NL-12-2266, SNCF164-RPT-01, Version 1.0, Seismic Walkdown Report, Rer SNC432467 for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic, Cover - Attachment 3: Seismic Walkdown Checklists, Page 58 of 561
| ML12355A779 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Farley  |
| Issue date: | 11/26/2012 |
| From: | Miktus P Southern Nuclear Operating Co |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NL-12-2266 SNCF164-RPT-01, Ver 1.0 | |
| Download: ML12355A779 (142) | |
Text
NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 PROJECT REPORT COVER SHEET VERSION 1.0 Page It of 50 Farley Unit 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT, RER SNC432467 For Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic pared by:
Date:
Paul A. Miktus Reviewed by:
Approved by: (ENERCON)
Project Manager or Designee Bill Henne Date:
Date:
11/26/2012 11/26/2012
/I-Zo'-
Approved by:
(SNC)
Technical Lead or Designee/
Peer Review Team Leader Approved by:
(SNC)
Melanie Brown 6o D~NC-~i Date:
Date:
Z6
- 401 Project Manager or Designee
FARLEY UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 2 OF 50 TABLE OF CONTENTS Section Title Page 1.0 SCOPE AND OBJECTIVE
.............................................. 3 2.0 SEISMIC WALKDOWN PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION APPROACH..................
5 3.0 SEISMIC LICENSING BASIS
SUMMARY
6 3.1 SAFE SHUTDOW N EARTHQUAKE..................................................................................
6 3.2 DESIGN CODES, STANDARDS AND METHODS...........................................................
8 4.0 PERSONNEL QUALIFICATIONS.......................................................................................
9 4.1 OVERVIEW OF PROJECT RESPONSIBILITIES.............................................................
10 4.2 TEAM EXPERIENCE SUMMARIES...............................................................................
12 5.0 IPEEE VULNERABILITIES REPORTING....................................................................
18 6.0 SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST DEVELOPMENT................
19 6.1 DEVELOPM EN T OF SW EL 1..........................................................................................
19 6.2 DEVELOPMENT OF SWEL 2..........................................
22 7.0 SEISMIC WALKDOWNS AND AREA WALK-BYS.......................................................
25 7.1 IN A CCESSIBLE ITEM S....................................................................................................
27 8.0 RE SU LTS...................................................................................................................................
32 8.1 POTENTIALLY ADVERSE SEISMIC CONDITIONS.....................................................
32 8.2 EQUIPM ENT OPERABILITY..........................................................................................
42 8.3 PLA N T C H A N G E S............................................................
.................................................. 42 8.4 OTHER NON-SEISMIC CONDITIONS..........................................................................
43 9.0 PEER REVIEW.........................................................................................................................
44 9.1 PEER REV IEW PRO CESS..................................................................................................
44 9.2 PEER REVIEW RESULTS
SUMMARY
44
10.0 REFERENCES
49 11.0 ATTACH M ENTS.....................................................................................................................
50
FARLEY UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 3 OF 50 EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
The Seismic Walkdowns at Farley Unit 1 in response to the NRC 50.54(f) letter dated March 12, 2012, "Enclosure 3, Recommendation 2.3: Seismic" are not complete as all items on the SWEL have not been accessible. A supplementary report will be required. The walkdowns are being performed using the methodology outlined in the NRC endorsed "Seismic Walkdown Guidance for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic" (EPRI Report number 1025286).
Plant Farley Unit 1 had no significant degraded, non-conforming or unanalyzed conditions that warranted modification to the plant. Plant Farley Unit 1 had no as-found conditions that would prevent SSCs from performing their required safety functions.
FARLEY UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 4 OF 50 1.0 SCOPE AND OBJECTIVE The objective of this report is to document the results of the Seismic Walkdowns at Farley Unit 1 in response to the NRC 50.54(f) letter dated March 12, 2012, "Enclosure 3, Recommendation 2.3:
Seismic" (Reference 10.1).
The Seismic Walkdowns followed the guidance contained in EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2),
which was endorsed by the NRC on May 31, 2012. The scope of the walkdowns was to identify potentially degraded, unanalyzed, or nonconforming conditions relative to the seismic licensing basis.
The 2.3: Seismic Walkdowns for Farley Unit 1 are not complete as all items on the SWEL have not been accessible. A supplementary report will be required. This report documents the findings from all Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys completed to date.
FARLEY UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC P
_______________________________________jPAGE 5 OF 50 2.0 SEISMIC WALKDOWN PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION APPROACH The requirements of the 50.54(f) Letter are satisfied by application of and compliance with the NRC endorsed methodology provided in EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). In accordance with Reference 10.2, the following topics are addressed in this report:
- Documentation of the seismic licensing basis for the systems, structures and components (SSCs) in the plant (Section 3.0);
- Assignment of appropriately qualified personnel (Section 4.0);
- Reporting of actions taken to reduce/eliminate seismic vulnerabilities identified by the Individual Plant Examination for External Events IPEEE program (Section 5.0);
- Selection of SSCs to be inspected in the plant (Section 6.0);
" Performance of the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys (Section 7.0);
- Evaluation of potentially adverse seismic conditions with respect to the seismic licensing bases (Section 8.0); and
- Performance of Peer Reviews (Section 9.0).
Supplemental guidance/clarification for opening cabinets to inspect for adverse conditions was received on September 18, 2012. This. required the opening of cabinets, electrical boxes, and switchgear to inspect the internals for potentially adverse seismic conditions, even when opening the components was not required to inspect the anchorage. At the time of this supplemental guidance/clarification, the Farley Unit 1 walkdowns were complete with non-outage walkdowns.
However, the affected components were identified and scheduled for re-inspection with component doors opened. Further discussion is given in Section 7.0.
FARLEY UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERIM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 6 OF 50 3.0 SEISMIC LICENSING BASIS
SUMMARY
This section provides a summary of the licensing bases for the Seismic: Category I Structures,,Systems, and Components (SSCs) in the plant. It includes a discussion of the Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE) and the codes and standards used in the design of the Seismic Category I SSCs for meeting the plant-specific seismic licensing basis requirements.
3.1 SAFE SHUTDOWN EARTHQUAKE The criteria for determining the adequacy of Seismic Category I mechanical and electrical equipment for the Farley Nuclear Plant are described in various areas of the UFSAR. In some cases the criteria are specified in general terms to require verification by tests or analyses. In other cases, more, specific criteria are specified such as verification in accordance with IEEE Standard 344-1971. At the time of the original design and licensing of the plant the requirements were changing to the use of IEEE 344-1975. These two separate programs were used to verify the seismic adequacy of Farley's mechanical and electrical equipment.
By letter dated February 19, 1987, the NRC issued Generic Letter (GL) 87-02, (Reference 10.4). On May 22, 1992, the NRC issued GL 87-02, Supplement 1 (Reference 10.8). As documented in NUREG-1211, (Reference 10.9), GL 87-02 is applicable to Farley Nuclear Plant (FNP) Unit 1, since Unit 1 had not previously been audited by the NRC's Seismic Qualification Review Team (SQRT). Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) replied to GL 87-02 by letter dated September 10, 1992. The SNC letter included a commitment to use the Seismic Qualification Utility Group (SQUG) methodology as documented in the Generic Implementation Procedure (GIP) for the resolution of seismic issues, identified in GL 87-02 for FNP Unit 1. The SQUG methodology is based on application of earthquake experience data to verify the seismic adequacy of equipment. The seismic evaluation for FNP Unit 1 was completed, and the results were documented in adocument entitled, "Unresolved Safety Issue A-46 Summary Report." This document was submitted to the NRC by letter dated May 18, 1995, as a 10 CFR 50.54(f) response. SNC received an SER dated July 9, 1998, concerning FNP Unit 1 Unresolved Safety Issue (USI) A-46 resolution and it stated that SNC's USI A-46 program implementation resulted in safety enhancements beyond the original licensing basis and SNC actions provide sufficient basis to close the USI A-46 review at the facility.
FARLEY UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 7 OF 50 Geologic and seismologic surveys of the site have been conducted to establish two "design earthquakes" with different intensities of ground motion. These are the 50 percent SSE (/2 SSE) and the SSE with different intensities of ground motion. The 1/2/2 SSE, sometimes referred to as the operating basis earthquake (OBE), is postulated to be the earthquake that could be expected to occur at the site during the operating life of the plant. The SSE represents the strongest earthquake that is hypothetically postulated to occur during an infinite period. The intensity postulated to occur at the site for both the '/2 SSE and SSE is defined from the history of seismic activity in the area around the site.
The V2 SSE and SSE are specified in terms of a set of idealized, smooth curves, called the design spectra because they specify a range of values for two of the important properties of an earthquake ground motion, i.e., the maximum ground acceleration and the frequency distribution. The SSE produces the vibratory ground motion for which Category I structures, systems and components are designed to remain functional.
The '/2 SSE and SSE spectra are each developed for 0%, 0.5%, 1.0%, 2.0%, 3.0%, and 5.0% of critical damping, with a horizontal ground peak acceleration of 0.05 g and 0.10 g, and vertical ground acceleration of 0.033 g and 0.067 g, respectively.
POWER GENERATION DESIGN BASIS Seismic Category 1 structures, systems and components are designed so that stresses remain within normal code allowable limits during the '/2 SSE and to ensure they will perform their required safety-related functions during and after an SSE.
MAJOR COMPONENT DESIGN BASIS The horizontal and vertical OBE and SSE in-structure response spectra curves form the basis for the.
seismic qualification and design of Category I SSCs and for demonstxating the structural integrity of Seismic Category II SSCs, where required. In addition, systems running between structures shall be designed to withstand the seismic relative displacements.
The seismic analysis of safety related systems, equipment, and components is based on the response spectra method, time-history method, or equivalent static method.
Although original seismic qualification was done to IEEE 344-1971, the USI A-46 Program verified that the original seismic qualification was adequate to support the seismic qualification of the equipment to the later requirements of IEEE 344-1975. Seismic qualification for new and replacement equipment is therefore based on the guidelines of IEEE 344-1975. Any new, replacement or changes to
FARLEY UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 8 OF 50 electrical and mechanical equipment are evaluated to the guidelines contained in IEEE 344-1975.
Damping values are provided in FSAR Table 3.7-1.
3.2 DESIGN CODES, STANDARDS AND METHODS The design codes and standards for seismic qualification are listed throughout Section 3.0 of the Farley UFSAR. Examples of the pertinent codes, standards, and methods used in the original design of Farley Unit 1 are listed below.
ACI 318-71, Building Code Requirements for Reinforced Concrete American Institute of Steel Construction (AISC), Manual of Steel Construction, 7 th Edition
'ASME III Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, 1968 Edition ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code for Pumps and Valves for Nuclear Power.
ASME VIII Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, 1968 Edition ANSI B3 1.1 Power Piping ANSI B31.7 Nuclear Power Piping BC-TOP-4, Seismic Analysis of Structures and Equipment for Nuclear Power Plants, September, 1972 IEEE 317-1976, Standard for Electric Penetration Assemblies in Containment Structures for Nuclear Power Generating Stations IEEE 323-1974, Std for Qualifying Class IE Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations IEEE 344-1971 Recommended Practice for Seismic Qualification of Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations. Methods include both analysis and testing.
IEEE 344-1975 Recommended Practice for Seismic Qualification of Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations. Methods include both analysis and testing.
FARLEY UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIcC PAGE 9 OF 50 4.0 PERSONNEL QUALIFICATIONS Table 4-1 identifies the project team members and their project responsibilities per the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). Table 4-2 identifies the Peer Review Team members and responsibilities.
Section 4.1 provides an overview of the project responsibilities. Section 4.2 includes brief experience summaries for all project personnel in alphabetical order.
Table 4-1 Project Team Members and Responsibilities Site Equipment Seismic Licensing Name Point of Selection /
Plant Walkdown Basis Contact IPEEE Operations Engineer Reviewer (POC)
Reviewer (SWE)
William Arens X
X Maggie Farah X
X Ryan Harlos X
X X
X Crystal Lovelady X
X Laura Maclay X
X Paul Miktus*
X X
Ronald Miranda*
X X
Alan Mullenix X
X Scott Walden*
X X
Robert Wood X
X Taylor Youngblood X
X X
Stephen Yuan X
X
FARLEY UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 10 OF50 Table 4-2 Peer Review Team Members and Responsibilities Peer SWEL Walkdown Licensing Submittal Name Review Peer Peer Basis Peer Report Peer Team Reviewer Reviewer Reviewer Reviewer Leader Robert Ashworth*
X X
X X
Melanie Brown*
X X
X X
Richard Starck*
X X
Kenneth Whitmore*-
X X
X X
Notes (Table 4-1 and Table 4-2):
- 1)
- Indicates Seismic Capability Engineer
- 2) As stated in Section 7.0, all potentially adverse conditions were entered into the plant Corrective Action Program (CAP) system. However, as part of the process of entering the condition into the CAP, the SWEs made a preliminary assessment of the condition with respect to the plant licensing basis. Further licensing basis reviews were performed as discussed in Section 8.0 as part of the CA]P resolution process by personnel not directly involved in the walkdowns.
4.1 OVERVIEW OF PROJECT RESPONSIBILITIES The Site Point of Contact (POC) is a site engineer from Southern Nuclear that has experience with the site equipment, site procedures, plant operations, and overall personnel organization. The site POC coordinated site access for walkdown personnel and any resources required for the walkdowns such as inspection equipment and support from plant operations. The POC was responsible for development of the walkdovwn schedule and any updates to the schedule based equipment availability.
FARLEY UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 11 0F 50 Equipment Selection Personnel (ESP) were responsible for identifying the sample of SSCs for the Seismic Walkdowns. The ESP have knowledge of plant operations, plant documentation, and associated SSCs. The ESP also have knowledge of the IPEEE program. For this project, site engineers and plant operations personnel participated in the equipment selection. The ESP also performed the responsibilities of the IPEEE Reviewers. The IPEEE Reviewers also ensured that the walkdown scope included a sample of equipment that had IPEEE seismic vulnerabilities.
Plant Operations Personnel provided detailed review of the sample of SSCs Seismic Walkdown Equipment List (SWEL) and Base List) to ensure the walkdown scope included equipment located in a variety of environments, equipment in a variety of systems, and equipment accessible for a walkdown.
Plant Operations Personnel also assisted in obtaining access to components and component internals and helped to coordinate with plant maintenance. For the Farley Unit 1 project, the Plant Operations Personnel were either former or currently licensed Senior Reactor Operators.
The SWEs were trained on the NTTF Recommendation 2.3: Seismic, and on the material contained in the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). SWEs who had previously completed the Seismic Walkdown Training Class developed by the SQUG were not required to complete training on the NTTF Seismic recommendations but were trained on the differences between SQUG activities and activities associated with the NTTF Seismic recommendations.
The Licensing Basis Reviewers were responsible for determining whether any potentially adverse seismic conditions identified by the SWEs met the plant seismic licensing basis. The Licensing Basis Reviewers have knowledge of and experience with the seismic licensing basis and documentation for the SSCs at Farley.
A Peer Review Team was formed for this project to provide both oversight and review of all aspects of the walkdowns. The Peer Review Team members have extensive experience in seismic design and qualification of structures, systems and components as well as extensive field experience. The Peer Review Team for this project interfaced with the ESP and SWEs to ensure that the walkdown program satisfied the guidance in the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2).
FARLEY UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE12OF50 4.2 TEAM EXPERIENCE SUMMARIES William Arens (SNC)
Mr. Arens is a Shift Supervisor assigned to the Operations staff at Farley Nuclear Plant. He earned a B.S. in Mechanical Engineering from the University of Oklahoma in 1980. Mr. Arens served for eight years as an officer in the U.S. Navy nuclear submarine force. He has been employed at Farley Nuclear Plant since 1988, obtaining a Senior Reactor Operator License in 1991. His experience at Farley includes serving as a MOV engineer, Shift Support Supervisor-, Shift Supervisor, Operations Superintendent, and Shift Manager.
Mr. Ashworth is a structural engineer with MPR and has more than six years of experience with providing engineering solutions for a wide variety of nuclear power plant components and systems.
His experience includes equipment walkdowns at industrial facilities to assess material condition, structural modeling and analyses, and seismic qualification in accordance with current industry standards for mechanical and electrical equipment in nuclear power plants. Mr. Ashworth has completed the training course for the EPRI Seismic Walkdown Guidance and is also a Seismic Capability Engineer (SCE) as defined in the SQUG GIP for resolution of USI A-46.
Ms. Brown has over 31 years of experience with Southern Company., the majority of which has been serving the nuclear fleet. Ms. Brown's most recent assignment was as a Seismic Qualification Engineer in the Fleet Design Department, where she was responsible for performing activities associated with the Governance, Oversight, Support, and Perform (GOSP) Model including:
- Management of the seismic design bases,
" Seismic equipment qualification,
" Seismic evaluation of plant structures and components,
" Design documentation and configuration management.
She is currently serving as the Southern Nuclear Seismic Technical Lead for the Fukushima Near-Term Task Force (NTTF) 2.3 Seismic Walkdowns for all three Southern Nuclear plants.
FARLEY UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 13OF 50 Maggie Farah, SWE (ENERCON)
Ms. Farah is a Structural Engineer with a B.S. in Civil Engineering from the New Jersey Institute of Technology and currently pursuing a Master's degree in Structural Engineering. Ms. Farah has been employed as a structural engineer at ENERCON for more than four years and has extensive experience in performing seismic equipment evaluations and structural analysis. She has performed numerous plant walkdowns as part of seismic design and modifications and had extensive on-site experience at Humboldt Bay and at the Metropolis Works fuel processing plant. She has been involved in various plant modifications, including design of dry fuel. storage installations. Ms. Farah completed the NTTF 2.3 Seismic Walkdown Training Course and was qualified as a SWE.
Mr. Harlos is a mechanical engineer in the Farley Engineering Systems Department at Southern Nuclear Operating Company and has a B.S. in Mechanical Engineering from Auburn University. He has been employed in the nuclear industry for approximately three years and has extensive experience in the design, operation, and monitoring of systems with respect to their applicable design bases. His primary experience is with SSCs on the Primary Side of PWR nuclear operating plants. Mr. Harlos also worked as a co-op employee for Southern Company for more than a year, while in college, prior to joining the staff at Farley Nuclear Station as a full-time employee. Mr. Harlos completed the EPRI training on Near Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 - Plant Seismic Walkdowns.
Ms. Lovelady-is a civil engineer in the Fleet Design Engineering Mechanical/Civil group at Southern Nuclear Operating Company. She has a B.S. in-Civil Engineering from the University of Alabama, Huntsville. She has more than five years of experience in structural analysis and design of structures in the power industry. She has additional experience as a member of the structural monitoring team at Plant Hatch and Plant Farley. Ms. Lovelady completed training on Near Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 -Seismic Walkdowns to qualify as a SWE.
FARLEY UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE14OF50 Laura Maclay, SWE (ENERCON)
Ms. Maclay has over three years of experience as a structural engineer with ENERCON. Her tasks have ranged from assisting with the development and preparation of design change packages to performing design calculations and markups, comment resolutions, and drawing revisions. She worked on-site at Turkey Point Nuclear Plant for a year preparing structural evaluations of SSCs for an Extended Power Uprate (EPU). She designed safety related supports for computer and electrical equipment for the Turbine Digital Controls Upgrade package and other similar packages. Her responsibilities also included the review of calculations, drawings and vendor documentation for the seismic evaluation of the Unit 3 Palfinger Crane inside containment and new platforms in the High Pressure Turbine enclosure. Recent work includes Fukushima flooding walkdowns at Limerick Generating Station. Ms. Maclay recently completed the NTTF 2.3 Seismic Walkdown Training Course and was qualified as a SWE.
Paul Miktus, SCE (ENERCON)
Mr. Miktus, P.E., has over 35 years of Civil/Structural experience in the design, construction and operation of nuclear power plants and process/industrial facilities retrofits. Mr. Miktus held positions of responsibility in a number of supervisory and management positions for ENERCON for clients including Florida Power and Light, Southern Company and Entergy. His design experience includes structural steel design (including anchorages); suspended systems (piping, ductwork, raceways) supports; seismic qualification of equipment, parts and structures; rigging and scaffolds; piping stress, analysis; and concrete slabs, beams and foundations. At River Bend Station, while with Entergy, Mr.
Miktus was Engineering Supervisor for many large projects and completed the SQUG Walkdown Screening and Seismic Evaluation Training and the Seismic IPEEE Add-On Training Courses.
FARLEY UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC I PAGE 15 OF 50 Ronald Miranda, SCE (ENERCON)
Mr. Miranda is a member of the ENERCON Senior Technical and Management staff with 40 years of experience in the Nuclear Power Generation industry. He has held various engineering and management positions in the industry, holds a MS degree in Civil Engineering and is a SCE certified by the SQUG. Mr. Miranda is experienced in structural steel and'reinforced concrete design, anchorage to concrete, identification and assessment of degraded structural conditions, evaluations using SQUG methodologies, and the management of large, complex, and high-visibility projects. Mr. Miranda is currently the ENERCON Dry Fuel Storage Product Line Manager responsible for the development and the design of Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations at power generating facilities under static, dynamic, and flooding conditions compliant with 10 CFR 50 and 10 CFR 72 regulations and industry standards, Mr. Miranda is recognized as an expert within the dry fuel storage industry.
Alan Mullenix, SWE (ENERCON)
Mr. Mullenix is a Registered Professional Engineer with over five years of Civil/Structural experience.
He has a B.S. in Civil Engineering and a Master of Science degree in Structural Engineering. His primary responsibilities include structural design, seismic design, and Design Change Package development. Mr. Mullenix assisted with 10 CFR 73.55 Nuclear Plant Security upgrades, Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations, and other design changes at Plant Farley, Plant Hatch, Brunswick, Crystal River, and Fort Calhoun Nuclear Stations. Mr. Mullenix completed his training on Near Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 - Seismic Walkdowns as a SWE.
-Mr. Starck is a registered Professional Engineer with more than 30 years of experience in seismic qualification of nuclear plant equipment. He is the principal author of the EPRI Seismic Walkdown Guidance Document (Reference 10.2) and developed and taught the six sessions of the NTTF 2.3 Seismic Walkdown Training Course to over 200 engineers. He provided technical oversight of work for various SQUG projects aimed at resolving USI A-46. Mr. Starck developed for SQUG the generic guidelines, criteria, and procedure for identifying safe shutdown equipment for resolution of USI A-46, is the editor and principal author of the SQUG GIP, and has interfaced with the NRC Staff and the SQUG Steering Group to resolve open issues on several revisions of the GIP. Mr. Starck is a SCE and has performed Seismic Walkdowns and evaluations of nuclear plant electric and mechanical equipment as part of the NRC required USI A-46 program. This work included equipment qualification, anchorage evaluation, seismic interaction review, outlier resolution, and operability determination.
FARLEY UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISNMC PAGE 16OF50 Scott Walden, SCE (SNC)
Mr. Walden is a senior engineer in the Fleet Design Analysis / Civil department at SNC. He has a B.S.
in Civil Engineering from Mississippi State University. Mr. Walden has more than 33 years of experience in structural analysis and design of structures for electric utilities, including extensive experience in seismic analysis of nuclear power plant structures and seismic qualification of equipment. He has extensive experience in the area of analysis of supports and also worked in developing the response spectra curves for Plant Hatch. He also has extensive experience in the Structure Monitoring Program (SMP) for Maintenance Rule and is responsible for oversight of the SMP for Plant Farley. He successfully completed the SQUG training course, is a Seismic Capability Engineer and participated in the original IPEEE/SQUG walkdown for Plant Farley and the conduit/cable tray SQUG walkdowns for Plant Hatch. He is a registered Professional Engineer is the states of Alabama and Mississippi.
Kenneth Whitmore, SCE (ENERCON)
Mr. Whitmore is a Registered Professional Engineer with more than 30 years of experience in seismic design and seismic equipment qualification in nuclear power plants. Mr. Whitmore is a Seismic Capability Engineer that was involved in the development of the SQUG methodology for verification of nuclear plant components. Specifically, Mr. Whitmore served on the sub-committee that developed the SQUG methodology for evaluation of raceways and on the sub-committee that performed the peer review of the SQUG walkdown training class. Mr. Whitmore performed A-46 and IPEEE walkdowns at Oyster Creek and Three Mile Island and has subsequently performed SQUG evaluations at numerous nuclear power plants. Mr. Whitmore served as both Chairman and Technical Chairman of the Seismic Qualification Reporting and Testing Service (SQRTS), has witnessed numerous seismic tests and is a recognized industry expert in seismic qualification of components. Mr. Whitmore has significant experience in all aspects of structural analysis and design and has extensive experience in performing plant walkdowns associated with seismic issues. Mr. Whitmore completed his EPRI training on Near Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 -
Seismic Walkdowns as a Seismic Walkdown Engineer (SWE) in June 2012.
FARLEY UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 17 OF 50 Robert Wood (SNC)
Mr. Wood is the Farley Severe Accident Management Program Manager. He holds BS degrees in Physical Science, Mathematics, and Chemistry from Troy State University. Mr. Wood has over 37 years of experience at operating nuclear plants, was licensed as a SRO and served seven years on shift as Shift Support Supervisor and Unit Shift Supervisor. He has supervisory experience in chemistry, work management, strategic analysis and major project management.
Mr. Youngblood is a Site Projects Lead at Plant Farley working primarily in major projects. He has a BS in Civil Engineering from the University of Alabama at Birmingham. Mr. Youngblood has 12 years of civil engineering experience with more than four of those years spent at Plant Farley in the areas of civil/structural design. His design experience includes evaluations and calculations for seismically qualifying various supports and structures. His specialties are in the areas concrete and
-earthwork and has developed an expertise in lifting and rigging evaluations. Mr. Youngblood is a registered Professional Engineer in the State of Alabama. Mr. Youngblood completed the EPRI training on Near Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 - Plant Seismic Walkdowns in June 2012.
Stephen Yuan, SWE (ENERCON)
Mr. Yuan, P.E., is a Senior Civil Engineer in ENERCON's New Jersey office. He has over 20 years of experience in structural modeling, design, upgrading, electrical facility structure analyses and maintenance of industrial installations and nuclear power plants, including significant experience at Perry, Pilgrim and Vermont Yankee Plant. Mr. Yuan was one of the key civil engineers in support of the transformer replacement project at Perry Nuclear Power Plant. He holds a M.S. in Civil Engineering from the City University of New York. Mr. Yuan recently completed the NTTF 2.3 Seismic Walkdown Training Course and was qualified as a Seismic Walkdown Engineer (SWE).
FARLEY UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM l VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 18 OF50 5.0 IPEEE VULNERABILITIES REPORTING Information on the seismic vulnerabilities identified during the IPEEE program is reported in. Within this context, "vulnerabilities" is used to mean seismic anomalies, outliers, or other findings. For each vulnerability, Attachment 5 also provides a description of the action taken to eliminate or reduce the seismic vulnerability.
Plant Farley completed modifications for all non-relay items on or before December 31, 1995, and all relays on or before December 31, 1996. The Equipment Selection/IPEEE Reviewers (see Table 4-1) reviewed the IPEEE implementation documents and final report to determine the list of items identified as having vulnerabilities and the required modifications.
The SWEL for Farley Unit 1 included 25 components for which seismic vulnerabilities were previously identified during the IPEEE program. During the walkdowns, the walkdown teams verify that the recommended resolutions to the IPEEE vulnerabilities associated with these 25 items are implemented.
FARLEY UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 19OF 50 6.0 SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST DEVELOPMENT A team of individuals with extensive knowledge of Plant Farley systems and components developed the SWEL. Qualifications of the personnel responsible for developing the SWEL are provided in Section 4.0. The equipment selection personnel used a SNC-template to ensure compliance with the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2) and consistency across the fleet.
Two SWELs were developed (SWEL 1 and SWEL 2) consistent with the guidance in the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). SWEL 1 consists of a sample of equipment related to safe shutdown of the reactor and maintaining containment integrity as described in Section 3.0 of the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). SWEL 2 consists of items related-to the spent fuel pool as described in Section 3.0 of the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). The two SWELs form the overall SWEL for the plant. provides the final SWEL 1 and SWEL 2.
In some cases, components listed on the SWEL were removed from the SWEL or were replaced with equivalent components. These changes were made when it was determined during the Seismic Walkdown that access to the equipment on the original SWEL would be impractical to achieve for a walkdown. For example, components located very high in the overhead were replaced with equivalent items that could be seen without erecting scaffolding. All such changes meet the provisions of the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). The SWELs provided in Attachment 1 reflect the final SWELs with all changes incorporated.
6.1 DEVELOPMENT OF SWEL 1 SWEL 1 was developed using the four screens described in EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2).
Screens 1 through 3 These screens were used to select Seismic Category 1 equipment that does not undergo regular inspection but support the five safety functions described in the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). Page 3-1 of the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2) lists three screens for use in selecting the Base List 1 if a utility was to not start from an existing equipment list used in previous plant evaluations. Applying these three screens would result in an acceptable base list that was comprised of Seismic Category I SSCs associated with maintaining the five safety functions listed in the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2).
FARLEY UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 20 OF 50 In accordance with the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2), page 3-3, Screens 1 through 3 were satisfied using previous equipment lists developed for the IPEEE program. Consequently, the Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL) developed for the Farley IPEEE Report for Unit 1 (Reference 10.6),
Appendix A-Seismic Report, was used as the base list for the development of SWEL 1.
The intent of the Base List 1 was to provide an equipment list of the SSCs used to safely shut down the reactor and maintain containment integrity following a SSE. The specific guidance used to create the IPEEE Seismic SSEL was EPRI Report NP-6041, "A Methodology for Assessment of Nuclear Power Plant Seismic Margin", (Reference 10.13). The Seismic SSEL from IPEEE - Seismic was checked and verified to meet the intentions set forth in the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2).
As stated in EPRI Report 1025286, the equipment on the SWEL must include equipment required to perform the following five safety functions:
- Reactor reactivity control
- Reactor coolant pressure control
- Reactor coolant inventory control
" Decay heat removal, and
" Containment function.
The criteria used in selection of the Seismic SSEL are detailed in Section 3.0.2 of the IPEEE - Seismic Report. Specifically, one preferred and one alternate path capable of achieving and maintaining a safe-shutdown condition for at least 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> following a Plant Farley Safe Shutdown Earthquake was selected for each unit. Further, it was assumed that a Small Break Loss of Coolant Accident (SBLOCA) had occurred and as such, the paths were also selected as being capable of mitigating a SBLOCA following an SSE. Plant Operations' input resulted in the inclusion of swing components not listed on the original IPEEE SSEL. Other suggestions by Plant Operations for inclusion in the SWEL, such as instrumentation stanchions and piping components, were determined to be covered by existing plant programs. Based on this, samples of those component types were not required to be added to the SWEL.
Therefore, based upon the review of the Base List, it was determined that the list did satisfy the requirements as specified in the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2) which is a list comprised of Seismic Category I SSCs associated with maintaining the aforementioned five safety functions that are used to safely shut down the reactor and maintain containment cooling integrity.
Base List 1 is presented in Attachment 1.
FARLEY UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERMvi VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC I
_________________ ______________________jPAGE 21 OF 50 Screen 4 Screen 4 is the sample considerations used to select components that make up the SWEL from the components contained in Base List 1. The selection of components for SWEL 1 was developed through an iterative process that ensured a representative sample of components was included in the SWEL. Various drafts of SWEL 1 were provided to Farley licensed Senior Reactor Operators (SROs) for review and input. The SROs identified and recommended inclusion of additional equipment important to plant operations.
The following list summarizes the sample considerations used to develop SWEL 1:
- Variety of systems
- Major new or replacement equipment Classes of equipment
- Variety of environments Equipment enhanced due to vulnerabilities identified during the IPEEE program
- Risk Significance Variety of Systems - The EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2) specifies that equipment from a variety of plant systems must be included on the SWEL 1. The systems represented in the Base List were reviewed and components from a majority of these systems are included on the SWEL.
Major New and Replacement Equipment - Major new or replacement equipment installed within the previous 15 years was identified through a search of work order (WO) histories for selected equipment from input from plant personnel familiar with plant modifications and from the Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) group on equipment changes to components that are included in the PRA.
Variety of Equipment Classes - A list of the 21 Classes of Equipment that should be included on the SWEL is provided in Appendix B of the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). The final SWEL contains a wide variety of components and includes a representative sample of components from each equipment class except classes 11, 13 and 19. The SWEL does not contain Class 11 or 13 components since it was developed from the SSEL associated with the IPEEE as described previously which does not contain Class 11 or 13 equipment. This is consistent with the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2) for development of the SWEL.
FARLEY UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC
__________________ _______________________PAGE 22 OF 50 Equipment Class 19 is not in scope for SWEL l 'The only Class 19 components on the Base List are Reactor Coolant System (RCS) RTDs installed on the RCS Piping. This is also consistent with the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2) which states, "The major pieces of equipment in the NSSS that are located inside the containment are excluded from the scope of this program. Also excluded are the supports for this equipment along with all the components mounted in or on this NSSS equipment".
Variety of Environments - The EPRI Report 1025286 specifies that the SWEL contains components located in various plant environments, including environments subject to corrosion and high temperatures. SWEL 1 includes equipment in three environment types. These include Harsh (e.g.
Containment Building, Main Steam Valve Room), Mild (e.g. Control Room, Auxiliary Building), and Outdoors/Intake Structures (e.g. Valve Boxes, Service Water Intake Structure).
IPEEE Vulnerabilities - SWEL 1 includes equipment identified as having seismic vulnerabilities as reported in Farley IPEEE Report for Unit 1 (Reference 10.6).
Risk Significance -
Information from the Farley Unit 1 PRA and the Maintenance Rule implementation documentation were used to determine whether items were risk significant. A representative sample of Risk Significant items are included on the SWEL. As stated, plant SROs reviewed the SWEL to ensure that equipment important to plant operation were included on the list.
6.2 DEVELOPMENT OF SWEL 2 SWEL 2 is developed using four screens described in the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2).
SWEL 2 is presented in Attachment 1.
Screens 1 through 2 The equipment selected through Screens 1 and 2 provide Seismic Category I components associated with the Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) that are also accessible for a walkdown. For Farley Unit 1, the only Seismic Category 1 equipment associated with the SFP is the Spent Fuel Cooling and Purification System. The Seismic Category I SSCs in the Spent Fuel Cooling and Purification System that are accessible and available for a walkdown comprise Base List 2.
FARLEY UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 23 OF 50 Screen 3 Screen 3 is the sample considerations that ensure that a broad category of equipment included in SWEL 2. These considerations include:
Variety of systems Major new or replacement equipment 0
Classes of equipment
- Variety of environments Using the Base List 2 developed from the SFP System, the following criteria were used to select a sample of the SFP Seismic Category I equipment and systems:
" Variety of systems - Only one system comprises Base List 2
- Major new or replacement equipment - No major new or replacement equipment installations with the past 15 years.
Classes of equipment - There are only 3 types of equipment in Base list 2: manual valves, 1 pump per train, and 1 heat exchanger per train. Additionally, one heat exchanger was included on SWEL 1 and therefore this selected heat exchanger was not chosen on SWEL 2 but applies to the SWEL 2 variety of equipment to prevent duplicates. The reason for the inclusion on SWEL 1 is due to Component Cooling Water (CCW) being the cooling medium for the SPF Heat Exchanger which requires the heat exchanger to maintain structural integrity during a seismic event for both SFP Cooling and CCW.
Variety of environments - All SFP components are located in a mild environment and are not submerged.
The Farley SFP System has a very basic system design with very limited component types and the system contains only one active component in each train; the SFP Cooling Pump. Since 3 of the 4 objectives for selecting the sample consideration of items for SWEL 2 did not have any variance, the only remaining criteria to satisfy the sample objectives was to ensure that a component from each category was chosen and these selected equipment varieties were used to comprise SWEL 2.
FARLEY UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 24 OF 50 Screen 4 Screen 4 identifies any items that could potentially lead to rapid drain down of the SFP. These include any penetrations in the SFP that are below 10 feet above the top of the fuel assemblies.
For Farley Unit 1, the SFP Cooling and Purification System contains three penetrations; two SFP pump suctions and one pump discharge. Neither the discharge line nor the suction line penetrations are located within 10 feet of the top of the fuel assemblies. However, the SFP discharge piping terminates approximately 6 feet above the top of the fuel assemblies in the SFP. Due to this, the discharge piping has a 1/2" hole on the bottom side of a 1800 bend at elevation 152'-0". This hole acts as a siphon breaker and is located approximately 23 feet above the top of the fuel assemblies. Since there are no penetrations within 10 feet of the fuel and since the design of the anti-siphon hole in the SFP discharge piping prevents water from being siphoned through this piping, no rapid drain-down of the pool can occur.
Therefore, there are, no components associated with rapid drain down of the Spent Fuel Pool included on SWEL 2.
FARLEY UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 25 OF 50 7.0 SEISMIC WALKDOWNS AND AREA WALK-BYS Walkdowns were performed for all components on the (combined) SWEL, except for those that were inaccessible (see Section 7.1). A Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC) was completed for each component and an Area Walk-by Checklist (AWC) was completed for each area containing equipment on the SWEL. Copies of the SWCs and AWCs are provided in Attachments 3 and 4, respectively.
The personnel performing walkdowns received training on the NTTF 2.3 Seismic Walkdown guidance.
Prior to the walkdown teams arriving onsite, walkdown packages were assembled into folders that contained the SWCs and AWCs and other pertinent information (e.g., calculations, test reports, IPEEE walkdowns, equipment location, and layout drawings). Each walkdown team consisted of two SWEs.
The walkdown teams spent the first week on site obtaining unescorted plant access and organizing for the walkdowns. Organization included assignment of specific components to the walkdown teams, review of the walkdown packages, development of a process for tracking the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys and familiarization with the plant.
The second week began with the peer reviewers (Mr. Whitmore and Mr. Ashworth) providing an overview on the information contained in the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). Expectations for the walkdowns were discussed and questions answered. After this overview, each walkdown team performed an initial Seismic Walkdown and Area Walk-by in the presence of the other teams and at least one peer reviewer. The purpose of this initial walkdown was to ensure consistency between the teams, to reinforce the expectations for identifying potential. adverse seismic conditions and to allow team members to ask questions and provide and obtain feedback.
Following the initial walkdowns, the walkdown teams began performing the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys. Support from plant personnel (operators, electricians and engineering) was obtained, as required, to access equipment and to assist in locating and identifying components. All Component Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys were documented on the SWCs and AWCs, respectively. The final status of all SWCs and AWCs indicates one of the following statuses:-
"Y" - Yes, the equipment is free from potentially adverse seismic conditions, "N" - No, the equipment is not free from at least one potentially adverse seismic condition, or "U" - Undetermined, a portion(s) of the walkdown could not be completed due to equipment inaccessibility and the condition is not known.
FARLEY UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC
.PAGE 26 OF 50 The walkdown focused on anchorage and seismic spatial interactions but also included inspections for other potentially adverse seismic conditions. Anchorage in all cases was considered to be anchorage to the structure. This included anchor bolts to concrete walls or floors, structural bolts to structural steel and welds to structural steel or embedded plates. For welds, the walkdown team looked for cracks and corrosion in the weld and base metal. Other bolts such as flange bolts on in-line components were not considered to be anchorage. These connections were evaluated and any potentially adverse seismic concerns were documented under "other adverse seismic conditions."
As part of the walkdown, the anchorage of at least 50% of the anchored components was evaluated to verify if the anchorage was consistent with plant documentation. The document that provides the anchorage configuration was identified on the SWC and the anchorage: in the field was compared to the information on this referenced document. In cases where the anchorage could not be observed (e. g.
where the anchorage is inside a cabinet that could not be opened at the time of the walkdown), the items related to anchorage were marked as "U" (Undetermined) and deferred until the piece of equipment was available for inspection. However, all other possible inspections associated with that item were completed and the results were documented on the SWC. These items were considered to be incomplete at that time and deferred to a time when they would be available for inspection.
In cases where the Seismic Walkdown team members identified a potential adverse condition, the condition was noted on the SWC or on the AWC and a condition report (CR) was written to document and evaluate/resolve the condition. As part of the process of generating the CR, preliminary licensing basis evaluations were performed by the SWEs during the walkdowns. Additionally, detailed licensing basis reviews were conducted as part of the resolution of the CR, as required. Conditions that were not obviously acceptable were documented on the checklists and a basis was provided for why the observed condition was determined to be acceptable.
Area Walk-bys were performed in the rooms containing the SSCs for walkdowns. For cases in which the room where a component was located was large, the extent of the area encompassed by the Area Walk-by was clearly indicated on the AWCs. For large areas, the walk-by included all structures, systems and components within a 35-foot radius of the equipment being walked down, as described on the AWC. The AWCs are included in Attachment 4.
FARLEY UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT -NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC P
__________________ _______________________jPAGE 27 OF 50 SWEL 1 Walkdowns A total of 113 of 115 SWEL 1 component walkdowns were performed prior to the additional guidance/clarification on opening cabinets to inspect for other adverse conditions was received on September 18, 2012. Of those 113 component walkdowns, 43 need to be revisited based on the guidance. Two components were originally deemed inaccessible. The schedule for performing the remaining 45 components walkdowns is presented in Table 7-1. All areas of the plant that contain items on the SWEL were included in the Area Walk-bys.
SWEL 2 Walkdowns A total of six of six component walkdowns were performed. All areas of the plant that contain items on the SWEL were included in the Area Walk-bys.
7.1 INACCESSIBLE ITEMS Table 7-1 identifies the components originally determined to be inaccessible for walkdowns. These items are located throughout the plant and the required Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys were not completed for these items during the initial phase of walkdowns.
Inaccessibility of equipment or plant areas occurred due to one of two conditions: (1) plant operating conditions, or (2) component inspections required the opening of cabinet/panel doors which was not conducted, or not permitted by plant Operations personnel during the time of the walkdowns. Items listed in Table 7-1 associated with Item 2 above include those that require walkdowns in accordance with the supplemental guidance to open cabinets to inspect for other adverse conditions as discussed in Section 2.0.
Based. on the above, 45 components were determined to be inaccessible. These items are located throughout the plant and the required Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys for these items are scheduled to be performed before or during the next Unit 1 outage, 1PR25, scheduled for October 2013.
Note that the majority of the checklists associated with the components determined to be inaccessible based on condition 2 currently indicate that the walkdowns of these components are complete. The supplemental guidance on opening cabinets was received after these walkdowns/checklists were complete.
Since the anchorage of these components was accessible without opening the cabinets, cabinet internals were not included in the inspections performed during the walkdowns. Therefore, those checklists will need to be revised/supplemented during later walkdowns. Completion of these checklists is tracked under CR numbers 520511, 520808, 521813, 521827 and 530499.
FARLEY UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 28 OF 50 Table 7-1.
Inaccessible Equipment per Original Walkdown Scope (see Note 1)
Reason for Item No.
Description Inaccessibility Remaining Walkdown Schedule for (Note 2)
Scope Completion Reactor Trip Switchgear (2)
Inspect panel internals Outage 1 R25 1
Q1CllE004B N.
No. 2 Ctmt Sump Level Xmitter (2)
Inspect panel internals Outage 1R25 2
QIEIILQ3594B Power Supply RHR Inlet Insolation (1)
SWC and AWC for Outage 1R25 Valve Containment El. 106' Aux Safeguards Cabinet (2)
Inspect panel internals Outage 1R25 4
Q1H11NGASC25O6C 5
Q1HI INGB2504J BOP Instrumentation Cabinet J (2)
Inspect panel internals Outage 1 R25 i
i w
6 QIHI1NGNIS2503A NIS Excore Detector Cabinet (2)
Inspect panel internals Outage 1R25 Process Control Cabinet (2)
Inspect panel internals Outage 1 R25 Channel 2 8
QHI 1NGR25041 Radiation Monitor Panel (2)
Inspect panel internals Outage 1R25 Solid State Protection (2)
Inspect panel internals Outage 1R25 Input Cabinet 4.16KV Switchgear 1G (2)
Inspect panel internals Outage 1R25 10 Q1H21EO05B Local Cont Panel 4.16KV Switchgear HJ (2)
Inspect panel internals Outage 1R25 11 Q1H21E505 Local Cont Panel 4.16KV Switchgear 1K (2)
Inspect panel internals Outage 1R25 12 Q1H21 E506 Local Cont Panel 13 Q1H21E527 Diesel Generator 1B Local Cont Panel (2)
Inspect panel internals Outage 1R25
FARLEY UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM I VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE29OF50 Table 7-1.
Inaccessible Equipment per Original Walkdown Scope (see Note 1)
Reason for Item No.
Description Inaccessibility Remaining Walkdown Schedule for (no te Scope Completion (Note 2) 14 Q1H21NBAFP2605A Hot Shutdown Panel A (2)
Inspect panel internals Outage 1R25 Multiplying Relay (2)
Inspect panel internals Outage 1 R25 Cabinet lE 16 Q1H22L002 Transfer Relay-Cabinet 1 (2)
Inspect panel internals Outage 1R25 Diesel Local Relay Panel (2)
Inspect panel internals Outage 1R25 17 Q1H22L503 L
113 (1)
Complete SWC after Outage 1R25 removal of insulating material from around the Steam Generator LA 18 Q1N11PT0476 Discharge Pressure instrument. This was not allowed by Plant Operations at the time the SWC was perfonned Containment Purge (1)
SWC and AWC for Outage 1R25 19 Q1P13HV2867D Isolation Inside Ctmt Containment el. 129' Valve Turb Bldg SW Iso Valve (2)
Inspect panel internals Outage 1R25 20 Q1P16G517BReaBx Relay Box 21 Q1R17BOOI-A MCC1A (2)
Inspect panel internals Outage 1R25 22 Q1R15A504 4.16KV Switchgear IJ (2)
Inspect panel internals Outage 1R25 23 Q1R16B006 600V Load Center ID (2)
Inspect panel internals Outage 1R25 24 Q1R17B504-A MCC 1K (2)
Inspect panel internals Outage 1R25 25 Q1R17B002 MCC 1B (2)
Inspect panel internals Outage 1R25 26 Q1R17B507-A MCC iN (2)
Inspect panel internals Outage 1R25 27 QIR18BO29 Power Disconnect Switch (2)
Inspect panel internals Outage IR25 I
FARLEY UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE30OF50 Table 7-1.
Inaccessible Equipment per Original Walkdown Scope (see Note 1)
Reason for Remaining Walkdown Schedule for Item No.
Description Inaccessibility Scope completion (Nt
)Scope Completion 28 QlR181331CircuitBreaker(Note
- 2)
I 28 QlR18BO031 Circuit Breaker Box (2)
]Inspect panel internals Outage 1R25 29 Q1R18B035 Circuit Breaker Box (2)
Inspect panel internals Outage 1R25 30 Q1R21BOO1A Vital AC Breaker Box (2)
Inspect panel internals Outage 1R25 31 Q1R21EO09C Inverter IC (2)
Inspect panel internals Outage 1R25 4.16KV Switchgear IL (2)
Inspect panel internals Outage IR25 Surge Arrestor 125VDC Distribution (2)
Inspect panel internals Outage 1R25 Panel 1B 34 Q1R42BOOIB 125VDC BUS 1B (2)
Inspect panel internals Outage 1R25 35 Q1R42EOOA Aux Bldg Battery Charger IA (2)
Inspect panel internals Outage IR25 36 Q1R43EOOA Sequencer BIF (2)
Inspect panel internals Outage 1R25 Sequencer B IF Aux (2)
Inspect panel internals Outage lR25 37 QlR43EO02A Relay Panel Diesel Gen 1-2A Local (2)
Inspect panel internals Outage 1R25 Control Panel Diesel Generator 1C (2)
Inspect panel internals Outage 1R25 Local Control Panel Service Water B Train (2)
Inspect panel internals Outage 1R25 40 QSH21L503B Battery Room HVAC LCS Diesel Local Relay Panel (2)
Inspect panel internals Outage 1R25 41 QH22L502-2A 42 QSR42B516 U1 Service Water Batt Fuse Box Train A (2)
Inspect panel internals Outage 1R25 i
-I
FARLEY UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC
_______________________________________PAGE 31 0F 50 Table 7-1.
Inaccessible Equipment per Original Walkdown Scope (see Note 1)
Reason for Remaining Walkdown Schedule for Item No.
Description Inaccessibility Scope Completion (Nt )Scope Completion
_________________(Note 2)
SW Battery NO. 3 or 4 (2)
Inspect panel internals Outage 1R25 Detection Cabinet SW Building A Train (2)
Inspect panel internals Outage 1R25 44 QSR42B525A BteySLS Battery SEL SW Svc Water Bldg Batt (2)
Inspect panel internals Outage 1R25 Charger #2 (Standby)
Table notes:
- 1)
Farley Unit 1 has one transformer (Equipment Class 4) in the SWEL 1. It was inspected tothe extent practical. All visible anchors, hardware and surfaces were inspected. The anchorage for the transformer was visible without opening the component. To inspect the transformer further would require disassembly and therefore would not be considered part of a normal electrical inspection. The inspection of this transformer meets the requirements of the guida~nce document and the 50.54(f)
Letter. The subject transformer is:
MPL #Q1R11B004 LC TRANSFORMER 1D
- 2)
Entries in Table 7-1 under column heading: "Reason for Inaccessibility" refer to the condition for inaccessibility discussed in Section 7.1.
FARLEY UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 32 OF 50 8.0 RESULTS This section discusses the results of the Seismic Walkdowns that were performed in response to the NRC 50.54(f) letter dated March 12, 2012, "Enclosure 3, Recommendation 2.3: Seismic". As potentially adverse conditions were identified, condition reports were initiated in the Plant CAP program and evaluated. The sections below discuss the results of these walkdowns and evaluations.
8.1 POTENTIALLY ADVERSE SEISMIC CONDITIONS All potentially adverse conditions were conservatively entered into the site Corrective Action Program (CAP) per Southern Nuclear expectations in a timely fashion. While some preliminary licensing basis evaluations were performed by the SWEs as part of the generation of the CAP entries, the items did not first undergo a detailed seismic licensing basis review as described in EPRI Report 1025286.
Consequently, the as-found conditions in Table 8-1 below do not necessarily indicate that SSCs are deficient or not in conformance with their seismic licensing basis. Instead, it is an indication that Southern Nuclear has a very low threshold for CRs and actively uses the system.
SNC personnel familiar with the Plant Farley Seismic Licensing basis, Plant Farley seismic qualification methods and documentation, and Southern Nuclear requirements and procedures for entering items into the CAP reviewed and dispositioned all of the potentially adverse seismic conditions as part of the CAP process. The subsections below summarize the key findings from the CAP reviews that pertain to equipment operability, SSC conformance with the seismic licensing basis, and any required plant changes.
During the course of the seismic walkdowns, a total of 11 Unit 1 Potentially Adverse Conditions were identified and entered into the Corrective Action Program. In addition, another 3 were entered that are Common to both Units 1 and 2. Table 8-1 provides additional details on the SSCs that were identified during the walkdowns and entered into the CAP as degraded, nonconforming, or unanalyzed relative to their seismic licensing basis.
FARLEY UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC
___ PAGE 33 OF 50 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Comp/
Brief Description of Potentially CR #
Brief discussion of Action Taken/Planned to Status Area Adverse Condition Analysis/Conclusion Address/Resolve the (Open/Clsd)
Condition Area A cable from tray BHMS06 was 504947 Although this has been marked as a WO SNC428446 created -
Closed 121' Piping found to be overhanging the edge potential adverse seismic concern, the Cable needs to be placed Pen Room 223 of the tray in several places. At seismic walkdown team has back in tray one location, the cable rested on a concluded that it is unlikely for the sharp edge where it crosses the cable to be damaged to the point that boundary of the tray. The tray is -
it would not perform its intended 9' in the overhead behind the function during a seismic event.
cubicle wall of the room entrance.
The cable, needs to be placed back in the cable tray.
Component Breaker racking tools were found 505403 Seismic walkdown personnel Breaker racking tools have Closed U1 4160V hanging from a 4" long rod - 3' determined damage to the cabinet been removed which Switchgear 1G from the U 1 4160V Switchgear would not occur in the event that the eliminates the adverse (QIR15AO07-LG (QiRi5AO07-B) Breaker tool struck the cabinet. However, seismic interaction B) Breaker Cabinet 7 in Rm 233. During a there is potential to damage the relays condition.
Cabinet seismic event the tool will located on the front of the switchgear.
potentially fall from the currently The effect of the impact on the staged location and strike the components in the cabinet should be switchgear.
evaluated and/or the tool relocated or adequately secured if any adverse impacts are suspected.
FARLEY UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 34 OF 50 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Comp/
Brief Description of Potentially CR #
Brief discussion of Action Taken/Planned to Status Area Adverse Condition Analysis/Conclusion Address/Resolve the (Open/Clsd)
Condition Component The Seismic Walkdown Team 505553 An initial assessment of the condition WO SNC428451 created -
Open Q1P18CO02B observed a potential seismic was performed and there are no Remove the adverse the Due 11/27/2012 interaction hazard on the Unit 1 immediate operability concerns. The Seismic Spatial interaction.
Train B Emergency Air constant speed unloader is used to Compressor in Room 189 prevent overloading the compressor (Q1P18CO02B). The Seismic and is actuated when the receiver Walkdown team observed a small pressure exceeds the pre-set pressure gap of less than 0.5" between a for the auxiliary valve spring. When 0.25" dia stainless steel the auxiliary valve opens, air is routed compressor instrument tubing and.
to the constant speed unloaders and an insulated pipe. The quarter forces them open. If the inch instrument tubing is located interconnecting line is lost, the directly on top of the compressor auxiliary valve will still mitigate at eye level and has been overloading of the compressor by identified as the constant speed relieving pressure to atmosphere unloader interconnecting line.
when pre-set values are exceeded.
The Walkdown Team judged that the insulation could impact the tubing since the lateral displacement of the insulated pipe during a seismic event could fill the 0.5" gap. The Seismic Walkdown Engineering Team judged the instrument tubing is too soft to tolerate interaction with the piping.
FARLEY UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 35 OF 50 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Comp/
Brief Description of Potentially CR #
Brief discussion of Action Taken/Planned to Status Area Adverse Condition Analysis/Conclusion Address/Resolve the (Open/Clsd)
Condition Area: Ul A Loose bolts were found in the 507934 The Gaitronics speaker could become All actions are completed to Closed Charging mounting hardware of the a concern if the mounting hardware prevent the adverse Pump room Gaitronics system inside the U1 A was to loosen further.
interaction.
(Room 181)
Charging Pump room (room 181).
Component A 1 1/2" dia. conduit is within 1/4" 508376 Ops Shift Supervisor Review: The CR 539942 has been written Open Multiplying of the side of Multiplying Relay cabinet and conduit are installed per to request an evaluation be Due 11/27/2012 Relay Cabinet Cabinet 1E (Q1H22LOO1E). The design. No indication of missing performed prior to 11/27/12.
1E, conduit spans - 10' and passes the hardware is evident. Installation of TE 532171 created.
Q1H22LOO1E relay panel about mid-span, and is stiffening hardware to minimize therefore very flexible. The potential for contact between the conduit must be moved away cabinet and conduit in the event of a from the panel or supported near seismic event will be pursued via the the panel to reduce any interaction corrective action process.
effects during a seismic event. An immediate solution is to clamp the small conduit to the adjacent larger conduit to restrain it from the relay cabinet. (AB,139', rm.
318). It's possible that no sensitive equipment is in the panel, in which case the interaction effects are credible but insignificant. The walkdown team could not make this determination.
FARLEY UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 36 OF 50 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Comp/
Brief Description of Potentially CR #
Brief discussion of Action Taken/Planned to Status Area Adverse Condition Analysis/Conclusion Address/Resolve the (Open/Clsd)
Condition Component While performing SAM NTTF 2.3 508387 The panel was re-walked down on WO SNC429766 created.
Closed Q1H21NBAF Seismic Walkdowns for Farley 10/26/12 and identified to be closed.
P2605A Units 1 & 2 in the Aux Bldg, Latch is operable but hard to operate Room 254, the rear door of Hot based on discussions with Operations.
Shutdown Panel A WO has been cre ated to fully fix the (Q 1 H21NBAFP2605A) was latch.
found unlatched, but should be latched to minimize impact to the panel from the door during a seismic event.
FARLEY UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 37 OF 50 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Comp/
Brief Description of Potentially CR #
Brief discussion of Action Taken/Planned to Status Area Adverse Condition Analysis/Conclusion Address/Resolve the (Open/Clsd)
Condition Area While performing SAM NTTF 2.3 508690 This configuration has been compared The original IPEEE SEWs Closed Room 184 Seismic Walkdowns for Farley against the original IPEEE Screening package did not specifically Units 1 & 2 in Room 184, the Evaluation Work Sheet (SEWS) refer to the flex conduit but seismic walkdown team observed which was performed by qualified using pictures the valve and a flexible cable attached to the IA SQUG Engineers. The SEWS flex conduit was identified Isolation Outside CTMT Valve package shows that the flex cable was to be in the same state.
with limited flexibility. The flex in the same configuration during this Based on this not being cable is routed to the valves upper evaluation at the area where called out as an issue during limit switch.
flexibility is limited. This seismic the original walkdown, no interaction has previously been further actions are needed.
evaluated as acceptable. This condition was present during SQUG/IPEE walkdowns performed in 1993 and is documented in the SEWS package for Q1Pl9HV3 611.
FARLEY UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 38 OF 50 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Comp/
Brief Description of Potentially CR #
Brief discussion of Action Taken/Planned to Status Area Adverse Condition Analysis/Conclusion Address/Resolve the (Open/Clsd)
Condition Component While performing SAM NTTF 2.3 508692 This same configuration was TE 509140- DCP has been Closed Q1P17HV309 Seismic Walkdowns for Farley observed during the Farley confirmed to remove the 6A Unit 1, one of the seismic SQUG/IPEEE walkdowns back in the adverse Seismic Condition.
walkdown teams noted two (2) mid 90's and there were no identified potential seismic concerns with discrepancies on the Seismic the 3096 A valve Evaluation Work Sheets (SEWS)
(Q1P17HV3096A):
concerning inadequate flexibility of
- 1) Rigid conduit within 1/2" of lines attached to the 3096 A valve.
pressure gage. During a seismic Additionally, the SEWS package did event, the worst credible failure not mention any concern for the would result in breaking the conduit in close proximity of the pressure gage glass.
pressure gage. 3096A also has
- 2) Insufficient flex in cables to difficulties in operating and the valve the upper and lower limit is already jacked closed, declared switches. One of the questions of inoperable, and is being replaced the seismic walkdown packages is during 1R25 so no impact.
"Do attached lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage?"
FARLEY UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 39 OF 50 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Comp/
Brief Description of Potentially CR #
Brief discussion of Action Taken/Planned to Status Area Adverse Condition Analysis/Conclusion Address/Resolve the (Open/Clsd)
Condition Component A permanent ladder was installed 508694 This configuration was compared The condition was verified Closed Q1EI 1MOV8 in contact with the Containment against the original IPEEE Screening against the SEWS which 812A Sump to RHR Pump 1 A Isolation Evaluation Work Sheet (SEWS) shows the ladder and valve Room 131 Valve (Q1E11MOV8812A). The which was performed by qualified in the same position and (El. 83')
seismic walkdown team that SQUG Engineers. The SEWS configurations. This was not performed the walkdown has package for Q 1E 11MOV8812A evaluated as a Seismic determined that this is a performed during the SQUG/IPEE Concern on the SEWS and potentially adverse seismic walkdowns in 1993 visually shows thus the condition is SAT.
condition the 8812A.
that the ladder and valve were in the same configuration during performance of the SEWS. This condition was not called out as an adverse seismic interaction on the SEWS.
FARLEY UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 40 OF 50 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Comp/
Brief Description of Potentially CR #
Brief discussion of Action Taken/Planned to Status Area Adverse Condition Analysis/Conclusion Address/Resolve the (Open/Clsd)
Condition Component Seismic Walkdown team 515693 This condition is similar to the condition WO SNC432772 created -
Open Q1P16F501A identified corrosion on a Service of a SW strainer bolt identified during Clean and coat the bolts.
Due 11/27/2013 Water Strainer IA (Q1P16F501A) 1R24 (CR:442339 and MDC hold down bolt.
SNC387300) showing excessive corrosion. The nut was cleaned and a torque applied to fully seat the nut. The nut was apparently cocked/cross threaded and could not be moved further. The torque applied was in excess of 1000ft-lbs proving the bolt was sound. After cleaning the nut, the material condition showed little surface degradation. This reference is provided to document that the degradation for this strainer hold down bolt is exacerbated by the wet environment which typically causes the corrosion layer to swell and look significantly worse than the actual sound material condition. Based on known pre and post cleaned condition of one of the strainer anchor bolts/nut, the seismic walkdown team is confident that the strainer bolt is sound and is capable to perform its intended function. The team members are qualified to use engineering judgment to make the Seismic Evaluation based on being qualified either through SQUG or EPRI training for Seismic Evals.
FARLEY UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 41 OF50 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Comp/
Brief Description of Potentially CR #
Brief discussion of Action Taken/Planned to Status Area Adverse Condition Analysis/Conclusion Address/Resolve the (Open/Clsd)
Condition Component While reviewing AWBs.
539901 Based on initial review from the site TE 540855 created -
Open QlP18CO02B performed by the Seismic POC for the Seismic Walkdowns, this evaluate the condition.
Due Walkdown Teams, it has been condition is not of concern during a Complete by 11/27/12.
11/27/2012 discovered that one of the four seismic event. The nut on the affected anchor bolts for the Ul Auxiliary anchor bolt appears to be installed Steam Condensate Tank is bent correctly with no gap between it and and has been documented-as an the concrete pad which results in adverse seismic concern.
negligible impact to the load bearing portion of the bolt. Also, the remaining 3 anchor bolts are SAT with no further discrepancies identified. The initial review has also determined that there is no effect on the current seismic design basis since the component is classified as non-seismic, Crit-N.
FARLEY UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC
__________________PAGE 42 OF 50 During the course of the walkdowns the team identified issues that, while not rising to the level of a seismic concern, warranted evaluation to determine if programmatic enhancements are warranted.
These issues have been entered into the SNC corrective action program.
CR 539958: While performing a review of the Condition Reports resulting from the SAM NTTF 2.3 Seismic Walkdowns, an adverse trend was identified with regards to storing tools and equipment throughout the plant. Several events were documented where tools and equipment (e.g. breaker racking tools, hot sticks) were stored in such a way that they had the potential to fall and strike nearby equipment (e.g. Switchgears) during a seismic event. The extent of condition should be investigated by the groups that use the tooling, all further conditions corrected, and actions put in place to prevent future recurrences.
CR 539961: While performing a review of the Condition Reports resulting from the SAM NTTF 2.3 Seismic Walkdowns, an adverse trend was identified with regards to maintaining the coating on components subject to corrosive environments. Several events were documented where anchorage and associated supports were corroded due to a lack of coatings and preventive maintenance to protect the material. The extent of the-damage varied from minor surface corrosion to more significant wastage of the components. The extent of condition should be investigated and appropriate corrective actions put in place to promote the long-term sustainability of anchorage, support, and components subject to corrosive environments.
CR 539962: While performing a review of the Condition Reports resulting from the SAM NTTF 2.3 Seismic Walkdowns, an adverse trend was identified with regards to maintaining the housekeeping of cable trays and their cables. Several events were documented where cable trays had damaged panels or cables overhanging the cable tray. The extent of condition should be investigated and appropriate correctiveactions, as needed, put in place.
8.2 EQUIPMENT OPERABILITY Plant Farley Unit 1 had no as-found conditions that would prevent SSCs from performing their required safety functions.
8.3 PLANT CHANGES There were no plant changes that resulted from the as-found conditions. Plant changes are any planned or newly installed protection and mitigation features (i.e., plant modifications) that result from the Seismic Walkdowns or Area Walk-bys.
FARLEY UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE43OF50
.8.4 OTHER NON-SEISMIC CONDITIONS Housekeeping items were identified during walkdowns and walk-bys that were not potentially seismic adverse conditions. All such items were brought to the attention of plant personnel and CRs were generated as necessary. These issues included water on the floor and loose items (small tools, trash, etc.) stored in the plant areas. These items were processed through the site CAP process and are not specifically documented in this report though are available in the Plant CAP database.
FARLEY UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERWM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE44OF50 9.0 PEER REVIEW 9.1 PEER REVIEW PROCESS The peer review for the NTTF Recommendation 2.3 Seismic Walkdowns was performed in accordance with Section 6 of the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). The peer review included an evaluation of the following activities:
" review of the selection of the structures, systems, and components (SSCs) that are included in the Seismic Walkdown Equipment List (SWEL);
- review of a sample of the checklists prepared for the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys;
" review of licensing basis evaluations and decisions for entering the potentially adverse seismic conditions in to the plant's Corrective Action Plan (CAP); and
- review of the final submittal report.
This report provides results of the review process for each review activity as well as the results of the peer review.
9.2 PEER REVIEW RESULTS
SUMMARY
9.2.1 Seismic Walkdown Equipment List Development The selection of items for the SWEL underwent peer review according to Section 3 of the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). The SSCs to be evaluated during the seismic walkdown were selected as described in Section 6.0 of this report. The list of components was provided to the members of the Peer Review Team, which consisted of all four peer reviewers listed in Section 4.0. The Peer Review Team members independently provided comments to the personnel who selected the components on the SWEL. All comments were addressed and the Peer Review Team reviewed the changes made to the SWEL and the final SWEL, to ensure all recommendations from Reference 10.2 were met. Specifically, the Peer Reviewers confirmed that all SSCs in SWEL 1 and 2 were Seismic Category I components that do not undergo regular inspections. Specific considerations for the peer review process are described below for SWEL 1 and SWEL 2. The peer review check sheet of the SWEL is provided in Attachment 2.
FARLEY UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 45 OF 50 For SWEL 1, the Peer Review Team verified that the list of SSCs represented a diverse sample of the equipment required to perform the following five safety functions, as specified in the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2):
" Reactor Reactivity Control;
- Reactor Coolant Pressure Control;
- Reactor Coolant Inventory Control;-
Decay Heat Removal; and
- Containment Function.
For SWEL 1, the Peer Review Team also verified that the SSCs included an appropriate representation of items having the following sample selection attributes:
Various types of systems; Major new and replacement equipment; Various types of equipment; Various environments; Equipment enhanced based on the findings of the IPEEE; and Risk insight consideration.
The final SWEL 1 contains items that perform each of the five safety functions specified in the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). Numerous components perform more than one of the safety functions and all five safety functions are well represented by the components on the list.
SWEL I contains components from all applicable classes of equipment listed in Appendix B of the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2), except for equipment classes 11, 13 and 19, and in cases where there are no safety-related components at the plant that fall into that specific equipment class. The list contains major new and replacement items, and items enhanced based on the IPEEE as well as equipment located in various environments and areas of the plant. All major safety-related systems are represented and risk factors were considered in development of the list.
FARLEY UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE46OF50 For SWEL 2, the Peer Review Team determined that the process to select spent fuel pool related items complied with the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). Portions of the spent fuel pool cooling system at Farley Unit 1 are Seismic Category I and all different types of components are represented on the SWEL 2. No items that could cause rapid drain down of the Spent Fuel Pool for Farley Unit 1 were identified. Therefore, SWEL 2 does not contain any components associated with potential rapid drain down of the pool. The Peer Review Team concluded that the bases for including/excluding items associated with the spent fuel pool were well documented and that the final SWEL 2 complies with the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2).
In summary, all of the peer review comments made during development of SWEL 1 and SWEL 2 were resolved by the team that prepared the SWELs. The resolutions were reviewed by the Peer Review Team and it was determined that all comments were adequately addressed. The SWEL was determined to incorporate all comments made by the Peer Review Team during the process.
During the walkdowns, a small number of isolated components that were not accessible were removed from the list and, in some cases, equivalent items that were determined to be accessible were added. The Peer Review Team reviewed all changes made to the SWELs and determined that these changes had no impact on the adequacy of the SWELs with respect to the provisions contained in the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). The Peer Review Team concludes that the team that developed the SWELs appropriately followed the SWEL development process described in Section 3 of the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2).
The Peer Review Checklist for development of the SWEL is provided in Attachment 2.
9.2.2 Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys The Peer Review Team was on-site and very involved with the Seismic Component Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys. The Peer Review was performed as follows:
Each of the walkdown teams performed an initial equipment Seismic Walkdown and an Area Walk-by while being observed by the other teams and at least one member of the walkdown Peer Review Team. The Peer Review Team provided comments and suggestions and answered questions raised by the team performing the walkdown and the other walkdown teams.
FARLEY UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 47 OF 50 During the first week of walkdowns, a member of the walkdown Peer Review Team individually accompanied each of the SWE walkdown teams and observed the SWE team conducting the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys. The Peer Review Team confirmed first-hand that the SWE walkdown teams performed the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys as described in Section 4 of the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). A member of the Peer Review Team accompanied each of the four walkdown teams on at least one full day of walkdowns. SWE walkdown teams were encouraged and expected to carry a copy of Section 4 of the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2) and refer to it, as necessary, during conduct of the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys.
Finally, the walkdown Peer Review Team reviewed the Seismic Walkdown and Area Walk-by packages completed during the first week to ensure that the checklists were completed in accordance with the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). The walkdown Peer Review Team confirmed that the Seismic Walkdown and Area Walk-by packages were consistent, thorough, and the packages accurately reflected the results of the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys as witnessed during the first week of walkdowns.
The Peer Review Team concluded that the SWE teams were familiar with the process for Seismic Equipment Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys. The SWE teams adequately demonstrated their ability to identify potentially adverse seismic conditions such as adverse anchorage, adverse spatial interaction, and other adverse conditions related to anchorage, and perform anchorage configuration verifications, where applicable. The SWEs also demonstrated the ability to identify seismically-induced flooding interactions and seismically-induced fire interactions. The SWEs documented the results of the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys on the appropriate checklists from Appendix C of the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2).
The Peer Review Team inspected all the checklists completed during the first week of walkdowns, representing approximately 40% of the total number of checklists. Peer review of the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys identified minor editorial errors and also some instances where comments in the checklists required additional explanation and information.
Mr. Ashworth and Mr. Whitmore provided verbal feedback to the SWEs to adjust these entries accordingly. The SWEs understood the comments and incorporated the recommendations and updates from the Peer Review Team.
FARLEY UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 48 OF 50 Since the peer review occurred at the start of the walkdowns, the peer reviewers were able to provide comments at the early stages of the walkdown process to ensure consistency in the reporting for all packages. Subsequently, the Peer Review Team considered the number of completed walkdown packages reviewed to be appropriate. In addition, all members of the Peer Review Team, including Mr. Ashworth, Ms. Brown, Mr. Starck and Mr. Whitmore were available by phone as necessary during the entire Walkdown process.
9.2.3 Licensing Basis Evaluations All potentially adverse seismic conditions identified were immediately entered into the plant CAP for further review and disposition as discussed in Section 8.1 of this report. Therefore, the Seismic Walkdown teams did not perform licensing basis evaluations apart from evaluations performed for the CAP. The Peer Review Team considers this CAP process approach fully comprehensive and acceptable for addressing the potentially adverse seismic conditions observed during the Seismic Walkdowns.
9.2.4 Submittal Report The Peer Review Team was provided with drafts of the submittal report. This allowed the Peer Review Team to verify that the submittal report would meet the objectives and requirements of the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2).
The Peer Review Team provided both verbal and written comments on the draft reports and was active in ensuring the report was thorough, complete and accurate.
The final version of the submittal report includes all necessary elements of the Peer Review and meets the requirements of the 50.54(f) letter.
FARLEY UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMC PAGE49OF50
10.0 REFERENCES
10.1 10 CFR 50.54(f) Letter, Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3 and 9.3 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-Ichi Accident, dated March 12, 2012 10.2 EPRI Report 1025286, Seismic Walkdown Guidance for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic, June 2012 10.3 Generic Letter No. 88-20, Supplement 4, Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities 10.4 Generic Letter No. 87-02, Verification of Seismic Adequacy of'Mechanical and Electrical Equipment in Operating Reactors, Unresolved Safety Issue (USI) A-46 10.5 Not used.
10.6 Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 and Unit 2, Individual Plant Examination of External Events - Seismic.
10.7 RER SNC432467, SAM NTTF 2.3: Seismic, Unit 1 and 2 Walkdowns at Plant Farley, (Recommendation) 2.3 - Seismic 10.8 Generic Letter No. 87-02, Supplement 1 to Verification of Seismic Adequacy of Mechanical and Electrical Equipment in Operating Reactors, Unresolved Safety Issue (USI) A-46 10.9 NUREG-1211, Regulatory Analysis for Resolution of Unresolved Safety Issue A-46, Seismic Qualification of Equipment in Operating Plants 10.10 NUREG-0 117 Supplement No. 5 dated March, 1981Safety Evaluation Report 10.11 Not used 10.12 Not used 10.13 EPRI Report NP-6041, A Methodology for Assessment of Nuclear Power Plant Seismic Margin 10.14 Farley Nuclear Plant Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), Rev. 24, August 2012.
10.15 NMP-GM-033-GLO1 Ver. 1.0, SAM NTTF Seismic Walkdowns Guide
FARLEY UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT TNO. SNCF164-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 50 OF 50 11.0 ATTACHMENTS ATTACHMENT 1 - SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS ATTACHMENT 2 - PEER REVIEW CHECKLISTS FOR SWEL 1 AND 2 ATTACHMENT 3 - SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS ATTACHMENT 4 - AREA WALK-BY CHECKLISTS ATTACHMENT 5 - IPEEE VULNERABILITIES INFORMATION ATTACHMENT 6 - SEISMIC WALKDOWN ENGINEER CERTIFICATIONS
ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 ATTACHMENT 1 UNIT 1 - SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 Equipment List Panes Unit 1 - Base List 1 2-21 Unit 1 - SWEL 1 22-26 Unit 1 - Base List 2 27-28 Unit 1 - SWEL 2 29-31 Page 1 of 31
ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 ATTACHMENT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS UNIT 1 - BASE LIST 1 NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 Equipment List Pa2es Unit 1 - Base List 1 2-21 Unit 1 - SWEL 1 22-26 Unit 1 - Base List 2 27-28 Unit 1 - SWEL 2 29-31 Page 2 of 31
ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 APPENDIX A SEISMIC REVIEW SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST (SSEL)
FARLEY UNIT 1 Page No. 1 KLINE NO.
CLASS MARK NO.
(1)
(2)
(3) 20 AiTBOO0 20 AlTBOO4 20 AITBO06 20 B1TBO02 20 B1TBO03 20 BlT004 18 N1E21LI0112-3 20 N1HlINGMCB25OOA-AB 07 N1P18PCV2885A 07 N1P18PCV2885B 07 NlP1BPCV2885C 07 NIP19PCV2228A 07 NIP19PCV2228B 23 21 21 21 18 18 19 19 19 19 19 19 07 0
18 18 QlBllHO01 Q1B21HO01A Q1821HOO1B Q1B21HOO1C Q1B2 1PT0402-P1 Q1B2IPTO4O3-P4 Q1B21TEO41O-P2 Q1B21TEO413-P1 Q1B21TE0420-P2 Q1821TE0423-PI Q1821TE0430-P4 Q1B21TE0433-P3 QIB31HV8028-A Q1831KO01 QIB31LT0459-Pl Q1B31LTO460-P2 SYSTEM/EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION use.
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(4)
TERMINAL BOX TERMINAL BOX TERMINAL BOX TERMINAL BOX TERMINAL BOX TERM4INAL BOX VCT LEVEL INDICATION MAIN CONTROL BOARD SECTION A PRESSURE CONTROL VALVE PRESSURE CONTROL VALVE PRESSURE CONTROL VALVE PCV TO PORV BACKUP AIR SUPPLY BOTTLE PCV TO PORV BACKUP AIR SUPPLY PRESSURE CONTROL REACTOR VESSEL STEAM GENERATOR IA STEAM GENERATOR IB STEAM GENERATOR IC RCS LOOP 3 WIDE RANGE PRESSURE RCS LOOP 1 WIDE RANGE PRESSURE RCS LOOP I COLD LEG RTD RCS LOOP 1 HOT LEG RTD RCS LOOP 2 COLD LEG RID RCS LOOP 2 HOT LEG RTD RCS LOOP 3 COLD LEG RTD RCS LOOP 3 HOT LEG RTD PRESSURE RELIEF TANK ISOLATION OUTSIDE CTIT VALVE RCS PRESSURIZER PRESSURIZER LEVEL (CONTROL ROOM)
PRESSURIZER LEVEL BUILDING (5)
AB As AB AB AB AB AB As AB AB AS AB As CB CB CB CB CS CB CS CB CB CS CB CB As CB CB CB ELEV (6) 100-00 100-00 121-00 121-00 100-00 100-00 121-00 155-00 100-00 100-00 100-00 121-00 121-00 129-00 155-00 155-00 155-00 105-00 105-00 105-00 105-00 105-00 105-00 105-00 105-00 121-00 155-00 132-00 132-00 ROOM (7) 0189 0194 0223 0235 0190 0192 0218 0401 0189 0189 0189 0218 0218 CTMT CT1T CTMT CMT CNMT CTNT CTNT CTNT CT4T CTNT CTMr CT14T 0223 CIMT CTNT CTNT Report Date/Time: 02-27-95 / 16:25:33 Data Base File Name/Date/Time: UIMASTER.DBF Sort Criteria: ID Number Filter Criteria: (Eval.
Type CONTAINS 'S')
Program File Name & Version: SSEM vO.O
/ 02/27/95 / 16:00:38 Page 3 of 31
ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 APPENDIX A SEISMIC REVIEW SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST (SSEL)
FARLEY UNIT 1 Page No. 2
-LINE NO.
(1)
CLASS MARK NO.
.amn=.
wouu a....==S....
(2)
(3) 18 OSA 0SA 07 07 18 18 18 02 02 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 a
QlB31LTO461-P3 Q1B3114OVS000A-A Q1B31MOV8O0B0-8 QIB31PCV04446-B Q1B31PCV044SA-A Q1B31PT0455-Pl Q1831PT0456-P2 Q1B31PT0457-P3 QI1C1E0O4A-AB QiCI 1EOO4B-AB Q1C221T0474-P1 Q1C22LT0475-P2 Q1C221T0476-P3 QIC22LT0484-Pl Q1C22LT0485-P2 Q1C221T0486-P3 Q1C221TO494-P1 Q1C22LT0495-P2 Q1C221T0496-P3 Q1CS1LO01B-1 SYSTEM/EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION (4)
PRESSURIZER LEVEL PRESSURIZER POWER RELIEF ISOLATION VALVE PRESSURIZER POWER RELIEF ISOLATION VALVE PRESSURIZER POWER RELIEF VALVE PRESSURIZER POWER RELIEF VALVE PRESSURIZER PRESSURE PRESSURIZER PRESSURE PRESSURIZER PRESSURE REACTOR TRIP SWITCHGEAR NO. 1 REACTOR TRIP SWITCHGEAR NO. 2 STEAM GENERATOR 1A STEAM GENERATOR 1A STEAM GENERATOR 1A STEAM GENERATOR 1B STEAM GENERATOR 1B STEAM GENERATOR 18 STEAM GENERATOR IC STEAM GENERATOR IC STEAM GENERATOR iC BUILDING ELEV ROOM (5)
(6)
(7)
NARROW NARROW NARROW NARROW NARROW NARROW NARROW NARROW NARROW RANGE LEVEL RANGE LEVEL RANGE LEVEL RANGE LEVEL RANGE LEVEL RANGE LEVEL RANGE LEVEL RANGE LEVEL RANGE LEVEL CB CB CB CR CB CB CB AB AB CB CB CB CB CB CB CB CB CB CB CB AB AB AB AB AB AB AB 132-00 175-00 175-00 155-00 173-00 166-00 166-00 166-00 121-00 121-00 155-00 155-00 155-00 155-00 155-00 155-00 155-00 155-00 155-00 129-00 139-00 139-00 83-00 83-00 83-00 83-00 87-00 CTNT CTNT CTNT CThT CINT CTMT CThT 0235 0235 CTNT CTMT CTMT CThT CTNT CThT CTNT CTMT CTNT CTMT CTMT 0332 0128 0122 0128 0128 0120 0
Q1C55NEOO48-A 20 QICS5NOO48-A 08A Q1EIlFCVO6O2A-A 0SA Q1EIIFCVO6O2B-B 18 Q1ElFIS602A-A 18 Q1EIlFIS602B-B 18 QlEllFT060SA-2 18 QlEllFT0605B-4 NIS NEUTRON DETECTOR BOX 18 (41A & 41B)
ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN NEUTRON FLUX DETECTOR ALTERN SHUTDOWN NEUTRON FLUX NON SIGNAL A1PLIFIER RHR PIUMP MINI FLOW VALVE RJ4R PUM MINI FLOW VALVE RHR PUMP FLOW INDICATING SWITCH RHR PUMP FLOW INDICATING SWITCH RHR HEAT EXCHANGER DISCHARGE FLOW TRANSMITTER RHR HEAT EXCHANGER DISCHARGE FLOW TRANSMITTER 87-00 0120 Report Date/Time: 02-27-95 / 16:25:33 Data Base File Name/Date/Time: IJIMASTER.DBF /
Sort Criteria: ID Number Filter Criteria: (Eval. Type CONTAINS 'S')
Program File Name & Version: SSEM vO.O 02/27/95 / 16:00:38 Page 4 of 31
ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 APPENDIX A Page No. 3 SEISMIC REVIEW SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST (SSEL)
FARLEY UNIT I
-LINE NO.
(1)
CLASS (2) 21 21 20 20 18 18 08A OSA 08A 08A OBA 08A 08A OBA 08A O6A OA 08A 08A 08A 06 06 18 MARK NO.
(3)
QIE1IHOOIA-A QIEI1HOO1B-B Q1El1LQ3594A-A QIE11LQ35948-B Q1EI1LT3594A-A QIE11LT3594B-B Q1E11MOV87O1A-A QIE11MOVS701B-B Q1E11MOV8702A-A QIE11MOV8702B-B Q1E11MOV87O6A-A QlEl1MOV8706-Bo Q1E11MOV8809A-A QiEl1MOV8809B-B QIE11MOV8811A-A Q1E11MOV8811B-B Q1EI1MOV8812A-A Q1E11MOV8812B-B Q1E11MOV8888A-A Q1E11MOV8888B-B Q1E11POO1A-A Q1EllPOO1B-B Q1IE13PTO95O-PI SYSTEM/EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION (4)
RHR HEAT EXCHANGER 1A RHR HEAT EXCHANGER 1B CTMT SUMP LEVEL TRANSMITTER POWER SUPPLY CTNT SUMP LEVEL TRANSMITTER POWER SUPPLY CTMT SUMP LEVEL TRANSMITTER CTNT SUMP LEVEL TRANSMITTER RHR INLET ISOLATION VALVE RHR INLET ISOLATION VALVE RHR INLET ISOLATION VALVE RHR INLET ISOLATION VALVE RHR LOOP NO. I DISCHARGE TO CVCS RHR LOOP NO. 2 DISCHARGE TO CVCS RWST TO RHR PUMP 1A SUCTION RWST TO RHR PUMP 1B SUCTION RHR PUMP SUCTION FROM CONTAINMENT TRAIN A RHR PUMP SUCTION FROM CONTAINMENT TRAIN B CONTAINMENT SUMP TO RHR PUMP 1A ISOLATION CONTAINMENT SUMP TO RHR PUMP 1B ISOLATION LHSI TO RCS COLD LEG LHSI TO RCS COLD LEG RHR PUMP 1A RHR PUMP 1B CONTAINMENT PRESSURE PROTECTION TRANSMITTER CONTAINMENT PRESSURE PROTECTION TRANSMITTER CONTAINMENT PRESSURE PROTECTION TRANSMITTER CONTAINMENT PRESSURE PROTECTION TRANSMITTER CHG/HHSI PUMP ROOM COOLER IA (TRAIN A)
CHG/HHSI PUMP ROOM COOLER IC (TRAIN 8)
BUILDING (5)
AB AB AB AB CB CB CB CB CB CB AB As AB AS AB As AB AB AS AB As As AB ELEV (6) 83-00 83-00 139-00 139-00 116-00 116-00 105-00 105-00 105-00 105-00 83-00 83-00 83-00 83-00 83-00 83-00 83-00 83-00 121-00 121-00 83-00 83-00 121-00 ROOM (7) 0128 0128 0318 0318 CTNT CTMT CTMT CThT CThT CTNT 0128 0128 0131 0129 0131 0129 0131 0129 0223 0223 0131 0129 0223 18 QIE13PTO951-P2 18 Q1E13PTO9S2-P3 18 QIE13PTO953-P4 As AB AB AB AB 121-00 0223 121-00 0223 121-00 0223 10 10 QE1E6HOO1A-A Q1E16HOO1C-B 100-00 100-00 0181 0173 Report Date/Time: 02-27-95 / 16:25:33 Data Base File Name/Date/Time: UIMASTER.DBF / 02/27/95 / 16:00:38 Sort Criteria: ID Number Filter Criteria: (Eval.
Type CONTAINS 'S')
Program File Name & Version: SSEN vO.0 Page 5 of 31
ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 APPENDIX A SEISMIC REVIEW SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST (SSEL)
FARLEY UNIT 1 Page No. 4 LINE NO.
z A.,o SYSTEM/EQUIPMENT CLASS MARK NO.
DESCRIPTION BUILDING
.. al
... a........=S===
s a
S 0
=
t ELEV ROOM Uanun..ns emfs~b (1)
(2) 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 18 (3)
QIE16HOO3A-A QIEI6HOO3B-B Q1E16HOO4A-A Q1E16HOO4B-B Q1E16HOO5A-A QIE16HOOSB-B Q1E16HOO6A-A QIE16HOO6B-B QIE16HOO7-A QIE16HOO8A-B Q1E16HOOBB-B Q1E16HOO9-A Q1E16HOIO-B QIE21FTO940 (4)
RHR PUMP ROOM COOLER 1A AS RHR PUMP ROOM COOLER IB AS CCW PUMP ROOM COOLER TRAIN A AS CCW PUMP ROOM COOLER TRAIN B AD AUX FEEDWATER PUMP ROOM COOLER IA AS AUX FEEDWATER PUMP ROOM COOLER IB AS BATTERY CHARGING ROOM COOLERS AD BATTERY CHARGING ROOM COOLERS AD MCC 1A ROOM COOLER AS NCC 1B ROOM COOLER AS MCC 1B ROOM ACU AS 600V LOAD CENTER ID ROOM COOLER AS 600V LOAD CENTER 1E ROOM COOLER AB HIGH HEAD SAFETY INJECTION FLOW AD TRANSMITTER HIGH HEAD SAFETY INJECTION FLOW AD TRANSMITTER REGENERATIVE HEAT EXCHANGER CB SEAL WATER HEAT EXCHANGER AS LETDOWN HEAT EXCHANGER AS LETDOWN ORIFICE ISOLATION CB LETDOWN ORIFICE ISOLATION CB LETDOWN ORIFICE ISOLATION CB CVCS ISOLATION OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT VALVE AS BORON INJECTION RECIRCULATION PUMP VALVE AB BORON INJECTION SURGE TANK VALVE AS RWST TO CHARGING PUMP SUCTION VALVE AD VOLUME CONTROL TANK OUTLET ISOLATION VALVIE AD RWST TO CHARGING PUMP SUCTION VALVE AD VOLUME CONTROL TANK OUTLET ISOLATION VALVE AD VOLUME CONTROL TANK LEVEL TRANSMITTER AB (5)
(6)
(7) 83-00 83-00 100-00 100-00 100-00 100-00 121-00 121-00 139-00 121-00 121-00 139-00 121-00 77-00 0131 0129 0185 0185 0190 0192 0245 0244 0332 0209 0209 0339 0228 0111 18 QIE21FT0943 0
QIE21H002 21 QIE21HOO3 21 Q1E21HOO4 07 QIE21HVS149A-A 07 QIE21HV8149B-A 07 QIE21HV8149C-A 07 QlE21HV8152 07 Q1E21HV8942-A 07 QIE21HV8945A-A OSA QIE21LCVO115B-A OA QIE21LCVO115C-A GSA QIE21LCVOII5D-B OA QIE21LCV0115E-B 18 QIE21LTI12-3 100-00 0175 105-00 100-00 100-00 105-00 105-00 105-00 100-00 100-00 121-00 100-00 121-00 100-00 121-00 121-00 CTNT 0170 0170 CTlT CTlT CTNT 0184 0186 0222 0172 0216 0172 0216 0217 Report Date/Time: 02-27-95 / 16:25:33 Data Base File Name/Date/Time: UI1ASTER.DBF Sort Criteria: ID Number Filter Criteria: (Eval.
Type CONTAINS 'S')
Program File Name & Version: SSEM vO.0
/ 02/27/95 / 16:00:38 Page 6 of 31
ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 APPENDIX A Page No. 5 SEISMIC REVIEW SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST (SSEL)
FARLEY UNIT 1 L'*INE NO.
CLASS (1)
(2) 18 0SA 08A 0CA 08A 08A 08A GSA 08A 14ARK NO.
(3)
QlE21LT115-1 QlE21NOV8100-B Q1E21MOV8106-A Q1E21NOV81O7-A QlE21NOVB108-B QIE21MOV8109A-B Q1E2 1NOV8109C-B QIE21MOV8112-A QIE211MOV813OA-A SYSTEM/EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION BUILDING ELEV ROOM CSSSUm fC~m
- =m fbOeU Sn bf n
=="=..am m
s (4)
VOLUME CONTROL TANK LEVEL TRANSMITTER RCP SEAL WATER RETURN ISOLATION (5)
(6)
(7) 08A Q1E21MOVS13OB-B 08A Q1E21MOV8131A-A 08A QIE21MOV8131B-B 08A Q1E21NOVB132A-A 08A QIE21M0V8132B-B 08A QIE21MOVS133A-A C8A Q1E21MOVB133B-B CHARGING CHARGING CHARGING CHARGING CHARGING RCP SEAL CHARGING VALVE CHARGING VALVE CHARGING VALVE CHARGING VALVE CHARGING VALVE CHARGING VALVE CHARGING VALVE CHARGING VALVE PUMP MINIFLOW ISOLATION PUMP TO RCS ISOLATION PUMP TO RCS ISOLATION PUMP POO2A NINIFLOW VALVE PUMP POO2C NINIFLOW VALVE WATER RETURN ISOLATION PUMP SUCTION HEADER ISOLATION PUMP SUCTION HEADER ISOLAYION PUMP SUCTION HEADER ISOLATION PUMP SUCTION HEADER ISOLATION PUMP DISCHARGE HEADER ISOLATION PUMP DISCHARGE HEADER ISOLATION PU1P DISCHARGE HEADER ISOLATION PUMP DISCHARGE HEADER ISOLATION AB AB AB AB AB AB AB CB AB AB AB AB AB AB AB AB 121-00 121-00 100-C0 121-0C 121-00 100-00 100-00 129-00 100-00 0217 0223 0170 0223 0223 0181 0173 CINT 0181 100-00 0175 100-00 0175 100-00 0172 100-00 0181 100-00 0175 100-00 0175 100-O0 0173 08A 08A OSA 08A 0SA 08A 05 05 21 is Q1E21MOV88OIA-A Q1E21MOV8803A-A QLE211MOV880CM-A Q1E211MOV8888D-8 Q1E21MOVS80BC-A Q1E211MOVS885-B Q1E2IPOO2A-A QIE21PO02C-B Q1E21TO06 Q1F16LTO5OI-A BORON INJECTION TANK OUTLET ISOLATION BORON INJECTION TANK INLET ISOLATION ACC. DISCH. VALVE ACC. DISCH. VALVE ACC. DISCH.
VALVE HHSI TO RCS COLD LEG ISOLATION CHARGING/HHSI PUMP PO02A TRAIN A CHARGING/HHSI PUMP P002C TRAIN B BORON INJECTION TANK RWST LEVEL TRANSMITTER AB AB CB, CB CB AB AB AB AB Yo 121-00 100-00 105-00 105-00 105-00 100-00 100-00 100-00 100-00 155-00 0223 0172 CTNT CTlT CTNT 0184 0181 0173 0172 YARD Report Date/Time: 02-27-95 / 16:.25:33 Data Base File Name/Date/Time: UIMASTER.DBF Sort Criteria: ID Number Filter Criteria: (Eval. Type CONTAINS 'S')
Program File Name & Version: SSEM vO.O
/ 02/27/95 / 16:00:38 Page 7 of 31
ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 APPENDIX A SEISMIC REVIEW SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST (SSIEL)
FARLEY UNIT 1 Page No. 6 LINE NO.
CLASS
.=. mean a......
(1)
(2) 18 21 07 SYSTEM/EQUIPMENT MARK NO.
DESCRIPTION BUILDING ELEV ROOM 3000uW8~35flzS n~maBn ff isaufafm acfafhz nnufbmsansubsc c=--.
(3)
Q1F16LT0502-B Q1F16TO501 QIG21HV3376-B 07 Q1G21HV3377-A 07 Q1G21NV7136-B 07 Q1G21LCVIOO3-A 07 07 07 21 21 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 Q1G24VO03A Q1G24VOO3B Q1G24VOO3C QIG31HOOIA-B Q1G31HOOIB-A QiHI1NGASC2SO6C-B Q1H11NGASC25O6D-A Q1HI1NGB2504J-A Q1HI1NGB2504K-B Q1HIINGCC42523A-A QlHlINGCCM2523B-B QlHIINGNIS2SO3A-1 QlHlINGPIC250SA-1 QIH11NGPIC2505B-2 QIHIINGPIC2505C-3 Q1Hl1NGPIC2505D-4 QINH1NGPIC250SE-1 QlHIlNGPIC2505F-2 QIHIINGPIC25O5G-3 QIHIINGPIC250SH-4 QlHl1NGR25041-AB QIH1lNGSSP2506G-B (4)
RWST LEVEL TRANSMITTER REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK RADIOACTIVE DRAIN ISOLATION INSIDE C1NT VALVE RADIOACTIVE DRAIN ISOLATION OUTSIDE CThT VALVE WASTE PROCESSING ISOLATION OUTSIDE CTNT VALVE WASTE PROCESSING ISOLATION INSIDE CTNT VALVE SG IA BLOJDOWN ISOLATION SG 1B BLOWDOWN ISOLATION SG IC BLOWDOWN ISOLATION SPENT FUEL POOL HEAT EXCHANGER TRAIN B SPENT FUEL POOL HEAT EXCHANGER TRAIN A AUX SAFEGUARDS CABINET C AUX SAFEGUARDS CABINET D BOP INSTRUMENTATION CABINET J BOP INSTRUMENTATION CABINET K ICCMS PROCESSOR CABINET TRAIN A YD YD CB AB AB CB AB AB AB AB AB AB AB AB AB AB As AB AB AB AB AB AB AB As AB AB AB (5)
(6)
(7) 100-00 0184 100-00 0184 105-00 OMB 155-00 155-00 105-00 YARD YARD CTNT IC0MS PROCESSOR CABINET TRAIN B NIS EXCORE DETECTOR CABINET PROCESS PROTECTION CABINET CHANNEL PROCESS PROTECTION CABINET CHANNEL PROCESS PROTECTION CABINET CHANNEL PROCESS PROTECTION CABINET CHANNEL PROCESS CONTROL CABINET CHANNEL 1 PROCESS CONTROL CABINET CHANNEL 2 121-00 121-00 121-00 155-00 155-00 155-00 155-00 155-00 155-00 155-00 155-00 155-00 155-00 155-00 155-00 155-00 155-00 155-00 1
55- 00 155-00 155-00 155-00 0223 0223 0223 0445 0467 0416 0416 0416 0416 0416 0416 0416 0416 0416 0416 0416 0416 0416 0416 0416 0416 0416 1
2 3
4 PROCESS CONTROL CABINET CHANNEL 3 PROCESS CONTROL CABINET CHANNEL 4 RADIATION MONITOR PANEL SOLID STATE PROTECTION INPUT CABINET Report Date/Time: 02-27-95 / 16:25:33 Data Base File Name/Date/Time: U1MASTER.DBF Sort Criteria: ID Number Filter Criteria: (Eval.
Type CONTAINS 'S')
Program File Name & Version: SSEN vO.0
/ 02/27/95 / 16:00:38 Page 8 of 31
ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 APPENDIX A SEISMIC REVIEW SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST (SSEL)
FARLEY UNIT 1 Page No. 7 K tNE NO.
CLASS (1)
(2) 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 18 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 07 07 07 07 07 07 18 18 SYSTEM/EQUIPMENT MARK NO.
DESCRIPTION BUILDING ELEV (3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Q1HI1NGSSP2506J-B Q1HIINGSSP2506K-A QIHl1NGSSP2506N-A QIH21EO04-A Q1H21EO05-B Q1H21ESO4-A Q112IE505-B QIH21E506-A Q1H21E507-B QIH21E527-B QIH21NBAFP2605A-A Q1H21NBNER2619-B QIH22LOO1E-A Q1H22LO0IF-B QIH22LO02-A Q1H22LO03-A QIH22LO04-B QIH22LS03-B QIH23S544B-B Q1H25LOO-A QIH25L029-B Q1NllHV3369A Q1W11HV3369B QIN11HV3369C Q1NIIHV337OA-B QIN11HV337OB-B QIN11HV337OC-B QlNI1LTO477-A QINILTO487-A SOLID STATE PROTECTION TEST CABINET SOLID STATE PROTECTION INPUT CABINET
.SOLID STATE PROTECTION TEST CABINET 4.16KV SWITCHGEAR IF LOCAL CONT PANEL 4.16KV SWITCHGEAR IG LOCAL CONT PANEL 4.16KV SWITCHGEAR 1H LOCAL CONT PANEL 4.16KV SWITCHGEAR 1J LOCAL CONT PANEL 4.16KV SWITCHGEAR 1K LOCAL CONT PANEL 4.16KV SWITCHGEAR 1L LOCAL CONT PANEL DIESEL GENERATOR IB LOCAL CONTROL PANEL HOT SHUTDOWN PANEL A STEAM GENERATOR IC WIDE RANGE LEVEL NCB ISOLATOR MULTIPLYING RELAY CABINET IE MULTIPLYING RELAY CABINET IF TRANSFER RELAY CABINET I TRANSFER RELAY CABINET 2 TRANSFER RELAY CABINET 3 DIESEL LOCAL RELAY PANEL 1B DIESEL GENERATOR ROOM 1B HVAC LCS TERMINATION CABINET TERMINATION CABINET MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VALVE MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VALVE MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VALVE MAIN STEAM LINE ISOLATION VALVE MAIN STEAM LINE ISOLATION VALVE MAIN STEAM LINE ISOLATION VALVE STEAM GENERATOR 1A WIDE RANGE LEVEL STEAM GENERATOR 1B WIDE RANGE LEVEL AB AB AB AB AB DB DO SW Sw DB AB AB AB AB AB AB AB DB DB AB AB AB AB AB AB AB AB CB CB 155-00 155-00 155-00 139-00 121-00 1s5-00 155-00 188-06 188-06 155-00 121-00 121-00 139-00 139-00 139-00 100-00 139-00 155-00 155-00 139-00 139-00 121-00 121-00 121-00 121-00 121-00 121-00 129-00 129-00 ROOM (7) 0416 0416 0416 0343 0233 0056A 0056C 0072E 0072B 0058 0254 0227 0318 0318 0347 0190 0334 0058 0058 0318 0318 0241 0241 0241 0241 0241 0241 CThT CT4T Report Date/Time: 02-27-95 / 16:25:33 Data Base File Name/Date/Time: U1MASTER.DBF / 02/27/95 / 16:00:38 Sort Criteria: ID Number Filter Criteria: (Eval.
Type CONTAINS 'S')
Program File Name & Version: SSEM vO.0 Page 9 of 31
ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 APPENDIX A SEISMIC REVIEW SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST (SSEL)
FARLEY UNIT 1 Page No. 8 LINE NO.
CLASS MARK NO.
(1)
(2)
(3) 18 QlNM1LTO497-B 18 QII1PTO474-P2 18 QIN11PTO475-P3 18 Q1NI1PTO476-P4 18 Q1N11PTO484-P2 18 Q1N11PTO485-P3 18 Q1NI1PTO486-P4 18 QIN11PTO494-P2 IS QINI1PTO49S-P3 18 Q1N11PTO496-P4 18 QINI1PT3371A-A 18 QIN11PT3371B-A 18 Q1NI1PT3371C-A 07 Q1NI1PV3371A-A 07 Q1N11PV33718-A 07 QINIIPV3371C-A 08B QIN11SV3369AC-A 08B QINI1SV33698C-A 08B QIN11SV3369CC-A 18 QIN23FI3229AB-A 18 QIN23FI3229CB-8 18 QlN23FT3229A-A 18 Q1N23FT3229B-A 18 Q1N23FT3229C-B 07 QIN23HV3227A 07 QIN23HV32278 07 QIN23HV3227C OBA QlN231OV3209A-A SYSTEN/EQUIPI4ENT DESCRIPTION BUILDING
=
.nm an=
(4)
(5)
STEAM STEAM STEAM STEAM STEAM STEAM STEAM STEAM STEAM STEAM STEAM STEAM STEAM GENERATOR GENERATOR GENERATOR GENERATOR GENERATOR GENERATOR GENERATOR GENERATOR GENERATOR GENERATOR GENERATOR GENERATOR GENERATOR 1C WIDE RANGE LEVEL 1A PRESSURE IA DISCHARGE PRESSURE 1A DISCHARGE PRESSURE 1B DISCHARGE PRESSURE lB PRESSURE IB DISCHARGE PRESSURE 1C DISCHARGE PRESSURE 1C DISCHARGE PRESSURE 1C PRESSURE IA PRESSURE 1B PRESSURE 1C PRESSURE MAIN STEAM ATMOSPHERIC RELIEF VALVE MAIN STEAM ATMOSPHERIC RELIEF VALVE MAIN STEAM ATMOSPHERIC RELIEF VALVE SOLENOID VALVE SOLENOID VALVE SOLENOID VALVE FEEDWATER INTAKE FLOW INDICATION FEEDWATER INTAKE FLOW INDICATION AUX FEEDWATER FLOW TRANSMITTER AUX FEEDWATER FLOW TRANSMITTER AUX FEEDWATER FLOW TRANSMITTER MOTOR DRIVEN AUX FEEDWATER TO STEAM GENERATOR IA MOTOR DRIVEN AUX FEEDWATER TO STEAM GENERATOR IB MOTOR DRIVEN AUX FEEDWATER TO STEAM GENERATOR IC SERVICE WATER ISOLATION VALVE TO AUX FEEDWATER CB AB AB AS AS AS AS AB AS AS AS AS AS AS AS AS AS AS AB AS AS AS AS As AS AS AD AS ELEV (6) 129-00 155-00 155-00 155-00 155-00 155-00 155-00 155-00 155-00 155-00 155-00 155-00 155-00 121-00 121-00 121-00 121-00 121-00 121-00 100-00 100-00 100-00 100-00 100-00 121-00 ROOM (7)
CT14T 0462 0462 0462 0462 0462 0462 0464 0464 0464 0462 0462 0464 0241 0241 0241 0241 0241 0241 0190 0190 0190 0189 0194 0241 121-00 0241 121-00 0241 100-00 0191 Report Date/Tiee: 02-27-95 / 16:25:33 Data Base File Name/Date/Time: U1MASTER.DBF Sort Criteria: ID Number Filter Criteria: (Eval.
Type CONTAINS 'S')
Program File Name & Version: SSEM vO.O
/ 02/27/95 / 16:00:38 Page 10 of 31
ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 APPENDIX A Page No. 9 SEISMIC REVIEW SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST (SSEL)
FARLEY UNIT I
'TINE NO.
CLASS (1)
(2)
SYSTEM/EQUIPENT (3 NO.
DESCRIPTION BUILDING (3)
(4)
(5)
ELEV ROOM Rluonlfl
- u.
a s..
(6)
(7) 100-00 0192 O8A Q1N23MOV3209B-B 08A Q1N23rOV3210A-A 08A Q1N23MOV3210B-B SERVICE WATER ISOLATION VALVE TO AUX FEEDWATER SERVICE WATER TO AUX FEEDWATER PUMP IA INTAKE SERVICE WATER TO AUX FEEDWATER PUMP 1B INTAKE AB AB AB 100-00 0191 100-00 0192 05 05 18 18 21 07 Q1N23POO1A-A Q1N23POO1B-8 QIPIILT0515-A QlPl1LT0516-B QIPilT00l Q1PI3HV2866C-A 07 Q1P13HV2866D-B 07 Q1P13HV2867C-A 07 Q1P13HV2867D-B 07 Q1P15HV3103-A 07 07 07 07 07 0
0 07 07 20 20 08A 06 Q1P15HV3105-B QlP1SHV3106-B Q1P15HV3332-B QIPlSHV3333-B QIPISHV3765-A QIP16F501A-A QIP16FSO1B-B Q1P16FV3009A-B Q1P16FV3009C-A Q1P16G517A-A QIP16G517B-B Q1P16MOV3149-A Q1P16POOIA-A AUX FEEDWATER PUMP IA AB AUX FEEDWATER PUMP lB AB CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK LEVEL TRANSMITTER YD CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK LEVEL TRANSMITTER YD CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK YD CONTAINMENT PURGE ISOLATION OUTSIDE CThT AB VALVE CONTAINMENT PURGE ISOLATION INSIDE C7NT CB VALVE CONTAINMENT PURGE ISOLATION OUTSIDE CThT AB VALVE CONTAINMENT PURGE ISOLATION INSIDE CThT CB VALVE PRESSURIZER LIQUID SAMPLE LINE ISOLATION CB VALVE RHR HX A SAMPLE VALVE AB RIHR HX B SAMPLE VALVE AB PRESSURIZER SAMPLE AB RCS HOT LEG SAMPLE LINE ISOLATION VALVE AB RCS SAMPLE CB SW STRAINER 1A, Sw SW STRAINER lB Sw CCW HEAT EXCHANGER SERVICE WATER DISCHARGE AB CCW HEAT EXCHANGER SERVICE WATER DISCHARGE AB TURB. BLDG.
S.W. ISOL. VALVE RELAY BOX OB TURB.
BLDG.
S.W.
ISOL. VALVE RELAY BOX D8 BLOWDOWN HEAT EXCHANGER ISOLATION MOV AB SERVICE WATER PUMP 1A SW Report Date/Time: 02-27-95 / 16:25:33 Data Base File Name/Date/Time: U1MASTER.DBF Sort Criteria: ID Number Filter Criteria: (Eval.
Type CONTAINS 'S')
Program File Name & Version: SSEM vO.0 129-00 CTNT 121-00 0223 129-00 CTMT 129-00 CT14T 100-00 100-00 155-00 155-00 155-00 121-00 77-00 77-00 121-00 121-00 126-00 167-00 167-00 100-00 100-00 155-00 155-00 121-00 188-06 0128 0128 0223 0223 CTNT 0072A 0072A 0185 0185 0060 0056C 0223 0072A 0191 0192 YARD YARD YARD 0223
/ 02/27/95 / 16:00:38 Page 11 of 31
ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 APPENDIX A Page No. 10 SEISMIC REVIEW SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST (SSEL)
FARLEY UNIT 1
- LINE NO.
CLASS MARK NO.
SYSTEM/EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION BUILDING (4)
(5)
ELEV (6)
ROOM (7)
(1)
(2)
(3) 06 QIP16POO1B-A 06 QIP16PO01D-B 06 QIPI6PO01E-B 18 QIPI6PDS620-A 18 Q1PI6PDS621-B GSA Q1P16V514-B 08A Q1P16VS15-A G8A QIP16VS16-B 08A Q1P16V517-A 08A Q1P16V538-B 08A Q1P16V539-A 08A QIP16V545-B OSA Q1P16V546-A 07 Q1P16V562-B 07 QIP16VS63-A 07 Q1P16V577-A 07 Q1P16VS78-AB 07 Q1PB6V579-B 21 Q1P17HOO1A-B 21 QIPI7HOO1B-AB 21 Q1P17HOOIC-A 07 QIP17HV2229 07 Q1P17HV3045-A 07 Q1P17HV3067-B SERVICE WATER PUMP 18 SERVICE WATER PUMP 10 SERVICE WATER PUMP IE DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE SWITCH DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE SWITCH SERVICE WATER TO TURBINE BLDG ISOLATION VALVE SERVICE WATER TO TURBINE BLDG ISOLATION VALVE SERVICE WATER TO TURBINE BLDG ISOLATION VALVE SERVICE WATER TO TURBINE BLDG ISOLATION VALVE SERVICE WATER EMERGENCY RECIRCULATION TO POND SERVICE WATER EMERGENCY RECIRCULATION TO POND SERVICE WATER DISCHARGE FROM AUXILIARY BUILDING SERVICE WATER DISCHARGE FROM AUXILIARY BUILDING SERVICE WATER DILUTION BYPASS PRESSURE CONTROL SERVICE WATER DILUTION BYPASS PRESSURE CONTROL A TRAIN SERVICE WATER MINIFLOW A-B TRAIN SERVICE WATER MINIFLOW B TRAIN SERVICE WATER MINIFLOW CCW HEAT EXCHANGER TRAIN B SWING CCW HEAT EXCHANGER CCW HEAT EXCHANGER TRAIN A COMPONENT COOLING WATER SUPPLY TO SAMPLE COOLERS CCW RETURN FROM RCP THERMAL BARRIER ISOLATION CCW RETURN FROM EXCESS LETDOWN SW SW SW YD YD YD YD YD YD YD YD YD YD YD YD SW SW SW AB AB AB AB AB AB 188-06 0072A 188-06 188-06 155-00 155-00 155-00 155-00 155-00 155-00 155-00 155-00 155-00 140-00 155-00 155-00 188-06 188-06 188-06 100-O0 100-00 100-00 100-00 121-00 121-00 0072A 0072A YARD YARD ISVB1 1SVB1 1SVBI 1SVB1 1SVB2 ISVB2 ISVB4 1SVB4 1SVB2B ISVB2A 0072A 0072A 0072A 0185 0185 0185 0162 0223 0223
.)
Report Date/Time: 02-27-95 / 16:25:33 Data Base File Name/Date/Time: U1MASTER.DBF Sort Criteria: ID Number Filter Criteria: (Evai. Type CONTAINS 'S')
Program File Name & Version: SSEN vO.O
/ 02/27/95 / 16:00:38 Page 12 of 31
ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 APPENDIX A Page No. 11 SEISMIC REVIEW SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST (SSEL)
FARLEY UNIT I LINE NO.
(1)
CLASS MARK NO.
(2)
(3) 07 QIP17NV3095-B 07 QIP17HV3096A 07 Q1P17HV3O96B 07 QIP17HV3184-B 07 Q1P17HV3443-A OSA Q1P17NOV3046-B 08A QIP17MOV3052-A OA Q1P17N0V3182-A 08A Q1PI7MOV3185A-A O8A QLP17MOV3185B-B 05 Q1P17POOA-B 05 Q1P17POOLC-A 07 Q1P17PCV34O4A 07 Q1P17PCV34O4B 21 QIP17TO00 12 Q1P18CO02A-A 12 Q1P18COO2B-B 07 Q1P19HV2228-B 07 Q1P19HV3611-A 21 Q1P19NCYL-A 21 QIP19NCYL-B 04 QIR11BO04-A 04 Q1R11BOOS-B 04 Q1RlIB503-A 04 QIR118504-A 04 Q1R11B505-B 04 QlRllBS07-0 SYSTEMA/EQUIPHENT DESCRIPTION O....
-s---l=
s=
(4)
CCW SUPPLY TO EXCESS LETDOWN HEAT EXCHANGER CCW NON-SAFETY ISOLATION CCV NON-SAFETY ISOLATION CCW RETURN FROM RCP THERMAL BARRIER ISOLATION CCW RETURN FROM EXCESS LETDOWN HEAT EXCHANGER BUILDING (5)
ROOM (7) 121-00 0223 100-00 100-00 129-00 0161 0161 CTIT 129-00 CTMT CCW RETURN FROM RCPS CB CCW TO RCP THERMAL BARRIER ISOLATION AB CCV RETURN FROM RCPS AB CCW INLET TO RHR HEAT EXCHANGER NO.
1 AB CCW INLET TO RHR HEAT EXCHANGER NO. 2 AB CCW PUMP IA TRAIN B AB CCV PUMP 1C TRAIN A AB CCV RHR Pi4P 1A SEAL HEAT EXCHANGER PRESURE AB CONTROL CCW RHR PMP 18 SEAL HEAT EXCHANGER PRESURE AB CONTROL SURGE TANK (CCW)
AB TRAIN A EMERGENCY AIR COMPRESSOR AB TRAIN B EMERGENCY AIR COMPRESSOR AB PRESSURIZER PORV BACK-UP AIR SUPPLY VALVE AB INSTRUMENT AIR ISOLATION OUTSIDE AB CONTAINMENT VALVE NITROGEN CYLINDER AB NITROGEN CYLINDER AB LC TRANSFORMER ID AB LC TRANSFORMER lE AB 130-00 121-00 121-00 83-00 83-00 100-00 100-00 83-00 CTMT 0223 0223 0128 0128 0185 0185 0128 83-00 0129 179-00 100-00 100-00 121-00 100-00 121-00 121-00 139-00 121-00 155-00 188-06 188-06 155-00 0506 0189 0189 0223 0184 0218 0218 0335 0229 0056A 0072E 0072B 0056C LC TRANSFORMER AR LC TRANSFORMER 1K LC TRANSFORMER IL LC TRANSFORMER IS OB Sw Sw 08 Report Date/Time: 02-27-95 / 16:25:33 Data Base File Name/Oate/Time: LIIMASTER.DBF Sort Criteria: ID Number Filter Criteria: (Eval.
Type CONTAINS 'S')
Program File Name & Version: SSEM vO.O
/ 02/27/95 / 16:00:38 Page 13 of 31
ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 APPENDIX A SEISMIC REVIEW SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST (SSEL)
FARLEY UNIT 1 Page No. 12
- 'IINE NO.
CLASS (1)
(2) 03 03 03 03 03 03 02 02 02 02 02 02 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 02 02 14 14 02 02 14 02 MARK NO.
(3)
QlRlSA006-A QIR15AO07-B QlR15A503-A QlIRSA504-B Q1R1SASOS-A QlRlA506-B Q1R116BOOS-A QLRL6B007-B Q11116B506-A Q1R16B507-8 Q1R16BSOB-A Q1111613509-13 Q1R17B00 l-A Q1R17B002-B Q11R17BOOB-A Q1R17B009-B Q1R17B504-A Q1R17B5O5-B Q1R17BS07-A Q111170508-B QI R17B509-A QIR178510-6 Qi R188029-A QlRIB0303-A Q1RIBB031-A Q1R189032-A QlRlBB033-B Q1R188034 -B QlRlSB035-B QlRlSB036-8 SYSTEM/EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION BUILDING ELEV
.=..Oman.....................
.=
U
=n~of (4)
(5)
(6) 4.16KV SWITCHGEAR IF AB 139-00 4.16KV SWITCHGEAR IG AB 121-00 4.16KV SWITCHGEAR [H DB 155-00 4.16KV SWITCHGEAR 1J DO 155-00 4.16KV SWITCHGEAR 1K SW 188-06 4.16KV SWITCHGEAR IL SW 188-06 600V LOAD CENTER 1D AB 139-00 600V LOAD CENTER 1E AB 121-00 600V LOAD CENTER 1K/2K Sw 188-06 600V LOAD CENTER 1L/2L SW 188-06 600V LOAD CENTER 1R/2R DB 155-00 600V LOAD CENTER 15/25 DO 155-00 MCC IA AB 139-00 MCC 1B AB 121-00 MCC 1U AB 139-00 MCC 1V AB 139-00 14CC IK SW i88-06 14CC 1L SW 188-06 MCC IN DO 155-00 MCC iP DO 155-00 MCC 1s DO 155-00 MCC IT DB 155-00 POWER DISCONNECT SWITCH AB.
139-00 POWER DISCONNECT SWITCH AB 139-00 CIRCUIT BREAKER BOX AS 139-00 CIRCUIT BREAKER BOX AS 139-00 POWER DISCONNECT SWITCH AB 139-00 POWER DISCONNECT SWITCH AB 139-00 CIRCUIT BREAKER BOX AB 139-00 POWER DISCONNECT SWITCH AS 139-00 ROOM mSabo*-m===
(7) 0343 0233 0056A 0056C 0072E 00728 0335 0229 0072E 0072B 0056A 0056C 0332 0209 0347 0334 0072E 0072B 0060 0057 0061 0o58 0332 0332 0332 0332 0322 0322 0322 0322 Report Date/Time: 02-27-95 / 16:25:33 Data Base File Name/Date/Time: U1MASTER.DBF Sort Criteria: ID Number Filter Criteria: (Eval.
Type CONTAINS 'S')
Program File Name & Version: SSEM vO.O
/ 02/27/95 / 16:00:38 Page 14 of 31
ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 APPENDIX A Page No. 13 SEISMIC REVIEW SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST (SSEL)
FARLEY UNIT I LINE NO.
(1)
CLASS MARK NO.
(2)
(3) 02 02 02 02 02 02 14 14 14 14 16 16 16 16 16 16 14 14 14 14 14 14 03 03 03 03 14 14 14 14 Q1R18BO38-A QIR186039-A Q1RlOBO40-A QlR1BB041-B Q1R1BB042-B Q1RIBB043-B Q1R21BOO1A-1 Q1R2IBOO1B-2 Q1R21BOOIC-3 Q1RZ1B001D-4 QIR21E009A-1 QIR21EOO9B-2 Q1R21EOO9C-3 QIR21EOO9D-4 QIR21EOO9F-A QIR21EOO9G-B Q1R21LOO1A-1 Q1R21LOOIB-2 Q1R21L001C-3 Q1R21L0LOD-4 Q1R21LOOSA-A QIR21LOO5B-B QIR36A501-A QlR36A502-B Q1R36A510-A QlR36A511-B Q1R411LOO1A-A QIR41LOOIB-A Q1R41LOO1C-A QIR41LOOID-B SYSTEM/EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION (4)
NOV POWER DISCONNECT SWITCH NOV POWER DISCONNECT SWITCH NOV POWER DISCONNECT SWITCH NOV POWER DISCONNECT SWITCH NOV POWER DISCONNECT SWITCH NOV POWER DISCONNECT SWITCH VITAL AC BREAKER BOX VITAL AC BREAKER BOX VITAL AC BREAKER BOX VITAL AC BREAKER BOX INVERTER IA INVERTER 1B INVERTER 1C INVERTER ID INVERTER IF INVERTER 1G VITAL AC DISTRIBUTION PANEL IA VITAL AC DISTRIBUTION PANEL 16 VITAL AC DISTRIBUTION PANEL 1C VITAL AC DISTRIBUTION PANEL 10 120V VITAL AC DISTRIBUTION PANEL 1J 120V VITAL AC DISTRIBUTION PANEL 1K 4.16KV SWITCHGEAR 1K SURGE ARRESTOR 4.16KV SWITCHGEAR 1L SURGE ARRESTOR 4.16KV SWITCHGEAR 1K SURGE ARRESTOR 4.16KV SWITCHGEAR IL SURGE ARRESTOR 125VDC DISTRIBUTION PANEL IA 125VDC DISTRIBUTION PANEL 1B 125VDC DISTRIBUTION PANEL IC 125VDC DISTRIBUTION PANEL ID BUILDING (5)
AB AB AB AS AS AS AB AS AS AS AB AS AS AS AS AS AB AS AS AB AB AB Sw Sw DB DB AB AS AB AB ELEV (6) 139-00 139-00 139-00 139-00 139-00 139-00 155-00 155-00 139-00 139-00 121-00 121-00 121-00 121-00 121-00 121-00 155-00 155-00 139-00 139-00 121-00 121-00 188-06 188-06 155-00 155-00 155-00 139-00 139-00 155-00 ROOM (7) 0332 0332 0332 0312 0312 0312 0416 0416 0318 0318 0224 0224 0226 0226 0224 0226 0416 0416 0318 0318 0224 0226 0072A 0072A 0056A 0056C 0416 0343 0312 0416 Report Date/Time: 02-27-95 / 16:25:33 Data Base File Name/Date/Time: U1MASTER.DBF Sort Criteria: ID Number Filter Criteria: (Eval.
Type CONTAINS 'S')
Program File Name & Version: SSEN vO.0
/ 02/27/95 / 16:00:38 Page 15 of 31
ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 APPENDIX A SEISMIC REVIEW SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST (SSEL)
FARLEY UNIT I Page No. 14
-LINE NO.
(1)
CLASS MARK NO.
(2)
(3) 14 Q1R41L001E-B 14 QIR41LOO1F-B 02 QIR42BOO1A-A 02 Q1R42BO01B-B 16 Q1R42EOO1A-A 1i Q1R42EDO1B-B 15 QIR42EOO2A-A 15 Q1R42EOO2B-B 17 QIR43A502-B 20 QIR43EOO1A-A 20 Q1R43EOO1B-B 20 Q1R43EOO2A-A 20 QIR43EOO2B-B 20 QIR43E5O1A-A 20 QIR43E501B-B 0
Q1R43E502B-B 20 QlR43G510-B 21 Q1R43T502-B 21 Q1R43T503 21 Q1R43T504 09 Q1V47CO1ZA-A 09 QIV47CO12B-B 05 Q1Y52P502B-B 21 QIY52T502 20 QSHI1NGEPB2508-AB 20 QSH21ES25-A 20 QSH21E528-A SYSTEM/EQUIP4ENT DESCRIPTION (4) 125VDC DISTRIBUTION PANEL 1E 125VDC DISTRIBUTION PANEL IF 125VDC BUS IA 125VDC BUS 1B AUX BLDG BATTERY CHARGER IA BUILDING ELEV ROOM (5)
(6)
(7)
AB AB AB AD AB AUX BLDG BATTERY CHARGER IB AB AUX BLDG BATTERY IA AD AUX BLDG BATTERY 1B AB DIESEL GENERATOR 1B (SKID)
DB SEQUENCER B1F AB SEQUENCER BIG AD SEQUENCER BIF AUX RELAY PANEL AS SEQUENCER BIG AUX RELAY PANEL AB SEQUENCER BUS IH DB SEQUENCER BUS iJ DB DIESEL GENERATOR 1B NEUTRAL GROUNDING DB RESISTOR DIESEL GENERATOR IB CT JB DB FUEL OIL DAY TANK 1B DB DIESEL GENERATOR 1B STARTING AIR RECEIVER DB TANK DIESEL GENERATOR IB STARTING AIR RECEIVER DB TANK AUXILIARY BLDG A TRAIN BATTERY ROOM AB EXHAUST FAN AUXILIARY BLDG B TRAIN BATTERY ROOM AB EXHAUST FAN DIESEL GEN 1B FUEL OIL STORAGE TRANSFER YD PUMP FUEL STORAGE TANK 1B YD EMERGENCY POWER BOARD AS DIESEL GENERATOR 1-2A LOCAL CONTROL PANEL OB DIESEL GENERATOR 1C LOCAL CONTROL PANEL DB Report Date/Time: 02-27-95 / 16:25:33 Data Base File Name/Date/Time: UIMASTER.DBF Sort Criteria: ID Number Filter Criteria: (Eval. Type CONTAINS 'S')
Program File Name & Version: SSEN vO.0 121-00 121-00 121-00 121-00 121-00 121-00 121-00 121-00 155-00 139-00 121-00 139-00 121-00 155-00 155-00 155-00 155-00 155-00 155-00 0233 0209 0224 0226 0224 0226 0214 0212 0058 0335 0229 0343 0233 0056A 0056C 0058 0058 0063 0058 155-00 0058 175-00 0501 175-00 0501 155-00 YARD 155-00 155-00 155-00 155-00 YARD 0401 0061 0060
/ 02/27/95 / 16:00:38 Page 16 of 31
ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 APPENDIX A Page No. 15 SEISMIC REVIEW SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST (SSEL)
FARLEY UNIT I LINE NO.
(1)
CLASS MARK NO.
(2)
(3) 20 QSH21L503A-A 20 QSH21L503B-B 20 QSH22LS02-A 20 QSH22L504-A 20 QSH23SS44D-A 20 QSH23S544E-A 01 QSR17BO06-A 01 QSR17BOO7-B 14 QSR19LOO2A-A 14 QSR19LOOZB-B 14 QSR41LSO4-A 14 QSR41L505-B 20 QSR42B516A-A 20 QSR42BS16B-B 20 QSR42BS20A-A 20 QSR42BS20B-B 15 QSR426523A-A SYSTEM/EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION BUILDING ELEV ROOM m...
m...................lll~mlm
- N~m (4)
SERVICE WATER A TRAIN BATTERY ROOM HVAC LCS SERVICE WATER B TRAIN BATTERY ROOM HVAC LCS DIESEL LOCAL RELAY PANEL 1-2A DIESEL LOCAL RELAY PANEL IC DIESEL GENERATOR ROOM 1C HVAC LCS DIESEL GENERATOR R 1-2A HVAC LCS NCC IF MCC 1G 120V AC CONTR. PWR.
PANEL 1S 125VDC DISTRIBUTION PANEL IM 125VDC DISTRIBUTION PANEL IN UNIT 1 SERVICE WATER BATTERY FUSE BOX TRAIN A UNIT 1 SERVICE WATER BATTERY FUSE BOX TRAIN B SW BATTERY NO. 1 or 2 DETECTION CABINET SW BATTERY NO. 3 or 4 DETECTION CABINET 125 VDC SERVICE WATER BUILDING BATTERY NO.
I (5)
(6)
(7) 188-06 0072D SW SW DB DB DB D11 AB AB AB AB SW SW SW SW SW SW SW 188-06 0072C 155-00 155-00 155-00 155-00 155-00 155-00 155-00 155-00 188-06 188-06 188-06 0061 0060 0060 0061 0409 0409 0409 0409 0072E 0072B 0074 188-06 0073 188-06 188-06 188-06 0074 0073 0074 15 QSR426523B-A 15 QSR42B523C-B 15 QSR42B523D-B 20 QSR42B525A-A 20 QSR42B525B-B 16 QSR428526A-A 16 QSR42B526B-A 125 VDC SERVICE WATER BUILDING BATTERY NO.
SW 2
125 VIC SERVICE WATER BUILDING BATTERY NO.
SW 3
125 VDC SERVICE WATER BUILDING BATTERY NO. SW 4
SW BUILDING A TRAIN BATTERY SEL SW SW SW BUILDING B TRAIN BATTERY SEL SW SW SERVICE WATER BLDG BATTERY CHARGER NO. 1 SW (NORMAL)
SERVICE WATER BLDG BATTERY CHARGER NO. 2 SW (STANDBY) 188-06 0074 188-06 0073 188-06 0073 188-06 188-06 188-06 0074 0073 0072D 188-06 0072D Report Date/Time: 02-27-95 / 16:25:33 Data Base File Name/Date/Time: U1NASTER.DBF / 02/27/95 / 16:00:38 Sort Criteria: ID Number Filter Criteria: (Eva].
Type CONTAINS 'S')
Program File Name & Version: SSEM vO.O Page 17 of 31
ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 APPENDIX A SEISMIC REVIEW SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST (SSEL)
FARLEY UNIT 1 Page No. 16 t*LINE NO.
CLASS MARK NO.
7*ntfnf 7..=.. fas e
.muam fme (1)
(2)
(3) 16 QSR42B526C-B 16 QSR42B526D-B 17 QSR43ASOI-A 17 QSR43ASO3-A 0
QSR43E502A-A 0
QSR43ESO2C-A 20 QSR43G509-A 20 QSR43LO01A-A 20 QSR43LOO1C-A 21 QSR43TSOL-A 21 QSR43T503-A 21 QSR43T507 21 QSR43TS08 21 QSR43T511 21 QSR43T512 20 QSV49HS3313AB-A 20 QSV49HS3313BB-B 10 QSV49KOO1A-A 10 QSV49KO01B-B is QSW41B515E-B 18 QSW41BSI5F-A 18 QSW41B592B-B 18 QSW41B592D-A 09 QSW41CSO5A-B SYSTEM/EQUIPMENT fl~sna~fDESCRIPTION sefl (4)
BUILDING anm... a...um.
(5)
SERVICE WATER BLDG BATTERY CHARGER NO. 3 SW (NORMAL)
SERVICE WATER BLDG BATTERY CHARGER NO. 4 SW (STANDBY)
DIESEL GENERATOR 1-2A (SKID)
DB DIESEL GENERATOR I-2A NEUTRAL GROUNDING DB RESISTOR DIESEL GENERATOR IC NEUTRAL GROUNDING DB RESISTOR DIESEL GENERATOR 1-2A CT JB OB DIESEL GEN 1-2A DC CONTROL PWR AUTO XFER D0 SW (ATS)
DIESEL GEN 1C DC CONTROL PWR AUTO XFER SW OB (ATS)
FUEL OIL DAY TANK 1-2A DB FUEL OIL DAY TANK 1C DB DIESEL GENERATOR IC STARTING AIR RECEIVER DB TANK DIESEL GENERATOR IC STARTING AIR RECEIVER DO TANK DIESEL GENERATOR 1-2A STARTING AIR DB RECEIVER TANK DIESEL GENERATOR 1-2A STARTING AIR DB RECEIVER TANK CTRL RM A/C LOCAL CONTROL STATION A AB CTRL RN A/C LOCAL CONTROL STATION B As CONTROL ROOM PACKAGE A/C UNIT AB CONTROL ROOM PACKAGE A/C UNIT As SERV WTR BATTERY ROOM FIRESTAT SW SERV WTR BATTERY ROOM FIRESTAT SW SERV WTR BATTERY ROOM FIRESTAT SW SERV WTR BATTERY ROOM FIRESTAT SW SERVICE WATER PUMP ROOM EXHAUST VENTILATOR SW A
ELEV ROOM (6)
(7) 188-06 0072C 188-06 0072C 155-00 155-00 155-00 0061 0060 0061 155-00 0060 155-00 155-00 0061 0061 155-00 0060 155-00 155-00 155-00 0066 0065 0060 155-00 0060 155-00 0061 155-00 0061 155-00 155-00 175-00 175-00 188-06 188-06 188-06 188-06 188-06 0416 0416 0501 0501 0073 0074 0073 0074 0072A Report Date/Time: 02-27-95 / 16:25:33 Data Base File Name/Date/Time: U1MASTER.DBF / 02/27/95 / 16:00:38 Sort Criteria: ID Number Filter Criteria: (Eval.
Type CONTAINS 'S')
Program File Name & Version: SSE4 vO.0 Page 18 of 31
ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 APPENDIX A SEISMIC REVIEW SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST (SSEL)
FARLEY UNIT 1 Page No. 17 LINE NO.
-cesnwen CLASS MARK NO.
==a
==
UU (1)
(2)
(3) 09 QSW41C505B-B 09 QSW41C5O5C-B 09 QSW41CSOSD-A 09 QSW41CSO5E-A 09 QSV41CSO5F-A 09 QSW41C5O6A-B 09 QSW41CSD6B-B 09 QSW41CSO6C-A 09 QSW41C5O6D-A 09 QSW41C5O7A-B 09 QSW41C5O7B-B 09 QSW41CSO7C-A 09 QSW41C5O7D-A 0
QSW41C513A-B 0
QSW41C513B-B 0
QSW41C513C-A 0
QSW41C513D-A 0
QSW41C514A-B 0
QSW41CS14B-B 0
QSW41CS14C-A 0
QSW41CS14D-A SYSTEM/EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION a..f.........mu.n......n f
u.........h (4)
SERVICE WATER PUMP ROOM EXHAUST VENTILATOR B
SERVICE WATER PUMP ROOM EXHAUST VENTILATOR C
SERVICE WATER PUMP ROOM EXHAUST VENTILATOR D
SERVICE WATER PUMP ROOM EXHAUST VENTILATOR E
SERVICE WATER PUMP ROOM EXHAUST VENTILATOR F
SERVICE WATER B TRAIN SWITCHGEAR ROOM EXHAUST FAN SERVICE WATER B TRAIN SWITCHGEAR ROOM EXHAUST FAN SERVICE WATER A TRAIN SWITCHGEAR ROOM EXHAUST FAN SERVICE WATER A TRAIN SWITCHGEAR ROOM EXHAUST FAN SERVICE WATER B TRAIN BATTERY ROOM EXHAUST FAN SERVICE WATER B TRAIN BATTERY ROOM EXHAUST FAN SERVICE WATER A TRAIN BATTERY ROOM EXHAUST FAN SERVICE WATER A TRAIN BATTERY ROOM EXHAUST FAN SERVICE WATER PUMP ROOM INTAKE LOUVER SERVICE WATER PUMP ROOM INTAKE LOUVER SERVICE WATER PUMP ROOM INTAKE LOUVER SERVICE WATER PUMP ROOM INTAKE LOUVER SERVICE WATER B TRAIN SWGR ROOM INTAKE LOUVER SERVICE WATER B TRAIN SWGR ROOM INTAKE LOUVER SERVICE WATER A TRAIN SWGR ROOM INTAKE LOUVER SERVICE WATER A TRAIN SWGR ROOM INTAKE LOUVER BUILDING (5)
ELEV (6) 188-06 188-06 188-06 188-06 188-06 188-06 188-06 188-06 188-06 188-06 188-06 188-06 188-06 167-00 167-00 167-00 167-00 188-06 188-06 188-06 188-06 ROOM (7) 0072A 0072A 0072A 0072A 0072A 00728 0072B 0072E 0072E 0073 0073 0074 0074 0072A 0072A 0072A 0072A 0072B 0072B 0072E 0072E Report Date/Time: 02-27-95 / 16:25:33 Data Base File Name/Date/Time: UIMASTER.DBF /
Sort Criteria: ID Number Filter Criteria: (Eval.
Type CONTAINS 'S')
Program File Name & Version: SSEM vO.0 02/27/95 / 16:00:38 Page 19 of 31
ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 APPENDIX A SEISMIC REVIEW SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST (SSEL)
FARLEY UNIT I Page No. 18 LINE NO.
(1)
CLASS MARK NO.
(2)
(3)
O QSU41CS1SA-B 0
QSW41CSI5A-B O
QSW41CS158-8 0
QSW41CSI5C-A 0
QSW41C515D-A 18 QSY41B532A-B 18 QSY418532C-A 18 QSY41B532D-A 18 QSY41B616A-B 18 QSY41B616B-B 18 QSY41B616C-B 18 QSY41B616D-B 18 QSY41O616J-A 18 QSY418616K-A 18 QSY41B616L-A 18 QSY41B616M-A 18 QSY41B616N-A 18 QsY41n616P-A 18 QSY41B616Q-A 18 QSY41B616R-A 09 QSY41C507A-B 09 QSY41C5O7B-B 09 QSY41C5O7E-A 09 QSY41C507F-A 09 QSY41CSO8A-A 09 QSY41CS08B-A 09 QSY41CS11A-A 09 QSY41C511B-A SYSTEM/EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION BUILDING ELEV
-b--------b-5)==
(......
(4)
(5)
(6)
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Program File Name & Version: SSEN vO.O
/ 02/27/95 / 16:00:38 Page 20 of 31
ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 APPENDIX A SEIS1IC REVIEW SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST (SSEL)
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Program File Name & Version: SSEN vO.O Page 21 of 31
ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 ATTACHMENT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS UNIT 1 -SWEL 1 NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 Equipment List Pages Unit 1 - Base List 1 2-21 Unit 1 - SWEL 1 22-26 Unit 1 - Base List 2 27-28 Unit 1 - SWEL 2 29-31 Page 22 of 31
ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 UNIT I SWEL 1 SWEL Revision Date - 9/18/12 Originator:.
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Page 23 of 31
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ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0
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SI SERVICE WATER A TORAN ATTEERY M
EAUG lS 188/U074 A
X x
NW1 9
W-TE X
DMT.V1W1 TOTH D
SEIVIC 10105TATE Y
-IPAINT INTAKE',00110010 AVU A_____o
+/-_____
______0 EOGE
..OSW-11C FNEr 7C-D s
T1SW400H PAS i
l l
l IQ
-BR I
lHu EEL 51 ms x
l I
Page 26 of 31
ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 ATTACHMENT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS UNIT 1 - BASE LIST 2 NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 Equipment List Pages Unit 1 - Base List 1 2-21 Unit 1 - SWEL 1 22-26 Unit 1 - Base List 2 27-28 Unit 1 - SWEL 2 29-31 Page 27 of 31
ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS ENERCON NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 Farley Unit 1 SWEL 2 Spent Fuel Pool Related Items NTTF Recommendation 2.3: Seismic Walkdowns Variety of Environments Variety of types of Major new equipment or V21 Classes Variety of Not replcmnt from Systems Submerged Submerged Other equpmnt Appendix B)
Location MPL#
System/Equipment Description Class #
1 QIG31HOO01A SPENT FUEL HEAT EXCHANGER 1A G31 X
21 AB-155/0445 2 Q1G31H0001B SPENT FUEL HEAT EXCHANGER 1B G31 X
21 AB-165'/0013 3 Q1G31P002A 1A SFP PUMP G31 X
5 AB-139'/0342 4 Q1G31P002B 1B SFP PUMP G31 X
5 AB-139'/0342 S QIG31V001A 1A SFP PUMP SUCTION ISO G31 X
0 AB-139'/0342 60.1G31V001B 1B SFP PUMP SUCTION ISO G31 X
0 AB-139'/0342 7 Q1G31V002A 1A SFP HX INLET ISO G31 X
0 AB-155'/0455 8 Q1G31V002B 1B SFP HX INLET ISO G31 X
10 AB-155'/0423 9 QIG31VO03A 1A SFP HX OUTLET ISO G31 X
0 AB-155'/0455 10 QIG31V003B 1B SFP HX OUTLET ISO G31 X
0 AB-155'/0423 11 Q1G31V004A 1A SFP COOLING LOOP TO SFP PURIF G31 0
INLET ISO X
AB-139'/0342 12 QIG31VO04B 1B SFP PUMP COOLING LOOP TO SFP G31 0
PURIF INLET ISO X
AB-139'/0342 13 QlG31V00S SFP PURIF OUTLET TO SFP G31 X
0 AB-155'/0455 14 Q1G31V006 SFP COOLING LOOP RETURN (KEY Z-031 0
225)
X AB-139'/0342 15 Q1G31V007 DW TO SFP ISO (KEY Z-335)
G31 X
0 AB-139'/0342 16 QIG31V008A 1A SFP PUMP DISCH PI-652B ROOT G31 X
0 AB-139'/0342 17 QlG31V008B 1B SFP PUMP DISCH PI-6520 ROOT G31 X
0 AB-139'/0342 18 QIG31V009A 1A SFP PUMP SUCTION PI-652A ROOT G31 0
Sx AB-139'/0342 19 QIG31V009B 1B SFP PUMP SUCTION PI-652C ROOT G31 0
X AB-139'/0342 20 Q1G31V017 SFP COOLING LOOP RETURN DRN G31 X
0 AB-139'/0342 21 QIG31VO18 1B SFP COOLING LOOP ORN G31 X
0 AB-139'/0307 22 QIG31V019 SFP COOLING LOOP RETURN VENT G31 X
0 AB-139'/0342 23 Q1G31V021A 1A SFP PUMP CASING VENT G31 X
0 AB-139'/0342 24 QIG31VO21B 1B SFP PUMP CASING VENT G31 X
0 AB-139'/0342 25 Q1G31VO22A 1A SFP PUMP CASING DRN G31 X
0 AB-139'/0345 26 QIG31VO22B 1B SFP PUMP CASING ORN G31 X
0 AB-139'/0345 27 Q1G31V023A 1A SFP PUMP SUCTION ORN G31 X
0 AB-139'/0345 28 QIG31V023B 1B SFP PUMP SUCTION ORN G31 X
0 AB-139'/0345 29 QIG31V024A 1A SFP PUMP SUCTION VENT G31 X
0 AB-139'/0345 30 Q1G31V024B 1B SFP PUMP SUCTION VENT G31 X
0 AB-139'/0345 31 Q1G31V025 SFP HX HIGH POINT VENT G31 X
0 AB-165'/0013 Page 28 of 31
ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 ATTACHMENT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS UNIT 1 - SWEL 2 SNCF164-RPT-01 Equipment List Pages Unit 1 - Base List 1 2-21 Unit 1 - SWEL 1 22-26 Unit 1 - Base List 2 27-28 Unit 1 - SWEL 2 29-31 Page 29 of 31
ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 Originator:
2uap 1-r
- 6. ll?ý/_
Date:
Dae Originator: ;?OESY LO) i*-!A,{i)
Reviewer:,-,&
oA Ops Reviewer:
IA]
Date:
Date: _,-_______
Date:/'"
2.-/2_
Peer Reviewer:
J Peer Reviewer:
Dalte; W'> XL-./J
-Peer Reiwr.ý Date:
~Ic~c~ 3~r 4~~7 Date': 01~4W,2 Peer Reviewer; Page 30 of 31
ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 Farley Unit 1 SWEL 2 Spent Fuel Pool Related Items - Revision Date 9/18/12 NTTF Recommendation 2.3: Seismic Walkdowns Screen #3 Screen #4 Anchorage Variety of check MPL#
System/Equipment Location Variety of environments required?
Description Major new equipment (50% of or (21 Classes Column B)
Variety of replcmnt from Systems equpmnt Appendix B)
Rapid Drain-Down Comments Hydraulic lines connected to the SFP and the equipment connected to Class #
Submerged Not Submerged Other Yes No those lines O1G31SH0001A SPENT FUEL HEAT AUX BLDG/ 155' /0445 1
EXCHANGER 1A G31 21 X
0, 2 Q1G31P002B 1B SFP PUMP AUX BLDG / 139' /0342 G31 5
X IX Q1G31V001A 1A SFP PUMP AUX BLDG / 139' / 0342 3
SUCTION ISO G31 0
X X
4 QIG31V003B 1B SFP HX OUTLET AUX BLDG / 155' / 0423 ISO G31 0
X X
QIG31V004A 1A SFP COOLING AUX BLDG / 139' / 0342 G31 0
INLET ISO QIG31V006 SFP COOLING LOOP AUX BLDG / 13V /0342 031 6
RETURN (KEY Z-225)
Page 31 of 31
ATTACHMENT 2: PEER REVIEW CHECKLIST FOR SWEL 1 AND 2 NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 ATTACHMENT 2 UNIT 1 - PEER REVIEW CHECKLIST FOR SWEL 1 AND 2 NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 Page 1 of 3
ATTACHMENT 2: PEER REVIEW CHECKLIST FOR SWEL 1 AND 2 NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 Sheet I of 2 Peer Review Checklist for SWEL For Farley Unit 1 Instructions for Completing Checklist This peer review checklist may be used to document the review of the Seismic Walkdown Equipment List (SWEL) in accordance with Section 6: Peer Review. The space below each question in this checklist should be used to describe any findings identified during the peer review process and how the SWEL may have changed to address those findings. Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.
- 1. Were the five safety functions adequately represented in the SWEL 1 selection?
YN NEI SWEL Ifor Farley Unit 1 meets the requirements of having 90 to 120 items and addresses ailfive safety functions. Many components provide safety functions for multiple systems, and/or are part offrontline support systems. Allfive safety functions discussed in EPRI Report 1025286 are well represented in the SWEL 1.
- 2. Does SWEL I include an appropriate representation of items having the following sample selection attributes:
- a. Various types of systems?
YN NEI Items included on the SWEL comprise a variety of systems such as Emergency Diesel Generators and Auxiliaries, Service Water System, Component Cooling Water System, Automatic Depressurization, Residual Heat Removal System, Vital A/C and D/C systems.
- b. Major new and replacement equipment?
YED NEI New and replacement components are identified in SWEL 1.
- c. Various types of equipment?
YN NE1 SWEL 1 includes at least one example of each of the 21 classes of equipment, except Classes 11 (chillers), 13 (Motor Generators) and 19 (Temperature Sensors). These components did not meet the screening criteria for incorporation in the SWEL as discussed in Section 6 of the submittal report.
All other equipment classes were well represented. In general, the number of components in each class is proportional to the number of safety-related components of that class in the plant as a whole, except that the number of in-line valves is proportionally smaller than anchored equipment. Anrchored equipment is more vulnerable to seismic loads.
- d. Various environments?
YEA NEI The SWEL contains components in mild, harsh, and outdoor environments. The components are located in different buildings, rooms, and/or on different building elevations. The SWEL also includes components located inside primary containment.
- e. Equipment enhanced based on the findings of the IPEEE (or equivalent) program?
YN NEI The SWEL included equipment that had been modified as a result of the IPEEE program. Section 5 and Attachment 5 of the submittal report provides information on resolution of the IPEEE findings. The SWEL and individual component checklists provide information about the IPEEE modifications and verification of modification incorporation.
Page 2 of 3
ATTACHMENT 2: PEER REVIEW CHECKLIST FOR SWEL 1 AND 2 NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 Sheet 2 of 2 Peer Review Checklist for SWEL For Farley Unit 1
- f. Were risk insights considered in the development of SWEL 1?
Y9 NEI SWEL 1 includes high risk components based on risk significance in the plant probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) models. Section 6 of the submittal report discusses the risk insights used for SWEL development.
- 3. For SWEL 2:
- a. Were spent fuel pool related items considered, and if applicable included in YZ NO SWEL 2?
SWEL 2 includes components for maintaining cooling of the SFP, which are Seismic Category I components.
- b. Was an appropriate justification documented for spent fuel pool related items not YN NEI included in SWEL 2?
Section 6.2 of the submittal report provides the justification for excluding items on SWEL 2. There were no components identified that could contribute to rapid SFP drain down. Note that there were no new/replacement equipment in SWEL 2 because there have been no major modifications to the Spent Fuel Pool systems that would have affected equipment that meets the screening requirements to be included on SWEL 2.
- 4. Provide any other comments related to the peer review of the SWELs.
The peer review team reviewed the initial SWEL 1 and SWEL 2 and provided comments and suggestions for enhancement of the SWELs. Comments included suggestions to include additional electrical components and more equipment mounted to the structure, since such equipment has shown more potential to be adversely impacted by seismic loads than in-line mounted components. In addition, comments were made suggesting that certain equipment classes contain more components and that explanations be provided for not including certain equipment (e. g. there are no safety-related or Seismic Category I components in that equipment class installed in the plant). The peer reviewers ensured that the SWELs met the requirements of EPRI Report 1025286. Changes deemed necessary during the walkdown due to inaccessibility were reviewed by the peer reviewers to ensure that the changes did not impact the level of compliance to the EPRI report. The final SWEL meets all requirements of EPRI Report 1025286.
- 5. Have all peer review comments been adequately addressed in the final SWEL?
YNJ NEI Peer Reviewer #1: RobertAshworth Date:
11/05/2012 Peer Reviewer #2: Melanie Brown, Date:
11/05/2012 Page 3 of 3
ATTACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 ATTACHMENT 3 UNIT 1 - SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS (SWCs)
NO. SNCF164-RPT-01 Page 1 of 561
ATTACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 r/-
Sheei rofa3 Status:.
NFj Ull Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)
Equipment ID No. NIp.9PCV2228A Equip. Classl 7 Equipment Descripfion PCV TO PORV BACKUP AIRSUPPLY PRESSURE CONTROL.
.ocatiofi: 'Bldg: AUXILIARY' Flo6r,l, E121 Room, Area
Ž Manuifacturer,; Mode, Etc. (optiboali but recommended)
Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklist may be usid to documente ithe results of the Seismic Walkdowniof anlitem of e uipment oi the
,SWEL. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record thlel resultsofjudgnlents and findings. Additional space is providecd at the end of this checklist for docurmeInting other codments.
Anchorage
- 1. Is, the anchorage cOnfiguratioh.Verification requpired (i.e., is the item 6ne o* the
/50%
of' SWEL Itemsrequiring such verification)?
- 2. Is theýanchorage free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware?
- 3. Is the anchorage free of corrosion that is morethan mild surface oxidation?
- 4. :,Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in the:concrete near the anchors?
- 5. Is the anchorage configuration consistent, with, plant documentation?
(Note:: Ig.
question,,pIy appliesl if the itemris-one ofthe 50% for which an, anchorage configuration verification is fequired.)
- 6. Based on the above anchorage evaluations,,is theanchoragelfreeof potentially adverse seismic conditions?
Y uN-E U0 N/AE Yý U0 N/Ar[
Y* NE LF-l NiAE]
Y'NmUE N/A Y/NN UO Elilite the eqdiofieipft dlas namne from Appendix B: Classes~of Equiptoent.
Page 2 of 561
ATTACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 Sheet 3 of 3 Status: Ye'ND u[
Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)
EquipmentIDNo.
NIP 19PCV2228A Equip Class Eqipmcnct Description PCV TO.PORV BACKUP AIR.SUPPLY PRESSURE.CONTROL Interaction Effects 7; Arcsoft.targets free from impact bynearby equipment or structures?
- 8. Are overhead equipment, distribution systems,ýceiling, tiles and:lighting, and masonry block*aills not likely to collapse onto Ithe equipment.
- 9. Do attached lines have adequate flexibility-to avoid damage?
10, Based onqthe above seismic interaction evaluations, is equipmentfree of potentially. advefse seismic intbraction cdfects?
Y$/ty U0 N/AED YONIUM, N/ADI
- ,/
Yj*r/NE U0ME]
-Other Adverse Conditions
- 1. H.ave you looked for and found no other seismic conditions that could' NO U0 adversely affect the safety finctions ofithe equipment?
Comments (Additional pages may be added.s. aecessary)
Evaluated.by:
~AA+/-oa~- \\4~q?~LAbD :Jj/
(4i x
(1/
jJ Date-F~2, 7 Page 3 of 561
S ATTACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS 9
NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 N1P19pv2 Page 4 of 561
ATTACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0
-1.5 Sheet i of)8/I Status: Y~'L UT Seismic Walkdown Chfecklist (SWC):
Equipment ID N6. QIB31HV8028 Equip.:
Equipment Description PRESSURE RELIEF TANK ISOLA TION'OUTSIDE CTMT VALVE Location: Bldg. AUXILIARY Floor: EL 12 Room, Area Manufacturer, ModýtL Et.; (optional but icommen.ded)
Instructions for Completing'Checklist This checklist may be used to document the results of the Seismnic Walkdb'wn6f an item of equipment oý the SWEL. The space below each of the foliovitng questions may be used to record the results ofjudgments and finding.s Additional, space is providedat thle endoft i'i checklist for doe imenting other comnents.
AnchoraIe
- 1. is the anchorage configuration verification required (i.e., is the item one, YEr Ni of the 50% of SWEL items requiring.such verification)?
- 2. Is the:anchorage free ofbent, broken, missing or lbose hardware?
3, Is the anchorage free of corrosion :that is, more than mild surface oxidation?
YO, NE3 UE N/A f YE NME. UE NiAO
ý" ve Qry 0M vrll an xIODI.
4._Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in. the concrete near, the anchors?,
YE3 NEI U0E N/AdJ V~\\vw ova 5I is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation?
(Note: This-que-stion only applie if the itm L one of te,50% for whichi an ancho 'age COfiguration verificaion is required.
&6 Based on.the above anchorage evaluations, is the anchorage free of potentially ad erse seismic conditions?
Y01 N[t-.UYE N/AV' NO UE 0k jEriterthe qutliptmizt class namne fr-om Appendix B; C lasscs of Equip~m il.
Page 5 of 561
ATTACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 She~
f&
Status: Y~ N'uI Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)
Equipmefit ID No.
QB31V0286 Eq~fip. Class' 7 Equipment Description PRESSUREz RELIEF TANK ISOLA TION OUTSIDE CTMT VALVE Interaction Effects
- 7. Are soft targets free.ferm impact by nearby equipment or sw ctures?
\\1Y NE] UU3 N/AU
- 8. Are oyerheadte.quipment, distributionl sySes;cis ceiling tiIles, and lighting;.
and masomryblock walls not likely to collapse onto the equipment?
- 9. Do attached lines:have adequate, flexibility to avoid damage?
Yd NO U07 N/AU!
- Yd*.,NIO UI-N/AI-I
- 10. Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations, iseqwuipment free YI ENU l UM of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects?
Other Adverse, Conditions
- 11. Have you looked for and found no other seismic conditions ihat could Yf N\\
UE adverselyaffect the safety functions of the equipment?
Comments(Additional pages may be added as necessary)'
w- ) 7~z~ S~>
N Evaluatedy:
b cL~
Date:
d-7 gt0
[
Page 6 of 561
9 ACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION
.010 Page 7 of 561
ATTACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKIDOWN CHECKLISTS NO, SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 Page 8 of 561
ATTACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)
Equipment ID No. QtC,1E004B Equip. Class' 2 Equipment Description REACTOR TRIP SWITCHGEAR NO. 2 SSeeiNt of /4 Statu' 'YZ NM ij[]
7y Location: Bldg. AUXILIARY: Floor El. ý121 Room, Area 235 Manufacturer, Model. Etc; (optional but recommended)
Instructions for Completing Cheicklist This checklist may be used o dt*kýumnt the results of theismic Walkdown of an item ofequipmentbon the SWEL. The space below eacho* the following questions may be used to record the result ofjudgments and findings. Additional space is provided at the end of this *checklist for documenting other comments.,
Anchorage
,1.Is the anchorage configuration verification required (i.e., is the.itemloe
'oZne NC of the 50%. of SWEL items requiring such verification)?
Refeience SEWS package Q1CI 1EOO4B (April 1994)
- 2. Is the anchoa ge free of bent, broken, missihg or l6osejhardware?
Anchorage of cabinet is welded per desiao.
- 3. Is the Anchorage frie of coriosioin that is more than mild surface oxidation?
- 4. Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in theconcrete.hea-theanchorsi.?
- 5. Is the ahchorage *onfiguration corsistent With plant do~umentation?
(Note: This questiwnonvly applies ifithe itcm!is moe of the 500i for which anl nnchi~rage*cofigumrtion.verifi~at~in. nis reqaije 1,)1
- 6. Based on tie above anchorageevaluations is nI t~heobehorage fi'ee 6f potentially adverse.ismic conditions?
YS NNH UC N/AC YED N10 UC N/AC Yz Nn U N,/Ac Y01 NCI iC3 N/ACl-
-YE NC) tiC Enro~~~~~~~~~~~~~3 0,1he
.eupnn ls sefo p~itxt:CassOf.Eupfe Page 9 of 561
ATTACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 Sheet 2 of P Status: YN Nn] UE]
Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)
Equ'ipment ID No. 01Ct IE004B Equip. Class1 2 Equipment"Description REACTOR TRIP SWtTCHGEAR NO. 2 Interaction Effects
- 7. Are soft targets free from impact by nearby eptlIpmertr or structures?
YZ N] Ju] N/ACD
- 8. Are overheadeqtuipment, distiibution systems, ceiling tiles and lighting, Y.
NC UC N/AC and:masonry block walls not likely to collapse onto the equipment?
- 9. Do attached lines have miequateflexibility to avoid damage?-
- 10. Based on the above seismidc interAction evaluations, is equipment~free of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects.
YZI NE U O N/AC:
Y0 NO-UI Other.Adverse Conditions.
SL. Have you looked for and found no other seismic conditions that could YZ NC U[E adversely affect the safety functions of the equipment?
Scaffold #6273 is located within 3 feet of panel QICI1tEOO4B butis.
adequately tied to a rigid pipe/conduit.support and-therefore is seismically adequate.
Comments (Additional pages naybe added as necessary)
Evaluated by:.'
- j *.
.* (
I JRr6~ M1Mia\\i LauIli LAMad;6vVN Datc:
-242 Page 10 of 561
9 ACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSIOP Page 11 of 561
ATTACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 Page 12 of 561
ATTACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 Shleet iof 4 Status: YNN] U]
Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)
Equipment lID No. MI.:IFCVO602A.
Equip. Class I
8 a__8 Pkq FI-5 Equipment Description RHR PUMP.MINIFLOW VALVE Location: Bldg, AUXILIARY Floof El. 83.
Room, Area 128 Manufacturer, Model, Etc. (6pftinal but recoimmended)
Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklistlmay be used to document the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of equipment on the SWEL. The space below each of the following questions may be:used to record ith: results ofjudgments and findings. Additional space is provided atthe end of this checklist for documenting othei comminents.
Anchorake
- 1. Is the anchorage configuration verification required (ije., is;the item onie of the 50% of SWEL items *requiring sulch, verification)?
YO NO
- 2. Is the.inchorage free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware?
- 3. Is the anchorage-free of corrosion that is more than mild surface
.oxiddatioh?
- 4. Is tie anchorage free of visible c iac.*snithe concretp near the anchors?
- 5. Is the-anchorage configuration consistent withplant documentation?
(Note: This questiorn only applies if thelitem is one of the 50%. for which an anchorage configuration verification is required,)
- 6. Based on the above anchorage evaluations, isihe anchorage free.of
.potentially.adverse seismi6. conditions?
YD NO UD N/AZ YD. NE UE N/AE YO ND UED N/A0 YZ NDUD*I' i:Enter-the equipineticlass. nram6 from Appendix B: Classes of Equipment.
Page 13 of 561
ATTACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 Sheet 2 of 4 Status: YM NE1 UL Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)
Equippment iINo. QEIIFCGVO602A, Eqtip; Classl8
,Pko F1-5 Elquipment.DescriptionR..HRR PUMP MINIFLOW VALVE Interaction Effects
- 7. Adfc soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment or structures?
YZ NOJ UC N,/A
- 8. Are overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles and lighting, YN NC UW N/AC and masonry block walls not likely to collapse onto the equipment?
- 9. Do attached.lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage?
- 10. Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations, is equipment free of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects?
Y0 NC UC1 N/AC YO NCI UC Other Adverse, Conditions
- 1. Have you lookedlfor and found 'o other seismic conditions that could YN NCI U[
adversely affect the;safety fuictions of theequipment?
hip aca wsigfi nl l F
y-77, Equipment Q8P19 MOV318521 S.T'his package was originally signed on 8-1 9-12 but:
retypedl for clarity. on:
10- 15-1?2.
Evaluated by.
Laura Maclay by Telecon Date:
8/29/12 Terry A. Mullenixk 8/2,912.
Page 14 of 561
ATTACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 Page 15 of 561
ATTACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 Page 16 of 561
ATTACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 0- (,
Sheet t Of 3 Status:
Zj ND UM Seismic Walkdown. Checklist (SWC)
Equipment ID No. QIEIIFTO605A Equip. Class, 18 Equipm.ent Description RHR HEAT EXCHANGER DISCHARGE FLOW TRANSMITTER Location: Bldg. AUXILIARY Floor El. 87 Room, Area Manufacturer, Model, Etc. (optional but recommended)
Instructions for Completing Checklist Thischecklist may be used to document the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of equipment.on the SWEL. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record tihe resultsofjudgments and findings. Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.
Anchorage I. Is the anchorage configuration verification required,(i.e, is the item one of the:,50% of SWEL items requiring such verificationi)
YOJ NVý
- 2. Is the anchorage free of bent, broken, missing or loosehardware?
- 3. Is the anchorage~free ofcorrosion that is more than mild surface oxidation?
- 4. Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors?
- 5. Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation?
(Note: Thiszquestion only applies if the item is 'one of the. 50% :for which an anchorage configuration verification is required.)
- 6. Based on thae abov¢e anchorge evaluations, is the anchorage free of potentially adverse seismic conditions?
Y/N0J UEJ 1N/AO[
Yv`NE!UD
/Am
&T LTD N/AD1
[I NO U-1 N/A-Y/ND U Enter the equiprnent~clase name fdhApiikB ls oEquipnient.
Page 17 of 561
ATTACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 Sheet: 2 Of 3 Status: Yo-'&L ULI Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC) quipment ID NO.
QIEIIFTO605A EqNuip C1a3ss* 18 Equipment D*scription RHR HEAT EXCHANGER DISCHARGE FLOW TRANSMITTER Interaction Effects:
- 7. Are soft targets free~fromilnipact by nearby equipmnent or strtures?
- 8. Are overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceilingftiles andtlighting, and masonAr block-waUs, not likely to collapse ont6 the equipment?
- 9. Do attachedlines.have adequate flexibility to avoid damage?
- 10. Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations, is equipment free 0f potentially0adverse seismijc interaction effects?
0 ND UD N/AD
'iNd lN U0 N/AD Y*[N] U.D 11ýýoUF1 Other Adverse Conditions
- 11. Have you looked. fot and fouxnd no other. seismic conditions that* could Y*tND UDZ advirsely affect Lhe-safety functionsqofthe equipment.,
Coniements (Additional pages may be ridded a$ necessary)
<C kYi
/
Evaluated by, A ~ / ~
Date:
oz-2~
~
nýý U
.j Page 18 of 561
ATTACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 Page 19 of 561
ATTACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 Sheet t of 3/ 5,".1 Status: Yz'NqUF I
Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)
Equipment ID No. QIEI1L03594B Equip. Class. 20 Equipment Description CTMT SUMP LEVEL TRANSMITTER POWER SUPPLY Location: Bldg. AUXILIARY Floor El. )--
14 Room, Area 3 1 Manufacturer, Model, Etc. (optional but recommendedd).
lnstr uctions for Completinig Checklist This checkiist may be.used to document the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of equipment on, the SWEL.The space below each of the following questions maybe used to record the results ofjudgments and findings. Additional, space is provided atthe end of this checklist for documetiting other comments.
Anchorage I. Is the anchorage configuration verification required (i.e., is the item-one YE] N of the 50% of SWEL items requiiringesuch verification)?
- 2. Is the anchorage free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware?
- 3. Is the anchorage free of corrosion that is more than mild surface oxidation?
YEM1NFI U'D N/AE]
YE["NF 130 N/AE]
- 4. Is~the anchoragefree of visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors?
VYQ/N--
U0 N/AI
- 5. Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation?
(Note: This question only applies if the item'is one of the.50% for which an anchorage configuration verification, isrequiredl)
- 6. Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is the anchorage free of potentially adverse seismic conditions?
YM NEI 130 N/Aij YI'"NEJ UD1 Enter the-equipment claSs name.from Appendix B: Classes, of Equipment.
Page 20 of 561
ATTACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 Sheet 2 of°5.
Status: YaND UD-, 10 Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)
Equipment ID No. QIE1ILQ3594B Equip. Class, 20 Equipment Dcscription CTMT SUMP LEVEL TRANSMITTER POWER SUPPL Y Interaction Effects
- 7. Are soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment*.or structures?
- 8. Are overhead equipment, distributibn systems, ceiling tiles and lighting, and masonry block walls not likely to collapse onto the equipment?
- 9. Do attached lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage?
- 10. Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations, is equipment free of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects?
Y¥jND UD N/AD YEND lID N/AD YEI/NDl UD MAO Yg?(NNK U'U Other Adverse Conditions
- 11. Have you looked for and.found no other: seismic conditions that could Y
'NDM UD adversely affect tie safety functions of the equipment?
Co0njents (Additional pages may be added as necessary)
A¢,?
Evaluated by:
't
\\k P. 44(9V Date:
_/
Page 21 of 561
9 ACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 9
-Jl Page 22 of 561
9
,ACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION
.010 Page 23 of 561
- ACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS 0
NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 Page 24 of 561
ATTACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 I p-l's Sheet i ofc Status. YZ N)
Un Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)
Equipment D No. QIE1IMO.V8812A Equip. Class' 8 Equipment Description CTMTSUM4P TO RHR PUMP IA ISOLATION Location: Bldg. AUXILIARY Floor El. 83 Room, Area k
Manufacturer, Model, Etc. (optional but recommended)
Instructions for.Completing Checklist This checklist may be used to document the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of equipment on the SWEL. The spacebelow eaeh of the following questions-may be used to.record the results ofjudgments and findings. Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting.other comments.
Anchorage h
Is the anchorage configuration verification required (i.e., is the item.one YE] NS4 of the 50% of SWEL items requiring such verification)?
- 2. Is the anchorage free of bent, broken, missing or.loose hardware?
- 3. Is the anchorage free of corrosion'that is more than mild surface oxidation?
YE] NE] UE] N/A/"
YE] NEI UE N/Atý
- 4. Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors?
YO NE], iEi N/i
- 5. Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation?
(Note: This question only applies if the item is one of the 50% for which an anchorage configuration verification is required.)
B ased on the above anchorage evaluations, is the anchorage free of potentially adverse seismic conditions?
\\
YE NEI UE] X/
'Yhk NE] VE]
/ x
.Enmer the eqbipment class namne from Apperidix B1 Classes ofEquipment.
Page 25 of 561
ATTACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 Sheet 2ofX5 Status* Y[-E No UEI-Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)
Equipment tDNo. Q'1EIIMOV8812A Equip. Class' 8 Equipment Description.-TMT. SUMP TO RHR PUMP MA ISOLATION Interaction, Effects
- 7. Are soft targets fre from mpactby nearby equipment or structures?
YD NV UD N/AD C,#a ~
WA
ýi4.
w vsri"vxý ib 60WVIýe
.J-h Ct*1d41"noh,
- 8. Are Overhead equipment, distribution systems,.ceiling tiles aindlighting,. Y* NE Ul N/A0 and masonry block walls not likely to bollapseý onto the equipment?
- 9. Do attached lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage?
1.0. Based on the above~seismic interaction evaluations, is equipment free of potentially adverse seismic inieractjin effects?
Y# NEI UD3 N/ACD YCI N* UE Other Adverse Conditions i1. Have y~u looked for and found no other seismic conditions that could
'Y$ND UD adversely, affect the safety functions. of the equipment?
Comments (Additional pages may be added as necessary)
Evau td b:
~UAY~ L}~LAvta~r 'McAoa Date:
Page 26 of 561
ACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS 9
NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 Fi4~
Page 27 of 561
- ACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSIONR Page 28 of 561
ATTACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0
--?0 / -1
,-4 Page 29 of 561
ATTACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 Sheetaiof'X,0 Status: Y I N[
U-Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)
EquipmenttIDNo. QiElIMOV8888A Equip. ClaWss 8 Equipment Desciption LHSI TO RCS COLD LEG Location: Bldg; AUXILIARY Floor El. 121 Room, Area Manufacturer, Model, Etc. (optional but recommended)
Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklist may be used to documnent the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an itemof equipment on the SWEL. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results ofjudgments and findingsi. Additional space is provided at the end of thifschecklist for documenting other comments&
Anchora~e
- 1. is the anchorage configration verification required (i.e., is the item one YE N) of the 50% of SWEL itoms requiring such verification)?
- 2. Is the anchoragefi-ee of bent, broken, missing or.loose hardware?
- 3. Is the anchorage free of corrosion that is more than inild surface oxidation?
YE) NE) UE] NIA[Z' YE NE) UE) N/AD/
- 4. Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors?
YEI NE) UE+! N/An"'
- 5. Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation?
(Note: This question only applies if the item is one of the 50% for which.an arichorage configurationi verification is required.)
YE NoE UE) N/Az'
- 6. Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is the anchorage free of Y[
NE)N 1
potentially adverse seismic conditions?
uDE I Enter the equipment ctassnamne from Appendix B: Classes of Equipment.
Page 30 of 561
ATTACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 Shee 2 Of'N Status: Y;`;F N-- UI Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)
Equipment ID No. QIEI 1MOV8888A Equip. Class, 8 Equipment Description LHSI TO RCS COLD LEG.,
Interaction Effects
- 7. Are soft targets free.fi-om impact by nearby equipment or structures?
8; Are overhead equipmenftt, distribution. systems, ceiling tilIes and'Iighting, and masonty block walls not likely to: collapse onto the equipment?
- 9. Do attached lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage?
Y¥( ND UO N/AD Y9 ND UD N/AU YEý ND UD N/AD
- 10. Based on the above seismic interaction ealuatjons, is equipment free Yd NDI UD1 of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects?
Other Adverse Conditions S1I. Have you looked for and.found no other seismic conditions that could Y"
ND UD adversely affect the safety functions of the equipment?
Comments (Additional pages may be added as necessary).
Date:
-I L- )i z.-
Page 31 of 561
9 ACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSIONR Page 32 of 561
ATTACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS I I,
NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0
ý -
(4-Page 33 of 561
ATTACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0
- -:3
.4 Sheet of 3 Status: YN['ND U0D Seismic WalkdoWn Checklist (SWC)
EquipmentfID No,.QIE11POOIB Equip. Class' 6, Equipment Description RHR PUMP 1B, Location: Bldg., AUXIL(ARY Floor,El. 83 Room, Area, L* 24,/
Manifacturer, Model, Etc. (optional butlttecommerded)
Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklistrnjay be used to documerit the results of t'the.Seiiinic Walkdown of ad item of equipment oh ithe, SWEL. -The space below each of the f61lowing questions may be used to record the results of judgments and findings. Additibnaltspace is proVided at the end of this, checklist for. docAimenting.other compents'.
Anchorage
- 1. Is the anchorage configuration verification required (i.e., is the item one Y/NE of the, 50% of SWEL items requiring such: verification)?
iii) v7(~.S9z V
- 2. Is :theanchorage free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware?
- 3. Is the anchorage free ofcorrosion thatis more than mild-surface
- oxidat'ion?
- 4. Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in ihe concrete-near the anchors?:
- 5. Is theanchorage configuration consistent with plan't documentation?
(Note:: This qtiestiontinl y apPlies if'the item is one of the: 50% for which an arich6ouage configurati6nx.,efification is required.)
- 6. Based on the above anchorage:evaluations, is:the anchorage freeof potentialy adverse seismic conditions?
Y NEI UEN/AE Y/NE UE3 N/A.
- N*
U N/A[E Y /
, UEJ N/A-1 Y*NE U0
'Enter the equipment class narne fon.Appeadix B:-Classcs of Equipmeni Page 34 of 561
ATTACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 Sheet. 3 Of 3 Status: Y v$1z urE Seismiic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)
EqupipmentIDNo. QIE116OOI8 Equip Class: 6 Equipnent Description RHR PUMP
.18.
Interaction Effects-
- 7. Are softtargets free from:impact by nearby equipmentor structures?
- 8. kre overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling.liles and lighting, and masonry block walls not likely to collapse. onto the equipment?
- 9. Do attached lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage?
- 10. Based onfthe above seismic interaction evaluations, is equipment free of potentiall'advere sdismic interaction effects?
Y/NEJ ULF] NVAEn Y
iOUL0 NWACII Y /Nl EJ IN T/A0
'ZNE JUE3 Other&Adverse Conditions j
I Il Have'You looked for and found nc other seismic conditiouis that could adversely :affect the safety functions of the equipment?
Comhients (Additiofial pagesrty be ea'dded, asnecessary)
A/oL Evaluated by:
(V0 Date:
z ZZ.: zoiZ fl 12 Page 35 of 561
9 ACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION.010
-z Page 36 of 561
ATTACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 11 ý1 -rs;"
Sheet~o Status: Y 14 NO UDl Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)
Equipment ID No.
Q21E13PT0952 Equip. Class' 18 Equipment Description CrMT PRESSURE PROTECTION TRANSMITTER Location': Bldg. AUXILIARY FloorEI, 121 Rooi, Area Manufactiurer, Model, Etc. (op'tidnal but recommended)
Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklist may be used to document the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of 4qUiperint on the SWPEL. Tle space below each of the fllowing questions may be used to record the results ofjudgmentsý and findings. Additional'space is'provided at the.ýnd of this checklist for documenti ng other commen nts.
Anchorage
- 1..Is the anchorage configuration verification required (i.e., is the-item one of the 50%* of SWEL items requiring such ve.rification)?
YO NS~/
- 2. Isthe anchorage free of bent; broken,.missing or loose hardware?
- 3. Is the anchorage free of corrosion that, is more than mild surface.
oxidation?
YVNDNO UD N/AD1 Y4ND UD N/AD-
- 4. Is the anchoragefree of visible cracks-in the concrete nearthe anchors?
Y[f NO UD N/AD
- 5. Is the anchorage configuration consistent withkplant documentation?
(Note: This quelstion. oniy applies if the itemis one of the -50% for which an anchorage configuration.verificaiion~is required.)
- 6. Based on the.above anchorage evaliations, is the anchorage.free of potentially'adycrse seismic conditions?
YO NM. UD] NiAR/
YR"/NDý UD-
'Enteif the equipimentrclass narnelroinAppen Idix B.Classes 6f'Equipinent.
Page 37 of 561
ATTACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 Sheet 2.OfyZ 'O Status: Yiý Ni :E] u[] ifft Seismic Walkdown *Checklist (SWC)
Equipment ID No. Q1E13PT0952
.Equip.
Class' 18
. qu-pment Description CTMTPRESSURE PROTECTION TRANSMITTER:
I teiraction Effects 7, Are soft targets free from impact by nearby equipmeht'or structures?
- 8. Are. overhead equipment, distribution systt:ms, ceiling tilesand lighting, and mhasonry block walls ýnot likely to collapse onto.the equipment?
- 9. Do attached lines have adeqtiate flexibility to6 tvoid damage?
- 10. Based on the:above seismic interaction.evalhations, is:equipment free of potentially adverse seismic iiteraction effects'?
YZ'Nrl UEJ N/Af' Y/N11 UE1 WAD Y/1:UEJ N/AM xca4oD UD:
Other Adverse Conditions
- 11. Have you oloked for and found no other seismic conditions that coud, adversely affec:t the safetyZ functions of the equipmeit,?
YceI/< 2L liD Comments'(Addhional pages may be addedas necesslry)
Evaluated by:
Date:.
ý?MYA q-Vol-Page 38 of 561
ATTACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 0ý-16 She t of Status; NON Uv Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)
Equipment ID No. QIE16HOOIA Equip. Class' 10 Equipment Description CHGHHSI PUMP ROOM COOLER lA (TRAIN A)
Location: Bldg. AUXILIARY Floor El. 100 Room, Area
__\\_
Manufacturer, Model, Etc. (optional but recommended)
Instructions' for Completing Checklist This checklist may be used:to document the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of equipment on the SWEL. The space below each of the. following questions may be used to record the results of judgments and findings. Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.
Auchorane I. Is the anchorage configuration verification required (i.e., is the item one Y
N/--
of the 50% of SWEL items requiring such verification)? Nl O 2, Is the anchorage free of bent, broken, missing or.loose hardware?
- 3. Is the anch6rage free of corrosion that is more thanmild surface oxidation?
- 4. ls'the anchorage free of\\visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors?
- 5. Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation?
(Note:, This-question only applies if the item is one of the 50% for which an anchorage cvtflgurafion yerfication is required.)
- 6. Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is the anchorage free of poienially adverse seismic conditions?
YW NC] U7 N/AC Y NCI UC N/AC YjE'NC UC N/AC-1 YEC NC uE] N/AU/
'y N] UC
'.Enter the equipment class name,rom Appeendix 13: Classes of Equipmeni, Page 39 of 561
ATTACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 Sheet 2 of Status: vlDN" Seismic.Walkdown ChecklisJ (SWC)
Equipment ID No, Q1E16HOOA Equip. Class', 10 EquipmentDescription CHG/HHSI. PUMP ROOM COOLER 1A (TRAIN A):
interaction. Effects 7T Aý:e soft targets free from impact by neairbly equipment or structures?
- 8. AYrkeoverhead equipment, distibution systems, ceiling tiles and lighting;,
and masomnr block walls not likely to colapse nto the eqdiipment?
- 9. Do attac ed.lines!lave, adequate flexibility to avoid damage?
- 10. Based on the above seismic interaction'evaluations,.is equipment free of potenitially adverse seismnic interaction.:effects?
YE NE UEI N/AO Y
NTO li N/WA Yo No UD Other Adverse-Conditions-
- 11. Have you looked for and found no other seismic conditions that could
'YO/NE] U[D adversely affect the safety functions of the1equipment?
Comme6*t (Additional pages may be added as necessary)
La Page 40 of 561
ATTACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS
- i: ii NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 Sheet Status: Y2 NEI UED Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)
Equipment ID N.
QI1Ef6HOO3B Equip. CIlass,. 10.
Equipment Description RHR PUMP ROOM COOLER 1B Location: Bldg. AUXILIARY Floor.El. 83 Room, Area Manufacturer, Model, Etc. (optional but recommended) instructions for Completing Checklist his check'list may be usedto document:the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of equipmnent on: the SWEL. The space'below each of the following..questions may be used to. record the results ofjudgments and findings. Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.
Anchorage
-1. Is the anchorage configuration verification required (i e., is. the',item.one ofthe 5,0% of SWEL items requhiiig such verification)?
- 2. Is'the an*chorage free of bent, broken, missing,qr loose hardware?,
- 3. hshthe anchorage free of corrosion that is.more than rmild surface oxidation?
- 4. Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in thecdff&Pete near the anchof0
- 5. Is the anchorage configuration consisterWt.,with plant documentation?
(Note: This question only applies if the item is one of the 50% for which an anchorage configuration. verification is requ, ed)
- 6. Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is the anchorage free of potentially adverse seismic conditions?
'YV* UED N/AU.
UD N/AD Y&2"'NTM UM N/AD/
D: ND huE N/'
UDl iEnter-the equipment class naneifronii Appcndix, B: Cl(ases of Efuipien,.
Page 41 of 561
ATTACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS F1 - o' NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 Sheet: 2 OfN 5
Status: yýýNLb V, Seismic Wal.kdawn Checklist (SWC)
Equipment D. No,,. Q1EI6HOO3B Equip-Class, 10 Equipment Description-RHR PUMP ROOM COOLER 1B Interaction Effects
- 7. Are soft targets fi-ee from impact by nearby cquipmenttoi structures?
- 8. Are overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling.tiles and lighting, and masmiy block. walls natlikely to collapse onto the equipment?
- 9. Do: atached:lineshave adequate:flexibility-to avoid damage?
- 10. Based on the above seismic interactionevaluations, is: equipment free of potentidly.adverse. seisami interaction effects?
Y /1NE3 UE N/A-Y6"NEI UD NaWA L1N0 Un N/AD]
,'/No Ur Other Adverse Conditions
/
H,1 Have you looked for, and found no otherseismic conditions that could Y./N[] UD adversely affect the safety finteions of the equipment'?
Ciomments (Additional pages may belded asnrqceSsary) a...
A 11 Evaluated by
~M~L~gQ/4j~
V Date-E
ýZZ YZ, Page 42 of 561
ATTACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 r-_, -
t I Page 43 of 561
ATTACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0
/i~ I Sheet i of 3 Status: Y[P1N[
UEý]
Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)
Equipment ID No, QIE16H04B6 Eqpipý Class' 10 Equiipment Description CCW PUMP ROOM COOL ER TRAIN. B Location: Bldg. AUXILIARY Floor El, 1-00 Room, Area Manufacturer, Model, Etc. (optional but, recommended)
InStructions for Completing Checklist This checklist may be used to docurnent.the results of the Seismidc W*kdown ofan item of equipment on the SWEL. The space below each of the following questionsmay be used to record the results ofjudgments and findings. Additional spacedis provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other'comments.
Anchorage
/
- 1. Is the anchorage configuration verification required (i.e., is the iter one Y[---
of the 50% of SWEL items-requiring such verification)?
- 2. Is the anchorage free-of bent, broken, missing or lo'osehardwafe?
- 3. Is the anchorage free'.of corrosion that is more than mild surface.
oxidation?
Y960 UDI N/AD]
Y NC Ur N/AD IA4I~ p~wr e~-e~Lr~ ~
~4
- 4. Is the anchorage fbhe of visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors? Y* ý - UO WAWAr~
- 5. Is the anchorage cohfiguration consi~stent with plant documentation?
(Note: This question only applies if'the item is :one. of the 50% for which an anchorag6 cpnfiguration verification is required.)
- 6. Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is the anchorage: free of potentially adverse seismic conditions?
YD NDI, UD N/A[lallý Ye N[0U Enter the equipment class name from Appendix B::COassesof Equipment, Page 44 of 561
ATTACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 Sheets of 3 Status: Y L UE]
Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)
Equipment ID No. Q1E16Hoo4B Equip4., lass, Equipment Description CCW,:PUMP ROOM.COOLERT R'AINB Interaction Effects-
- 7. Are soft targets: freefroimiipact byn.earby equipent or struct ires?
- 8. Are overheOd equipment, distribution systemsi ceiling tiles and lighting;
,and masonry block wallsnot likely to collapse onto.the equipment?.
- 9. Do attached linesý have adquate flexibility to avoid damage?
- 10. Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations, is eqUiPment free of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects?
Y/`OUC-NI/AC4 YJZSNC 00 N/ACT Y&6NO UE I N Other Adverse Conditions, 1). 1Have you looked for-and found no other seismic conditious that could 46 NC UC adversely affect the safet3y fýnlions of the equipment?
Comments (Additional pages may be addedlas hecegsary)
- r-.
Evaluated by-( W Date::~/
20/z-Page 45 of 561
ATTACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 Page 46 of 561
ATTACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 Sheet of 3 Status: Y, NO-Ut-i Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)
Equipment ID Nod, QIE16HOO5A Equip. Class, 10 E iipmeuet Descriptiolp AUX FEEDWA TER PUMP ROOM COOLER IA Location: Bldg. AUXILIARY Floor El. 100 Room, Area SI 9f P~V Manufacturer, Model, Etc. (optional but recommended)
Instructions for Completing Checldist This checklist may be used to document the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of equipment on, the SWEL. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record :the results ofjudgments and findings. Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.
Anchorage
- 1. Is. the anchorage configuration verification required (i e. is. the item one Y6'YNE]
of the 50% of SWEL items requiring such verification)?
0)553 V-c
- 2. Is the anchorage free of bent, broken, missing or loose.hardware?
- 3. is the anchorage free of corrosion that is more than mildsurface oxidation?
- 4. Is the arichorage free'of visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors?
Y WE,4 UE3 N/AD1 YvNE* UD N/AO Y DUD N/AD]
- 5. Is the anchorage configuration consistent with pl0ant documentation?
Yle N U[D NiAD (Note: This question. only applies if the item is one of the 50% for which an anchorage configuration verification is required.)
- 6. Based on the above anchorage evaiuationsis the anchorage free of Y'"9-<E LEr potentially adverse seismic conditions?
'Enter the equipment class name from.Appendik B: Classes of Equipment.
Page 47 of 561
ATTACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0
$Sheeý2. of 3 Status-, YFI NF~ 'Ul Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)
.Equipment ]D No. OIE16UO05A Equip, Class, 10 Equipment Description AUX FEEDWAZTER PUMP ROOM COOLER, 1A Interaction Effects
- 7. Are soft targets free from impact by nearby eqhifpment or-stiuctures?'
- 8. A'e overhead equipment, distfibutionsystems, ceiling tiles and lighting, and masonry blockxwalls not likely to collapse outo theequipment?
- 9. Do.attached lines haweadequate.flekibility to avoid damage?
- 10. Based on the above seismic interactiof evaluations, is equipment free of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects?
0'N UE! N/'A]
- Y NDIE UD N/ADl Other Adverse Conditions U.- Have youi looked for and found no other, seis'mic.conditions that could adversely affect the safety functions of the eqUipment?,
Y'vX NDUE Comments (Additional. pages may be added as necessary)
A/14-
/7 Evaluated by:.
4 L t 4 Date: 5 Page 48 of 561
ATTACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS T Il l
-ý. -
NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 Page 49 of 561
ATTACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 hrIwZ Sheet i of 3 Status: Y¥I-NiZ U[
Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC.)
Equipmrent. ID No. QIE16HOO6B Equipý Class' 10 Equiprment:IDescriptfiofi BATTERY CHARGiNG ROOM COOLERS Location: Bldg, AUXILIAR.Y Floor El. 121 Room, Area Manufacturer, Model, Etc. (optional but recommended) instructi6ns for Completing Checklist This checklist may be used to document the resuilts of the Seismic Walkdpwn ofan item 0f equitiient on the SWEL. The space below each of the following questions may'be.used.to record the results ofjidgments and findings. Additional space~is provided at the end of this checklistfor documenting oth~er cominents.,
Anchorage I-is the-anchorage configuration verifcation*tcquired (Ii.., is the item one of the 50% of SWEL itemsrequiring suchverification)?
- 2. Is the'anchorage free of bent, broken, missing or loose hliardwafe?
3ý. Is the anchorage.Tfree of corrosion that is more than mild surface oxidation?.'
- 4. Is th-a~nchorAge free6of visible cracks in the condrete neai-the anchorl?
- 5. Is the~anphofoge configuration consisltent With plant documentation?
(Note: Thisquestion only applies if the item is one of the 50% for which an anfchorage configurationveri*fication is requied.)
6.. Based on the above a*chorage evaldations, is:the anchor-ge freeof
,potentially adverse seismic. conditions?
YmN Y
'NL UE] N/AD fJu N/AD YO NEI. U N/AD MI ND UD
'Enter theequipmerii class na epfromn Appendix B: Classes of0Equipment.
Page 50 of 561
ATTACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 ao Sheea't 2* fu3 Statuis: Y ND uCD Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)
Equipment ID No. OEII 6HOO6B Equip..Class* ý10 EquipmeInt. Description BATTERY CHARGING ROOM COOLERS Interaction Effects
.7. Are. soft targets free from inpact by nearby equipment ir stnudt'r~s?
- 8. Are overhead equipmeinit, distribution1 systems, ceiling tiles and lighting, and masoniy block wals* not likely It collapse onto theequippment?
- 9. Do-attached lines have adequate flexibility tolav6id daimage?
- 10. Based on the aboe, seismic interaction evaluations; is equipment-free of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects?
Yp l<iE] UMN/AM I
NE] CUE] N/AC Yek4C CE]1 N/-ACE Yz?1NM um Other Adverse Con ditions:
- 11. Haveyou Iooked for and found no other seismiceconditions that could adversely affect the safety functions of the equipment?
'Y2ONTh CE]
IComments (Additional pagps may be added as necessary)
A Evaluateidby:.
If A/J4,:,k bate:
7-:d-Page 51 of 561
wz w0*
LL 0z C-w z
ci) 03)
Mu a-L) ci-0 w
0 a
Co z
I1
ATTACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 S heet yof Status Nf/N1 ULI I/
z Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)
Equipment ID No. QIE16HOO8A Equip. Class, Equipment Descriptioh MCC. IB ROOM COOLER Location: Bldg, AUXLIARY, Floor El. 121 Room, Area.
'Z0 Manufacturer,-Model, Etc. (optional.but recommended)
Instructions for Completing Checklist This~checklistimay be used to document the results of the Seismic'Walkdown of an item of equipment on the SWEL. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results ofjudgments. and findings: Additionalispace is provided at the end of this checklist fordocumenting other comments..
Anchoraee
- 1. Is the anchorage configuration verification required (i.e., is the item one of the. 50% of SWEL items, requiring~such verification)?
YE, NO
- 2. Is the anchorage free.Of bent, broken, inissirg or loose hardwafte?
- 3. Is the aachorage free of corrosion thatis more than mnild, surface oxidation?
Ycr NEI UD NWEC Yd'NEC li N/AC
- 4. Is the anchorage free of visible~crakks in the concrete near the anchors?
Y'2<F] UO N/AC
- 5. Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation?
(Note: This question.only applies if the item is one of the 50% for which an anchorage:configuration. verification is required.)
- 6. Based on'thhe above anchorage evaliations, is theanchorage free of potentially adverse seismic conditions?
YIfNC UlE N/AC Y
NC40UD Enter ille equipment class name from Appendix B-Classes of Equipment.
Page 53 of 561
ATTACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 Sheet 2 of Status: YJ-ZNL] UV21l Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)
Equipment IDN:o, QEI16HOO8A Equip. Classi 1l_0_
Equipment Descriptiopn MCC 1B8ROOM COOLER Interaction Effects
- 7. Are soft targets free from impact by nearby cqdipmentorstructuresi
- 8. Are oVerhead :equipmnenit distributi0n.systenis cei1ing tiles and lighting, and masonry block walls noi,.likel yto collapse onto the equipment?
- 9. Do attached lineshave adeudate flexibility. to avoid dnmage?
- 10. :Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations, is~cquipment flce of potentially adverse seismicý interaction effects?
Other Adverse Conditions
- 11. Have you.looked for and found no otlh,&
sismicconditions: that. could adversely affect, te safety functions of.the equipment?
Y2/NF O UDAF UiJ N/Al]
Y6 NO Uf N/AO Y&6-NO U0, YIZ/
oUC Comments (Addifichal pages may be added as necdssary)
-T
~$
~
U~A-~
y c~A
\\A Q~t~"4 Evaluated by:
Date:
Page 54 of 561
9 ATTACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION.010 Page 55 of 561
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9 ACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION ql
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