RC-02-0152, Revised EPIP EPP-001, Rev. 24, Change F, Activation & Implementation of Emergency Plan.

Revised EPIP EPP-001, Rev. 24, Change F, Activation & Implementation of Emergency Plan.

ML022590147
Person / Time
Site:	Summer
Issue date:	09/04/2002
From:	Browne M South Carolina Electric & Gas Co
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
RC-02-0152 EPP-001, Rev. 24
Download: ML022590147 (55)

Text

Melvin N. Browne Manager,NuclearLicensing & Operating Experience 345-4141 A SCANA COMPAN September 4, 2002 AscANA COMPANY RC-02-0152 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 Gentlemen:

Subject:

VIRGIL C. SUMMER NUCLEAR STATION (VCSNS)

DOCKET NO. 50/395 OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-12 TRANSMITTAL OF EMERGENCY PLAN PROCEDURE In compliance with 1 OCFR50 Appendix E(V), South Carolina Electric & Gas Company, acting for itself and as agent for South Carolina Public Service Authority, transmits one controlled copy of EPP-001, Revision 24, Change F, "Activation and Implementation of Emergency Plan".

The effectiveness of the Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station Radiation Emergency Plan is not decreased by the change to this procedure.

Should you have any questions, please contact Mrs. Michelle Bedenbaugh at (803) 345-4427.

Very truly yours, Melv N. Bron MBB/MNB/mb Attachment c: L. A. Reyes (With 2 Attachments) ec: (Without Attachment)

NRC Resident Inspector RTS (0-L-99-0354)

File (810.10-2, RR 6000)

DMS (RC-02-0152)

SCE&G I Virgil C.Summer Nuclear Station

• P.0.Box 88 . Jenkinsville, South Carolina 29065 .T (803) 345.5209 .wwwscona corn

SOUTH CAROLINA ELECTRIC & GAS COMPANY VIRGIL C. SUMMER NUCLEAR STATION NUCLEAR OPERATIONS NUCLEAR OPERATIONS COPY NO. Ib')

EMERGENCY PLAN PROCEDURE EPP-001 ACTIVATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF EMERGENCY PLAN REVISION 24 SAFETY RELATED DtAPLIPR A A. i0' SUPETHVISOR DATE APPROVAL AUTHORITY DATE RECORD OF CHANGES CHANGE TYPE APPROVAL CANCELLATION CHANGE TYPE APPROVAL CANCELLATION LETTER CHANGE DATE DATE LE-TER CHANGE PATEI DATE b- _ _ _

INFORMATION USE Procedure may Be Performed From Memory.

User Retains Accountability For Proper Performance.

NUCLEAR OPERATIONS SAP-139 A1TACHMENT II PAGE 1 OF 3 REVISION 20 PROCEDUREDEVELOPMENT FORM - A I. DATE: PROC.# k-,f"/ 06/ REV. . CHG. COMM. C02 C&*,a TITE: ,;5 Qnd' Z,"' ~/), 0,7 A0 2le I,,e ýf

&1rtw C7 cc., kfa I '-

NEW PROCEDURE - REVISION __ SAFETY RELATED CH-ANGE: ..X.. PERMANENT QUALITY RELATED NON-SAFETY RELATED RESTRICTED__ FROM_____ TO______

ri DESCRIPTION:

,-ý 0on/yA tfQ, y REASON FOR CHANGE.'

nama in and PRINT Iame iiL REQUIRED REVIEWS: Check ALL selectons in first 3 columns for SAPs (except for minor chanoes) Other Reviewso

)MCHS *}MNPS ( )MPLE I )GMES ( )CWPS ( )ISEG ( )NOET ( )QC

()MDE )MNT ()MPSE ()GMNPO )DE ()MNTS ()NPS ($( OFE (04

)MNPS ( )MOD&P ( )MSPD GMNSS ( )FFD ( )MOS ( )NTET ()RC - (

()MMPR ()MPO ()SAS )GMSPD QHPS ()MPR KC)OPS ( )RE ( }

)MMS ( )MOPS ( )QA ( )CHS )ISD ( )NL&OE )PSE ( )TU

)MNL&OE I )50.59 W6- DISCIPLINE SUPERVISOR AUTHORIZATION TO PROCESS PROPOSED-CHANGES:

1 DeoneSupervsor Date V. TEMPORARY APPROVAL:

QUALIFIED REVIEWER DATE OA REVIEW DATE TELECON BY TELECON BY SHIFT SUPERVISOR DATE_ FINAL APPROVAL REQUIREDS. :DATE VII PICAP ACCEPTfLEI . E,,- V VI. DISCIPLINE SUPERVISOR FINAL REVIEW: C. YESL' NO a u- I PSRC REVIEW REQUIRED? YES_ NO N. YES-__ NO ..- 1 SRESP. MGR Date IF YES, PRIOR TO IMPLEMENTATION? YES__ NO- VIII. FINAL OA REVIEW (If Applicable)

/r~t I TRAINING REQUIRED? YES.._ NO- CA Concurrence Date IF YES. PRIOR TO IMPLEMENTATION') YES._ NO IX. ROVAL R fP3 P/CAP AFFECTED', _ l 1 YES NO T Co

. Date COMMENTS RESOLVED: ./Concurren.e .*" A1t Date

• isl sor X. PSRC REVIEW:

A. REVIEWED BY: B. PSRC COMMENTS RESOLVED:

PSRC Cha-rman Date Responsible Manager Date COMMENTS: YES_ NO_

PSRC Chairman Date

SAP-139 Attachment II Revision Summary EPP-001, Revision 24, Change F

==

Description:==

Step 1.2, added SAP-630.

Reason for Change: A PCAP was added to Attachment 1II. SAP-139 requires that SAP-630 be listed in the Scope section if it applies.

==

Description:==

Section 2.9, Changed title of SAP- 1131 from Electronic Processing of Condition Evaluation Reports to Corrective Action Program.

Reason for Change: To reflect new title of procedure.

==

Description:==

Added Section 2.11 SCP-113 Two Person Rule Reason for Change: To reflect new procedure.

==

Description:==

Attachment III, page 1, Changed first paragraph into a Note.

Reason for Change: To highlight this statement to show its importance.

==

Description:==

Attachment MI, pages 6 and 9, Changed telephone number.

Reason for Change: New telephone switch necessitates different dialing protocol.

==

Description:==

Attachment III, page 8 added section entitled, Site-Specific Credible Insider Threat.

Reason for Change: To meet requirements specified in Interim Safeguards and Security Compensatory Measures Order (Security Order) issued 2/25/02.

rOP.i SAP-139 ATTACHMENT II PAGE 1 OF 3 REVISION 20 PROCEDURE DEVELOPMENT FORM - A

i. DATE PROC.# F-.Pp- DOI REV.## 7- V CHG. .--- COMM.#

NEW PROCEDURE __ REVISION -- SAFETY RELATED V" CHANGE _' PERMANENT V,-- QUALITY RELATED*_.-

RESTRICTED__ FROM TO NON-SAFETY RELATED iix DESCRIPTION:

REASON FOR CHANGE:

On - Name iii. REQUIRED REVIEWS: Check ALL selections in first 3 columns for SAPs (except for minor chanes) Other Reviews:

)MCHS ( )MNPS ( )MPLE ( )GMES ( )CWPS ( )ISEG ( )NOET ( )QC

( MDE ( MNT ( MPSE [ GMNPO ()DE ( MNTS *NPS 6<" OR > _*,V....

)MHPS ( )MOD&P ( )MSPD [ )GMNSS ( )FFD ( )MQS ( )NTET ( )RC (

)MMPR ( )MPO ( )SAS ( )GMSPD ý6<HPS ( )MPR P<OPS ( )RE (

)MMS ( )MOPS ( )OA (-)CHS ( )ISD ( )NL&OE ( )PSE ( )TU MNL&OE " 59 1*-- DISCIPLINE SUPERVISOR AUTHORIZATION TO PROCESS PROPOSED-CHANGE Disci inofSuie sor I Date

-V. TEMPORARY APPROVAL*

QUALIFIED REVIEWER -DATE OA REVIEW DATE TELECON BY TELECON BY SHIFT SUPERVISOR DATE FINAL APPROVAL REQUIRED BY: DATE VIL P/CAP ACCEPTABLE? g, VI. DISCIPLINE SUPERVISOR FINAL REVIEW:

/ C YES_ NO ._ ~NIp Anr... _

Date YES__ NO VL- N. YES___ NO WA-- I PSRC REVIEW REQUIRED?

RESP. MGR Date IF YES, PRIOR TO IMPLEMENTATION' YES-__ NO_ VIII. FNAL CA REVIV/Pppicable)

TRAINING REQUIRED? YES_V' __ QA Concurrence Date IF YES, PRIOR TO IMPLEMENTATION? YES__ NO_'I.APRVLATO  :

P/CAP AFFECTED? Y S- NOV ra/ . "p r. i Date COMMENTS RESOLVED D----z i- P--DtCcurrencee Discioline Supervisor-- DateV J X. PSRC REVIEW:

A REVIEWED BY: B. PSRC COMMENTS RESOLVED:

/ /

PSRC Chairman Date Responsible Manager Date COMMENTS: YES__ NO C PSRC Chairman Date

EPP-001, Activation and Implementation of Emergency Plan Revision 24, Change E Attachment to PDF-A, Section ii, Description and Reason for Change Page 1 of 2

Description:

Attachment II, Page 4 of 17: Site Area Emergency Detection Method for a "Major Steam Line Break with Greater Than 50 Gallons per Minute Primary-to Secondary Leakage and Indication of Fuel Damage": Changed "RM-L1 High Range valid alarm and laboratory analysis dose equivalent 1-131 activity _>300 p.Ci/gm in primary coolant" to "RM-L1 High Range valid alarm and primary coolant dose equivalent 1-131 activity >_300 pgCVgm".

Reason for the Change: This change supports and clarifies the practice of the determining primary coolant dose equivalent 1-131 activity by laboratory analysis or by radiation survey on the sample line.

==

Description:==

Attachment II, Page 4 of 17: General Emergency Detection Method for a "Loss of Two of Three Fission Product Barriers with Potential Loss of the Third Barrier": Changed "Laboratory analysis dose equivalent 1-131 activity > 300 A.CVgm in primary coolant" to "Primary coolant dose equivalent f-131 activity

_ 300 g.Cvgm".

Reason for the Change: This change supports and clarifies the practice of the determining primary coolant dose equivalent 1-131 activity by laboratory analysis or by radiation survey on the sample line.

==

Description:==

Attachment II, Page 6 of 17: Notification of Unusual Event for a "Fuel Damage Indication": Changed "Laboratory analysis which indicates dose equivalent 1-131 activity concentration Ž> 30 gCVgm in primary coolant" to "Primary coolant dose equivalent 1-131 activity _Ž30 g.CVgm".

Reason for the Change: This change supports and clarifies the practice of the determining primary coolant dose equivalent 1-131 activity by laboratory analysis or by radiation survey on the sample line.

==

Description:==

Attachment II, Page 6 of 17: Alert Detection Method for a "Possible Fuel Damage": Changed "Laboratory analysis which indicates dose equivalent 1-131 activity concentration >_300 gCi/gm in primary coolant" to "Primary coolant dose equivalent 1-131 activity Ž300 piCVgm".

Reason for the Change: This change supports and clarifies the practice of the determining primary coolant dose equivalent 1-131 activity by laboratory analysis or by radiation survey on the sample line.

==

Description:==

Attachment 11,Page 6 of 17: Site Area Emergency Detection Method for a 'Degraded Core with Possible Loss of Coolable Geometry": Changed "RM-L1 High Range off scale (>1 06 cpm) with laboratory analysis dose equivalent 1-131 activity concentration > 300 jiCilgm in primary coolant" to "RM-L1 High Range off scale (>106 cpm) with primary coolant dose equivalent 1-131 activity Ž 300 p.Ci/gm".

Reason for the Change: This change supports and clarifies the practice of the determining primary coolant dose equivalent 1-131 activity by laboratory analysis or by radiation survey on the sample line.

EPP-001, Activation and Implementation of Emergency Plan Revision 24, Change E Attachment to PDF-A, Section ii, Description and Reason for Change Page 2 of 2

==

Description:==

Attachmeht II, Page 7 of 17: General Emergency Detection Method for

'Transient Requiring Operation of Shutdown Systems with Failure to Trip Which Results in Core Damage or Additional Failure of Core Cooling and Makeup Systems Which Could Lead to Core Melt": Changed "RM-L1 alarm, with laboratory analysis dose equivalent 1-131 activity concentration > 300 jiCi/gm in primary coolant" to "RM-L1 alarm, with primary coolant dose equivalent 1-131 activity Ž 300 pgCL/gm".

Reason for the Change: This change supports and clarifies the practice of the determining primary coolant dose equivalent 1-131 activity by laboratory analysis or by radiation survey on the sample line.

==

Description:==

Attachment Ill: Made various changes to the format and the wording of some sections. Format changes include providing lines next to each step for place keeping.

Reason for the Change: Feedback from users to make: the attachment more usable and to provide clarification.

==

Description:==

Attachment IIl: Removed the provision for certain TSC duty personnel to report to the TSC instead of the EOF during a security emergency. The entire ERO duty will now be instructed to report to the EOF in the event of a security emergency.

Reason for the Change: This action simplifies and clarifies the response instructions. The EOF provides a safe staging area away from the plant site. TSC and OSC personnel can be directed to respond to the plant site from the EOF as necessary and as conditions permit.

NUCLEAR OPERATIONS SAP-139 COPY NO. ) ATTACHMENT II PAGE 1 OF 3 REVISION 20 PROCEDURE DEVELOPMENT FORM - A

1. DATE:1 i1ZPJ PROC.# I E REV. # .1 CHG.- COMM. #

TITLE: ( -. / r4" LA4&4 46J NEW PROCEDURE - REVISION _ SAFETY RELATED CHANGE V PERMANENT L QUAUTY RELATED RESTRICTED__ FROM TO NON-SAFETY RELATED --

iiL, DESCRIPTION: (i L ex & 5co PE 0a yo /.

REASON FOR CHAN4GE: ) A- 9.()7 s.*z 1~-4a- i~ol 't Ondator- Sign and ORIINT Name iii. REQUIRED REVIEWS: Check ALL selections in first 3 columns for SAPs (except for mnorchanges) Other Revews:

)MCHS ( )MNPS ( )MPLE ( )GMES ( )CWPS ( )ISEG ( )NOET ( )CC K ew" ryl

)MDE ( )MNT ( )MPSE ( )GMNPO ( )DE ( ) MNTS . NPS ,,TQR *.,.f

)MHPS ( )MOD&P ( )MSPD ( )GMNSS ( )FFD ( )MOS ( )NTET ( )RC

)MMPR ( )MPO ( )SAS [ )GMSPD X4HPS ( )MPR ,>6OPS ( )RE ( )

)MMS ( )MOPS ( )QA [ )CHS ( )ISD ( )NL&OE ( )(PSE ( )TU MNL&OE Z 50.59, V.- DISCIPLINE SUPERVISOR AUTHORIZATION TO PROCESS PROPOSED-CHANE/

7X/.-P "A\/ 1/2

'If*t I

-V. TEMPORARY APPROVAL: V.

QUALIFIED REVIEWER DATE GA REVIEW DATE TELECON BY TELECON BY SHIFT SUPERVISOR DATE FINAL APPROVAL REQUIRED BY: DATE VIL P(CAP ACCEPTABLE? gj, VL DISCIPLINE SUPERVISOR FINAL REVIEW: C. YES NO I NgO. Date PSRC REVIEW REQUIREDI YES___ NO V/ N. YES_ NO

• RESP. MGR. Date IF YES, PRIOR TO IMPLEMENTATION? YES___ NO_ "VI.NAQREE I Ica TRAINING REQUIRED9 YES._.NO__ QA Concurrence Date IF YES. PRIOR TO IMPLEMENTATION? YES__ NOIXAPRVLUhRTY P/CAP AFFECTED?  ;)YES- NO . Train* g Complet Date COMMENTS RESOLV /D I /// ( rd r°'al/Concurrence /Date X. PSRC REVIEW:

A. REVIEWED BY: B. PSRC COMMENTS RESOLVED.

/ /

PSRC Chairman Date Responsible Manager Date COMMENTS. YES_ NO_

PSRC Chairman Date

SAP-139 NUCLEAR OPERATIONS ATTACHMENT IV COPY NO. I'SZ PAGE 1 OF 3 REVISION 18 PROCEDURE DEVELOPMENT FORM - A /

L DATE:/O-/,- 7 PROC.# -PP- I . REv # 2- CHG._.. cOMM.,#

NEW PROC __ CHANGE-J PERMANENT L--' SAFETY RELATED REVISION RESTRICTED FROM ToQUALITY RELATED NON-SAFETY RELATED IL DESCRIPTION:

REASON FOR CHANGE:

L/ ongintor Q sin/Prnt IlL WILL THIS REVISION/CHANGEINEW PROCEDURE: 'YES NO N/A

1. Result insignificant inhied personnel radia-ton eosure? (ALARA review)

2. Result in a release of effluents to the Environent?

3. Degrade the effectveness of the Radiation Emergency Plan? d,

4. Degrade the safeguards effectveness of the Physical Security, Safeguards Contingency -

of Training and Qualification Plans?

It any question I through 4 is answered YES, refer to appropriate section of procedure for REQUIRED REVIEW AND COMMENT: REQUESTGDJ EVEW.

MOPS (MHPS ()GMNPO ()QA OTU ()ISD h I

()MMS (MDE () GMES ()QC () CHS () .

( MQS OMNT ()GMNSS ()SAS >PPS

• L (..

SMPSE ()MNL&OE ()GMSPD ()MNTS Ol ()R 0 MCHS OMNPS ,PPS WPS ()DE 11__ ()

TV. 10CFRSC.9 SCREENING REVIEWISAFETY EVIALUATION

[3 REQUIRED EXEMPT [3 PSRC SUPPORTING DOCUMENT:.DCF'Z.

V. TEMPORARY APPROVAL:

QUALIFIED REVIEWER DATE QA REVIEW DATE__

TELECON BY TELECON BY SHIFT SUPERVISOR DATE__ _ FINAL APPROVAL REQUIRED BY:.DA VII. P/CAP ACCATMF Vw DISCIPLINE SUPERVISOR FINAL EVIEW. C. YES__ NO NO PSRC REVIEW PRIOR TO IMPLEMENTATION? YES___ - NO.. . NON4 MG--e TRAINING REQUIRED? YES jL.NO_ Vill FINAL QIA REVIEW (As Appiable)

IF YES, PRIOR TO PROCEDURE IMPLEMENTATION? YESA 2 NO OA Concurrence Date PCAP AFFECTED? YES t IX/AP

• COMMENTSRES . T 6'dD V~au~dior - ,Iqkt, P 21t v VConcurrence Date X. PSRC REVIEW: V A. REVIEWED By: B. PSRC COMMENTS RESOLVED:

I /

PSRC Chairman Date Respomble Manager Date COMMENTS: YES_ NO I PSRC Chainnan Date

EPP-001, Activation and Implementation of Emergency Plan Revision 24, Change C Addendum to PDF-A,Section II Description and Reason for Changes Page 1 of 2 Change

Description:

Changed reference 2.9 from SAP-1 122 to SAP-1 131.

Reason for Change:

To update the reference to the new procedure for the CER Program.

Change

Description:

Added section 5.3, Undeclared and Misclassified Events and supporting reference 2.10, NUREG-1022, Event Reporting Guidelines 10CFR50.72 and 50.73. Section 5.3 is designated Commitment #CO1.

Reason for Change:

To provide guidance to the user for actions to take when it is discovered that an event or condition had existed which met the criteria for Emergency Plan activation but no emergency had been declared and the basis for the emergency classification no longer exists.

==

Description:==

Deleted Definition 3.1.5, EWSS Inoperable which is Commitment #NO1.

Reason for Change:

The Detection Method for an EAL in which this definition was used was deleted in a previous revision and does not appear elsewhere in this procedure.

==

Description:==

Attachment !1Page 10 of 17: Detection Method for Emergency Action Levels (EAL) 231 and 331: Changed the detection method for EAL 231 to "An automatic reactor trip fails when required, and, a manual reactor trip from either MCB handswitch is successful" and changed detection method for EAL 331 to "Entry into EOP-13.0 from EOP-1.0, Step 1".

Reason for Change:

Revision 24 has nearly identical detection methods for Site Area Emergency and General Emergency indicating any Site Area Emergency from an ATWS would also warrant a General Emergency classification.

EPP-001., Activation and Implementation of Emergency Plan Revision 24, Change C Addendum to PDF-A,Section II Description and Reason for Changes Page 2 of 2

==

Description:==

Attachment IIPage 16 of 17: Added the following note to each of the Security related EALs, "See EPP-001 Attachment II for additional guidance".

Reason for Change:

To remind the user of the location of additional guidance for actions to take in a Security event.

==

Description:==

Attachment II Page 17 of 17: Corrected typographical error in the detection method for the first Alert EAL.

Reason for Change:

Correct typographical error.

==

Description:==

Section 5.2.C: Removed the reference to declaring the emergency classification by using EIS.

Reason for Change:

Declaring an emergency is a decision made by the IEDIED and is not dependent on the availability of EIS.

EPP-001, Activation and Implementation of Emergency Plan Revision 24, Change C Addendum to 10CFR50.54.q Evaluation Page 1 of 5 Change

Description:

Changed reference 2.9 from SAP-1 122 to SAP-1 131.

Reason for Change:

To update the reference to the new procedure for the CER Program.

IOCFR50.54.q Evaluation Basis:

This change does not affect sections in IOCFR50.47(b) or 10CFR50 Appendix E.

This change is administrative in nature. Procedures for evaluation of events are not mentioned in the Radiation Emergency Plan. Therefore, this change does not decrease the effectiveness of the Radiation Emergency Plan. This change does not require further revision to the Radiation Emergency Plan. This change does not require further revision to Emergency Plan Procedures.

Change

Description:

Added section 5.3, Undeclared and Misclassified Events and supporting reference 2.10, NUREG-1022, Event Reporting Guidelines 10CFR50.72 and 50.73. Section 5.3 is designated Commitment #CO1.

Reason for Change:

To provide guidance to the user for actions to take when it is discovered that an event or condition had existed which met the criteria for Emergency Plan activation but no emergency had been declared and the basis for the emergency classification no longer exists.

IOCFRSO.54.q Evaluation Basis:

This change affects 10CFR50.47(b)(4) and 10CFR50"Appendix E IV.C. This change provides guidance to the user for the actions to take for undeclared and misclassified events as described in NUREG-1022, Event Reporting Guidelines 10CFR50.72 and 10CFR50.73, Rev 1, section 3.1.1, Immediate Notification Requirements. This section of the NUREG states that when such a condition is discovered that a one hour report to the NRC is appropriate and that emergency declaration and termination is unnecessary. At annual training for State and local governments conducted on 9/3/98 this issue was discussed and authorizing representatives of the State and the four Risk Counties stated that they also want to be notified within one hour of when such an event is discovered.

Unclassified and misclassified events are not mentioned in the Radiation Emergency Plan. Therefore, this change does not decrease the effectiveness of the Radiation Emergency Plan. This change does not require further revision to the Radiation Emergency Plan. This change does not require further revision to Emergency Plan Procedures.

EPP-001, Activation and Implementation of Emergency Plan Revision 24, Change C Addendum to IOCFR50.54.q Evaluation Page 2 of 5

==

Description:==

Deleted Definition 3.1.5, EWSS Inoperable which is Commitment #NO1.

Reason for Change:

The Detection Method for an EAL in which this definition was used was deleted in a previous revision and does not appear elsewhere in this procedure.

IOCFRSO.54.q Evaluation Basis:

This change affects 10CFR50.47(b)(4) and 1 OCFR50 Appendix E IV.C. EWSS Inoperability is no longer used as a detection method for emergency classification. This detection method was removed from the EALs in a prior revision to this procedure and to the Radiation Emergency Plan. This revision to the Plan was approved by the NRC prior to implementation. Therefore, this change does not decrease the effectiveness of the Radiation Emergency Plan.

This change does not require further revision to the Radiation Emergency Plan.

This change does not require further revision to Emergency Plan Procedures.

==

Description:==

Attachment II Page 10 of 17: Detection Method for Emergency Action Levels (EAL) 231 and 331: Changed the detection method for EAL 231 to "An automatic reactor trip fails when required, and, a manual reactor trip from either MCB handswitch is successful" and changed detection method for EAL 331 to "Entry into EOP-1 3.0 from EOP-1.0, Step 1".

Reason for Change:

Revision 24 Change B has nearly identical detection methods for Site Area Emergency and General Emergency indicating any Site Area Emergency from an ATWS would also warrant a General Emergency classification.

IOCFRSO.54.q Evaluation:

These changes affect 10CFR50.47(b)(4) and 10CFR50 Appendix E (IV.C). The Alert level is entered as a result of safety system degradation. This condition indicates a failure of the automatic protection system to trip the reactor. This condition is more than a potential degradation of a safety system in that a first line automatic protection system did not function in response to a plant transient and thus the plant safety has been compromised, and design limits of the fuel may have been exceeded. An Alert is indicated because conditions exist that could lead to potential loss of fuel clad or RCS integrity. Reactor protection system setpoint being exceeded, rather that limiting safety system setpoint being exceeded, is specified here because failure of the automatic protection system is the issue. For some transients, the timing of the manual reactor trip would not be critical and fuel damage could be avoided. For other events, fuel damage could occur that would warrant the increased monitoring that would occur for an

EPP-001, Activation and Implementation of Emergency Plan Revision 24, Change C Addendum to IOCFRSO.54.q Evaluation Page 3 of 5 Alert. Failure of the manual trip would escalate the event to a Site Area Emergency.

Automatic and manual scram are not considered successful if entry into EOP-1 3.0 is required due to failure of both the automatic and manual reactor trip functions (both switches). Under these conditions, the reactor is producing more heat than the maximum decay heat load for which the safety systems are designed. A Site Area Emergency is indicated because conditions exist that could lead to the loss or potential loss of both fuel clad and RCS. Again, timing and the type of event that required the reactor trip initially are important factors on the expected damage. But to simplify the classification scheme, entry into EOP-13.0 indicates some time may pass before reactor power is low enough to prevent fuel damage.

The General Emergency EAL 431 detection method was not changed. The General Emergency classification is more closely related to the loss of fission product barriers. This event assumes continued power generation and demonstrated evidence of fuel damage or the loss of functions needed to support core cooling which could lead to core melt. With respect to critical safety functions, this event would represent a severe challenge to both "Subcriticality" and "Core Cooling".

The above changes match the intent of the Initiating Conditions of these EALs and reduce the possibility for misclassification. Therefore, these changes do not decrease the effectiveness of the Radiation Emergency Plan. These changes do require further revision to the Radiation Emergency Plan, Table 4-1. These changes do not require further revision to implementing procedures.

EPP-001, Activation and Implementation of Emergency Plan Revision 24, Change C Addendum to 10CFRSO.54.q Evaluation Page 4 of 5

==

Description:==

Attachment II Page 16 of 17: Added the following note to each of the Security related EALs, "See EPP-001 Attachment III for additional guidance":

Reason for Change:

To remind the user of the location of additional guidance for actions to take in a Security event.

IOCFR5O.54.q Evaluation These changes affect 10CFR50.47(b)(4) and IOCFR50 Appendix E (IV.C).

These changes help to insure appropriate actions are taken'in a Security event and enhance emergency response. Therefore, these changes do not decrease the effectiveness .of the Radiation Emergency Plan. These changes do require further revision to the Radiation Emergency Plan, Table 4-1. These changes do not require further revision to implementing procedures.

==

Description:==

1Page 17 of 17: Corrected typographical error in the detection method for the first Alert EAL.

Reason for Change:

Correct typographical error.

IOCFR5O.54.q Evaluation This change affects 10CFR5OA7(b)(4) and 10CFR50 Appendix E (IV.C). This change corrects a typographical error and is administrative in nature. Therefore, this change do not decrease the effectiveness of the Radiation Emergency Plan.

This change does require further revision to the Radiation Emergency Plan, Table 4-1. This change does not require further revision to implementing procedures.

EPP-001, Activation and Implementation of Emergency Plan Revision 24, Change C Addendum to IOCFRSO.54.q Evaluation Page 5 of 5

==

Description:==

Section 5.2.C: Removed the reference to declaring the emergency classification by using EIS.

Reason for Change:

Declaring an emergency is a decision made by the IED/ED and is not dependent on the availability of EIS.

IOCFRSO.54.q Evaluation This change affects 10CFR50.47(b)(4) and 10CFR50 Appendix E (IV.C). This change does not alter the Emergency Action Level scheme. This change simplifies the emergency declaration process by removing a restrictive and inappropriate statement about using EIS to declare an emergency. EIS is not mentioned in the Radiation Emergency Plan, therefore, this change do not decrease the effectiveness of the Radiation Emergency Plan. This change does require further revision to the Radiation Emergency Plan, Table 4-1. This change does not require further revision to implementing procedures.

SAP-139 NUCLEAR OPERATIONS ATTACHMENT IV COPY NO. I 5-7 PAGE 1 OF 3 REVISION 18 PROCEDURE DEVELOPMENT FORM - A

i. DATE: _ PROC. -# REV.C#

REV. g/W CHG. COMM.#

TITLE: ,V J,4-T 71 l n---* ,,

/ --7 t-w/.,N -,F 1= ,4,11?-..- C,-A-A,

• I 1 1 1 J I I 1 NEW PROC CHANGEX PERMANENT K SAFETY RELATED REVISION RESTRICTED__ FROM TO QUALITY RELATED NON-SAFETY RELATED UI. DESCRIPTbON- ThýýLELer P.F 6--70 '3

'+ 2>~-7,--r~,a-e.e4EaA(5 70E t 4 , ~~ ~ ~ -j ~ ~ .eVLl/6E 4 ei-r-fo ,Da-rrn-a REASON FOR CHANGE' Ongfinatcr SmgnlPrint IlL WILL THIS REVISIONICHANGVENEW PROCEDURE- YES NO N/A

1. Result in sigrnicant increased personnel radaion exposure? (ALARA review)

2. Restut in a release of effluents to the Ernroment?

3. Degrade the effectiveness of the Radiation Emergency Plan?

4. Degrade the safeguads effectiveness of the Phtysial Security, Safeguards Contngency of Train-ing and Quafitication Plans?

"If any question I through 4 Is answered "YES, refer to appropriate section of procedure for direction.

REQUIRED REVIEW AND COMMENT: REQUESTED REVIEWS SMOPS OMPS ()GMNPS OSFQA 0T ( "ISD (-,*

0 0 MMS OMDE ()GMES OQC CHS ORC 0MOS OMNT ()GMNSS OSFADC(,)%iPS (&~)_ __

0 MSCE ()MNL&OE () GMSPD MNTS SCE O)e OMCS ()MNPS OPS 1PS DE O IV. 10CRESOQU

[]REQUIRED RSCREEXGEM I*EXEMPT P*TEWPC

[:3 PSRC ESPUTION.

SUPPORTING DOCUMENT/'): .'.

"C W/cfn Sov Concurrence V. TEMPORARYAPPROVAL: "

QUALIFIED REVIEWER______ DATE___ QA REVIEW______ DATE___

TELECON BY__ TELECON BY SHIFT SUPERVISOR DATE FINAL APPROVAL REQUIRED BY: DATE VIL PCAP ACCEPTABLE?

VL DISCIPLINE SUPERVISOR FINAL REVIEW: C. YES__ NO

/LILOE Date NO __ N. YES NO __ _______ _Date PSR CREVIEW PRIOR TO IMPLEMENTATION? YES RESP. MGR. Date TRAINING REQUIRED? YES__ NO VIIL FINAL QA REVIEW 5 .pcable)

IF YES, PRIOR TO PROCEDURE IMPLEMENTATION? YES_ NO___ QA Corm.ence Date P/CAP AFFECTED? YES DL2IXAPPROVAL AUTHORnrY:

COMMENTS RESOLVED / , Traiir Date Date __5___ __ __/__

Procedure AppoaCmmeDt X. PSRC REVIEW:

A. REVIEWED BY: B. PSRC COMMENTS RESOLVED:

PSRC Chairman Date Responsbe Manager Date COMMENTS. YES__ NO /

PSRC Chakrman Date

EPP-001 REVISION 24, CHANGE B

SUMMARY

OF CHANGES A. Reference 2.9, EPP-025, "Use of the ERON System" was deleted. The ERON System is no longer in use. The ERON System was used only for recording results of radio-pager drills and has been replaced by another system. It was not used for communicating with the Emergency Response Organization or offsite agencies. Therefore, there is no decrease in the level of effectiveness of the Radiation Emergency Plan.

B. Step 4.3 was revised to remove all reference to the ERON System. (See A. above for justification.)

C. Attachment I, page 2 of 2, item 11. E was deleted. This item described an Initiating Condition that is being revised to delete the referenced condition. The new 11. E was revised to better reflect the condition described in the referenced Initiating Condition. (See E. below for justification.)

D. Attachment II, page 1 of 17, The Initiating Condition and Detection Methods for the Notification of Unusual Event was revised. NRC approval for the revision was granted per letter dated July 11, 1997. The new Initiating Condition and Detection Methods were taken from NUMARC/NESP-007 which is approved by the NRC for use. Therefore, there is no decrease in the level of effectiveness of the Radiation Emergency Plan.

E. Attachment II, page 16 of 17, The Initiating Condition and Detection Methods for the Notification of Unusual Event was revised. NRC approval for the revision was granted per letter dated July 11, 1997. The new Initiating Condition and Detection Methods were taken from NUMARC/NESP-007 which is approved by the NRC for use. Therefore, there is no decrease in the level of effectiveness of the Radiation Emergency Plan.

NUCLEAR OPERATIONS SAP-139 ATTACHMENT IV PAGE 1 OF 3 COPYNO., l REVISION 17 PROCEDURE DEVELOPMENT FORM -A I. DATE: . --- PROC.# fA-- ,  ! -- REV.# -1.* CHG., 4 COMM.#

TITLE: eA =. - -- '

NEW PROC I CHANGE DfPERMANENT1--* SAFETY RELATED REVISION RESTRICTED _ FROM TO QUALITY RELATED NON-SAFETY RELATED IL DESCRIPTION: ,-4* /Y ',,e.. 44 9 ,. ,......

REASON FOR CHANGE." , j 4.. ,

Onginator SigniPrint III. WILL THIS REVISIONICHANGE/NEWPROCEDURE: YES NO NIA

1. Resultinsignificantincreased personnel radiationexposure? (ALARAreview)

2. Result in a release of effluents to the Environment?

3 Degrade the effectiveness of the Radiation Emergency Plan' 4 Degradethe safeguards effectiveness of the Physical Security, Safeguards Contingency i or Training and Qualification Plans?

"ifany q uestion 1 through 4 is answered -YES-, refer to appropriate section of procedure for direction.

REQ IRED REVIEW AND COMMENT: , REQUESTED REVIEWS: / "

- (5%R(AS) ()NL&OE 5 I~~NPO o) ______ - I

.('rOPS ().YNTS (ORPS ()GMES 0 _ C) _ /J- , .

(.rQA (vNPS () SCE - () GMNSS () -- () -- _-- '.

)QC (TU (DE ()0() _ () ____/Disop i2/.upervisor Date IV. IOCFR50.59 SCREENING REVIEW/SAFETY EVALUATION 1 REQUIRED 0-'1EMPT 0 PSRC SUPPORTING DOCUMENT: -d Ct'.93K4)

I scipli Ulervisorconcurrince V. TEMPORARY APPROVAL:

QUALIFIED REVIEWER DATE QA REVIEW . DATE TELECON BY TELECON BY SHIFTSUPERVISOR DATE _ FINALAPPROVAL REQUIRED BY: DATE VI. DISCIPLINE SUPERVISOR FINAL REVIEW: A VIL PICAP ACCEPTABLE? N C YES_ NO__ / [ I PSRC REVIEW PRIOR TO IMPLEMENT. ON? YES__ NO NL&OE Date TRAINING REQUIRED? YES._NO N. YES NO RESP.MGR. Date IFYES, PRIOR TO PROCEDURE IM PLEMENTATION' YESV"NO VIILFIN.A\AIIEW(AsApplcable)

P/CAPAFFECTED? YES 0 P ý Z Z11 QA Concurrence Date COMMENTSRESOLVE pi u s I IDDate APPROVALTHORI-Y:

TRAININGApprovallConcurrence Date Discipli S pervisor Date u X PSRC REVIEW:

A. REVIEWED BY: B. PSRC COMMENTS RESOLVED:

PSRCChairman Date Responsible Manager Date COMMENTS: YES__ NO _

PSRC Chairman Date

EPP-001 PAGE i REVISION 24 TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTION PAGE SChg 1.0 PURPOSE AND SCOPE 1 D

2.0 REFERENCES

1 3.0 DEFINITIONS 1 4.0 CONDITIONS AND PREREQUISITES 3 5.0 PROCEDURE 4 6.0 RECORDS 5 IChgC SChgC 7.0 REVISION

SUMMARY

5 A ATTACHMENTS Attachment I - Emergency Action Level Cross Reference Guide Attachment II - Emergency Action Levels Attachment III- Considerations for a Security Emergency Chg IA

EPP-001 REVISION 24 1.0 PURPOSE AND SCOPE 1.1 To define the Emergency Action Levels (EALs) that will activate and implement the Emergency Plan and to provide a means of classifying the emergency.

1.2 Changes and revisions to this procedure must ensure compliance with the requirements of 10CFR50.54.q., 10CFR50 Appendix B and SAP-630. A Chg 10CFR50.59 review is not required. D &F

2.0 REFERENCES

21 Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station FSAR, Appendix 13A, "South Carolina Electric and Gas Company Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station Radiation Emergency Plan".

2.2 NUREG-0654, Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants.

2.3 10CFR50, Appendix E.

2.4 10CFR50.54 (x) and (y), Applicability of License Conditions and Technical Specifications in an Emergency.

2.5 EPP-001.1, Notification of Unusual Event.

2.6 EPP-001.2, Alert.

2.7 EPP-001.3, Site Area Emergency.

2.8 EPP-001.4, General Emergency.

2.9 SAP-1 131, Corrective Action Program. Chg B, C and F and 50.73. Chg 2.10 NUREG-1 022, Event Reporting Guidelines 10CFR50.72 I c Chg 2.11 SCP-113, Two Person Rule F 3.0 DEFINITIONS 3.1 Definitions 3.1.1 Notification of Unusual Event - Off normal events which could indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant.

1 of 5

EPP-001 REVISION 24 3.1.2 Alert - Events are in progress or have occurred which involve an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant.

3.1.3 Site Area Emergency - Events which involve actual or likely major failures of plant functions needed for protection of the public.

3.1.4 General Emergency - Events which involve actual or imminent substantial core degradation or melting with potential for loss of containment integrity. Chg C 3.2 Abbreviations 3.2.1 EAL - Emergency Action Level 3.2.2 NUE - Notification of Unusual Event 3.2.3 lED - Interim Emergency Director 3.2.4 ED - Emergency Director 3.2.5 EPP - Emergency Plan Procedure 3.2.6 EOP - Emergency Operating Procedure 3.2.7 TEDE - Total Effective Dose Equivalent 3.2.8 CDE- Committed Dose Equivalent 2 of 5

EPP-001 REVISION 24 4.0 CONDITIONS AND PREREQUISITES 4.1 The Emergency Plan shall be implemented whenever an "Initiating Condition" (as identified in Attachment II) has occurred.

NOTE 4.2 The implementation of any specific Emergency Plan Procedure (except this procedure) does not necessarily implement the Emergency Plan, but may do so at the discretion of the IED/ED. For example: a small chlorine leak would implement the toxic release procedure but not necessitate implementation of the Emergency Plan, whereas a large release with the potential of affecting the level of safety of the plant.

would implement the toxic release procedure and the Emergency Plan due to the declaration of a NUE.

4.2 The "Initiating Condition" and "Detection Method" shall be used to determine the applicable EAL. The Detection Methods are intended to be a guide for the proper classification of an emergency. The judgment of the IED/ED may take precedence in determining if the Initiating Condition has been met or exceeded.

4.3 The 3 digit number in parenthesis associated with EALs on Attachment II is the Emergency Information System (EIS) Emergency Type Code.

ICh B

NOTE 4.4 When the plant is in a security related event, deviation from the Chg.

guidance in the Emergency Plan Procedures is allowed when the safety A of plant personnel and/or plant equipment must be considered. See Attachment Ill for additional guidance.

4.4 The Duty Shift Supervisor must concur with any actions that depart from a license condition or technical specification in an emergency when such actions are immediately needed to protect the public health and safety (Reference 2.4).

3 of 5

EPP-001 REVISION 24 4.5 Attachment I provides a cross reference for the EAL Classification and should only be used as a guide to locate the "Initiating Condition" in Attachment II, Emergency Action Levels.

5.0 PROCEDURE 5.1 Upon recognition of an abnormal plant or site condition, the observer shall notify the Duty Shift Supervisor of the potential emergency plan condition.

NOTE 5.2 When the TSC is activated, the ED is responsible for determining the appropriate EAL and emergency classification.

5.2 The IED/ED shall:

A. Using Attachment I for guidance, locate the appropriate initiating condition and turn to the referenced page in Attachment I1.

B. Determine the EAL by comparing the verified plant parameters or conditions to the detection method for each emergency condition.

C. Declare the appropriate emergency classification. Perform additional Chg actions in accordance with the EOPs and the appropriate EPPs. C Notification of Unusual Event - EPP-001.1 Alert - EPP-001.2 Site Area Emergency - EPP-001.3 General Emergency - EPP-001.4 5.3 Undeclared or Misclassified Events C01-> A. When it is discovered that an event or condition had existed which met the criteria for Emergency Plan activation but no emergency had been declared and the basis for the emergency classification no longer exists, the lED/ED shall insure that an ENS notification to the NRC and ESSX Chg C

notification to the State and local governments is made within one hour of the discovery of the undeclared or misclassified event. No "after-the-fact" emergency declaration is necessary.

4 of 5

EPP-001 REVISION 24 6.0 RECORDS 6.1 There are no records generated by this procedure.

7.0 REVISION

SUMMARY

7.1 Include use of Emergency Type Codes in EIS in step 4.3.

7.2 Include use of Emergency Type Codes in EIS in step 5.2.C.

7.3 Incorporate Change A.

7.4 Addition of SAP-1 122.

5 of 5

EPP-001 ATTACHMENT I PAGE 1 OF 2 REVISION 24 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL CROSS REFERENCE GUIDE NOTE: This Attachment is not to be used for Event Classification. Refer to Attachment I1.

INITIATING EVENT/TOPIC REFERENCE PAGE IN ATTACHMENT II Reactor Coolant System A. Reactor Coolant Leakage I B. Loss-of-Coolant Accident (LOCA) 1 C. Pressurizer or Steam Generator Safety or Relief Valve Fails to Reseat 2 D. Loss of Fission Product Barriers 4 E. Primary to Secondary Leakage 3, 4 F. Major Steam Line Break with Primary to Secondary Leak 4

2. Secondary System A. Major Steam Line Break 4 B. Steam Generator Safety or Relief Valve Fails to Reseat 2 C. Secondary System Depressurization 5 D. Loss of Feedwater and Condensate System 5 E. Failure of Emergency Feedwater System 5,8 F. Turbine-Generator Rotating Component-Failure 5

3. Fuel A. Fuel Damage 1,2,4,6,7 B. Fuel Handling Accident 6 C. Loss of Fission Product Barriers 4 D. Loss of Coolable Geometry 1,2,6

4. Engineered Safety Feature A. Failure of the Reactor Protection System 7 B. Operation of Shutdown Systems with Failure to Trip 7

5. Station Power A. Loss of Offsite Power 3,8 B. Loss of Onsite AC Power 8 C. Loss of Onsite DC Power 8

6. Containment A. Loss of Containment Integrity 4

7. Radiological Effluents A. Liquid or Gaseous Effluent Exceeds Technical Specification 9,10 B. High Radiation Levels 9 C. Radiation Levels Detected/Projected at the Exclusion Area Boundary 9, 10

EPP-001 ATTACHMENT I PAGE 2 OF 2 REVISION 24 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL CROSS REFERENCE GUIDE NOTE: This Attachment is not to be used for Event Classification. Refer to Attachment II INITIATING EVENT/TOPIC REFERENCE PAGE IN ATTACHMENT il

8. Fire A. Fire Lasting More Than 15 Minutes 11 B. Fire Effecting Safety Trains, Systems or Functions 11

9. Security A. Security Threats, Attempted Entry or Sabotage 12

10. Natural Phenomenon A. Natural Events Onsite or Near Site 13 (Earthquake, Tornado, or Hurricane)

B. Other Hazards Onsite or Near Site 14 (Aircraft Crash, Train Derailment, Explosion or Toxic/Flammable Gas Release)

11. Other A. Emergency Director Discretion Based On Other Plant Conditions 15 B. Inability to Reach Required Shutdown Within Technical Specification Umits 15 C. Loss of Function for Plant Cold or Hot Shutdown 16 D. Control Room Evacuation 16 I Chg.

E. Loss of Communications Capability 16 B F. Loss of RHR 1,17

C C EPP-001 ATTACHMENT II PAGE 1 OF 17 REVISION 24 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY INIIIATINGi CONDITION (l1l0 INITIATING CONDITION (201) INITIATING CONDITION (301) INITIATING CONDITION (401)

RCS LEAKAGE REACTOR COOLANT LEAKAGE RATE KNOWN LOSS-OF-COOLANT ACCIDENT SMALL OR LARGE LOSS OF COOLING EXCEEDS 50 GALLONS PER MINUTE GREATER THAN CHARGING PUMP CAPACITN ACCIDENT WITH FAILURE OF EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM TO PERFORM, LEADING TO SEVERE CORE DEGRADATION OR MELT.

Ch Detection Method Detection Methode Detoclion Method: Detection Method:

B3 EITHER 1 OR 2 Excessive Makeup to the Volume Control Tank. All of the following (1 - 7) OR 8: Items 1 - 7 On 8 under Site Area Emergency and (Only applicable in Modes 1 through 4) EITHER IOR 2:

1. Pressurizer low pressure reactor trip, 1. Indications that safely Injection and RHR

1. Unidentified or Pressure Boundary Leakage 2. Pressurizer low pressure safety Injection greater than 10 gpm. signal, pumps are not running (no AMPS).

3. Reactor Building pressure OR !11.5 pslg, oR

4. Reactor Building sump level above zero,

2. Identified Leakage greater than 25 gpm 5. RBCU Drain Flow High, 2. Flow indication for safely Injection and RHR

6. RM-A2, RM-G7, RM-G18 high alarm, pumps reading zero

7. Reactor Building temperature >1200 F.

oR

8. Pressurizer Relief Tank conditions above normal (for PORV OR Safety Valve LOCA's)

U L J.

C C EPP-001 ATTACHMENT II PAGE 2 OF 17 REVISION 24 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT I i ALERT IT SITE AREA EMERGENCY I1 GENERAL EMERGENCY INITIATING CONDITION (102) INITIATING CONDITION (402)

FAILURE OF A PRESSURIZER OR STEAM SMALL LOSS OF COOLING ACCIDENT WITH GENERATOR SAFETY OR RELIEF VALVE TO INITIALLY SUCCESSFUL EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM, FOLLOWED BY RESEAT (EXCEEDING NORMAL WEEPAGE)

SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OF REACTOR BUILDING HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEMS THAT COULD LEAD TO CORE MELT Detection Mpthod, Detection Method:

Pressurizer or Steam Generator Safety or Relief All of the following (1 - 5)"

Valve opens and then falls to reseat as indicated by EITHER 1 On 2 OR3: 1. Pressurizer low pressure reactor trip,

i. Valid open Indication of Pressurizer Relief QO AND Safety Valve OR valid Acoustical Monitor Indication. 2. Pressurlzer low pressure safety Injection signal.

OR 2 Visual OR audible Indication at vent stacks of AND open Steam Generator Safety or Relief Valve 3 RHR flow Indicators show zero flow for greater than 30 minutes after shift to RHR, OR AND 3 Excess feedwater flow to and steam flow from affected Steam Generator. 4. RCS temperature rising, AND

5. Reactor Building Spray and Reactor Building Cooling Units fail to function.

____________________________ A J L

C C EPP-001 ATTACHMENT II PAGE 3 OF 17 REVISION 24 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY INITIATING CONDITION 1103) INITIATING CONDITION (202) INITIATING CONDITION (302)

EXCEEDING TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION RAPID GROSS FAILURE OF ONE STEAM RAPID FAILURE OF SEVERAL STEAM PRIMARY TO SECONDARY LEAK RATE LIMIT GENERATOR TUBE WITH LOSS OF OFFSITE GENERATOR TUBES (SEVERAL HUNDRED POWER GALLONS PER MINUTE PRIMARY-TO SECONDARY LEAK RATE) WITH LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER Detection Method, Detection Method, Detection Method:

Primary to Secondary Leak Rate Exceeds T.S. All of the following (I - 5): All of the following (1 - 3):

3 4 6 2 Limits,

1. Pressunzer low pressure alarm AND reactor 1. Entry into EOP-4 0.

1. >1 gpm Total for > 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. trip,

2. > 500 gpd any one Steam Generator for AND

> 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. AND

2. Loss of 15KV and 230KV Emergency

2. Pressurizer low level alarm, Safeguards Power Potential Lights, AND AND

3. RM-A9, G19A, G-19B, QOG19C valid high 3. Lifting of Steam Generator Power Operated alarm supported by laboratory analysis, Relief Valves or Safely Valves.

AND

4. Pressurizer low pressure safety Injection signal.

AND

5. Loss of 115 KV AND 230 KV ESF Potential Lights.

INITIATING CONDITION (203)

RAPID FAILURE OF SEVERAL STEAM GENERATOR TUBES (e.g., SEVERAL HUNDRED GALLONS PER MINUTE PRIMARY TO-SECONDARY LEAK RATE)

Detection Method, Entry into EOP-4 0

C C EPP-001 ATTACHMENT II PAGE 4 OF 17 REVISION 24 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY INITIATING CONDITION (204) INITIATING CONDITION (3031 I INITIATING CONDITION (403)

MAJOR STEAM LINE BREAK (e.g., GREATER MAJOR STEAM LINE BREAK WITH GREATER LOSS OF TWO OF THREE FISSION THAN 6 INCHES EQUIVALENT DIAMETER) THAN 50 GALLONS PER MINUTE PRIMARY PRODUCT BARRIERS WITH POTENTIAL WITH A SIGNIFICANT PRIMARY-TO TO-SECONDARY LEAKAGE AND INDICATION LOSS OF THE THIRD BARRIER (e.g., LOSS SECONDARY LEAK RATE. OF FUEL DAMAGE. OF FUEL INTEGRITY AND PRIMARY COOLANT BOUNDARY AND HIGH POTENTIAL FOR RADIOACTIVITY RELEASE FROM CONTAINMENT)

Detecton Method: Detection Method: Detection Method:

All of the following (1 - 3): All of the following (1 - 4): EITHER 1 O 20 3.

1. All of the following rapidly decreasing: 1. All of the following rapidly decreasing: 1. Primary coolant dose equivalent 1-131

a. Tavg activity ý! 300 pCi/gm AND LOCA In

a. Tavg b. PZR pressure progress AND Reactor Building

b. PZR pressure c. PZR level, pressure _>30 pslg for at least 2 minutes

c. PZR level, AND Ch t*

OR E AND 2. High alarms on RM-A9 and laboratory analysis of secondary coolant activity 2. Primary coolant dose equivalent 1.131 2 High alarms on either RM-L3. L10, QOAg, supporting 50 gpm leakage, activity > 300 I.Ci/gm AND breech of containment Integrity AND AND and EITHEFI a OR b:

3. RM-L1 High Range valid alarm and Chg

3. EITHER a OR b: a. RCS leakage greater than Technical primary coolant dose equivalent 1.131 E Specification allowable.

a. For break Inside RB: activity > 300 llCI/gm,

!Ilgh-I RB pressure AND safely injection oR actuation. AND

b. RCS pressure a 2335 psig.

oR 4. EITHER a OR b:

oR b For break outside RB: a. For break Inside RB:

safety Injection actuation due to steamillne High-I RB pressure AND safety Injection 3. LOCA AND breech of containment integrity AiP or low steamline pressure actuation and EITHER aOR b,

a. Dose equivalent 1-131 activity 2!l1pCI/gm in primary coolant.

b. For break outside RB:

safety Injection actuption due to oR steamline AP or low steamline pressure.

Refer to Loss of 2 of 3 FP Barriers b. Core Exit temperature > 700" (Possible General Emergency).

C C EPP-001 ATTACHMENT II PAGE 5 OF 17 REVISION 24 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS SECONDARY SYSTEM NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT I ALERT [ SITE AREA EMERGENCY I GENERAL EMERGENCY INITIATING CONDITION (104) INITIATING CONDITION (411 RAPID SECONDARY SYSTEM TRANSIENT INITIATED BY LOSS OF DEPRESSURIZATION FEEDWATER AND CONDENSATE SYSTEMS (PRINCIPLE HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM)

FOLLOWED BY FAILURE OF EMERGENCY FEEDWATER SYSTEM FOR EXTENDED PERIOD. CORE MELTING POSSIBLE IN SEVERAL HOURS Detection Method, Detection Method, Rapid decrease in S/G pressure resulting In a EI__H_ 1OR 2:

safety Injection actuation.

1. a. Failure of feed and bleed of the RCS to maintain core cooling, AND

b. Steam Generator wido range levels less INITIATING CONDITION (105) INITIATING CONDITION (292) than 15% In two or more steam generators.

OTHER HAZARDS BEING EXPERIENCED OR OTHER HAZARDS BEING EXPERIENCED OR PROJECTED WHICH HAVE THE POTENTIAL PROJECTED WHICH HAVE A SIGNIFICANT oR FOR ENDANGERING THE FACILITY POTENTIAL FOR AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY

2. a. Failure of feed and bleed of the RFS to (TURBINE-GENERATOR ROTATING (TURBINE -GENERATOR FAILURE CAUSING maintain core cooling, COMPONENT FAILURE CAUSING RAPID CASING PENETRATION)

PLANT SHUTDOWN) AND Deteclion Method, Detection Method, b. RCS Pressure > 2335 psig due to loss of heat sink.

All of the following ( 1 AND 2): All of the following ( I AND 2):

1. Turbine Trip, 1. Turbine Trip, AND AND

2. Observation of Failure of EITHER a OR b. 2. Observation of penetration of the turbine casing a Turbine Rotating Assembly.

oR

b. Generator Rotating Assembly. ______________________ & I

C C EPP-001 ATTACHMENT II PAGE 6 OF 17 REVISION 24 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS IFIIIL ALERT FUE *~L U ~l AREA EMERGENCY SITE SfISIIJ*LL*

GENERAL EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT ...= * . .**

,*Al AI II~llrl flrfllkl

1. t lrtTII~t., I':1')4 I INITIATING CONDITION (106) POSSIBLE FUNUI INITIABLING FUEL D MA zA DAMAGE DEGRADED CORE WITH POSSIBLE LOSS OF FUEL DAMAGE INDICATION COOLABLE GEOMETRY Detection Method Detection Method; Detection Method:

All of the following (1 AND 2), All of the following (1 - 3):

All of the following (1 AND 2)"

0

1. RM-L1 High Range Alarm, 1. RM-L1 High Range off scale (>t 0cpm)

1. RM-L1 I lgh Range Alarm, with primary coolant dose equivalent Chg AND 1-131 activity :>300 piCI/gm, E A-NQ AND

2. Primary coolant dose equivalent 1-1311 Chg 2. Primary coolant dose equivalent 1-1311 Chg activity _30 101igm. I activity Ž300 pCI/gm. E 2. Core Exit Temperatures > 700'F, AND

3. No indication of forced or natural circulation INITIATING CONDITION (322)

INITIATING CONDITION (2221 MAJOR DAMAGE TO MORE THAN ONE FUEL HANDLING ACCIDENT WITH RELEASE SPENT FUEL ASSEMBLY IN REACTOR OF RADIOACTIVITY TO REACTOR OR FUEL BUILDING OR FUEL HANDLING BUILDING HANDLING BUILDING LEADING TO CLAD RUPTURE (e.g., LARGE Detection Method. OBJECT DAMAGES FUEL OR WATER LOSS BELOW FUEL LEVEL)

EITHER 1OR2 Detection Method, l.e. In the Reactor Building:

Observation of damage to spent fuel EITHiER 1OR 2:

assembly,

1. a. In the Reactor Building:

AND Observation of major damage to more than one spent fuel assembly OR water level below the tops of spent fuel

b. RM.G5, RM-G17A, 170 high alarm.

assemblies, OR AND

b. RM-G5, GI7A, G17B high alarms.

2. a. In the Fuel Handling Building, Observation of damage to spent fuel assembly, In the Fuel Handling Building

2. a.

Observation of major'damage to more AND than one spent fuel assembly OR water level below the tops of spent fuel

b. RM-A6 high alarm, OR RM-G8 high assemblies, alarm.

AND

b. RM.A6or RM-G8 high alarm I I I

C C C EPP-001 ATTACHMENT II PAGE 7 OF 17 REVISION 24 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY INITIATING CONDITION (2311 INITIATING CONDITION (331 IINITIATING CONDITION (4311 FAILURE OF THE REACTOR PROTECTION TRANSIENT REQUIRING OPERATION OF TRANSIENT REQUIRING OPERATION OF SYSTEM TO INITIATE AND COMPLETE A TRIP SHUTDOWN SYSTEMS WITH FAILURE TO SHUTDOWN SYSTEMS WITH FAILURE TO WHICH BRINGS THE REACTOR SUBCRITICAL TRIP (CONTINUED GENERATION, NO FUEL TRIP WHICH RESULTS IN CORE DAMAGE OR DAMAGE EVIDENT) ADDITIONAL FAILURE OF CORE COOLING AND MAKEUP SYSTEMS WHICH COULD LEAD TO CORE MELT Detection Method, Detection Method: Detection Method:

An automatic reactor trip fails when required, Entry Into EOP-13.0 from EOP-1.0, Step 1 EITHE I Q1 2 QR 3:

Chg C 1. a. Reactor remains critical after attempted AND trip, A manual reactor trip from either MCB handswitch Is successful, AND

b. RM-L1 alarm, with primary coolant dose equivalent 1-131 activity Chg

300 P*C/gm. E OR

2. a. Reactor remains critical after attomptod trip, AND

b. Flow indicators on safety Injection system AND RHR systems show zero flow with safety injection initiated OR

3. a. Reactor remains critical after attempted trip.

AND

b. Status lights show safety injection system AND RHR pumps not running with safety Injection Initiated.

C C EPP-001 ATTACHMENT II PAGE 8 OF 17 REVISION 24 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS STATION POWER NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT I ALERT II INITIATING SITE AREA EMERGENCY CONDITION (341)

GENERALEMERGENCY INITIATING CONDITION (107) INITIATING CONDITION (2411 INITIATING CONDITION (441)

LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER AND LOSS OF FAILURE OF OFFSITE AND ONSITE POWER TOTAL LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER OR LOSS LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER AND LOSS OF ALL ONSITE AC POWER FOR MORE ONSITE AC POWER FOR MORE THAN ALONG WITH TOTAL LOSS OF EMERGENCY OF ONSITE AC POWER CAPABILITY 5 MINUTES 15 MINUTES FEEDWATER MAKEUP CAPABILITY.

Detection Method: Detection Method; Detection Method, Detection Method.

EITHEr 1QO 2: EITHER 1 OB 2. All of the following (1 - 3):

In Modes 1-6, EITHE 1 QB 2 OR 3:

1. a. Both Diesel Generators inoperable, i. a. Both Diesel Generators inoperable, 1. Both Diesel Generators Inoperable 1 Loss of 115KV AND 230KV ESF Potential Lights AND AND AND OR b Loss of 115KV AND 230KV ESF Potential b. Loss of 115KV AND 230KV ESF 2. EITHER a OR b:

2. Automatic actuation of both trains of Lights. Potential Lights.

emergency Diesel Generators due to oR QB a. Loss of 115KV AND 230KV ESF degraded or undervoltage conditions. potential lights.

2. a. Both Diesel Generators Inoperable, 2. a. Both Diesel Generators Inoperable.

OR oB AND b Automatic actuation of both trains of

3. Both Diesel Generator Inoperable for > 1 emergency Diesel Generators due to hour. b. Automatic actuation of both trains of b. Automatic actuation of both trains of emergency Diesel Generators due to emergency Diesel Generators due to degraded voltage or undervoltage degraded or undervoltage conditions. degraded or undervoltage conditions conditions, AND INITIATING CONDITION (2421 INITIATING CONDITION (3421 LOSS OF ALL VITAL ONSITE DC POWER FOR 3 EITHER a OR b LOSS OF ALL ONSITE DC POWER FOR A PERIOD GREATER THAN 5 MINUTES MORE THAN 15 MINUTES

a. Steam Driven Emergency Feedwater Detection Method: .* Pump fails to start AND Is Inoperable Detection Method.

for one hour.

All of the following (1 - 3): All of the following (1 - 3):

OR

1. DC bus undervoltage alarms on all buses, 1. DC bus undervoltage alarms on all buses,

b. Core Exit temperatures > 700° F.

ANm AND 2.480 V ESF Channel A ORB Loss of DC Alarm 2. 480V ESF Channel A OR B Loss of DC Alarm, AND AND 3 DG A OR B Loss of DC Alarm

3. DG A OR B Loss of DC Alarm.

( C (

EPP-001 ATTACHMENT II PAGE 9 OF 17 REVISION 24 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT INITIATING CONDITION (261) INITIATING CONDITION (361) INITIATING CONDITION (461)

INITIATING CONDITION (108)

SUSTAINED HIGH RADIATION LEVELS OR PROJECTED DOSE GREATER THAN EFFLUENT MONITORS DETECT LEVELS GASEOUS EFFLUENT INSTANTANEOUS HIGH AIRBORNE CONTAMINATION WHICH 50 MILLIREM TEDE (WHOLE BODY) CORRESPONDING TO 1 REM TEDE RELEASE RATE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION (WHOLE BODY)

LIMITS EXCEEDED ron I HOUR (APPENDIX INDICATES A SEVERE DEGRADATION IN THE B TABLE II, COLUMN 1 10CFR20) CONTROL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS (e.g., INCREASE BY A FACTOR OF 1000 IN OR OR DIRECT RADIATION READINGS)

GREATER THAN 250 MILLIREM CDE 5 REM CDE (THYROID) AT THE EXCLUSION (THYROID) AT OR BEYOND THE EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY UNDER ACTUAL AREA BOUNDARY METEOROLOGICAL CONDITIONS.

Detection Method; Detection Method: Detection Method:

t Mciodethod; EITHER 1 OR 2: Non-routine release(s) cause an alarm of RM-A3, All of the following (1 AN._D2):

EITHER 1 Qf 2 R 3 OR 4:

A4, A13, A14, or RM-GI9 (or detection by other

1. Unexpected valid RMG readings as follows- moans) warrant an offsIte dose assessment and 1. Radiation Monitor levels exceed those

i. RM-A3 (Gas) increases > 1 x 105 cpm above the results indicate projections exceeding the specified for Site Area Emergency, bkgd in any 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.

a RM-G2-4, 8-13, or 16; greater than above doses at or beyond the exclusion area 2 5 R/hr OR boundary. AND OR b) RM-G7, 17A, 17B, or 18 greater than 100 R/hr OR Calculation on Dose Assessment Forms

2. RM-A3 (Iodine) Increases > 8 x 10 cpm bkgd In any I hour. c) RM-G1; greater than 1 R/hr. Indicates levels exceeding 1 Rem TEDE above (whole body) or 5 Rem CDE (thyroid) at the OR Rexclusion area boundary using radiation monitor readings and effluent stream flow Unexpected plant area Iodine or particulate rates (measured or assumed) for actual 3 RM-A4 (Gas) exceeds 4 times the high alarm airborne concentration greater than 1000 DAC meteorological conditions; or using field setpoint for more than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.

(as per 10CFR20 Appendix B, Table 1). measurements.

on

4. RM-A4 (Iodine) in valid high alarm for more than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.

Classification for gaseous radiological effluents Classification for gaseous radiological effluents Classification for gaseous radiological effluents can also be determined using EPP-005. Classification for gaseous radiological elfluents can also be determined using EPP-005.

can also be determined using EPP-005.

can also be determined using EPP-005.

C C EPP-O01 ATTACHMENT II PAGE 10 OF 17 REVISION 24 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT I ALERT I SITE AREA EMERGENCY I GENERAL EMERGENCY INITIATING CONDITION (10g9 INITIATING CONDITION (262) INITIATING CONDITION (362)

LIQUID EFFLUENT CONCENTRATIONS RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT RELEASE RATE DOSE RATES LISTED BELOW ARE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS LIMITS EXCEEDING 10 TIMES TECHNICAL PROJECTED BASED ON GAMMA RADIATION EXCEEDED FOR 15 MINUTES (APPENDIX B SPECIFICATION INSTANTANEOUS LIMITS MONITOR (RMG) READINGS AND/OR OTHER TABLE II COLUMN 2 10CFR20) PLANT PARAMETERS OR ARE MEASURED AT THE EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY Deftection Method Detection Method Detection Method, Any of the following liquid effluent monitors In Any of the following valid radiation monitor EITHER IOR 2 OR 3:

valid High Alarm for longer than 15 min. AND readings for longer than 15 minutes:

isolation valve(s) fail to close: 1. Reactor Building leak rate results in

1. RM-A3 (Gas) Is off scale high. calculated dose rate at exclusion area RM-L5 Q boundary greater than 50 mrom/hr whole RM-L7 OR QB body for 0.5 hr. or RM-L9. 500 mrem/hr whole body for 2 min.

2. RM-A3 (Iodine) Is off scale high OR OR

3. RM-A4 (Gas) exceeds 40 times high alarm 2. Radiation Monitoring Teams measure dose rates greater than 50 mrem/hr for 0.5 hr. or setpolnt greater than 500 mram/hr for 2 min. (beta +

gamma) at one mile or greater from the plant.

9B 0I

4. RM-A4 (Iodine) exceeds 10 times high alarm selpoint. 3. Radiation Monitoring Teams measure thyroid dose rates (equivalent 1-131 concentrations)

OR greater than EITHER a or b:

5 RM-L5, RM-L7, or RM-L9 exceeds 10 times a. 250 mremlhr I.

high alarm setpoint AND Isolation valve(s) fail (1.3x10 7 pCI/cc) for 0 5 hr.

to close OR

b. 2500 mrem/hr (1.3x10 6 1Ci/cc) for 2 min. at one mile or greater from the plant.

C C C 'I EPP-001 ATTACHMENT II PAGE 11 OF 17 REVISION 24 EMERGENCY-ACTION LEVELS F=IRE*

NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY INITIATING CONDITION ( 110 INITIATING CONDITION (271) FIRE AFFECTING SAFETY TRAINS OR FIRE POTENTIALLY AFFECTING SAFETY FIRE WITHIN THE PROTECTED AREA OR THE FUNCTIONS SYSTEMS.

SWITCHYARD LASTING MORE THAN 15 MINUTES Detection Method.

Detection Method Detection Method, Observation of fire that could affect one or more Observation of major fire that defeats both trains EITHER 1 OR 2: of a safety system or function.

safety systems.

1 Observation.

2. Fire Detection Device alarm with confirming observation

________________ I________________ J ________________

C C EPP-001 ATTACHMENT II PAGE 12 OF 17 REVISION 24 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS SECURITY NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENTI ALERT I SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY INITIATING CONDITION (111 ) INI I IA I IrtJ kI .UU lUlq lZO I I INITIATING CONDITION (381) I INITIATING CONDITION (4811 ONGOING SEVERE SECURITY THREAT SECURITY THREAT INVOLVING IMMINENT SECURITY THREAT RESULTING IN LOSS OF SECURITY THREAT OR ATTEMPTED ENTRY PHYSICAL CONTROL OF THE FACILITY OR ATTEMPTED SABOTAGE LOSS OF PHYSICAL CONTROL OF THE PLANT Detection Method: Detection Mothodo Dptectlion Method Detection Method, Security safeguards contingency event which Physical attack on the Plant has resulted In Report to the Control Room by Security or occupation of EITHER 1 QO2:

observer. results In adversaries commandeering an area of Physical attack on the Plant Involving Imminent the plant, but not Impacting shutdown capability. occupancy of EITHER 1 On 2:

1. Control Room.

1. Control Room oR OR

2. Control Room Evacuation Panel Rooms.

2. Control Room Evacuation Panel Rooms.

Ch See EPP-O01 Attachment IIIfor additional See EPP-001 Attachment III for additional See EPP-001 Attachment III for additional See EPP-001 Attachment III for additieonl C guidance. guidance. guidance.

guidance

_______________________ .1.

C C EPP-001 ATTACHMENT II PAGE 13 OF 17 REVISION 24 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS NATURAL PHENOMENON NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT I ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY I GENERAL EMERGENCY INITIATING CONDITION (112) INITIATING CONDITION (291i INITIATING CONDITION (391!

NATURAL EVENTS: SEVERE NATURAL EVENT NEAR SITE: SEVERE NATURAL PHENOMENON BEING

1. EARTHQUAKE 1. EARTHQUAKE GREATER THAN THE EXPERIENCED OR PROJECTED WITH PLANT

2. TORNADO ONSITE 213 OPERATING BASIS EARTHQUAKE NOT IN COLD SHUTDOWN:

3. HURRICANE NEAR SITE LEVEL 1. EARTHQUAKE GREATER THAN

2. TORNADO STRIKING FACILITY OPERATING BASIS EARTHQUAKE LEVEL

3. SUSTAINED HURRICANE WINDS 2. SUSTAINED WINDS IN EXCESS OF GREATER THAN 75 MILES PER HOUR 100 MILES PER HOUFN ONSITE Detection Method* Detection Method, Detection Method:

EITHER 1 OR 2 OR 3: EITHER 1 OR 2 OR 3: EITHER 1 OR 2:

1. For Earthquake 1. For Earthquake 1. For Earthquake*

Seismic Recording System Start Indication Seismic Event Annunciator 2/3 OBE Observation of the event (fell or heard) and confirmation of a seismic event thru exceeded (one or more yellow lights lit) and lasting >2 seconds and EITHER a QB b, observation (felt or heard) In the Control confirmation of a seismic event through Room observation (fell or heard) in the Control a. RB Foundation Seismic Switch OBE Room. exceeded.

OR on

2. For Tornado b. Seismic Event Annunciator OBE Observation of event In Exclusion Area. 2. For Tornado:

Observation of the event within the exceeded (one or more red lights lit).

OR Protected Area or Switchyard oR

3. For Hurricane: OR Sustained winds in excess of 50 mph due to a 2. Forsustained winds in excess of 100 mph hurricane as measured by onsile 3. For Hurricane: onsite:

meteorological instrumentation or the National Sustained winds In excess of 75 mph due to As measured by onsite meteorological Weather Service a hurricane as measured by onsite Instrumentation or the National Weather meteorological Instrumentation or the Service.

National Weather Service.

C C EPP-001 ATTACHMENT II PAGE 14 OF 17 REVISION 24 EMERGENCY-ACTION LEVELS MANMADE PHENOMENON NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT I ALERT I SITE AREA EMERGENCY I GENERAL EMERGENCY INITIATING CONDITION (113) INITIATING CONDITION (292) INITIATING CONDITION (3921 OTHER HAZARDS BEING EXPERIENCED OR OTHER HAZARDS BEING EXPERIENCED OR OTHER HAZARDS BEING EXPERIENCED OR PROJECTED WHICH HAVE THE POTENTIAL PROJECTED WHICH HAVE A SIGNIFICANT PROJECTED WITH PLANT NOT IN COLD FOR ENDANGERING THE FACILITY: POTENTIAL FOR AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY: SHUTDOWN:

1. ONSITE AIRCRAFT CRASH 1. AIRCRAFT CRASH ON FACILITY 1. AIRCRAFT CRASH INTO VITAL

2. ONSITE TRAIN DERAILMENT 2. MISSILE IMPACTS ON FACILITY WITH STRUCTURES,

3. ONSITE EXPLOSION (EXCLUDING RESULTANT MAJOR DAMAGE 2. MISSILE OR EXPLOSION IMPACT ON PLANNED ACTIVITIES) 3. KNOWN EXPLOSION AT FACILITY FACILITY RENDERING SEVERE DAMAGE

4. NEAR OR ONSITE TOXIC OR FLAMMABLE RESULTING IN MAJOR DAMAGE TO TO SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT GAS RELEASE OF A MAGNITUDE THAT PLANT STRUCTURES OR EQUIPMENT 3. ENTRY OF TOXIC OR FLAMMABLE GASES THREATENS PERSONNEL 4. ENTRY INTO FACILITY ENVIRONS OF INTO VITAL AREA WHICH INVOLVE A TOXIC OR FLAMMABLE GASES IN SIGNIFICANT DEGRADATION OF PLANT CONCENTRATION WHICH EXCEED THE SAFETY LIMITS OF FLAMMABILITY OR TOXICITY Detection Method. Detection Method: Detection Method:

EITHER 1 OR 2 OR 3 OR 4: EITHER 1 QB2 QE3 QO4: EITHER I OR 2 OR 3'

1. For Aircraft Crash, 1. For Aircraft Crash: 1. Aircraft crash causing damage QB fire in:

Observation of eveti Observation of aircraft crash Into Plant a) Reactor Building; OR structures. b) Control Room; OR OR OB c) Auxiliary Building; OR d) Fuel Handling Building; OR

2. For Train Derailment: e) DG Building; OR Observation of event. 2. For Missile Impact. f) Intermediate Building; OR Observation of missile Impacts on Plant g) SW Intake Structures.

OR structures or components.

OR 3 For Onsilte Explosion: 2. For Missile or Explosion Impact:

Observation of explosion or warning from 3. For Onsilte Explosion: Loss of functions needed for hot shutdown (see offsite. specific Initiating Condition for this situation)

Observation of damage by explosion.

9n 9B

3. Entry of toxic or flammable gases into 4 For Onsite Toxic or Flammable Gas Release a) Control Room; OR Observation of release or warning from offsilte 4. For Onsile Toxic or Flammable Gas b) Cable spreading rooms; OR Release c) Reactor Building; OR Observation or warning from outside the d) Switchgear room; On Plant; detection of gasses (using portable e) Control Room Evacuation Panel Rooms; Instrumentation) which exist In concentrations which exceed the limits of on flammability or toxicity. f) Emergency Diesel Generator rooms; (as detected by portable Instrumentation AND which renders a train of a safety related system Inonerable)

C C EPP-001 ATTACHMENT II PAGE 15 OF 17 REVISION 24 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS OTHER NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT I ALERT I SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY INITIATING CONDITION (293) INITIATING CONDITION (393) INITIATING CONDITION (493)

OTHER PLANT CONDITIONS EXIST THAT OTHER PLANT CONDITIONS EXIST THAT OTHER PLANT-CONDITIONS EXIST THAT WARRANT ACTIVATION OF TECHNICAL WARRANT ACTIVATION OF EMERGENCY WARRANT ACTIVATION OF EMERGENCY SUPPORT CENTER AND PLACING FACILITIES AND RADIATION MONITORING FACILITIES AND RECOMMENDED EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY TEAMS AND A PRECAUTIONARY PUBLIC PROTECTIVE MEASURES FOR THE PUBLIC PERSONNEL ON STANDBY WARNING Detection Method, Detection Method: Detection Method.

As determined by IED/ED. As determined by IED/ED. As determined by IED/ED.

INITIATING CONDITION (114)

INABILITY TO REACH REQUIRED SHUTDOWN WITHIN TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION LIMITS Detection Method:

Same as Initiating Condition.

_____________________ 1. L L

C ( C .1 %,

EPP-001 ATTACHMENT II PAGE 16 OF 17 REVISION 24 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS OTHER NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY INITIATING CONDITION (115) INITIATING CONDITION (2941 INITIATING CONDITION (394)

UNPLANNED LOSS OF ALL ONSITE OR LOSS OF ALL FUNCTIONS NEEDED FOR LOSS OF FUNCTIONS NEEDED FOR PLANT OFFSITE COMMUNICATIONS CAPABILITY. PLANT COLD SHUTDOWN HOT SHUTDOWN Datpction Method- Detection Method. Detection Method.

Ch EITHER 1 OR 2: All of the following (I AND 2)" All of the following (1 - 4):

B

1. Loss of all onsite communications capability 1. RHR system not functional In Modes 1-4, 1. Inability to establish charging pump Injection.

affecting the ability to perform routine operations. (Internal telephone system, Gal- AND AND Tronics system and radio system )

2. Inability to reject heat to the condenser and 2. Inability t6 establish Emergency Feedwator OR atmosphere. Flow,

2. Loss of all offsite communications capability. AND Internal telephone system, Bell lines, Fiberoptic 3. RIH-lSystem not functional (applicable to links, radio system (When extraordinary Modes, 1.2. and 3 only),

means must be used to make communications.) AND

4. Inability to reject heat to the condenser and atmosphere INITIATING CONDITIONS (295) INITIATING CONDITION (395)

EVACUATION OF CONTROL ROOM EVACUATION OF CONTROL ROOM AND ANTICIPATED OR REQUIRED WITH CONTROL CONTROL OF SHUTDOWN SYSTEMS NOT OF SHUTDOWN SYSTEMS ESTABLISHED ESTABLISHED FROM LOCAL STATIONS IN FROM LOCAL STATIONS 15 MINUTES.

Detection Method: Detection Method:

Same as Initiating Condition. Same as Initiating Condition.

C C EPP-001 ATTACHMENT II PAGE 17 OF 17 REVISION 24 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS OTHER NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT I ALERT I SITE AREA EMERGENCY i GENERAL EMERGENCY INITIATINQ r;UNU tIuIN i(u96 INITIATING CONDITION (396) I MOST OR ALL ANNUNCIATOR ALARMS LOST MOST OR ALL ANNUNCIATORS LOST AND PLANT TRANSIENT INITIATED OR IN PROGRESS Detection Method: Detection Method:

Ch[ All of the following (1 AND 2):

Greater than 75% of the MCB annunciators C Inoperable. I 1. Greater than 75% of the MCB Annunciators Inoperable.

AND

2. Reactor Trip or Safety Injection actuation Initiated or In progress.

INITIATING CONDITION (397}

LOSS OF RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL FLOW INITIATING CONDITION (297)

LOSS OF RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL FLOW FOR MORE THAN 40 MINUTES DURING FOR MORE THAN 20 MINUTES DURING HALF-PIPE OPERATIONS WITH VESSEL HALF-PIPE OPERATIONS WITH VESSEL HEAD INSTALLED AND HIGH HEAD SAFETY HEAD INSTALLED INJECTIONICHARGING UNAVAILABLE.

Detection Method: Detection Method:

All of the following (I - 4): All of the following (1 - 5):

1) Both RHR Loop A FLO LO AND RHR Loop 1) Both RHR Loop A FLO LO A RHR Loop B B FLO LO annunciators In alarm, FLO LO annunciators In alarm, AND AND

2) NEITHER RHR Pump Is running, 2) NEITHER RHR pump Is running, AND AND

3) Core exit temperature Increasing on core 3) Core exit temperature Increasing on core exit exit thermocouples, thermocouples, AMD

4) Reactor Vessel Head Is In place and RGS

4) Reactor Vessel Head Is In place and RCS loops are practically filled, loops are partially filled AND

5) NEITHER train of Charging/Sl Is available.

______________________________ £

EPP-O01 ATTACHMENT III PAGE 1 OF 11 REVISION 24 CONSIDERATIONS FOR A SECURITY EMERGENCY NOTE Due to the wide range of possible security emergencies, it is not feasible to develop a strategy for every possible situation. Therefore, this general Chg guidance has been provided to help in determining appropriate response. F Scripts of plant page announcements contained in this Attachment are examples only and should be modified based on the nature of the emergency.

The Security Team Leader will notify the Control Room of a security emergency. A security emergency may be classified as an Intrusion or a Site-Specific Credible Threat. See the following considerations for each of these situations. Lines to the left of the considerations are for place keeping and are optional.

Intrusion:

CAUTION Avoid moving personnel within the Protected Area without consulting the Security Team Leader as to the safety of the personnel.

1. Immediately direct an Operator to install the "Ultra Dogs" on the two card reader doors that lead into the Control Room area.

2. Make the following plant announcement:

Attention in the Plant. Attention in the Plant.

The Station is in a Security Emergency. All personnel should remain in their current location and take cover. Do not move to another location unless advised by the Control Room or Security personnel. (Repeat announcement once.)

3. DO NOT sound the Radiation Emergency Alarm.

4. Maintain contact between the Control Room and the Security Team Leader.

The Control Room may monitor the Security frequency on a hand-held radio.

5. Declare the appropriate Emergency Classification when the Initiating Conditions are met.

EPP-001 ATTACHMENT III PAGE 2 OF 11 REVISION 24 CONSIDERATIONS FOR A SECURITY EMERGENCY

6. If the ERO is needed, DO NOT activate pagers using the normal method to summon the entire ERO. After working hours, contact the ERO and instruct only the Duty ERO Team to report to the Primary EOF or Backup Chg EOF. Provide the access route, if appropriate (see page 11). The ERO E&F may be contacted using the Dialogics Communicator or the Call Tree as follows:

a) Dialogics Communicator:

1) Dial the Dialogics Communicator at 58716 or dial toll free . Chg 1 (877) 262-5585.

2) The Dialogics Communicator System will answer as follows: "This is the Remote Activation Module. Please enter your scenario activation password followed by the # sign". Enter 1234567 and press the # sign.

3) "To start a scenario, enter the scenario ID followed by the # sign or press # alone for more options". To start the scenario for sending the Duty ERO Team to the Primary EOF, enter the scenario ID 100200 followed by the # sign. To start the scenario for sending the Duty ERO Team to the Backup EOF, enter the scenario ID 100201 followed by the # sign. The text for the current scenarios is as follows:

Primary EOF, Scenario ID 100200:

"The V. C. Summer Nuclear Station has received a security threat. The On-duty and only the On-duty Emergency Response Team, including the Technical Support Center, Operations Support Center and the Emergency Operations Facility staffs, shall report to the Primary Emergency Operations Facility at the Nuclear Training Center. All other Emergency Response Personnel should stand-by for further instructions".

Backup EOF, Scenario ID 100201:

"The V. C. Summer Nuclear Station has received a security threat. The On-duty and only the On-duty Emergency Response Team, including the Technical Support Center, Operations Support Center and the Emergency Operations Facility staffs, shall report to the Backup Emergency Operations Facility at the Palmetto Center. All other Emergency Response Personnel should stand-by for further instructions.

EPP-001 ATTACHMENT III PAGE3 OF 11 REVISION 24 CONSIDERATIONS FOR A SECURITY EMERGENCY

4) After you enter the scenario ID and press the # sign you will hear, "You may change the current message. Press 1 to listen to the message. Press 2 to record a new message or Press the # sign to continue". Press 1 if no supplemental information, such as access routes to the EOF, is needed. Press 2 if supplemental information needs to be provided.

5) If 1 is pressed, listen to the message, then press # to continue. If 2 is pressed, record the new message. Press the # sign when completed.

6) "To start the scenario, press 3. To return to the Main Menu press #". Press 3. Press the # sign to exit.

Or Chg IE b) Use the Call Tree. The current Call Tree may be found in: Public Folders/VCS/Emergency Preparedness.

7. The lED retains Emergency Plan duties and responsibilities until it is safe to staff the TSC.

8. Evacuate Non-essential personnel when it is safe to do so.

9. During normal working hours, consider utilizing personnel responding to the EOF to assist in making notifications.

EPP-001 ATTACHMENT III PAGE 4 OF 11 REVISION 24 CONSIDERATIONS FOR A SECURITY EMERGENCY Site-Specific Credible Threat:

CAUTION Avoid moving persorinel inside or outside the Protected Area without consulting the Security Team Leader as to the safety of the personnel.

1. Declare a Notification of Unusual Event (NOUE), at a minimum, based on Security Threat, EAL #111. A higher initial classification could be made based on the nature and timing of the threat and potential consequences.

2. Implement the Radiation Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan Procedures.

State and local governments should be notified as required. Do not activate the Early Warning Siren System unless directed by the government agencies, per our procedures.

3. TSC/OSC staffing and other personnel decisions are made based on the nature of the threat and the timing of the threat. These decisions are independent of the NOUE activities.

Evacuate plant personnel if the information about the threat indicates that time is available. The ERO Duty team is directed to report to the EOF or Backup EOF as described below. The EOF or Backup EOF is used as a staging area for TSC and OSC personnel. The lED may contact the EOF or Chg Backup EOF to direct specific TSC and OSC personnel to come to the plant E site, as necessary. The TSC and OSC should not be fully manned until the threat is resolved.

EPP-001 ATTACHMENT III PAGE 5 OF 11 REVISION 24 CONSIDERATIONS FOR A SECURITY EMERGENCY

4. Make one of the following plant announcements:

TAKE COVER:

Attention in the Plant. Attention in the Plant.

The Station is in a Security Emergency. All personnel should remain in their current location and take cover. Do not move to another location unless advised by the Control Room or Security personnel.

OR a EVACUATE:

Attention in the Plant. Attention in the Plant.

The Station is in a Security Emergency. All non-essential and off-duty ERO Chg personnel evacuate the site. All Duty ERO personnel report to the EOF. F (Provide the exit route, if appropriate. See Page 11)

Sound the Radiation Emergency Alarm.

Repeat the Plant Announcement.

5. The Duty Emergency Director should evaluate assuming emergency duties from the lED without a staffed and activated TSC. The Duty Emergency Chg Director should only assume emergency duties from the lED if the Duty E Emergency Director is located in the TSC.

6. Maintain contact between the Control Room and the Security Team Leader.

The Control Room may monitor the Security frequency on a hand-held radio.

7. Reactor and plant operational decisions should be as directed by Management.

8. After working hours, contact the ERO and instruct only the Duty ERO Team to report to the Primary EOF or Backup EOF. Provide the access route, if Chg appropriate (see page 11). The ERO may be contacted using the Dialogics E&F Communicator or the Call Tree as follows:

EPP-001 ATTACHMENT III PAGE 6 OF 11 REVISION 24 CONSIDERATIONS FOR A SECURITY EMERGENCY a) Dialogics Communicator:

1) Dial the Dialogics Communicator at 58716 or dial toll free I Chg 1 (877) 262-5585.

2) The Dialogics Communicator System will answer as follows. "This is the Remote Activation Module. Please enter your scenario activation password followed by the # sign". Enter 1234567 and press the # sign.

3) "To-start a scenario, enter the scenario ID followed by the # sign or press # alone for more options". To start the scenario for sending the Duty ERO Team to the Primary EOF, enter the scenario ID 100200 followed by the # sign. To start the scenario for sending the Duty ERO Team to the Backup EOF, enter the scenario ID 100201 followed by the # sign. The text for the current scenarios is as follows:

Primary EOF, Scenario ID 100200:

"The V. C. Summer Nuclear Station has received a security threat. The On-duty and only the On-duty Emergency Response Team, including the Technical Support Center, Operations Support Center and the Emergency Operations Facility staffs, shall report to the Primary Emergency Operations Facility at the Nuclear Training Center. All other Emergency Response Personnel should stand-by for further instructions".

Backup EOF, Scenario ID 100201:

"The V. C. Summer Nuclear Station has received a security threat. The On-duty and only the On-duty Emergency Response Team, including the Technical Support Center, Operations Support Center and the Emergency Operations Facility staffs, shall report to the Backup Emergency Operations Facility at the Palmetto Center. All other Emergency Response Personnel should stand-by for further instructions.

EPP-001 ATTACHMENT III PAGE 7 OF 11 REVISION 24 CONSIDERATIONS FOR A SECURITY EMERGENCY

4) After you enter the scenario ID and press the # sign you will hear, "You may change the current message. Press 1 to listen to the message. Press 2 to record a new message or Press the # sign to continue". Press 1 if no supplemental instructions, such as access routes to the EOF, are needed. Press 2 if supplemental information needs to be provided.

5) If 1 is pressed, listen to the message, then press # to continue. If 2 is pressed, record the new message. Press the # sign when completed.

6) "To start the scenario, press 3. To return to the Main Menu press

1. ". Press 3. Press the # sign to exit.

Or Chg.

b) Use the Call Tree. The current Call Tree may be found in: Public E FoldersNCS/Emergency Preparedness.

9. Notify Security of the intended routes and direct them to ensure gates are open, as appropriate.

EPP-001 ATTIACHMENT III PAGE 8 OF 11 REVISION 24 CONSIDERATIONS FOR A SECURITY EMERGENCY Site-Specific Credible Insider Threat:

NOTE Due to the wide range of possible security emergencies, it is not feasible to develop a strategy for every possible situation. Therefore, this general guidance has been provided to help in determining appropriate response.

Scripts of plant page announcements contained in this Attachment are examples only and should be modified based on the nature of the emergency.

1. Make the following announcement:

Attention in the Plant. Attention in the Plant.

The Station is in a Security Emergency. All personnel except Operations and Security evacuate the Protected Area. Assemble in the parking lot and await further instructions.

Chg.

2. Sound the Radiation Emergency Alarm. F

3. Repeat the Plant Announcement.

C02 *- 4. In close coordination with the Security Team Leader implement the actions in SCP-1 13, Two Person Rule.

5. Establish communications with the MDS and Security management.

6. Declare the appropriate Emergency Classification when the Initiating Conditions are met.

7. If the ERO is needed during normal working hours, management will assemble teams in the parking lot and provide direction as to facility manning and activation.

8. Ifthe ERO is needed after working hours, DO NOT activate pagers using the normal method to summon the entire ERO. Contact the ERO and instruct only the Duty ERO Team to report to the Primary EOF or Backup Chg.

EOF. Provide the access route, if appropriate (see page 11). The ERO E&F may be contacted using the Dialogics Communicator or the Call Tree as follows:

EPP-001 ATTACHMENT III PAGE 9 OF 11 REVISION 24 CONSIDERATIONS FOR A SECURITY EMERGENCY a) Dialogics Communicator.

1) Dial the Dialogics Communicator at 58716 or dial toll free 1 (877) 262-5585.

2) The Dialogics Communicator System will answer as follows: "This is the Remote Activation Module. Please enter your scenario activation password followed by the # sign". Enter 1234567 and press the # sign.

3) "To start a scenario, enter the scenario ID followed by the # sign or press # alone for more options". To start the scenario for sending the Duty ERO Team to the Primary EOF, enter the scenario ID 100200 followed by the # sign. To start the scenario for sending the Duty ERO Team to the Backup EOF, enter the scenario ID 100201 followed by the # sign. The text for the current scenarios is as follows:

Chg.

F Primary EOF, Scenario ID 100200:

"The V. C. Summer Nuclear Station has received a security threat. The On-duty and only the On-duty Emergency Response Team, including the Technical Support Center, Operations Support Center and the Emergency Operations Facility staffs, shall report to the Primary Emergency Operations Facility at the Nuclear Training Center. All other Emergency Response Personnel should stand-by for further instructions".

Backup EOF, Scenario ID 100201:

"The V. C. Summer Nuclear Station has received a security threat. The On-duty and only the On-duty Emergency Response Team, including the Technical Support Center, Operations Support Center and the Emergency Operations Facility staffs, shall report to the Backup Emergency Operations Facility at the Palmetto Center. All other Emergency Response Personnel should stand-by for further instructions.

"EPP-001 ATTACHMENT III PAGE 10 OF 11 REVISION 24 CONSIDERATIONS FOR A SECURITY EMERGENCY

4) After you enter the scenario ID and press the # sign you will hear, "You may change the current message. Press 1 to listen to the message. Press 2 to record a new message or Press the # sign to continue". Press 1 if no supplemental information, such as access routes to the EOF, is needed. Press 2 if supplemental information needs to be provided.

5) If 1 is pressed, listen to the message, then press # to continue. If 2 is pressed, record the new message. Press the # sign when completed.

Chg.

6) "To start the scenario, press 3. To return to the Main Menu F press #". Press 3. Press the # sign to exit.

Or Chg.

Sb) Use the Call Tree. The current Call Tree may be found in: Public E FoldersNCS/Emergency Preparedness.

9) The lED retains Emergency Plan duties and responsibilities until it is safe to staff the TSC.

EPP-001 ATTACHMENT III PAGE 11 OF 11 REVISION 24 CONSIDERATIONS FOR A SECURITY EMERGENCY Access/Exit Routes:

As dictated by the events, select one of the below Basic Routes and the closest open bridge(s) to access/exit the plant and the EOF.

Three Basic Routes:

1. Normal Route via Highway 215.

2. Northern Route via the dirt road over the Fairfield Pumped Storage dam.

3. Southern Route via the dirt road from the south end of the plant access road to Parr.

Bridges Across the Broad River:

1. Pinner Bridge, Highway 213.

2. Highway 34 Bridge, located near the junction of Highway 34 and Highway 215, in the northern section of the 10-mile EPZ.

3. 1-20 Bridge, located in Columbia, west of the junction of 1-20 and Monticello Rd. (Highway 215).