Text

Emergency Plan Procedure EPP-001, Revision 25, Change a, Activation and Implementation of Emergency Plan
	ML040490122
Person / Time
Site:	Summer
Issue date:	02/06/2004
From:	Clary R; South Carolina Electric & Gas Co
To:	; Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response
References
	RC-04-0032
	Download: ML040490122 (47)
	v • d • e

Ronald B. Clary Manager, Nuctear Licensing 3454757 A e SCANA COMPANYFebruary A SCANA COMPANY 6, 2004 RC-04-0032 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555

Dear Sir / Madam:

Subject:

VIRGIL C. SUMMER NUCLEAR STATION (VCSNS)

DOCKET NO. 50/395 OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-12 TRANSMITTAL OF EMERGENCY PLAN PROCEDURE In compliance with 10CFR50 Appendix E(V), South Carolina Electric & Gas Company, acting for itself and as agent for South Carolina Public Service Authority, transmits one controlled copy of EPP-001, Revision 25, Change A, "Activation and Implementation of Emergency Plan".

Should you have any questions, please contact Mrs. Donna Railey at (803) 345-4107.

Very truly yours, Ronald B. Clary DWR/RBC/dr Attachment c: L. A. Reyes (With 2 Attachments)

(Without Attachment)

NRC Resident Inspector RTS (L-99-0354)

File (810.10-2, RR 6000)

DMS (RC-04-0032)

SCEUG I Virgil C.Summer Nudeor Station

P.0.Box 88 . Jenkinsville, South Corolina 29065 . T(803) 345.5209 *www.scana.com

SOUTH CAROLINA ELECTRIC & GAS COMPANY VIRGIL C. SUMMER NUCLEAR STATION NUCLEAR OPERATIONS NUCLEAR OPERATIONS COPY NO.1 7 EMERGENCY PLAN PROCEDURE EPP-001 ACTIVATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF EMERGENCY PLAN REVISION 25 SAFETY RELATED Oriainal sianed bv R. E. Williamson 7114103 DISCIPLINE SUPERVISOR DATE Original signed by Greg Halnon 7116/03 APPROVAL AUTHORITY DATE

- RECORD OF CHANGES CHANGE TYPE APPROVAL CANCELLATION CHANGE TYPE APPROVAL CANCELLATION LETTER CHANGE DATE DATE LETTER CHANGE DATE DATE A P 12/1/03 . E _

INFORMATION USE Procedure may Be Performed From Memory.

User Retains Accountability For Proper Performance.

NUCLEAR OPERATIONS SAP-1 39 COPY. flor4 _ ATTACHMENT II PAGE 1 OF 3 REVISION 21 PROCEDURE DEVELOPMENT FORM - A

i. DATE: 5 PROC.# P-0 aI REV. CHG. A COMM.#

TlITiL E: C75 tf- z V AN2 . zo3 -~

14+T7 OW 48co NEW PROCEDURE _ REVISION __._SAFETY RELATED CHANGE: 7X_ PERMANENT ;, QUALITY RELATED _

RESTRICTED ( FROM TO NON-SAFETY RELATED ii. DESCRIPTION: Ar47tcy ew sr < t 6 t@ r 3

-Piear 71A 6CJOV >z5t4b REASONFORCHANGE: {46eadeF 770`0- A tt'J 6Sfe7cA df pw-sc Al 27 f

.. naor- Slgn. snd PRINT

... Name iii. REQUIRED REVIEWS: Check ALL selections Infirst 3 columns for SAPs except for minor changes) Other Reviews:

)MCHS ( )MNPS ()MPO ( )GMES (.)CHS ( )IST ( )NOET ( )QC ( )

( )MDE ( )MNT ( )MPSE ( )GMNPO ( ) CWPS ( ) MNTS () NPS (Y -)i5

)MHPS ( )MOD&P ( ) MBFS ( )GMNSS ( )DE ( ) MPR ( ) NTET ( )RC ( )

)MMPR ( )MOPS ( )QA ( )GMOE ( )FFD ( ) MS (C) OPS ( )RE ( )

)MMS ( )MPLE ( )RMS .(HPS ( )NL&OE ( )PSE ( )TU ( )

( )MNL _

IV. DISCIPUNE SUPERVISOR AUTHORIZATION TO PROCESS PROPOSED CHANGES:

TRAINING REQUIRED? YES_ NO 1 dl'7 Prior to implementation? YES___NOI /.O) bis~ipine Supervisor Date V. TEMPORARY APPROVAL:

QUALIFIED REVIEWER TE QA REVIEW DATE TELECON BY _ TELECON BY SHIFT SUPERVISOR DATE_ FINAL APPROVAL REQUIRED BY: DATE VI. DISCIPUNE SUPERVISOR FINAL REVIEW: VII. PICAP ACCEPTABLE?

P.' ~~~ C. YES___ NO, \A..

PSRC REVIEW REQUIRED? YES; JO_2C Date '

YE - N. YES-_ NO 71 444i,.

IFYES, PRIOR TO IMPLEMENTATION? YEg O N. YEES_.MGR 19 TRAINING COMPLETED? YES___ NO ___NIAX VIII. FINAL QA REVIEW. (If Applicable)

IF NO. Enter CER #

QA Concurrence Date PICAP AFFECTED? k, n YES_ NNO7 COMMENTS RESOLVVED.D4 IX. AP AUTHO:R7/ :Y1

Discipline Supervisor Date r e A rova nc=ence . Date X. PSRC REVIEW: CER # (if applicable)

A. REVIEWED BY: B. PPRC COMMENTS RESOLVED:

PSRC Chairman Date Responsible Manager Date COMMENTS: YES NO__ - /

PSRC Chairman Date

EPP-001 PAGE i REVISION 25 TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTION PAGE 1.0 PURPOSE AND SCOPE 1

2.0 REFERENCES

3.0 DEFINITIONS 2 4.0 CONDITIONS AND PREREQUISITES 3 5.0 PROCEDURE 4 6.0 RECORDS 5 7.0 REVISION

SUMMARY

5 ATTACHMENTS ATTACHMENT I- - EEmergency Action Level Cross Reference Guide ATTACHMENT II - EEmergency Action Levels ATTACHMENT III - CConsiderations for a Security Emergency .

EPP-001 REVISION 25 1.0 PURPOSE AND SCOPE 1.1 To define the Emergency Action Levels (EALs) that will activate and implement the Emergency Plan and to provide a means of classifying the emergency.

1.2 Changes and revisions to this procedure must ensure compliance with the requirements of 10CFR50.54.q, 10CFR50 Appendix B, and SAP-630. A IOCFR50.59 review is not required.

2.0 REFERENCES

2.1 Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station FSAR, Appendix 13A, "South Carolina Electric and Gas Company Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station Radiation Emergency Plan".

2.2 NUREG-0654, Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants.

2.3 10CFR50, Appendix E.

2.4 10CFR50.54 (x) and (y), Applicability of License Conditions and Technical Specifications in an Emergency.

2.5 EPP-001.1, Notification of Unusual Event.

2.6 EPP-001.2, Alert.

2.7 EPP-001.3, Site Area Emergency.

2.8 EPP-001.4, General Emergency.

2.9 SAP-1131, Corrective Action Program.

2.10 NUREG-1022, Event Reporting Guidelines 10CFR50.72 and 50.73.

2.11 SCP-113, Two Person Rule.

2.12 SAP-1110, Emergency Preparedness.

PAGE 1 of 5

EPP-001 REVISION 25 3.0 DEFINITIONS 3.1 Definitions 3.1.1 Notification of Unusual Event - Off normal events which could indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant.

3.1.2 Alert - Events are in progress or have occurred which involve an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant.

3.1.3 Site Area Emergency - Events which involve actual or likely major failures of plant functions needed for protection of the public.

3.1.4 General Emergency - Events which involve actual or imminent substantial core degradation or melting with potential for loss of containment integrity.

3.2 Abbreviations 3.2.1 EAL - Emergency Action Level 3.2.2 NUE - Notification of Unusual Event 3.2.3 IED - Interim Emergency Director 3.2.4 ED - Emergency Director 3.2.5 EPP - Emergency Plan Procedure 3.2.6 EOP - Emergency Operating Procedure 3.2.7 TEDE - Total Effective Dose Equivalent 3.2.8 CDE - Committed Dose Equivalent PAGE 2 of 5

EPP-001 REVISION 25 4.0 CONDITIONS AND PREREQUISITES 4.1 The Emergency Plan shall be implemented whenever an "Initiating Condition" (as identified in Attachment II) has occurred.

NOTE 4.2 The implementation of any specific Emergency Plan Procedure (except this procedure) does not necessarily implement the Emergency Plan, but may do so at the discretion of the lED/ED. For example: a small chlorine leak would implement the toxic release procedure but not necessitate implementation of the Emergency Plan, whereas a large release with the potential of affecting the level of safety of the plant would implement the toxic release procedure and the Emergency Plan due to the declaration of a NUE.

4.2 The "Initiating Condition" and "Detection Method" shall be used to determine the applicable EAL. The Detection Methods are intended to be a guide for the proper classification of an emergency. The judgment of the lED/ED may take precedence in determining if the Initiating Condition has been met or exceeded.

4.3 The 3 digit number in parenthesis associated with EALs on Attachment II is the Emergency Information System (EIS) Emergency Type Code.

NOTE 4.4 When the plant is in a security related event, deviation from the guidance in the Emergency Plan Procedures is allowed when the safety of plant personnel and/or plant equipment must be considered. See Attachment IlIl for additional guidance.

4.4 The Duty Shift Supervisor must concur with any actions that depart from a license condition or technical specification in an emergency when such actions are immediately needed to protect the public health and safety (Reference 2.4).

4.5 Attachment I provides a cross reference for the EAL Classification and should only be used as a guide to locate the UEAL Topic" and the "Initiating Condition" in Attachment II, Emergency Action Levels.

PAGE 3 of 5

EPP-001 REVISION 25 5.0 PROCEDURE 5.1 Upon recognition of an abnormal plant or site condition, the observer shall notify the Duty Shift Supervisor of the potential emergency plan condition.

NOTE 5.2 When the TSC is activated, the ED is responsible for determining the appropriate EAL and emergency classification.

5.2 The IED/ED shall:

A. Using Attachment I for guidance, locate the appropriate "EAL Topic" and "Initiating Condition" and turn to the referenced page in Attachment I.

B. Determine the EAL by comparing the verified plant parameters or conditions to the detection method for each emergency condition.

C. Declare the appropriate EAL classification. Perform additional actions in accordance with the EOPs and the appropriate EPPs.

Notification of Unusual Event - EPP-001.1 Alert - EPP-001.2 Site Area Emergency - EPP-001.3 General Emergency - EPP-001.4 5.3 Undeclared or Misclassified Events C01-e A. When it is discovered that an event or condition had existed which met the criteria for Emergency Plan activation but no emergency had been declared and the basis for the EAL classification no longer exists, the lED/ED shall ensure that an ENS notification to the NRC and ESSX notification to the State and local governments is made within one hour of the discovery of the undeclared or misclassified event. No "after-the-fact" emergency declaration is necessary.

PAGE 4 of 5

EPP-001 REVISION 25 6.0 RECORDS 6.1 There are no records generated by this procedure.

7.0. REVISION

SUMMARY

7.1 Incorporated Changes A through F.

7.2 Revised Attachment I to match Attachment II.

7.3 Revised Attachment II to provide clarification to the Detection Methods via format changes, reference to EOPs and/or addition of clarifying remarks.

PAGE 5 of 5

EPP-001 ATTACHMENT I PAGE 1 OF 2 REVISION 25 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL CROSS REFERENCE GUIDE NOTE: This Attachment is not to be used for EAL Classification.

Refer to Attachment II.

EAL TOPIC PAGE A. Reactor Coolant System Leakage or LOCA

1. RCS Leakage ...................................................... 1,2,3

2. LOCA ...................................................... 1,2,3

3. Failure of Pressurizer or Steam Generator Safety or Relief Valve to Reseat ........ ............. 22...........................

4. Loss of Fission Product Barriers ....................................................... 2 B. Steam Generator Tube Leak or Rupture ....................................................... 4 C. Secondary System

1. Main Steam Line Break or Secondary System Depressurization ................. 5

2. Stuck Open Steam Generator Safety or Relief Valve ................. ................. 5

3. Loss of Heat Sink ....................................................... 6

4. Turbine or Generator Failure ...................... ................................. 7 D. Nuclear Fuel

1. Fuel Damage .................. 8

2. Fuel Handling Accident ............................................. 9 E. Engineered Safety Feature (Failure of Reactor to Trip) ................................ 10 F. Loss of Station Power

1. Station AC Power ............................................ 11

2. Station DC Power .................. 12 G. Radiological Effluents.................. 13,14 H. Fire .................. 15 I. Security .................. 16 J. Natural Phenomenon

1. Earthquake ............... 17

2. Tornado or Wind ............... 18

3. Hurricane...................................................................................8......... ........ 18

EPP-001 ATTACHMENT I PAGE 2 OF 2 REVISION 25 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL CROSS REFERENCE GUIDE NOTE: This Attachment is not to be used for EAL Classification.

Refer to Attachment II.

EAL TOPIC PAGE K. Manmade Phenomenon

1. Aircraft Crash .19

2. Train Derailment .19

3. Missile Impacts or Explosion .20

4. Toxic or Flammable Gas .21 L. Loss of RHR at Half Pipe .22 M. Loss of Plant Annunciators .. 23 N. Control Room Evacuation .23

0. Emergency Director Discretion .24 P. Other

1. Loss of Communications .25

2. Loss of Functions for Cold Shutdown .25

3. Loss of Functions for Hot Shutdown .25

(@ c EPP-0O1 ATTACHMENT II PAGE 1 OF 25 REVISION 25 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LEAKAGE OR LOCA (1 of 3)

IMLkNOTIFICATION OFAUNUSUAIUEVENTAOI ALE-ER. _ . I SITE AREA EMERGENCYiiGENERAL EMERGENCYEN INITIATING CONDITION (1O11 INITIATING CONDITION (201) INITIATING CONDITION (301) INITIATING CONDITION (401)

RCS LEAKAGE REACTOR COOLANT LEAKAGE RATE KNOWN LOSS-OF-COOLANT ACCIDENT SMALL OR LARGE LOSS OF COOLING EXCEEDS 50 GALLONS PER MINUTE GREATER THAN CHARGING PUMP CAPACITY ACCIDENT WITH FAILURE OF EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM TO PERFORM, LEADING TO SEVERE CORE DEGRADATION OR MELT.

Detection Method: Detection Method: Detection Method: Detection Method:

ANY of the following exceeded (1QR 2 OR 3): Evaluation of the following to determine leakage ANY of the following Indications (1 OR 2 Q2 3): Failure of BOTH of the following after rate: depressurizing the RCS to < 140 psig per

1. Evaluate the following Indications to EOP-14.0.

determine if a LOCA condition exists

1. Unidentified Leakage greater than 10 gpm. Note: This excludes SG Tube Leakage. (similar to EOP-1.0): Failure of (1 AND 2)

(See Specific Table for SG Tube Leakage)

- - QR - - -- - - -- - - a. Pressurizer low pressure reactor trip.

b. Pressurizer low pressure safety injection. 1. High Head Injection Flow.

2. Pressure Boundary Leakage greater than 1. Excessive Makeup to the Volume Control c Reactor Building pressure > 1.5 psig.

10 gpm. Tank. d. Abnormal Reactor Building sump level. ---------------- AND--.

e. RBCU Drain Flow High.

OR ------------------- 2. IPCS CHGwT. f. Abnormal radiation levels on RM-A2 or 2. Low Head Injection Flow.

RM-G7, or RM-G18.

3. identified Leakage greater than 25 gpm. 3. STP-114.002, OperationalLeakTest.

2. Stuck Open and Unisolable Pressurizer PORV or Safety Valve Leading to Pressurizer Relief Tank Rupture.

OR----------------- ---------------

3. Initiating Bleed and Feed per EOP-1 5.0.

(Refer to Initiating Condition 411 for possible escalation.)

C C I EPP-001 ATTACHMENT II PAGE 2 OF 25 REVISION 25 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS REACTOR COOLANT SYSTFM LFAKAG.F OR I-OCA (2 nf 31 IMS.?NOTIFICATION OF.UNUSUJALEVENTOMA LER,.ERGENCYAO sN..l__ all I 1111TE8IgAREA"W~~.

IGENERAIEMERGENCZYA l N NW-1__A INITIATING CONDITION (102) INITIATING CONDITION (402)

FAILURE OF A PRESSURIZER OR STEAM SMALL LOSS OF COOLING ACCIDENT WITH GENERATOR SAFETY OR RELIEF VALVE TO INITIALLY SUCCESSFUL EMERGENCY CORE RESEAT (EXCEEDING NORMAL WEEPAGE) COOLING SYSTEM, FOLLOWED BY SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OF REACTOR BUILDING HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEMS THAT COULD LEAD TO CORE MELT Detection Method: Detection Method:

Pressurizer or Steam Generator Safety or Relief ALL of the following (I AND 2 AND 3):

Valve opens and then fails to reseat as indicated by:

1. Loss of primary or secondary coolant in EITHER 1 OR 2 OR 3: progress.

AND ----------------

1. Valid open Indication on ANY of the following: EITHER (a OR b OR c) 2. Failure to establish EITHER of the following after depressurizing the RCS to c 140 psIg a) Unisolable Pressurizer Relief Valve per EOP-14.0.

OR a) High Head Injection Flow b) Pressurizer Safety Valve b) Low Head Injection Flow c) Valid Acoustical Monitor Indication ----------------- AND -------------

3. RB Spray AND RBCU Cooling fails to function.

-QR ----------------

2. Visual or audible indication at vent stacks of open Steam Generator Safety or Relief Valve.

OR ----------------

3. Excess feedwater flow to and steam flow from the affected Steam Generator.

(C. C~~~~~~ EPP-001 ATTACHMENT II PAGE 3 OF 25 REVISION 25 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LEAKAGE OR LOCA 13 of 3)

' if . NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT - D ALERT .- ' I SITE AREA EMERGENCY --

. % 7- -' -*GENERAL EMERGENCY ' 1 -

INITIATING CONDITION (403)

LOSS OF TWO OF THREE FISSION PRODUCT BARRIERS WITH POTENTIAL LOSS OF THE THIRD BARRIER (e.g., LOSS OF FUEL INTEGRITY AND PRIMARY COOLANT BOUNDARY AND HIGH POTENTIAL FOR RADIOACTIVITY RELEASE FROM CONTAINMENT)

Detection Method:

EITHER 1 OR 2 OR 3:

1. PrImary coolant dose equivalent 1-131 activity 2 300 pCI/gm AND LOCA In progress AND Reactor Building pressure > 30 psig for at least 2 minutes.

2. Primary coolant dose equivalent l-131 activity 2 300 pCilgm AND breach of containment integrity and EITHER a O b:

a. RCS leakage greater than Technical Specification allowable.

OR

b. RCS pressure a 2335 psig.

QB----------------

3. LOCA AND breach of containment integrity and EITHER a QE b:

a. Dose equivalent 1-131 activity

>1 pCVgm In primary coolant.

b. Core Exit temperature > 700° F.

&____________________________________ J

(C C 1 .,

EPP-001 ATTACHMENT II PAGE 4 OF 25 REVISION 25 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS STEAM GENERATOR TUBE LEAK OR RUPTURE MaNOTIFICATION OF.~UNUSUALJEVEN1WMWI w.rMMMWWALER 1

.. ___10"miii

'iiiiSITeTAREAtEMERGENCY ~ftwI GENERAIVEMERGENCYA1110M INITIATING CONDITION (103) INITIATING CONDITION (203) INITIATING CONDITION (302)

EXCEEDING TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION RAPID FAILURE OF SEVERAL STEAM RAPID FAILURE OF SEVERAL STEAM PRIMARY TO SECONDARY LEAK RATE LIMIT GENERATOR TUBES (e.g., SEVERAL GENERATOR TUBES (SEVERAL HUNDRED HUNDRED GALLONS PER MINUTE GALLONS PER MINUTE PRIMARY-TO-SECONDARY LEAK RATE) PRIMARY-TO-SECONDARY LEAK RATE) WiTH LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER Detection Method:

Detection Method: Detection Method:

Entry into EOP-4.0.

Primary to Secondary Leak Rate Exceeds ALL of the following (1 AND 2):

Technical Specification 3.4.6.2 Limits.

ALERTROWIII10 ANYLof the following exceeded (1 5R 2): INITIATING CONDITION (202) 1. Entry into EOP4.0.

RAPID GROSS FAILURE OF ONE STEAM GENERATOR TUBE WITH LOSS OF OFFSITE ----------------- AND --------------

POWER

1. >1 gpm Total for > 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months . 2. A loss of offsite power has led to Chg.

Detection Method: the loss of Condenser vacuum. A

OR-LL of the foltowing (1 AND 2 AN 3):

1. Primary to Secondary Leakage Exceeds

2. >500 gpd any one Steam Generator for

> 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months . 10 gpm as determined per AOP-1 12.2.

AND ---

2. Safety Injection Is NOT required per AOP-1 12.2.

AND--

Chg'

3. A loss of offsite power has led to l A the loss of Condenser vacuum.

'9@-.o

(.a' 'I4

(

EPP-001 ATTACHMENT II PAGE 5 OF 25 REVISION 25 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS MAIN STEAM LINE BREAKS OR SECONDARY DEPRESSURIZATION NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUIAUEVENTAhV E ALERI SITE AREA EMERGENCY __________________ _

INITIATING CONDITION (104) INITIATING CONDITION (204) INITIATING CONDITION 1303)

RAPID SECONDARY SYSTEM MAJOR STEAM LINE BREAK (e.g., GREATER MAJOR STEAM LINE BREAK WITH GREATER DEPRESSURIZATION THAN 6 INCHES EQUIVALENT DIAMETER) THAN 50 GALLONS PER MINUTE PRIMARY-WiTH A SIGNIFICANT TO-SECONDARY LEAKAGE AND INDICATION PRIMARY-TO-SECONDARY LEAK RATE. OF FUEL DAMAGE.

Detection Method:

Rapid decrease in SIG pressure resulting In:

Detection Method: Detection Method:

ALL of the following (1AND 2):

'ALL of the following (1AND 2 AND 3):

BOQiU of the following (1 AND 2):

1 Safety Injection Actuation

1. The EOP Network has determined a faulted

AND- 1. The EOP Network has determined a faulted Steam Generator exists.

Steam Generator exists.

2. EITHER a OR b: ---------------- AND---- -----------

AND -....-....-.- -----------------

a. Steamline pressure < 675 psig 2. Primary to Secondary Leakage Exceeds 50 gpm as determined by ANY of the OR 2. Primary to Secondary Leakage exceeds following:

10 gpm as determined by ANY of the

b. Steamline differential pressure greater following: a. Pre-event analysis, than 97 psid. b. RM-G19A,BorC,

a. Pre-event analysis, c. RM-A9, a" NOTIFICATIONOFiUNUSUAL*EVENTU b. RM-G19A,BorC, d. RM-L3, RM-L7, or RM-L10, or

c. RM-A9, e. SG Sample Analysis.

FOR STUCK OPEN STEAM GENERATOR d. RM-L3, RM-L7, or RM-L1 0, or SAFETIES OR RELiEF VALVES SEE e. SG Sample Analysis. ---------------- AND ----------------

INITIATING CONDITION 102.

3. There is failed fuel Indicated as determined by BOTH of the following:

a. RM-L1 High Range Valid Alarm.

b. RCS dose equivalent 1-131 > 300 ipCgm.

(

EPP-001 ATTACHMENT II PAGE 6 OF 25 REVISION 25 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS LOSS OF HEAT SINK j

111110NOTIFICATION OPNSAEEN4111I 1,I-~ R -IMSITE nAEAREMIERGENCYai m1go w GENERAILEMERGENCY.0W SEE INITIATING CONDITION 301 INITIATING CONDITION (4111 (REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LOCA) TRANSIENT INITIATED BY LOSS OF FEEDWATER AND CONDENSATE SYSTEMS (PRINCIPLE HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM)

FOLLOWED BY FAILURE OF EMERGENCY FEEDWATER SYSTEM FOR EXTENDED PERIOD. CORE MELTING POSSIBLE IN SEVERAL HOURS Detection Method:

ALL of the following exists (1 AND 2):

1. Inability to Establish Bleed and Feed Cooling when required per EOP-1 5.0.

AND --------------

2. Core Exit Temperatures > 700OF.

.5. I

( (. EPP-001 ATTACHMENT II PAGE 7 OF 25 REVISION 25 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS TURBINE OR GENERATOR FAILURE OWNOTIFICATION OFUNUSUALVEVENTU_l __ _IBM__LE __ _ SITEAREDLEMERGENCYR CGENERAEMERGENCY.

INITIATING CONDITION (105) INITIATING CONDITION (292)

OTHER HAZARDS BEING EXPERIENCED OR OTHER HAZARDS BEING EXPERIENCED OR PROJECTED WHICH HAVE-THE POTENTIAL PROJECTED WHICH HAVE A SIGNIFICANT FOR ENDANGERING THE FACILITY POTENTIAL FOR AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY (TURBINE-GENERATOR ROTATING (TURBINE-GENERATOR FAILURE CAUSING COMPONENT FAILURE CAUSING RAPID CASING PENETRATION)

PLANT SHUTDOWN)

Detection Method: Detection Method:

AR of the following (1AND 2): All of the following (1 AND 2):

1. Turbine Trip, 1. Turbine Trip,

AND ----------------- ---------------- AND -............

2. Observation of penetration of the turbine

2. Observation of Failure of EITHER a OR b: casing.

a. Turbine Rotating Assembly.

OR

b. Generator Rotating Assembly.

( C. EPP-001 ATTACHMENT II PAGE 8 OF 25 REVISiON 25 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS FUEL KWNOTIFICATION ORUNUSUALDEVENTTI LE;r':;;iiiiiSITE-IAREAkEMERGENCY - jI -GENERAtIrEMERGENCY INITIATING CONDITION (106) INIlTIATING CONDITION (221) INITIATING CONDITION (321)

FUEL DAMAGE INDICATION POSSIBLE FUEL DAMAGE DEGRADED CORE WITH POSSIBLE LOSS OF COOLASLE GEOMETRY Detection Method: Detection Method: Detection Method:

L of the followIng (1AND 2): ALL of the following (1 AND 2): ALL of the following (1 AND 2 AND 3):

1. RM-L1 High Range Alarm, 1. RM-L1 High Range Alarm, 1. RM-L1 High Range off scale (>10 6cpm) with primary coolant dose equivalent

- - AND ----------------- ---------------- AND -------------- 1-131 activity~ 300 pCtgm,

2. Primary coolant dose equivalent 1-131 2. Primary coolant dose equivalent 1-131 activity 2 30 pCl~gm. activity 2 300 pCVgm.

AND ------

2. Core Exit Temperatures > 700'F,

AND - -

3. No Indication of forced or natural circulation.

( (7 EPP-001 ATTACHMENT II PAGE 9 OF 25 REVISION 25 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS FUEL HANDLING

-:NOTIFICATIONOFUNUSUALEVENT <; e l 9 - -- ALERT

- artl SITE AREA EMERGENCY' -GENERAL EMERGENCY.'.-

INITIATING CONDITION (222) INITIATING CONDITION (322)

FUEL HANDLING ACCIDENT WITH RELEASE MAJOR DAMAGE TO MORE THAN ONE OF RADIOACTIVITY TO REACTOR OR FUEL SPENT FUEL ASSEMBLY IN REACTOR HANDLING BUILDING BUILDING OR FUEL HANDLING BUILDING LEADING TO CLAD RUPTURE (e.g., LARGE OBJECT DAMAGES FUEL OR WATER LOSS BELOW FUEL LEVEL)

Detection Method: Detection Method:

EITHER I OR 2: EITHER 1 OR 2:

1. In the Reactor Building: 1. In the Reactor Building:

a. Observation of damage to one spent fuel a. Observation of major damage to more assembly. than one spent fuel assembly or water level below the tops of spent fuel AND assemblies, AND

b. RM-G5, RM-G17A and RM-G178 high alarms.

b. RM-G5, G17A and G17B high alarms.

OR -----------------

OR-----------------

2. In the Fuel Handling Building:

a. Observation of damage to one spent fuel 2. In the Fuel Handling Building:

assembly.

a. Observation of major damage to more AND than one spent fuel assembly or water level below the tops of spent fuel

b. RM-A6 high alarm, or RM-G8 high alarm. assembles, AND

b. *RM-A6 or RM-G8 high alarm.

Ir( C. r*' lSI EPP-001 ATTACHMENT II PAGE 10 OF 25 REVISION 25 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE (FAILURE OF REACTOR TO TRIP)

DiNOTIFICATION OFUNUSUAUEVENTMNlLAI l lI SITE AREA EMERGENCYRGF I .GENERAL EMERGENGEN INITIATING CONDiTioN (231) INITIATING CONDITION (3311 INITIATING CONDITION (431)

FAILURE OF THE REACTOR PROTECTION TRANSIENT REQUIRING OPERATION OF TRANSIENT REQUIRING OPERATION OF SYSTEM TO INITIATE AND COMPLETE A TRIP SHUTDOWN SYSTEMS WITH FAILURE TO SHUTDOWN SYSTEMS WITH FAILURE TO WHICH BRINGS THE REACTOR SUBCRITICAL TRIP (CONTINUED GENERATION, NO FUEL TRIP WHICH RESULTS IN CORE DAMAGE OR DAMAGE EVIDENT) ADDITIONAL FAILURE OF CORE COOLING AND MAKEUP SYSTEMS WHICH COULD LEAD TO CORE MELT Detection Method: Detection Method: Detection Method:

ALL of the following (1 AND 2): Entry into EOP-13.0 from EOP-1.0, Step 1. ALI of the following (1 AND 2):

1. An automatic reactor trip fails when required, 1. Entry into EOP-1 3.0 from EOP-1.0, Step 1.

AND --------------- I ---------------- AND ---------------

2. EITHER a OR b:

2. A manual reactor trip from either MCB handswitch Is successful. a. RM-L1 alarm, with primary coolant dose equivalent 1-131 activity > 300 pICIgm.

b. Inability to successfully complete 'Initiate Emergency Boration of the RCS' when required per EOP-13.0.

(With the reactor not tripped.)

J I

(

rC Ih I, EPP-001 ATTACHMENT II PAGE 11 OF 25 REVISION 25 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS LOSS OF STATION AC POWER t-. NOTIFICATION

. OF UNUSUALEENT - ALERT- ..... I.I - -' SITE AREA EMERGENCY--:t- A';;'.'l-ag- I : GENERAL EMERGENCY-, -'-<-

INITIATING CONDITION (107) INITIATING CONDITION (241) INITIATING CONDITION (341) INITIATING CONDITION (441)

TOTAL LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER OR LOSS LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER AND LOSS OF ALL LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER AND LOSS OF FAILURE OF OFFSITE AND ONSITE POWER OF ONSITE AC POWER CAPABILITY ONSITE AC POWER FOR MORE ONSITE AC POWER FOR MORE THAN ALONG WITH TOTAL LOSS OF EMERGENCY 5 MINUTES 15 MINUTES FEEDWATER MAKEUP CAPABILITY.

Detection Method: Detection Method: Detection Method: Detection Method:

EITHER I OR 2 OR 3: AUL of the following (1 AND 2 AND 3): eLL of the following (1 AND 2 AND 3) ALL of the following (1AND 2 AND 3 AND 4):

(Lost for a period of from 5 to 15 minutes) (Lost for a period greater than 15 minutes)

1. BOTH Diesel Generators unavailable,

1. Loss of 115KV ESF Potential lIghts 1. BOTH Diesel Generators unavailable, 1. BOTH Diesel Generators unavailable,

AND ---

AND ---------------- AND --------------- AND -- _ ----------------

2. Loss of 115KV Potential Lights

2. Loss of 230KV ESF Potential Lights. 2. Loss of 115KV Potential Lights 2. Loss of 115KV Potential Lights

AND ---- .

OR----------------- ---------------- AND--------------- ---------------- AND --------------

3. Loss of 230KV ESF Potential Lights

3. Automatic actuation of BOTH trains of 3. Loss of 230KV ESF Potential Lights. 3. Loss of 230KV ESF Potential Lights.

emergency Diesel Generators due to ---------------- AND ---------------

degraded or undervoltage conditions.

4. EITHER a PR b:

OR -----------------

a. Steam Driven Emergency Feedwater BOTH Diesel Generators unavailable for Pump fails to start and is unavailable

> 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months . for one hour.

OR

b. Core Exit Temperatures > 700 ° F.

r C EPP-001 I.,

ATTACHMENT II PAGE 12 OF 25 REVISION 25 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS LOSS OF STATION DC POWER tMNO11FICA11ON-ORUNUSUALIEVENT!4

[= I I I_ kL __

.~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

j rosiTEBAREA~EMERGENCYIU.PM .WGGENERUEMERGENCYO INITIATING CONDITiON o242) INITiATING CONDTON (342)

LOSS OF ALL ONSITE DC POWER FOR A LOSS OF ALL VITAL ONSITE DC POWER FOR PERIOD GREATER THAN 5 MINUTES MORE THAN 15 MINUTES Detection Method: Detection Method:

ALL of the following (1 AND 2 AND 3): ALL of the following (1 AND 2 AND 3):

(Lost for a period of from 5 to 15 minutes) (Lost for a period greater than 15 minutes)

1. DC bus undervoltage alarms on all ESF buses, 1. DC bus undervoltage alarms on all ESF buses,

- AND ------- -........ ----------

- AND -- -- -- - - - ------

2.480 V ESF Channel A or B Loss of DC Alarm.

2. 480V ESF Channel A or B Loss of DC Alarm,

AND --------------- ---------

AND - -.-------------

3. DG A or B Loss of DC Alarm.

A____________________________________ I

(7 (7 ,.

EPP-001 ATTACHMENT II PAGE 13 OF 25 REVISION 25 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS (1 of 2)

9,NOTIFICATION OF.UNUSUAItEVENT_ t l_ L-- ALER SITEZAREANEMERGENCY Z GWENERA EMERGENCY INITIATING CONDITION (108) INITIATING CONDITION (261) INITIATING CONDITION 1361) INITIATING CONDITION (461)

GASEOUS EFFLUENT INSTANTANEOUS SUSTAINED HIGH RADIATION LEVELS OR PROJECTED DOSE GREATER THAN EFFLUENT MONITORS DETECT LEVELS RELEASE RATE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION HIGH AIRBORNE CONTAMINATION WHICH 50 MILLIREM TEDE (WHOLE BODY) CORRESPONDING TO 1 REM TEDE LIMITS EXCEEDED FOR 1 HOUR INDICATES A SEVERE DEGRADATION IN THE (WHOLE BODY)

(APPENDIX B TABLE II, COLUMN I 10CFR20) CONTROL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS (e.g., INCREASE BY A FACTOR OF 1000 IN OR OR DIRECT RADIATION READINGS)

GREATER THAN 250 MILLIREM CDE 5 REM CDE (THYROID) AT THE EXCLUSION (THYROID) AT OR BEYOND THE EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY UNDER ACTUAL AREA BOUNDARY METEOROLOGICAL CONDITIONS Detection Method: Detection Method: Detection Method: Detection Method:

EITHER I OR 2 3 54: EITHER 1OR 2: ALL of the following (1 AND 2):

1. RM-A3 (Gas) increases > I x 10scpm above 1. Unexpected valid RMG readings as follows: Non-routine release(s) cause an alarm of RM-A3, 1. Radiation Monitor levels exceed those bkgd In any 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months . A4, A13, A14, or RM-G19 (or detection by other specified for Site Area Emergency,

a. RM-G2-4, 8-13, or 16; greater than means) warrant an offsite dose assessment and 2.5 R/hrQE the results indicate projections exceeding the ----------------AND -----------------

above doses at or beyond the exclusion area

2. RM-A3 (iodine) Increases > 8x 10 cpm b. RM-G7, 17A, 17B, or 18 greater than boundary. 2. Calculation on Dose Assessment Forms above bkgd in any 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months . 100 R/hr OR Indicates levels exceeding 1 Rem TEDE

-~~~~~~~~OR- (whole body) or 5 Rem CDE (thyroid) at the

c. RM-G1 greater than 1 R/hr. exclusion area boundary using radiation monitor readings and effluent stream flow

3. RM-A4 (Gas) exceeds 4 times the high alarm ----------------- ------....-..-. rates (measured or assumed) for actual setpolnt for more than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months . meteorological conditions; or using field

2. Unexpected plant area iodine or particulate measurements.

- -- OR----.....

-- airborne concentration greater than 1000 DAC (as per IOCFR20 Appendix B, Table 1).

4. RM-A4 (Iodine) in valid high alarm for more than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months .

Classification for gaseous radiological effluents can also be determined using EPP-005.

Classification for gaseous radiological effluents Classification for gaseous radiological effluents Classification for gaseous radiological effluents can also be determined using EPP-005. can also be determined using EPP-005. can also be determined using EPP-005.

( C ( e, EPP-001 1-I, ATTACHMENT II PAGE 14 OF 25 REVISION 25 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS (2 of 2) lNOTIFICATION OF. UNUSUAIUEVENT-U ALET _ _SITEAREA

_A EMERGENCYMi GENERAIJEMERGENCY-INITIATING CONDITION (109) INITIATING CONDITION (262) INITIATING CONDITION (362)

LIQUID EFFLUENT CONCENTRATIONS, RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT RELEASE RATE DOSE RATES LISTED BELOW ARE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS LIMITS EXCEEDING 10 TIMES TECHNICAL PROJECTED BASED ON GAMMA RADIATION EXCEEDED FOR 15 MINUTES SPECIFICATION INSTANTANEOUS LIMITS MONITOR (RMG) READINGS ANDIOR OTHER (APPENDIX B TABLE II COLUMN 2 10CFR20) PLANT PARAMETERS OR ARE MEASURED AT THE EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY Detection Method: Detection Method: Detection Method:

EITHER 1 OR 2 OR 3:

ALL of the following (1 AND 2): ANY of the following valid radiation monitor readings for longer than 15 minutes 1. Reactor Building leak rate results in calculated (I OR 2OR 3OR 4OR 5): dose rate at exclusion area boundary greater

1. ANY of the following liquid effluent monitors In than EITHER (a OR b):

valid High Alarm for longer than 15 minutes:

1. RM-A3 (Gas) is off scale high. a. 50 mrem/hr whole body for 0.5 hour5.787037e-5 days 0.00139 hours 8.267196e-6 weeks 1.9025e-6 months .

RM-15 or RM-L7 or RM-19 OR

OR-----------------

AND ---- b. 500 mrem/hr whole body for 2 minutes.

2. RM-A3 (Iodine) is off scale high.

2. The associated isolation valve(s) fail to close. ---------------- OR ----------------

_ - -- - OR -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -

2. Radiation Monitoring Teams measure dose

3. RM-A4 (Gas) exceeds 40 limes high alarm rates at one mile or greater from the plant at setpoint. greater than EITHER (a OR b):

OR ----------------- a. 50 mrem/hr for 0.5 hour5.787037e-5 days 0.00139 hours 8.267196e-6 weeks 1.9025e-6 months .

4. RM-A4 (Iodine) exceeds 10 times high alarm setpoint. b. Greater than 500 mrem/hr for 2 minutes (beta + gamma)

OR----------------- ---------------

OR -----------------

5. RM-L5, RM-L7, or RM-L9 exceeds 10 times high alarm setpoint and isolation valve(s) fail 3. Radiation Monitoring Teams measure to close. thyroid dose rates (equivalent 1-131 concentrations) at one mile or greater from the plant at greater than EITHER (a OR b):

a. 250 mrem/hr (1.3x1i07 pCVcc) for 0.5 hour5.787037e-5 days 0.00139 hours 8.267196e-6 weeks 1.9025e-6 months .

b. 2500 mrem/hr (1.3x100i8 CVcc) for 2 minutes.

( (. C EPP-001 ATTACHMENT II PAGE 15 OF 25 REVISION 25 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS FIRE OWNOTIFICATIONOF;,UNUSUA1EEVENT MI____________I' ___LE______________ K IMMM SITEAREA ,EMERGENCY MOMMj GENERAISEMERGENCY *J&

INITIATING CONDITION (110) INITIATING CONDITION (271) INITIATING CONDITION (371)

FIRE WITHIN THE PROTECTED AREA OR THE FIRE POTENTIALLY AFFECTING SAFETY FIRE AFFECTING SAFETY TRAINS OR SWITCHYARD LASTING MORE THAN SYSTEMS FUNCTIONS 15 MINUTES Detection Method: Detection Method: Detection Method:

Observation of Fire lasting more than 15 minutes within:

Observation of a fire that has the potential for Observation of a fire that renders both trains of a EITHER I OR 2: rendering one or more safety systems inoperable safety system or function inoperable per the per the Technical Specifications. Technical Specifications.

1. Protected Area

--.--- OR ----------------------------

2. Syitchyard

I- I,

( 6* *,

EPP-001 ATTACHMENT II PAGE 16 OF 25 REVISION 25 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS SECURITY UINOTIFICATION OF.iUNUSUALI!EVENTU [_______al_____________ __ ___ - SITE AREA EMERGENCNGENERAL EMERGENCY41!_

INITIATING CONDITION (1111 INITIATING CONDITION (2811 INITIATING CONDITION (3811 INITIATING CONDITION (4811 SECURITY THREAT OR ATTEMPTED ENTRY ONGOING SEVERE SECURITY THREAT SECURITY THREAT INVOLVING IMMINENT SECURITY THREAT RESULTING IN LOSS OF OR ATTEMPTED SABOTAGE LOSS OF PHYSICAL CONTROL OF THE PHYSICAL CONTROL OF THE FACILITY PLANT Detection Method: Detection Method: Detection Method: Detection Method:

Report to the Control Room by Security or Security safeguards contingency event which Security safeguards contingency event which Physical attack on the Plant has resulted In observer. results in adversaries commandeering or causing results In adversaries commandeering or causing occupation of:

significant damage to a Non-Vital area within the significant damage to a Vital Area of the Plant.

Protected Area. EITHER 1 Q 2:

1. Control Room.

OR------------------

2. Control Room Evacuation Panel Rooms.

See EPP-001 Attachment III for additional See EPP-001 Attachment III for additional See EPP-001 Attachment III for additional See EPP-001 Attachment IlIl for additional guidance. guidance. guidance. guidance.

(. (.t 1, I1I C.

EPP-001 ATTACHMENT II PAGE 17 OF 25 REVISION 25 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS EARTHQUAKE pI~NOTIFICATION~~iUNUSUAIIEVENTALER -J N SITErAREAIEMERGENCY M M IS - GENERArIEMERGENCYXW0W INITIATING CONDITION (112) INITIATING CONDITION (2911 INITIATING CONDITION (391)

EARTHQUAKE EARTHQUAKE GREATER THAN THE EARTHQUAKE GREATER THAN OPERATING 213 OPERATING BASIS EARTHQUAKE BASIS EARTHQUAKE LEVEL BEING LEVEL EXPERIENCED OR PROJECTED WITH PLANT NOT IN COLD SHUTDOWN Detection Method: Detection Method: Detection Method:

BOTH 1 AND 2: BOTH I AND 2: BOTH 1 AND 2:

1. Seismic Recording System Start Indication. 1. Seismic Event Annunciator 2/3 OBE 1. Observation of the event (felt or heard) lasting exceeded (one or more yellow rights rt). >2 seconds.

- --- AND-.........-

-AND --.... -..... ---------------- AND ---------------

2. Confirmation of a seismic event through observation (felt or heard) in the Control 2. Confirmation of a seismic event through 2. EITHER a OR b:

Room. observation (felt or heard) in the Control Room. a. RB Foundation Seismic Switch OBE exceeded.

.OR

b. Seismic Event Annunciator OBE exceeded (one or more red lights lit).

U

(.

(. C.

EPP-001 ATTACHMENT II PAGE 18 OF 25 REVISION 25 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS TORNADO OR WIND i --NOTIFICATION OFUNUSUALEVENT -. , -' ALERT. .~-: -;-SITEAREAEMERGENCYs X - ills -+ GENERALEMERGENCY - l INmATING CONDITION (112) INITIATING CONDITION 1291) INITIATING CONDITION (391)

TORNADO ONSITE TORNADO STRIKING FACILITY SUSTAINED WINDS IN EXCESS OF 100 MILES PER HOUR ONSITE BEING EXPERIENCED OR PROJECTED WITH PLANT NOT IN COLD SHUTDOWN Detection Method Detection Method: Detection Method:

Observation of Tornado in Exclusion Area. Observation of a Tornado within: Sustained winds in excess of 100 moh onsite:

EITHER a OR b: As measured by EITHER a OR b:

a. Protected Area

a. Onsite meteorological Instrumentation

OR------------------

b. Switchyard.

b. The National Weather Service.

- HURRICANE

'(. NOTIFICATION OF. UNUSUA1UEVEN 1i l _ 3KALER. SITEAREMERGENCY GENERAINEMERGENCYA l INITIATING CONDITION (112) INITIATING CONDITION (291)

HURRICANE NEAR SITE SUSTAINED HURRICANE WINDS GREATER THAN 75 MILES PER HOUR NEAR SITE SAME AS TORNADO ABOVE Detection Method: Detection Method:

Sustained winds In excess of 50 mph onsite Sustained winds in excess of 75 moh onsite due to a hurricane: due to a hurricane:

As measured by EITHER a QR b: As measured by EITHER a OR b:

a. Onsite meteorological Instrumentation a. Onsite meteorological Instrumentation

.R

b. The National Weather Service. b. The National Weather Service.

C .

EPP-001 ATTACHMENT II PAGE 19 OF 25 REVISION 25 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS AIRCRAFT CRASH iiiNOTIFICATION OFUNUSUALBEVENT IR[ _ R l11lSITEtAREA EMERGENNCY lflENERALFEMERGENCY _

INITIATING CONDITION (113) INITIATING CONDITION (292) INITIATING CONDITION (392)

ONSITE AIRCRAFT CRASH BEING AIRCRAFT CRASH ON FACILITY BEING AIRCRAFT CRASH INTO VITAL STRUCTURES EXPERIENCED OR PROJECTED WHICH HAS EXPERIENCED OR PROJECTED WHICH HAS BEING EXPERIENCED OR PROJECTED WiTH THE POTENTIAL FOR ENDANGERING THE A SIGNIFICANT POTENTIAL FOR AFFECTING PLANT NOT IN COLD SHUTDOWN FACILITY PLANT SAFETY Detection Method: Detection Method: Detection Method:

Observation of Aircraft Crash within the Exclusion Observation of a Aircraft Crash within: Aircraft crash causing damage or fire in ANY of Area. the following areas:

EITHER a OR b:

a. Reactor Building.

a. Protected Area b. Control Building C. Auxiliary Building.

-OR-------------OR-----_- , d. Fuel Handling Building.

e. DG Building.

b. Switchyard. f. Intermediate Building.

g. SW Building Structures.

TRAIN DERAILMENT pq;NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUADEVENTMUI[ - lALE I..S SITREAREAEMERGENCYG _E 'GENERAIiEMERGENGYC INITIATING CONDITION (113)

ONSITE TRAIN DERAILMENT WHICH HAS THE POTENTIAL FOR ENDANGERING THE FACILITY Detection Method:

Observation of Train Derailment within the Exclusion Area.

( (. EPP-001 1(

ATTACHMENT II PAGE 20 OF 25 REVISION 25 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS MISSILE IMPACTS nR FXP[OI-pny

- NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT ............-...- --

X - ALERT . -.......

->->... [ . - SITE AREA EMERGENCY - I- - GNERAL EMERGENCY-INITIATING CONDITION (292)

MISSILE IMPACTS ON FACILITY WITH RESULTANT MAJOR DAMAGE BEING EXPERIENCED OR PROJECTED WHICH HAVE A SIGNIFICANT POTENTIAL FOR AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY Detection Method:

INITIATING CONDITION (392)

Observation of missile Impacts on Plant structures MISSILE OR EXPLOSION IMPACT ON FACILITY or components with major damage. RENDERING SEVERE DAMAGE TO SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT BEING EXPERIENCED OR kn..rtfl

..II%&.inU...fl IIU.Ul.UNSA3VNra 1 a....s I Esa..e.,n. a. --

PROJECTED WITH PLANT NOT IN COLD INITIATING CONDITION (113) INITIATING CONDITION (292) SHUTDOWN ONSITE EXPLOSION (EXCLUDING PLANNED KNOWN EXPLOSION AT FACILITY ACTIVITIES) BEING EXPERIENCED OR RESULTING IN MAJOR DAMAGE TO PLANT PROJECTED WHICH HAS THE POTENTIAL STRUCTURES OR EQUIPMENT BEING FOR ENDANGERING THE FACILITY EXPERIENCED OR PROJECTED WHICH HAS Delection Method:

A SIGNIFICANT POTENTIAL FOR AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY Loss of functions needed for hot shutdown (See specific Initiating Condition 394 for this situation).

Detection Method: Detection Method:

Observation of Explosion within the Exclusion Observation of major damage by Explosion.

Area.

I I

_________________________________ I~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

( d-I C EPP-001 ATTACHMENT II PAGE 21 OF 25 REVISION 25 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS TOXIC OR FLAMMABLE GAS diiKNOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL USVENUlEYENiALE l SITE AREAKEMERGENCY GENERAIIEMERGENCYP INITIATING CONDITION (113) INITIATING CONDITION (292) INITIATING CONDITION (392)

NEAR OR ONSITE TOXIC OR FLAMMABLE ENTRY INTO FACILITY ENVIRONS OF TOXIC ENTRY OF TOXIC OR FLAMMABLE GASES GAS RELEASE OF A MAGNITUDE THAT OR FLAMMABLE GASES IN CONCENTRATION INTO VITAL AREA WHICH INVOLVES A THREATENS PERSONNEL BEING WHICH EXCEEDS THE LIMITS OF SIGNIFICANT DEGRADATION OF PLANT EXPERIENCED OR PROJECTED WHICH HAS FLAMMABILITY OR TOXICITY BEING SAFETY BEING EXPERIENCED OR PROJECTED THE POTENTIAL FOR ENDANGERING THE EXPERIENCED OR PROJECTED WHICH HAS WITH PLANT NOT IN COLD SHUTDOWN FACILITY A SIGNIFICANT POTENTIAL FOR AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY Detection Method:

Detection Method: Detection Method:

Entry of Toxic or Flammable Gas into ANY of the Observation or credible warning of an unplanned Observation or credible warning of an unplanned following areas:

release of toxic or flammable gas within the release of toxic or flammable gas within:

Exclusion Area. a. Control Room, EITHER a OR b: b. Cable Spreading Rooms,

c. Reactor Building,

a. Protected Area d. ESF Switchgear Rooms, e.. Control Room EvacuatIon Panel Rooms or

OR------------------ f. Emergency Diesel Generator Rooms.

b. Switchyard.

( C I,

EPP-001 ATTACHMENT II PAGE 22 OF 25 REVISION 25 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS LOSS OF RHR AT HALF PIPE OPERATIONS

.NOT~FICATIONWOKUNUSUAtIEVENT ALE IZ O SITE AREA EMERGENCY U- - GENERAL EMERGENCYAC__

INITIATING CONDITION (297) _ INITiATING CONDITION (397)

LOSS OF RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL FLOW LOSS OF RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL FLOW FOR MORE THAN 20 MINUTES DURING FOR MORE THAN 40 MINUTES DURING HALF-PIPE OPERATIONS WiTH VESSEL HEAC HALF-PIPE OPERATIONS WiTH VESSEL INSTALLED HEAD INSTALLED AND HIGH HEAD SAFETY INJECTIONICHARGING UNAVAILABLE Detection Method: Detection Method:

ALL of the following (1 THROUGH 4) ALL of the following (1 THROUGH 5)

For a period of 20 to 40 minutes: For a period greater than 40 minutes:

1. Both RHR Loop A FLO LO AND RHR Loop B FLO LO annunciators in alarm, 1. Both RHR Loop A FLO LO AND RHR Loop B FLO LO annunciators in alarm,

AND---------------

AND----------------

2. NEITHER RHR Pump Is running,

2. NEITHER RHR pump is running,

AND ---------------

-AND---------------

3. Core exit temperature Increasing on core exit thermocouples, 3. Core exit temperature Increasing on core exit thermocouples,

AND ---------------

.-------.. -AND

4. Reactor Vessel Head is in place and RCS loops are drained to 431 or less, 4. Reactor Vessel Head is in place and RCS loops are drained to 431' or less,

AND --... -.......

5. NEITHER train of Charging/Si Is available.

(7 C EPP-001 ho I ATTACHMENT II PAGE 23 OF 25 REVISION 25 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS LOSS OF PLANT ANNUNCIATORS

.--.---.- Y -

inNNTTIFICAIONOOFiUNUSUJAI1EVENT

-- - - -r - --- - - --

M I ~ALERM I inS STT~fARE~

rMERGEN CY~~inI_ _ _ MBW E.NFRAUE4MrRGR-NCYJWKNO INITIATING CONDITION (296) INITIATING CONDITION 1396)

MOST OR ALL ANNUNCIATOR ALARMS LOST MOST OR ALL ANNUNCIATORS LOST AND PLANT TRANSIENT INITIATED OR IN PROGRESS Detection Method: Detection Method:

Greater than 75% of the MCB annunciators ALL of the following (1 AND 2):

inoperable.

1. Greater than 75% of the MCB Annunciators Inoperable,

AND ----------------

2. Reactor Trip or Safety Injection actuation initiated or In progress.

CONTROL ROOM EVACUATION NOTIFICATION OFAUNUSUALYEEVENTO ALERT-I SI'AREA EMERGENC GENERALiEMERGENCY _

INITIATING CONDITION (295) INITIATING CONDITION (395)

EVACUATION OF CONTROL ROOM EVACUATION OF CONTROL ROOM AND ANTICIPATED OR REQUIRED WITH CONTROL CONTROL OF SHUTDOWN SYSTEMS NOT OF SHUTDOWN SYSTEMS ESTABLISHED ESTABLISHED FROM LOCAL STATIONS IN FROM LOCAL STATIONS 15 MINUTES Detection Method: Detection Method:

Same as Initiating Condition. Same as Initiating Condition.

( c ('

EPP-O01 I

ATTACHMENT II PAGE 24 OF 25 REVISION 25 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS EMERGENCY DIRECTOR DISCRETION IINORAFICATIONOUNUSUAOEVENTMUSU[ EV i__ALSITASITEAREAEMERGENCYAC jlI GENERAL-EMERGENCYCY INITIATING CONDITION /293) INITIATING CONDION (3931 INITIATING CONDITION (493)

OTHER PLANT CONDITIONS EXIST THAT OTHER PLANT CONDITIONS EXIST THAT OTHER PLANT CONDITIONS EXIST THAT WARRANT ACTIVATION OF TECHNICAL WARRANT ACTIVATION OF EMERGENCY WARRANT ACTIVATION OF EMERGENCY SUPPORT CENTER AND PLACING FACILITIES AND RADIATION MONITORING FACILUTIES AND RECOMMENDED EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY TEAMS AND A PRECAUTIONARY PUBLIC PROTECTIVE MEASURES FOR THE PUBLIC PERSONNEL ON STANDBY WARNING Detection Method: Detection Method: Detection Method:

As determined by IEDIED. As determined by IEDIED. As determined by IEDIED.

( C, EPP-001 ATTACHMENT II PAGE 25 OF 25 REVISION 25 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS OTHFR j

I r NnTIFlr:a

, nnN nF

, *.UAta, , I- s.sn ... r ~ .~r.

.f. . . nFW.-

INITIATING CONDITION (1151 INITIATiNG CONDITION (294) INITIATING CONDITION (3941 UNPLANNED LOSS OF ALL ONSITE OR LOSS OF ALL FUNCTIONS NEEDED FOR LOSS OF FUNCTIONS NEEDED FOR PLANT OFFSITE COMMUNICATIONS CAPABILITY PLANT COLD SHUTDOWN HOT SHUTDOWN Detection Method: Detection Method: Detection Method:

Unplanned loss of EITHER 1 OR 2: MIJL of the following (1AND 2): &L of the following (1 AND 2 AND 3 AND 4):

1. ALL of the following onsite communications 1. RHR system not functional in Modes I to 4, 1. Inability to establish charging pump injection, capability affecting the ability to perform routine operations: ---------------- AND ---------------- ----------------- AND ----------------

a. Internal telephone system; 2. Inability to reject heat to the condenser and 2. Inabiiity to establish Emergency Feedwater

b. Gal-Tronics system and atmosphere. Flow,

c. Radio System.

AND ----- -----------

OR----------------

3. RHR System not functional (applicable to

2. All of the following offsite communications Modes, 1, 2, and 3 only),

capability (when extraordinary means must be used to make communications): ----------------AND ----------------

a. Internal telephone system, 4. Inability to reject heat to the condenser AND

b. Bell Lines, atmosphere.

c. Fiberoptic Links and

d. Radio System.

\ NOTIFICATION'OFUNUSUAiEVENTV T INITIATING CONDITION (114)

INABILITY TO REACH REQUIRED SHUTDOWN WITHIN TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION LIMITS Detection Method:

Same as Initiating Condition.

EPP-001 ATTACHMENT III PAGE 1 OF 11 REVISION 25 CONSIDERATIONS FOR A SECURITY EMERGENCY NOTE Due to the wide range of possible security emergencies, it is not feasible to develop a strategy for every possible situation. Therefore, this general guidance has been provided to help in determining appropriate response. Scripts of plant page announcements contained in this Attachment are examples only and should be modified based on the nature of the emergency.

The Security Team Leader will notify the Control Room of a security emergency. A security emergency may be classified as an Intrusion or a Site-Specific Credible Threat. See the following considerations for each of these situations. Lines to the left of the considerations are for place keeping and are optional.

Intrusion:

CAUTION Avoid moving personnel within the Protected Area without consulting the Security Team ILeVCIuVI nnrlr oi! 4n th^

a; Iu Ii

c ^f thm IV QCIiLy uL IVe E VI QJI II EVI.

-_____ 1. Immediately direct an Operator to install the "Ultra Dogs" on the two card reader doors that lead into the Control Room area.

2. Make the following plant announcement:

%LLVI ILIVJI I 11I LI IW F ICi IL. I"lVI ILIIJI I 111 Li IC F Id1 IL.

The Station is in a Security Emergency. All personnel should remain in their current location and take cover. Do not move to another location unless advised by the Control Room or Security personnel. (Repeat announcement once.)

3. DO NOT sound the Radiation Emergency Alarm.

4. Maintain contact between the Control Room and the Security Team Leader. The Control Room may monitor the Security frequency on a hand-held radio.

5. Declare the appropriate Emergency Classification when the Initiating Conditions are met.

EPP-001 ATTACHMENT III PAGE 2 OF 11 REVISION 25 CONSIDERATIONS FOR A SECURITY EMERGENCY

_6. Ifthe ERO is needed, DO NOT activate pagers using the normal method to summon the entire ERO. After working hours, contact the ERO and instruct only the Duty ERO Team to report to the Primary EOF or Backup EOF. Provide the access route, if appropriate (see page 11). The ERO may be contacted using the Dialogics Communicator or the Call Tree as follows:

a. Dialogics Communicator:

1) Dial the Dialogics Communicator at 58716 or dial toll free 1-(877)-262-5585.

2) The Dialogics Communicator System will answer as follows:

"This is the Remote Activation Module. Please enter your scenario activation password followed by the # sign".

Enter 1234567 and press the # sign.

3) "To start a scenario, enter the scenario.lD followed by the

sign or press # alone for more options". To start the scenario for sending the Duty ERO Team to the Primary EOF, enter the scenario ID 100200 followed by the # sign. To start the scenario for sending the Duty ERO Team to the Backup EOF, enter the scenario ID 100201 followed by the # sign. The text for the current scenarios is as follows:

Primary EOF, Scenario ID 100200:

"The V. C. Summer Nuclear Station has received a security threat. The On-duty and only the On-duty Emergency Response Team, including the Technical Support Center, Operations Support Center and the Emergency Operations Facility staffs, shall report to the Primary Emergency Operations Facility at the Nuclear Training Center. All other Emergency Response Personnel should stand by for further instructions".

Backup EOF, Scenario ID 100201:

"The V. C. Summer Nuclear Station has received a security threat. The On-duty and only the On-duty Emergency Response Team, including the Technical Support Center, Operations Support Center and the Emergency Operations Facility staffs, shall report to the Backup Emergency Operations Facility at the Palmetto Center. All other Emergency Response Personnel should stand by for further instructions."

EPP-001 ATTACHMENT IlIl PAGE 3 OF 11 REVISION 25 CONSIDERATIONS FOR A SECURITY EMERGENCY

4) After you enter the scenario ID and press the # sign you will hear, "You may change the current message. Press I to listen to the message. Press 2 to record a new message or Press the

sign to continue". Press 1 if no supplemental information, such as access routes to the EOF, is needed. Press 2 if supplemental information needs to be provided.

5) If 1 is pressed, listen to the message, then press # to continue. If 2 is pressed, record the new message. Press the # sign when completed.

6) "To start the scenario, press 3. To return to the Main Menu press #". Press 3. Press the # sign to exit.

OR

b. Call Tree:

The current Call Tree may be found in:

Public FoldersNCS/Emergency Preparedness.

7. The IED retains Emergency Plan duties and responsibilities until it is safe to staff the TSC.

8. Evacuate Non-essential personnel when it is safe to do so.

EPP-001 ATTACHMENT III PAGE 4 OF 11 REVISION 25 CONSIDERATIONS FOR A SECURITY EMERGENCY Site-Specific Credible Threat:

CAUTION Avoid moving personnel inside or outside the Protected Area without consulting the Security Team Leader as to the safety of the personnel.

1. Declare a Notification of Unusual Event (NOUE), at a minimum, based on Security Threat, EAL #111. A higher initial classification could be made based on the nature and timing of the threat and potential consequences.

2. Implement the Radiation Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan Procedures. State and local governments should be notified as required.

Do not activate the Early Warning Siren System unless directed by the government agencies, per our procedures.

3. TSC/OSC staffing and other personnel decisions are made based on the nature of the threat and the timing of the threat. These decisions are independent of the NOUE activities.

Evacuate plant personnel if the information about the threat indicates that time is available. The ERO Duty Team is directed to report to the EOF or Backup EOF as described below. The EOF or Backup EOF is used as a staging area for TSC and OSC personnel. The IED may contact the EOF or Backup EOF to direct specific TSC and OSC personnel to come to the plant site, as necessary. The TSC and OSC should not be fully manned until the threat is resolved.

EPP-001 ATTACHMENT III PAGE 5 OF 11 REVISION 25 CONSIDERATIONS FOR A SECURITY EMERGENCY

4. Make one of the following plant announcements:

TAKE COVER:

Attention in the Plant. Attention in the Plant.

The Station is in a Security Emergency. All personnel should remain in their current location and take cover. Do not move to another location unless advised by the Control Room or Security personnel.

OR EVACUATE:

Attention in the Plant. Attention in the Plant.

The Station is in a Security Emergency. All non-essential and Off-Duty ERO personnel evacuate the site, proceed to your private residence. All On-Duty ERO personnel report to the EOF. (Provide the exit route, if appropriate, see page 11.)

Sound the Radiation Emergency Alarm.

Repeat the Plant Announcement.

5. The Duty Emergency Director should evaluate assuming emergency duties from the IED without a staffed and activated TSC. The Duty Emergency Director should only assume emergency duties from the IED if the Duty Emergency Director is located in the TSC.

6. Maintain contact between the Control Room and the Security Team Leader. The Control Room may monitor the Security frequency on a hand-held radio.

7. Reactor and plant operational decisions should be as directed by Plant Management.

EPP-001 ATTACHMENT III PAGE 6 OF 11 REVISION 25 CONSIDERATIONS FOR A SECURITY EMERGENCY

8. After working hours, contact the ERO and instruct only the Duty ERO Team to report to the Primary EOF or Backup EOF. Provide the access route, if appropriate (see page 11). The ERO may be contacted using the Dialogics Communicator or the Call Tree as follows:

-_____ a. Dialogics Communicator:

1) Dial the Dialogics Communicator at 58716 or dial toll free 1-(877)-262-5585.

2) The Dialogics Communicator System will answer as follows:

"This is the Remote Activation Module. Please enter your scenario activation password followed by the # sign".

Enter 1234567 and press the # sign.

3) "To start a scenario, enter the scenario ID followed by the #

sign or press # alone for more options". To start the scenario for sending the Duty ERO Team to the Primary EOF, enter the scenario ID 100200 followed by the # sign. To start the scenario for sending the Duty ERO Team to the Backup EOF, enter the scenario ID 100201 followed by the # sign. The text for the current scenarios is as follows:

Primary EOF, Scenario ID 100200:

"The V. C. Summer Nuclear Station has received a security threat. The On-duty and only the On-duty Emergency Response Team, including the Technical Support Center, Operations Support Center and the Emergency Operations Facility staffs, shall report to the Primary Emergency Operations Facility at the Nuclear Training Center. All other Emergency Response Personnel should stand by for further instructions."

Backup EOF, Scenario ID 100201:

"The V. C. Summer Nuclear Station has received a security threat. The On-duty and only the On-duty Emergency Response Team, including the Technical Support Center, Operations Support Center and the Emergency Operations Facility staffs, shall report to the Backup Emergency Operations Facility at the Palmetto Center. All other Emergency Response Personnel should stand by for further instructions."

EPP-001 ATTACHMENT IlIl PAGE 7 OF 11 REVISION 25 CONSIDERATIONS FOR A SECURITY EMERGENCY

4) After you enter the scenario ID and press the # sign you will hear, "You may change the current message. Press I to listen to the message. Press 2 to record a new message or Press the

sign to continue". Press I if no supplemental information, such as access routes to the EOF, is needed. Press 2 if supplemental information needs to be provided.

5) If 1 is pressed, listen to the message, then press # to continue. If 2 is pressed, record the new message. Press the # sign when completed.

6) "To start the scenario, press 3. To return to the Main Menu press #". Press 3. Press the # sign to exit.

OR

b. Call Tree.

The current Call Tree may be found in:

Public FoldersNCS/Emergency Preparedness.

9. Notify Security of the intended routes and direct them to ensure gates are open appropriate.

EPP-001 ATTACHMENT IlIl PAGE 8 OF 11 REVISION 25 CONSIDERATIONS FOR A SECURITY EMERGENCY Site-Specific Credible Insider Threat:

NOTE Due to the wide range of possible security emergencies, it is not feasible to develop a strategy for every possible situation. Therefore, this general guidance has been provided to help in determining appropriate response. Scripts of plant page announcements contained in this Attachment are examples only and should be modified based on the nature of the emergency.

_____ 1. Make the following announcement:

Attention in the Plant. Attention in the Plant.

The Station is in a Security Emergency. All personnel except Operations and Security evacuate the Protected Area. Assemble in the parking lot and await further instructions.

2. Sound the Radiation Emergency Alarm.

3. Repeat the Plant Announcement.

k--C02 -0 4. In close coordination with the Security Team Leader implement the actions in SCP- 13, Two Person Rule.

5. Establish communications with the MDS and Security management.

6. Declare the appropriate Emergency Classification when the Initiating Conditions are met.

7. If the ERO is needed during normal working hours, Plant Management will assemble teams in the parking lot and provide direction as to facility manning and activation.

EPP-001 ATTACHMENT III PAGE 9 OF 11 REVISION 25 CONSIDERATIONS FOR A SECURITY EMERGENCY

8. If the ERO is needed after working hours, DO NOT activate pagers using the normal method to summon the entire ERO. Contact the ERO and instruct only the Duty ERO Team to report to the Primary EOF or Backup EOF. Provide the access route, if appropriate (see page 11). The ERO may be contacted using the Dialogics Communicator or the Call Tree as follows:

a. Dialogics Communicator:

1) Dial the Dialogics Communicator at 58716 or dial toll free 1-877-262-5585.

2) The Dialogics Communicator System will answer as follows:

"This is the Remote Activation Module. Please enter your scenario activation password followed by the # sign". Enter 1234567 and press the # sign.

3) "To start a scenario, enter the scenario ID followed by the #

sign or press # alone for more options". To start the scenario for sending the Duty ERO Team to the Primary EOF, .enter the scenario ID 100200 followed by the # sign. To start the scenario for sending the Duty ERO Team to the Backup EOF, enter the scenario ID 100201 followed by the # sign. The text for the current scenarios is as follows:

Primary EOF, Scenario ID 100200:

"The V. C. Summer Nuclear Station has received a security threat. The On-Duty and only the On-Duty Emergency Response Team, including the Technical Support Center, Operations Support Center and the Emergency Operations Facility staffs, shall report to the Primary Emergency Operations Facility at the Nuclear Training Center. All other Emergency Response Personnel should stand by for further instructions."

Backup EOF, Scenario ID 100201:

"The V. C. Summer Nuclear Station has received a security threat. The On-Duty and only the On-Duty Emergency Response Team, including the Technical Support Center, Operations Support Center and the Emergency Operations Facility staffs, shall report to the Backup Emergency Operations Facility at the Palmetto Center. All other Emergency Response Personnel should stand by for further instructions."

EPP-001 ATTACHMENT III PAGE 10 OF 11 REVISION 25 CONSIDERATIONS FOR A SECURITY EMERGENCY

4) After you enter the scenario ID and press the # sign you will hear, "You may change the current message. Press I to listen to the message. Press 2 to record a new message or Press the

sign to continue." Press 1 if no supplemental information, such as access routes to the EOF, is needed. Press 2 if supplemental information needs to be provided.

5) If I is pressed, listen to the message, then press # to continue. If 2 is pressed, record the new message. Press the # sign when completed.

6) "To start the scenario, press 3. To return to the Main Menu press #". Press 3. Press the # sign to exit.

OR

b. Call Tree:

The current Call Tree may be found in:

Public FoldersNCS/Emergency Preparedness.

9.

__ The IED retains Emergency Plan duties and responsibilities until it is safe to staff the TSC.

I EPP-001 ATTACHMENT IlIl PAGE 11 OF 11 REVISION 25 CONSIDERATIONS FOR A SECURITY EMERGENCY Access/Exit Routes:

As dictated by the events, select one of the below Basic Routes and the closest open bridge(s) to access or exit the plant and the EOF. Contact Security to remove barriers and/or unlock gates for Routes 2 and 3.

Three Basic Routes:

1. Normal Route via Highway 215.

2. Northern Route via the dirt road over the Fairfield Pumped Storage dam.

3. Southern Route via the dirt road from the south end of the plant access road to Parr.

Bridges Across the Broad River:

1. Pinner Bridge, Highway 213.

2. Northern section of the 10-mile EPZ.

3. 1-20 Bridge, located in Columbia, west of the junction of 1-20 and Monticello Road (Highway 215).

RC-04-0032, Emergency Plan Procedure EPP-001, Revision 25, Change a, Activation and Implementation of Emergency Plan

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