TXX-3659, Forwards Final Response to NUREG-0612, Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants
| ML20072A945 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Comanche Peak  |
| Issue date: | 06/08/1983 |
| From: | Schmidt H TEXAS UTILITIES SERVICES, INC. |
| To: | Youngblood B Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| REF-GTECI-A-36, REF-GTECI-SF, RTR-NUREG-0612, RTR-NUREG-612, TASK-A-36, TASK-OR TXX-3659, NUDOCS 8306130176 | |
| Download: ML20072A945 (153) | |
Text
TEXAS UTILITIES SERVICFS INC.
Log # TXX-3659 m.n nin u m o:n nsu. m m w 2..e iem.-
File # 10010 June 8, 1983 Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Attention: Mr. B. J. Youngblood, Chief Licensing Branch No. 1 Division of Licensing U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555
SUBJECT:
COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION DOCKET NOS. 50-445 and 50-446 FINAL RESPONSE TO NUREG-0612
Dear Mr. Youngblood:
Enclosed are forty (40) copies of our final response to NUREG-0612,
" Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants".
If you have questions, please call.
Sincerely,
\\
ji H. C. Schmidt RWH: tis Enclosures l
fuW B306130176 030608 PDR ADOCK 05000445 A
l' i
bec:
S. B. Burwell - w/o attachment T. L. Chan E. D. Sylvester R. D. Calder J. C. Kuykendall R. A. Jones 4
R. T. Jenkins J. T. Merritt W. J. Nixon L. E. Kostyniak D. L. Davis P. J. VanHekken C. K. Feist S. Chiratwatchai R. W. Haskovec i
9 I
i l
I
r)
I:
CPSES FINAL RESPONSE TO NUREG-0612
" CONTROL OF HEAVY LOADS AT NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS" JUNE 1983 4
.-~
t
....~;--.---~-......,...._,..
.-..-.A,_...__----,--_
..., _ _... _ _ _.. ~.,
i l
t i
1 I
i i
i CPSES FINAL RESPONSE TO NUREG-0612 l
" CONTROL 0F HEAVY LOADS AT i
NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS" s
i JUNE 1983 f
i
[-
l i
i i
l k
I i
h t
'e
===.
Background===
In a letter dated December 22, 1980, the NRC requested appiicants for operating licenses to submit a report documenting their compliance with NUREG-0612, " Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants."
Specifically, Enclosure 3 (Sections 2.1 through 2.4) was to be addressed. Texas Utilities Generating Company (TUGCO) provided the response to this enclosure, as applicable to the Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station (CPSES), on March 1,1982. EG8G Idaho, Inc. was contracted by the NRC to evaluate the CPSES response. On May 20, 1982, the NRC provided TUGC0 with the EG8G comments.
Introduction This submittal provides the complete response to the NRC request for information and specifies CPSES compliance with Sections 5.1.2, 5.1.3, and 5.1.5 of NUREG-0612. These sections of NUREG-0612 provide guidelines concerning the design and operation of load handling systems in the vicinity of stored spent fuel, the reactor core, and equipment and components required for safe shutdown or decay heat removal.
Attachment A of this submittal provides the CPSES revised response to of NRC letter dated December 22, 1980. Attachment B provides the CPSES response to comments generated by EGAG Idaho, Inc.
as listed in NRC letter dated May 20, 1982. Attachment C provides CPSES plant specific data and summary of regulatory positions for the fuel building overhead crane.
l It should be noted that Unit 1 and Unit 2 layouts are approximately mirror images and that load handling modifications and restrictions applicable to l' nit 1 are also applicable to Unit 2.
{
ATTACHMENT A CPSES RESPONSE (REY. 1) TO ENCLOSURE 3 0F NRC LETTER DATED DECEMBER 22, 1980 L.
CPSES LOAD HANDLING SYSTEMS A.1 INTRODUCTION The term " heavy load" as used in this attachment is defined as greater than the weight of a fuel assembly with control rods plus the weight of a spent fuel tool which totals approximately 2150 pounds.
A.2 RESPONSE TO NUREG-0612 The following sections quote NUREG-0612 guidelines and provide the CPSES response.
A.2.1 GENERAL REOUIREMENTS FOR OVERHEAD HANDLING SYSTEMS 1.
" Report the results of your review of plant arrangements to identify all overhead systems from which a load drop may result in damage to any system required for plant shutdown or decay heat removal (taking no credit for interlocks, technical specifications, operating procedures, or detailed structural analysis)."
RESPONSE
The overhead handling systems at CPSES from which a heavy load drop could result in damage to systems required for plant shutdown or decay heat removal are summarized in Table A-1.
Also listed in Table A-1 are all cranes which are capable of carrying heavy loads in or near spent fuel storage areas.
2.
" Justify the exclusion of any overhead handling systems from the above category by veritying that there is sufficient physical separation from any load-impact point and any safety-related component to permit a determination by inspection that no heavy load drop can result in damage to any system or component required for plant shutdown or decay heat removal."
A-1 l
RESPONSE
Table A-2 lists the overhead handling systens at CPSES which maintain sufficient physical separation from systems required for, plant shutdown or decay heat removal to prevent damage to these j
systems, as determined by visual inspection.
Therefore, these overhead handling systems have been excluded from the category of load handling systems listed in Table A-1.
Location of Unit 1 and common monorails are shown in the figures listed below for each crane or hoist excluded:
a.
Drumming Storage Area Crane Figure A-12 CPX-MEMCDS-01 b.
Maintenance Building Bridge Crane No Figure CPX-MESCMB-01 c.
Turbine Building Gantry Crane Figure A-3 CP1-MESCTC-01 d.
Circulating Water Intake Structure No Figure Gantry Crane CPX-MESCCW-01 e.
Equipment Hatch Door Hoist Figure A-8 CP1-MEMHCH-41 f.
Waste Gas Compressor Hoist Figure A-18 CPX-MEMHCH-05 9
Positive Displacement Charging Figure A-17 Pump Hoist CP1-MEMHCH-03 A-2 i
I
_, - ~. _
3 "e
+:
RESPONSE
Table A-2 lists the overhead handling systems at CPSES which maintain sufficient physical separation from systems required for, j
plant shutdown or decay heat renoval to prevent damage to these systems, as determined by visual inspection.
Therefore, these overhead handling systems have been excluded from the category of load handling systems listed in Table A-1.
Location of Unit 1 and common monorails are shown in the figures listed below for each crane or hoist excluded:
a.
Drumming Storage Area Crane Figure A-12 CPX-MEMCDS-01 b.
Maintenance Building Bridge Crane No Figure CPX-MESCMB-01 c.
Turbine Building Gantry Crane Figure A-3 CP1-MESCTC-01 d.
Circulating Water Intake Structure No Figure Gantry Crane CPX-MESCCW-01 e.
Equipment Hatch Door Hoist Figure A-8 CP1-MEMHCH-41 f.
Waste Gas Compressor Hoist Figure A-18 CPX-MEMHCH-05 9
Positive Displaccment Charging Figure A-17 Pump Hoist CP1-MEMHCH-03 A-2
CPSES h.
H2 Recombiner Hoist Figure A-18 CPX-MEMHCH-07 i.
Letdown Chiller Package Hoist Figure A-19 CP1-MEMHCH-05
- j. H&V Chiller Hoist (near H-A Line)
Figure A-20 CPX-MEMHCH-09 k.
H&V Chiller Hoist (near J-A Line)
Figure A-20 CPX-MEMHCH-10 1.
Letdown HX and Seal Water HX Figure A-6 Hoist CP1-!1EMHCH-15 m.
Condenser Vacuum Pump Hoist Figure A-1 CP1-MEMHCH-25 n.
TBCW Pump Hoist Figure A-1 CPX-MEMHCH-11 o.
Heater Drain Pump Hoist Figure A-1 CP1-MEMHCH-28 p.
Control Fluid Tank Hoist Figure A-1 CP1-MEMHCH-29 q.
Personnel Lock Hoist Figure A-7 CP1-MEMHCH-30 r.
Reactor Vessel Stud Hoist Figure A-10 CP1-MEMHJC-01 A-3
l CPSES s.
Steam Generator Feed Water Pump Figure A-2 and Turbine Driver Crane CP1-MEMH0C-01 t.
Equipment Hatch Hoist 0 790'-6" Figure A-5 CP1-MEMHCH 45 u.
Equipment Hatch Hoist 0 810'-6" Figure A-6 CP1-MEMHCH-46 v.
Equipment Hatch Hoist 0 873'-6" Figure A-20 CPX-MEMHCH-52 w.
Equipment Hatch Hoist 0 886'-6" Figure A-20 CPX-MEMHCH-53 x.
Misc. Equipment Hoist No Figure CPX-MEMHCH-54 y.
Misc. Equipment Hoist No Figure CPX-MEMHCH-55 z.
Dry Waste Compactor Hoist Figure A-12 CPX-MEMHCH-56 aa. Chlorine Containers Hoist No Figure CPX-MEMHCH-57 bb.
Chlorine Containers Hoist No Figure CPX-MEMHCH-58 cc. Aux. Steam Condensate Cooler Hoist Figure A-16 CPX-MEMHCH-60 A-4
CPSES dd.
Containment Equipment Hatch Hoist No Figure CPX-MEMHCH-67, 68 ee.
Wall Puller for Letdown HX No Figure CP1-MEMHLH-01 ff. Demineralizers Hoist Figure A-19 CPX-MEMHWR-05 gg.
Radial Arm Stud Tensioner Hoist No Figure TBX-FHHCAH-01 hh.
Miscellaneous Equipment Hoist Figure A-8 CP1-MEMHCH-64 3.
"With respect to the design and operation of heavy-load-handling systems in the containment and the spent-fuel pool area and those load-handling system identified in 2.1-1 above, provide your evaluation concerning compliance with the guidelines of NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.1.
The following specific information (Comments 3(a) through 3(g)) should be included in your reply."
RESPONSE
Our evaluation of compliance with NUREG-0612 concerning heavy load handling systems at CPSES is presented in the responses to the specific requests for information (Comments 3(a) through 3(g))
listed below.
Comment 3(a):
Drawings or sketches sufficient to clearly identify the location of safety load paths, spent fuel, and safety-related equipment.
A-5
(-
Response 3(a):
{
" Safe load areas" (areas serviced by a particular crane in which a load drop will not result in damage to shutdown or decay heat removal equipment or spent fuel) have been identified where applicable for the cranes listed in Table A-1.
Equipment handled by these cranes will be transported whenever possible within the identified safe load areas.
" Safe load paths" will also be identified and established for loads handled outside safe load areas prior to initial fuel load to ensure the safe operation of the crane during maintenance and normal operation of the plant.
Each crane listed in Table A-1 is described below with a discussion of the safe load area along with referenced drawings to identify their location within the plant.
a.
Fuel Building Overhead Crane - (CPX-MESCFC-01)
This crane is shown in Figure A-15 along with the safe load area illustrated by the shaded region.
Although this crane does not travel directly over the spent fuel pools, a safe load area has been defined outside the spent fuel pool areas.
The safe load area includes the fuel receipt and inspection area, the shipping cask receipt and decontamination area, and new fuel storage area.
Load drop analyses have been performed for these areas to assure that in the event of a cask drop, the structural integrity of the floor will be maintained and no damage may result to any safety related equipment.
b.
Containment Auxiliary Upper Crane - (CP182-MESCCA-01)
This crane and its associated safe load areas are shown in i
Figure A-10.
The area serviced by this crane includes the A-6
CPSES reactor vessel and therefore the potential exists for a heavy
(
load drop into the vessel. As a result, the safe load area is defined outside of the reactor vessel area as indicated by the f
shaded area in Figure A-10.
c.
Containment Polar Crane - (CP182-MESCCP-01)
The area in the containment building serviced by this crane, along with its safe load area, is shown in Figure A-11A and A-11B.
The Polar Crane essentially travels the entire diameter of the Containment Building above elevation 905' and has the potential for heavy load drops over the reactor vessel, steam generators, reactor coolant pumps and piping, main steam lines, and the temporary containment fuel storage area.
Therefore, during hot shutdown the safe load areas have been defined outside of these areas as shown in Figure A-11A.
The safe load areas during cold shutdown for this crane are shown in Figure A-118. When fuel is not being stored in the containment fuel storage area, this crane can safely traverse this area with a heavy load.
Load drop analyses have been performed for the entire operating floor to assure that in the event of a heavy load drop the floor will remain intact.
d.
Containment Fuel Handling Bridge Crane - (CP182-MESCCF-01)
This crane is primarily designed for lifting a fuel assembly and components and the associated handling tool (2150 lbs).
These loads are excluded from consideration as " heavy loads" as defined in NUREG-0612 and therefore safe load areas are not required.
1 A-7
4 CPSES e.
Refueling Machine (TBX-FHSCMC-01 & TCX-FHSCMC-01)
This crane is shown in Figure A-8.
The manipulator mast of
~
this crane is specifically designed to handle fuel assemblies and therefore does not handle " heavy loads" as defined.
The auxiliary hoist of this crane services the refueling cavity during refueling.
Loads will be limited to 2150 lbs.
f.
Containment Access Rotating Platform Hoists - (CP182-MESCRP-01)
This hoist has the same safe load areas as the Containment Polar crane as shown in Figure A-4, A-11A, and A-11B due to its location and travel range.
g.
Service Water Intake Structure Crane - (CPX-MESCSW-01)
This crane is shown on Figure A-21 along with the safe load areas. Since most of the equipnent serviced by this crane is safety related Service Water pumps, pump motor, and piping, only small portions of the intake structure can be considered as safe load areas as illustrated in the shaded areas in Figure A-21.
h.
Fuel Handling Bridge Crane - (TBX-FHSCFB-01)
This crane is shown on Figure A-14.
The crane is primarily designed to handle a fuel assembly and components with its associated handling tool and therefore does not carry " heavy loads" as defined.
No safe load areas are therefore required.
- i. Reactor Coolant Pumps Hoist - (CP182-MEMHCH-42)
This hoist is attached to the Containment Polar Crane main hook during reactor coolant pump maintenance operations; therefore, A-8
CPSES the safe load areas are the same as for the Polar Crane in Figure A-11A and A-11B.
~
For the remaining hoists listed in Table A-1, the establi'shnent of safe load areas is not applicable since the hoists generally travel along a single monorail which allows the hoist to follow only one possible path.
Locations of the Unit 1 and common monorails with respect to plant shutdown equipnent, decay heat renoval equipnent, or spent fuel storage areas are shown in the figures listed below for each hoist identified in Table A-1.
a.
Moderating HX and Letdown HX Hoist Figure A-7 (CP1-MEMHCH-16) b.
Component Cooling Water Pump Hoist Figure A-17 (CPX-MEMHCH-01) c.
Safety Related Chiller Hoist Figure A-16 (CP1-MEMHCH-04,04A) d.
Centrifugal Charging Pump Hoist Figure A-17 (CP1-MEMHCH-01,02) e.
Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Hoist Figure A-5 Electric - (CP1-MEMHCH-13,14) f.
Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Hoist Figure A-5 Turbine - (CP1-MEMHCH-12) g.
Auxiliary Filter Hoist Figure A-19 (CPX-MEMHWR-04) h.
Diesel Generator Hoist Figure A-6 (CPI-MEMHCH-37,38)
A-9
CPSES i.
Spent Fuel Pool HX Hoist Figure A-13 (CPX-MEMHCH-69,70)
~
j.
Service Water Traveling Screen Figure A-22 Hoist (CPX-MEMHCH-12) and Jib Crane (CPX-SWEHSG-01) k.
Residual Heat Removal and Containment Figure A-7 Spray HX Hoist (CP1-MEMHCH-47, 59) 1.
Main Steam Safety Valve Hoist Figure A-9 (CP1-MEMHCH 48, 49, 50, 51) m.
Service Water Intake Stop Gate Hoist Figure A-21 (CPX-MEMHCH-61) n.
Auxiliary Filter Hoist Figure A-1 (CPX-MEMHWR-04A) o.
Miscellaneous Hoist Figure A-13 (CPX-MEMHCH-72) p.
Residual Heat Removal Pump Hoist Figure A-5 (CP1-MEMHCH-08)
Comment 3(b):
A discussion of measures taken to ensure that load-handling operations remain within safe load paths, including procedures, if any, for deviation from these paths.
A-10 l
CPSES Response 3(b):
[
l Through the use of administrative controls, heavy loads will be
{
transported whenever possible within " safe load areas" established in respone to Comment 3(a) above. The " safe load areas" will be clearly identified for each crane by a combination of placards, procedures, and/or marked off areas near plant shutdown and decay heat removal equipment or where spent fuel is stored.
However, for some heavy loads, it may be necessary to operate outside the " safe load areas" and transport the heavy load over or near plant shutdown or decay heat removal equipment or spent fuel.
In this event, special precautions, procedures, and/or instructions will be utilized with the purpose of minimizing the risk of a heavy load drop in these areas.
The procedures will consist of a combination of load drop prevention measures such as a list of required equipment, inspections, acceptance criteria for the movement of the load, sequence of steps, etc.
" Safe load paths" will also be established with the purpose of transporting equipment over safe shutdown or decay heat removal equipment or spent fuel via the safest and shortest route to the nearest " safe load area".
The equipment will then be transported within the " safe load area" to its final destination.
The " safe load paths" will be clearly defined in the load handling procedures and/or instructions that will be written for loads handled over safety equipment or spent fuel.
As stated in response to Comment 3(a), " safe load paths" will be defined before initial fuel load operations.
Comment 3(c):
A tabulation of heavy loads to be handled by each crane which includes the load identification, load weight, its designated A-11
CPSES lifting device, and verification that the handling of such load is governed by a written procedure containing, as a minimum, the information identified in NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.1(2).
Response 3(c):
Table A-4 lists the cranes and hoists identified in Table A-1 including the major loads projected to be lifted by each load handling system.
Also included is the approximate weight of each of the loads identified.
As stated in the response to Comment 3(b), special precautions, procedures, and/or instructions will be utilized when handling these loads over or near safe shutdovm equipment, decay heat removal equipment, or spent fuel storage areas.
Comment 3(d):
Verification that lifting devices identified in 2.1.3(c) above comply with the requirements of ANSI N14.6-1978, or ANSI B30.9-1971 as appropriate.
For lifting devices where these standards, as supplemented by NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.1(4) or 5.1.5(5) are not met, describe any proposed alternatives and demonstrate their equivalency in terms of load-handling reliability.
Response 3(d):
Lifting devices for the loads identified in response to Comment 3(c) above will comply with ANSI B30.9-1971 where applicable.
Although a special lifting device for a spent fuel shipping container weighing 10,000 pounds or more has not yet been procured, ANSI N14.6-1978 and NUREG-0612 Guidelines for special lifting devices will be invoked when this device is obtained.
Although it is anticipated at this time that the standards for the lifting devices will be met, it may later be determined that alternatives A-12
CPSES to the standard are required.
In that event, written notification will be made to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission describing the alternatives and their equivalency in terms of load handling reliability.
Reactor vessel head and reactor internals lifting rigs meet the intent of ANSI N14.6-1978 and NUREG-0612 for design, fabrication, assenbly and operation. The analysis for these devices is provided in Reference [2].
Comment 3(e):
Verification that ANSI B30.2-1976, Chapter 2-2, has been invoked with respect to crane inspection, testing and maintenance. Where any exception is taken to this standard, sufficient information should be provided to demonstrate the equivalency of proposed alternatives.
Response 3(e):
ANSI B30.2-1976, Chapter 2-2, will be invoked with respect to crane inspection, testing, and maintenance.
With respect to Section 2-2.1.1.1 of ANSI B30.2-1976, cranes located within Containment will be inspected per the required visual inspection schedule only during the periods of crane operation (generally during refuelings and cold shutdowns).
This is necessary because periodic inspections during power operations are impractical due to high radiation levels in Containment.
No other exceptions to the standard are anticipated at this time; however, if it is later determined that exceptions are required, written notification will be made to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
A-13
CPSES Comment 3(f):
Verification that crane design' complies with the guidelines of CMAA Specification 70 and Chapter 2-1 of ANSI B30.2-1976, including the demonstration of equivalency of actual design requirements for instances where specific compliance with these standards is not provided.
Response 3(f):
Table A-3 lists the load handling systems identified in Table A-1 and the applicable codes and standards as specified in the CPSES Equipment Purchase Specifications.
In all cases, the crane design complies with the guidelines of CMAA Specification 70 and Chapter 2-1 of ANSI B30.2-1967 and all hoists are designed in accordance with the requirements of ANSI B30.16-1973.
Comment 3(g):
Exceptions, if any, taken to ANSI B30.2-1976 with respect to operator training, qualification, and conduct.
Response 3(g):
No exceptions to ANSI B30.2-1976 with respect to operator training, qualifications, and conduct are anticipated at this time; however, if it is later determined that exceptions are required, written notification will be made to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
A-14
~
CPSES A.2.2 SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS FOR OVERHEAD HANDLING SYSTEMS IN THE
(
VICINITY OF FUEL STORAGE P0OLS
{
The following load handling systems are located in the vicinity of the spent fuel storage area:
(
- Fuel Building Overhead Crane (CPX-MESCFC-01)
- Fuel Handling Bridge Crane (TBX-FHSCFB-01) 1.
" Identify by name, type, capacity, and equipment designator, any
(
cranes physically capable (i.e., ignoring interlocks, moveable mechanical stops, or operating procedures) of carrying loads which could, if dropped, land or fall into the spent fuel pool."
i'
RESPONSE
Equipment Name:
Fuel Building Overhead Crane Type:
Overhead Capacity:
Main Hoist - 130 Tons Auxiliary Hoist - 17 Tons i
Auxiliary Hoist - 5 Tons l
Equipment I. D. No:
CPX-MESCFC-01 l
Note:
This crane does not travel directly over the spent fuel pools, however, loads can be traversed within 15 feet of the pools.
2.
" Justify the exclusion of any cranes in this area from the above category by verifying that they are incapable of carrying heavy A-15
CPSES loads or are permanently prevented from movement of the hook centerline closer than 15 feet to the pool boundary, or by providing a suitable analysis demonstrating that for any failure
~
mode, no heavy load can fall into the fuel-storage pool."
RESPONSE
Fuel Handling Bridge Crane (TBX-FHSCFB-01) is excluded from the above category since this equipment is primarily designed for handling a single fuel assembly within the spent fuel pools, refueling canal, and cask handling pit.
In addition, lif t-limiting features are provided for the fuel handling bridge crane to ensure that spent fuel assemblies are not lifted above the safe shielding depth provided by the water in the transfer canal, wet cask loading pit, and spent fuel pools.
3.
" Identify any cranes listed in 2.2-1, above, which you have evaluated as hading sufficient design features to make the likelihood of a load drop extremely small for all loads to be carried and the basis for this evaluation (i.e., complete compliance with NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.6 or partial compliance supplemented by suitable alternative or additional design features). For each crane so evaluated, provide the load-handling system (i.e., crane-load combination) information specified in."
RESPONSE
Fuel Building Overhead Crane (CPX-MESCFC-01) - The Fuel Building Overhead Crane consists of three separate hoists:
The main hoist (130 ton capacity) and two auxiliary hoists (17 ton and 5 ton 4
capacities).
The fuel building overhead crane is the primary means of transporting nuclear fuel in and out of the fuel handling area of A-16
s CPSES the fuel building.
Its range includes the spent fuel cask loading area, the new storage pit, the cask handling area, the new fuel receiving area, and the railroad loading and unloading area. The crane is designed as a traveling bridge crane with a single trolley and is provided with a cab and radio control station.
The crane's main hoist has been equipped with single-failure-proof features.
The special features incorporated into the design of the main hoisting system of the crane precludes a load drop accident by preventing a load drop in the event of a single failure in the hoisting or braking system. Detailed information regarding the design of the fuel building overhead crane's compliance with single-failure-proof provisions of Regulatory Guide 1.104
" Single-Failure-Proof Overhead Crane "'ndling System for Nuclear Power Plants" (Draft 3, Rev.1, Oct. 78), may be found in the generic topical report entitled "Ederer's Nuclear Safety Related X-Sam Cranes" EDR-1(P)-A and its Non-proprietary version EDR-1(MP)-A.
See FSAR Sections 9.1.4.2.3 and 9.1.4.3 for supplemental information.
The two auxiliary hoists are used to handle new fuel assemblies and other miscellaneous loads.
Neither of these hoists can physically travel any closer than 6'3" from the nearest spent fuel pool, which should be sufficient clearance to prevent load drops into the pool s.
To help insure this, any spent fuel cask will be handled exclusively by the main hoist.
A drawing of the location of the Fuel Building Overhead Crane with the safe load area is shown on Figure A-15.
The limits of the safe load area on the 860' elevation are bounded by the closest point that any of the hoists can physically access the spent fuel pool; 6'9" for the No.1 spent fuel pool and 9'6" for the No. 2 spent fuel pool.
A-17 i
CPSES 4.
"For the crane identified in 2.2-1, above, not categorized according to 2.2-3, demonstrate that the criteria of NUREG-0612, Section 5.1, are satisfied. Compliance with Criterion IV will be demonstrated in response to Section 2.4 of this request. With respect to Criteria I through III, provide a discussion of your evaluation of crane operation in the spent fuel area and your determination of compliance. This response should include the following information for each crane...."
RESPONSE
This is not applicable to CPSES.
A.2.3 SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS OF OVERHEAD HANDLING SYSTEMS OPERATING IN THE CONTAINMENT The following load handling systems are located in the Containment Building (in the vicinity of the reactor core):
- Containment Polar Cranes (CP1 & 2 -MESCCP-01)
- Containment Auxiliary Upper Cranes (CP1 & 2 -MESCCA-01)
- Reactor Coolant Pump Hoists (CP1 & 2 -MEMHCH-42)
- Containment Fuel Handling Bridge Cranes (CPI & 2 - MESCCF-01)
- Refueling Machines (TBX-FHSCMC-01 and TCX-FHSCMC-01)
- Containment Dome Access Rotating Platform Hoists (CPI & 2 -MESCRP-01) 1.
" Identify by name, type, capacity, and equipnent designator, any cranes physically capable (i.e., taking no credit for any interlocks or operating procedures) of carrying heavy loads over the reactor vessels."
A-18 l
s CPSES
[
RESPONSE
[
l a.
Equipment Name:
Containment Polar Crane
[
j Type:
Single Trolley Traveling Bridge Crane i
Capacity:
Main Hook 175 Tons Auxiliary Hook 20 Tons Equipment I.D. No:
CP 1 & 2-MESCCP-01 b.
Equipment Name:
Containment Auxiliary Upper i
Crane Type:
Gantry Capacity:
5 Tons Equipment I.D. No..
CP 1 & 2-MESCCA-01 c.
Equipment Name.
Reactor Coolant Pump Hoist Type:
Electric Hoist Capacity:
45 Tons Equipment I.D. No.:
CP 1 & 2-MEMHCH-42 t
A-19 i
l i
l l
... - _.. _.-,.-__.__-_-,._ ___.,--,,~
CPSES d.
Equipment Name:
Containment Access Rotating Platform Hoists Type:
NA Capacity:
1 Ton Equipment 1.D. No..
CP 1 & 2-MESCRP-01 2.
" Justify the exclusion of any cranes in this area from the category by verifying that they are incapable of carrying " heavy loads," or are permanently prevented from the movement of any load either directly over the reactor vessel or to such a location where in the event of any load-handling-system failure, the load may land in or on the reactor vessel."
RESPONSE
a.
Containment Fuel Handling Bridge Crane (CF1 & 2-MESCCP-01)
This crane is used for handling fuel assemblies and components within the containment by means of a long-handled tool suspended from the hoist. The hoist travel range and tool length are designed to limit the maximum lift of a fuel assembly to a safe shielding depth.
In addition, the following design safety features are provided:
- 1) The fuel handling bridge crane controls are interlocked to prevent simultaneous operation of the bridge drive and hoist.
- 2) Bridge drive operation is prevented except when the hoist is in full up position.
A-20
- 3) Restraining bars are provided on each truck to prevent the bridge from overturning.
The heaviest load to be handled by this crane is approximately 2150 lbs. This load is not considered a " heavy load" as defined.
b.
Refueling Machine (TBX-FHSCMCC-01 & TCX-FHSCMC-01)
The containment building refueling machine is used for lifting a fuel assembly during refueling and transporting it between the reactor vessel and the containment fuel transfer area.
This equipment is provided with electrical interlocks and limit switches on the br.idge and trolley drives to prevent damage to fuel assemblies. The winch is also provided with limit switches to prevent a fuel assembly from being raised above a safe shielding depth.
In an emergency, the bridge, trolley, and winch can be operated manually using the handwheel on the motor shaft. The containment building refueling machine is also equipped with a 1-1/2 ton hoist.
This hoist is used during the inspection of a control rod drive shaft. This load is excluded from consideration as a " heavy load" as defined.
The maximum load to be lifted by this hoist over the reactor vessel will be administratively limited to 2150 pounds.
3.
" Identify any cranes listed in 2.3-1, above, which you have evaluated as having sufficient design features to make the likelihood of a load drop extremely small for all loads to be carried and the basis for this evaluation (i.e., complete compliance with NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.6, or partial compliance supplemented by suitable alternative or additional design features). For each crane so evaluated, provide the load-handling-system (i.e., crane-load-combination) information specified in Attachment 1.
A-21
RESPONSE
Containment Polar Crane (CP 1 & 2-MESCCP-01) is a single trolley traveling bridge crane rotating on a single rail circular track and is provided with cab and radio control stations.
The Containment Polar Crane was used during the plant construction phase for lifts up to 475 tons (for handling the reactor vessel and steam generators) prior to its intended normal service.
The use of the crane during the construction phase does not imply any nuclear safety related condition.
During refueling or maintenance operations, the Containment Polar Crane handles a maximum non-critical load of 175 tons. The heaviest load expected to be lifted is the reactor vessel head assembly. Various accident cases (i.e., dropping a reactor vessel head assembly in the refueling cavity) were analyzed (Ref. 3) to determine consequences. The analysis of each situation showed that the integrity of the fuel cladding, and reactor vessel nozzles and core cooling capability would be maintained.
Due to the seismic design of the Containment Polar Crane, its structural integrity is sustained and its wheels are not dislodged from the track during an SSE.
The conclusions of reactor vessel head drop analysis indicated that the Containment Polar Crane did not need to be provided with single failure protection. However, to avoid placing undue restrictions on routine crane operations in the containment building, the Containment Polar Cranes' main hoists have been equipped with single-failure-proof features. A detailed analysis of the features of the Containment Polar Crane has been made against the guidelines of NUREG-0554 " Single-Failure-Proof Cranes for Nuclear Power Plants." This analysis indicates that although the Containment A-22
CPSES Polar Crane was built prior to issuance of NUREG-0554, it is in
~
essential compliance with NUREG-0554. There are some minor differences between the main hoist and the requirements of NUREG-0554. These differences are described in detail in Table A-7 and Reference 1.
The special safety features incorporated into the design of the main hoisting system of the Containment Polar Crane precludes a load drop accident by prevec. ting a load drop in the event of a single failure in the hoisting or braking systems.
Detailed information on the lifting fixtures' compliance with ANSI N14.6-1978 and NUREG-0612 is provided in Reference 2.
See FSAR Sections 9.1.4.2.3 and 9.1.4.3 for supplemental information.
4.
"For cranes identified in 2.3-1 above, not categorized according to 2.3-3 demonstrate that the evaluation criteria of NUREG-0612, Section 5.1, are satisfied. Compliance with Criterion IV will be demonstrated in your response to Section 2.4 of this request. With respect to Criteria I through III, provide a discussion of your evaluation of crane operation in the containment and your determination of compliance. This response should include the following information for each crane."
RESPONSE
Cranes and hoists identified in Section A.2.3.1, not included in A.2.3.3, are discussed here.
The discussion includes all the measures that are provided for each load handling system to assure safe handling of heavy loads. The specific methods to be used for each load handling system are as follows:
a) Containment Auxiliary Upper Crane (CP 1 & 2-MESCCA-01) -
Figure A-10 depicts the safe load area for operating the auxiliary upper crane during cold shutdown or refueling.
The area covered by this crane includes most of the reactor refueling cavity area and, therefore, the potential exists for A-23
s CPSES a heavy load drop into the reactor vessel when the vessel head is removed.
This crane can safely traverse its entire load handling area when the vessel head is set on the reactor vessel and is shown as a safe load area on Figure A-10.
However, to preclude a potential load drop into the vessel, the safe load area for this crane, as shown in the shaded safe load area in Figure A-10 will be reduced when the vessel head is removed.
Mechanical stops will be utilized during reactor vessel head removal to physically prevent this crane from traversing over the open reactor vessel.
Administrative controls addressing the installation and removal of the mechanical stops will be included in the reactor vessel head removal and installation procedure.
b) Reactor Coolant Pump Hoist (CP 1 & 2-MEMHCH-42) - This hoist is an auxiliary hoist which is attached to the Polar Crane main hook when lifting the reactor coolant pump and motor out of the steam generator compartments up to the 905' elevation in the Containment Building. To preclude the failure of this hoist from preventing decay heat removal or damaging spent fuel, the following administrative controls will be implemented:
- 1) This hoist will be used only during cold shutdown and refueling modes when lifting the reactor coolant pump and motor.
In these modes, the steam generators are not used for decay heat removal which, in this case, will be provided by the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System.
If a load drop occurred in a steam generator compartment and damaged the reactor coolant system piping in that compartment, core cooling could still be maintained by use of the separate and redundant RHR loop.
A-24
L-CPSES
- 2) Specific load paths will be developed for each reactor coolant pump and motor removal and will not allow the load t
to traverse over or near the reactor vessel.
f
(
- 3) Specific instructions will be developed to insure that the reactor coolant pump and motor are properly rigged and b
transported safely to its designated lay-down area.
The above conditions and instructions will be incorporated in the load handling procedure written for the use of this hoist.
c) Containment Access Rotating Platform Hoist (CP1 & 2-MESCRP-01)
This one ton hoist is used for lifting miscellaneous tools up to the Containment Access Rotating Platform and to the Polar Crane.
Interlocks to restrict the use of this crane only within the safe load areas defined on Figure A-11A and A-11B are not feasible, therefore, administrative controls will be utilized which will restrict the use of this hoist only within the safe load areas. This will insure that an accidental load drop will not damage safe shutdown equipment or spent fuel.
A.2.4 SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS FOR OVERHEAD HANDLING SYSTEM OPERATING IN PLANT AREA CONTAINING EQUIPMENT REQUIRED FOR REACTOR l
SHUTDOWN CORE DECAY HEAT REMOVAL, OR SPENT FUEL POOL COOLING The following is a list of the load handling systems from Table A-1 not included in Section A.2.2 or A.2.3 above.
a.
Service water intake structure crane (CPX-MESCWS-01) b.
Safety related chiller hoists (CP 1 & 2-MEMHCH-04, 04A)
Moderating HX and letdown chiller HX hoists (CP 1 & 2-MEMHCH-16) c.
A-25
CPSES d.
Component cooling water pump hoist (CPX-MEMHCH-01)
Centrifugal charging pump hoists (CP 1 & 2-MEMHCH-01, 02) e.
f.
Auxiliary feedwater pump hoists (CP 1 & 2-MEMHCH-13, 14)
(Electric motor driven pump) g.
Auxiliary feedwater pump hoists (CP 1 & 2-MEMHCH-12)
(Turbine driven pump) h.
Diesel generator (piston) hoists (CP 1 & 2-MEMHCH-37, 38) 1.
Spent Fuel pool HX hoists (CPX-MEMHCH-69, 70)
- j. Residual heat removal HX and containment spray HX hoists (CP 1 & 2-MEMHCH-47, 59) k.
Main steam safety valves hoists (CP 1 & 2-MEMHCH-48, 49, 50, 51) 1.
Service water intake stop gate hoists (CPX-MEMHCH-61) m.
Service water traveling screen hoist (CPX-MEMHCH-12)
Auxiliary filter hoist (CPX-MEMHWR-04, 04A) n.
o.
Miscellaneous hoist (CPX-MEMHCH-72) p.
Residual heat removal pump hoists (CP 1 & 2-MEMHCH-08, 09) 1.
" Identify any cranes listed in 2.1-1, above, which you have evaluated as having sufficient design features to make the likelihood of a load drop extremely small for all loads to be carried and the basis for this evaluation (i.e., complete compliance with NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.6, or partial compliance A-26
CPSES supplemented by suitable alternative or additional design features).
For each crane so evaluated, provide the load-handling system (i.e., crane-load-combination) information specified in."
RESPONSE
a.
Safety Related Chiller Hoist - (CP1&2-MEMHCH-04A)
This single-failure-proof hoist is being procured to replace the existing hoist so as to prevent or mitigate the consequences of a heavy load drop. This new hoist is designed, and fabricated in accordance to the generic topical report entitled "Ederer's Nuclear Safety Related X-Sam Cranes" EDR-1(P)-A.
b.
Auxiliary Filter Hoist (CPX-MEMHWR-04A)
This hoist, in conjuction with the existing hoist (CPX-MEMHWR-04), is used during the removal and transfer of radioactive filter elements from their respective filter cells to the drumming station. A single-failure-proof hoist is being procured for handling the transfer cask from El. 852'-6" to the drumming station at El. 810'-6".
This hoist is designed and fabricated in accordance to the generic topical report EDR-1(P)-A.
2.
"For any cranes identified in 2.1-1 not designated as single-failure-proof in 2.4-1, a comprehensive hazard evaluation should be provided which includes the following information..."
A-27
RESPONSE
Hoists and cranes identified in Table A-1 which openate over safe
~
shutdown or decay heat removal equipment not addressed in Section A.2.2 and A.2.3 of this report, are presented in Table A-6.
This table addresses each applicable overhead handling system with a description of the anticipated loads and impact areas. Also listed is the safety related equipment affected by each load handling system and load with the approximate elevation and the hazard elimination category. The weights of the loads are provided in Table A-4.
Most of the hoists listed are used for service on redundant, horizontal, physically separated safety related equipment required for safe shutdown and decay heat removal such that a load drop on one safety train will not preclude the operation of the operable redundant safety train.
The following describes the basis for the exclusion of the hoists listed in Table A-6.
a.
Service Water Intake Structure (SWIS) Crane - (CPX-MESCSW-01)
Service water intake structure crane is an overhead I-Beam crane used to install and maintain the service water pumps, fire pumps and associated piping and equipment inside the service water structure during the maintenance operation of the pumps.
The Station Service Water (SSW) System consists of two separate and independent full-capacity, safety related trains.
Safety-related trains are redundant in that the components supplied by one train are sufficient to perform the minimum required safety function. Service water pumps inside the pump A-28
CPSES house are physically separated from each other by reinforced concrete walls. The SWIS crane is required to handle occasional non-critical loads and operate during normal operation of the plant.
The safety related equipment which may be affected by the movement of loads with this crane is the service water pumps and associated piping. Because of the physical separation and the cross connections between both the train and unit, a load drop from the SWIS crane will not preclude safe shutdown through the use of the redundant SSW pump.
A detailed load drop analysis is shown in Table A-5.
Case 3 represents the worst case, assuming pump 1B is inoperable and needs to be repaired. During maintenance operation of this pump, the SWIS crane is used to lift the pump motor over Train "1A", "2B", and "2A" equipment to the open bay laydown area, (see Figure A-21). During this crane operation, it is postulated that the motor is dropped because of crane or rigging device failure and damages Train "1A" pump and piping.
As the result of this postulated accident, both pumps for Unit 1 are inoperable. By opening the Unit 1/ Unit 2 cross connect valve (XSW-006), Unit 1 safety-related equipment cooling requirements can be maintained by pump 2A with 1B piping and Unit 2 safety-related equipment cooling requirements will be maintained by pump 2B and 2B piping. Therefore, a load drop from this crane will not prevent the redundant service water pump from performing its safety function.
(See Figure A-23 for simplified flow diagram).
In addition, during maintenance operation of miscellaneous equipment in this building, special precautions, procedures, and/or instructions will be utilized with the purpose of minimizing the risk of a heavy load drop in this area.
A-29
CPSES b.
Safety Related Chiller Hoist - (CP1 & 2-MEMHCH-04)
The safety related chiller hoist is used for handling the cooler heat exchanger, chilled water circulation pump, pump motor, and associated piping and equipment in Room No.115A and B of the Auxiliary Building.
The safety chilled water system is designed to remove heat rajected by engineered safety feature pump motors and electrical switchgear. Administrative controls and speical precautions will be taken when using this hoist prior to its replacement with the single failure proof hoist described in Section A.2.4.1.a above.
c.
Moderating and Letdown Chiller Heat Exchanger Hoist (CP1 &
2-MEMHCH-16)
The safety related equipment, which may be affected by the movement of loads with this hoist, is a small section of Class 1E (Train A) cable tray which is used for auxiliary feedwater and component cooling water motor operated valves.
Since all of the cables are for TRAIN A only, TRAIN B equipment will be available to perform the safety fuctions should a load drop damage the cables in the tray.
It should be noted that this hoist does not travel directly over the cable tray. Considering the remote possibility that a load could accidentally swing out and damage the cable tray, the redundant tray would still be available. Therefore, operation of the hoist will not preclude safe shutdown of the reactor fallowing a load drop.
A-30
CPSES d.
Component Cooling Water Pump Hoists (CPX-MEMHCH-01)
Unit 1 and Unit 2 are equipped with redundant Component Cooling
~
Water (CCW) systems consisting of two trains per unit. Each CCW train is located in a separate room and serviced with a separate hoist that can only traverse that particular CCW train. Therefore, due to horizontal physical separation, it is not possible for a load drop of one CCW pump hoist to preclude the operation of the redundant CCW train.
A load drop analysis has been performed and the result indicates that there will be no consequential damage to the floor directly below the monorail.
Centrifugal Charging Pump (CCP) Hoists (CPI & 2-MEMHCH-01, 02) e.
Each centrifugal charging pump hoist services one centrifugal charging pump (CCP). There are two redundant 100% capacity CCP's per unit, each physically and electrically separated in different rooms.
Due to the physical separation and redundancy of the CCP safety trains, a load drop from one hoist would not preclude safe shutdown of the reactor.
A load drop analysis has been performed and the result indicates that there will be no consequential damage to the floor directly below the monorail.
A-31
CPSES f.
Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Hoists (electric motor driven pump)
(CP1 & 2-MEMHCH-13, 14)
These hoists service each of the electric motor driven auxiliary feedwater pumps.
If a load drop were to occur over one of these feedwater pumps, the redundant 100% capacity turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump would be available to supply the required feedwater since this pump is physically separated in a different room.
l g.
Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Hoist (turbine driven pump) - (CP1 &
2-MEMHCH-2)
This hoist services only the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump.
If a load drop were to occur above this pump and result in damage, the separate and redundant motor driven auxiliary feedwater pumps would be available to supply the required feedwater for decay heat removal.
h.
Diesel Generator (Piston) Hoist (CP1 & 2-MEMHCH-37, 38)
Eac hoist services an area directly above each of the two 100%
capacity redundant diesel generators.
Since each diesel generator and associated hoist are located in different rooms and, therefore, physically and electrically separated, a load drop from one hoist would not preclude the use of the redundant diesel generator to provide emergency power if required.
1.
Spent Fuel Pool Heat Exchanger Hoist (CPX-MEMHCH-69, 70)
The safety-related equipment for TRAIN A and TRAIN B spent fuel pool cooling systems are located in separate rooms and serviced by separate Spent Fuel Pool Heat Exchanger Hoists. The hoists are positioned above the train which it services and can only A-32
CPSES traverse above that particular train. Therefore, due to physical separation, it is not possible for a load drop from one Spent Fuel Pool Heat Exchanger Hoist to preclude the operation of the other train.
j Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Heat Exchanger and Containment Spray (CS) Heat Exchanger Hoists - (CP1 & 2-MEMHCH-47, 59)
There are two RHR and CS Heat Exchanger hoists per unit with each hoist servicing one RHR and CS Heat Exchanger.
Each of the two safety trains of RHR and CS Heat Exchangers are physically separated from the other train. Therefore, due to sufficient physical separation and redundancy of ti.e systems, the operation of these hoists will not preclude safe shutdown or decay heat removal should a load drop occur and damage result to safety equipment.
k.
Main Steam Safety Valves Hoists - (CP1 & 2-MEMHCH-48, 49, 50, 51)
The primary function of these hoists is to remove and install main steam safety valves from each main steam line. There is one hoist per main steam line. The installation and removal of the safety valves will be performed while the unit is on residual heat removal, and therefore, a load drop would not adversely effect continued decay heat removal.
However during safety valve testing, the hoist may be used to lift testing equipment over the valves.
In the unlikely event a load drop causes a main steam line break, safe shutdown and decay heat removal could be achieved via the use of the other three steam generators (if the steam generators were being used for reactor heat removal). This steam break accident scenario is bounded by the main steam line rupture analysis presented in the CPSES FSAR Section 15.1.
A-33
CPSES Service Water Intake Stop Gate Hoist - (CPX-MEMHCH-61) 1.
The Service Water Intake Stop Gate Hoist is used for removal and installation of the service water pump compartment stop gate s.
The remote possibility exists for a load drop of the Service Water Intake Stop Gate Hoist to affect the operation of one service water pump (one pump per train) by damaging the pump shaft casing. However, since TRAIN A and TRAIN B compartments of the service water intake structure are physically separated by a concrete wall, a load drop on one train of the service water intake will not preclude the operation of the redundant service water train.
m.
Service Water Traveling Screen Hoist (CPX-MEMHCH-12 and Jib Crane (CPX-SWEHSG-01)
These hoists are used for handling the service water traveling screens and stop gates during maintenance operations (see Figure A-22). A load drop from this hoist would not impact any safety-related equipment.
A load drop analysis has been performed for the screens and stop gates and the result indicates that there will be no consequential damage to the floor directly below the monorail and jib crane.
n.
Auxiliary Filter Hoist (CPX-MEMHWR-04)
This hoist is used for handling miscellaneous spent filters and the transfer cask. Figure A-19 shows the travel range for the hoist.
Until the single failure proof hoist described in Section A.2.4.1.b is installed, this hoist will cover the entire monorail area.
Special precautions will be taken when handling any heavy load over the equipment hatch area. By A-34
CPSES inspection, there is no safety related safe shutdown equipment directly below this hoist's permanent service area.
Load handling procedures will be established to ensure that any load
~
drop will not result in a safety concern.
o.
Miscellaneous Hoist - (CPX-MEMHCH-72)
This hoist is used for handling the spent fuel pool cooling system isolation valves during maintenance operations (see Figure A-13).
In the event of a load drop and damage to one train, the separate and redundant train would be available to supply the required cooling for decay heat removal.
p.
Residual Heat Removal Pump Hoist - (CP1-MEMHCH-08)
This hoist is designed for use during maintenance on each of the RHR pumps. The RHR pumps provide decay heat removal capabilities during cold shutdown and refueling modes. There are two redundant 100% capacity RHR pumps per unit, each located in a separate room with its associated monorail.
The hoist will be used for maintenance when the associated RHR pump is removed from service.
Since the redundant train is still available, a load drop from one monorail will not prevent the RHR system from performing its safety function.
A.3 CONCLUSIONS Based on our evaluation of heavy load handling systems at the CPSES facility, it is concluded that, in accordance with the provisions of NUREG-0612, all heavy load handling systems will have adequate design safety features to prevent or mitigate the consequences of postulated accidental load drops.
A-35
~
CPSES To further assure the safe handling of heavy loads at CPSES, the following measures will be provided for all load handling equipment specified in Sections A.2.2, A.2.3 and A.2.4 of this attachment.
1.
Safe laydown areas, safe load areas, and/or safe load paths will be provided as discussed in this attachment prior to initial fuel load operations to ensure safe operation of the cranes during maintenance activities.
2.
To preclude rolling (if dropped) and to reduce floor impact, all heavy loads will be carried at the lowest practical height above the operating floor or other components and structures along the path of travel.
3.
Load handling procedures for applicable cranes, and periodic inspection and testing of the cranes, as previously stated in Section A.2.1 of this attachment (Response (3e)), will be utilized.
This attachment, in conjuction with the results of the polar crane single-failure-proof analysis (Reference 1) and reactor vessel head and reactor internals lifting devices analysis (Reference 2) constitutes our final response to Mr. Darrell G. Eisenhut's letter dated December 22, 1980.
A.4 REFERENCES 1.
Holloran & Associates, " Evaluation of the Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station Containment Building Polar Cranes' Compliance with NUREG-0554 Requirements," Revision 1, 12-15-82.
2.
H. H. Sandner, " Evaluation of the Acceptability of the Reactor Vessel Head Lif t Rig, Reactor Vessel Internals Lift Rig, Load Cell, and Load Cell Linkage to the Requirements of NUREG-0612,"
WCAP-10156, October 1982.
3.
D. W. Alexander, R. Shakely and D. F. Dudek, " Reactor Vessel Head Drop Analyses," WCAP-9198, January 1978.
A-36
CrSES TABLE A-1 (Sheet 1 of 3)
OVERHEAD LOAD HANDLING SYSTEMS WITH POTENTIAL FOR LOAD DROP ON SPENT FUEL OR SYSTEMS RE0VIRED FOR PLANT SHUTDOWN OR DECAY HEAT REMOVAL Equipment and/or Piping Crane /Holst Name Crane / Hoist I.D. No.
Location Elevation Capacity (Tons)
Along The Load Path 1.
Fuel building CPX-MESCFC-01 Fuel Bldg.
Above 860" 130-17-5 Spent fuel pool cooling overhead crane, piping.
Spent fuel transfer area.
2.
Containment auxiliary CPI-MESCCA-01 Containment Bldg.
905'-9" 5
Reactor vessel.
upper cranes.
CP1-MESCCA-01 3.
Containment polar CPI-MESCCP-01 Containment Bldg.
950'-7" 175-20 Reactor vessel, cranes.
CP2-MESCCP-01 Steam generator.
Reactor coolant pumps.
Reactor coolant piping.
4 Moderating Heat CP1-MEMHCH-16 Safeguards Bldg.
831'-6" 2
Train "A" electrical tray Exchanger (HX)
CP2-MEMHCH-16 (cabling for Auxiliary and letdown chiller Feedwater System, i
HX hoist.
Component Cooling Water (CCW) System Motor operated valves) located near the monorail.
5.
Component Cooling CPX-MEMHCH-01 Auxiliary Bldg.
810'-6" 4
CCW pump and associated Water (CCW) pump piping hoi st.
6.
Safety related CPI-MEMHCH-04A Auxiliary Bldg.
778' 3
CCW piping connected to chiller hoist CP2-MEMHCH-04A the chiller. Train "A" (Single-Failure-Chiller Unit. Train "B" Proof).
Chiller Unit.
7.
Centrifugal charging CP1-MEMHCH-01, 02 Auxiliary Bldg.
810'-6" 4
Centrifugal charging pump pumps hoist.
CP2-MEMHCH-01, 02 and associated piping and valves.
R.
Containment fuel CP1-MESCCF-01 Containment Bldg.
Above 860' 1
Containment fuel transfer handling bridge CP2-MESCCF-01 area and fuel rack.
crane.
J CPSES TABLE A-1 (Sheet 2 of 3)
OVERHEAD LOAD HANDLING SYSTEMS WITH POTENTIAL FOR LOAD DROP ON SPENT FUEL OR SYSTEMS REQUIRED FOR PLANT SHUTDOWN OR DECAY HEAT REMOVAL Equipment and/or Piping l
Crane / Hoist Name Crane / Hoist I.D. No.
Location Elevation Capacity (Tons)
Along The Load Path 9.
Auxiliary feedwater CP1-MEMHCH-13, 14 Safeguards Bldg.
790'-6" 4
Motor driven auxiliary pump hoist (electric CP2-MEMHCH-13, 14 feedwater pumps, piping and valves.
driven pump).
- 10. Auxiliary feedwater CP1-MEMHCH-12 Safeguards Bldg.
790'-6" 3
Turbine driven auxiliary f
pump hoist (turbine CP2-MEMHCH-12 feedwater pump, piping and valves.
l driven pump).
l l
- 11. Auxiliary filter CPX-MEMHWR-04 Auxiliary Bldg.
852'-6" 8
Miscellaneous filters.
l hoist.
- 12. Reactor coolant pumps CP1-MEMHCH-42 Containment Bldg.
905'-9" 45 Same as polar crane.
hoist.
CP2-MEMHCH-42 Upgraded to 45 See Note 1.
l tons per DCA-9035 i
1
- 13. Diesel generator CP1-MEMHCH-37, 38 Safeguards Bldg.
810'-6" 1
Diesel generator and its (piston) hoist.
CP2-MEMHCH-37, 38 associated piping and in strumenta tion.
- 14. Spent fuel pool HX CPX-MEMHCH-69, 70 Fuel Bldg.
838'-9" 8
Spent fuel pool heat exchangers, piping and hoist.
valves.
- 15. Service water CPX-MEMHCH-12 Outside of service 838' 20 Traveling screens and traveling screen CPX-SWEHSG-01 water structure 3
stop gates.
hoist and jib crane.
- 16. Residual heat removal CP1-MEMHCH-47, 59 Safeguards Bldg.
831'-6" 10 RHR & CSS heat exchanger (RHR) HX and CP2-MEMHCH-47, 59 and its associated Containment Spray piping and valves.
- 17. Main steam safety CP1-MEMHCH-48,49,50,51 Safeguards B1dg.
880'-6" 1
valves hoist.
CP2-MEMHCH-48,49,50,51
- 18. Service water intake CPX-MESCSW-01 Service water structure Above 796' 7 1/2 Service water pumps and its associated piping structure crane.
and valves.
- 19. Containment dome CPI-MESCRP-01 Containment Bldg.
1000' 1
Reactor vessel. Fuel access rotating CP2-MESCRP-02 storage rack. Steam platform hoist.
generator. Reactor coolant pumps. Reactor coolant piping.
I l
1 1
I I
I l
l
(
CPSES l
TABLE A-1 (Sheet 3 of 3)
OVERHEAD LOAD HANDLING SYSTEMS WITH POTENTIAL FOR LOAD DROP ON SPENT FUEL OR SYSTEMS REQUIRED FOR PLANT SHUTDOWN OR DECAY HEAT REMOVAL Equipment and/or Piping Crane / Hoist Name Crane /Holst I.D. No.
Location Elevation Capacity (Tons)
Along The Load Path
- 20. Fuel handling bridge TBX-FHSCFB-01 Fuel Bldg.
Above 860' 2
Spent fuel pool.
l crane (Fuel Bldg.).
Refueling canal.
New fuel storage pit.
- 21. Refueling machine TBX-FHSCMC-01 Containment Bldg.
Above 860' 2
Reactor vessel.
(Containment Bldg.).
TCX-FHSCMC-01 Containment fuel transfer area.
- 22. Service water intake CPX-MEMHCH-61 Service water intake 789'-9" 8
Service water pumps.
stop gate hoist, structure l
- 23. Auxiliary filter CPX-MEMHWR-04A Auxiliary Bldg.
852'-6" 8
Service water piping, hoist (Single-misc. filters.
l Failure-Proof).
- 24. Miscellaneous CPX-MEMHCH-72 Fuel Bldg.
838'-9" 2
Spent fuel pool cooling hoist.
pump inlet isolation valve.
- 25. Residual heat CPI-MEMICH-08 Safeguards Bldg.
773' 3
RHR pump and its removal pump hoist CP2-MEMICH-09 associated piping.
l NOTE:
1.
Reactor Coolant Pumps Holst is attached to the Polar Crane Hooks during the maintenance operation of the Reactor Coolant Pump.
l CPSES TABLE A-2 (Sheet 1 of 3)
OVERHEAD LOAD HANDLING SYSTEMS CRANES AND HOISTS WHICH DO NOT REQUIRE ADDITIONAL REVIEW AND EVALUATION Separation Crane / Hoist Name Crane /Holst I.D. No.
Loca tion Elevation Capacity (Tons)
Criteria (Note 1) 1.
Dumming storage area CPX-MESCDS-01 Fuel Bldg.
831' 17 B
l
- crane, 2.
Maintenance Bldg.
CPX-MESCMB-01 Maintenance Bldg.
810' 25 A
bridge crane.
3.
Turbine Bldg.
CPI-MESCTC-01 Turbine Bldg.
830' Main hoist - 210 A
gantry crane.
CP2-MESCTC-01 Aux. hoi st - 50 I
4.
Circulating water CPX-MESCCW-01 Circulating water 810' Ma t n hoi st:
intake structure intake structure Inside span - 25 A
l gantry crane.
Outside span - 12 l
Aux. Hoist: 5 5.
Equipment hatch door CPI-MEMHCH-41 Containment Bldg.
832'-6" 10 C
hoist.
0 223 degrees 6.
Waste gas compressor CPX-MEMHCH-05 Auxiliary Bldg.
831'-6" 1
C hoist.
7.
Positive displacement CP1-MEMHCH-03 Auxiliary Bldg.
810'-6" 6
C charging pump hoist.
CP2-MEMHCH-03 8.
H Recombiner CPX-MEMHCH-07 Auxiliary Bldg.
831'-6" 1
C phoist.
9.
Letdown chiller CPI-MEMHCH-05 Auxiliary Bldg.
852'-6" 2
C package hoist.
CP2-MEMHCH-05
- 10. Heating & Ventilation CPX-MEMHCH-09 Auxiliary Bldg.
873'-6" 6
A chiller hoist.
- 11. Heating & Ventilation CPX-MEMHCH-10 Auxiliary Bldg.
873'-6" 1
A chiller hoist.
12.
Letdown HX and seal CPI-MEMHCH-15 Safeguards Bldg.
810'-6" 1 1/2 C
water HX hoist.
CP2-MEMHCH-15
- 13. Condenser vacuum CP1-MEMHCH-25 Turbine Bldg.
778' 4
A pumps hoist.
CP2-MEMHCH-25
\\
f I
\\
J 9
CPSES TABLE A-2 (Sheet 2 of 3)
OVERHEAD LOAD HANDLING SYSTEMS CRANES AND HOISTS WHICH DO NOT REQUIRE ADDITIONAL REVIEW AND EVALUATION Separa tion Crane / Hoist Name Crane / Hoist I.D. No.
Location Elevation Capacity (Tons)
Criteria (Note 1) 14 Turbine plant cooling CPX-MEMHCH-11 Turbine Bldg.
778' 6
A water pump hoist.
- 15. Heater drain pump CPI-MEMHCH-28 Turbine Bldg.
778' 4
A hoist.
CP2-MEMHCH-28
- 16. Control fluid tank CPI-MEMHCH-29 Turbine Bldg.
778' 3
A hoist.
CP2-MEMHCH-29
- 17. Personnel lock hoist.
CPI-MEMHCH-30 Safeguards Bldg.
831'-6" 2
C 0 317 degrees
- 18. Reactor vessel studs CPI-MEMHJC-01 Containment Bldg.
905'-9" 1/2 A
hoi st.
CP2-MEMHJC-01 l
l
- 19. Steam generator CP1-MEMHOC-01 Turbine Bldg.
803' 10 A
l feedwater pump and CP2-MEMHOC-01 I
turbine driver crane.
t l
- 20. Equipment hatch hoist CP1-MEMHCH-45 Safeguards Bldg.
790'-6" 4
A 0 790'-6" for misc.
CP2-MEMHCH-45 equipment.
- 21. Equipment hatch hoist CP1-MEMHCH-46 Safeguards Bldg.
810'-6" 4
A e 810'-6" for misc.
CP2-MEMHCH-46 equipment.
- 22. Equipment hatch hoist CPX-MEMHCH-52 Auxiliary Bldg.
873'-6" 1
A 0 873'-6" for misc.
ventilation equipment.
- 23. Equipment hatch hoist CPX-MEMHCH-53 Auxiliary Bldg.
886'-6" 1
A 0 886'-6" for misc.
ventilation equipment.
- 24. Misc. equipment hoist. CPX-MEMHCH-54 Unit 2, Turbine Bldg.
810' 2
A
- 25. Misc. equipment hoist. CPX-MEMHCH-55 Unit 2, Turbine Bldg.
810' 1/4 A
26.
Dry waste compactor CPX-MEMHCH-56 Fuel Bldg.
810'-6" 2
A hoist.
- 27. Chlorine containers CPX-MEMHCH-57 Servica water 823'-9"
?
A hoist.
chlorination bldg.
- 28. Chlorine containers CPX-MEMHCH-58 Circ. water chlorination 809'-6" 2
A hoist.
bldg.
s l
CPSES TABLE A-2 (Sheet 3 of 3) l OVERHEAD LOAD HANDLING SYSTEMS CRANES AND HOISTS WHICH DO NOT REQUIRE ADDITIONAL REVIEW AND EVALUATION Separation Crane / Hoist Name Crane /Holst I.D. No.
Location Elevation Capacity (Tons)
Criteria (Note 1) l
- 29. Auxiliary steam CPX-MEMHCH-60 Auxiliary Bldg.
778' 1
A condensate cooler hoist.
l
- 30. Containment equipment CPX-MEMHCH-67 Outside containment 25 A
1 l
hatch hoist.
CPX-MEMHCH-68 l
- 31. Wall puller for CP1-MEMHLH-01 Safeguards Bldg.
810'-6" 8 3/4 C
l letdown HX, CP2-MEMHLH-01 831'-6" moderating HX.
- 32. Demineralizers hoist.
CPX-MEMHWR-05 Auxiliary Bldg.
852'-6" 8
C
- 33. Radial arm stud TBX-FHHCAH-01 Containment Bldg.
Below 860' 2
D l
tensioner hoists.
TCX-FHHCAH-01
- 34. Miscellaneous CP1-MEMHCH-64 Safeguards Bldg.
852'-6" 3
A equipment hoist.
CP2-MEM CH-64 Note 1: Separation criteria used is as follows:
A - No safety related equipment located in, under, or near the load path.
B - Safety related equipment separated by barriers which have been analyzed for load drop.
C - Equipment in, under, or near load path is not required for safe shutdown or decay removal.
D - Load handling equipment not used except in safe shutdown and equipment, in, under, or near load path is not required for decay heat removal.
i CPSES TABLE A-3 (Sheet 1 of 3)
OVERHEAD LOAD HANDLING SYSTEMS APPLICABLE CODE AND STANDARDS Crane / Hoist Name Crane /Hof st I.D. No.
Location Elevation Capacity (Tons)
Code and Standards 1.
Fuel Pullding CPX-MESCFC-01 Fuel B1dg.
Above 860' 130-17-5 Crane Manuf acturers overhead crane.
Association of America (CMAA) Spec. No. 70 and ANSI B30.2-1967, Chapter 2-1.
2.
Containment auxiliary CPI-MESCCA-01 Containment Bldg.
905'-6" 5
CMAA Spec. No. 70 and upper cranes.
CP2-MESCCA-01 ANSI B30.2-1967, Chapter 2-1.
3.
Containment polar CP1-MESCCP-01 Containment Bldg.
950'-7" 175-20 CMAA Spec. No. 70 and cranes.
CP2-MESCCP-01 ANSI B30.2-1967, Chapter 2-1.
4.
Moderating HX and CPI-MEMHCH-16 Safeguards Bldg.
831'-6" 2
ANSI B30.16-1973 letdown chill (r HX CP2-MEMHCH-16 hoist.
5.
Component cooling CPX-MEMHCH-01 Auxiliary Bldg.
810'-6" 4
water pump hoist.
6.
Safety related CPI-MEMHCH-04A Auxiliary Bldg.
778' 3
CMAA Spec. No. 70 and chiller hoist (Single-CP2-MEMHCH-04A ANSI B30.16-1973 Failure-Proof).
7.
Centrifugal charging CP1-MEMHCH-01, 02 Auxiliary Bldg.
810'-6" 4
ANSI B30.16-1973 pumps hoist.
CP2-MEMHCH-01, 02 8.
Containment fuel CP1-MESCCF-01 Containment Bldg.
Above 860' 1
CMAA Spec. No. 70 and handling bridge CP2-MESCCF-01 ANSI B30.2-1967, crane.
Chapter 2-1.
9.
Auxiliary feedwater CP1-MEMHCH-13, 14 Safeguards Bldg.
790'-6" 4
ANSI B30.16-1973 pump hoist (electric CP2-MEMHCH-13, 14 motor driven pump).
- 10. Auxiliary feedwater CPI-MEMHCH-12 Safeguards Bldg.
790'-6" 3
ANSI B30.16-1973 pump hoist (turbine CP2-MEMHCH-12 driven pump).
l CPSES i
TABLE A-3 (Sheet 2 of 3)
OVERHEAD LOAD HANDLING SYSTEMS APPLICABLE CODE AND STANDARDS Crane / Hoist Name Crane / Hoist !.D. No.
Location Eleva tion Capacity (Tons)
Code and Standards
- 11. Auxiliary filter CPX-MEMHWR-04 Auxiliary Bldg.
852'-6" 8
ANSI B30.16-1973 hoist.
- 12. Reactor coolant CP1-MEMHCH-42 Containment Bldg.
905'-9" 45 ANSI B30.16-1973 pumps hoist.
CP2-MEMHCH-42
- 13. Diesel generator CP1 MEMHCH-37, 38 Safeguards Bldg.
810'6" 1
ANSI B30.16-1973 (piston) hoist.
CP2-MEMHCH-37, 38
- 14. Spent fuel pool HX CPX-MEMHCH-43, 44 Fuel Bldg.
838'-9" 8
ANSI B30.16-1973 hoist.
- 15. Service water CPX-MEMHCH-12 Outside of service 838' 20 ANSI B30.16-1973 traveling screen CPX-SWEHSG-01 water intake structure 3
ANSI B30.16-1973 hoist and jib crane.
- 16. Residual heat removal CP1-MEMHCH-47, 59 Safeguards Bldg 831'-6" 10 ANSI B30.16-1973 l
HX and Containment Spray System hoist.
- 17. Main steam safety CP1-MEMHCH-48,49,50,51 Safeguards Bldg.
880'-6" 1
ANSI B30.16-1973 valves hoist.
CP2-MEMHCH-48,49,50,51
- 18. Service water intake CPX-MESCSW-01 Service water intake Above 796*
7 1/2 CMAA Spec. No. 70 and I
structure crane.
structure ANSI B30.2-1967, l
Chapter 2-1.
l
- 19. Containment dome CPI-MESCRP-01 Containment Bldg.
1000' 1
CMAA Spec. No. 70 and i
access rotating CP2-MESCRP-01 ANSI B30.2-1967, l
platform hoist.
Chapter 2-1.
j l
- 20. Fuel handling bridge TBX-FHSCFB-01 Fuel Bldg.
Above 860' 2
CMAA Spec. No. 70 and crane (Fuel Bldg.).
ANSI B30.2-1967, Chapter 2-1.
- 21. Pefueling machine TBX-FHSCMC-01 Containment Bldg.
Abcve 860' 2
CMAA Spec. No. 70 and (Containment Bldg.).
TCX-FHSCMC-01 ANSI B30.2-1967, l
Chapter 2-1.
l
- 22. Service water intake CPX-MEMHCH-61 Service water intake 789'-9" 8
ANSI B30.16-1973 stop gate hoist.
struc ture
- 23. Auxiliary filter CPX-MEMHWR-04A Auxiliary Bldg.
852'-6" 8
CMAA Spec. No. 70 and l
hoist (Single.
ANSI B30.16-1973 Failure-Proof).
CPSES TABLE A-3 (Sheet 3 of 3)
OVERHEAD LOAD HANDLING SYSTEMS APPLICABLE CODE AND STANDARDS l
Crane / Hoist Name Crane / Hoist I.D. No.
Loca tion Elevation Capacity (Tons)
Code and Standards l
l
- 24. Miscellaneous CPX-MEMHCH-72 Fuel Bldg.
838'-9" 2
hoist.
l
- 25. Residual heat CPI-MEMHCH-08 Safeguards Bldg.
773' 3
ANSI B30.16-1973 removal pump CP2-MEMHCH-09 hoist.
l l
l
1 1
l CPSES TARLE A-4 (Sheet 1 of 5)
OVERHEAR LOAD HANDLING SYSTEM PROJECTED LOADS ANJ WEIGHTS l
APPROX.
ANTICIPATED CRANE / HOIST EQUIPMENT I.D. NUMBER LOCATION ELEVATION PROJECTED LOADS LOAD WTS.
LIFTING DEVICES
- 1.
Fuel building CPX-MESCFC-01 Fuel Bldg.
860' A.
Spent Fuel Cask 220,000 lbs.
SLD overhead crane.
B.
New Fuel Assembly and 2,088 lbs.
NR Handling Tool C.
New Fuel Shipment Cask 7,000 lbs.
S l
D.
Fuel Transfer Canal Stop 12,000 lbs.
S I
Gates 1
2.
Containment auxiliary CP1-MESCCA-01 Containment 905' A.
Reactor Vessel Stud 4,000 lbs.
S l
upper crane.
CP2-MESCCA-01 Tensioning Device B.
Reactor Vessel Stud 6,200 lbs.
S Transport Baskets (full)
C.
Reactor Vessel Studs 570 lbs.
S D.
Control Rod Drive 1,000 lbs.
S Ventilation Ducts 3.
Containment polar CP1-MESCCP-01 Containment 950' A.
Reactor Vessel Head 336,218 lbs.
SLD crane.
CP2-MESCCP-01 Assembly plus Rig Assembly plus Load Celi Linkage and Contingencies B.
Reactor Upper Internals 132,000 lbs.
SLD C.
Reactor Lower Internals 290,000 lbs.
SLD plus Lif ting Rig plus Load Cell Linkage and Contingencies
- Internals Lif ting Rig 18,350 lbs.
NR
- Reactor Lower Intunals 260,000 lbs.
SLD
- Load Cell and Load 2,930 lbs.
NR Cell Linkage D.
Reactor Coolant Pumps
- Pump Internals and 60,480 lbs.
S Holst
- Pump Impeller and Hoist 52,880 lbs.
S
- Rotating Element and 12,880 lbs.
5 Hoist
- Pump Motor, Lif ting Rig 89,986 lbs.
S and Hoist
- Motor Stator and Hoist 53,283 lbs.
5
- Motor Rotor snd Hoist 36,764 lbs.
5
- Fly Wheel and Holst 21,405 lbs.
S
- Air Cooler and Hoist 7,280 lbs.
5 E.
Reactor Coolant Punp 16,280 lbs.
5 Motor Stand and Hoist F.
Fuel Storage Area 12,000 lbs.
S Stop Gate
r 1
i 1
l CPSES TABLE A-4 (Sheet 2 of 5)
OVERHEAR LOAD HANDLING SYSTEM PROJECTED LOADS AND WEIGHTS APPROX.
ANTICIPATED CRANE / HOIST EQUIPMENT 1.D. NUMBER LOCATION ELEVATION PROJECTED LOADS LOAD WTS.
LIFTING DEVICES
- 4.
Moderating Heat CPI-MEMHCH-16 Safeguards 831' A.
Moderating HX Channel 268 lbs.
5 Exchanger (HX) and CP2-MEMHCH-16 Bldg.
Head l
letdown chiller HX B.
Moderating HX Tube Bundle 1,515 lbs.
S hoist.
C.
Moderating HX Shell 2,558 lbs.
S D.
Letdown Chtller HX 357 lbs.
S Channel Head E.
Letdown Chiller HX 1,357 lbs.
S Tube Bundle F.
Letdown Chiller HX Shell 1,905 lbs.
S 5.
Congonent cooling water CPX-MEMHCH-01 Auxiliary Bldg.
810' A.
Component Cooling Water 6,500 lbs.
S pump hoist.
Pump B.
Component Cooling Water 3,300 lbs.
S Pump Base C.
Component Cooling Water 7,500 lbs.
SB Pump Motor D.
Valves - 24" 1,040 lbs.
5 E.
Emergency Fan / Coil 200 lbs.
S Unit Motor 6.
Safety related chiller CP1-MEMHCH-04A Auxiliary Bldg.
778' A.
Cooler HX Tube Bur.dle 1,500 lbs.
S hoist.
CP2-MEMHCH-04A B.
Condenser HX Tube Bundle 1,500 lbs.
S C.
Chilled Water Circulating 210 lbs.
S Pump D.
Chilled Water Pump Motor 546 lbs.
5 E.
Potential Transformers 1,500 lbs.
S l
7.
Centrifugal charging CP1-MEMHCH-01,02 Auxiliary Bldg.
810' A.
Centrifugal Charging '
7,500 lbs.
S pump hotst.
CP2-MEMHCH-01,02 Pump (CCP) (Total)
B.
CCP Gear Assembly 2,700 lbs.
S C.
CCP Motor (Total) 5,830 lbs.
SB D.
CCP Motor Rotor 1,760 lbs.
S E.
Lube Oil Cooler (Shell) 260 lbs.
S F.
Emergency Fan / Coil Unit 140 lbs.
S Motor 8.
Containment fuel CPI-MESCCF-01 Containment 860' A.
Fuel Assembly and 2,088 lbs.
NR handling bridge.
CP2-MESCCF-01 Bldg.
Lif ting Tool 1
l 9.
Auxiliary feedwater CP1-MEMHCH-13,14 Safeguarcs 790' A.
Auxiliary Feedwater 4,000 lbs.
S l
pump hoist (Motor CP2-MEMHCH-13,14 Bldg.
Pump driven).
B.
Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 7,100 lbs.
SB Motor C.
Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1,224 lbs.
S Rotor D.
Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1,200 lbs.
S Casing
w CPSES TABLE A-4 (Sheet 3 of 5)
OVERHEAR LOAD HANDLING SYSTEM PROJECTED LOADS AND WEIGHTS APPROX.
ANTICIPATED CRANE / HOIST EQUIPMENT I.D. NUMBER LOCATION ELEVATION PROJECTED LOADS LOAD WTS.
LIFTING DEVICES *
- 10. Auxiliary feedwater CPI-MEMHCH-12 Safeguards 790' A.
Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 4,000 lbs.
5 pump hoist (Turbine CP2-MEMHCH-12 Bldg.
B.
Turbine Driver 2,800 lbs.
SB Driven).
C.
Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1,150 lbs.
5 Rotor D.
Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1,300 lbs.
S Casing
- 11. Auxiliary filter CPX-MEMHWR-04 Auxiliary B1dg.
852'-6" A.
Miscellaneous Filter 20 lbs.
N/A hoist.
B.
Spent Filter Cask 10,000 lbs.
5 C.
Concrete Floor Plug 12,875 lbs.
S
- 12. Reactor coolant pump CPI-MEMHCH-42 Containment 905' A.
Reactor Coolant Pump 55,200 lbs.
S hoi st.
CP2-MEMHCH-42 Bldg.
Internal s
- 1. Pump Stator 47,600 lbs.
5
- 2. Pump Rotating Element 7,600 lbs.
5 B.
Reactor Coolant Pump Motor 84,706 lbs.
SB and Lif ting Rig
- 1. Stator 48,003 lbs.
S
- 2. Rotor 31,484 lbs.
S
- 3. Flywheel 16.125 lbs.
S
- 4. Motor Air Coolers 7,000 lbs.
5 C.
Reactor Coolant Pump 10,435 lbs.
5 Motor Stand
- 13. Diesel generator CP1-MEMHCH-37,38 Safeguards 810' A.
Various Piping and 2,000 lbs.
5 (Piston) hoist.
CP2-MEMHCH-37,38 Bldg.
Structural Components on or near Diesel Generator Set
- 14. Spent fuel pool heat CPX-MEMHCH-69,70 Fuel Bldg.
838' A.
Spent Fuel Cooling Pump 2,500 lbs.
S exchanger hoist.
B.
Spent Fuel Cooling Motor 2,100 lbs.
S C.
Spent Fuel Heat Exchanger 1.
Shell 7,600 lbs.
SB 2.
Tube Bundle 7,400 lb s.
SB D.
Concrete Floor Plugs 8,985 lbs.
S
- 15. Service water traveling CPX-MEMHCH-12 Service Water 838' A.
Miscellaneous Parts, 3,500 lbs.
SB screen hoist and jib CPX-SWEHSG-01 Intake Trays, Chains, Housing, crane.
Structure Chain Guides (Max.)
B.
Traveling Screen Unit 21,500 lbs.
SB C.
Stop Gates 4,500 lbs.
1 1
1 1
CPSES TABLE A-4 (Sheet 4 of 5)
OVERHEAR LOAD HANDLING SYSTEM PROJECTED LOADS AND WElGHTS APPROX.
ANTICIPATED CRANE / HOIST EQUIPMENT I.D. NUMBER LOCATION ELEVAY10N PROJECTED LOADS LOAD WTS.
LIFTING DEVICES
- l
- 16. Residual heat removal CP1-MEMHCH-47,59 Safeguards 831' A.
Containment Spray Heat I
and containment spray CP2-MEMHCH-47,59 Bldg.
Exchanger I
system HX hoist.
1.
Shell Body 7.300 lbs.
SB l
2.
Tube Bundle 17,000 lbs.
SB I
B.
RHR Heat Exchanger 1.
Shell Body 7,750 lbs.
SB 2.
Tube Bundle 16,600 lbs.
SB C.
Cowartment Concrete 11,045 lbs.
5 Floor Plugs D.
Containment Spray System 580 lbs.
S HX Support Beam E.
Miscellaneous Valves 200 lbs.
S j
- 17. Main steam safety CP1-MEMHCH-48,49 Safeguards 880' A.
Main Steam Safety Valves 1,550 lbs.
S l
valves hoist.
50, 51 Bldg.
CP2-MEMHCH-48,49 50, 51 i
1
- 18. Service water intake CPX-MESCWS-01 Service Water 796' A.
Service Water Pump Motor 9,700 lbs.
S structure crane.
Intake B.
Fire Pump Jockey Pump 525 lbs.
5 Structure C.
Fire Pump Jockey Pump 235 lbs.
5 Motor D.
Fire Pump Diesel Driven 4,730 lbs.
5 Pump E.
Fire Pump Diesel Driven 3,450 lbs.
SB f
Pump Driver l
F.
Fire Pump Diesel Driven 1,450 lbs.
5 Pug Gear G.
Fire Pug Diesel Coupling 181 lbs.
5 H.
Fire Pump (Electric 4,730 lbs.
S Driven) Pump I.
Fire Pump (Electric 4,800 lbs.
5 Driven) Motor
- 19. Containment dome CP1-MESCRP-01 Containment 1000' A.
Miscellaneous Tools 200 lbs.
S access rotating CP2-MESCRP-01 Bldg.
B.
Welding Equipment 300 lbs.
S platform hoist.
- 20. Fuel handling bridge TBX-FHSCFB-01 Fuel Bldg.
860' A.
Fuel Assembly and Tool 2,088 lbs.
NR crane (Fuel b1dg.).
B.
Underwater Lighting 300 lbs.
NR Fixture 21.
Refueling machine TBX-FHSCMC-01 Containment 860' A.
Fuel Assembly, Rod Control 1,854 lbs.
NR (Containment b1dg.).
TCX-FHSCMC-01 Bldg.
Cluster & Gripper B.
Control Rod Drive Shaf t 336 lbs.
NR
& Handling Fixture
~
1
___3
_)
CPSES TABLE A-4 (Sheet 5 of 5)
OVERHEAR LOAD HANDLING SYSTEM PROJECTED LOADS AND WEIGHTS APPROX.
ANTICIPATED CRANE / HOIST EOUIPMENT I.D. NUMBER LOCATION ELEVATION PROJECTED LOADS LOAD WTS.
LIFTING DEVICES *
- 22. Service water intake CPX-MEMHCH-61 Service Water 789'-9*
A.
Service Water Pump 12,400 lbs.
S stop gate hoist.
Intake Compartment Stop Gates Struc ture l
- 23. Auxiliary filter CPX-MEMHWR-04A Auxiliary 852'-6" A.
Miscellaneous Filter 20 lbs.
NR hoist (Single-Bldg.
B.
Spent Filter Cask 10,000 lbs.
5 Failure-Proof).
C.
Concrete Floor Plug 12,875 lbs.
S
- 24. Miscell aneous CPX-MEPH CH-72 Fuel Bldg.
838'-9" A.
Spent Fuel Pool 2,500 lbs.
S hoist.
Cooling Pump Inlet Isolation Val ve.
25.
Residual heat CPI-MEMHCH-08 Safeguards Bldg.
773' A.
RiR Pump.
6,000 lbs.
S I
removal pump CP2-ME!41CH-09 l
hoists.
l l
l
- LIFTING DEVICE SYMBOLS i
5
- Sling or Cable Arrangement SB
- Sling and Spreader Bar Arrangement SLD - Special Lifting Device NR - None Required
i
+
CPSES TABLE A-5 SWIS CRANE LOAD DROP ANALYSIS I
1 1
55k5 COMPONEN15 (1)
CASE I CASE 2 CASE 3 CASE 4 CASE 5 CASE 6 CASE 7 CASE B CASE 9 Train IA:
1 Pump (CP1-5WAP5W-01)
I I
D 0
0 0
0 0
0 l
Piping N/A N/A D
0 0
D D
0 D
i Cross-Connect Valve (X5W-008)
C C
C C
C 0 (2)
C C
C l
l Isolation Valve (1HV-4286)
N/A N/A N/A 0
0 C
C 0
C 1 rain 1B:
Pump (CPI-5WAP5W-02) 0 0
I I
I I
O O
O Piping 0
0 0
N/A N/A 0
0 0
0 Cross-Connect Valve (X5W-007)
C C
0 (2)
C C
0 (2)
C 0 (2)
C Isolation Valve (1HV-4287) 0 0
0 N/A N/A 0
0 C
0 Unit 1/2 l
Cross Connect Valve (X5W-006)
C C
0 (2)
C C
C C
0 (2)
C Train 2A:
Pwe O
D D
0 D
0 1
0 0
Piping 0
0 0
0 0
0 N/A D
D Cross-Connect Valve (X5W-0028)
C C
0 (2)
C C
C C
C 0 (2)
Isolation Valve (2HV-4286) 0 N/A C
0 N/A C
N/A N/A C
Train 28:
Pump D
0 0
D 0
0 0
I I
Piping D
0 0
D 0
0 0
0 0
Cross-Connect Valve (X5W-0029)
C C
C C
C C
C 0 (2) 0 (2)
Isolation Valve (2HV-4287)
N/A 0
0 N/A 0
0 0
0 0
55WS Train in service:
Unit 1 IB 18 2A pump w/
1A 1A 1A pump w/
18 1A IB 1B piping 1R pipino Unit 2 2A 28 28 2A 28 28 2B 18 pump w/
2A pump w/
2B piping 2B piping LEGEND: 1-inoperable (1) Operator action required to open " cross-connect" valves and to close isolation valves.
0-Operable or Open C-Closed (2) Hanual operated valve.
D-Damaged due to load drop
'lABIE A-6 (Sheet 1 of 18)
CPSES Ioad/ Impact Area Matrix Crane:
Service Water Intake Structure Crane Tag. No.: CPX-MESCSW-01 IMPACT AREA (description)
Area within the pump compartments HAZARD ELIMINATION IDADS SAFETI-RELATED EQUIPMENT ELEVATION CATECDRY Service water Service water pumps and 810'-6" Note D pumps and notors notors
'IABLE A-6 (Sheet 2 of 18)
CPSES Ioai/ Impact Area Matrix r
L Crane:
Safety Related Chiller Hoist (S-P-P)
Tag. No.:
CP1 & 2-MEMHCH-04A IMPACT AREA (description)
Area directly below the Ebnorail. This includes both " Train A" and " Train B" Safety Chillers.
Iboins 115A and 1158.
HAZARD ELIMINATION LOADS-
-SAFETY-RELATED 800IPMENT ELEVATION CATEGORY Cooler HX.
Safety Chiller Package -
738'-
Note A Tube Bundle
" Train A" and " Train B" Condenser HX.
Tube Bundle Chilled Water Circ. Pump Chilled Water Circ. Pump bbtor Potential Transformers
CPSES TABLE A-6 (Sheet 3 of 18)
CPSES IDad/ Impact Area Matrix Crane:
bbderating and Letdown Chiller Heat Exchanger Hoist Tag. No. :
CP 1 & 2-MEMHCH-16 IMPACT AREA Electrical cable tray, " Train A",
located near end of (description) hoist monorail. Safeguards building Rooms 93 and 99.
HAZARD ELIMINATION IDADS SAFETY-RELATED EQUIPMENT ELEVATION CATEGORY Moderating Heat
" Train A" cables for Aux.
Exchanger Ebedwater Component 831' Note B Channel Head Cooling Water bbtor Operated _ Valves Moderating Heat Exchanger Tube Bundle Moderating Heat Exchanger Shell Letdown Chiller HX. Channel Head Letdown Chiller HX Tube Bundle Letdown 01ill'er HX Shell
CPSES TABLE A-6 (Sheet 4 of 18)
~
CPSES Loa 3/Immet Area Matrix Crane:
ChTponent Cooling Water Pump Tag. No.: CPX-MFMICH-01 IMPACT AREA Area directly below each Component Cooling Water Pump (description)
Hoist. Auxiliary Building Rooms 204, 205, 196, 197.
HAZARD ELIMINATION LOADS SAFETY-RELATED EQUIPMBff ELEVATION CATEGORY Component Component Cooling Water Note B and Cooling Water Piping 810'-6" Note C Pump Component Cool-ing Pump Base Component Cool-Component Cooling Water
~
ing Water Pump Pump and Piping Motor Valves - 24 in.
Component Cooling Water Pump, Fbtor, and Piping Emergency Fan /
Coil Unit Motor
CPS.E TABIE A-6 (Sheet 5 of 18)
CPSES Loa 3/ Impact Area Matrix Crane:
Centrifugal Charging Pumps Hoist Tag. No.: CP 1 & 2-MEMHCH-01, 02 IMPACT AREA Area directly below each Centrifugal Chargin Pump Ibist.
(description)
Auxiliary Building Rooms 194, 195, 200 and 201.
HAZARD ELIMINATION IDADS SAFETY-RELATED DOUIPMENT ELEVATION' CATEGORY Centrifugal Chemical Volume and Con-810'-6" Note B & C Charging Pump trol System (CVCS) Piping (CCP) and Valves CCP Gear Assembly
~
CCP bbtor CCP bbtor Rotor Lube Oil Cooler (Shell)
'IABLE A-6 (Sheet 6 of 18)
CPSES Load /Inpact Area Matrix Crane:
Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Hoist (electric notor driven pump)
Tag. No.: CP 1 & 2-MPR CH-13, 14 IMPACT AREA.
Area directly taelow each electric notor driven Auxiliary (description)
Feedwater Pump Hoist. Safeguard Building Rooms 72 and 73.
I HAZARD ELIMINATION LOADS SAFETY-RELATED EUJIPMENT.
_ ELEVATION CATEGORY Auxiliary Feed-Auxiliary Feedwater 790'-6" Note B water Pump Piping Auxiliary Feed-water Pump Ittor Auxiliary Feed-water Pump Ibtor Auxiliary Feed-water Pump Upper Casing
~
CPSES TABLE A-6
~
(Sheet 7 of 18)
CPSES Ioad/ Impact Area Matrix Crane: Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Hoist (turbine driven pump)
Tag. No.: CP 1 & 2-MEMHCH-12 IMPACT AREA (description)
Area directly below each turbine driven Auxiliary Feed-water Pump Hoist. Safeguard Building Room 74.
HAZARD ELIMINATION IDADS SAFUI'Y-RELATED EQUIPMETI' ELEVATION' CATIXDRY Auxiliary Feed-Auxiliary Feedwater Piping 790'-6" Note B water Pump Turbine Driver Auxiliary Feed-water Pump lbtor Auxiliary Feed-water Pump Casing
'IABIE A-6 (Sheet 8 of 18)
CPSES Load / Impact Area Matrix Crane:
Diesel Generator (Piston) Hoist Tag. No.: CP 1 & 2 MEMHCH-37, 38 I
IMPACT AREA Area directly below Diesel Generator Hoists. Safeguards (description)
Building Rooms 84 and 85.
HAZARD ELIMINATION IDADS SAFETY-RELATED DJUIPMENT-ELLYATION' CATfXDRY Various Diesel Diesel-Generator 810'-6" Note B Generator Parts and Conponents l
CPSES TABLE A-6
~
(Sheet 9 of 18)
CPSES Inad/ Impact Area Matrix Crane:
Spent Fuel Pool Heat Exchanger Hoists
[
Tag. No.: CPX-MEMHCH-69,70 l
I IMPACT AREA Area directly below Spent Fuel Pool Heat Exchanger Hoist (description)
Fuel Building Rooms 240 and 240 A.
HAZARD ELIMINATION IDADS SAFE 7fY-RELATED EQUIPMENT
-ELEVATION CATEGORY Spent Fuel Spent Fuel Pool Heat Cooling Pump Exchanger and Piping 810'-6" Note B Spent Fuel Spent Fuel Pool Heat Cooling Motor Exchanger and Piping Spent Fuel Spent Fuel Pool Heat Heat Exchange Exchange, Pump, and 1.
Shell Piping 2.
Tube Bundle Concrete Floor Spent Fuel Pool Heat Plugs Exchange, Pump, and Pipings
~
CPSES TABLE A-6 (Sheet 10 of 18)
CPSES Load / Impact Area Matrix Crane:
Residual Heat Removal Heat Exchanger and Containment Spray System Heat Exchanger Hoist Tag. No.: CP 1 & 2-MEMHCH-47, 59 IMPACT AREA Area directly below load path of Residual Heat Renoval (description)
(RHR) and Containment Spray Heat Exchanger Hoists. Rooms 68 aml 69.
HAZARD ELIMINKI'IUN LOADS SAFETI-RELATED EQUIPMENT ELEVATION CATEGORY Containment Spray Hoist RHR Heat Exchanger and 790'-10" Note B 1.
Shell Body Piping 2.
Tube Bundle RHR Hoist RHR Piping 790'-10" 1.
Shell Body 2.
Tube Bundle Compartment RHR Heat Exchanger and 790'-10" Concrete Floor Plugs 1
CPSES TABLE A-6 (Sheet 11 of 18)
CPSES Inad/ Impact Area Matrix Crane:
Main Steam Safety Valves Hoist Tag. No.: CP 1 & 2-MEMHCH-48, 49, 50, 51 IMPACT AREA Area directly below the Main Steam Safety Valves Hoist.
(description)
Safeguards Building Room 109.
HAZARD ELIMINATION IDADS SAFETY-RELATED BOUIPMENT ELEVATION' CATEGORY Main Steam Main Steam Safety Valves 873'-6" Note B Safety Valves
CPSES TABLE A-6 (Sheet 12 of 16)
CPSES Inad/ Impact Area IMtrix Crane:
Service Water Intake Stop Gate Hoist Tag. No.: CPX-MEMHCH-61 IMPACT AREA Area directly below the Service Water Intake Stop Gate (description)
Hoist. Roon 274 (lower elevation of Service Water Structure)
HAudD ELIMitMl'IUN IDADS SAFETY-RELATED EQUIPMENT ELEVATION-CATECDRY Service Water Service Water Pump Shaft 755' Note B Pump Compartment Stop Gates l
CPSES TABLE A-6 (Sheet 13 of 18)
CPSES Load / Impact Area Matrix Crane:
Service Water Traveling Screen Hoist and JIB Crane Tag. No.:
CPX-MEMHCH-12 and CPX-SWEHSG-01 1
IMPACT AREA (description)
Area directly below Service Water Traveling Screen Hoist HAZARD ELIMINATION LOADS SAFETY-RELATED EQUIPMENT ELEVATION CATEGORY Misc. Parts, Service Water 810'-6" Note B and Note C Trays, Chains Traveling Screens Etc.
I
~
TABLE A-6 (Sheet 14 of 18)
~
CPSES Ioad/ Impact Area Matrix Crane:
Auxiliary Filter Hoist (S-F-P)
Tag. No.: CPX-MFR MR-04A IMPACT AREA Area directly below the open hatch at el. 852'-6".
(description)
'Ihis area is located at elevation 810'-6".
('Ihis hoist services only the east side of Ibom 234).
HAZARD ELIMINATION IIEDS SAFETY-RELATCD EQUIPMENT ELEVATION CATDOORY Spent Filter Unit 1 & 2 Transfer Cask Train "A" and Train "B" 785'-6" of Note A (App. wt. 5 ton)
Service Water Inlet /
Auxiliary Discharge Piping Bldg.
~
TABLE A-6 (Sheet 15 of 18)
CPSES Ioa3/ Impact Area Matrix Crane:
Auxiliary Filter Hoist Tag. No.: CPX-MEMHhR-04 i
IMPACT AREA (description)
Area directly below the tronorail.
('Ihis hoist services only the west side and south side of Ibom 234).
HAZARD ELIMINATION IDADS SAFETY-REIATED SQUIPMENT ELEVATION-CATEGORY Spent Filter Radioactive filters 852'-6" Note C Transfer Cask cavity is directly (App. wt. 5 ton) below the tronorail
CPSES TABLE A-6 (Sheet 16 of 18)
~
CPSES Ioa3/ Impact Area Matrix
~
Crane:
Residual heat removal ptmp hoists Tag. No.: CP1 & 2 - MEMHCH-08, 09 I
IMPACT AREA p
(description)
Area directly below the nonorail (Rm 264)
I HAZARD ELIMINATION IDADS SAFETIY-RELATED EQUIPMENT ELEVATION CATECDRf RHR pump Train "A" and Train "B" and its equipment 773' tbte B associated Piping
CPSES TABLE A-6 (Sheet 17 of 18)
CPSES IDad/ Impact Area Matrix
~
Crane:
Miscellaneous ibist Tag. No.: CPX-MEMHCH-72 I
IMPACT AREA (description)
Area directly below the nonorail (Rn 264)
HAZARD ELIMINATION
)
IDADS SAFETIY-RELATED EQUIPMENT ELEVATION CATE(DRf Spent fuel pool Train "A" and Train "B" Cooling pump spent fuel pool cooling 838'-9" Note B Inlet isolation piping valve
~
TABLE A-6
~
(Sheet 18 of 18)
~
Notes for Hazard Elimination Category Note A: Single-failure-proof hoist is provided for hardling of heavy loads.
Note B: System redundancy and horizontal physical separation precludes loss of the system's capability to perform it safety-related function following the load drop in this area.
Note C: Ioad drop analysis was performed and resulted in ro design change to the plant structure.,
Note D: See load drop analysis shown in Table A-5 and discussed on page A-22.
umme mune 1
J 1
i L_,J i
t CPSES TABLE A-7 (Sheet 1 of 6)
SUMMARY
OF PRIMARY DIFFERENCES BETWEEN CONTAINMENT POLAR CRANES AND NUREG-0554 RECOMMENDATIONS Analysi s Report NUREG-0554 Item Recommendation (Note 1)
Difference l
"2.4 Material Properties 2.4.1 All critical structural members of CPSES Polar Cranes 2.4.2 were fabricated with ASTM A-36 or equivalent (ASTM A-572,
"... In order to ensure resistance to brittle GR B). The crane structural members were proportioned to i
fracture, materials for structural members give comparable design factors. Because the minimum l
essential to structural integrity should be tested operating temperature in the Containment Building is 50 F, the crane manufacturer (KRANCO) does not anticipate 0
in accordance with the following impact test requirements. Either drop weight test per ASTM any brittle fracture to occur on the crane structural E-208 cr Charpy tests per ASTM A-370 may be used members. Therefore, neither drop weight tests nor Charpy for impact testing.
V-Notch impact testing was required by the Specification.
"The minimum operating temperature based on the drop weight test should be obtained by the following procedures in paragraph NC-2300 of Section III of the ASME Code. The minimum operating temperature based on the Charpy V-notch impact test should be obtained by following the procedures in paragraph ND-2300 of Section III of the ASME Code.
"These toughness recommendations were developed at a time when typical material section thickness for crane girders was a maximum of 51 mm (2 in).
However, later information indicates that material thickness of 102 mm (4 in) or more may be.needed for some applications. The rules for ASME Code Class 3 charpy testing do not make any adjustments
umme t_J i
i i
i CPSES
{
i TABLE A-7 (Sheet 2 of 6)
SUMMARY
OF PRIMARY DIFFERENCES BETWEEN CONTAINMENT POLAR CRANES AND NUREG-0554 RECOMMENDATIONS l
Analysi s l
Report 1
NUREG-0554 Item l
_ Note 1)
Difference
(
(
Recommendation l
for thicknesses greater than 64 mm (21/2 in), and for this reason it is felt that the NC-2300 and ND-2300 requirements give equivalent requirements only for the smaller thicknesses.
"For thicknesses over 64 mm (21/2 in), it is recommended that the NC-2300 requirements be used exclusively."
"2.4 Material Properties 2.4.4 See the response to Analysis Report Items 2.4.1 and 2.4.2 above.
It should be noted that during construction the
... However, it may be impractical to perform a crane received a 499 ton load test at ambient toughness test for cranes that have progressed too tempera ture, far in the manufacturering sequence or for cranes already built and operating. Such cranes should therefore be tested by subjecting the crane to a test lif t at the lowest anticipated operating temperature.
It is desirable to include the crane manufacturer in the planning of the test....
"As an alternative to the above recommendations, the crane and lif ting fixtures for cranes already fabricated or operating may be subjected to a cold proof test consisting of a single dummy load test as follows: Metal temperature of the structural members essential to the structural integrity of
m m
\\
1 t
_1 1
1 CPSES l
TABLE A-7 (Sheet 3 of 6)
SUMMARY
OF PRIMARY DIFFERENCES BETWEEN CONTAINMENT POLAR CRANES AND NUREG-0554 RECOMMENDATIONS I
Analysi s Report NUREG-0554 Item Recommendation (Note 1)
Difference l
l l
the crane handling system should be at or below the minimum operating temperature. The corresponding i
dummy load should be equal to 1.25 times the MCL.
l If the desired minimum operating temperature cannot be achieved during the test, the minimum operating temperature should be that of the test until the crane is retested at a lower temperature. The cold proof test should be followed by a nondestructive examination of welds whose failure could result in the drop of a critical load. The nondestructive examination of critical areas should be repeated at 4-year intervals or less."
"2.8 Welding Procedures 2.8.2 The Specification did not require postweld heat-treatment (stress-relief) for structural weldments. According to
" Problems with welding of low-alloy steels can the crane manufacturer (Kranco), postweld heat-treatment occur if the base metal temperature is not properly was not performed due to the very large member size, controlled during... the postweld heat treatment which was beyond the size of available furnance equipment at the time. Also, the design stress limit of structural assemblies per CMAA No. 70 takes into account the effect of additional stress from welding without thermal stress relieving. The purpose of any thermal stress relieving performed on crane components is to relieve any induced stresses prior to subsequent machining operations to prevent distortion, misalignment, etc., which could occur if the component is not stress relieved.
t__J t
i i
_1 CPSES TABLE A-7 l
l (Sheet 4 of 6)
SUMMARY
OF PRIMARY DIFFERENCES BETWEEN CONTAINMENT POLAR CRANES AND NUREG-0554 RECOMMENDATIONS l
Analysi s l
Report NUREG-0554 Item Recommendation (Note 1)
Difference
... postweld heat-treatment (stress-relief) temperatures for all weldments should be specified in the weld procedure.
" Welds described in the recommendations of Section 2.6 should be post weld heat treated in accordance with Subarticle 3.9 of AWS D1.1, " Structural Welding Code."
"4.3 Head and Load Blocks 4.3.5 The dual load path hook received a 499 ton load test prior to construction use of the crane. The load
"... A 200% static-type load test should be equalizing system assured that each load path equally performed for each load-attaching hook."
shared the load. Therefore, each load path was statically loaded to 249.5 tons, which corresponds to a 167% static-type load test.
"... Measurements of the geometic configuration 4.3.6 Measurement of the geometric configuration of the hooks of the hooks should be made before and af ter the were not made before and after the load test. Based upon the substantial over design inherent in the hooks, it is test..
not considered necessary to retest them just to verify that their geometric configuration does not change before and after the test.
"... The load blocks should be nondestructively 4.3.9 According to the crane manufacturer (Kranco), the upper examined by surface and volumetric techniques."
4.3.10 block support was magnetic particle inspected. Based
a r i
t i
t i
CPSES l
TABLE A-7 (Sheet 5 of 6)
SUMMARY
OF PRIMARY DIFFERENCES BETWEEN CONTAINMENT POLAR CRANES AND NUREG-0554 RECOMMENDATIONS Analysi s Report NUREG-0554 Item l
Recommendation (Note 1)
Difference 1
I upon the conservatism in the design of the load block, no further nondestructive inspection of it is considered necessary.
"5.1 Braking Capacity 5.1.4 The Specification requires the bridge brakes to have 5.1.7 torque ratings equal to CMMA #70 requirements, as a
"... To avoid the possibility of drive motor minimum, and that they be capable of stopping the crane over-torque within the control system, the maximum within a distance of 5 feet when it is traveling at torque capability of the driving motor and gear maximum speed with the rated load and the trolley is at reducer for trolley motion and bridge motion of the maximum distance from the center of the span. CMAA #70 overhead bridge crane should not exceed the requires brake torque ratings from 50 to 100% of drive capability of the gear train and brakes to stop the motor torque, depending upon the crane configuration.
trolley or bridge from the maximum speed with the DRL attached."
... holding brakes should be rated at 100% of maximum drive torque that can be developed at the point of application.
i i
i i
i i
CPSES TABLE A-7 (Sheet 6 of 6)
StM4ARY OF PRIMARY DIFFERENCES BETWEEN CONTAINMENT POLAR CRANES AND l
NUREG-0554 RECOMMENDATIONS NOTE 1:
Meta Services, " Evaluation of the CPSES Containment Building Polar Cranes' Compliance with NUREG-0554 Requirements", Revision 1, dated December 15, 1982.
l l
l i o o tm u
l()() L )]
7a j
-~b
' ~ "
0 CONDENSER VACUUM PU5IP HOIST
~~
~
CPI-MEMHCH-25 g
CAPACITY: 4 TON a
g O)
C co -
m.
O O
o oo m:
0 HEATER DRAIN PUMP HOIST U
5 CPI - MEMHCH - 28 TUR8INE PLANT CODLING
,J CAPACITY: 4 TON a
hWB 1 CAPACITY' 6 TON
~~
y 7c L
U D
(Yl On
_nn (S f, -;'1
- l f X, f
-L_
c3 O
F inni
)
l V
V 1
1 1
i Plan at EL. 778'-0*
l (Basement Floor Plan) l l
t I
l
I Plan at Elevation 778'-O' Rm.# Rm.Name 5
Turtune Area h--J
j"/
6 Machine Room 6
JL 7
Oil Room 7a WaterTreatment Area 7b Fire Protectbn Valve Room Q
7c Fire Protection Valve Room l
b
,M ROL FLUID TANK HOIST
-MEMHCH-29
,;ACITY: 3 TON Hn
?RC A ?
R i a l-iF i"""
a 4
u_
=
s.. CARJ 7
l 1
Mso Availabic On Aperture Card u
7b COMANCHE PEAK S.E.S.
UNITS I and 2 TURBINE BUILDING
(
MISCELLANEOUS HolST FIGURE A-1 h 6 vts o N. % - o\\
(.
A
\\
l t
a e,!
L_
~'
STM. GEPERATC U
AND TURBINE I 1l]
b_
CPI-MEMHOC - C r--
Ir-(
a
@~
a
(..
10b a
==
~
R 8
\\
n X X v
qo o
9
_y O
=
o L-
. _l O
%)
__=
"W
?-
llllf l O II k g
I
[3
~
~
~
Plans at EL. 803'-
(Mezzanine Floor Plan [
1
s
-_ _ J Plans at EL. 803'-0" & EL. 810'-6" Rm.# Rm. Name 8
TurbineArea 9
TVR Room
[ --
10 Acidand Caustc Tank Area
'R FEED WATER PUMP 11 12 10a LubeOilReservoir Room
> RIVER CRANE
) CAPACITY: 10 TON 10b Stair No.T-2 g
11a EntryArea r-11b Stair No.T-1 23 14 h
- 1}3 -
12 Toilet Room 11 Lavatory
{p 13 Drying Room 15 14 Shower Room "n
15 LockerArea U
16 Corridor
_L(
17 Health Physicist Office 18 Corridor l
19 Toilet Room 20 Closet 16 Q
Q 21 First Aid Room 17 22 PersonnelDecontamination J-Room J
23 JanitorRoom 18 24 Open Area 33 Dressing Area Lq g QQ 32, 22 l
M l
20 v
l 33
=
'nC u w tr A?Ia7 Jag hem. 0 A R D 24 a
[ mn F ht I
T3 Also Available On h
W !
Aperture Card l
0 E
10s O
g t 33,l2 l
O
="
-l 3
i
~
I.
I COMANCHE PEAK S.E.S.
L1 U UNITS 1 and 2 BUILDINh TURBINE CR'NE i
f & 810'-6
~ f A
MISCELLANEOUS FGURE A-2 DDLODDD'
f 1
y a
a a
44
'I A
TT TURBINE BLDG GANTRY CRANE CPI-MESCTC-Ol o
no req CAPACITY: 210 (MAIN HOIST)
W W
50(AUX. HOIST)
-r w a;
.., p
//
H l
i
\\\\
=s,
l
' =E
3
= = =
C-Plan of Operating Floorat EL830 U 3
s, i
I 1
l
- /
l 1
1
l Plan of O 830'-0" perating Floorat Elevatiort
- 5l g
Rm.# Rm. Name QQ2.J
_X '47' 44 Stair No.T-2
- _JL.
46 48 Ventilation Airintake Room 48 t No T-1
[X][] B.
=
i l
l o
l L^
r
/
Ni
?RC OP A 3 E R-E C A R J g-t E
TM N L--
liso Available On M
[8) hperture Card M
__g-
==
COMANCHE PEAK S.E.S.
UNITS 1 and 2 l
f,'
TURBINE BUILDING TURB. BLDG. GANTRY CRANE FKiURE A-3 3DDQ\\
DN h '
]
t 84n 45 7
- g' : ;
!f
. n
,N gd
- [
r I
'e 2
I m
o I
iN
!I E
iEE b
iN
))
N TT SS I
I OO E
HH N
N A
I X.
.T R
AU C
MA
((
RA NN
, [P
- I O
TT L
OO E
P 1 50 MG ONT 0 72 DISL N T-1 TI OO NP AO-T EC:
T TH
/ MCY P1 N O R N ST E RM C:Y AI EI C
M M
R S A
N SOEIT T
I N-I P A SF MC 7 OPA 1
TET-A CCC 3l!
NCAI P OC LPA CAPCC 7
.7
\\
1/
D/
5N.
4 l
I i
,i l
i
'I i
8 0
i I
1 i
M ONg n
pOF a' C % _ID i
~
~r o
WC P
~
I
\\.
Safeguard Building F
T T
Rm.# Rm.Name 53 RHR Pump Room
~
~
g 57 Floor DrainTank Pump Room 61 Floor Drain Tank Room W
. ___j n
U 64 Chemical AdditiveTank Room 70 Corridor k
i i 1
- )
77 Radioactive Penetration Area 79 Corrid7r l
1 82 Corridor j
88 Piping Penetration Area
~
.E 94 Corridor l[--
p E
100a FeedWater Penetraton Area t
dl 108 Main Steam Penetration Area lr--
n L--
Containment Building 153 ReactorCavity
[-
. 4___,
gp g4) s e
3 154 Ground FloorLevel 155a Floor Levels
~.~
r
~
l lf
> I
,l Tg t
t g
l P
o Also Available On
[
d T1perture Card g
g l
2 W
F _
"t F-D L
E R
3 L
3 D.G 2 FUEL D.G l L
BLDG.
R.B.2 R. B. I g
0
\\
AL)x.
?
n
[
R O, 6 s.G.2 BLoG.
s.G. i l = " OWGR. l GR. C 3
3 7
g
-8 a
e a
1 L1-- O ti-- -
9 T. 8. 2 T.B. I g
\\
m trit k
l KEY PLAN I
In COMANCHE PEAK S.E.S.
I D
l UNITS 1 and 2 o
45 CONT. & SAFEGUARD BLDG.
so $
POLAR CRANE AND
$Q ROTATING PLATFORM HOIST. I j
FIGURE A-4 ThDb%CN b
-D J
i Dh i
/
l 153 AUX. FEED WATER I (MOTOR DRIVEN)
CPI-hEMHCH - 13,14
}
CAPACITY. 4 TON rJ
/
0a0 I a Od3
~
!/,
i i
O 72
-AUX.FW PUMP HOIS1 g
63 64(
)
[
f UME DNO 65 Il J
CPI-MEMHCH -12 l
~
~
W
~
O
" [,
CAPACITY: 3 TON L
J M
7j 73 l
CiB kh &
~'
O s u ZDi j[
[
g O ss o o e9 O 74 O
_;I I ; _i r-EQUIPMENT HATCH HOIST CPI-MEMHCH-45 CAPACITY: 4 TON I
Plan at EL 790'-6*
3RC
-i o+-
AP R~~JRE i
i C A'R J I:
I
l t
Primary Plant - Unit 1 Containment
& Safeguard Buildings Plan at Elevation 790'-6*
RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL Rm.# Rm.Name Dh PUMP HOISTS 63 ValveIsolationTank Room 64 Chemical AdditiveTank Room CP 1& 2-MEMHCH-08*09 65 ValveisolationTank Room CAPACITY: 3 TON 66 Valve Room 67 Valve Room 68 RHR& Containment Spray Heat t-[1" ExchangerRoom
_.a t
6 H
H H
69 RHR& ContainmentSpray Heat I
I g
1 Exchanger Room s,
,, s
=
=
l
=
70 Conidor p_
51 54 71 Corridor
,,I 7
I,,
g
=
72 Motor Driven Auxiliary m
Feedwater Pump Room 56 73 MotorDrivenAuxiliary
~h) 59 Feedwater Pump Room 55 r
74 Turbine Driven Auxiliary s
s 61 Feedwater Pump Room 153 RemCaWty 60
-0
=-
62 Plan at EL 773'-0*
Primary Plant - Unit 1 Containment
& Safeguard Buildings WMP HOIST Plan at Elevation 773'-0*
51 ContainmentSpray Pump Room Dh 52 RHR Pump Room 53 RHR Pump Room 54 Containment Spray Pump Room 55 Stairwell 56 Comdor Dh 57 Floor DrainTank Pump Room 58 C.C.W. Drain Tank Room 59 Stairwell 60 Safetyinjection Pump Room
~
61 FloorDrainTank Room 62 Safetyinjection Pump Room Primary Plant - Unit 1 Containment a
iF i
i
& Safeguard Buildings Partial Plan at EL 785'-6*
~
~
62e 62f 63a ElectricalChase 62b ElectricalChase g,ii-ai
,g, 62c PipeTrench 62d Pipe Trench 62e Radoactive Pipe Tunnel I
h-62f Radoactive, Pipe Tunnel 21 !
Ull2 1
.i i F-I O ni i __
Also AvaHable On Partial Plariat EL 785'-6*
' perture Card A
COMANCHE PEAK S.E.S.
UNITS I and 2 CONT. & SAFEGUARD BLOG.;
MISCELLANEOUS HolST I
FOURE A-5 5
3DD bGO N(o ~~ O 5
e
\\
Db t
~
O_ _
O C
_f+__%._
.s
=
4 C
7
~-!!
O N
a 4
]
~
155 c
s llllll V
g Partial Plan at EL. 822'-9" (containment Building only) 54 7
'O O
i r
r Q
O k-.__O 77
{-
g r i e i
]
68 l
l 69 q.
[]'
[
.2 78 Partial Plan at EL. 800'-6" (Safeguard Buildin nly) 79 s
t r
L_s- -
f '
1 n
q I
'l gj i O 68 O Ol x
_hi 1 r J
86 85b LET D<
8 EQUP. HATCH HOIST SEALy s
CPt-MEMHCM-46 HX.HO
=
l g7 CAPACITY: 4 TON m.g i
q
~
_I O I.
t lana Partial Plan at EL 821'-0" (Safeguard Building Only)
Dh l
i
)
i Plan at Elevations 808'-0" & 810'-6" Q
_l Rm.# Rm. Name 68 RHR & Containment Spray Heat i
Exchanger Room 4
69 RHR & Containment Spray Heat 154 Exchanger Room 77 Radioactive Penetration Area Q
g 78 Sample Room 79 Corridor 80 Valve Room 81 Letdown Heat Exchanger Partial Plan at EL. 819'-6" tcontainment suildeas only) g g
[/
k 84 Diesel Generator Room 83 Electrical Equipment Area k
]-
85 Diesel Generator Room 156 Q
4 85a H&V Equipment Room W_
i}=
85b Stair No. S-1
'O 85c Stair No. S-5 e
.1,. "2 O
85c 154 Corridor 156 Incore Instrumentation Area O
p
/
Partial Plan at Elevation 821'-0"
//
0 86 vaive operating Room
/
Q 87 SealWater Heat Exchanger Room O
O
"}
Partial Plan at Elevation 800*-6"
-O 0
7s vaive operating Room 76 Valve Operating Room 83
)
Partial Plan at Elevations 822'-9" Q
& 819'-6" I
0 77 0
iss vaive Room E
D 3t0
[_
~
80 c-CARJ m
g psO SO asa
~g L
_ la,,3 i
~
m Also Available 01 gDESEL GENERATOR Aperture Card
>WN HK AND L,
>TER
'ST PISTON HotST l
b.t5 CAPACITY: 11/2 ton r,
CPI-hEMHCH-37,38 CAPACITY: 1 TON t
t EL. 808'-0" and 810'-6" COMANCHE PEAK S.E.S.
UNITS 1 and 2 CONT. & SAFEGUARD BLDG. !
MISCELLANEOUS HOISTS L
FIGURE A-6 3
3D 4ND DV D L
\\
(
D I
I I
QI i
Ir P 161a
\\
e 'o
(
}
,L 1581]
/,
i Partial Plan at EL. 842'-0" (Containment Building Only)
(
\\ r, x
h t
T
- g
=F J l eq a
s 155a s'
Partial Plan at EL. 849'-0" O
O C
(Containment Building Only) r gg i
I J
E
'lj a
( 97 90 a
98
.[
5k i
g g:!!!
h i
u
(
9's l
Partial Plan at EL. 841'-6"
- C
.i O O
O (Safeguard Building Only) lRHR HX. AND CSSJ MODERAt HX. ItOIST LETDOE h.
CPI-ME M H CH -47, 59 CPI-C I
%./
l CAPACITY
- 10 TON CAPACl?
lI Plans a3
,AD f
I
A
.i 3
i I
C
^
REF Ut. LING MACHINL f'
)
TBX-FHSCMC-Ol 4
i e,
CAPACITY: 2 TON
/
ISSa
~
g b
7
-Q
.miw_
f (Partial Plan at EL. 871'-6" d
m_ _
Containment Building Only) e CONTAINMENT FUEL
[
j [l-HANDLING BRIDGE CRANE
]
r CPI-MEMHCH-01 M
s CAPACITY: 1 TON
~~
l I
7
+4 155a Partial Plan Partial Plan
/<,
at EL. 853'-6" at EL. 886'-0"
[
-i fl t i s\\
_ _ _ s.
(
t/5 3'
7 1614 16 t'a ;
g :-
l c.
q 300 1D(
_.l
~B b.a Partial Plan Partial Plan L_____.
at EL. 870'-6" at EL. 884'-0"
~
l l
f 101f l
N l
N
~
=;rry i
l (LLA r 2 -
[.
8 F
' g _.
Plan at EL. 852'-6'
?
h A O
\\
1 l
)
A I
T I
O O
O C
(bo w
O
'h
~
- -x*
~
j
' N
, N~-
~,g/
~
[-MAIN STEAM SAFETY VALVES HOIST j
CPI-MEMHCH-48,49, 50,5I CAPACITY
- 1 TON g-e
=
=
e (TYR OF 4) e e
e 108 107 a
i!
A L. 2, to!,
__r 110 Nk
~
Ch' ll u
u u
u b b,,
~
Partial Plan at EL. 880'-6" 106 AD 1
i
l
}
4
'D O,
i
(
N
.)
246a g
161a Plan of Containment Dome Platform 1
at EL.1000'-6"
'N 2 D q
h 111 E
_]
AUX. UPPER CRANE 3-
- .:. SAFE LOAD AREA
"' (WITH REACTOR VESSEL HEAD INSTALLED)
, __ : _ ::.=
Plan AUX. UPPER CRANE SAFE LOAD AREA (WITH REACTOR VESSEL HEAD REMOVED)
\\
A ND I
Plans at Elevations 905'-9",
L REACTOR VESSEL STUDS HolST 896'-4" & 1000'-6" I
I _*
CPI-MEMHJC - Ol Rm.# Rm. Name
.N, 112 Stair No. 8-1 CAPACITY: t/2 TON 111 Emergency Airlock Access
\\
160 Operating Room 160 160 Valve Room 161a Pressurizer Compartment 246a Penthouse
\\
Q nw/on,s
~ f j $.
e DR
^
- - =
160 o/
?R0 CONTAINMENT AUX. UPPER 3-
~~
~
~
~
CRANE
- = = = - '
C PI-M E S C C A-OI L
_;[
CAPACITY: 5 TON f.
t E
Igh,o Avana TIApetture i:A D 7
p at EL. 905'-9" & 896'-4" l
l COMANCHE PEAK S.E.S.
UNITS 1 and 2 CONT. & SAFEGUARD BLDO.
CONT. AUX. UPPER CRANE AND VESSEL STUDS HOISTf FGJRE A-lO f
OhOLMWG~ Lt>
6 I
s i
,.. : : :.1 J
f:
V
' ' fi
.. :e:o
- a 3
!!X y
- ii::::::. s \\
s I
..g.:.=.gf 246a 161a Plan of Containment Dome Platform
'N at EL.1000'-6"
\\N s
4*
L$b
%L l
~.
111 I
3 1
POLAR CRANE AND CONTAINMENT y2~
ACCESS ROTATING PLATFORM HOIST SAFE LOAD AREA.
Plan
\\c SAFE LOAD AREA ONLV WHEN b.\\
SPENT FUEL 15 NOT STORED IN THIS AREA.
i ll t
- i
s i
h c.!E......i.
'N
- 7 y
j f h,ggj 2Aba N.
Plan of Containment Dome Platform "O
at EL.1000'-6*'
~
s J D L
+;:p 7
(
111 I
POLAR CRANE AND CONTAINMENT 2
ACCESS ROTATING PLATFDRM 3
HolST SAFE LOAD AREA.
.L
^
~
.% SAFE LOAD AREA QNLY WHEN
~ REACTOR VESSEL HEAD IS INSTALLED.
't
% SAFE LOAD AREA QNLY WHEN P'**
k
- SPENT FUEL IS NOT STORED IN THIS AREA.
r--
e i
E A'
El
~e - - - -
SPENT FUEL POOL HX. HOIST
.[
C PX - M E M H C H - 4 3,4 4
[]
h]
i CAPACITY: 8 TON o a MISC. HOIST
'264
~
265 268 CPX-MEMHCH-72 e CAPACITY: 2 TOk -
lgJ y-N 271a l
I s
\\
263a 266 I
i i
I O
L J
271 I
7 260 gjg N7, l
l A
258 I
I
]
I 267 k) 73
]i L_
1 F
Plan at EL. 838'-9" & 841'-O' Y
\\
1 j
1 l
4 T
l 1
i el i
F h
E I
i 4
- t___
l O
C 272a FUEL HANDLING BRIDGE CRANE TBX-FHSCFB-Ol CAPACITY: 2 TON O
s r
,l
,(
1 g
j,,
3 00n00 N
j nonno
/.
26,0 266 259
/
s omon Df
.10 omon
{
i onoOO
/
C EI]OOO 1
Lygf 3
)
Oh rQ
'~
b d]
fa Plan at EL 860'-0" AE T
9 i
I 2
)
TE I
i t
- i:3j:!
~~
j M.. h. b..b. N..b...b..b...$. h.E..k...h. NMN
]
_ f 272a I
ig g i g g e r:.:0: D:0:
g s
p 8.
?
' MM Eti m
/,
\\3
't
-:isd::'
259
(
260 QCl y C}
50 maa 0/..
\\
Li:1313a
..........!!d.....
i EL. 3.0E]E3 us?-- 'bst g;;;;;:::-
,u l 1, J i
in
=
3e Plan at EL. 860'-0" AE 3
l l
FUEL BUILDING OVERHEAD CRANE SAFE LOAD AREA.
I 1
/
t
TE I
l Plan at Elevation 860'-0"
~
Rm.# Rm. Name 259 Spent Fuel Pool No.1 260 Spent Fuel Pool No. 2 266 Wet Cask Loading Area 272 Operating Floor Level 272a Open Space Plan at Elevation 899'-6" Z
i 273 Stair No. F-2 C
.)
l
.==
l c,
\\\\
h_-.
l_
~
J Plan at EL 899'-6" f Avanahic on hperture Card JE 3RC A?ER
_RE l
k CAU l
COMANCHE PE AK S.E.S.
UNITS 1 and 2 FUEL BUILDING l
FUEL BLDG. OVERHEAD CRANE SAFE LOAD AREA I
FGURE A-15 SACh( i% D\\ D 1
i 1
7 El f
3 UNIT 2 g
7 y
UNIV U"
O on 1 3 x
(
E.t-Ov 166 3
162
/
'S a '.is2
\\
, _.]
ies j-)O h
s
,/
,7 s
b I
,/
[_
i7e r
/
0 0000 lJ 0
[
rY i,s 7e8 1=r
,=l
=t 1=i 17701 ooco F-O S
{ 973 O []y O
g.
O84 o
c-O
[]
o
[-
g n'
rL0 178 5
J E
17' O
[
181 181 0
179 Q
~
e o
O t
.a o
=
y a
u
=
a O
k 180
'I
~~' '
1
'I g
w w
s _ x s
- SAFI
~~
C PI-2nE CAPI c,
g vg-g
,3
[
=_
C';
A o
o O
a v
a c
o_
a
_a i
i ~.
~
115a
'3 v
v 115b l
o-o
=a i
0 g
m O
Od'O g["5 9-
%r io i
l 1
i Plan at EL. 778'-0" & 790'-6" 3
L A ? 'E R~lR E CARJ t
l
i Plan ct El:v:tions 778'-0" & 790'-61 AUX. STEAM CONDENSATE COOLER HolST Rm.O Rm.Nime 1
CPX.- M E M HC H - 60 114 Chemical Feed Eq pment &
CAPACITY - l TON Chemeal Storage oom 115 Secondary Sampling Room 115a Chiller Equ,ipment Area 115b Chiller Equipment Area 162 Valve and Piping Area 163 Blowdown S nt Resin
-i 0
0m Stora e Ta Room I
I
. _. 117 I 164 Blow n Spent Resin l
11 6 I
Sluice Pump Room sQ 165 Reverse Osmosis Package Rwm 11 8 119 166 Valve and Pi Area Il U
E!
167 Waste Hold-k Room M-168 Valve Room 169 Waste Evaporator Feed 120 121 Pump Room
,S)
+
170 Recycle Eva ator Feed r
12 2 ;
,125
~
Pump (No.2 Room II I
l l
_ __.}
II 171 Valve Room a
l 123 124 l
172 Recycle Eva ator Feed Pump (No.1 Room 128 127 c-173 Chemical Drain Tank Room 3I{t 174 Laundry Hold Up Area
[pr
[l
5 []
175 Component Cooling Water 3
Heat Exchanger Room
=
=
s' 126 12 9 N 176 Floor DrairlTank Room dI[
H 177 Floor Drain Tank Pump Room 5;
13C
_ f 91 178 Waste MonitorTank Pump Room
]
Partial Plan at EL 792'-0" 181 Recycle Hold-UpTank Room 182 Auxillary Steam Drain Tank
- TY RELATED CHILLER HolST Equipment Room EMHCH-04A g
184 Waste MonitorTank No.1 8
hk On Room g N erture CITY : 3 TON P
Car rl185 Waste Monitor Tank No. 2 Room Partial Plan at EL 792'-0" l
116 Battery Room #2-2 117 Battery Room #1-2 118 UPS & Distribution Rooms, 119 Train 'B' 120 UPS & Distribution Rooms, Tr' in 'A' 121 a
122 Corridor 5
123 Battery Room #2-1 124 Battery Room #1-1 2
l 125 Corridor 126 UPS & Distribution Rooms l
127 Battery Room #1-3 128 Baney Room $2-3 l
129 Train 'C' 130.131 Stairways i
COMANCHE PEAK S.E.S.
UNITS 1 and 2 AUXILIARY & CONTROL BLDG.
MISCELLANEOUS. HOISTS l
j
I UNIT 2 r188
. r ' 89~
r 0
255[
]
190 191 i,
O
/
l ll C
I
\\
207
.g.
pi 7
s 210 1G C 105 O
M~
397 198
- M D g' r
{-
196 U--
o g
]
~~
n C
C d
__n 202
[
203 t
C n
a
~~
~~
206 204
,205 {
E 207a "Pa C'/ca i:
ca I
I I
C d
(
2 p 7 COMPONENT COOLING WATER PUMP c PX-MEM H C H- 01 207 CAPACI T Y : 4 TON g
O O
IJ O
O 134 133 O
O 1 1 O
O O
-1,-
n
'n-O L
E I
b si 3-e e
'b ii Plan at EL. 807'-0" & 810'-6" A>
R URE
.CARJ f
I
\\
i
- POSITIVE DISPLACEMENT CHARGING PUMP HOIST Plan at Elevations 807'-0" & 810'-6"
' UNIT 1 C PI-M E M H C H - 0 3 Rm.# Rm. Name C APACITY : 6 TON 1.33 Cable Room 134 Cable Room p
134a Stair No. EC-1 l
134b Stair No. EC-2 f
J 188 Floor Drain Waste Evap.
l Package Room
\\
208 189 Waste Evaporator Room N
190 Waste Evaporator Control Room ll 191 Spent Resin Sluice Pump K
1 Room Partial Plan at EL. 822'-0" 192 Spent Resin Storage Tank
, c: m CENTRIFUGAL CHARGING Room PUMP HOIST 193 Boron Recycle Evaporator
!b CPI-M EMH CH-Ol. 02 Package Room 194 trifugalCharging Pump 1
CAPACITY : 4 TON g
195 Centrifugal Charging Pump a
a 209 Room
~
196 Positive Displacement F
Charging Pump Room j
197 Component Cooling Water Partial Plan at EL. 822'-0" Pump Room M
198 Component Cooling Water 199 Positive Displacement
?
Charging Pump Room l
d 200 CentrifugalCharging Pump Room foist 201 Centrifugal Charging Pump Room l
r1 202 Valve Room adi 203 Valve Room
_]
204 Component Cooling Water l
Pump Room 205 Component Cooling Water i
Pump Room 1
206 Boric Acid Storage Tank Room l
207 Corridor L
207a Recycle Hold-Up Tank Room 255 Filter Drop Area Partial Plan at Elevation 822'-0" 208 Operating Valve Room Partial Plan at Elevatiori822'-0" i
209 Operating Valve Room Also Availasic n,
! Aperture Car J
!L l
~
COMANCHE PEAK S.E.S.
UNITS 1 and 2 r
AUXILIARY & CONTROL BLD G.
MISCELLANEOUS HOISTS (
FIGURE A-17 l-l DOb\\.hGN V O '
/
2
}
1EI UNIT 2 210 241 X si 2i0 R
ea o
o o
O O. O O
O o
o o
=
2i2 oo oo o o
o o
o oo go g
c 213
=
7L_____
=
216 O
o 2 77 O
O 218
..a 219 -
I l
l l
v r,
q' h2d O
22rl r 2
207a 207a j_
223 224 E ::
.O
' L
~
/pl..
" 't
=:
C t
ME GAS COMPRESSOR HOIST b b H2 RECOMBINER HOIST CPX-ME MHCH - 05 CPX-MEMHCH-07
[
C APACITY : 1 TON 226 CAPACITY : 1 TON C
%i i-u EE EE b
b b
]b O
O O
0 0
!>1 !
li ! i !
~
b 135
'r 7
iii i s't T
m 145 3 i=== q c
=-'r Et=r-
= c=C i
n i I I I 139 141
- 14 3 gg j q 34k 14 6 147 136 137
=
=
ijg
,142 14 4
=
J Plan at EL. 830'-0" & 831'-6" A3ER~~LRE CAR 3 i
i
e I
A E,
i DC 3
3.t UNIT 2
/
ri n o r-,
3 Q
UN!'
AUX FILTERS HolST I
MjAil-JOLi-A LJ L-OUU
\\\\
CPX-ME M H W R -04 A CAPACITYi 8 TON O
O O
O O
i t
/
(;
M!
/
L_ __
l 1!
i
~
y O
O O
O O
O
/
0
-ln r7mI 11 Inn
~ - - '
1T nnnng 19l t_J L.J L_B.
11 it__JL J
_ u tJ u o L a 1;.
m 3
0
~
O
~
[
O l
Q 239 a
a
-)
O 0 090_0 U
s
.i O
O O
241 t
x t
_b
\\
i cff Ib
{
_EiF
)
~~
m.L O
Il O
.u-b 150 150a
.y l
l 2L a
- r-J
_ t.,
152a X
, c-(
r
_a 152k
~ ~ ~ ~
151a 151b i
i Plans at EL. 852'-6" & 854'-4" r
I 1
e 1
Rm.# Rm.Name Plan at Elevations 852'-6" & 854'-4" 150 Mechanical Equipment Room
- LOAD L AYDOWN AREA 150a Mechanical Equipment Room 151 Mechanical Equipment Room
-- DEMINERALIZERS HOIST 151a Mechanical Equipment Room CPX-MEMHWR-05 151b MechanicalEquipment Room C APACITY : 8 TON 152 Stair No. EC-2 152a Stair No. EC-2 4
234 Monorail Corridor AUX FILTERS HOIST 235 Valve Operating Area CPX-MEMHWR -04 238 Gas Decay Tanks' CAPACIT1r a 8 TON Compartment J
239 Valve Room
'E 240 Gas Decay Tanks' Compartment 241 Corridor a
242 Gas Decay Tanks Drain Pump Room
'\\
I ii Partial Plan at Elevation 862'-6" Rm.# Rm. Name 243 243 Valve Operating Room J,
J'
}
-, a y
'24A 3
=
'~
~
Partial Plan at EL. 862'-6" I,
1 LETDOWN CHILLER PACKAGE HOIST CPI-MEMHCH - 05 Also Available on CAPACITY: 2 TON Perture Card PRC A ?,r a i y,a y:
-4 CAR 3 COMANCHE PEAK S.E.S.
UNITS 1 and 2 AUXILIARY & CONTROL BLDG.
MISCELLANE0US HolSTS !
FIGURE A-19
?
DDk6C) My
- bO
a l
A
, EI N
17J bL_
244 C
C D
C O
[
l
_r r.
__r c
'N 8 V CHILLER [
,w I.
CPX-MEMHCH - l
.1- %
e",
,w, CAPACITY. I TOI U
~
O O
O O
O O
O
'"~~ Havi h
.1 CAPAC CPX-b 3
\\
I,G 1.
3I
[
['>< ]
[3-Il
[>1 I
[ > Cl
[ >r] 3 g
~
EQUIPMENT HATCH HOIST Plan at EL. 873'-6" C P X-M E M HC H -S 2 CAPACIT Y : 1 TON
[@@@@@a k
2 230 o
o o
O O
O O
O o
o o
n 212 p
00 10 0 O
O O
O O
OO 00 214 y,
__~
L-
=Q 232
{233 0B88888 o o FW1 o [518888E80 233a 233a 231 Partial Plan at EL. 842'-0" A E e
I
A 7EI Partial Plan at Elevation 842'-0" M
Rm.# Rm.Name 246 212 Piping Area 214 Piping Area 228 Filters 1
O O
C C
230 Valve and Pipe Gallery r7 231 Filters zw 232 Open Area 233 Open Area 233a Stair No. A-12 and No. A-13 IST Partial Plan at EL. 886'-6"
-EQUIPMENT HATCH HOIST Plan at Elevation 873'-6" CPX-MEMHCH-53 244 Mechanical Equipment Room
- E CAPACITY
- 1 TON 245 Mechanical Equipment Room 3
l HILLER HOIST Partial Plan at Elevation 888'-6" lEMHCH-09 246 Mechanical Equipment Room ITY: 6 TON l
t i
i l
1 f AvanaMc o l
S erture Card n
P
(
?30
~
)
k D - }
,} _Q.,
r 1
CARJ i
l l
l
\\
COMANCHE PEAK S.E.S.
UNITS 1 and 2 AUXILIARY S CONTROL BLDG.
i
(
MISCELLANEOUS HolSTS j FIGURE A-20
(
Y Y -
'I M
[
surwP su Ptasp se Pump se Ptasp anDLtegp :
] sara e
L como taa#m W im a m *st ima#w"Isf Tua#m*t a'
. ogee an(A E
C
=emto o a=A luulP
.: M g'.
v mm ti oov s' i
.. utree.as> 44
- 7sEo,
-Ptmeans concam y
a an stan=.mi
-- M7 ocmam man sw P.
E i..,.
I lilllill3334111!!!illl!llHil
(_
\\.omo-.a
.amec mien vaanum 3GIE1m Multf@lMEEDO*4 2
L PLAN AT ELEVATION 810'-6" "E'fe)
...~e.
? ?,
'Id p
M eb N.
!5.nana
_M-- '-._x-f-._:ss--f..2x-7 ^^w"*'"
,,,,,,4 REts0wnKE rn.
500so.all ASWE 8 Am"IFT BOTTtBI ELTOW-W FLEL7M*-f LA00ER est SAFETY a.msorm cevict UP TO EL TMk#
FHIISM FL.EL.79540*
g, eaTE le00ST-tFMEMMC90 61 v.
.;t!
-e:
p.
.n g oF vnAvtume scaceae
,_g N
PLAN AT ELEVATION 755'-Cf COMANCHE PE AK S.E.S.
UNITS 1 and 2 SERVICE WATER INTAKE STRUCTURE BRIDGE CRANE AND i
SAFE t.OAD AREAS j
FOURE A-21
il 1ll111l EN REEE S.
U RN TC A E
C SR U
S RG C 2
TN K
SI B d
L1 A
n EE J
E a
KVE AAR P
1 TRU 2
E S
NTT 2
I C
H T
RR U A EE R I
C N
TT T N
U AA S E
A WW & A m
M EE G
.i O
CCT F
II S C
VVI RRO EEH r
SS g
=
L f,d
')
n(
i
=
I N.t I
m l;e'd kL.
I 3
- l I l
, i, 1
1 1
,l
,'i11 1111
,1 1
- ;;'li:
l C
l 6
a
.=
4
=
i
=.
s s
. t.
i 1
. o.
.u
.=
4 I
- u. t
.e n
c i.
e x-w u
b l
s n?
!l lIllIl l
TO SAFETY -REL ATED TO S AFETv - REL ATED TO ' SAFETY - RELATED TO S AF ETY - REL ATED E QUIPME N T TR AIN *1S*
E QUIPME N T TR AIN "l A
- EQUIPMENT TR AIN " 2 8 "
E QUIP MEN T TR AIN
- 2 A" di Jk JL Jk TO $CNtLN TO SCNtL N TO bCHL E N TO SCREEN b WASH PUM P WASH PUM P WASH PU M P WASH PUMP
~
6HV 1HV 2HV
~
2HV 4287 4286 428F 4288 l
W' N"
/\\
/N ESw-OOF xSw-OO6 ESw-028 l
, ISw 373 15w-374
_ sew-373 2Sw-374 l
l l L_A i
Sw PUMP Sw PUMP Sw PUMP SW PUM P TR AIN
- 18 "
TRAIN "lA*
T R AIN "tB*
TRAIN *tA*
COMANCHE PE AK S E.S UNITS 1 and 2 STATION SERVICE WATER SYSTEM SIMPLIFIED FLOW DIAGRAM FGURE A-23 1
wa-f+
a-1 t-
~
a
+
- ~
a n
m
-~,
2+
L--
+
i a
1 i
+
, ATTACHMENT B CPSES RESPONSE TO COMMENTS' GENERATED J
BY EG8G IDAHO, INC. CONCERNING.
THE CPSES LOAD HANDLING SYSTEMS 1
4 i
C A
4 4
~-ev-
.v
+
r,-~.y--,-
,m
-w
,,--,-..r.--.n,
.v,-
---m -,e
.w w w e.--,,
,--,, +w-.,-.w.,..-
-e,-e--+,-,,
CPSES RESPONSE TO NRC COMMENTS DATED MAY 20,1982 (REF.1)
Section 2.2.1 EGAG Evaluation: The lack of detailed " separation criteria" and other information such as drawings showing the relationship between crane coverage and location of safety equipment make evaluation of the licensee's statement dif ficul t.
TUGC0 Response:
A review of the CPSES plant arrangement has verified physical horizontal separation of Train A and Train B components. All Train A related components, system piping and electrical supplies are located in a separate room or compartment from Train B equipment and its associated components (see Attachment A, Section A.2.1.2 and Table A-2).
l B-1 l
CPSES Section 2.3.1 EG8G Evaluation: The licensee's response states that " safe load areas" have been developed for each crane, where applicable.
However, " safe load paths" for each heavy load have not yet been established.
EG8G feels that the idea of " safe load areas" is only partially sound. An extremely large load, if dropped, may have sufficient momentum to penetrate structural barriers that would contain a smaller
" heavy load". Thus a marked " safe load area" may induce a false sense of security.
The licensee should take steps to ensure that marked safety zones clearly indicate the maximum applicable safe load.
For overly large heavy loads, specific load paths should be marked across the safe zones.
The licensee has not indicated that safe load paths will be marked on equipment layout drawings, as specified in the guideline. The licensee has also failed to indicate that deviations from defined paths will require written alternatives approved by the plant safety review committee.
Since the development of safe load paths is not complete, a more thorough evaluation is not possible at this time.
TUGC0 Response:
Load drop calculations were utilized to establish safe load areas in the containment and the fuel building. These calculations demonstrated that no plant design changes were required.
B-2
CPSES l
Section 2.3.1 (continued)
In addition, all loads to be carried in these safe load areas will be maintained at the minimum practical height above the operating floor. All loads outside these safe load areas will be taken via the safest and shortest route to the safe load area.
The load will then be transported within the safe load area to its final destination.
All " safe load areas" and " safe load paths" will be identified by drawing.
Safe load paths will be defined in the CPSES maintenance procedure as attachments to load handling procedures. Procedures will be approved and handled in accordance with CPSES station procedures, as directed by the Station Operation Review Committee.
Deviation from this maintenance procedure or load path will be handled in accordance with procedures governing deviation or revisions of safety related procedures, as directed by the Station Operation Review Committee.
I r
B-3 l
l CPSES Section 2.3.1 (continued)
In addition, all loads to be carried in these safe load areas will be maintained at the minimum practical height above the operating floor. All loads outside these safe load areas will be taken via the safest and shortest route to the safe load area.
The load will then be transported within the safe load area to its final destination.
All " safe load areas" and " safe load paths" will be identified by drawing.
Safe load paths will be defined in the CPSES maintenance procedure as attachments to load handling procedures. Procedures will be approved and handled in accordance with CPSES station procedures, as directed by the Station Operation Review Committee.
Deviation from this maintenance procedure or load path will be handled in accordance with procedures governing deviation or revisions of safety related procedures, as directed by the Station Operation Review Committee.
i B-3
l l
CPSES Section 2.3.2 EG&G Evaluation:
The license has stated that procedures are being developed for loads carried outside of " safe load area s". The substance of these procedures are consistent with the requirements of NUREG-0612.
These procedures should be extended to include overlarge loads carried in " safe load areas". The procedures should be available for possible NRC review prior to plant operation.
TUGC0 Response:
For some heavy loads, it may be necessary to operate outside the safe load area and transport the load over or near plant shutdown or decay heat removal equipment or spent fuel. For these loads and all oversize loads, special precautions or procedures will be utilized with the purpose of minimizing the risk of a heavy load drop in these areas. The procedure will consist of load drop prevention measures, such as a list of required equipment, inspection, acceptance criteria for the movement of the load, sequence of steps, etc. These procedures will be available for NRC review.
B-4
CPSES Section 2.3.3 EG8G Evaluation: The licensee's statement contains insufficient information to determine compliance. The statement infers that procedures governing operator training, etc., are not complete at this time.
Sufficient information would be provided by verifying the implementation of such procedures.
TUGC0 Response:
Crane operators will be trained, qualified, and will conduct themselves in accordance with Chapter 2-3 of ANSI B30.2-1976 " Overhead and Gantry Cranes".
Procedures governing crane operator training qualifications and conduct will be available for NRC review prior to fuel load.
B-5
. ~. -
CPSES Section 2.3.4 EG8G Evaluation:
Guideline 4 states that all special lif ting devices involved with heavy load lif ts will comply with ANSI N14.6-1978, not just those devices used to handle spent fuel shipping containers. A review of the lif ting device and heavy load lists provided by the licensee indicates that the criteria of Guideline 4 should be met for at least the following devices:
(1)
Spent Fuel Cask Lifting Device; (2) Reactor Vessel Head Lif ting Rig; (3) Reactor Internals Lif ting Rig; (4) Failed Fuel Assembly Lif ting Tool.
EG8G has included item (4) above as we feel that a failed assembly is a special case not exempted by the definition of a " heavy load" contained in NUREG-0612, Section 1.2.
The criteria of Guideline 4 is more restrictive than that of ANSI N14.6 in that dynamic loads must be considered. Thus the licensee should ensure that ANSI N14.6, Section 3.2.1.1 is properly appended when applied to the special lif ting devices covered by the guideline.
1 The licensee should take all reasonable steps to ensure that item (1) above, when procured, meets the appended requirements of ANSI N14.6 as NRC approval of exceptions to required criteria is not insured.
B-6
CPSES Section 2.3.4 (continued)
TUGC0 Response:
(1)
As stated in our report, the lif ting device for spent fuel shipping casks has not yet been procured.
ANSI N14.6-1978 and the criteria of Guideline 4 in NUREG-0612 will be invoked when this lif ting device is obtained.
(2), A report, WCAP-10156 (Ref. 2), by Westinghouse (3) on reviewing the designs of Comanche Peak Reactor Vessel Internals and Reactor Vessel Head Lif ting Rigs to determine the acceptability of these devices to meet the criteria of NUREG-0612 and ANSI N14.6-1978 has been completed.
In conclusion, these rigs meet the intent of mentioned NUREG and ANSI standard for design, fabrication, assembly and operation, but do not meet all the specific load verification testing. The proposed alternate testing was included in Section 6 of WCAP-10156.
(4)
The failed fuel assembly lif ting tool has been deleted from Table 4 of Reference 3 because our review indicated that this tool is not required.
i B-7
CPSES Section 2.3.5 EGaG Evaluation: The licensee has only addressed ANSI B30.9 in the reply. Guideline 5 is more restrictive than ANSI B30.9 as the marking procedure is appended and the rated working load must be factored to account for dynamic effects.
TUGC0 Response:
Lif ting devices that are not specially designed for use with heavy loads, as defined by NUREG-0612, will comply with the guidelines of ANSI B30.9-1971. A visual inspection will be made of a sling prior to use and a documented periodic visual inspection will be performed on at least a yearly basis.
Sling ratings will be identified on the sling in terms of the static load, which produces the maximum static and dynamic load; (i.e., load x.005 x hoist speed + maximum static load). Where this restricts slings to use on only certain cranes, the slings will be clearly marked as to the cranes with which they may be used.
B-8
CPSES Section 2.3.6 EG8G Evaluation: The licensee's statement indicates that measures consistent with the requirements of Guideline 6 will be invoked. EG&G assumes that these measures will be implemented prior to fuel handling at the facility.
Procedures, inspection records, and other documentation should be retained and available for possible NRC review.
l TUGC0 Response:
ANSI B30.2-1976, Chapter 2-2, will be invoked with respect to crane inspections, test and maintenance.
With respect to Section 2-2.1.1.1 of ANSI B30.2, cranes located within containment will be inspected every scheduled refueling outage in accordance with the requirements of ANSI B30.2. This is necessary because periodic inspections during power operations are impractical due to high radiation levels in containment.
These measures will be implemented prior to fuel handling.
Procedures and inspection records will be retained and available for NRC review.
I B-9
CPSES Section 2.3.7 EG8G Evaluation:
EG8G has performed a cursory review of both CMAA 70-1975 and ANSI B30.2-1976, Chapter 2-1.
It is our belief that conformance to CMAA-70 does not give sufficient coverage of all topics contained in Chapter 2-1 of ANSI B30.2. The actual design of the cranes in question may meet the criteria of Chapter 2-1 as many of the criteria are based on sound engineering and safey practices; however, the licensee has supplied insufficient information to make this determination.
The licensee's exemption of crane 22, the Fuel Building Fuel Handling Bridge Crane, is questioned by EG8G. The licensee has supplied the weight of " fuel assembly and lif ting tool" for the Containment Fuel Handling Bridge Crane as 1,700 lbs. We have adopted this value as the minimum weight of a heavy load at the plant (see Section 2.1).
The largest load listed by the licensee for crane 22 is a " failed fuel assembly and lif ting tool" at 3,000 lbs. We feel that this failed fuel assembly is not equivalent to the " spent fuel assembly" used in the definition of
" heavy load" (NUREG-0612, Section 1.2), based on the information given.
If the licensee wishes to continue to pursue an exemption for crane 22, we suggest that a more thorough argument be supplied.
Based on the load information provided, EG8G feels that the Containment Fuel Handling Bridge Crane (crane 8), the Main Steam Safety Valves Hoist (crane
- 19) and the Containment Dome Access Rotating Platform Hoist (crane 21) may qualify for exemption to this B-10 l
l
CPSES Section 2.3.7 (continued) guideline based on the magnitude or loads carried and the " heavy load" definitions.
The licensee may wish to address exemption for these cranes.
Review of the load weights and crane capacity ratings provided by the licensee reveals two cranes with listed loads heavier than the listed capacity. The RHR Pump Hoist (crane 10) has a capacity of 40 tons indicated with a maximum load (RCP Pump and Lif ting Rig) of 43.7 tons.
In addition, six other cranes (numbers 9,13,15,16,17, and 24) have maximum loads equal to the rated capacity. The licensee needs to explain the apparent discrepancy concerning capacity ratings on cranes 10 and 14.
EG8G feels that cranes 9,13,15,16,17, and 24 may also be underrated when dynamic load effects are considered although we presently have insufficient information to support (or disprove) this position.
TUGC0 Response:
The term " heavy load" is defined in NUREG-0612 as a load whose weight is greater than the combined weight of a single spent fuel assembly and its handling tool. For CPSES,this weight is approximately 2,150 lbs.
Table 3 of Reference 3 has been revised to indicate that the design of load handling equipment complies with CMAA-70-1975 and ANSI B30.2-1967, as specified in the equipment specification.
(See Attachment A, Table A-3).
B-11
CPSES Table 4 of Reference 3 has been corrected to eliminate the discrepancies concerning rated capacity j
of cranes (numbers 22, 9, 10, 13, 15, 16, 17, and 24 l
of Reference 3) and their maximum loads.
(See Attachment A, Table A-4).
4 i
i l
4 B-12
CPSES References 1.
May 20, 1982 letter from B. J. Youngblood (Nuclear ' Regulatory Commission) to R. J. Gary (Texas Utilities Generating Company) providing the draf t technical evaluation report (by EG8G Idaho, Inc., dated March 1982) of the CPSES response to Enclosure 3 of NRC letter dated December 22, 1980.
2.
H. H. Sandner, " Evaluation of the Acceptability of the Reactor Vessel Head Lif t Rig, Reactor Vessel Internals Lif t Rig, Load i
Cell, and Load Cell Linkage to the Requirements of NUREG-0612",
WCAP-10156, October 1982.
3.
CPSES Response (March 1982) to Enclosure 3 of NRC Letter dated December 22, 1980.
B-13
. _ _. = _
f i
i l
l
?
f i
l.
t ATTACHMENT C i
CPSES PLANT' SPECIFIC DATA AND i.
- SLMMARY OF REGULATORY POSITIONS' FOR THE FUEL BUILDING OVERHEAD CRANE r
l f
1 e
5 E
I
__., _.. _ _ - _ _ _... -.-~ _,.. - _ _. _ _ _., __._.;.- - _ ___-.- _.._..__ _...... _ -- _ _ _., _.. ___..,. _ _..., _..__.-.__....._
CPSES TABLE C-1 (Sheet 1 of 8) j FUEL BUILDING OVERHEAD CRANE DATA (NOTE 1) i Ederer Topical Rsgulatory Report Position Section Information to be Provided Specific Crane Data j
C.1.a III.C (C.1.a) 1.
The actual crane duty classification 1.
The crane has a Class A-1 crane duty of the crane specified by the classification in accordance with 4
l appl icant.
CMAA Specification #70.
i C.1.b III.C (C.1.b) 1.
The minimum operating temperature 1.
The crane was designed and fabri-of the crane specified by the cated for a minimum operating i
applicant.
temperature of 40 degrees F.
1 C.2.h III.C (C.2.b) 1.
The maximum extent of load motion 1.
The crane was designed such that -
III.E.4 and the peak kinetic energy of the the maximum load motion following load following a drive train failure.
a drive train failure is less than
+
I foot and the maximum kinetic j
energy of the load is less than j
that resulting from 1 inch of
{
free fall of the maximum critical load.
I 2.
Provisions for actuating the 2.
Provisions for automatically actuat-Emergency Drum Brake prior to ing the Emergency Drum Brake prior traversing with the load, when to traversing with the load are not required to accommodate the load required since the maximum amount of motion following a drive train load motion and kinetic energy can failure.
be accomodated by the facility design.
ec e
l gf n h
a e
noa t
s c
tr i
t shi fo w%p t
s ect ic,
l ni l
e o0en aa s l8co h
e i r rl rr l
ci t gl ms c
eo ooo otat n
uie rr ttf fu c
hism nm et ce oee 0
c wii d o u d n dar gb h S 7
uo xa m
E o eee nat sl eaomi c
srh i
n l rml ox d
u T
d s yi n
dou ra et e
aib o
efl eefm en eh o
d i
n ihh pe bt a
l ede t
gn a t t g e sr s
t reh a
iof nh
- r tmk a
euws c
si dfit 5 u ooc D
ll oi i
etenot c
nra bill f
dopa lf a
fr e
aalb.
i mo yuo y
l n
cfaa) s c
s rt gs sd l sl t e.
e e
ad orel ad ite a
e p
waeoerl h e wnu r
mems C
upue3 r
S orf n a
ef mom g
eli etf ed em c
iriaC e
A n
we a
ne.
net at i
x xi(
d A
am nch e al n f
aear M
rueoit e ram ree m r m e C.
2 C
cml t
r.
cl e c
p i
i t
/
e ignenfd ut l s ce eweiI 1
n r
exnana a
e gs ee p
h hrI o
e h aih ih f o h ey hur S
TatcI 3
N P
Tmstktol T rs Tfo
)
1 E
1 1
2 3
1 1
2 TO N
(
)
er t
A e.
u dne T
l eel A
3 d
i dvi D
na iiC nda m
neh
)
E r(
aaf e
erw 8
N ee o
t mp nl e s
m s
1 A
r t C.
oot
- f R
ui o
p y
S Co C
d l rI ieo st ctn E
e gicI thr n
e e
S E2 D
d na I
ot l a r3 m P
L A
i ife s
m e
oc 1 e C
Bt E
v d
cn d
fr ri e
v Ae H
o aeno n
foi tl r1 o Te R
r opai e
o w
np a
m h
E P
l ott e
b y
op e
S V
rpc l
tge ca sd e
(
O e
e ee g
e nrl ki g b
l ecS n
s eeg d e cud G
brc a
r r
tnn ah oGi N
o aian e
e xei ot l
r I
t cw i
t v
t e
s l
ryb D
e e
e e
c y
er L
n mahd e
r m
mia fb tod I
o u
te l
a ut o
nt n meg d
i aa U
i mg h
f f
i B
t infs o
d inn ee l
a xioi m
xii pi ruy L
m aw l
u r
e akw yf ege E
r mosb m
e v
m o
ti hel U
o l ma i
b a
kl c
tRl F
f el rt x
m e
eal ee e
o n
hoes a
u h
heo h p hyr I
Tft e M
N S
T pf Ts Wbt 1
1 2
3 1
1 2
)
)
)
e.
h.
1 3
3 3
C C1 C
l n
(
(1
(
rato ecri C.
C. E.
C.
riot eppc I
II I
d oee I
II I
ETRS I
II I
yron to ai lt e.
f.
h.
1 ui gs 3
3 3
3 eo RP C
C C
C l1 l
lt
- i i
- i!
- 4i 1;!!; i j i j ii j j i ii)i I
l
CPSES TABLE C-1 (Sheet 3 of 8)
FUEL BUILDING OVERHEAD CRANE DATA (NOTE 1)
Ederer i
Topical Regulatory Report Position Section Information to be Provided Specific Crane Data fuel elements are being lif ted and interlocks to prevent trolley and whether they are provided for this bridge movements while hoisting appl ication.
are not provided.
C.3.j III.C (C.3.j) 1.
The maximum cable and machinery 1.
The Energy Absorbing Torque Limiter loading that would result in the (EATL) was designed such that the event of a high speed two blocking maximum machinery load, which would assuming a control system malfunctlon result in the event of a high speed that would allow the full breakdown two blocking that allows the full torque of the motor to be applied breakdown torque of the motor to be to the drive motor shaft.
applied to the drive shaf t, will not exceed twice the design rated loading.
In addition, the EATL design does not allow the maximum cable loading to exceed the acceptance criteria established in Section III.C (C.3.e) during the above described two blocking.
2.
Means of preventing two blocking 2.
The auxiliary and cantilever hoists of auxiliary hoist, if provided.
have two independent travel limit switches to prevent two blocking.
C.3.k III.C (C.3.k) 1.
Type of drum safety support provided.
1.
As shown in figure C-1, the drum safety support, which is the same on both ends of the drum, complies with i
C.3.k of the Regulatory Guide, in that it will limit the drop of the
CPSES TABLE C-1 (Sheet 4 of 8)
FUEL BUILDING OVERHEAD CRANE DATA (NOTE 1)
Ederer Topical Regulatory Report Position Section Information to be Provided Specific Crane Data drum and thereby prevent it from disengaging its holding brake system should the drum shaf t or bearing fail or fracture. However, this design does not have the extra safety hub shown in figure III.D.4 of EDR-1, since the crane was designed and manufacturered prior to its approval.
C.3.0 1.
Type of hoist drive to provide 1.
Five speed magnetic incremental motion.
C.3.p 1.
Maximum trolley speed.
1.
50 FPM 2.
Maximum bridge speed.
2.
50 FPM 3.
Type of overspeed protection for 3.
Both the trolley and bridge drives the trolley and bridge drives, are powered by AC motors that can inherently not overspeed, since their maximum speed is limited by i
the 60 HZ line frequency. Therefore, overspeed sensors that actuate the trolley and bridge drive brakes have not been provided.
1.
Control station location.
1.
Operator's cab mounted on the bridge.
C.3.q
CPSES TABLE C-1 (Sheet 5 of 8)
FUEL BUILDING OVERHEAD CRANE DATA (NOTE 1)
Ederer Topical R:gulatory Report Position Section Information to be Provided Specific Crane Data II.D.1 1.
The type of Emergency Drum Brake 1.
The crane has a tandem pneumatically used, including type of release released drum brake.
mechani sm.
2.
The relative location of the 2.
The Emergency Drum Brake engages the Emergency Drum Brake.
wire rope drum.
i 3.
Emergency Drum Brake Capacity.
3.
The Emergency Drum Brake has a minimum capacity of 130% of that required to hold the design rated l
load.
III.D.2 1.
Number of friction surfaces in 1.
The EATL has 21 friction surfaces.
EATL.
2.
EATL Torque Setting.
2.
The specified EATL torque setting is approximately 130% of the design rated load.
III.D.3 1.
Type of Failure Detection System.
1.
The Electronic Failure Detection System was ordered prior to the NRC comment that led to the EDR-1 commitment to qualify and test Electronic Failure Detection Systems in accordance with IEEE Standard 323,
" Standard for Qualifying class 1 Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Sta tions." The Failure Detection
CPSES TABLE C-1 (Sheet 6 of 8)
FUEL BUILDING OVERHEAD CRANE DATA (NOTE 1)
Ederer Topical R:gulatory Report Position Section Information to be Provided Specific Crane Data Systems manufactured since the Comanche Peak Fuel Building Crane are of the mechanical type.
Therefore, an Electronic Failure Detection System has never been qualified and tested in accordance 4
with IEEE Standard 323.
III.D.5 Type of Hydraulic Load Equalization 1.
The Hydraulic Load Equalization System.
System includes both features described in this section.
III.D.6 1.
Type of hook.
1.
The crane has a single load path hook.
d 2.
Hook design load.
2.
The hook design load is 130 tons with a 10:1 factor of safety on ul timate.
3.
Hook test load.
3.
The test load for the hook was 260 tons.
III.F.1 1.
Design rated load.
1.
130 Tons 2.
Maximum critical load rating.
2.
130 Tons 3.
Trolley weight (net).
3.
Less than 118,000 lbs. (including hook)
CPSES TABLE C-1 (Sheet 7 of 8)
FUEL BUILDING OVERHEAD CRANE DATA (NOTE 1)
Ederer Topical R:gulatory Report Position Section Information to be Provided Specific Crane Data
.4.
Trolley weight (with load).
4.
378,000 lbs.
I
-5.
Hook lift.
5.
77' l
6.
Number of wire rope drums.
6.
1 7.
Number of parts of wire rope.
7.
2 ropes with 8 parts each 8.
Drum size (pitch diameter).
8.
35" 9.
Wire rope diameter.
9.
1 1/4"
- 10. Wire rope type.
- 10. 6x37 class IWRC
- 11. Wire rope material.
- 11. Stainless steel.
- 12. Wire rope breaking strength.
- 12. 146,000 pounds.
- 13. Wire rope yield ' strength.
- 13. 116,800 pounds.
- 14. Wire rope reserve strength.
- 14. 64%
- 15. No. wire ropes.
- 15. 2
CPSES TABLE C-1 l
(Sheet 8 of 8)
FUEL BUILDING OVERHEAD CRANE DATA (NOTE 1)
NOTE 1:
Completes Appendix B of Generic Licensing Topical Report EDR-1(P)-A, Revision 2 dated February 15, 1980 and i
EDR-1(NP)-A, Revision 2 dated February 15,1980, " Nuclear Safety Related extra-Safety And Monitoring (X-SAM) l Cranes."
NOTE 2:
Regulatory Guide 1.104 (Revision 1, Draft 3), October 1978.
4 i
)
l i
}
l
n s
c e
dn ian lt es 9
ath e co tu d2 ncthh in no e
ie wt t
eh z1 mSf i
rs v
y a
od weai td l e xn e
vp tae s
ead eiAm
,a n
ohz ig rni rd eco nti n
eau edxoehii r
ai w
G veif rstt e gu tt d
iid ru ec rns as sn.
tfnetene ais di eag ciepch gp de x
r e
utp atas a
sl r te ud R rnpef mn t
nip c
s te t eA rut i
a ou aer cnt sd enat D
ibt ph e uge eid wahos t
o mtb ri e d
n mtni e
cl n i
m tsm neat h
n ee re se os rsneT a
sus yom d o no) oaor r
fi rf s
t h d. pwie C
x o
l oee tea
'e ly et e
tw.
r l
1 R ep d
c bhn cl r nl e b o nese i
ta ab u aar atCl acgt f
d r
fat rne r
( arxnc i
eec sl c ci d a s C. icceie c
sc ii u gE pn gp e
one tar ei moi peers E
p lih avt hry oiI ohhon N
S Cst Sas Tob CtI Tttfi AR C
D 1
1 1
1 A
E E
B H
R 9
y O
E t
2 l
T V
g o
e O
n n
1 v
ST fi se ti NNG ot s
er e
ot OAN d
os i
ra d
nc I CI e
ri u
ci e
u TI D s
px a
t,i u her I LL o
eht cd mG trt
)
SPI l
d ca ues as 7
OPU d
c l nid r ci y n
e 2
PAB e
ooh taer ihd
- f d
f c
wt sl so cn S
C o YEL i
o d
s p
t sio E
RHE v
dere seea thn S
E1 OTU o
g nmot rhl nw P
L T
F r
n arf
'e t u i
e C
Bt AY P
i o
t ng g
o
,r Ae LBN t
ef sc ange j se Te U
O e
n vrra ri n R ew h
GDI b
e i eep cei s r S
EET v
t pb m btf d u,
(
RSA o
c mi e
eo l td ST t
f.
uee hte eced FES os rb my toms wucn OR n
n t
r n
t raa DK o
to sol o.
t f n ttl YDA i
ni etate neoe nsp,
RAE t
et d
rcl er m
e ed A
P a
tc nguab taee tsre M
m xe ontfa x
l r x
n M
E r
es ni c sl ehbi e 'e g i U
H o
tuii cau nnm S
C f
ex esrta ei p q e ai a N
n ho hetav hhae h rex A
I Tb Tt ssa Twcr T cb e M
O C
R 1
1 1
1 OF
))
))
34
(()
)
)
- b. b. d.
c.
d.
114 1
1
)
)
CCC C
C l
n1 1
(((
(
(
rato
(
e c ri e b.
C. C. C.
C.
C.
riott e p pc o 1
III I
I d oeeN III I
I ETRS(
C III I
I yron)
))
to2 34 ai
((
lte
- b. b. d.
c.
d.
ui t gso 114 1
1 eon RP(
CCC C
C l
CPSES TABLE C-2 (Sheet 2 of 7)
SUMMARY
OF REGULATORY POSITIONS TO BE ADDRESSED BY THE APPLICANT FOR COMANCHE PEAK STATION FUEL BUILDING OVERHEAD CRANE Ederer Topical Regulatory Report Position Section (Note 2)
(Note 1)
Information to be Provided Specific Crane Data considered mandatory by Ederer, nor is it required by either NUREG-0612 or Regulatory Guide 1.104.
Furthermore, the X-SAM system protected the crane from overloads during construction usage.
2.
The extent the base material, at 2.
The weld joint geometries used in joints susceptible to lamellar the existing bridge structure are tearing, was nondestructively not considered to be susceptible examined.
to lamellar tearing.
C.1.e III.C (C.1.e) 1.
The extent the crane's structures, 1.
The crane was designed in accordance which are not being replaced, are with the provisions of Topical capable of withstanding the fatigue Report Section III.C(C.1.e).
effects of cyclic loading from previous and projected usage, l
including any construction usage.
C.1.f III.C (C.1.f) 1.
The exte: t the crane's structures, 1.
The crane was manufactured in which are not being replaced, were accordance with the provisions of post-weld heat-treated in accordance Topical Report Section III.C(C.1.f).
with Subarticle 3.9 of AWS D1.1,
" Structural Welding Code."
CPSES TABLE C-2 (Sheet 3 of 7)
SUMMARY
OF REGULATORY POSITIONS TO BE i
ADDRESSED BY.THE APPLICANT FOR COMANCHE PEAK STATION FUEL BUILDING OVERHEAD CRANE Ederer Topical R gulatory Report Position Section (Note 2)
(Note 1)
Information to be Provided Specific Crane Data C.2.h III.C(C.2.b) 1.
Provisions for accommodating the 1.
Administrative procedures will be 1
III.E.4 load motion and kinetic energy used to assure that a minimum of i
following a drive train failure 1 foot of clearance is maintained when the load is being traversed between the load and surfaces that and when it is being raised or cannot withstand the kinetic energy lowered.
associated with 1 inch of free fall i
of the load involved. The surfaces, j
which will support the load, are designed to withstand a minimum of 1 inch of free fall of the load 4
involved.
C.2.c III.C (C.2.c) 1.
Location of safe laydown areas 1.
Figure C-2 shows the laydown for use in the event repairs to areas that can be used in the event the crane are required that cannot that repairs to the crane are be made with the load suspended, required that cannot be made with j
the load suspended.
C.2.d III.C (C.2.d) 1.
Size of replacement components that 1.
The replacement trolley components can be brought into the building for will be brought in through the Fuel repair of the crane without having to Building roll-up door, which means break its integrity.
that any trolley component can be brought in to the fuel building if needed for crane repairs.
CPSES TABLE C-2 (Sheet 4 of 7)
SUMMARY
OF REGULATORY POSITIONS TO BE ADDRESSED BY THE APPLICANT I
FOR COMANCHE PEAK STATION FUEL BUILDING OVERHEAD CRANE Ederer Topical Regulatory Report Position Section (Note 2)
(Note 1)
Information to be Provided Specific Crane Data 2.
Location of area where repair 2.
Repair work, involving heavy lifts work can be accomplished on the by non-single failure proof crane without affecting the safe equipment, can be safely accomplished shut-down capability of the reactor.
on the crane when it is positioned over the areas shown in Figure C-2.
There are no nuclear safety restrictions on crane repairs that do not involve handling heavy components.
3.
Any limitations on reactor 3.
There are no limitations on reactor operations that would result from operations that would result from crane repairs.
crane repairs.
C.3.b III.C (C.3.b) 1.
The design margin and type of 1.
Each lif ting device attached to the lif ting devices that are attached to hook to carry critical loads will the hook to carry critical loads, support a load three times the load (static and dynamic) being handled without permanent deformation.
C.3.t III.C (C.3.t) 1.
The extent construction requirements 1.
The construction requirements for for the crane's structures, which the cranes were the same as for will not be replaced, are more permanent plant service.
severe than those for permanent plant service.
CPSES TABLE C-2 I
(Sheet 5 of 7)
SUMMARY
OF REGULATORY POSITIONS TO BE ADDRESSED BY THE APPLICANT FOR COMANCHE PEAK STATION FUEL BUILDING OVERHEAD CRANE Ederer Topical Regulatory Report Position Section (Note 2)
(Note 1)
Information to be Provided Specific Crane Data 2.
The modifications, and inspections 2.
No special modifications or inspec-to be accomplished on the crane tions are required to convert the following construction use, which crane from construction use to was more severe than those for permanent plant service, since permanent plant service.
the requirements are the same.
C 3.u 1.
The extent of installation and 1.
The installation and operating operating instructions.
instructions have been updated by Ederer to fully comply with the requirements of Section C.3.u of Regulatory Guide 1.104 and Section 7.1 and 9 of NUREG-0612.
C.4.a 1.
The extent of assembly checkout, 1.
Prior to handling critical loads C.4.b test procedures, load testing and the crane will be given a complete C.4.c rated load marking of the crane.
assembly and operational checkout C.4.d by Ederer, and then given a no load test of all motions in accordance with updated procedures provided by Ederer. A 125% static load test and a 100% performance test will also be performed at this time in accordance with updated test procedures provided by Ederer. A two blocking test was performed by Ederer prior to delivery of the
CPSES TABLE C-2 (Sheet 6 of 7)
SUMMARY
OF REGULATORY POSITIONS TO BE ADDRESSED BY THE APPLICANT FOR COMANCHE PEAK STATION FUEL BUILDING OVERHEAD CRANE Ederer Topical Regulatory Report Position Section (N3te 2)
(Note 1)
Information to be Provided Specific Crane Data j
1 crane per Topical Report EDR-1.
I The maximum Critical Load is plainly marked on each side of the crane.
i C.S.d III.C (C.5.a) 1.
The extent the procurement 1.
The procurement documents for the l
documents for the crane's crane invoked ANSI N45.2-71.
structures, which will not be replaced, required the crane manufacturer to provide a quality i
assurance program consistent with the pertinent provisions of Regulatory Guide 1.28.
CPSES TABLE C-2 i
(Sheet 7 of 7)
SUMMARY
OF REGULATORY POSITIONS TO BE ADDRESSED BY THE APPLICANT FOR COMANCHE PEAK STATION FUEL BUILDING OVERHEAD CRANE NOTE 1:
Completes Appendix C of Generic Licensing Topical Report EDR-1(P)-A, Revison 2 dated February 15, 1980 and EDR-1(NP)-A, Revision 2 dated February 15,1980, " Nuclear Safety Related extra-Safety And Monitoring (X-SAM)
Crane s".
NOTE 2:
Regulatory Guide 1.104 (Revision 1, Draf t 3), October 1978.
l I
i i
t 4
DRUM SHELL s
WEB l
I
)
HUB DRUM RESTR AINT DRUM BEARING
\\
s
^
V//////
b I
V/////]
- e
\\\\\\
li F ! 1, 1
I l
COMANCHE PE AK S.E.S.
UNITS 1 and 2 DRUM SAFETY SUPPORT STRUCTURE FIGURE C-1 l
l
1 c
i 2
'E I
..a:.:
.3$$N(($h!$fdN. HEE
.=;
272a R
O I.
,mm-
- y j y /si& W iM &93'Z e Z E;ig:
7 r-ii
^
!E7W'
\\
y x
\\
EXE
/
N' NEU 260 iji$$ji 259
(
LT T3D O-O E H 3El 0/
\\
C13512 i
........ !!iG !
NO 272:::
inkh!!!....;;is!:l:"'""
ie
'-~. L:'..................'
59i@i:i8M:.:~ .
IJ 1,
~
fl Plan at EL. 860'-0" AE 1
FUEL BUILDING OVERHEAD CRANE SAFE LOAD AREA.
1 1
(
)
L I
I A
TE I
Plan at Elevation 860'-0"
~
Rm.# Rm.Name 259 Spent Fuel Pool No.1 260 Spent Fuel Pool No.2 266 Wet Cask Loading Area 272 Operating Floor Level 272a Open Space Plan at Elevation 899'-6" 5
.". 2TJ 273 Stair No. F-2 C
~
.)
. = =
h h
b
\\
PR0
~
Plan at EL. 899'-6" CARD AE 3
MgPertur& alla14, Ors h
e Cn,.,r COMANCHE PEAK S.E.S.
UNITS 1 and 2
}
l FUEL BUILDING t
FUEL BLDG. OVERHEAD CRANE SAFE LOAD AREA FGURE C-2 NOW