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{{#Wiki_filter: | {{#Wiki_filter:High Energy Arcing Faults (HEAF) | ||
Hazard Modeling Gabriel Taylor P.E. | |||
-July 24, 2019 *Provide overview of modeling | Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research Division of Risk Analysis July 24, 2019 Public Meeting - July 24, 2019 | ||
-History-Types-Existing models | |||
-Comparisons to | Purpose | ||
-July 24, 2019 Categories of Electrical | * Provide overview of modeling | ||
-Review Public Meeting | - History | ||
-July 24, 2019 | - Types | ||
- Existing models | |||
-July 24, 2019 | - Comparisons to measurement Public Meeting - July 24, 2019 | ||
-Published 2005 | |||
*This EPRI/NRC working group was the first to explicitly model HEAF events as part of a fire PRA-The need was identified as part of accident investigation efforts for the development of 6850 & | Categories of Electrical Enclosure Failure Mode - Review Public Meeting - July 24, 2019 | ||
)- | |||
Operating Experience San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, 2001 | |||
-July 24, 2019 *NUREG/CR-6850, Appendix M (2005) | * Highlighted HEAF hazard | ||
*Zone of Influence (ZOI) Method largely based on one well documented fire event at San | * NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 2002-27 | ||
-Observational data and | - RECENT FIRES AT COMMERCIAL NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS IN THE UNITED STATES | ||
-No test data available | - https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML0226/ML022630147.pdf Public Meeting - July 24, 2019 | ||
-Currently this model has been used to support NFPA 805 transitions | |||
Public Meeting | Fire PRA Methodology NUREG/CR-6850 EPRI 1011989 | ||
-July 24, 2019 HEAF | * NUREG/CR 6850 forms the basis for nuclear power plant (NPP) Fire PRAs | ||
-July 24, 2019 Current | - Published 2005 | ||
*Bus duct guidance for high energy arcing faults (FAQ 07-0035) *Methodology developed as an expert elicitation | * This EPRI/NRC working group was the first to explicitly model HEAF events as part of a fire PRA | ||
-Observational data and | - The need was identified as part of accident investigation efforts for the development of 6850 & NRCs assessment of energetic faults from 1986-2001 https://www.nrc.gov/readin | ||
-No test data available | * (ADAMS Accession No. ML021290364) g-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/contract | ||
-Currently this model has been used to support NFPA 805 transitions Public Meeting | - Timely OpE- San Onofre 2/3/2001 /cr6850/ | ||
-July 24, 2019 HEAF | Public Meeting - July 24, 2019 | ||
-July 24, 2019 Conceptual Modeling Approaches Public Meeting | |||
-July 24, 2019 *Bounding (Current models) | Current Methodology Electrical Enclosures | ||
*Enclosure, bus ducts | * NUREG/CR-6850, Appendix M (2005) | ||
*Bounding by Categories | * Zone of Influence (ZOI) Method largely based on one well documented fire event at San Onofre in 2001 | ||
*By power, energy, voltage, fault current, protection scheme, material, safety class | * Methodology developed as an expert elicitation | ||
*Dynamic ZOI | - Observational data and OpE information only | ||
*Scenario dependent source | - No test data available | ||
*Target | - Currently this model has been used to support NFPA 805 transitions Public Meeting - July 24, 2019 6 | ||
-i.e., one size fits all | HEAF OpE Electrical Enclosure SONGS, 2001 San Onofre; 2001 Onagawa; 2011 Public Meeting - July 24, 2019 | ||
-Damage and ignition of components within ZOI | |||
-Peak HRR*Least amount of information needed to determine ZOI | Current Methodology Bus Ducts | ||
*Least realistic for majority of cases | * NUREG/CR-6850, Supplement 1 | ||
*Simple to apply*Lowest | * Bus duct guidance for high energy arcing faults (FAQ 07-0035) | ||
* Methodology developed as an expert elicitation | |||
-Energy/Power potential | - Observational data and OpE information only | ||
-Protection scheme | - No test data available | ||
-Size, Material, Design, etc. | - Currently this model has been used to support NFPA 805 transitions Public Meeting - July 24, 2019 | ||
*More realistic | |||
*Requires more information to apply | HEAF OpE Bus Duct Diablo Canyon Bus Duct (OpE) Bus Duct Testing Columbia Bus Duct (OpE) 2000 2016 2009 Public Meeting - July 24, 2019 | ||
*More costly for development and | |||
Conceptual Modeling Approaches Public Meeting - July 24, 2019 | |||
*Requires knowledge of fire PRA target fragility to high heat flux short | |||
*Potential to provide most realistic results | As presented at 4/18/2018 public workshop Modeling Approach | ||
*Complex*Most | * Bounding (Current models) | ||
-July 24, 2019 *No approach has been excluded | * Enclosure, bus ducts | ||
*Understand and evaluation existing and new hazard models | * Bounding by Categories | ||
*Needs to consider development and application efficiencies along with level of realism in a holistically manner to make informed decision on appraoch*NRC/EPRI working group advancing | * By power, energy, voltage, fault current, protection scheme, material, safety class | ||
-July 24, 2019 Overview of Existing Models Public Meeting | * Dynamic ZOI | ||
-July 24, 2019 *Simple geometric configuration | * Scenario dependent source | ||
-arc modeled as sphere | * Target fragility 11 Public Meeting - July 24, 2019 | ||
*Heat transfer to predict distance where threshold is exceeded*Used available research on human skin / clothing fragility (Stoll / Artz)*Conservative due to maximum arc power assumption | |||
*Used in IEEE 1584 | As presented at 4/18/2018 public workshop Bounding ZOI (Current Model) | ||
-2002 for > 15kV | * Assumes worst case damage for all HEAF | ||
-July 24, 2019 *Output-IE, incident energy (J/ | - i.e., one size fits all | ||
-t, arcing time (seconds) | - Damage and ignition of components within ZOI | ||
- | - Peak HRR | ||
-D, distance from arc | * Least amount of information needed to determine ZOI | ||
-July 24, 2019 Semi-Empirical Wilkins-Allison-Lang Method | * Least realistic for majority of cases | ||
*Output-IE, incident energy | * Simple to apply | ||
*Input- | * Lowest cost 12 Public Meeting - July 24, 2019 | ||
-V, system voltage | |||
-Varc, arc voltage | As presented at 4/18/2018 public workshop Refined Bounding ZOI | ||
-Iarc, arc current | * Subdivides equipment by HEAF damaged potential | ||
-t, arcing time | - Equipment type | ||
-D, distance from arc point | - Energy/Power potential | ||
-a, enclosure dimension | - Protection scheme | ||
-g, gap-Ve, electrode | - Size, Material, Design, etc. | ||
-July 24, 2019 Semi- | * More realistic | ||
- | * Requires more information to apply | ||
*Input-MVAsc, short-circuit MVA | * More costly for development and application 13 Public Meeting - July 24, 2019 | ||
-t, arcing time | |||
-D, distance from arc point | As presented at 4/18/2018 public workshop Dynamic ZOI | ||
-X, configuration factor (IEEE) | * Requires detailed information on power system | ||
- | * Correlation from experiments and theory to model source term and incident flux as a function of distance | ||
-2.098) | * Requires knowledge of fire PRA target fragility to high heat flux short duration. | ||
-July 24, 2019 | * Potential to provide most realistic results | ||
*Input-F, 3-phase short | * Complex | ||
-circuit current | * Most costly 14 Public Meeting - July 24, 2019 | ||
- | |||
- | Modeling Approach Status | ||
* No approach has been excluded | |||
-V Power Distribution System, 2000 Public Meeting | * Understand and evaluation existing and new hazard models | ||
-July 24, 2019 *Guide for performing arc | * Needs to consider development and application efficiencies along with level of realism in a holistically manner to make informed decision on appraoch | ||
*Model for incident energy calculations | * NRC/EPRI working group advancing PRA modeling methodology Public Meeting - July 24, 2019 | ||
*Empirically derived model from 300 tests | |||
*Methodology focused on personal protection | Overview of Existing Models Public Meeting - July 24, 2019 | ||
-Arc flash boundary is only applicable to human fragility-Arc fault current and incident energy are independent of | |||
Theoretical Lee Model | |||
* Simple geometric configuration | |||
-Flash Hazard Calculation, 2002 Public Meeting | - arc modeled as sphere | ||
-July 24, 2019 Empirical | * Heat transfer to predict distance where threshold is exceeded | ||
- | * Used available research on human skin / clothing fragility (Stoll / Artz) | ||
-2002*Output-IE, Incident Energy | * Conservative due to maximum arc power assumption | ||
*Input-V, system voltage | * Used in IEEE 1584-2002 for > 15kV applications R. Lee, The Other Electrical Hazard: Electric Arc Blast Burns, 1982 Public Meeting - July 24, 2019 | ||
- | |||
-t, arc duration | Theoretical Lees Method | ||
-G, conductor gap | * Output | ||
-D, distance | - IE, incident energy (J/cm2) ASTM slug | ||
-x, distance exponent | * Inputs T-cap. slug | ||
-Configuration (open / box) | - V, system voltage (kV) | ||
-Flash Hazard Calculation, 2002 Public Meeting | - t, arcing time (seconds) KEMA Daq | ||
-July 24, 2019 | - Ibf, 3 phase bolted fault current | ||
*Significantly changed from 2002 edition | - D, distance from arc point Physical Measurement R. Lee, The Other Electrical Hazard: Electric Arc Blast Burns, 1982 Public Meeting - July 24, 2019 | ||
*Model for incident energy calculations | |||
*Empirically derived model from 2,160 tests | Semi-Empirical Wilkins-Allison-Lang Method | ||
*Five configurations | * Output ASTM slug | ||
-VCB, VCBB, HCB, VOA, | - IE, incident energy T-cap. slug | ||
- | * Input | ||
- VLL, line-line voltage KEMA Daq | |||
- | - V, system voltage | ||
- Varc, arc voltage | |||
*Frequency: 50 or 60 Hz | - Iarc, arc current | ||
*Bolted fault current: | - t, arcing time | ||
-Low Voltage: 500 to 106,000 A | - D, distance from arc point | ||
-Med Voltage: 200 to 65,000 A | - a, enclosure dimension Physical Measurement | ||
*Conductor Gaps: | - g, gap | ||
-Low Voltage: 0.25 to 3 inches | - Ve, electrode voltage Literature R. Wilkins, M. Allison, M. Lang, Improved Method for Arc Flash Hazard Analysis, 2004 Public Meeting - July 24, 2019 | ||
-Med Voltage: 0.75 to 10 inches | |||
**Fault clearing time: no limit | Semi-empirical Gammon Simplified | ||
* Output ASTM slug | |||
-July 24, 2019 *Output-IE, Incident Energy | - IE, incident energy T-cap. slug | ||
*Input- | * Input KEMA Daq | ||
- | - MVAsc, short-circuit MVA | ||
-T, Duration | - t, arcing time Physical Measurement | ||
-D, Distance | - D, distance from arc point | ||
-G, Conductor gap | - X, configuration factor (IEEE) | ||
-Enclosure Dimensions | Literature | ||
-Equip | - IEratioUB, Incident energy rate ratio upper bound (configuration based 0.758 - 2.098) | ||
- | T. Gammon, J. Matthews, The IEEE 1584-2002 Arc Modeling Debate and Simple Incident Energy Equations for Low-Voltage Systems, 2006 Public Meeting - July 24, 2019 | ||
-Model overpredict max measured incident energy*Maximum overprediction : ~11x | Empirical - Statistical Doughty - Neal - Floyd | ||
-550 kJ/ | * Output ASTM slug | ||
*Minimum overprediction : ~2x | - EMA,EMB, Max. Incident Energy T-cap. slug | ||
-3.4MJ/ | * Input | ||
- F, 3-phase short-circuit current KEMA Daq | |||
-July 24, 2019 *ASTM slug calorimeter (copper) | - tA, tB, arc duration | ||
-Model overpredict max measured incident energy*Maximum overprediction : ~17x | - DA,DB, distance Physical Measurement R. Doughty, T. Neal, H Floyd, Predicting Incident Energy to Better Manage the Electric Arc Hazard on 600-V Power Distribution System, 2000 Public Meeting - July 24, 2019 | ||
-550 kJ/ | |||
*Minimum overprediction : ~3x | Empirical - Statistical IEEE 1584 - 2002 | ||
-3.4MJ/ | * Guide for performing arc flash calculations | ||
-Note: 2 instruments damaged due to HEAF | * Model for incident energy calculations | ||
-July 24, 2019 | * Empirically derived model from 300 tests | ||
-Model overpredict max measured incident energy*Maximum overprediction : ~26x | * Methodology focused on personal protection | ||
-236 kJ/ | - Arc flash boundary is only applicable to human fragility | ||
*Minimum overprediction : agreement | - Arc fault current and incident energy are independent of target IEEE 1584-2002, Guide for Performing Arc-Flash Hazard Calculation, 2002 Public Meeting - July 24, 2019 | ||
-6.0MJ/ | |||
Empirical - Statistical IEEE 1584 - 2002 | |||
-July 24, 2019 *T-cap slug calorimeter (tungsten) | * Output ASTM slug | ||
-Model overpredict max measured incident energy*Maximum overprediction : ~39x | - IE, Incident Energy T-cap. slug | ||
-236 kJ/ | * Input | ||
*Minimum overprediction : ~1.6x | - V, system voltage KEMA Daq | ||
-6.0MJ/ | - Ia, arc current | ||
-July 24, 2019 *Follow similar form | - t, arc duration | ||
-Inverse power relationship with distance to target | - G, conductor gap Physical Measurement | ||
*Supporting test configurations not directly applicable | - D, distance | ||
-Open air or box w/opening | - x, distance exponent Literature | ||
*Fragility different (human vs equipment) | - Configuration (open / box) | ||
*Existing models may be adapted to make representative and realistic. | IEEE 1584-2002, Guide for Performing Arc-Flash Hazard Calculation, 2002 Public Meeting - July 24, 2019 | ||
Empirical - Statistical IEEE 1584 - 2018 | |||
* Guide for performing arc flash calculations | |||
* Significantly changed from 2002 edition | |||
* Model for incident energy calculations | |||
* Empirically derived model from 2,160 tests | |||
* Five configurations IEEE 1584-2018, Guide for Performing Arc-Flash | |||
- VCB, VCBB, HCB, VOA, HOA Hazard Calculation, 2018 Public Meeting - July 24, 2019 | |||
IEEE 1584 - 2018 Range of model | |||
* System voltage: 208 to 15,000 Volts | |||
* Frequency: 50 or 60 Hz | |||
* Bolted fault current: | |||
- Low Voltage: 500 to 106,000 A | |||
- Med Voltage: 200 to 65,000 A | |||
* Conductor Gaps: | |||
- Low Voltage: 0.25 to 3 inches | |||
- Med Voltage: 0.75 to 10 inches | |||
* Target Distances: 12 inches | |||
* Fault clearing time: no limit Public Meeting - July 24, 2019 | |||
Empirical - Statistical IEEE 1584-2018 | |||
* Output ASTM slug | |||
- IE, Incident Energy T-cap. slug | |||
* Input | |||
- Ibf, Bolted fault current | |||
- Voc, System voltage KEMA Daq | |||
- T, Duration | |||
- D, Distance Physical Measurement | |||
- G, Conductor gap | |||
- Enclosure Dimensions Literature | |||
- Equip Configuration Public Meeting - July 24, 2019 | |||
Model Comparison IEEE 1584 - 2018 vs MV Alum | |||
* ASTM slug calorimeter (copper) | |||
- Model overpredict max measured incident energy | |||
* Maximum overprediction : ~11x | |||
- 550 kJ/m2 measured vs. 6,100 kJ/m2 calculated | |||
* Minimum overprediction : ~2x | |||
- 3.4MJ/m2 measured vs. 6.3MJ/m2 | |||
- Note: 2 instruments damaged due to HEAF damage likely higher heat flux at damaged sensors and better agreement with model Public Meeting - July 24, 2019 | |||
Model Comparison LEE vs MV Alum | |||
* ASTM slug calorimeter (copper) | |||
- Model overpredict max measured incident energy | |||
* Maximum overprediction : ~17x | |||
- 550 kJ/m2 measured vs. 9,100 kJ/m2 calculated | |||
* Minimum overprediction : ~3x | |||
- 3.4MJ/m2 measured vs. 9.4MJ/m2 calculated | |||
- Note: 2 instruments damaged due to HEAF damage likely higher heat flux at damaged sensors and better agreement with model Public Meeting - July 24, 2019 | |||
Model Comparison IEEE 1584 - 2018 vs MV Alum | |||
* T-cap slug calorimeter (tungsten) | |||
- Model overpredict max measured incident energy | |||
* Maximum overprediction : ~26x | |||
- 236 kJ/m2 measured vs. 6,100 kJ/m2 calculated | |||
* Minimum overprediction : agreement | |||
- 6.0MJ/m2 measured vs. 6.3MJ/m2 Public Meeting - July 24, 2019 | |||
Model Comparison LEE vs MV Alum | |||
* T-cap slug calorimeter (tungsten) | |||
- Model overpredict max measured incident energy | |||
* Maximum overprediction : ~39x | |||
- 236 kJ/m2 measured vs. 9,100 kJ/m2 calculated | |||
* Minimum overprediction : ~1.6x | |||
- 6.0MJ/m2 measured vs. 9.4MJ/m2 Public Meeting - July 24, 2019 | |||
Wrap-up Existing Models | |||
* Follow similar form | |||
- Inverse power relationship with distance to target | |||
* Supporting test configurations not directly applicable | |||
- Open air or box w/opening | |||
* Fragility different (human vs equipment) | |||
* Existing models may be adapted to make representative and realistic. | |||
Public Meeting - July 24, 2019}} |
Latest revision as of 17:10, 19 October 2019
ML19183A309 | |
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Issue date: | 07/02/2019 |
From: | Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research |
To: | |
K. Hamburger 415-2022 | |
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Download: ML19183A309 (31) | |
Text
High Energy Arcing Faults (HEAF)
Hazard Modeling Gabriel Taylor P.E.
Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research Division of Risk Analysis July 24, 2019 Public Meeting - July 24, 2019
Purpose
- Provide overview of modeling
- History
- Types
- Existing models
- Comparisons to measurement Public Meeting - July 24, 2019
Categories of Electrical Enclosure Failure Mode - Review Public Meeting - July 24, 2019
Operating Experience San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, 2001
- Highlighted HEAF hazard
- RECENT FIRES AT COMMERCIAL NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS IN THE UNITED STATES
- https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML0226/ML022630147.pdf Public Meeting - July 24, 2019
Fire PRA Methodology NUREG/CR-6850 EPRI 1011989
- NUREG/CR 6850 forms the basis for nuclear power plant (NPP) Fire PRAs
- Published 2005
- The need was identified as part of accident investigation efforts for the development of 6850 & NRCs assessment of energetic faults from 1986-2001 https://www.nrc.gov/readin
- (ADAMS Accession No. ML021290364) g-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/contract
- Timely OpE- San Onofre 2/3/2001 /cr6850/
Public Meeting - July 24, 2019
Current Methodology Electrical Enclosures
- NUREG/CR-6850, Appendix M (2005)
- Zone of Influence (ZOI) Method largely based on one well documented fire event at San Onofre in 2001
- Methodology developed as an expert elicitation
- Observational data and OpE information only
- No test data available
- Currently this model has been used to support NFPA 805 transitions Public Meeting - July 24, 2019 6
HEAF OpE Electrical Enclosure SONGS, 2001 San Onofre; 2001 Onagawa; 2011 Public Meeting - July 24, 2019
Current Methodology Bus Ducts
- NUREG/CR-6850, Supplement 1
- Bus duct guidance for high energy arcing faults (FAQ 07-0035)
- Methodology developed as an expert elicitation
- Observational data and OpE information only
- No test data available
- Currently this model has been used to support NFPA 805 transitions Public Meeting - July 24, 2019
HEAF OpE Bus Duct Diablo Canyon Bus Duct (OpE) Bus Duct Testing Columbia Bus Duct (OpE) 2000 2016 2009 Public Meeting - July 24, 2019
Conceptual Modeling Approaches Public Meeting - July 24, 2019
As presented at 4/18/2018 public workshop Modeling Approach
- Bounding (Current models)
- Enclosure, bus ducts
- Bounding by Categories
- By power, energy, voltage, fault current, protection scheme, material, safety class
- Dynamic ZOI
- Scenario dependent source
- Target fragility 11 Public Meeting - July 24, 2019
As presented at 4/18/2018 public workshop Bounding ZOI (Current Model)
- Assumes worst case damage for all HEAF
- i.e., one size fits all
- Damage and ignition of components within ZOI
- Peak HRR
- Least amount of information needed to determine ZOI
- Least realistic for majority of cases
- Simple to apply
- Lowest cost 12 Public Meeting - July 24, 2019
As presented at 4/18/2018 public workshop Refined Bounding ZOI
- Subdivides equipment by HEAF damaged potential
- Equipment type
- Energy/Power potential
- Protection scheme
- Size, Material, Design, etc.
- More realistic
- Requires more information to apply
- More costly for development and application 13 Public Meeting - July 24, 2019
As presented at 4/18/2018 public workshop Dynamic ZOI
- Requires detailed information on power system
- Correlation from experiments and theory to model source term and incident flux as a function of distance
- Requires knowledge of fire PRA target fragility to high heat flux short duration.
- Potential to provide most realistic results
- Complex
- Most costly 14 Public Meeting - July 24, 2019
Modeling Approach Status
- No approach has been excluded
- Understand and evaluation existing and new hazard models
- Needs to consider development and application efficiencies along with level of realism in a holistically manner to make informed decision on appraoch
- NRC/EPRI working group advancing PRA modeling methodology Public Meeting - July 24, 2019
Overview of Existing Models Public Meeting - July 24, 2019
Theoretical Lee Model
- Simple geometric configuration
- arc modeled as sphere
- Heat transfer to predict distance where threshold is exceeded
- Used available research on human skin / clothing fragility (Stoll / Artz)
- Conservative due to maximum arc power assumption
- Used in IEEE 1584-2002 for > 15kV applications R. Lee, The Other Electrical Hazard: Electric Arc Blast Burns, 1982 Public Meeting - July 24, 2019
Theoretical Lees Method
- Output
- IE, incident energy (J/cm2) ASTM slug
- Inputs T-cap. slug
- V, system voltage (kV)
- t, arcing time (seconds) KEMA Daq
- Ibf, 3 phase bolted fault current
- D, distance from arc point Physical Measurement R. Lee, The Other Electrical Hazard: Electric Arc Blast Burns, 1982 Public Meeting - July 24, 2019
Semi-Empirical Wilkins-Allison-Lang Method
- Output ASTM slug
- IE, incident energy T-cap. slug
- Input
- VLL, line-line voltage KEMA Daq
- V, system voltage
- Varc, arc voltage
- Iarc, arc current
- t, arcing time
- D, distance from arc point
- a, enclosure dimension Physical Measurement
- g, gap
- Ve, electrode voltage Literature R. Wilkins, M. Allison, M. Lang, Improved Method for Arc Flash Hazard Analysis, 2004 Public Meeting - July 24, 2019
Semi-empirical Gammon Simplified
- Output ASTM slug
- IE, incident energy T-cap. slug
- Input KEMA Daq
- MVAsc, short-circuit MVA
- t, arcing time Physical Measurement
- D, distance from arc point
- X, configuration factor (IEEE)
Literature
- IEratioUB, Incident energy rate ratio upper bound (configuration based 0.758 - 2.098)
T. Gammon, J. Matthews, The IEEE 1584-2002 Arc Modeling Debate and Simple Incident Energy Equations for Low-Voltage Systems, 2006 Public Meeting - July 24, 2019
Empirical - Statistical Doughty - Neal - Floyd
- Output ASTM slug
- EMA,EMB, Max. Incident Energy T-cap. slug
- Input
- F, 3-phase short-circuit current KEMA Daq
- tA, tB, arc duration
- DA,DB, distance Physical Measurement R. Doughty, T. Neal, H Floyd, Predicting Incident Energy to Better Manage the Electric Arc Hazard on 600-V Power Distribution System, 2000 Public Meeting - July 24, 2019
Empirical - Statistical IEEE 1584 - 2002
- Guide for performing arc flash calculations
- Model for incident energy calculations
- Empirically derived model from 300 tests
- Methodology focused on personal protection
- Arc flash boundary is only applicable to human fragility
- Arc fault current and incident energy are independent of target IEEE 1584-2002, Guide for Performing Arc-Flash Hazard Calculation, 2002 Public Meeting - July 24, 2019
Empirical - Statistical IEEE 1584 - 2002
- Output ASTM slug
- IE, Incident Energy T-cap. slug
- Input
- V, system voltage KEMA Daq
- Ia, arc current
- t, arc duration
- G, conductor gap Physical Measurement
- D, distance
- x, distance exponent Literature
- Configuration (open / box)
IEEE 1584-2002, Guide for Performing Arc-Flash Hazard Calculation, 2002 Public Meeting - July 24, 2019
Empirical - Statistical IEEE 1584 - 2018
- Guide for performing arc flash calculations
- Significantly changed from 2002 edition
- Model for incident energy calculations
- Empirically derived model from 2,160 tests
- Five configurations IEEE 1584-2018, Guide for Performing Arc-Flash
- VCB, VCBB, HCB, VOA, HOA Hazard Calculation, 2018 Public Meeting - July 24, 2019
IEEE 1584 - 2018 Range of model
- System voltage: 208 to 15,000 Volts
- Frequency: 50 or 60 Hz
- Bolted fault current:
- Low Voltage: 500 to 106,000 A
- Med Voltage: 200 to 65,000 A
- Conductor Gaps:
- Low Voltage: 0.25 to 3 inches
- Med Voltage: 0.75 to 10 inches
- Target Distances: 12 inches
- Fault clearing time: no limit Public Meeting - July 24, 2019
Empirical - Statistical IEEE 1584-2018
- Output ASTM slug
- IE, Incident Energy T-cap. slug
- Input
- Ibf, Bolted fault current
- Voc, System voltage KEMA Daq
- T, Duration
- D, Distance Physical Measurement
- G, Conductor gap
- Enclosure Dimensions Literature
- Equip Configuration Public Meeting - July 24, 2019
Model Comparison IEEE 1584 - 2018 vs MV Alum
- Model overpredict max measured incident energy
- Maximum overprediction : ~11x
- 550 kJ/m2 measured vs. 6,100 kJ/m2 calculated
- Minimum overprediction : ~2x
- 3.4MJ/m2 measured vs. 6.3MJ/m2
- Note: 2 instruments damaged due to HEAF damage likely higher heat flux at damaged sensors and better agreement with model Public Meeting - July 24, 2019
Model Comparison LEE vs MV Alum
- Model overpredict max measured incident energy
- Maximum overprediction : ~17x
- 550 kJ/m2 measured vs. 9,100 kJ/m2 calculated
- Minimum overprediction : ~3x
- 3.4MJ/m2 measured vs. 9.4MJ/m2 calculated
- Note: 2 instruments damaged due to HEAF damage likely higher heat flux at damaged sensors and better agreement with model Public Meeting - July 24, 2019
Model Comparison IEEE 1584 - 2018 vs MV Alum
- T-cap slug calorimeter (tungsten)
- Model overpredict max measured incident energy
- Maximum overprediction : ~26x
- 236 kJ/m2 measured vs. 6,100 kJ/m2 calculated
- Minimum overprediction : agreement
- 6.0MJ/m2 measured vs. 6.3MJ/m2 Public Meeting - July 24, 2019
Model Comparison LEE vs MV Alum
- T-cap slug calorimeter (tungsten)
- Model overpredict max measured incident energy
- Maximum overprediction : ~39x
- 236 kJ/m2 measured vs. 9,100 kJ/m2 calculated
- Minimum overprediction : ~1.6x
- 6.0MJ/m2 measured vs. 9.4MJ/m2 Public Meeting - July 24, 2019
Wrap-up Existing Models
- Follow similar form
- Inverse power relationship with distance to target
- Supporting test configurations not directly applicable
- Open air or box w/opening
- Fragility different (human vs equipment)
- Existing models may be adapted to make representative and realistic.
Public Meeting - July 24, 2019