Semantic search
| Start date | Reporting criterion | Title | Event description | System | LER | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ENS 55844 | 15 April 2022 14:00:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Notification to Government Agency or News Release | Notification of Environmental Report to Another Government Agency | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: On April 15, 2022 at 1000 hours (EDT), four off-site notifications were made to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts Department of Environmental ÿProtection (MADEP) in accordance with the Massachusetts Contingency Plan (310 CMR 40.0000). ÿThe notifications document non-radiological contaminants found slightly above reportable concentrations in select soil and groundwater samples collected during site characterization efforts, as part of the decommissioning process, from four parcels of land at the property.ÿ ÿReportable concentrations in soil were identified in a composite sample for Polychlorinated Biphenyls (PCBs). ÿReportable concentrations in groundwater were identified in samples for per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS) and Semi Volatile Organic Compound (SVOC). Additionally, the reports include sample results where laboratory reporting limits equaled or exceeded reporting thresholds. This notification is being made solely as a four-hour, non-emergency notification for a Notification of Other Government Agency in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi).ÿ There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Lead Decommissioning Inspector and NMSS Project Manager assigned to Pilgrim have been notified. | ||
| ENS 55567 | 9 November 2021 15:40:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Notification to Government Agency or News Release | Offsite Notification Due to Violation of Discharge Permit | At 1040 hours EST, November 9, 2021, the site reported a violation of the station National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permit. The 24-hour environmental report addressed an unauthorized discharge of 7,245 gallons of non-radiological water that was pumped into a storm drain to de-water an on-site electrical vault located outside of the protected area. This discharge occurred from 0800 to 1230 hours on November 8, 2021. Sampling and analysis of the vault water is in progress to assess for the presence of pollutants. This notification is being made solely as a four-hour, non-emergency notification for a Notification of Other Government Agency. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The licensee notified the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection. | ||
| ENS 55202 | 21 April 2021 11:52:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Notification to Government Agency or News Release | Offsite Notification to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts | On April 21, 2021, at 0752 hours (EDT), an offsite notification was made to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection (MADEP) in accordance with Regulation 310 CMR 40.0000: Massachusetts Contingency Plan (MCP). The notification documents non-radiological contaminants found above reportable concentrations in select samples collected during site characterization efforts. The reported reportable concentrations were slightly above reporting limits in a soil sample for Per and Polyfluoroalkyl Substances (PFAS), two groundwater sampling locations for PFAS, and isolated instances of metals in groundwater including Arsenic, Vanadium, Lead, Antimony, Beryllium, Cadmium, Chromium, Nickel, and Thallium. This report is being submitted in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi) based on notification being made to another government agency. Concentrations above reporting limits have been entered into the site's corrective action program. As per MCP, the site will proceed with requirements to implement the phased MCP process. This condition does not represent a threat to station personnel or to members of the general public. | ||
| ENS 55071 | 18 January 2021 21:00:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Notification to Government Agency or News Release | Offsite Notification Due to Leak from Underground Sewage Storage Tank | On January 18, 2021 at 1600 hours (EDT), Holtec Decommissioning International (HDI) made an off-site notification to the Environmental Protection Agency's Enforcement and Compliance Assurance Division in accordance with Section B of the station's National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) Permit No. 0003557. The event was associated with an underground sewage water system holding tank. The specific details of the occurrence are as follows: On January 13, 2021 at 1000 hours (EDT) site personnel identified what appeared to be water bubbling up from an unidentified cover within the security protected area of the site. The water emanating from the cap had no visible color or solid material and no odor. The water estimated at 25 gallons per hour or less was flowing to a site storm drain connected to permitted outfall number 007. Initial indication was that the water was potable water as part of the station's fire protection system. Further investigation determined that a back-up in an underground sewage holding tank inlet was the source of the leakage. By 1400 hours (EDT) when bathrooms including toilets on site were shutdown and removed from service, efforts were underway to pump the tank and remove the blockage, and the bubbling from the cover had stopped. The licensee has notified the Massachusetts Environmental Protection Agency, the Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency and the NRC Resident Inspector. | ||
| ENS 54071 | 18 May 2019 03:03:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation | Manual Reactor Scram Due to Degrading Condenser Vacuum | On Friday, May 17, 2019 at 2303 (EDT), with the reactor at 70 (percent) core thermal power, Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station initiated a manual reactor scram due to degrading condenser vacuum as a result of the trip of Seawater Pump B. All control rods inserted as designed. The plant is in hot shutdown. Plant safety systems responded as designed. Pressure is being controlled using the Mechanical Hydraulic Control System and Main Condenser. Reactor water level is being maintained with the feedwater and condensate system. During the manual reactor scram, the plant experienced the following isolation signals as designed: "Group 2 Isolation: Miscellaneous containment isolation valves Group 6 Isolation: Reactor Water Clean-up Reactor Building Isolation Actuation Due to the Reactor Protection System actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), 'any event that results in actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) when the reactor is critical...' This notification is also being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), 'Any event or condition that results in valid actuation of any of the systems listed in paragraph (b)(3)(iv)(B) of this section...' (B)(2) 'General containment isolation signals affecting containment isolation valves in more than one system or multiple main steam isolation valves (MSIVs).' This event has no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The licensee will notify the Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency. | Feedwater Reactor Protection System Main Steam Isolation Valve Main Condenser Control Rod | |
| ENS 53648 | 5 October 2018 04:00:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation | Automatic Reactor Scram Due to Low Reactor Water Level | On Friday, October 5, 2018 at 1209 hours, with the reactor at 100 percent core thermal power, Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (PNPS) automatically tripped due to reactor water level perturbation and receipt of a low reactor water level Reactor Protection System (RPS) signal. The cause of the low reactor water level is under investigation. The plant is in hot shutdown. All other plant systems responded as designed. Pressure is being controlled using the Mechanical Hydraulic Control System and Main Condenser. Reactor water level is being maintained with the feedwater and condensate system. During the automatic reactor scram the plant experienced the following isolation signals as designed: Group 2 Isolation: Miscellaneous containment isolation valves Group 6 Isolation: Reactor Water Clean-up Reactor Building Isolation System Actuation Due to the RPS actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), 'any event that results in actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) when the reactor is critical.' This notification is also being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), 'Any event or condition that results in valid actuation of any of the systems listed in paragraph (b)(3)(iv)(B) of this section ... ' (B)(2) 'General containment isolation signals affecting containment isolation valves in more than one system.' This event has no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The licensee will notify the Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency. | Feedwater Reactor Protection System Main Condenser | |
| ENS 53147 | 4 January 2018 19:10:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation | Manual Reactor Scram Due to Partial Loss of Offsite Power During Winter Storm | On January 4, 2018, at 1410 hours EST, with the reactor at approximately 100 percent power and steady state conditions, the winter storm across the Northeast caused the loss of offsite 345 kV Line 342. Reactor power was reduced to approximately 81 percent and a procedurally required manual reactor scram was initiated. All control rods fully inserted. As a result of the reactor scram, indicated reactor water level decreased, as expected, to less than +12 inches resulting in automatic actuation of the Primary Containment Isolation Systems for Group II - Primary Containment Isolation and Reactor Building Isolation System, and Group VI - Reactor Water Cleanup System. Reactor Water Level was restored to the normal operating band. The Primary Containment Isolation Systems have been reset. The Reactor Protection System signal has been reset. Following the reactor scram, the non-safety related Control Rod Drive Pump "B" tripped on low suction pressure. Control Rod Drive Pump "A" was placed in service. All other systems operated as expected, in accordance with design. This event is reportable per the requirements of Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 50.72 (b)(2)(iv)(B) - "RPS Actuation" and 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(iv)(A) - "Specified System Actuation. This event had no impact on the health and/or safety of the public. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The main steam isolation valves are open with decay heat being removed via steam to the main condenser. Offsite power is still available from 345kV line 355. As a contingency, emergency diesel generators are running and powering safety busses per licensee procedure. The licensee notified the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. The licensee will be notifying the town of Plymouth as part of their local notifications. The licensee will be issuing a press release. | Reactor Protection System Emergency Diesel Generator Main Steam Isolation Valve Primary Containment Isolation System Primary containment Reactor Water Cleanup Main Condenser Control Rod | |
| ENS 52449 | 20 December 2016 23:30:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Notification to Government Agency or News Release | Offsite Notification - Release of Hydrogen Gas in Excess of the Reportable Quantity of Ten Pounds | At 1830 EST on 20 December, 2016 the Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection and the Plymouth Massachusetts Fire Department were notified of a Hydrogen release in accordance with plant procedures and 310CMR40.300, Massachusetts Contingency Plan Notification for Oil and Hazardous Material; Identification and Listing of Oil and Hazardous Material, due to a release of hydrogen gas to the environment exceeding the reportable quantity of ten pounds. The release, which is an expected part of a routine plant start-up was from the generator hydrogen cooling system. This event posed no danger to the health and safety of plant personnel or members of the general public. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | ||
| ENS 52231 | 9 September 2016 21:39:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Notification to Government Agency or News Release | Offsite Notification - Release of Hydrogen Gas in Excess of the Reportable Quantity of Ten Pounds | At 1739 (EDT) on Friday September 9, 2016 the Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection and the Plymouth Massachusetts Fire Department were notified of a Hydrogen release in accordance with plant procedures and 310CMR40.300, Massachusetts Contingency Plan Notification for Oil and Hazardous Material; Identification and Listing of Oil and Hazardous Material, due to a release of hydrogen gas to the environment exceeding the reportable quantity of ten pounds. The Massachusetts DEP Tracking Number is RTN4-26311. The release was from the generator hydrogen cooling system. There was no plant damage. Hydrogen system pressure has been restored to the normal operating band with the Main Generator secured and is stable. The cause of the event is under investigation. This event posed no danger to the health and safety of plant personnel or members of the general public. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
The Plymouth Massachusetts Fire Department was notified on Monday, September 12, 2016, at 1411 EDT. This clarifies information applicable to the local notification as identified in the original notification. Notified R1DO(Noggle) and NSIR (Stapleton) via email. | ||
| ENS 52223 | 6 September 2016 12:27:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation | Manual Reactor Scram Due to High Reactor Water Level | On Tuesday, September 6, 2016 at 0827 (EDT), with the reactor at 91% core thermal power (CTP), Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (PNPS) operators initiated a manual reactor scram due to high reactor water level resulting from feedwater level control oscillation. Other than the feedwater level control oscillations, all other plant systems responded as designed. Plant cooldown is in progress using the High Pressure Coolant Injection System in the pressure control mode. The plant is in hot shutdown. The cause of the feed water level control oscillations is under investigation. This event has no impact on the health and safety of the public. Subsequent to the manual reactor scram the plant experienced the following isolation signals: Group 1 Isolation: Main Steam Isolation Valves Group 2 Isolation: Miscellaneous containment isolation valves Group 6 Isolation: Reactor Water Clean-up Reactor Building (Ventilation) Isolation Actuation The licensee has notified the NRC Senior Resident Inspector. This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), 'any event that results in actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) when the reactor is critical...'. This notification is also being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), 'Any event or condition that results in valid actuation of any of the systems listed in paragraph (b)(3)(iv)(B) of this section...' (B)(2) 'General containment isolation signals affecting containment isolation valves in more than one system or multiple main steam isolation valves (MSIVs).' All rods were inserted. The plant is stable with normal off-site power line-up. The licensee will notify the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. | Feedwater High Pressure Coolant Injection Reactor Protection System Main Steam Isolation Valve | |
| ENS 51338 | 22 August 2015 20:28:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation | Reactor Scram Due to a Single Msiv Closure | On Saturday, August 22, 2015, at 1628 (EDT), with the reactor at 100% core thermal power (CTP) the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (PNPS) experienced an automatic reactor scram signal due to the rapid closure of one main steam isolation valve (MSIV). Other than the MSIV all other plant systems responded as designed. Plant cooldown is in progress using steam bypass to the main condenser. The plant is in hot shutdown. The cause of the MSIV closure is still under investigation. This event has no impact on the health and safety of the public. The licensee has notified the NRC Senior Resident Inspector. This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), 'Any event that results in actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) when the reactor is critical'. Subsequent to the reactor scram the plant experienced the following isolation signals: - Group 2 Isolation: Miscellaneous containment isolation valves
- Group 6 Isolation: Reactor Water Clean-up
- Reactor Building Isolation Actuation
This notification is also being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), 'Any event or condition that results in valid actuation of any of the systems listed in paragraph (b)(3)(iv)(B) of this section' (B)(2) 'General containment isolation signals affecting containment isolation valves in more than one system or multiple main steam isolation valves (MSIVs).' Plant response was considered normal and the plant is in a stable shutdown / cooldown condition. The license will be notifying the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. | Reactor Protection System Main Steam Isolation Valve Main Condenser | |
| ENS 51087 | 22 May 2015 14:02:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation | Manual Reactor Scram Due to Loss of Condenser Vacuum | On Friday, May 22, 2015 at 1002 EDT, with the Reactor Mode Select Switch in the Start-Up position and the reactor at approximately 3 percent core thermal power, while returning to power from Refueling Outage Number 20, a manual reactor scram was inserted due to degrading main condenser vacuum. The cause of the degraded vacuum is currently under investigation. Following the reactor scram, all rods were verified to be fully inserted and no Emergency Operating Procedure entry conditions existed. All plant systems responded as designed. Currently reactor pressure is being maintained at 400 psig with the Mechanical Hydraulic Control System (turbine by-pass valves). Reactor water level is being maintained in normal bands with the Condensate and Feedwater System. Off-site power is being supplied to the station by the Startup Transformer (normal power supply for shutdown operations). This event had no impact on the health and/or safety of the public. The NRC Resident Inspector is on-site and has been notified. The licensee has notified the Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency. The licensee will be issuing a press release.
The following was provided by the licensee as clarifying information to the first paragraph of the original event notification: As a conservative measure, the operating crew had previously started reducing power from 20 percent core thermal power when it was first noticed that main condenser vacuum was degrading. This was well before any low condenser vacuum alarms were received. During the shutdown, after already securing the main turbine, the operating crew established benchmark values for degrading condenser vacuum for a normal plant shutdown and for a manual reactor scram should vacuum continue to decline to preclude an automatic scram. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Dwyer). | Feedwater Main Turbine Main Condenser | |
| ENS 50769 | 27 January 2015 09:02:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Notification to Government Agency or News Release 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation | Automatic Reactor Scram on Turbine Trip Due to Loss of Offsite Power | On Tuesday January 27, 2015 at 0402 hours, with the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (PNPS) Reactor Mode Select Switch (RMSS) in Run and reactor power approximately 52% an automatic reactor scram signal was received due to the automatic trip of the main turbine that was initiated by the opening of the main generator breaker, ACB-104. The event occurred during winter storm 'Juno.' Prior to the event off-site transmission Line 355 was de-energized due (to) weather conditions and its associated PNPS switchyard breakers (ACB-105, a main generator breaker and ACB-102), were open. Per station procedures, reactor power was being lowered, a reactor protection system bus had been placed onto a back-up power supply, the Emergency Diesel Generators had been started and were powering the associated safety related 4 KV buses. The second off-site transmission Line 342 de-energized and the associated PNPS switchyard breakers (ACB-104 main generator breaker and ACB-103) opened. The Shutdown Transformer off-site power supply has remained available throughout this event. All control rods were verified to be fully inserted. Per plant design, Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) Group lI sampling systems, Group VI Reactor Water Clean-up (RWCU) system and Reactor Building Isolation System (RBIS) isolations occurred. Currently, the EDG's are powering the safety related 4KV buses, reactor water level is being maintained by the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system and reactor pressure is being maintained by High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system. The station is conducting a plant cool down at this time. All systems responded as designed with the exception of a non-safety-related diesel air compressor, K-117 that failed to start. The licensee will notify the State and local governments and plans on issuing a press release. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed. | High Pressure Coolant Injection Reactor Protection System Emergency Diesel Generator Primary Containment Isolation System Reactor Core Isolation Cooling Main Turbine Control Rod | 05000293/LER-2015-001 |
| ENS 50134 | 23 May 2014 16:10:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Notification to Government Agency or News Release | Offsite Notification - Release of Hydrogen Gas in Excess of Reportable Quantity | At 1210 EDT on Friday, May 23, 2014, the Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection and the Plymouth Massachusetts Fire Department were notified of a hydrogen release in accordance with plant procedures and 310CMR40.300, Massachusetts Contingency Plan Notification for Oil and Hazardous Material; Identification and Listing of Oil and Hazardous Material. This was due to a release of hydrogen gas to the environment exceeding the reportable quantity of ten pounds. The release was from the generator hydrogen cooling system. There was no plant damage. Hydrogen system pressure has been restored to the normal operating band and is stable. The cause of the event is under investigation. This event posed no danger to the health and safety of plant personnel or members of the general public. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | ||
| ENS 49454 | 19 October 2013 07:31:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation | Group 1 Isolation Due to High Reactor Water Level | On Saturday, October 19, 2013 at 0331 hours, with the reactor critical at approximately 1% core thermal power and the mode switch in start-up, a high reactor water level condition resulted in a main turbine trip and a valid Group 1 isolation signal. As a result, the Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs) closed. The plant was in start-up from a forced outage. The initial plant conditions were reactor pressure at approximately 280 psig with a corresponding reactor coolant temperature for that pressure. Currently reactor pressure and water level are being maintained with the MSIVs closed in normal bands. The reactor is being cooled down in preparation for operation in shutdown cooling. Off-site power is supplying station power from the Start-up Transformer (normal power supply for shutdown operations). All plant systems responded as designed. The cause of the increase in reactor water level is currently under investigation. This event had no impact on the health and/or safety of the public. The USNRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified. | Main Steam Isolation Valve Shutdown Cooling | 05000293/LER-2013-010 |
| ENS 49296 | 22 August 2013 11:55:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation - ECCS Discharge | Reactor Protection Actuation (Scram) | On Thursday, August 22, 2013 at 0755 hours (EDT), with the reactor critical at approximately 98% core thermal power, and the mode switch in RUN, a manual reactor scram was inserted due to lowering reactor water level. The cause of the lowering reactor water level was due to the trip of all three Feedwater Pumps. The cause of the Feedwater Pump trip event is currently under investigation. Following the reactor scram, all control rods were verified to be fully inserted. All 4kV busses transferred to the Startup Transformer as designed. Following the scram the reactor water level lowered to +12 inches initiating the Primary Containment Isolation System (Group II, Reactor Building Isolation System (RBIS); and Group VI - Reactor Water Cleanup System) automatically as per design. Reactor water level lowered to -46 inches initiating Primary Containment Isolation System Group I - Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs); Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) actuated which included automatic start and injection of the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System and the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System and an automatic start of the Emergency Diesel Generators as designed. Reactor water level was promptly restored to normal level. Currently a cooldown is in progress with reactor pressure is being maintained by the HPCI System operating in the pressure control mode and reactor water level is being maintained by the RCIC System. Reactor Water Clean-up System and normal reactor building ventilation have been restored. Off-site power is being supplied to the station by the Start-up Transformer (normal power supply for shutdown operations). This event had no impact on the health and/or safety of the public. The USNRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified. This 4-hour notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(2)(iv)(A) and (B). The plant is transferring from decay heat removal to the torus to decay heat removal to the main condenser. Reactor pressure is 371 psig. Initial indications are that a main feedwater power supply breaker tripped. | Feedwater High Pressure Coolant Injection Emergency Diesel Generator Main Steam Isolation Valve Primary Containment Isolation System Reactor Core Isolation Cooling Reactor Building Ventilation Reactor Water Cleanup Emergency Core Cooling System Decay Heat Removal Main Condenser Control Rod | 05000293/LER-2013-008 |
| ENS 49053 | 20 May 2013 07:53:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Notification to Government Agency or News Release | Off-Site Notification Due to Fire in Turbine Building | At 0353 hours (EDT) on Monday, May 20, 2013 Pilgrim Station responded to indications of a fire in the Turbine Building (TB) Lubricating Oil Room. The Pilgrim Fire Brigade responded to the fire and was able to extinguish a small fire associated with the 'A' Auxiliary Oil Pump Motor. The plant was in start-up at the time of the event with the reactor critical and reactor coolant system temperature approximately 180 degrees F. The Plymouth Fire Department was contacted and responded to the site. The event did not require entry into the Emergency Action Levels (EALs). The plant is in a safe condition and plant personnel are investigating the cause. The plant will be restarted after a thorough evaluation and any necessary repairs are completed. This informational notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi). The licensee has notified the Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency (MEMA) . The Resident Inspector staff has been informed of this notification. This was an electrical fire confined to the aux oil pump motor and was extinguished using hand held CO2 and dry chemical extinguishers. | Reactor Coolant System | |
| ENS 48923 | 15 April 2013 02:17:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation | Specified System Actuations While Shutting Down | On Sunday, April 14, 2013 at 2217 hours, with the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (PNPS) Reactor Mode Select Switch (RMSS) in Start-up, the turbine generator previously removed from service, and the reactor sub-critical on Intermediate Range Monitors Range 2 and lowering, a manual reactor scram was inserted due to reactor pressure lowering beyond established control bands. At the time of the manual reactor scram PNPS was conducting a planned reactor shutdown to commence refueling outage (RFO) -19. All control rods fully inserted and Primary Containment Isolation System Group II (Reactor Building) and Group VI (Reactor Water Cleanup System) actuations occurred as designed due to the expected reactor water level shrink associated with the scram signal. All plant systems responded as designed. Off-site power was unaffected and was supplied by the start-up transformer (normal power supply for refuel and reactor shutdown operations). The Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIV) were manually closed to terminate the reactor pressure reduction and the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system was manually started in the reactor pressure control mode. The Reactor Protection System (RPS) was reset as were the reactor building and reactor water clean-up system isolation signals. Currently, the plant cooldown is continuing with the HPCI system in pressure control and reactor water level being maintained within normal bands with the condensate and feedwater system. The cause of the lowering reactor pressure has not been determined and remains under review. This event had no impact on the health and/or safety of the public. This 8-hour notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(iv)(A). The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified. The licensee will also be notifying state authorities. | Feedwater High Pressure Coolant Injection Reactor Protection System Main Steam Isolation Valve Primary Containment Isolation System Reactor Water Cleanup Intermediate Range Monitor Control Rod | |
| ENS 48909 | 10 April 2013 17:14:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Notification to Government Agency or News Release | Massachusetts Agencies Notified Regarding Neutralizing Sump Discharge Line Inspection | At 1314 hours on Wednesday, April 10, 2013 during a boroscopic inspection of the sub-surface portions of the Neutralizing Sump Discharge Line, Pilgrim Station discovered indications of a separation in the line. The line is currently isolated and no discharges were in progress during the planned inspection. This line is used infrequently to discharge permitted liquids that have the potential to contain radiological contamination. This notification is conservatively being made in accordance with Pilgrim site procedures with direct voluntary communications with offsite agencies. There is no impact on the safe operation of the plant and personnel are investigating the cause. The (NRC) Resident Inspector staff has been informed of this notification. This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi). The licensee will notify the Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency (MEMA) and other state agencies.
Entergy Pilgrim Station has twenty three (23) groundwater monitoring wells used to sample for tritium and other radioactive nuclides in accordance with the Nuclear Energy Institute's (NEI) voluntary Groundwater Protection Initiative (GPI). One of the newly installed wells, MW-219, located in the vicinity of a Catch Basin adjacent to the Reactor Building Auxiliary Bay and in the flow path of the Neutralizing Sump Discharge Line indicated an elevated level of tritium (H3), that exceed the limits established by the NEI Groundwater Protection initiative and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) limits for liquid effluent release. A protocol for more frequent sampling has been instituted and an investigation of the cause is underway. To date, tritium is the only isotope detected In the groundwater monitoring well samples collected at the site. This supplemental information has been voluntarily communicated to Federal, State and local stakeholders. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this update. This is an update to the 4-hour non-emergency notification made in accordance with 50.72(b)(2)(xi) on April 10, 2013 at 1619 hours. Notified R1DO (Rogge). | ||
| ENS 48739 | 10 February 2013 19:05:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Notification to Government Agency or News Release 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation | Loss of Offsite Power and Subsequent Press Release | On Sunday, February 10, 2013 at 1405 (EST), with the reactor at 0% core thermal power, all control rods fully inserted, and in cold shutdown conditions, the plant experienced a loss of off-site power. With Pilgrim Station aligned to off-site power via the start-up transformer (SUT), a fault on the 'B' phase of the SUT was experienced due to suspected falling ice striking the phase's insulator. This resulted in the tripping of the feeder breaker, ACB-102, and the loss of power to 4160 KV buses A1 through A4. Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs) 'A' and 'B' auto-started as designed and are powering emergency buses. The loss of off-site power resulted in de-energization of both Reactor Protection System (RPS) channels resulting in a reactor scram signal and isolation of shutdown cooling. At 1418, shutdown cooling was returned to service. All other plant systems responded as designed. Station personnel are in the process of establishing back-up power in accordance with plant procedures. The following press release was made at 1715 hours: 'Offsite power to Pilgrim station was interrupted this afternoon. The plant is in a cold shutdown condition and Pilgrim's diesel generators are providing power to the site. There is no worker or public safety concern. Plant personnel are troubleshooting the cause of the interruption.' This event had no impact on the health and/or safety of the public. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified. | Reactor Protection System Emergency Diesel Generator Shutdown Cooling Control Rod | 05000293/LER-2013-003 |
| ENS 48736 | 9 February 2013 03:00:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation 10 CFR 50.72(a)(1)(i), Emergency Class Declaration | Unusual Event Declared Due to Loss of Offsite Power | Pilgrim Station scrammed on a loss of offsite power. All systems performed as designed. Groups I, II, VI went to completion. Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) is injecting to the vessel controlling level. High Pressure Coolant Injection is in pressure control and slowly cooling down. Offsite power was lost multiple times. The Startup Transformer has been declared inoperable. The Unusual Event was declared under EAL SU 1.1 based on loss of offsite power greater than 15 minutes (at 2200 EST). The licensee originally experienced an automatic reactor scram at 2117 EST due to a load reject with a turbine trip/reactor scram due to loss of power. Offsite power availability has been fluctuating in and out to the site. The licensee states that all systems are functioning as required. All rods fully inserted and the reactor is stable in Mode 3. Both Emergency Diesel Generators are providing power to the safety related buses. The loss of offsite power is believed to be weather related. The licensee has notified the State and local authorities and the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified DHS SWO, FEMA, USDA, HHS, DOE, DHS NICC, EPA, and NuclearSSA via email.
Pilgrim terminated the Unusual Event and has transitioned to recovery effective at 10:55 AM on 02/10/2013. Offsite power has been restored to safety-related and non-safety-related electrical buses through the station Startup Transformer via a single 345 KV line. The other two offsite power sources remain out of service. The emergency diesel generators have been secured and are in standby. Residual heat removal is in shutdown cooling mode maintaining the reactor in cold shutdown. Fuel Pool Cooling is in service with fuel pool coolant temperatures trending down. The licensee notified State, local authorities and the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1 RA (Dean), R1DO (Powell), NRR DIR(Leeds) NRR EO (Evans) and NSIR IRD (Marshall). Notified DHS SWO, FEMA, USDA, HHS, DOE, DHS NICC, EPA, and NuclearSSA via email. | High Pressure Coolant Injection Emergency Diesel Generator Reactor Core Isolation Cooling Shutdown Cooling Residual Heat Removal | |
| ENS 48669 | 12 January 2013 14:50:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Notification to Government Agency or News Release 10 CFR 50.72(a)(1)(i), Emergency Class Declaration | Unusual Event Declared Due to Potential Security Event | On Saturday, January 12, 2013 at 0925 hours (EST), with the reactor shutdown at 0% core thermal power, a security threat was reported. Security personnel took action to investigate the threat and implemented appropriate protective actions as required per security procedures. Based on this security event, the Shift Manager activated the Emergency Plan and made notification of an Unusual Event at 0950 hours. As a result, the Emergency Response organization was notified and activated. At 1001 hours, the NRC and applicable state and local authorities were notified via the Emergency Notification System (ENS). At 1050 hours, Security and applicable local law enforcement agency officials completed immediate investigations and determined that the security threat was not credible and was the result of local duck hunters on a small watercraft near the plant site. At 1105 hours, the Emergency Director terminated the Unusual Event. The Senior Resident Inspector was on-site and has been informed of this event and associated offsite notification. The licensee has notified appropriate state and local authorities as required per Emergency Planning and other site specific procedures. A press release was also issued. This notification is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi). Notified the DHS SWO, FEMA and DHS NICC.
This is an informational update to notification EN# 48669 based on completion of the post event Emergency Planning review. Our initial notification contained the following documentation error: At 1001 hours, the NRC and applicable State and Local authorities were notified via the Emergency Notification System (ENS). This statement is corrected as follows: 'At 1001 hours, State and Local authorities were notified via the Dedicated Notification Network (DNN). At 1025 hours, the NRC was notified via the Emergency Notification System (ENS).' The Resident Inspector has been informed of this event update. Notified R1DO (Ferdas). | ||
| ENS 48665 | 11 January 2013 11:55:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Notification to Government Agency or News Release | Offsite Notification Regarding Manual Reactor Scram | At 1534 EST on Thursday, January 10, Pilgrim Station operators initiated a manual shutdown of the power plant following a trip of the plant's recirculation pumps. The plant is in a safe condition and plant personnel are investigating the cause. The plant will be restarted after a thorough evaluation and any necessary repairs are completed. The plant had been online continuously for 230 days at the time of the shutdown. The NRC Resident Inspector staff has been informed of this press release and notification. This informational notification is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi). The licensee will notify the Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency (MEMA). | ||
| ENS 48664 | 10 January 2013 20:34:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation | Reactor Protection Actuation (Scram) - Recirculation Pump Trip | On Thursday, January 10, 2013 at 1534 hour (EST), with the reactor at 100% core thermal power, both recirculation pumps spuriously tripped and a manual reactor scram was inserted as required by station procedures. The cause of the recirculation pump trip is under investigation. Following the reactor scram, all rods were verified to be fully inserted and the Primary Containment Isolation System Group II (Reactor Building) and Group VI (Reactor Water Cleanup System) actuations occurred as designed due to the expected reactor water level shrink associated with the scram signal. All other plant systems responded as designed. Currently reactor pressure is being maintained between 900 and 1050 psig with the Mechanical Hydraulic Control System (turbine by-pass valves). The Reactor Protection System has been reset; Reactor Water Cleanup System and normal reactor building ventilation have been restored. Reactor water level is being maintained in normal bands with the Condensate and Feedwater System. Off-site power is being supplied to the station by the Start-up Transformer (normal power supply for shutdown operations) and the switchyard ring bus has been restored. This event had no impact on the health and/or safety of the public. The USNRC Senior Resident Inspector is on-site and has been notified. This 4-hour notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(2)(iv)(B). The scram was uncomplicated and decay heat is being released to the main condenser via the turbine by-pass valves. | Feedwater Reactor Protection System Primary Containment Isolation System Reactor Building Ventilation Reactor Water Cleanup Main Condenser | |
| ENS 48439 | 24 October 2012 23:20:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Notification to Government Agency or News Release | Press Release Regarding Status of Ongoing Labor Negotiations | On October 24, 2012, at 1920 EDT hours with the reactor at 100% core thermal power the following press release is being issued by Entergy Nuclear regarding the status of the ongoing labor negotiations. ENTERGY NUCLEAR STATEMENT - ENTERGY AND UWUA LOCAL 369 AGREE TO TENTATIVE CONTRACT October 24, 2012 Plymouth, Mass. - Entergy Nuclear and the Utility Workers Union of America (UWUA) reached a tentative agreement today on a new four-year labor contract for Local 369 technical employees at Pilgrim Station, pending a ratification vote by Union membership. Additionally, the parties have agreed to a 21-day extension that will expire at midnight on Nov. 14. The previous contract for the approximately 67 workers affected by this union contract will remain in effect during the extension. The original contract was set to expire at midnight Oct. 24. Pilgrim's Site Vice President Robert Smith said, 'We appreciate the hard work of both parties to come to a successful outcome to this negotiation process. We believe the new proposal represents fair and equitable terms both for our employees and the Company.' END The Resident Inspector staff has been informed of this press release and notification. This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi). | ||
| ENS 48078 | 8 July 2012 20:27:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Notification to Government Agency or News Release | Commonwealth of Massachusetts Notified That Pilgrim Station Workers Ratify New Contract | On July 8, 2012, at 1627 (EDT) hours and the reactor at 100% core thermal power, the following informational statement was issued by Entergy Nuclear regarding the status of the ongoing labor action at the site: UWUA Local 369 Pilgrim Station Workers Ratify New Contract. UWUA Local 369 Pilgrim Station union members voted today to ratify a new, four-year bargaining union contract which is effective May 16, 2012. 'The new contract, which came to fruition as a result of a lot of hard work on both sides, reflects our commitment to our employees, is acceptable to our union workers and preserves union interests,' said Pilgrim Site Vice President, Robert Smith. 'We look forward to our employees returning to work, which has been our goal throughout this process,' he continued. While specific details of the agreement are not being disclosed, the new four-year contract represents a substantial commitment to employees in the form of guaranteed wage increases, a comprehensive benefits package including premium health care plan options, a Company-matching 401(k) savings program, a defined benefits pension plan and a union incentive plan. 'We now turn our attention to the transition/turnover process and have initiated our Reintegration Plan which is a deliberate process to ensure the qualifications, training and other site requirements of returning employees are current and meet all NRC or procedural requirements. As employees are reintegrated, we will be phasing out our alternate staffing/contingency plan and expect to have all of our union employees back to work this week,' said Smith. The licensee notified the Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency and the NRC Resident Inspector. | ||
| ENS 48059 | 29 June 2012 21:46:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Notification to Government Agency or News Release | Offsite Notification Due to an Employee Medical Emergency | On June 29, 2012, at 1746 EDT hours and the reactor at 100% core thermal power, the following informational statement was issued by Entergy Nuclear regarding a medical emergency involving a member of the Pilgrim Station Security Department. This afternoon, a security employee at Pilgrim Station who appeared to be in medical distress was immediately transported to the hospital for observation and professional medical care. The individual was observing and monitoring union picket line activities and was not filling a position required by the Pilgrim Station Security Plan. The Resident Inspector staff has been informed of this press release and notification. This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi). The licensee will notify the Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency. | ||
| ENS 47997 | 6 June 2012 04:45:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Notification to Government Agency or News Release | Offsite Notification Regarding Labor Negotiations | On June 6, 2012, at 0045 EDT hours and the reactor at 100% core thermal power the following press release being issued by Entergy Nuclear regarding the status of the ongoing labor negotiations. Plymouth, Mass. - Entergy Nuclear, the company that owns and operates the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station is implementing a contingency staffing plan after weeks of negotiations between the Company and the Utility Workers Union of America Local 369 leadership were unsuccessful in reaching an agreement for a new union contract. Local 369 has stated flatly that while its members are not on strike, they reserve the right to walk off the job at any time, without any notice, and leave the nuclear power plant critically understaffed and in violation of the plant's operating license. This disregard for public safety is unacceptable. Accordingly, the company's contingency plan is being implemented. The contingency plan for temporary alternate staffing is consistent with Nuclear Regulatory Commission regulations and is in the interest of safety and maintaining formal organizational controls on the plant site. Highly qualified individuals from within Pilgrim's management team as well as the Entergy nuclear fleet will be filling the necessary positions. The NRC Resident Inspector staff has been informed of this press release and notification. This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi). The licensee will be notifying the Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency. | ||
| ENS 47968 | 26 May 2012 06:00:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Notification to Government Agency or News Release | Press Release Regarding Status of Ongoing Labor Negotiations | On May 26, 2012, at 0200 EDT with the reactor at 42% core thermal power, the following press release is being issued by Entergy Nuclear regarding the status of the ongoing labor negotiations. Pilgrim Station Negotiation Team Agrees to Present Proposed Package to Union Membership for Ratification Vote. Plymouth, Mass. - Entergy Nuclear and the Utility Workers Union of America (UWUA), which have been negotiating a four-year Pilgrim Station labor contract, agreed early Saturday to present a proposed package of pay and benefits to the membership for a vote on Saturday, June 7. Additionally, the parties have agreed to a 10-day (contract) extension that will expire at midnight on Tuesday, June 5. The previous contract for the approximately 240 workers will remain in effect during the extension. Pilgrim's Site Vice President Robert Smith said, 'We appreciate the hard work of both parties to get to this point and believe this proposal represents fair and equitable terms both for our employees and the company.' Entergy owns and operates power plants with more than 30,000 megawatts of electrical generating capacity and has about 14,000 employees. Entergy's nuclear businesses comprise six reactors at five sites in Massachusetts, New York, Vermont and Michigan and five reactors at four locations in Arkansas, Mississippi and Louisiana. Entergy Nuclear also manages operations at a nuclear generating plant in Nebraska. The (NRC) Resident Inspector staff has been informed of this press release and notification. This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi). The licensee will notify the Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency. | ||
| ENS 47945 | 22 May 2012 17:11:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation | Manual Reactor Scram Due to Degrading Condenser Vacuum | On Tuesday, May 22, 2012 at 1311 hours (EDT), with the reactor at approximately 35% core thermal power, during a planned power reduction to support thermal backwash of the main condenser, a manual reactor scram was inserted due to degrading main condenser vacuum. The cause of the degraded vacuum is currently under investigation. Following the reactor scram, all rods were verified to be fully inserted and the Primary Containment Isolation System Group II (Reactor Building) and Group VI (Reactor Water Cleanup System) actuations occurred as designed due to the expected reactor water level shrink associated with the scram signal. Standby Gas Treatment System Train 'B,' which is designed to shutdown 65 seconds after the Group II signal is received if the Standby Gas Treatment Train 'A' is in service, continued to operate until manually secured. With this exception, all other plant systems responded as designed. Currently reactor pressure is being maintained at 920 psig with the Mechanical Hydraulic Control System (turbine by-pass valves). Reactor water level is being maintained in normal bands with the Condensate and Feedwater System. Off-Site power is being supplied to the station by the Start-up Transformer (normal power supply for shutdown operations). This event had no impact on the health and/or safety of the public. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified." The licensee has notified the Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency. | Feedwater Primary Containment Isolation System Reactor Water Cleanup Standby Gas Treatment System Main Condenser | |
| ENS 47927 | 17 May 2012 01:00:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Notification to Government Agency or News Release | Press Release Regarding Status of Ongoing Labor Negotiations | On May 18, 2012, at 2100 (EDT) hours and the reactor at 100% core thermal power the following press release is being issued by Entergy Nuclear regarding the status of the ongoing labor negotiations. Plymouth, Mass -- Entergy Nuclear, the owner and operator of the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station in Plymouth, Mass. said today that the company remains focused squarely on plant safety as a negotiating team works toward a four-year contract with plant workers that reflects the realities of the competitive electric power business and fairly compensates the workforce. The contract with the Utility Workers Union of America Local 369 covers approximately 240 production and maintenance/office technical and professional workers out of a total workforce of about 650 employees at the plant. The contract expired May 15 without final resolution. Plant management directed workers covered by the contract in non-essential positions to remain at home Wednesday with full pay with benefits and insurance pending further progress on the contract. It is not a lockout. The management decision to temporarily limit the workforce at the plant is in the interest of safety. The company remains prepared to implement contingency plans in the event of a strike by the union members. Those plans assign routine tasks to other pre-qualified workers in roles that ensure continued safe operations. The Resident Inspector staff is onsite and has been informed of this press release and notification. This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi). The company feels they have adequate numbers of pre-qualified workers available to fill necessary positions to ensure continued safe operations. | ||
| ENS 47199 | 26 August 2011 17:45:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Notification to Government Agency or News Release | Press Release Related to Hurricane Preparations at the Pilgrim Site | At approximately 1345 EDT, on August 26, 2011, Entergy Corporation issued a press release regarding ongoing preparations at Pilgrim Station for hurricane Irene currently located 300 miles SSW of Cape Hatteras, North Carolina traveling in a northerly direction at approximately 14 miles per hour. The purpose of the press release is to re-assure the public regarding the safety and security of the facility and the extent of preparations that are in progress. Current plant operation is not impacted and the release of this information does not indicate a current threat to the facility or the health and safety of the public. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. This four (4) hour report is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi). State and local notifications will be made coincident with the Issuance of this Event Report. | ||
| ENS 46837 | 10 May 2011 17:15:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation | Reactor Protection System Actuation During Start-Up | At 1315 hours on Tuesday, May 10, 2011, with the Reactor Mode Select Switch in Startup, the Reactor Protection System (RPS) actuated due to a valid Hi-Hi trip signal from the Intermediate Range Monitors (IRMs) of the Neutron Monitoring System. At the time of the RPS actuation, reactor thermal power was four (4)% and control rods were being withdrawn as part of a planned reactor startup from a refueling outage. The RPS actuation signal resulted in a reactor scram. The IRMs were in range 7 when the scram occurred. All control rods automatically inserted in accordance with design. No other ESF actuation signals were generated. The reactor scram was not part of pre-planned test or reactor operation. The cause of the Hi-Hi IRM trip signal is under investigation. This event had no impact on the health and/or safety of the public. The licensee has notified the NRC Senior Resident Inspector. This 4-hour notification is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). The unit is in a normal post trip electrical alignment. Decay heat is being removed via the main steam line drains to the main condenser. The licensee will notify the Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency. | Reactor Protection System Intermediate Range Monitor Main Steam Line Main Condenser Control Rod | |
| ENS 46631 | 20 February 2011 15:34:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation | Reactor Protection System Actuation While Shutdown | On Sunday, February 20, 2011, at 1034 EST with the reactor shutdown and all control rods fully inserted a valid Reactor Protection System (RPS) low reactor water initiation signal (+12 inch) was received. The RPS actuation signal resulted in reactor scram and actuation of the Primary Containment Isolation Systems for Group II - Primary Containment Isolation and Reactor Building Isolation System (RBIS), and Group VI - Reactor Water Cleanup System (RWCU). At the time of the event, a controlled reactor shutdown and cooldown was in progress. The Reactor Mode Selector Switch was in 'Startup' and a cooldown was being controlled using the Mechanical Hydraulic Control (MHC) System. Initial event review indicates that the turbine by-pass valve controlling the cooldown closed causing a 'shrink' on indicated reactor water level to briefly lower to +12 inches (lowest observed water level). Reactor water level was immediately restored, the isolations (Group II and VI) were reset, and the RPS signal was reset at 1135 EST. All systems operated as expected, in accordance with design. This event had no impact on the health and/or safety of the public. The US NRC Senior Resident Inspector was in the Main Control Room at the time of the event. The licensee will be notifying the State. | Reactor Protection System Primary Containment Isolation System Primary containment Reactor Water Cleanup Control Rod | |
| ENS 46206 | 25 August 2010 12:30:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Notification to Government Agency or News Release | Offsite Notification - Release of Hydrogen Gas in Excess of the Reportable Quantity of Ten Pounds | On August 25, 2010 (the licensee) made a notification to) the Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection and the Plymouth Massachusetts Fire Department in accordance with 310CMR40.300, Massachusetts Contingency Plan Notification of Oil and Hazardous Material; Identification and Listing of Oil and Hazardous Material. (The licensee made the notification) due to a release of hydrogen gas to the environment exceeding the reportable quantity of ten pounds via the designed system release path. The release occurred when restoration of a system vacuum pump following planned maintenance resulted in higher than normal system makeup rates. Combustible gas sampling of equipment areas confirmed that the excess hydrogen gas had been released to the environment via a remote roof vent designed to continuously exhaust (hydrogen) removed from the seal oil system by the vacuum pump. The release of hydrogen gas was secured when the vacuum pump was removed from service. The estimated quantity of hydrogen gas released was approximately twenty pounds. This event posed no danger to the health and safety of plant personnel or members of the general public. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector is on-site and has been notified. The licensee is investigating the cause of the excessive makeup rate. | ||
| ENS 46083 | 9 July 2010 04:00:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Notification to Government Agency or News Release | Offsite Notification Due to Elevated Levels of Tritium Found in a Well Sample | Entergy Pilgrim Station has twelve groundwater monitoring wells used to sample for tritium and other radioactive nuclides in accordance with the Nuclear Energy Institute's (NEI) voluntary Groundwater Protection Initiative (GPI). One of the wells, MW-205, located in the vicinity of the Condensate Storage Tanks (CST) indicated an elevated level of tritium, however well below the limits established by the NEI Groundwater Protection Initiative, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) limits for liquid effluent release and the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) limits for tritium in drinking or non-drinking water wells. The latest sample taken on June 21, 2010, returned a test result of 11,072 picocuries per liter of tritium. To date, tritium is the only isotope detected in the samples collected at the site. This information has been communicated to federal, state and local stakeholders and a press advisory is expected to be issued by the Massachusetts Department of Public Health (MDPH). On that basis and the anticipated interest to the general public this notification is being made. This event has no impact on the health and/or safety of the public. The NRC Resident Inspector is on-site and has been notified.
Entergy Pilgrim Station has received the results of its most recent weekly tritium sample taken on July 7, 2010 for groundwater monitoring well, MW-205. The sample results have shown an increase in the tritium concentration to 25,552 picocuries per liter (pCi/L) from the previous sample taken on June 30, 2010 which had a test result of 8,477 pCi/L. The latest results remain below any regulatory reporting requirements and the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) limits for tritium in non-drinking water wells. This information has been communicated to federal, state and local stakeholders. There remains no threat to drinking water sources and no impact on the health and/or safety of the public. The NRC Resident Inspector is on-site and has been notified of this update. This is an update to the 4-hour non-emergency notification made in accordance with 50.72(b)(2)(xi) on July 9, 2010 at 1555 hours. Notified R1DO (Doerflein). | ||
| ENS 44998 | 18 April 2009 05:20:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Notification to Government Agency or News Release | Courtesy Notification Made to State of Massachusetts Involving an Employee Fatality | On April 18, 2009 an informational notification was made to the US NRC. At approximately 0120 EDT on April I8, 2009, the Pilgrim main control room received an emergency medical call stating that a Pilgrim employee had been found unconscious inside the radiologically controlled area of the plant. The individual was treated by the on-site first responders who administered CPR and AED treatment. Off site medical assistance was requested and the individual was transported to the local hospital. At approximately 0230 EDT, Pilgrim was notified that the individual had died of an apparent heart attack. A courtesy notification was made to the Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The event had no adverse effect to the health and safety of the public. The licensee confirmed that the employee transported offsite was not radiologically contaminated. No press release is planned.
While Pilgrim does not plan to issue a news release regarding this event, it is anticipated that media coverage of the event will ensue based upon the off-site response to the medical emergency. This 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xi) notification is conservatively being made in advance of any media attention. Notified R1DO (Powell). | ||
| ENS 44737 | 20 December 2008 15:45:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation | Momentary Loss of 345Kv Offsite Power | At approximately 1045 hours on Saturday, December 20, 2008, while in a Hot Shutdown condition, Pilgrim Station experienced a momentary loss of all 345kV off-site power to the Startup Transformer (SUT). As a result, the following safety system actuations occurred: automatic Reactor Protection System (RPS) actuation (all control rods were previously inserted), automatic start of both Emergency Diesel Generators (EDG) and loading of their respective emergency buses, automatic actuation of Primary Containment Isolation Systems (PCIS) Groups I, II, VI and Reactor Building Ventilation, manual initiation of the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system for reactor pressure control, and manual initiation of the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system for reactor level control. All systems functioned as designed and expected. Because power from an off-site source remained available from the 23kV Shutdown Transformer, the criteria for declaration of an Unusual Event were not met (Pilgrim EAL 6.3.2.1). 345kV power was automatically restored to the Startup Transformer via breaker reclose logic. Restoration of normal on-site power to all 4kV buses is complete and efforts to return systems to normal shutdown alignments are in progress. Current plans are in place to maneuver the plant to a Cold Shutdown condition as necessary to support recovery actions. The NRC Resident was on-site at the time of the event and has been notified. There was no threat to the health or safety of the public as a result of this event. The loss of power was caused by a breaker icing in the onsite switchyard. The switchyard breakers were inspected for icing. The licensee notified the State of Massachusetts. | High Pressure Coolant Injection Reactor Protection System Emergency Diesel Generator Primary Containment Isolation System Reactor Core Isolation Cooling Reactor Building Ventilation Control Rod | 05000293/LER-2008-007 |
| ENS 44735 | 19 December 2008 23:31:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation | Automatic Reactor Scram Due to Load Reject | On December 19, 2008, at 1831 hours with the reactor at 100% core thermal power (CTP) an automatic reactor scram occurred. It appears the scram occurred as a result of a load reject experienced during a severe winter storm. Three of the four safety relief valves opened in response to the event. Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) Group 2 (sample valves) and Group 6 (reactor water cleanup system) and the reactor building isolation system (RBIS-secondary containment) isolated as designed (all have since been restored) on the reactor water level +12 inches setpoint due to normal vessel shrink. Initial review indicates all safety-related systems responded as designed. Off-site power has been maintained; however the two 4kv safety related buses (A5&A6) were conservatively placed on the station emergency diesel generators due to potential grid stability concern. Currently, the reactor mode select switch (RMSS) is in the Shutdown position; the reactor scram has been reset; the reactor is being maintained at approximately 940 psig, with pressure being maintained by the main turbine by-pass valves; and reactor water level is being maintained at normal levels of 29 inches with the main condensate and feedwater system. Station maintenance personnel are assessing the status of the station switchyard. Once this activity is complete the duration of the forced outage and recovery plans will be determined. All control rods fully inserted on the scram. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | Feedwater Emergency Diesel Generator Primary Containment Isolation System Main Turbine Reactor Water Cleanup Safety Relief Valve Control Rod | |
| ENS 44217 | 16 May 2008 00:00:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Notification to Government Agency or News Release | Offsite Notification to State of Massachusetts Regarding Press Release | Entergy Pilgrim Station has reached a tentative 4-year agreement with UWUA Local 369. This notification is in anticipation of media interest and Entergy Press Releases. Licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency. | ||
| ENS 43642 | 14 September 2007 14:50:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Notification to Government Agency or News Release | Offsite Notification to Epa Required by Npdes Permit | At 0630 hours on September 14, 2007, while operating at 100% power, Pilgrim Station experienced a fish impingement on the intake structure traveling screens. Plant power was reduced to 50% and one of two seawater circulating pumps was secured. The impingement did not impact the operability of safety related cooling water systems. At 1050 hours, plant assessment determined that the impingement, involving a large school of Atlantic juvenile menhaden, is reportable to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) under conditions of the Pilgrim National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit. Following a substantial reduction in the numbers of fish discharged via the traveling screen outfall trough, the seawater pump was restored to service and restoration of the plant to 100% power is in progress. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector and will inform both the State and EPA. | ||
| ENS 43479 | 10 July 2007 23:54:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation | Main Turbine Trip Causing a Reactor Scram | During a planned power reduction to support thermal backwash of the main condenser, an automatic reactor scram resulted from a main turbine trip. The cause for the turbine trip is currently under investigation. Following the reactor scram, the expected reactor level shrink resulted in valid group 2, Reactor Building Ventilation, and group 6, Reactor Water Cleanup System isolations. All safety systems and equipment functioned as designed. A schedule for plant restart has not yet been determined. All control rods fully inserted and no safety relief valves lifted from the scram. Minimum level after the scram was -10 inches. Decay heat is being removed using the main turbine bypass valves to the main condenser and maintaining level using normal reactor feed water. The plant is using the normal shut down electrical lineup and slowly cooling down (currently at 820 psi). The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | Reactor Building Ventilation Reactor Water Cleanup Safety Relief Valve Main Condenser Control Rod | |
| ENS 43245 | 17 March 2007 20:58:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation | Group Isolations Following Manual Reactor Scram | On March 17 2007, at approximately 1658 EDT, Group 2 (Reactor Building Ventilation Isolation) and Group 6 (RWCU Isolation) automatic containment isolation signals were received due to low reactor water level following the insertion of a manual scram signal. The manual scram signal was inserted following the reaching of internal administrative limits on changes in unidentified drywell leakage. The receipt of these isolation signals is not unusual following the insertion of a scram signal. The reactor was manually shutdown due to reaching internal administrative limits on changes in unidentified drywell leakage. Prior to the manual shutdown, the leakage had not reached the applicable Technical Specification limits. Drywell leakage as of 1800 EDT was 1.3 GPM identified and 2.59 GPM unidentified with the unit in Hot Shutdown Mode. All safety systems responded as expected. The plant is in a stable condition. Investigation is continuing. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | Reactor Building Ventilation | |
| ENS 42750 | 2 August 2006 09:45:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Notification to Government Agency or News Release | Motor Vehicle Fatality of Plant Employee | On Wednesday, August 2, 2006, at approximately 0545 EDT, a motor vehicle accident occurred at the entrance to the Owner Controlled Area that resulted in the fatality of a plant employee. The employee was reporting to work. Local law enforcement and emergency medical personnel were called and responded to the scene. An investigation by local law enforcement and plant security is ongoing. No formal press release is anticipated. This event presented no risk to public health and safety. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this report by the licensee. | ||
| ENS 42414 | 13 March 2006 23:08:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation | Manual Reactor Scram After Offgas System Failure | During a power ascension, the non-safety Augmented Offgas System experienced a failure which caused a Recombiner high temperature condition. To protect components of the non-safety Augmented Offgas System, station procedures require a manual scram of the reactor when this condition occurs. Station procedures were followed and the reactor was manually scrammed at 18:08. All rods fully inserted and all safety systems performed per design. Primary containment isolation systems responded properly resulting in an automatic isolation of Primary Containment Isolation System Groups 2 and 6 valves and a Reactor Building Isolation due to the transient low reactor water level condition caused by the scram. The plant is in a stable condition. Investigation is continuing. No safety valves lifted on the scram, decay heat is being removed with the bypass valve, normal feed and condensate are maintaining reactor water level, and the electrical grid is stable on the startup transformer. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | Primary Containment Isolation System |