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{{#Wiki_filter:Public Meeting
{{#Wiki_filter:High Energy Arcing Faults (HEAF)
-July 24, 2019 High Energy Arcing Faults (HEAF) Hazard ModelingGabriel Taylor P.E.Office of Nuclear Regulatory ResearchDivision of Risk Analysis July 24, 2019 Public Meeting  
Hazard Modeling Gabriel Taylor P.E.
-July 24, 2019 *Provide overview of modeling
Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research Division of Risk Analysis July 24, 2019 Public Meeting - July 24, 2019
-History-Types-Existing models
 
-Comparisons to measurementPurpose Public Meeting  
Purpose
-July 24, 2019 Categories of Electrical EnclosureFailure Mode  
* Provide overview of modeling
-Review Public Meeting  
                -     History
-July 24, 2019 *Highlighted HEAF hazard
                -     Types
*NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 2002 RECENT FIRES AT COMMERCIAL NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS IN THE UNITED STATES-https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML0226/ML022630147.pdfOperating ExperienceSan OnofreNuclear Generating Station, 2001 Public Meeting  
                -     Existing models
-July 24, 2019 *NUREG/CR 6850 forms the basis for nuclear power plant (NPP) Fire PRA's
                -     Comparisons to measurement Public Meeting - July 24, 2019
-Published 2005
 
*This EPRI/NRC working group was the first to explicitly model HEAF events as part of a fire PRA-The need was identified as part of accident investigation efforts for the development of 6850 & NRC's assessment of energetic faults from 1986-2001 *(ADAMS Accession No. ML021290364
Categories of Electrical Enclosure Failure Mode - Review Public Meeting - July 24, 2019
)-Timely OpE-San Onofre2/3/2001Fire PRA MethodologyNUREG/CR-6850 EPRI 1011989https://www.nrc.gov/readin g-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/contract/cr6850/
 
Public Meeting
Operating Experience San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, 2001
-July 24, 2019 *NUREG/CR-6850, Appendix M (2005)
* Highlighted HEAF hazard
*Zone of Influence (ZOI) Method largely based on one well documented fire event at San Onofrein 2001*Methodology developed as an expert elicitation  
* NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 2002-27
-Observational data and OpEinformation only  
                  - RECENT FIRES AT COMMERCIAL NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS IN THE UNITED STATES
-No test data available  
                  - https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML0226/ML022630147.pdf Public Meeting - July 24, 2019
-Currently this model has been used to support NFPA 805 transitions Current MethodologyElectrical Enclosures 6
 
Public Meeting  
Fire PRA Methodology NUREG/CR-6850 EPRI 1011989
-July 24, 2019 HEAF OpEElectrical EnclosureSONGS, 2001San Onofre; 2001Onagawa; 2011 Public Meeting  
* NUREG/CR 6850 forms the basis for nuclear power plant (NPP) Fire PRAs
-July 24, 2019 Current MethodologyBus Ducts*NUREG/CR-6850, Supplement 1
                - Published 2005
*Bus duct guidance for high energy arcing faults (FAQ 07-0035) *Methodology developed as an expert elicitation  
* This EPRI/NRC working group was the first to explicitly model HEAF events as part of a fire PRA
-Observational data and OpEinformation only  
                - The need was identified as part of accident investigation efforts for the development of 6850 & NRCs assessment of energetic faults from 1986-2001                               https://www.nrc.gov/readin
-No test data available  
                          * (ADAMS Accession No. ML021290364)       g-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/contract
-Currently this model has been used to support NFPA 805 transitions Public Meeting  
                - Timely OpE- San Onofre 2/3/2001                  /cr6850/
-July 24, 2019 HEAF OpEBus DuctColumbia Bus Duct (OpE)2009Diablo Canyon Bus Duct (OpE)2000Bus Duct Testing 2016 Public Meeting  
Public Meeting - July 24, 2019
-July 24, 2019 Conceptual Modeling Approaches Public Meeting  
 
-July 24, 2019 *Bounding (Current models)
Current Methodology Electrical Enclosures
*Enclosure, bus ducts
* NUREG/CR-6850, Appendix M (2005)
*Bounding by Categories
* Zone of Influence (ZOI) Method largely based on one well documented fire event at San Onofre in 2001
*By power, energy, voltage, fault current, protection scheme, material, safety class
* Methodology developed as an expert elicitation
*Dynamic ZOI
                - Observational data and OpE information only
*Scenario dependent source
                - No test data available
*Target fragilityModeling Approach 11As presented at 4/18/2018 public workshop Public Meeting
                - Currently this model has been used to support NFPA 805 transitions Public Meeting - July 24, 2019                           6
-July 24, 2019 *Assumes worst case damage for all HEAF
 
-i.e., one size fits all
HEAF OpE Electrical Enclosure SONGS, 2001 San Onofre; 2001 Onagawa; 2011 Public Meeting - July 24, 2019
-Damage and ignition of components within ZOI
 
-Peak HRR*Least amount of information needed to determine ZOI
Current Methodology Bus Ducts
*Least realistic for majority of cases
* NUREG/CR-6850, Supplement 1
*Simple to apply*Lowest costBounding ZOI(Current Model) 12As presented at 4/18/2018 public workshop Public Meeting
* Bus duct guidance for high energy arcing faults (FAQ 07-0035)
-July 24, 2019 *Subdivides equipment by HEAF damaged potential-Equipment type
* Methodology developed as an expert elicitation
-Energy/Power potential
                - Observational data and OpE information only
-Protection scheme
                - No test data available
-Size, Material, Design, etc.
                - Currently this model has been used to support NFPA 805 transitions Public Meeting - July 24, 2019
*More realistic
 
*Requires more information to apply
HEAF OpE Bus Duct Diablo Canyon Bus Duct (OpE) Bus Duct Testing Columbia Bus Duct (OpE) 2000            2016               2009 Public Meeting - July 24, 2019
*More costly for development and applicationRefined Bounding ZOI 13As presented at 4/18/2018 public workshop Public Meeting
 
-July 24, 2019 *Requires detailed information on power system*Correlation from experiments and theory to model source term and incident flux as a function of distance
Conceptual Modeling Approaches Public Meeting - July 24, 2019
*Requires knowledge of fire PRA target fragility to high heat flux short duration.
 
*Potential to provide most realistic results
As presented at 4/18/2018 public workshop Modeling Approach
*Complex*Most costlyDynamic ZOI 14As presented at 4/18/2018 public workshop Public Meeting  
* Bounding (Current models)
-July 24, 2019 *No approach has been excluded
* Enclosure, bus ducts
*Understand and evaluation existing and new hazard models
* Bounding by Categories
*Needs to consider development and application efficiencies along with level of realism in a holistically manner to make informed decision on appraoch*NRC/EPRI working group advancing "PRA modeling" methodologyModeling ApproachStatus Public Meeting  
* By power, energy, voltage, fault current, protection scheme, material, safety class
-July 24, 2019 Overview of Existing Models Public Meeting  
* Dynamic ZOI
-July 24, 2019 *Simple geometric configuration
* Scenario dependent source
-arc modeled as sphere
* Target fragility 11 Public Meeting - July 24, 2019
*Heat transfer to predict distance where threshold is exceeded*Used available research on human skin / clothing fragility (Stoll / Artz)*Conservative due to maximum arc power assumption
 
*Used in IEEE 1584
As presented at 4/18/2018 public workshop Bounding ZOI (Current Model)
-2002 for > 15kV applicationsTheoreticalLee ModelR. Lee, The Other Electrical Hazard: Electric Arc Blast Burns, 1982 Public Meeting  
* Assumes worst case damage for all HEAF
-July 24, 2019 *Output-IE, incident energy (J/cm 2)*Inputs-V, system voltage (kV)
                - i.e., one size fits all
-t, arcing time (seconds)
                - Damage and ignition of components within ZOI
-I bf, 3 phase bolted fault current
                - Peak HRR
-D, distance from arc pointTheoreticalLee's MethodASTM slug T-cap. slugKEMA DaqPhysical MeasurementR. Lee, The Other Electrical Hazard: Electric Arc Blast Burns, 1982 Public Meeting  
* Least amount of information needed to determine ZOI
-July 24, 2019 Semi-Empirical Wilkins-Allison-Lang Method
* Least realistic for majority of cases
*Output-IE, incident energy
* Simple to apply
*Input-V LL, line-line voltage
* Lowest cost 12 Public Meeting - July 24, 2019
-V, system voltage
 
-Varc, arc voltage
As presented at 4/18/2018 public workshop Refined Bounding ZOI
-Iarc, arc current
* Subdivides equipment by HEAF damaged potential
-t, arcing time
                -     Equipment type
-D, distance from arc point
                -     Energy/Power potential
-a, enclosure dimension
                -     Protection scheme
-g, gap-Ve, electrode voltageASTM slug T-cap. slugKEMA DaqPhysical MeasurementLiteratureR. Wilkins, M. Allison, M. Lang, Improved Method for Arc Flash Hazard Analysis, 2004 Public Meeting  
                -     Size, Material, Design, etc.
-July 24, 2019 Semi-empiricalGammon SimplifiedT. Gammon, J. Matthews, The IEEE 1584
* More realistic
-2002 Arc Modeling Debate and Simple Incident Energy Equations for Low-Voltage Systems, 2006*Output-IE, incident energy
* Requires more information to apply
*Input-MVAsc, short-circuit MVA
* More costly for development and application 13 Public Meeting - July 24, 2019
-t, arcing time
 
-D, distance from arc point
As presented at 4/18/2018 public workshop Dynamic ZOI
-X, configuration factor (IEEE)  
* Requires detailed information on power system
-IEratio UB, Incident energy rate ratio upper bound (configuration based 0.758  
* Correlation from experiments and theory to model source term and incident flux as a function of distance
-2.098)ASTM slug T-cap. slugKEMA DaqPhysical MeasurementLiterature Public Meeting  
* Requires knowledge of fire PRA target fragility to high heat flux short duration.
-July 24, 2019 *Output-E MA ,E MB, Max. Incident Energy
* Potential to provide most realistic results
*Input-F, 3-phase short
* Complex
-circuit current
* Most costly 14 Public Meeting - July 24, 2019
-t A , t B, arc duration
 
-D A ,D B, distanceEmpirical
Modeling Approach Status
-StatisticalDoughty -Neal -FloydASTM slug T-cap. slugKEMA DaqPhysical MeasurementR. Doughty, T. Neal, H Floyd, Predicting Incident Energy to Better Manage the Electric Arc Hazard on 600
* No approach has been excluded
-V Power Distribution System, 2000 Public Meeting  
* Understand and evaluation existing and new hazard models
-July 24, 2019 *Guide for performing arc flashcalculations
* Needs to consider development and application efficiencies along with level of realism in a holistically manner to make informed decision on appraoch
*Model for incident energy calculations
* NRC/EPRI working group advancing PRA modeling methodology Public Meeting - July 24, 2019
*Empirically derived model from 300 tests
 
*Methodology focused on personal protection
Overview of Existing Models Public Meeting - July 24, 2019
-Arc flash boundary is only applicable to human fragility-Arc fault current and incident energy are independent of targetEmpirical
 
-StatisticalIEEE 1584
Theoretical Lee Model
-2002IEEE 1584-2002, Guide for Performing Arc
* Simple geometric configuration
-Flash Hazard Calculation, 2002 Public Meeting  
                - arc modeled as sphere
-July 24, 2019 Empirical  
* Heat transfer to predict distance where threshold is exceeded
-StatisticalIEEE 1584  
* Used available research on human skin / clothing fragility (Stoll / Artz)
-2002*Output-IE, Incident Energy
* Conservative due to maximum arc power assumption
*Input-V, system voltage
* Used in IEEE 1584-2002 for > 15kV applications R. Lee, The Other Electrical Hazard: Electric Arc Blast Burns, 1982 Public Meeting - July 24, 2019
-I a, arc current
 
-t, arc duration
Theoretical Lees Method
-G, conductor gap
* Output
-D, distance
                - IE, incident energy (J/cm2)                           ASTM slug
-x, distance exponent
* Inputs                                                       T-cap. slug
-Configuration (open / box)ASTM slug T-cap. slugKEMA DaqPhysical MeasurementLiteratureIEEE 1584-2002, Guide for Performing Arc
                -     V, system voltage (kV)
-Flash Hazard Calculation, 2002 Public Meeting  
                -     t, arcing time (seconds)                           KEMA Daq
-July 24, 2019 *Guide for performing arc flashcalculations
                -     Ibf, 3 phase bolted fault current
*Significantly changed from 2002 edition
                -     D, distance from arc point                        Physical Measurement R. Lee, The Other Electrical Hazard: Electric Arc Blast Burns, 1982 Public Meeting - July 24, 2019
*Model for incident energy calculations
 
*Empirically derived model from 2,160 tests
Semi-Empirical Wilkins-Allison-Lang Method
*Five configurations
* Output                                     ASTM slug
-VCB, VCBB, HCB, VOA, HOAEmpirical
                - IE, incident energy                 T-cap. slug
-StatisticalIEEE 1584
* Input
-2018IEEE 1584-2018, Guide for Performing Arc
                -     VLL, line-line voltage         KEMA Daq
-Flash Hazard Calculation, 2018 Public Meeting
                -     V, system voltage
-July 24, 2019 *System voltage: 208 to 15,000 Volts
                -     Varc, arc voltage
*Frequency: 50 or 60 Hz
                -     Iarc, arc current
*Bolted fault current:  
                -     t, arcing time
-Low Voltage: 500 to 106,000 A
                -     D, distance from arc point
-Med Voltage: 200 to 65,000 A
                -     a, enclosure dimension         Physical Measurement
*Conductor Gaps:
                -     g, gap
-Low Voltage: 0.25 to 3 inches
                -     Ve, electrode voltage          Literature R. Wilkins, M. Allison, M. Lang, Improved Method for Arc Flash Hazard Analysis, 2004 Public Meeting - July 24, 2019
-Med Voltage: 0.75 to 10 inches
 
**Fault clearing time: no limit IEEE 1584
Semi-empirical Gammon Simplified
-2018Range of model Public Meeting  
* Output                                                    ASTM slug
-July 24, 2019 *Output-IE, Incident Energy
            - IE, incident energy                                T-cap. slug
*Input-I bf, Bolted fault current
* Input                                                     KEMA Daq
-V oc, System voltage
            -   MVAsc, short-circuit MVA
-T, Duration
            -   t, arcing time                                   Physical Measurement
-D, Distance
            -   D, distance from arc point
-G, Conductor gap
            -   X, configuration factor (IEEE)
-Enclosure Dimensions
Literature
-Equip ConfigurationEmpirical
            -   IEratioUB, Incident energy rate ratio upper bound (configuration based 0.758 - 2.098)
-StatisticalIEEE 1584-2018ASTM slug T-cap. slugKEMA DaqPhysical MeasurementLiterature Public Meeting
T. Gammon, J. Matthews, The IEEE 1584-2002 Arc Modeling Debate and Simple Incident Energy Equations for Low-Voltage Systems, 2006 Public Meeting - July 24, 2019
-July 24, 2019 *ASTM slug calorimeter (copper)
 
-Model overpredict max measured incident energy*Maximum overprediction : ~11x
Empirical - Statistical Doughty - Neal - Floyd
-550 kJ/m 2measured vs. 6,100 kJ/m 2calculated
* Output                                                             ASTM slug
*Minimum overprediction : ~2x
                  - EMA,EMB, Max. Incident Energy                             T-cap. slug
-3.4MJ/m 2measured vs. 6.3MJ/m 2-Note: 2 instruments damaged due to HEAF damagelikely higher heat flux at damaged sensors and better agreement with modelModel ComparisonIEEE 1584
* Input
-2018 vs MV Alum Public Meeting  
                  - F, 3-phase short-circuit current KEMA Daq
-July 24, 2019 *ASTM slug calorimeter (copper)
                  - tA, tB, arc duration
-Model overpredict max measured incident energy*Maximum overprediction : ~17x
                  - DA,DB, distance                                            Physical Measurement R. Doughty, T. Neal, H Floyd, Predicting Incident Energy to Better Manage the Electric Arc Hazard on 600-V Power Distribution System, 2000 Public Meeting - July 24, 2019
-550 kJ/m 2measured vs. 9,100 kJ/m 2calculated
 
*Minimum overprediction : ~3x
Empirical - Statistical IEEE 1584 - 2002
-3.4MJ/m 2measured vs. 9.4MJ/m 2calculated
* Guide for performing arc flash calculations
-Note: 2 instruments damaged due to HEAF damagelikely higher heat flux at damaged sensors and better agreement with modelModel ComparisonLEE vs MV Alum Public Meeting  
* Model for incident energy calculations
-July 24, 2019 *T-cap slug calorimeter (tungsten)
* Empirically derived model from 300 tests
-Model overpredict max measured incident energy*Maximum overprediction : ~26x
* Methodology focused on personal protection
-236 kJ/m 2measured vs. 6,100 kJ/m 2calculated
                - Arc flash boundary is only applicable to human fragility
*Minimum overprediction : agreement
                - Arc fault current and incident energy are independent of target IEEE 1584-2002, Guide for Performing Arc-Flash Hazard Calculation, 2002 Public Meeting - July 24, 2019
-6.0MJ/m 2measured vs. 6.3MJ/m 2Model ComparisonIEEE 1584
 
-2018 vs MV Alum Public Meeting  
Empirical - Statistical IEEE 1584 - 2002
-July 24, 2019 *T-cap slug calorimeter (tungsten)
* Output                                 ASTM slug
-Model overpredict max measured incident energy*Maximum overprediction : ~39x
                - IE, Incident Energy             T-cap. slug
-236 kJ/m 2measured vs. 9,100 kJ/m 2calculated
* Input
*Minimum overprediction : ~1.6x
                -     V, system voltage KEMA Daq
-6.0MJ/m 2measured vs. 9.4MJ/m 2Model ComparisonLEE vs MV Alum Public Meeting  
                -     Ia, arc current
-July 24, 2019 *Follow similar form
                -     t, arc duration
-Inverse power relationship with distance to target
                -     G, conductor gap Physical Measurement
*Supporting test configurations not directly applicable
                -     D, distance
-Open air or box w/opening
                -     x, distance exponent Literature
*Fragility different (human vs equipment)
                -     Configuration (open / box)
*Existing models may be adapted to make representative and realistic.
IEEE 1584-2002, Guide for Performing Arc-Flash Hazard Calculation, 2002 Public Meeting - July 24, 2019
Wrap-upExisting Models}}
 
Empirical - Statistical IEEE 1584 - 2018
* Guide for performing arc flash calculations
* Significantly changed from 2002 edition
* Model for incident energy calculations
* Empirically derived model from 2,160 tests
* Five configurations                       IEEE 1584-2018, Guide for Performing Arc-Flash
                - VCB, VCBB, HCB, VOA, HOA          Hazard Calculation, 2018 Public Meeting - July 24, 2019
 
IEEE 1584 - 2018 Range of model
* System voltage: 208 to 15,000 Volts
* Frequency: 50 or 60 Hz
* Bolted fault current:
                - Low Voltage: 500 to 106,000 A
                - Med Voltage: 200 to 65,000 A
* Conductor Gaps:
                - Low Voltage: 0.25 to 3 inches
                - Med Voltage: 0.75 to 10 inches
* Target Distances:  12 inches
* Fault clearing time: no limit Public Meeting - July 24, 2019
 
Empirical - Statistical IEEE 1584-2018
* Output ASTM slug
                - IE, Incident Energy T-cap. slug
* Input
                -     Ibf, Bolted fault current
                -     Voc, System voltage       KEMA Daq
                -     T, Duration
                -     D, Distance Physical Measurement
                -     G, Conductor gap
                -     Enclosure Dimensions Literature
                -     Equip Configuration Public Meeting - July 24, 2019
 
Model Comparison IEEE 1584 - 2018 vs MV Alum
* ASTM slug calorimeter (copper)
                - Model overpredict max measured incident energy
* Maximum overprediction : ~11x
                              - 550 kJ/m2 measured vs. 6,100 kJ/m2 calculated
* Minimum overprediction : ~2x
                              - 3.4MJ/m2 measured vs. 6.3MJ/m2
                              - Note: 2 instruments damaged due to HEAF damage likely higher heat flux at damaged sensors and better agreement with model Public Meeting - July 24, 2019
 
Model Comparison LEE vs MV Alum
* ASTM slug calorimeter (copper)
                - Model overpredict max measured incident energy
* Maximum overprediction : ~17x
                              - 550 kJ/m2 measured vs. 9,100 kJ/m2 calculated
* Minimum overprediction : ~3x
                              - 3.4MJ/m2 measured vs. 9.4MJ/m2 calculated
                              - Note: 2 instruments damaged due to HEAF damage likely higher heat flux at damaged sensors and better agreement with model Public Meeting - July 24, 2019
 
Model Comparison IEEE 1584 - 2018 vs MV Alum
* T-cap slug calorimeter (tungsten)
                - Model overpredict max measured incident energy
* Maximum overprediction : ~26x
                              - 236 kJ/m2 measured vs. 6,100 kJ/m2 calculated
* Minimum overprediction : agreement
                              - 6.0MJ/m2 measured vs. 6.3MJ/m2 Public Meeting - July 24, 2019
 
Model Comparison LEE vs MV Alum
* T-cap slug calorimeter (tungsten)
                - Model overpredict max measured incident energy
* Maximum overprediction : ~39x
                              - 236 kJ/m2 measured vs. 9,100 kJ/m2 calculated
* Minimum overprediction : ~1.6x
                              - 6.0MJ/m2 measured vs. 9.4MJ/m2 Public Meeting - July 24, 2019
 
Wrap-up Existing Models
* Follow similar form
                - Inverse power relationship with distance to target
* Supporting test configurations not directly applicable
                - Open air or box w/opening
* Fragility different (human vs equipment)
* Existing models may be adapted to make representative and realistic.
Public Meeting - July 24, 2019}}

Latest revision as of 17:10, 19 October 2019

Hazard Modeling
ML19183A309
Person / Time
Issue date: 07/02/2019
From:
Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research
To:
K. Hamburger 415-2022
Shared Package
ML19183A307 List:
References
Download: ML19183A309 (31)


Text

High Energy Arcing Faults (HEAF)

Hazard Modeling Gabriel Taylor P.E.

Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research Division of Risk Analysis July 24, 2019 Public Meeting - July 24, 2019

Purpose

  • Provide overview of modeling

- History

- Types

- Existing models

- Comparisons to measurement Public Meeting - July 24, 2019

Categories of Electrical Enclosure Failure Mode - Review Public Meeting - July 24, 2019

Operating Experience San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, 2001

  • Highlighted HEAF hazard

- RECENT FIRES AT COMMERCIAL NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS IN THE UNITED STATES

- https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML0226/ML022630147.pdf Public Meeting - July 24, 2019

Fire PRA Methodology NUREG/CR-6850 EPRI 1011989

- Published 2005

  • This EPRI/NRC working group was the first to explicitly model HEAF events as part of a fire PRA

- The need was identified as part of accident investigation efforts for the development of 6850 & NRCs assessment of energetic faults from 1986-2001 https://www.nrc.gov/readin

- Timely OpE- San Onofre 2/3/2001 /cr6850/

Public Meeting - July 24, 2019

Current Methodology Electrical Enclosures

  • Zone of Influence (ZOI) Method largely based on one well documented fire event at San Onofre in 2001
  • Methodology developed as an expert elicitation

- Observational data and OpE information only

- No test data available

- Currently this model has been used to support NFPA 805 transitions Public Meeting - July 24, 2019 6

HEAF OpE Electrical Enclosure SONGS, 2001 San Onofre; 2001 Onagawa; 2011 Public Meeting - July 24, 2019

Current Methodology Bus Ducts

  • Bus duct guidance for high energy arcing faults (FAQ 07-0035)
  • Methodology developed as an expert elicitation

- Observational data and OpE information only

- No test data available

- Currently this model has been used to support NFPA 805 transitions Public Meeting - July 24, 2019

HEAF OpE Bus Duct Diablo Canyon Bus Duct (OpE) Bus Duct Testing Columbia Bus Duct (OpE) 2000 2016 2009 Public Meeting - July 24, 2019

Conceptual Modeling Approaches Public Meeting - July 24, 2019

As presented at 4/18/2018 public workshop Modeling Approach

  • Bounding (Current models)
  • Enclosure, bus ducts
  • Bounding by Categories
  • By power, energy, voltage, fault current, protection scheme, material, safety class
  • Dynamic ZOI
  • Scenario dependent source
  • Target fragility 11 Public Meeting - July 24, 2019

As presented at 4/18/2018 public workshop Bounding ZOI (Current Model)

  • Assumes worst case damage for all HEAF

- i.e., one size fits all

- Damage and ignition of components within ZOI

- Peak HRR

  • Least amount of information needed to determine ZOI
  • Least realistic for majority of cases
  • Simple to apply
  • Lowest cost 12 Public Meeting - July 24, 2019

As presented at 4/18/2018 public workshop Refined Bounding ZOI

  • Subdivides equipment by HEAF damaged potential

- Equipment type

- Energy/Power potential

- Protection scheme

- Size, Material, Design, etc.

  • More realistic
  • Requires more information to apply
  • More costly for development and application 13 Public Meeting - July 24, 2019

As presented at 4/18/2018 public workshop Dynamic ZOI

  • Requires detailed information on power system
  • Correlation from experiments and theory to model source term and incident flux as a function of distance
  • Requires knowledge of fire PRA target fragility to high heat flux short duration.
  • Potential to provide most realistic results
  • Complex
  • Most costly 14 Public Meeting - July 24, 2019

Modeling Approach Status

  • No approach has been excluded
  • Understand and evaluation existing and new hazard models
  • Needs to consider development and application efficiencies along with level of realism in a holistically manner to make informed decision on appraoch
  • NRC/EPRI working group advancing PRA modeling methodology Public Meeting - July 24, 2019

Overview of Existing Models Public Meeting - July 24, 2019

Theoretical Lee Model

  • Simple geometric configuration

- arc modeled as sphere

  • Heat transfer to predict distance where threshold is exceeded
  • Used available research on human skin / clothing fragility (Stoll / Artz)
  • Conservative due to maximum arc power assumption
  • Used in IEEE 1584-2002 for > 15kV applications R. Lee, The Other Electrical Hazard: Electric Arc Blast Burns, 1982 Public Meeting - July 24, 2019

Theoretical Lees Method

  • Output

- IE, incident energy (J/cm2) ASTM slug

  • Inputs T-cap. slug

- V, system voltage (kV)

- t, arcing time (seconds) KEMA Daq

- Ibf, 3 phase bolted fault current

- D, distance from arc point Physical Measurement R. Lee, The Other Electrical Hazard: Electric Arc Blast Burns, 1982 Public Meeting - July 24, 2019

Semi-Empirical Wilkins-Allison-Lang Method

- IE, incident energy T-cap. slug

  • Input

- VLL, line-line voltage KEMA Daq

- V, system voltage

- Varc, arc voltage

- Iarc, arc current

- t, arcing time

- D, distance from arc point

- a, enclosure dimension Physical Measurement

- g, gap

- Ve, electrode voltage Literature R. Wilkins, M. Allison, M. Lang, Improved Method for Arc Flash Hazard Analysis, 2004 Public Meeting - July 24, 2019

Semi-empirical Gammon Simplified

- IE, incident energy T-cap. slug

  • Input KEMA Daq

- MVAsc, short-circuit MVA

- t, arcing time Physical Measurement

- D, distance from arc point

- X, configuration factor (IEEE)

Literature

- IEratioUB, Incident energy rate ratio upper bound (configuration based 0.758 - 2.098)

T. Gammon, J. Matthews, The IEEE 1584-2002 Arc Modeling Debate and Simple Incident Energy Equations for Low-Voltage Systems, 2006 Public Meeting - July 24, 2019

Empirical - Statistical Doughty - Neal - Floyd

- EMA,EMB, Max. Incident Energy T-cap. slug

  • Input

- F, 3-phase short-circuit current KEMA Daq

- tA, tB, arc duration

- DA,DB, distance Physical Measurement R. Doughty, T. Neal, H Floyd, Predicting Incident Energy to Better Manage the Electric Arc Hazard on 600-V Power Distribution System, 2000 Public Meeting - July 24, 2019

Empirical - Statistical IEEE 1584 - 2002

  • Model for incident energy calculations
  • Empirically derived model from 300 tests
  • Methodology focused on personal protection

- Arc flash boundary is only applicable to human fragility

- Arc fault current and incident energy are independent of target IEEE 1584-2002, Guide for Performing Arc-Flash Hazard Calculation, 2002 Public Meeting - July 24, 2019

Empirical - Statistical IEEE 1584 - 2002

- IE, Incident Energy T-cap. slug

  • Input

- V, system voltage KEMA Daq

- Ia, arc current

- t, arc duration

- G, conductor gap Physical Measurement

- D, distance

- x, distance exponent Literature

- Configuration (open / box)

IEEE 1584-2002, Guide for Performing Arc-Flash Hazard Calculation, 2002 Public Meeting - July 24, 2019

Empirical - Statistical IEEE 1584 - 2018

  • Significantly changed from 2002 edition
  • Model for incident energy calculations
  • Empirically derived model from 2,160 tests

- VCB, VCBB, HCB, VOA, HOA Hazard Calculation, 2018 Public Meeting - July 24, 2019

IEEE 1584 - 2018 Range of model

  • System voltage: 208 to 15,000 Volts
  • Frequency: 50 or 60 Hz
  • Bolted fault current:

- Low Voltage: 500 to 106,000 A

- Med Voltage: 200 to 65,000 A

  • Conductor Gaps:

- Low Voltage: 0.25 to 3 inches

- Med Voltage: 0.75 to 10 inches

  • Target Distances: 12 inches
  • Fault clearing time: no limit Public Meeting - July 24, 2019

Empirical - Statistical IEEE 1584-2018

- IE, Incident Energy T-cap. slug

  • Input

- Ibf, Bolted fault current

- Voc, System voltage KEMA Daq

- T, Duration

- D, Distance Physical Measurement

- G, Conductor gap

- Enclosure Dimensions Literature

- Equip Configuration Public Meeting - July 24, 2019

Model Comparison IEEE 1584 - 2018 vs MV Alum

- Model overpredict max measured incident energy

  • Maximum overprediction : ~11x

- 550 kJ/m2 measured vs. 6,100 kJ/m2 calculated

  • Minimum overprediction : ~2x

- 3.4MJ/m2 measured vs. 6.3MJ/m2

- Note: 2 instruments damaged due to HEAF damage likely higher heat flux at damaged sensors and better agreement with model Public Meeting - July 24, 2019

Model Comparison LEE vs MV Alum

- Model overpredict max measured incident energy

  • Maximum overprediction : ~17x

- 550 kJ/m2 measured vs. 9,100 kJ/m2 calculated

  • Minimum overprediction : ~3x

- 3.4MJ/m2 measured vs. 9.4MJ/m2 calculated

- Note: 2 instruments damaged due to HEAF damage likely higher heat flux at damaged sensors and better agreement with model Public Meeting - July 24, 2019

Model Comparison IEEE 1584 - 2018 vs MV Alum

  • T-cap slug calorimeter (tungsten)

- Model overpredict max measured incident energy

  • Maximum overprediction : ~26x

- 236 kJ/m2 measured vs. 6,100 kJ/m2 calculated

  • Minimum overprediction : agreement

- 6.0MJ/m2 measured vs. 6.3MJ/m2 Public Meeting - July 24, 2019

Model Comparison LEE vs MV Alum

  • T-cap slug calorimeter (tungsten)

- Model overpredict max measured incident energy

  • Maximum overprediction : ~39x

- 236 kJ/m2 measured vs. 9,100 kJ/m2 calculated

  • Minimum overprediction : ~1.6x

- 6.0MJ/m2 measured vs. 9.4MJ/m2 Public Meeting - July 24, 2019

Wrap-up Existing Models

  • Follow similar form

- Inverse power relationship with distance to target

  • Supporting test configurations not directly applicable

- Open air or box w/opening

  • Fragility different (human vs equipment)
  • Existing models may be adapted to make representative and realistic.

Public Meeting - July 24, 2019