IR 05000282/2012008

IR 05000282-12-008 & 05000306-12-008, on 05/22-25/12, 06/04-08/12 & 06/18-22/12, Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 & 2, Triennial Fire Protection Baseline Inspection

ML12206A251
Person / Time
Site:	Prairie Island
Issue date:	07/23/2012
From:	Robert Daley Engineering Branch 3
To:	Molden J Northern States Power Co
Robert Winter
References
IR-12-008
Download: ML12206A251 (17)

Text

July 23, 2012

SUBJECT:

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2, TRIENNIAL FIRE PROTECTION INSPECTION REPORT 05000 282/2012008); 050003 06/2 0120 08(DRS)

Dear M r. Molden:

On June 2 2, 201 2 , the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed a Triennial Fire Protection Inspection at your Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2.

The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection results, which were discussed on June 2 2, 201 2 , with you and other members of your staff

. The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.

Based on the results of this inspection, no findings of significance were identified

. In accordance with Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Part 50, Section 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any), will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records System (PARS) component of NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS), accessible from the NRC website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA by A. Dahbur for/

Robert C. Daley, Chief Engineering Branch 3 Division of Reactor Safety Docket Nos. 50-282, 50-306 and 72-010 License Nos. DPR-42, DPR-60 and SNM-2506

Enclosures:

Inspection Report 05000282/2012008; 05000306/2012008(DRS)

w/Attachment: Supplemental Information

REGION III Docket Nos:

50-282; 50-306;72-010 License Nos:

DPR-42; DPR-60; SNM-2506 Report Nos:

05000282/20120 08; 050003 06/20120 08(DRS) Licensee: Northern States Power Company, Minnesota Facility: Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2 Location: Welch, MN Date s: May 2 2 - 25 , June 4 - 8 , and June 18 - 22, 201 2 Inspectors:

Robert Winter, Reactor Inspector, Lead Benny Jose, Senior Reactor Inspector Alan Dahbur , Senior Reactor Inspector Approved by:

Robert C. Daley, Chief Engineering Branch 3 Division of Reactor Safety

1 Enclosure

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

I R 05000282/20120 08; 050003 06/20120 08(DRS); 05/2 2/2012 - 05/25/2012, 06/04/2012

- 06/08/2012 , and 06/18/2012

- 06/22/201 2; Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Unit 1 and Unit 2; Triennial Fire Protection Baseline Inspection.

This report covers an announced triennial fire protection baseline inspection. The inspection was conducted by Region III inspectors. Based on the results of this inspection, no findings of significance were identified. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG

-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 4, dated December 2006. A.

Cornerstone: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity

N RC-Identified and Self-Revealed Findings No findings were identified.

B. No violations of significance were identified.

=

Licensee-Identified Violations===

1. REACTOR SAFETY

REPORT DETAILS

Cornerstones: Initiating Events and Mitigating Systems

1R05 Fire ProtectionThe purpose of the fire protection triennial baseline inspection was to conduct a design based, plant specific, risk

-informed, onsite inspection of the licensee's fire protection program's defense

-in-depth elements used to mitigate the consequences of a fire. The fire protection program shall extend the concept of defense

-in-depth to fire protection in plant areas important to safety by:

(71111.05T

) preventing fires from starting; rapidly detecting, controlling and extinguishing fires that do occur; providing protection for structures, systems, and components important to safety so that a fire that is not promptly extinguished by fire suppression activities will not prevent the safe shutdown of the reactor plant; and taking reasonable actions to mitigate postulated events that could potentially cause loss of large areas of power reactor facilities due to explosions or fires.

The inspectors' evaluation focused on the design, operational status, and material condition of the reactor plant's fire protection program, post

-fire safe shutdown systems and B.5.b mitigating strategies. The objectives of the inspection were to assess whether the licensee had implemented a fire protection program that: (1)provided adequate controls for combustibles and ignition sources inside the plant; (2)provided adequate fire detection and suppression capability; (3)maintained passive fire protection features in good material condition; (4)established adequate compensatory measures for out-of-service, degraded

, or inoperable fire protection equipment, systems or features; (5)ensured that procedures, equipment, fire barriers

, and systems exist so that the post-fire capability to safely shut down the plant was ensured; (6)included feasible and reliable operator manual actions when appropriate to achieve safe shutdown; and

(7) identified fire protection issues at an appropriate threshold and ensured these issues were entered into the licensee's problem identification and resolution program.

In addition, the inspectors' review and assessment focused on the licensee's post

-fire safe shutdown systems for selected risk significant fire areas. Inspector emphasis was placed on determining that the post

-fire safe shutdown capability and the fire protection features were maintained free of fire damage to ensure that at least one post

-fire safe shutdown success path was available. The inspectors' review and assessment also focused on the licensee's B.5.b related license conditions and the requirements of Title 10, Code of Federal Regulatio ns (CFR) Part 50.54(hh)(2). Inspector emphasis was to ensure that the licensee could maintain or restore core cooling, containment, and spent fuel pool cooling capabilities utilizing the B.5.b mitigating strategies following a loss of large areas of power reactor facilities due to explosions or fires. Documents reviewed are listed in the A ttachment to this report.

3 Enclosure The fire areas selected for review are listed below and those B.5.b mitigating strategies reviewed are listed in Section 1R05.13. The fire areas selected constitute four inspection samples and the B.5.b mitigating strategies selected constitute three inspection samples respectively as defined by Inspection Procedure (IP) 71111.05T. Fire Area Description 18 Relay and Cable Spreading Room, Unit 1 and Unit 2 20 Unit 1 Safeguards Switchgear 4.16 kV (Bus 16)32 "B" Train Hot Shutdown Panel and Air Compressor/ Auxiliary Feedwater Room 69 Turbine Building Ground and Mezzanine Floor, Unit 1

.1 a. Protection of Safe Shutdown Capabilities

For each of the selected fire areas, the inspectors reviewed the fire hazards analysis, safe shutdown analysis, and supporting drawings and documentation to verify that safe shutdown capabilities were properly protected.

Inspection Scope The inspectors ensured that applicable separation requirements of Section lll.G of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R and the licensee's design and licensing bases were maintained for the credited safe shutdown equipment and their supporting power, control, and instrumentation cables.

This review included an assessment of the adequacy of the selected systems for reactivity control, reactor coolant makeup, reactor heat removal, process monitoring, and associated support system functions.

b. No findings of significance were identified.

Findings

.2 a. Passive Fire Protection

For the selected fire areas, the inspectors evaluated the adequacy of fire area barriers, penetration seals, fire doors, electrical raceway fire barriers, and fire rated electrical cables. The inspectors observed the material condition and configuration of the installed barriers, seals, doors, and cables. The inspectors reviewed approved construction details. In addition, the inspectors reviewed license documentation, such as U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) safety evaluation report s (SER s), and deviations from NRC regulations and the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) standards to verify that fire protection features met license commitments.

Inspection Scope The inspectors walked down accessible portions of the selected fire areas to observe material condition and the adequacy of design of fire area boundaries (including walls, fire doors, and fire dampers) to ensure they were appropriate for the fire hazards in the area.

4 Enclosure b. No findings of significance were identified.

Findings

.3 a. Active Fire Protection

For the selected fire areas, the inspectors evaluated the adequacy of fire suppression and detection systems. The inspectors observed the material condition and configuration of the installed fire detection and suppression systems. The inspectors reviewed design documents and supporting calculations. In addition, the inspectors reviewed license basis documentation, such as, NRC SERs, deviations from NRC regulations, and NFPA standards to verify that fire suppression and detection systems met license commitments.

Inspection Scope b. No findings of significance were identified.

Findings

.4 a. Protection from Damage from Fire Suppression Activities

For the selected fire areas, the inspectors verified that redundant trains of systems required for hot shutdown would not be subject to damage from fire suppression activities or from the rupture or inadvertent operation of fire suppression systems including the effects of flooding. The inspectors conducted walkdowns of each of the selected fire areas to assess conditions such as the adequacy and condition of floor drains, equipment elevations, and spray protection.

Inspection Scope b. No findings of significance were identified.

Findings

.5 a. Alternative Shutdown Capability

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's systems required to achieve alternative safe shutdown to determine if the licensee had properly identified the components and systems necessary to achieve and maintain safe shutdown conditions. The inspector s also focused on the adequacy of the systems to perform reactor pressure control, reactivity control, reactor coolant makeup, decay heat removal, process monitoring, and support system functions.

Inspection Scope The inspectors conducted selected area walkdowns to determine if operators could reasonably be expected to perform the alternate safe shutdown procedure actions and that equipment labeling was consistent with the alternate safe shutdown procedure. The review also looked at operator training

, as well as consistency between the operations shutdown procedures and any associated administrative controls.

5 Enclosure b. No findings of significance were identified

. Findings

.6 a. Circuit Analyses

The inspectors verified that the licensee performed a post

-fire safe shutdown analysis for the selected fire areas and the analysis appropriately identified the structures, systems, and components important to achieving and maintaining safe shutdown. Additionally, the inspectors verified that the licensee's analysis ensured that necessary electrical circuits were properly protected and that circuits that could adversely impact safe shutdown due to hot shorts, shorts to ground, or other failures were identified, evaluated, and dispositioned to ensure spurious actuations would not prevent safe shutdown

. Inspection Scope The inspectors' review considered fire and cable attributes, potential undesirable consequences, and common power supply/bus concerns. Specific items included the credibility of the fire threat, cable insulation attributes, cable failure modes, and actuations resulting in flow diversion or loss of coolant events.

The inspectors also reviewed cable raceway drawings for a sample of components required for post

-fire safe shutdown to verify that cables were routed as described in the cable routing matrices.

The inspectors reviewed circuit breaker coordination studies to ensure equipment needed to conduct post

-fire safe shutdown activities would not be impacted due to a lack of coordination. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed a sample of circuit breaker maintenance records to verify that circuit breakers for components required for post

-fire safe shutdown were properly maintained in accordance with procedural requirements.

b. No findings of significance were identified

. Findings

.7 a. Communicatio

ns The inspectors reviewed, on a sample basis, the adequacy of the communication system to support plant personnel in the performance of alternative safe shutdown functions and fire brigade duties. The inspectors verified that plant telephones, page systems, sound powered phones, and radios were available for use and maintained in working order.

The inspectors reviewed the electrical power supplies for these systems to verify that either the telephones or the radios would remain functional following a fire.

Inspection Scope b. No findings of significance were identified.Findings 6 Enclosure

.8 a. Emergency Lighting

The inspectors performed a plant walkdown of selected areas in which a sample of operator actions would be performed in the performance of alternative safe shutdown functions. As part of the walkdown, the inspectors focused on the existence of sufficient emergency lighting for access and egress to areas and for performing necessary equipment operations. The locations and positioning of the emergency lights were observed during the walkdown and during review of manual actions implemented for the selected fire areas.

Inspection Scope b. No findings of significance were identified.

Findings

.9 a. Cold Shutdown Repairs

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's procedures to determine whether repairs were required to achieve cold shutdown and to verify that dedicated repair procedures, equipment, and material to accomplish those repairs were available onsite. The inspectors also evaluated whether cold shutdown could be achieved within the required time using the licensee's procedures and repair methods. The inspectors also verified that equipment necessary to perform cold shutdown repairs was available onsite and properly staged.

Inspection Scope b. No findings of significance were identified.

Findings

.10 a. Compensatory Measures

The inspectors conducted a review to verify that compensatory measures were in place for out-of-service, degraded or inoperable fire protection and post

-fire safe shutdown equipment, systems, or features (e.g., detection and suppression systems, and equipment, passive fire barriers, pumps, valves or electrical devices providing safe shutdown functions or capabilities). The inspectors also conducted a review on the adequacy of short term compensatory measures to compensate for a degraded function or feature until appropriate corrective actions were taken.

Inspection Scope b. No findings of significance were identified.

Findings 7 Enclosure

.11 a. Review and Documentation of Fire Protection

Program Changes The inspectors reviewed changes to the approved fire protection program to verify that the changes did not constitute an adverse effect on the ability to safely shutdown.

The inspectors also reviewed the licensee's design control procedures to ensure that the process included appropriate reviews and controls to assess plant changes for any potential adverse impact on the fire protection program and/or post

-fire safe shutdown analysis and procedures.

Inspection Scope b. No findings of significance were identified.

Findings

.12 a. Control of Transient Combustibles and Ignition Sources

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's procedures and programs for the control of ignition sources and transient combustibles to assess their effectiveness in preventing fires and in controlling combustible loading within limits established in the fire hazards analysis. A sample of hot work and transient combustible control permits were also reviewed.

The inspectors performed plant walkdowns to verify that transient combustibles and ignition sources were being implemented in accordance with the administrative controls.

Inspection Scope b. No findings of significance were identified.

Findings

.13 a. B.5.b Inspection Activities

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's preparedness to handle large fires or explosions by reviewing selected mitigating strategies.

This review ensure d that the licensee continue d to meet the requirements of their B.5.b related license conditions and 10 CFR 50.54(hh)(2) by determining that:

Inspection Scope procedures were being maintained and adequate

equipment was properly staged

, maintained, and tested

station personnel were knowledgeable and could implement the procedures; and additionally, inspectors review ed the storage, maintenance, and testing of B.5.b related equipment.

8 Enclosure The inspectors review ed the licensee's B.5.b related license conditions and evaluate d the selected mitigating strategies to ensure they remain feasible in light of operator training, maintenance/testing of necessary equipment and any plant modifications.

In addition, the inspectors review ed previous inspection reports for commitments made by the licensee to correct deficiencies identified during performance of Temporary Instruction (TI)2515/171 or subsequent performances of these inspections.

The B.5.b mitigating strategies selected for review are listed below. The offsite and onsite communications, notifications/emergency response organization activation , initial operational response actions, and damage assessment activities identified in Table A.3-1 of the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 06-12, "B.5.b Phase II and III Submittal Guidance,"

Revision 2 are evaluated each time due to the mitigation strategies' scenario selected. NEI 06-12, Revision 2, Section Licensee Strategy Table 2.3.1 SFP [Spent Fuel Pool] Makeup - External Strategy (Table A.2-2) 2.3.2 SFP Spray

- External Strategy (Table A.2-3) 3.4.4 Manually Depressurize SGs [Steam Generators

] and Use Portable Pump (Table A.4-4) b. No findings of significance were identified.

Findings

OTHER ACTIVITIES

(OA)

4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution

a. (71152) The inspector s reviewed the licensee's corrective action program procedures and samples of corrective action documents to verify that the licensee was identifying issues related to the fire protection program at an appropriate threshold and entering them in the corrective action program. The inspectors reviewed selected samples of condition reports, design packages, and fire protection system non-conformance documents.

Inspection Scope b. No findings of significance were identified.

Findings

4OA6

.1 Management Meetings

The inspector s presented the inspection results to Mr. Molden and to other members of the licensee staff on June 22, 201 2. The licensee acknowledged the inspection results presented.

Exit Meeting Summary

The inspectors confirmed that none of the potential report input discussed was considered proprietary.

ATTACHMENT:

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION KEY POINTS OF CONTAC

T

J. Molden, Site Vice President

P. Huffman, Site Engineering Director

K. Davison, Site Operations Director, Plant

Manager (Acting)

J. Anderson, Regulatory Affairs Manager

Licensee

J. Ruttar, Operations Manager

T. Holt, Operations Support Manager

C. Lane, Engineering Programs Manager

J. Kopitz, Reliability Standards Manager

M. Kelly, Fleet Program Engineering Supervisor

K. Vincent, Regulatory Program Engineering Supervisor

K. Balakrishanan, Fire Protection Program Engineer

G. Kvamme, Appendix R Program Engineer

D. Hazard, Electrical/Appendix R Engineer

F. Sperlak, Fire Protection Coordinator, Operations

S. DiPasquale, Regulatory Affairs

K. Stoedter, Senior Resident Inspector

P. Zurawski, Resident Inspector

Nuclear Regulatory Commission

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED AND DISCUSS

ED None.Opened, Closed, and Discussed

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWE

D The following is a list of documents reviewed during the inspection. Inclusion on this list does not imply that the NRC inspectors reviewed the documents in their entirety, but rather, that selected sections of portions of the documents were evaluated as part of the overall inspection effort. Inclusion of a document on this list does not imply NRC acceptance of the document or any part of it, unless this is stated in the

body of the inspection report.

ASSESSMENTS

Number Description

or Title AR 01252350

Date or Revision

2011 Fire Protection Triennial Focused Self

-Assessment

October 28, 2011

CALCULATIONS

Number Description or Title

30-762 SH Ex3

Date or Revision

Hydraulic Calculation for Screenhouse

Below Elevation 695'0"

ENG-ME-349 Aux Feedwater Pump

Room Sprinkler System WSP

-10 0 ENG-ME-586 Effects of Flooding in the AFW Pump Room From Postulated Pipe Rupture

GEN-PI-026 Safe Shutdown Analysis for Compliance with 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix R Section 3G

CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAM DOCUMENTS (A/R s) ISSUED DURING INSPECTION Number Description or Title

01338709 Date or Revision

Storage Cabinets for Scrubs have

Broken Handles

05/22/2012

01338879 Ladders Improperly Stored

05/23/2012

01338882 Barrel not Labeled in Aux Bldg 05/23/2012

01338847 NRC Inspector questioned

Thermometer in Bus 16 Room

05/24/2012

01338994 Observations from NRC

Discussion/

Walkdown of EDMGs 05/24/2012

01340442 Error in Revision 4 of EDMG

-1 06/05/2012

01340994 NRC-Identified Combustible Material in U1 TB w/o permit

06/07/2012

01342155 Telephone Wire not

Labeled as Abandoned 06/07/2012

01342159 T-Conduit Fitting

Missing Plug 06/19/2012

01342190 Questions regarding Security's Role during a B.5.b Event

06/19/2012

01342179 Unsecured Tool Cart found in Aux Bldg by NRC

06/19/2012

01342198 Valve Label Tag found in Aux Bldg by NRC

06/19/2012

01342202 NRC Questioned

Small Unsecured Metal Cabinet in Aux Bldg

06/19/2012

01342251 6" x 8" Cardboard lodged between

Equipment in

Relay Room 06/19/2012

01342362 Plastic Sheet on FOST Controls without CCP

06/20/2012

01342457 Question with F5 App B and Multiple Spurious Operations

06/21/2012

CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAM DOCUMENTS (A/R

s) REVIEWED

Number Description or Title

01156774 Date or Revision App R Equipment Selection Referenced in a Calculation not up to date

October 24, 2008

01180475 Classification of BM Appendix R Fan Questioned at T-8 Meeting May 01 , 2009 01188531 Degraded Floor Penetration PENF 2750

July 08, 2009 01191772 Door 224 threshold crushed and multiple issues exist

July 31, 2009

202193 Several bags of oil rags found in trash cart on 735' U1 Turbine Bldg. October 12 , 2009 01231017 Evaluate OE 31069 limits for combustible controls exceeded

May 04 , 2010

270625 01270796 Ball drip drain valve on d5 deluge valve failed

Drain funnel for new Admin Bldg FP deluge piping overflowing

February 12 , 2011 February 14 , 2011 01271658 FP-39-1, 11 Hydrogen seal oil sprinkler DA leaks by

February 18 , 2011 01272690 FP piping leaking outside of cold lab

February 26 , 2011 01273868 122 Diesel fire pump major coolant leak

March 05 , 2011 01278522 GEN-PI-054 - Overly Conservative Time Constraint for Appendix R Response and System Time Constraints

April 01, 2011

01310366 2011 FP FSA: No Checks and Balances for Hourly Fire Watch

October 28, 2011

DRAWINGS Number Description or Title

NE-40008 Date or Revision

Schematic Drawing

- 11 TD Aux. FW to 11 Steam Generator

BS NF-40903-1 Wiring Diagram Units 1 & 2 Train A Hot Shutdown Panel

U NF-40904-1 Wiring Diagram Units 1 & 2 Train B Hot Shutdown Panel

U NF-40191-1 Wiring Diagram Bus

-1 Motor Control Center 1A

W NF-40224-2 External Connections Motor Control Center 1A

K NF-120713-7 External Wiring Diagram 480V Switchgear Bus 212

C NF-39228-1 Flow Diagram

- Fire Protection and Screen Wash System

NF-39337-1 Aux Building Unit 1 &

Floor Drain Piping EL. 695'0"

W NF-38221-3 Turbine Room Concrete Equipment Plan Unit 1 EL. 695'0"

S Sheet 21 Valve MV-32238 MISCELLANEOUS

Number Description or Title

PINGP 1676

Date or Revision

Fire Drill Critique Report

SP 1664 Monthly Fire Fighting Equipment Check

SP 1673 Quarterly Communication Test

2010-04-019 NOS Observation Report Fire Protection

December 3, 2010

2012-01-013 NOS Observation Report Fire Protection (FP)

February 8, 2012

2177-3104-001 Attachment 2

- Expert Panel Scenario Review

Revision C

D C 00FP04 Add Fusible Link to Door #62

September 7, 2000

PREOP 15 Fire Protection System, Addendum 2, CARDOX System for Computer & Relay Rooms, September 27, 1 974 Printout Log

Fire Watch log Sheet

June 2012 PROCEDURES

Number Description or Title

5AWI 3.13.0

Date or Revision

Fire Protection Program

5AWI 3.13.2

Fire Prevention

5AWI 3.13.3

Hot Work 3 C47022 Alarm Response Procedure

D80 Scaffolding, Ladders and Cable Trays Platforms

EDMG-1 Guideline Response to a Loss of Normal Plant Command and Control

EDMG-2 Guideline for Damage Mitigating Strategies

F5 Appendix A

Fire Detection Zones

F5 Appendix B

Control Room Evacuation

F5 Appendix D

Impact of Fire Outside Control/Relay Room 30 F5 Appendix F

Fire Hazards Analysis

F5 Appendix K

Fire Protection System Operability Requirements

F5 Appendix K

Fire Protection System Functional Requirements

F3-5 Emergency Notifications

H62 Site Doors

ICPM 0-003 Relay and Computer Room CARDOX F.P. Temp Switches

SP 1208 Fire Pump and Hose Flow 3 Year Test

VENDOR DOCUMENTS

Number Description or Title

Section J Date or Revision

Automatic Model 38B Sprinklers

October 1964

WORK ORDERS (WOs)

Number Description or Title 00433442 01

Date or Revision

SP 1328 Diesel Driven Fire Pump "A" Battery QTRLY

June 19, 2012

00433443 01

SP 1328 Diesel Driven Fire Pump "B" Battery QTRLY

June 19, 2012

LIST OF ACRONYMS USE

D ADAMS Agencywide Documents Access and Management

System ACE Apparent Cause Evaluation

AOP Alarm Operating Procedure

A R Action Request ATTN Attention CAP Corrective Action Program

CFR Code of Federal Regulations

CR Condition Report

DBA Design Basis Accident

DC Direct Current

DRP Division of Reactor Project DRS Division of Reactor Safety

EDG Emergency Diesel Generator

EFR Effectiveness Reviews

EIR Equipment Improvement Request

IMC Inspection Manual Chapter

IP Inspection Procedure

IR Inspection Report

KV KiloVolt NCR Non-Conformance Report

NCV Non-Cited Violation

NEI Nuclear Energy Institute

NFPA National Fire Protection Association

NRC U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

NUREG NRC Technical Report Designation

OA Other Activities

OBD Operable But Degraded

OBN Operable But Nonconforming

OE Operating Experience

OWA Operator Workaround

PARS Public Available Records System

PRA Probabilistic Risk Assessment

RCE Root Cause Evaluation

RHR Residual Heat Removal

ROP Reactor Oversight Process

SCAQ Significant Condition Adverse to Quality

SDP Significance Determination Process

SER safety evaluation report

SFP Spent Fuel Pool

SG Steam Generator

SP Surveillance Procedure

TS Technical Specification

USAR Updated Safety Analysis Report

WO Work Order

Mr. James Molden

Site Vice President

Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant

Northern States Power Company, Minnesota

1717 Wakonade Drive East

Welch, MN 55089

SUBJECT: PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2, TRIENNIAL FIRE PROTECTION INSPECTION REPORT 05000282/2012008(DRS); 05000306/2012008(DRS)

Dear Mr. Molden:

On June 22, 2012, the

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed a triennial fire protection inspection at your Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2. The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection results, which were discussed on June 22, 2012, with you and other members of your staff

. The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.

Based on the results of this inspection, no findings of significance were identified

. In accordance with Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Part 50, Section 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any), will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records System (PARS) component of NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS), accessible from the NRC website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading

-rm/adams.html

(the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely, /RA by A. Dahbur for/

Robert

C. Daley, Chief

Engineering Branch 3

Division of Reactor Safety

Docket Nos. 50

-282, 50-306 and 72

-010 License Nos. DPR

-42, DPR-60 and SNM

-2506 Enclosures:

Inspection Report 05000282/2012008(DRS); 05000306/2012008(DRS)

w/Attachment: Supplemental Information

cc w/encl:

Distribution via ListServŽ

DISTRIBUTIONSee next page

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-Sensitive To receive a copy of this document, indicate in the concurrence box "C" = Copy without attach/encl "E" = Copy with attach/encl "N" = No copy

OFFICE RIII E RIII NAME RWinter: ls ADahbur for RDaley DATE 07/23/12 07/23/12 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

Letter to Mr. James Molden from Mr. Robert

C. Daley dated July 23, 201 2. SUBJECT: PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT TRIENNIAL FIRE PROTECTION INSPECTIO

N REPORT 05000282/2012008; 050003 06/2012008(DRS)

Silas Kennedy