RHR Sys Valve to Close on Isolation Signal Was Noted.Caused by Design Deficiency.Caution Tag Was Placed on RHR-V-40 Control Switch to Inform Plant Operators of limitation.W/980604 Ltr
ML17284A6421998-06-0101 June 1998
LER 98-004-00:on 980502,determined That Primary Containment Penetration Overcurrent Protection Does Not Meet Reg Guide 1.63 Requirements.Caused by Inadequate Design Changes. Installed Addl Fuse in RHR-MO-9 circuit.W/980601 Ltr
ML17292B3281998-04-0909 April 1998
LER 98-002-00:on 980311,reactor Scram & Plant Transient Occurred,Due to Failed Closed Main Steam Isolation Valve. Caused by Loss of Pneumatic Actuating Supply Pressure. Problem Evaluation Request Written for Failure of MS-V-22D
ML17292B3291998-04-0909 April 1998
LER 98-003-00:on 980311,WNP-2 Experienced SCRAM Signal as Result of Low Rpv.Caused by Less than post-SCRAM Operational Strategy for Resetting SCRAM Signal in Conditions.Changes in post-SCRAM Operational Strategy implemented.W/980409 Ltr
ML17292B2661998-03-0404 March 1998
LER 98-001-00:on 980203,automatic Start of HPCS EDG Was Noted.Caused by Operator Error.Operations Crew Stabilized Plant at Approximately 75% Reactor Power & Investigation of Event Was initiated.W/980304 Ltr
ML17292B1111997-11-10010 November 1997
LER 97-011-00:on 971010,HPCS Battery Charger Failed.Caused by Failure of a Phase Firing Control Circuit Board Due to Aging During 7 Yrs of Use.Hpcs Sys Was Immediately Declared inoperable.W/971110 Ltr
ML17292B1151997-11-0707 November 1997
LER 97-010-00:on 970906,discovered That TS SR 3.4.5.1 for Identified Portion of RCS Total Leakage Would Not Be Able to Perform within Time Limits of SR 3.0.2.Caused by Inadequate Methods.Method of Meeting SR 3.4.5.1 Established
ML17292B0641997-09-24024 September 1997
LER 97-004-01:on 970327,plant Operators Manually Scrammed Reactor as Required by TS Due to Indication of Entry Into Region a of power-to-flow Map.Caused by Inadequate Attention to Detail.Established Event Evaluation teams.W/970924 Ltr
ML17292B0241997-08-18018 August 1997
LER 97-009-00:on 970717,discovered Error in Recently Performed Inservice Testing procedure,OSP-TIP/IST-R701. Caused by Procedure Inadequacy.Plant Procedure OSP/TIP/IST-R701 Will Be changed.W/970818 Ltr
ML17292B0291997-08-15015 August 1997
LER 97-008-00:on 970716,wire Seal Used to Lock Containment Instrument Air Pressure Control valve,CIA-PCV-2B,found Not Intact.Cause of Misadjustment of CIA-PCV-2B Unknown.Event Will Be Communicated to Plant employees.W/970815 Ltr
ML17292B0201997-08-15015 August 1997
LER 97-S01-00:on 970718,failure to Take Compensatory Measure for Inoperative Microwave Security Zone Occurred. Caused by Personnel Error.Training Will Be Conducted W/ Appropriate Members of Security force.W/970815 Ltr
ML17292A9481997-07-23023 July 1997
LER 97-007-00:on 970611,voluntary Rept of Automatic Start of DG-1 & DG-2 Was Experienced.Caused by Undervoltage Condition on Electrical Busses SM-7 & SM-8.Circulating Water Pump CW-P-1C Control Switch Placed in pull-to-lock.W/970723 Ltr
ML17292A9201997-06-26026 June 1997
LER 97-006-00:on 970527,non-performance of Surveillance Requirement 3.6.1.3.2 for Blind Fanges,Was Noted.Caused Because Misunderstanding of Intent of Specs.Added Five Structural Assemblies for SP.W/970626 Ltr
ML17292A8331997-04-28028 April 1997
LER 97-004-00:on 970327,plant Operators Manually Scrammed Reactor as Required by TS Due to Entry Into Region a of power-to-flow Map Following Planned Trip of Single Mfp. Event Evaluation teams,established.W/970428 Ltr
ML17292A8311997-04-28028 April 1997
LER 97-005-00:on 970327,valid Reactor Scram Signal Received Due to Low Water Level Condition During Preparations for SRV Testing.Caused by Risks & Consequences of Decisions Not Completely Identified.Restored Water level.W/970428 Ltr
ML17292A8251997-04-21021 April 1997
LER 97-003-00:on 970320,notification of Noncompliance W/Ts as TS SRs for Response Time Testing Were Not Being Met for Specified Instrumentation in Rps,Pcis & Eccs.Requested Enforcement Discretion for One Time exemption.W/970421 Ltr
ML17292A7431997-03-20020 March 1997
LER 97-002-00:on 970218,determined That Rod Block Monitor (RBM) Calibr Values Were Not Set IAW Tech Specs.Caused by Calibr Procedures Inadequacies.Revised & re-performed RBM Channel Calibr procedures.W/970330 Ltr
ML17292A7401997-03-13013 March 1997
LER 97-001-00:on 970211,reactor Water Cleanup Sys Blowdown Flow Isolation Setpoint Was Slightly Above TS Allowable Valve Occurred Due to Calculation Error.Lds Fss LD-FS-15 LD-FS-16 Were Declared inoperable.W/970313 Ltr
ML17292A6641997-01-22022 January 1997
LER 96-009-00:on 961220,miscalculation of Instantaneous Overcurrent Relay Settings Resulted in Inoperability of safety-related Equipment.Caused by Utilization of Inappropriate Design.Testing Was completed.W/970122 Ltr
ML17292A6461997-01-0606 January 1997
LER 96-008-00:on 961205,failure to Comply with TS Action Requirement for Emergency Core Cooling Sys Actuation Instrumentation Occurred Due to Unidentified Inoperability Condition.Pmr initiated.W/970106 Ltr
ML17292A6371996-12-19019 December 1996
LER 96-007-00:on 961122,electrical Breakers Were Not Seismically Qualified in Test/Disconnect Position.Circuit Breaker Mfg Did Not Consider Raced Out Breaker Position During Testing.Relocated Circuit breakers.W/961217 Ltr
ML17292A4121996-08-0808 August 1996
LER 96-006-00:on 960709,average Power Range Monitor Rod Block Downscale Surveillance Not Performed Prior to Entry Into Mode 1.Caused by long-standing Misinterpretation of Requirements of Tss.Procedures revised.W/960808 Ltr
ML17292A3801996-07-24024 July 1996
LER 96-004-00:on 960624,plant Was Manually Scrammed by Control Room Personnel Due to Reactor Water Level Transient Experienced During Testing of Digital Feedwater Sys.Caused by Programming Error.Sys Was corrected.W/960724 Ltr
ML17292A3771996-07-24024 July 1996
LER 96-005-00:on 960624,determined Missed Surveillance Test Re Channel Check of Average Power Range Monitor.Caused by Inadequate Procedures.Revised Surveillance Procedure Re When APRM Checks Must Be performed.W/960724 Ltr
ML17292A3641996-07-12012 July 1996
LER 96-003-00:on 960615,required Surveillance Test Not Performed When Required by TS 3.4.1.3.Caused by Inadequate Procedures.Implementing Surveillance Procedure & Reactor Plant Startup Procedures revised.W/960712 Ltr
ML17292A3361996-06-20020 June 1996
LER 96-002-00:on 960504,critical Bus SM-8 Lost Power When Supply Breaker 3-8 Tripped.Caused by Personnel Error. Operators Counselled & Procedures revised.W/960620 Ltr
ML17292A2861996-05-24024 May 1996
LER 96-001-00:on 960425,inadvertent ESF Actuations Occurred Due to Tripping of Temporary Power Supply to IN-3.Caused by Personnel Error.Operations Restored to IN-3 Loads & Reset ESF actuations.W/960524 Ltr
ML17291B0891995-10-19019 October 1995
LER 95-011-00:on 950919,failed to Comply W/Ts SR for RCIC Sys Due to Analysis Deficiency That Resulted in Inadequate Surveillance Test Procedure.Surveillance Procedure Revised to Correct deficiency.W/951019 Ltr
ML17291A9021995-07-0707 July 1995
LER 95-010-00:on 950609,HPCS DG Declared Inoperable Due to Discovery That TS Test Method Incomplete.Caused by Inadequate Testing Procedure.Test Procedure for HPCS DG Reviewed & Special Test Procedures written.W/950707 Ltr
ML17291A9031995-07-0707 July 1995
LER 95-009-00:on 950607,inadvertent MSIV Closure Occurred During Surveillance Test Due to Poor Communication Between Test Team.Determined That MSIV Closure Not Valid Because Closure Not Triggered by Plant conditions.W/950707 Ltr
ML17291A8501995-06-0808 June 1995
LER 95-006-01:on 950405,reactor Scram Occurred During Surveillance Testing Due to Protective Sys Relay Failure. Replaced Failed Relay Before Plant Startup
ML17291A8101995-05-12012 May 1995
LER 95-008-00:on 940125,TS Wording Lead to Potential TS Violation.Caused by Lack of Clarity in Ts.Submitted Improved TS for Plant to Provide Addl clarity.W/950512 Ltr
ML17291A7841995-05-0505 May 1995
LER 95-007-00:on 950222,emergency Diesel Start Occurred Due to Voltage Transient on BPA Grid.Confirmation Was Received at 17:51 H That Disturbance Had Originated in BPA Grid
ML17291A7801995-05-0404 May 1995
LER 95-006-00:on 950405,main Turbine Trip Occurred During Performance of Surveillance Test Due to Protective Sys Relay Failed.Replaced Failed Relay Before Plant startup.W/950504 Ltr
ML17291A7851995-05-0303 May 1995
LER 95-005-00:on 950222,inoperable IRM Had Been Relied Upon to Meet TS Requirements During Reactor Startup.Caused by Lack of Neutron Source to Test Instrumentation. Sys Knowledge Gained Will Be incorporated.W/950503 Ltr
ML17291A7071995-03-25025 March 1995
LER 95-004-00:on 950226,malfunction in Main Turbine DEH Control Sys Caused All Four High Pressure Turbine Governor Valves to Rapidly Close.Caused by Blown Fuse.Suspected Faulty Circuit Card replaced.W/950325 Ltr
ML17291A7011995-03-20020 March 1995
LER 95-002-00:on 950218,automatic Reactor Scram Occurred. Caused by Erroneous Positioning of Control During Performance of Scheduled Periodic Functional Test.Control repositioned.W/950320 Ltr
1999-07-20
[Table view]
Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML17284A9001999-10-31031 October 1999
Rev 0 to COLR 99-15, WNP-2 Cycle 15,COLR
GO2-99-177, LER 99-S01-00:on 990903,failure to Take Compensatory Measure within Required Time Upon Failure of Isolation Zone Microwave Unit,Was Noted.Caused by Personnel Error.Provided Refresher Training on Compensatory Measures.With1999-10-0101 October 1999
LER 99-S01-00:on 990903,failure to Take Compensatory Measure within Required Time Upon Failure of Isolation Zone Microwave Unit,Was Noted.Caused by Personnel Error.Provided Refresher Training on Compensatory Measures.With
ML17284A8941999-09-30030 September 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1999 for WNP-2.With 991012 Ltr
ML17284A8801999-08-31031 August 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for WNP-2.With 990910 Ltr
ML17284A8691999-07-31031 July 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for WNP-2.With 990813 Ltr
ML17292B7421999-07-20020 July 1999
LER 99-001-00:on 990628,ESF Signal Closed All Eight MSIVs While Plant Was Shutdown.Caused by Failure of Relay RPS-RLY-K10D.Subject Relay Was Replaced & Tested on 990630. with 990720 Ltr
ML17292B7271999-06-30030 June 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for WNP-2.With 990707 Ltr
ML17292B6961999-05-31031 May 1999
Monthly Operating Repts for May 1999 for WNP-2.With 990608 Ltr
ML17292B6641999-04-30030 April 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for WNP-2.With 990507 Ltr
ML17292B6391999-03-31031 March 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1999 for WNP-2.With 990413 Ltr
ML17292B5871999-02-28028 February 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1999 for WNP-2.With 990311 Ltr
ML17292B5571999-01-31031 January 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for Jan 1999 for WNP-2.With 990210 Ltr
ML17292B5621999-01-31031 January 1999
Rev 1 to COLR 98-14, WNP-2 Cycle 14 Colr.
ML17292B5341999-01-15015 January 1999
Part 21 Rept Re Incorrect Modeling of BWR Lower Plenum Vol in Bison.Defect Applies Only to Reload Fuel Assemblies Currently in Operation at WNP-2.BISON Code Model for WNP-2 Has Been Revised to Correct Error
ML17292B5331999-01-15015 January 1999
Part 21 Rept Re XL-S96 CPR Correlation for SVEA-96 Fuel. Defect Applies Only to WNP-2,during Cycles 12,13 & 14 Operation.Evaluations of Defect Performed by ABB-CE
ML17292B4791998-12-31031 December 1998
Washington Public Power Supply Sys 1998 Annual Rept. with 981215 Ltr
ML17292B5351998-12-31031 December 1998
Monthly Operating Rept for Dec 1998 for WNP-2.With 990112 Ltr
ML17292B5741998-12-31031 December 1998
WNP-2 1998 Annual Operating Rept. with 990225 Ltr
ML17284A8231998-11-30030 November 1998
Monthly Operating Rept for Nov 1998 for WNP-2.With 981207 Ltr
ML17284A8081998-10-31031 October 1998
Monthly Operating Rept for Oct 1998 for WNP-2.With 981110 Ltr
ML17292B4451998-10-27027 October 1998
LER 98-012-01:on 980715,failure to Comply with Requirements of TS SR 3.8.4.7 Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Work Practices.Training Session Was Held with Personnel.With 981027 Ltr
ML17284A7831998-09-30030 September 1998
Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1998 for WNP-2.With 981007 Ltr
ML17284A7491998-09-10010 September 1998
WNP-2 Inservice Insp Summary Rept for Refueling Outage RF13 Spring,1998.
ML17284A7561998-09-0303 September 1998
LER 98-013-00:on 980805,ESF Actuations Were Noted Due to Deenergization of Vital Electrical Bus SM-8.Caused by Inadequate Direction in Troubleshooting Plan.Will Conduct Training for Engineering Personnel.With 980903 Ltr
ML17284A7571998-09-0202 September 1998
LER 98-014-00:on 980807,completion of TS 3.8.1.F Required Shutdown Due to Inoperability of EDG-2 Was Noted.Caused by Degraded Voltage Regulator for DG-2.Replaced Voltage Regulator & Associated Scrs.With 980902 Ltr
ML17284A7551998-09-0202 September 1998
LER 98-015-00:on 980808,discovered Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Leak During Shutdown Conditions.Caused by Leakage from Socket Weld (Fwb 63) on Elbow Connection.Failed Piping Connection Was Replaced.With 980902 Ltr
ML17284A7681998-08-31031 August 1998
Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1998 for WNP-2.With 980915 Ltr
ML17284A7311998-08-17017 August 1998
LER 98-012-00:on 980716,determined That 24-month SR 3.8.4.7 Had Not Been Fulfilled within Specified Frequency.Caused by Inadequate Work Practices.License Requested & Received Enforcement Discretion Re Battery Svc test.W/980817 Ltr
ML17284A7261998-07-31031 July 1998
Monthly Operating Rept for July 1998 for WNP-2.W/980810 Ltr
ML17284A7121998-07-23023 July 1998
LER 98-006-01:on 980520,discovered Discrepancies in Low Voltage Bus Calculations During Review of 10CFR50,App R Calculations for High Impedance Faults.Caused by Inadequate Work Practices.Implemented Procedural Changes
ML17284A6951998-07-17017 July 1998
LER 98-011-00:on 980617,ECCS Pump Room Flooding Was Noted Due to FP Sys Pipe Break.Caused by Inadequate Design of FP Sys.Detailed Review of FP Sys Design Was Conducted. W/980717 Ltr
ML17284A6961998-07-15015 July 1998
LER 98-010-00:on 980615,TS Required Shutdown Due to Inoperability of TIP Sys Isolation Valve Was Noted.Caused by Improper Installation of TIP Tubing.Reattached Affected Tubing & Inspected Other TIP tubing.W/980715 Ltr
ML17284A6731998-07-0101 July 1998
LER 98-009-00:on 980606,nuclear Steam Supply Shutoff Sys Group 3 & 4 Isolations During Testing Was Noted.Caused by Procedural Deficiency.Counseled Individuals Involved in preparation.W/980701 Ltr
ML17284A6751998-06-30030 June 1998
Ro:On 980617,flooding of RB Northeast Stairwell with Consequential Flooding of Two ECCS Pump Rooms.Caused by Inadequate Fire Protection Sys Design.Pumped Out Water from Affected Areas to Point Below Berm Areas of Pump Rooms
ML17284A6641998-06-24024 June 1998
LER 98-008-00:on 980531,inadvertent Full Scram During RPV Leak Testing in Mode 4 Was Noted.Caused by Change in Mgt Techniques.Revised Procedures to Take Into Account Addl Water Head in Pressure Sensing lines.W/980624 Ltr
ML17284A6651998-06-24024 June 1998
LER 98-007-00:on 980530,inadvertent Full Scram & Division 1 ECCS Injection Was Noted.Caused by Failure to Meet Mgt Work Practice Expectation When Encountering Deficient Procedure. Incident Review Board Convened to Review event.W/980624 Ltr
ML17284A6631998-06-19019 June 1998
LER 98-006-00:on 980520,discovered Discrepancies in Low Voltage Bus Calculations During Review of App R Calculations for High Impedance Fault Analysis.Caused Indeterminate. Implemented Procedural Changes Involving Operator Action
ML17284A6551998-06-0404 June 1998
LER 98-005-00:on 980506,potential for Failure of RHR Sys Valve to Close on Isolation Signal Was Noted.Caused by Design Deficiency.Caution Tag Was Placed on RHR-V-40 Control Switch to Inform Plant Operators of limitation.W/980604 Ltr
ML17284A6421998-06-0101 June 1998
LER 98-004-00:on 980502,determined That Primary Containment Penetration Overcurrent Protection Does Not Meet Reg Guide 1.63 Requirements.Caused by Inadequate Design Changes. Installed Addl Fuse in RHR-MO-9 circuit.W/980601 Ltr
ML17284A6491998-05-31031 May 1998
Rev 0 to COLR 98-14, WNP-2,Cycle 14 Colr.
ML17292B4031998-05-31031 May 1998
Monthly Operating Rept for May 1998 for WNP-2.W/980608 Ltr
ML17292B3921998-04-30030 April 1998
Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1998 for WNP-2.W/980513 Ltr
ML17292B3291998-04-0909 April 1998
LER 98-003-00:on 980311,WNP-2 Experienced SCRAM Signal as Result of Low Rpv.Caused by Less than post-SCRAM Operational Strategy for Resetting SCRAM Signal in Conditions.Changes in post-SCRAM Operational Strategy implemented.W/980409 Ltr
ML17292B3281998-04-0909 April 1998
LER 98-002-00:on 980311,reactor Scram & Plant Transient Occurred,Due to Failed Closed Main Steam Isolation Valve. Caused by Loss of Pneumatic Actuating Supply Pressure. Problem Evaluation Request Written for Failure of MS-V-22D
ML17292B3371998-03-31031 March 1998
Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1998 for WNP-2.W/980409 Ltr
ML17292B2641998-03-0404 March 1998
Performance Self Assessment,WNP-2.
ML17292B2661998-03-0404 March 1998
LER 98-001-00:on 980203,automatic Start of HPCS EDG Was Noted.Caused by Operator Error.Operations Crew Stabilized Plant at Approximately 75% Reactor Power & Investigation of Event Was initiated.W/980304 Ltr
ML17292B2911998-02-28028 February 1998
Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1998 for WNP-2.W/980313 Ltr
ML17284A7971998-02-17017 February 1998
Rev 28 to Operational QA Program Description, WPPSS-QA-004.With Proposed Rev 29
ML17292B3591998-02-12012 February 1998
WNP-2 Cycle 14 Reload Design Rept.
1999-09-30
[Table view] |
Text
CATEGORY REGULs RY INFORMATION DXSTRIBUT SYSTEM (RXDS)
ACCESSION NBR:9803110369 DOC.DATE: 98/03/04 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET FACIL:50-397 WPPSS Nuclear Project, Unit 2, Washington Public Powe 05000397 AUTH. NAME. AUTHOR AFFILIATION PFITZER,B. Washington Public Power Supply System BEMIS,P.R. Washington Public Power Supply System RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION
SUBJECT:
LER,98-001-00:on 980203,automatic start of HPCS EDG was noted. Caused by operator error. Operations crew stabilized plant at approximately 75% reactor power & investigation of event was initiated.W/980304 ltr.
DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22T COPIES RECEIVED: LTR ) ENCL i SIZE:
TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event rReport (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.
NOTES:
RECIPIENT COPIES RECIPIENT COPIES ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL PD4-2 PD 1 1 POSLUSNY,C 1 1 INTERNAL: ACRS 1 1 B 2 2 AEOD/SPD/RRAB 1 1 FILE CENTE 1 1 NRR/DE/ECGB 1 1 /D~E B 1 1 NRR/DE/EMEB 1 1 NRR/DRCH/HHFB 1 1 NRR/DRCH/HICB 1 1 NRR/DRCH/HOLB 1 1 NRR/DRCH/HQMB 1 1 NRR/DRPM/PECB 1 1 NRR/DSSA/SPLB 1 1 NRR/DSSA/SRXB 1 1 RES/DET/EIB 1 1 RGN4 FILE 01 1 1 EXTERNAL: L ST LOBBY WARD 1 1 LITCO BRYCE,J H 1 1 NOAC POORE,W. 1 1 NOAC QUEENER,DS 1 1 NRC PDR 1 1 NUDOCS FULL TXT 1 1 E
NOTE TO ALL "RIDS" RECIPIENTS:
PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE. TO HAVE YOUR NAME OR ORGANIZATION REMOVED FROM DISTRIBUTION LISTS OR REDUCE THE NUMBER OF COPIES RECEIVED BY YOU OR YOUR ORCANIZATION, CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK (DCD) ON EXTENSION 415-2083 FULL TEXT CONVERSION REQUIRED TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 25 ENCL 25
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March 4, 1998 G02-98-044 Docket No. 50-397 Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Gentlemen:
Subject:
NUCLEAR PLANT WNP-2, OPERATING LICENSE NPF-21, LICENSEE EV1PlT REPORT NO. 98-001-00 Transmitted herewith is voluntary Licensee Event Report No. 98-001-00 for WNP-2. This report is submitted in response to the recommendations contained in NUREG-1022.
Should you have any questions or desire additional information regarding this matter, please call me or Mr. Paul Inserra at (509) 377-4147.
Respectfully, C
P .Be is i President, Nuclear Operations 1 Drop PE23 Enclosure cc: EW Merschoff, NRC RIV NRC Sr. Resident Inspector, MD927N (2)
KE Perkins, Jr., NRC RIV, WCFO INPO Records Center - Atlanta, GA C Poslusny, Jr., NRR DL Williams, BPA, MD399 PD Robinson, Winston & Strawn 9803i'10369 980304 PDR ADQCK 05000397 PDR ff!fill!II!III!lfillfllllfffll fffffff
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LZR)
FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER I2) PAGE (3)
Washin ton Nuclear Plant - Unit 2 50-397 1 OF 4 TITLE (4) VOLUNTARYREPORT OF AUTOMATICSTART OF HPCS DG DUE TO OPERATOR ERROR EVENT DATE IS) LER NUMBER I6) REPORT DATE (7) OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (B)
MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR SEQUENTlAL REV. MOMrH PAY FAClLHYNAME DOCKET NUMBER NUMBER NUMBER FACrLITYNAME 02 03 98 00 03 04 98 N/A 05000 OPERATING HOOB THIS REPORT IS SUBHITTEO PURSUANT TO THE IKQUIREHENTS OF 10 CFR 5: (Check one or more) Ili) 20.402(h) 20.405(c) 50.73(a)(2) (iv) 73.71(b) 20.405(a)(1) Qi 50.36(c) (1) 50.73(a)(2)(v) 73.71(c) 20.405(a)(1) 0B 50.36(c)(2) 50.73(a)(2)(vii) OTHER 20.405(a) (1) (iii) 50.73(a)(2) I 50.73(a)(2)(vill)(A)
Voluntary 20.405(a)(1)(iv) 50.73(a) (2)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(viii) (B) (NUREG 1022) 20.405(a)(1)(v) 50.73(a) (2)(iii) 50.73(a)(2)(x)
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)
NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)
Bill Pfitzer, Licensing Engineer 509-377-2419 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT fAILURE DESCRIBED I)i THIS REPORT (13)
CAUSE svsvrM COMPONENT lAvlJFAClVRER REPORTABLE CAUSE COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE TO NPRDS TO NPRDS SUPPLFMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14) FXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR YES NO corn le)ed EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE .
ABSTRACT:
On 2/03/98, during the performance of surveillance testing, with the plant in Operating Mode 1, a control room operator mistakenly tripped the supply breaker for 4160v electrical bus SM-2 by inadvertent operation of the breaker handswitch. This resulted in the loss of electrical bus SM-2 which was accompanied by tripping of condensate pump COND-P-1B, condensate booster pump COND-P-2B, condenser circulating water pump CW-P-1B and the supply breaker to bus SM-4, and automatic starting of the High Pressure Core Spray emergency diesel generator (HPCS DG).
Loss of COND-P-1B and COND-P-2B initiated a reactor water level transient which was mitigated by prompt Operations crew action to reduce total core flow to approximately 60 million Ib-mass/hr by use of the Reactor Recirculation system. All plant equipment operated as designed during the event.
Immediate actions were taken by the Operations crew to stabilize the plant at approximately 75% reactor power, and an investigation of the event was initiated by convening an Incident Review Board ORB).
The cause of the event was human error and failure to self check, in that the control room operator erroneously tripped the supply breaker for electrical bus SM-2, which in turn caused the loss of bus SM-4 and the start of the HPCS DG.
This event is voluntarily reported since the HPCS DG is not an Engineered Safety Feature at WNP-2. The safety significance of this event is considered minimal.
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME I 1) DOCKET ))UMBER I 2) LER ))UMBER I 6) PAGE I 3)
YEAR S DQV EN T I AL REYIsIorr NUMBER IRJHBC R Washington Nuclear Plant - Unit 2 50-397 98 001 00 2 OF 4 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) ()7)
Even Descri tion On February 3, 1998, while operating in Mode 1 at 100% power, control room personnel were making preparations to perform the Division 1 Emergency Diesel Generator semi-annual operability surveillance (OSP-ELEC-S701). In accordance with the surveillance procedure, the designated Control Room Operator (CRO2) had shifted the power source for electrical board SM-1 from transformer TR-N to transformer TR-S, with a second Control Room Operator (CRO3) acting as a peer checker for the evolution. As one of the final steps in the evolution, the procedure directed the control switch for breaker CB-Nl/1, the normal supply breaker to electrical bus SM-1, to be placed in the TRIP position to ensure the switch escutcheon green flag is displayed.
Just prior to this step, CRO3 (the peer checker) responded to an unrelated control room annunciator, and CRO2 (the performer) momentarily turned away from the control panel to review the impending steps of the procedure.
After reviewing the procedure, CRO2 returned his attention to the control panel and incorrectly selected and manipulated the control switch for breaker CB-Nl/2, the normal supply breaker to bus SM-2. Upon manipulation of the handswitch, CB-Nl/2 tripped, de-energizing SM-2. The selection and operation of the handswitch for CB-Nl/2 was performed in error by CRO2.
De-energization of SM-2 caused automatic tripping of the pumps associated with the bus, i.e., condensate pump COND-P-1B, condensate booster pump COND-P-2B, and condenser circulating water pump CW-P-1B. The consequent reduction in reactor feedwater flow resulted in reactor water level lowering at a rate of about 25 inches per minute. Prompt action by the Operations crew to lower total core flow to approximately 60 million 1b-mass/hr using the Reactor Recirculation system, thus reducing reactor power level, successfully stabilized the plant at approximately 75% power. Power was immediately returned to bus SM-2 by manual closure of the alternate supply breaker from transformer TR-S.
Additionally, the momentary loss of bus SM-2 caused the de-energization of electrical bus SM-4, which in turn resulted in automatic starting of the HPCS DG due to SM-4 undervoltage. Normal power was subsequently returned to bus SM-4 when the Operations crew re-closed the supply breakers from SM-2 and manually tripped the HPCS DG.
Because the HPCS DG is not considered an Engineered Safety Feature at WNP-2, this report is being voluntarily submitted per the recommendation of NUREG 1022. This event would otherwise require a mandatory report per the requirements of 10CF50.73(a)(2)(iv).
Immediate Corrective Action A voluntary 4-hour report of the HPCS DG auto start was made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(2)(ii).
After the transient was stabilized, a Problem Evaluation Request was initiated and an Incident Review Board (IRB) was convened.
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (I ) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3)
YEAR SEQVEHTIAI REVIS IOH NVHBER WHBBR Washington Nuclear Plant - Unit 2 50-397 98 001 3 OF 4 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)
Root Cause The cause of the event was human error. AAer having reviewed the impending steps of the bus transfer procedure, CRO2 incorrectly selected the handswitch for breaker CB-Nl/2 switch and placed it in the TRIP position without adequate self-checking.
A contributing cause of this event was failure to obtain a peer check. AAer having completed the bulk of the procedure using peer checks, CRO2 considered the remaining portion of the procedure of lesser concern and discontinued obtaining peer checks prior to action steps.
An additional contributing cause of this event was that peer checking standards have not been properly communicated by Operations management.
Further orrective Action Operations supervision will conduct and document appropriate counseling to address the human performance error(s) associated with this event.
A station wide stand down was conducted on February 3, 1998, to review this event as well as other recent human performance error initiated events.
An entry into the Operations Night Orders was made on February 3, 1998, reiterating expectations regarding the Operations Observation program, procedure usage, prejob briefs, self checking, and peer checks.
Shift Managers will evaluate crew members for buy-in and adherence to routine self-checking. Individuals that do not exhibit the proper use of self-checking techniques will be given one-on-one reinforcement of the techniques, emphasizing the value of self-checking.
Operations management expectations regarding peer checks and self-checking will be documented in the appropriate Operating Instruction(s).
The Operations Observation program will be revised to provide instruction to reinforce management's expectations for peer checks and self-checking.
Asses men of afe onse uences The consequences of this event were minimized by prompt operator action to mitigate and stabilize the resultant reactor water level transient. Additionally, the design basis of the plant envelopes loss of electrical power conditions such as this event. A review of the WNP-2 Probabilistic Safety Analysis shows that loss of bus SM-2 is a negligible contributor to the overall core damage frequency. For these reasons, the safety
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (I) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3)
YEAR SEQUENTIAL RCVIS ION NUMBER NlNBCR Washington Nuclear Plant - Unit 2 50-397 98 001 00 4 OF 4 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) ((7) consequences of this event are considered minimal. However, it is recognized that personnel performance is critical to successful plant operations.
Similar Event LER 96-002 documented an equipment operator opening a potential transformer fuse compartment, resulting in electrical bus SM-8 transferring to alternate power supply, and automatic starting of EDG-2.
LER 95-002 documents Operations personnel manipulation of the wrong lever on the main turbine front standard, resulting in a main turbine trip and reactor scram.
