ML25091A046
| ML25091A046 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 03/27/2025 |
| From: | NRC/OCIO |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML25091A043 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-2025-000406 | |
| Download: ML25091A046 (55) | |
Text
IssueId 29177 29179 29217 29223 29224 29225 29267 29271 29287 29293 29352 29380 29406 29428 29445 29446 29449 29465 29466 29474 29508 29524 29550 29551 29552 29564 29566 29575 29581 29583 29605 29640 29658 29659 29660 29674 29680 29683 29707 29710 29716 29731 29777 29778 29782 29783 29794 29797 29800
29815 29823 29855 29931 29932 29934 29994 30006 30020 30025 30026 30028 30029 30033 30036 30076 30139 30161 30163 30175 30189 30213 30243 30291 30293 30295 30329 30375 30422 30474 30480 30518 30559 30563 30632 30637 30681 30694 30699 30714 30723 30772 30806 30842 30916 30920 30965 30979 30992 31011
31030 31076 31132 31175 31179 31208 31239 31294 31332 31336 31367 31397 31436 31643 31653 31729 31767 31913 31914 31924
Title LER 2021-001-00 for Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Unit 3, Reactor Scram due to Main Power Transfo LER 2021-002-00 for Clinton Power Station, Unit 1, Core Alteration With Source Range Monitor Inoperab LER 2022-001-00 for Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1 regarding "High Pressure Coolant Injecti INADVERTENT SIREN ACTUATIONS INADVERTENT SIREN ACTUATION INADVERTENT SIREN ACTUATION LER 2021-002-01 for Clinton Power Station, Unit 1, Core Alterations With Source Range Monitor Inopera DEGRADATION OF TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER PART 21 REPORT - TEMPERATURE TRANSMITTER FAILURES FITNESS-FOR-DUTY REPORT - CONTRACT SUPERVISOR FAILED FITNESS-FOR-DUTY TEST PART 21 - WESTINGHOUSE ACTUATOR FULL VOLTAGE REVERSING CONTACTORS DEFICENCY R ULTRASONIC EXAMINATION RESULTS - REACTOR VESSEL HEAD PENETRATION EN Revision Imported Date: 5/2/2022 EN Revision Text: ULTRASONIC EXAMINATION RESULTS - REA Update - BOTH TRAINS OF LOW PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION (LPCI) INOP LER 2022-001-00 for Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Unit 2, Electromatic Relief Valve 3B Did Not Ac BOTH TRAINS OF CONTROL ROOM AREA FILTRATION SYSTEM AND AREA VENTILATION AIR CO BOTH TRAINS OF CONTROL ROOM AREA VENTILATION AIR CONDITIONING SYSTEM INOPERABL LER 2022-001-00 for LaSalle County Station, Unit 1, Turbine Stop Valve Limit Switch Failure due to Lubr LER 2022-002-00 for LaSalle County Station, Unit 2, Turbine Stop Valve Limit Switch Failure due to Lubr INADVERTENT SIREN ACTIVATION LER 2021-001-01 for Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Unit 3, Reactor Scram due to Main Power Transfo LER 2022-001-00 for Byron Station, Unit 2, Volumetric Examinations of Reactor Pressure Vessel Head C Failure of Flowserve Solenoid Coil REACTOR MANUAL SCRAM DUE TO LOWERING REACTOR WATER LEVEL BOTH TRAINS OF STANDBY GAS TREATMENT INOPERABLE LER 2022-002 Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1, Low Pressure Coolant Injection Manually AUTOMATIC REACTOR SCRAM DUE TO TURBINE TRIP ON HIGH REACTOR WATER LEVEL FITNESS-FOR-DUTY REPORT Update - PART 21 REPORT - POTENTIAL PREMATURE FAILURES OF VALCOR COIL SHELL ASSEMB LER 2022-003-00 for LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2, Main Control Room and Auxiliary Electric Ro RHR CAPABILITY LOST DUE TO SUCTION BAY LEVEL ALCOHOL DISCOVERED WITHIN THE PROTECTED AREA LER 2021-001-01 for Byron Station, Unit 1, Pressurizer Safety Valves As-Found Lift Pressure Outside of LER 2022-003-00 for Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1 and 2, Both Trains of Standby Gas Treat LER 2022-002-00 for Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Unit 2, Manual Scram Due To Feedwater Regu LER 2022-003-00 for Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1 and 2, Both Trains of Standby Gas Treat LER 2022-001-00 for Byron Station, Units 1 and 2, OB Control Room Ventilation Supply Fan Failed to Sta LER 2022-001-00 for Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Unit 2, Reactor Scram due to Turbine Trip on High LER 2022-003-01 for LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2, Main Control Room and Auxiliary Electric Ro MANUAL REACTOR TRIP DUE TO REPORTED FIRE ON ISOPHASE BUS DUCT LER 2022-002-00 for Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Unit 2 and 3, Ultimate Heat Sink Declared Inopera Update - CONTROL ROD DRIVE MECHANISM (CRDM) PENETRATION DEGRADED PART 21 - BOLTS PROVIDED WITHOUT ZINC PLATING SOLA / HEVI-DUTY UNINTERRUPTIBLE POWER SUPPLY OUT-OF-SPECIFICATION LER 2022-002-01 for Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3, Ultimate Heat Sink Declared Inoper LER 2022-001-01 for Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Unit 2, Reactor Scram due to Turbine Trip on High LER 2021-002-02 for Clinton Power Station, Unit 1, Core Alterations With Source Range Monitor Inopera BOTH TRAINS OF CONTROL ROOM AREA VENTILATION AIR CONDITIONING SYSTEM INOPERABL MANUAL SCRAM DUE TO RISING WATER LEVEL
FLOWSERVE SOLENOID VALVE DEFICIENCY REPORT LER 2022-003-00 for LaSalle County Station, Unit 2, Manual Scram due to lsophase Bus Duct Fire and 2 LER 2022-001-00 for Braidwood Station, Unit 1, Liquid Penetrant Indications in Control Rod Drive Mecha LER 2022-003-02 for LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2, Supplement to Main Control Room and Auxi LER 2022-004-00 for LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2, Both Trains of Main Control Room and Auxil LER 022-003-00 for Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Unit 2, Manual Scram Due to Feedwater Regula AUTOMATIC SCRAM DUE TO TURBINE TRIP Update - LOSS OF COMMUNICATIONS AND ASSESSMENT CAPABILITIES LER 22-003-01 for LaSalle County Station, Unit 2, Manual Scram due to lsophase Bus Duct Fire followed LOSS OF COMMUNICATIONS AND ASSESSMENT CAPABILITIES LOSS OF COMMUNICATIONS AND ASSESSMENT CAPABILITIES LOSS OF COMMUNICATIONS AND ASSESSMENT CAPABILITIES LOSS OF COMMUNICATIONS AND ASSESSMENT CAPABILITIES LOSS OF COMMUNICATIONS AND ASSESSMENT CAPABILITIES LOSS OF COMMUNICATIONS AND ASSESSMENT CAPABILITIES AUTOMATIC ACTUATION OF REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM (RPS)
LER 23-001-00 for Clinton Power Station, Unit 1, Grid Fault Results in Switchyard Breaker Trips and Rea SINGLE TRAIN OF LOW PRESSURE CORE SPRAY INOPERABLE LER 2023-001-00 for LaSalle County Station, Unit 2 - Standby Liquid Control Valve Inoperable due to Fai LER 2023-002-00 for LaSalle County Station, Units 1 & 2, Air Circuit Breaker (ACB) Mechanically Operat LER 2023-003-00 for LaSalle County Station, Unit 2, Automatic Actuation of Reactor Protection System (
LER 2023-001-00 for Byron Station, Units 1 and 2, 0A Control Room Ventilation Inoperable due to Jumpe LER 2021-002-02 for LaSalle County Station, Unit 2, Supplement to Reactor Protection System Half Scra FITNESS-FOR-DUTY REPORT LER 2023-001-00 for LaSalle County Station, Unit 1, Low Pressure Core Spray Inoperable due to Minimu LER 2022-003-02 for LaSalle County Station, Unit 2, Manual Scram due to lsophase Bus Duct Fire Follow OFFSITE NOTIFICATION LER 2023-001-00 for Byron Station, Units 1 and 2, 0A Control Room Ventilation Inoperable due to Jumpe AUTOMATIC REACTOR SCRAM LOSS OF EMERGENCY ASSESSMENT CAPABILITY LER 2022-001-01 for Byron Station, Unit 2, Volumetric Examinations of Reactor Pressure Vessel Head C OFFSITE NOTIFICATION LER 2023-001-01 for Byron Station, Units 1 and 2, 0A Control Room Ventilation Inoperable Due to Jumpe LER 2023-001-00 for Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Unit 2, Turbine Trip and Automatic Reactor Scr FITNESS FOR DUTY REPORT Retraction - HPCI DECLARED INOPERABLE LER 2023-002-00 for LaSalle County Station, Unit 1, Turbine Stop Valve Limit Switch Failure due to Lubr LER 2023-001-00 for Braidwood Station, Unit 2, Train B Auxiliary Feedwater Pump was inoperable due to LER 2023-001-01 for Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Unit 2, Turbine Trip and Automatic Reactor Scr Update - INITIAL PART 21 REPORT - DEFICIENT FUEL INJECTORS Update - PART 21 REPORT - DEFECT IN VALCOR SOLENOID VALVES LER 2023-001-00 for Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Unit 2, HPCI Inoperable Due to Air Void Accumula FITNESS FOR DUTY VIOLATION LER 2023-002-00 for Clinton Power Station, Unit 1, Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System Inoperable Pr Update - FITNESS FOR DUTY AUTOMATIC ACTUATION OF REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM AUTOMATIC ACTUATION OF EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS LER 2024-001-00 for LaSalle County Station, Unit 1, Core Operating Limits Report Thermal Limits Excee Update - AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP DUE TO LOWERING STEAM GENERATOR WATER LEVEL LER 2024-001-00 for Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Unit 2, Automatic Actuation of Reactor Protectio
LER 2024-002-00 for LaSalle County Station Unit 1, Reactor Protection System Half Scram due to Motor AUTOMATIC SCRAM DUE TO TURBINE TRIP SIGNAL LER 2024-004-00 for LaSalle County Station, Unit 1, Emergency Diesel Generator Auto-Start and Load d LER 2024-001-00 for Braidwood Station, Unit 1, Trip on Low Steam Generator Level Ddue to Failure to V BOTH TRAINS OF CONTROL ROOM VENTILATION TEMPERATURE CONTROL SYSTEM INOPERAB LER 2024-002-00 for Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Unit 2, Turbine Trip and Automatic Scram due t LER 2024-003-01 for LaSalle County Station, Unit 1, Supplement to Technical Specification (TS) Limiting LER 2024-004-01 for LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2, Emergency Diesel Generator Auto-Start and Update - PART 21 - STRESS CORROSION CRACKING IN CONTROL ROD BLADES LER 2024-001-00 for Byron Station, Unit 1, Both Trains of Control Room Ventilation Temperature Control Update - DEGRADED REACTOR VESSEL CLOSURE HEAD PENETRATION LER 2023-002-01 for Clinton Power Station, Unit 1, Reactor Core Isolation Cooling Inoperable Prior to Mo LER 2023-002-01, LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2, Air Circuit Breaker (ACB) Mechanically Operate LER 2024-002-01 for Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Unit 2, Turbine Trip and Automatic Scram due t LER 2024-002-00 for Byron Station, Unit 1, Reactor Vessel Closure Head Penetration 31 Degraded LER 2023-002-01, LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2, Air Circuit Breaker (ACB) Mechanically Operate FITNESS FOR DUTY LER 2024-001-00 for Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1, Technical Specification 3.5.2 Action Not LER 2024-002-00 for Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Unit 3, Low Pressure Coolant Injection Pump Suct CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY VENTILATION AIR CONDITIONING SYSTEM INOPERABLE
Dockets Regions Sources DateCreateLastUpdateDateScree PNNumberIRSReport Componen Dresden 3 Region 3 LER 1/12/2022 1/13/2022 1/13/2022 Clinton Region 3 LER 1/12/2022 1/13/2022 1/13/2022 Quad CitiesRegion 3 LER 1/28/2022 2/1/2022 2/1/2022 Dresden 3,Region 3 EN 2/2/2022 2/3/2022 2/3/2022 Braidwood Region 3 EN 2/2/2022 2/3/2022 2/3/2022 LaSalle 1, Region 3 EN 2/2/2022 2/3/2022 2/3/2022 Clinton Region 3 LER 3/5/2022 3/7/2022 3/7/2022 Byron 1, ByRegion 3 EN 3/7/2022 3/7/2022 3/7/2022 Prairie Isla Region 2, REN, Part 213/14/2022 3/30/2022 3/17/2022 LaSalle 1, Region 3 EN 3/15/2022 3/17/2022 3/17/2022 LaSalle 1, Region 3 EN, Part 214/12/2022 5/26/2022 4/14/2022 Byron 2 Region 3 EN 4/25/2022 4/28/2022 4/28/2022 Byron 2 Region 3 EN 5/2/2022 5/2/2022 5/2/2022 Quad CitiesRegion 3 EN 5/11/2022 5/12/2022 5/12/2022 Quad CitiesRegion 3 LER 5/21/2022 5/23/2022 5/23/2022 LaSalle 1, Region 3 EN, Region5/23/2022 5/23/2022 5/23/2022 LaSalle 1, Region 3 EN, Region5/24/2022 5/26/2022 5/26/2022 LaSalle 1 Region 3 LER 5/28/2022 5/31/2022 5/31/2022 LaSalle 2 Region 3 LER 5/28/2022 5/31/2022 5/31/2022 Quad CitiesRegion 3 EN 6/2/2022 6/2/2022 6/2/2022 Dresden 3 Region 3 LER 6/15/2022 6/16/2022 6/16/2022 Byron 2 Region 3 LER 6/23/2022 6/27/2022 6/27/2022 Comanche Region 1, REN, Part 21 7/5/2022 8/9/2022 7/5/2022 Quad CitiesRegion 3 EN 7/5/2022 7/5/2022 7/5/2022 Quad CitiesRegion 3 EN 7/5/2022 7/5/2022 7/5/2022 Quad CitiesRegion 3 LER 7/9/2022 7/11/2022 7/11/2022 Dresden 2 Region 3 EN, Region7/13/2022 7/14/2022 7/14/2022 Braidwood Region 3 EN 7/18/2022 7/18/2022 7/18/2022 Catawba 1 Region 1, REN, Part 217/19/2022 9/28/2022 9/13/2022 LaSalle 1, Region 3 LER 7/19/2022 7/21/2022 7/21/2022 Dresden 3,Region 3 EN, Region 8/1/2022 8/1/2022 8/1/2022 Braidwood Region 3 EN 8/22/2022 8/22/2022 8/22/2022 Byron 1 Region 3 LER 9/2/2022 9/6/2022 9/6/2022 Quad CitiesRegion 3 LER 9/2/2022 9/6/2022 9/6/2022 Quad CitiesRegion 3 LER 9/3/2022 9/6/2022 9/6/2022 Quad CitiesRegion 3 LER 9/8/2022 9/13/2022 9/13/2022 Byron 1, ByRegion 3 LER 9/12/2022 9/13/2022 9/13/2022 Dresden 2 Region 3 LER 9/13/2022 9/15/2022 9/15/2022 LaSalle 1, Region 3 LER 9/24/2022 9/26/2022 9/26/2022 LaSalle 2 Region 3 EN 9/27/2022 9/29/2022 9/29/2022 Dresden 3,Region 3 LER 9/29/2022 10/3/2022 10/3/2022 Braidwood Region 3 EN Dresden 3,Region 3 EN 11/2/2022 11/3/2022 11/3/2022 Clinton Region 3 EN 11/2/2022 11/3/2022 11/3/2022 Dresden 3,Region 3 LER 11/2/2022 11/3/2022 11/3/2022 Dresden 2 Region 3 LER 11/2/2022 11/3/2022 11/3/2022 Clinton Region 3 LER 11/5/2022 11/7/2022 11/7/2022 LaSalle 1, Region 3 EN 11/7/2022 11/7/2022 11/7/2022 Quad CitiesRegion 3 EN 11/7/2022 11/7/2022 11/7/2022
Braidwood Region 1, REN LaSalle 2 Region 3 LER Braidwood Region 3 LER 12/1/2022 12/5/2022 12/5/2022 LaSalle 1, Region 3 LER 1/3/2023 1/3/2023 LaSalle 1, Region 3 LER 1/3/2023 1/3/2023 Quad CitiesRegion 3 LER 1/3/2023 1/3/2023 Clinton Region 3 EN 2/2/2023 2/2/2023 2/2/2023 Dresden 3,Region 1, REN 2/7/2023 2/16/2023 2/16/2023 LaSalle 2 Region 3 LER 2/10/2023 2/13/2023 2/13/2023 Braidwood Region 3 EN 2/15/2023 2/16/2023 2/16/2023 Byron 1, ByRegion 3 EN 2/15/2023 2/16/2023 2/16/2023 Clinton Region 3 EN 2/15/2023 2/16/2023 2/16/2023 Quad CitiesRegion 3 EN 2/15/2023 2/16/2023 2/16/2023 Dresden 3,Region 3 EN 2/15/2023 2/16/2023 2/16/2023 LaSalle 1, Region 3 EN 2/15/2023 2/16/2023 2/16/2023 LaSalle 2 Region 3 EN 3/6/2023 3/6/2023 3/6/2023 Clinton Region 3 LER 4/5/2023 4/6/2023 4/6/2023 LaSalle 1 Region 3 EN 4/18/2023 4/20/2023 4/20/2023 LaSalle 2 Region 3 LER 4/18/2023 4/20/2023 4/20/2023 LaSalle 1, Region 3 LER 4/26/2023 4/27/2023 4/27/2023 LaSalle 2 Region 3 LER 5/3/2023 5/4/2023 5/4/2023 Byron 1, ByRegion 3 LER 5/16/2023 5/18/2023 5/18/2023 LaSalle 2 Region 3 LER 5/26/2023 6/1/2023 6/1/2023 Byron 1, ByRegion 3 EN 6/16/2023 6/20/2023 6/20/2023 LaSalle 1 Region 3 LER 6/17/2023 6/20/2023 6/20/2023 LaSalle 2 Region 3 LER 6/17/2023 6/20/2023 6/20/2023 Quad CitiesRegion 3 EN 7/5/2023 7/6/2023 7/6/2023 Byron 1, ByRegion 3 LER 7/18/2023 7/20/2023 7/20/2023 Quad CitiesRegion 3 EN 8/14/2023 8/14/2023 8/14/2023 Byron 1, ByRegion 3 EN 8/28/2023 8/28/2023 8/28/2023 Byron 2 Region 3 LER 9/1/2023 9/5/2023 9/5/2023 Clinton Region 3 EN 9/20/2023 9/25/2023 9/25/2023 Byron 1 Region 3 LER Quad CitiesRegion 3 LER Quad CitiesRegion 3 EN Dresden 2 Region 3 EN 4/8/2024 4/8/2024 LaSalle 1 Region 3 LER Braidwood Region 3 LER Quad CitiesRegion 3 LER Braidwood Region 3 EN
- 1/18/2024 1/18/2024 LaSalle 1, Region 3 EN 1/2/2024 1/2/2024 Dresden 2 Region 3 LER 1/20/2024 1/22/2024 1/22/2024 Quad CitiesRegion 3 EN 2/9/2024 2/12/2024 2/12/2024 Clinton Region 3 LER 2/22/2024 2/26/2024 2/26/2024 Clinton Region 3 EN 3/26/2024 3/28/2024 3/28/2024 Quad CitiesRegion 3 EN 3/29/2024 4/1/2024 4/1/2024 LaSalle 1 Region 3 EN 4/22/2024 4/22/2024 4/22/2024 LaSalle 1 Region 3 LER 4/27/2024 4/29/2024 4/29/2024 Braidwood Region 3 EN 5/6/2024 7/8/2024 7/8/2024 Quad CitiesRegion 3 LER 5/11/2024 5/13/2024 5/13/2024
LaSalle 1 Region 3 LER 5/18/2024 5/20/2024 5/20/2024 Quad CitiesRegion 3 EN 5/28/2024 5/28/2024 5/28/2024 LaSalle 1 Region 3 LER 6/21/2024 6/24/2024 6/24/2024 Braidwood Region 3 LER 7/6/2024 7/8/2024 7/8/2024 Byron 1, ByRegion 3 EN 7/8/2024 7/8/2024 7/8/2024 Quad CitiesRegion 3 LER 7/23/2024 7/25/2024 7/25/2024 LaSalle 1 Region 3 LER 8/1/2024 8/5/2024 8/5/2024 LaSalle 1, Region 3 LER 8/23/2024 8/26/2024 8/26/2024 Hatch 1, HaRegion 1, REN 9/5/2024 9/9/2024 9/9/2024 Byron 1 Region 3 LER 9/6/2024 9/9/2024 9/9/2024 Byron 1 Region 3 EN 9/16/2024 9/19/2024 9/19/2024 Clinton Region 3 LER 9/27/2024 9/30/2024 9/30/2024 LaSalle 1, Region 3 LER Quad CitiesRegion 3 LER 11/1/2024 11/4/2024 11/4/2024 Byron 1 Region 3 LER 11/9/2024 ######## ########
LaSalle 1, Region 3 LER Dresden 3,Region 3 EN 1/17/2025 1/23/2025 1/23/2025 Quad CitiesRegion 3 LER 1/22/2025 1/23/2025 1/23/2025 Dresden 3 Region 3 LER 1/23/2025 1/27/2025 1/27/2025 Quad CitiesRegion 3 EN 1/27/2025 1/27/2025 1/27/2025
Systems CommGrouTRGs DispositionINPODoc OtherDocu LEREventDLERSubmi LERIssued Electrical PSent to TRG Reactor SySent to TRG, Consider for IRS 10/3/2021 12/1/2021 I&C, QA/VESent to TRG 12/1/2021 1/26/2022 EP Sent to TRG, INES Level 0 EP Sent to TRG, INES Level 0 EP Sent to TRG, INES Level 0 FUELS, OPSent to TRG 10/3/2021 2/24/2022 EP, HVAC/INES Level 0, Sent to TRG I&C, OpE CINES Level 0, Sent to TRG FFD, PHYSSent to TRG, INES Not Applicable QA/VENDOINES Level 0, Sent to TRG PRI MATL/Sent to TRG, INES Level 0 PRI MATL/Sent to TRG, INES Level 0 ECCS, PU INES Level 0, Sent to TRG HUMAN PESent to TRG 3/21/2022 5/20/2022 HVAC/DOSINES Level 0, Sent to TRG HVAC/DOSSent to TRG, INES Level 0 PUMP & VASent to TRG 2/4/2022 5/27/2022 I&C, PUMPSent to TRG 3/4/2021 5/27/2022 EP INES Level 0, Sent to TRG Electrical PSent to TRG, Consider for IRS
- 6/14/2022 RCS Reactor SySent to TRG 4/23/2022 6/22/2022 QA/VENDOINES Level 0, Sent to TRG Scram TrenINES Level 0, Sent to TRG HVAC/DOSINES Level 0, Sent to TRG PUMP & VASent to TRG 5/10/2022 7/8/2022 PUMP & VAINES Level 0, Sent to TRG PHYS SECSent to TRG, INES Level 0 QA/VENDOINES Level 0, Sent to TRG HVAC/DOSSent to TRG, Consider for IRS 5/20/2022 7/18/2022 SERVICE WATER SERVICE WINES Level 0, Sent to TRG, Consider for IRS FFD, PHYSSent to TRG, INES Not Applicable PUMP & VASent to TRG 9/19/2021 8/31/2022 OTHER, HVSent to TRG 7/4/2022 9/1/2022 Scram TrenSent to TRG 7/4/2022 9/1/2022 HVAC/DOSSent to TRG 7/4/2022 9/1/2022 PUMP & VASent to TRG 7/12/2022 9/9/2022 PUMP & VASent to TRG 7/12/2022 9/9/2022 HUMAN PESent to TRG 5/20/2022 9/23/2022 AC POWER Electrical PINES Level 0, Sent to TRG OTHER, S Sent to TRG 7/29/2022 9/27/2022 CRD, RCS PRI MATL/Sent to TRG, INES Level 0 INES Level 0, Info Only INES Level 0, Info Only SERVICE WINES Not Applicable, Sent to TRG7/29/2022 ########
QA/VENDOSent to TRG 7/12/2022 ########
FUELS, HUSent to TRG 10/3/2021 11/1/2022 HVAC/DOSSent to TRG, INES Level 0 PUMP & VAINES Level 0, Sent to TRG
Info Only Electrical PSent to TRG 9/26/2022 ########
PRI MATL/Sent to TRG 10/7/2022 ########
HVAC/DOSSent to TRG, Consider for IRS 5/20/2022 ########
HVAC/DOSSent to TRG, Consider for IRS 11/4/2022 ########
PUMP & VASent to TRG, Consider for IRS 11/4/2022 ########
Electrical PINES Level 0, Sent to TRG EP Sent to TRG, INES Not Applicable Electrical PSent to TRG 9/26/2022 2/9/2023 Info Only Info Only Info Only Info Only Info Only Info Only Scram TrenINES Level 0, Sent to TRG Scram TrenSent to TRG 1/31/2023 3/31/2023 ECCS INES Level 0, Sent to TRG Electrical PSent to TRG 2/17/2023 4/17/2023 Electrical PSent to TRG 2/24/2023 4/25/2023 Scram TrenSent to TRG 3/4/2023 5/2/2023 HUMAN PESent to TRG 3/16/2023 5/15/2023 PUMP & VASent to TRG 5/31/2021 5/25/2023 FFD, PHYSSent to TRG, INES Not Applicable ECCS, PU Sent to TRG 4/17/2023 6/16/2023 Electrical PSent to TRG 9/26/2022 6/16/2023 HEALTH PSent to TRG, INES Not Applicable HUMAN PESent to TRG 3/16/2023 5/15/2023 Scram TrenINES Level 0, Sent to TRG EP INES Level 0, Sent to TRG PRI MATL/Sent to TRG 4/23/2022 8/31/2023 Info Only, INES Not Applicable HUMAN PESent to TRG 3/16/2024 ########
Scram TrenSent to TRG 8/11/2023 ########
PHYS SECSent to TRG, INES Not Applicable ECCS Sent to TRG, INES Level 0 I&C, PUMPSent to TRG
Scram TrenSent to TRG 8/11/2023 ########
INES Level 0, Info Only Info Only, INES Level 0 ECCS Sent to TRG
I&C, Electr Sent to TRG 3/25/2024 5/17/2024 Reactor SySent to TRG, INES Level 0 Electrical PSent to TRG EN 57083 4/20/2024 6/19/2024 Scram TrenSent to TRG 5/5/2024 7/3/2024 HVAC/DOSSent to TRG, INES Level 0 Reactor SySent to TRG 5/23/2024 7/22/2024 PUMP & VASent to TRG 4/9/2024 7/31/2024 I&C, Electr Sent to TRG 4/20/2024 8/22/2024 Info Only, INES Level 0 HVAC/DOSSent to TRG 7/7/2024 9/5/2024 PRI MATL/INES Level 0, Sent to TRG PUMP & VASent to TRG
Reactor SySent to TRG 9/13/2024 11/7/2024 Electrical PSent to TRG 2/24/2023 10/9/2024 FFD, PHYSSent to TRG, INES Not Applicable HUMAN PESent to TRG
- 1/21/2025 PUMP & VASent to TRG
- 1/21/2025 HVAC/DOSINES Level 0, Sent to TRG
LERNumbeLERRevisioLERDescri LERCommPart21NumPart21Rep Part21Rep Part21EvenPart21Pub 2021-001-0 0
2021-002-0 0
2022-001-0 0
2021-002-0 1
2 3/9/2022 1/12/2022 4/4/2022 7
4/11/2022 4/6/2022 5/27/2022 2022-001-0 0
2022-001-0 0
2022-002-0 0
2021-001-0 1
2022-001-0 0
10 7/1/2022 2/2/2022 8/12/2022 2022-002-0 0
12 9/12/2022 5/19/2022 9/29/2022 2022-003-0 0
2021-001-0 1
2022-003-0 0
2022-002-0 0
2022-003-0 0
2022-001-0 0
2022-001-0 0
2022-003-0 1
2022-002-0 0
2022-002-0 1
2022-001-0 1
2021-002-0 2
2022-003-0 0
2022-001-0 0
2022-003-0 2
2022-004-0 0
022-003-00 0
22-003-01 1
23-001-00 0
2023-001-0 0
2023-002-0 0
2023-003-0 0
2023-001-0 0
2021-002-0 2
2023-001-0 0
2022-003-0 2
2023-001-0 0
2022-001-0 1
2023-001-0 1
2023-001-0 0
2023-002-0 0
2023-001-0 0
2023-001-0 1
2023-001-0 0
2023-002-0 0
2024-001-0 0
2024-001-0 0
2024-002-0 0
2024-004-0 0
2024-001-0 0
2024-002-0 0
2024-003-0 1
2024-004-0 1
2024-001-0 0
2023-002-0 1
2023-001-0 1
2024-002-0 1
2024-002-0 0
2023-002-0 1
2024-001-0 0
2024-002-0 0
Part21AccePart21DescENEventDaENSubmitt ENNumberENEventDe 2/1/2022 2/1/2022 55721 Power Rea 2/1/2022 2/1/2022 55722 Power Rea 2/1/2022 2/1/2022 55723 Power Rea 3/5/2022 3/6/2022 55769 Power Rea ML22087A
<img src=" 3/14/2022 3/14/2022 55788 Power Rea ML22140A
PART 2 4/6/2022 4/11/2022 55836 Part 21 4/23/2022 4/23/2022 55856 Power Rea 4/23/2022 4/23/2022 55857 Power Rea 5/10/2022 5/10/2022 55891 Power Rea 5/20/2022 5/20/2022 55905 Power Rea 5/23/2022 5/23/2022 55908 Power Rea 6/1/2022 6/1/2022 55922 Power Rea
Emaile 2/2/2022 7/1/2022 55974 Part 21 7/4/2022 7/4/2022 55975 Power Rea 7/4/2022 7/4/2022 55976 Power Rea 7/12/2022 7/12/2022 55988 Power Rea 7/15/2022 7/15/2022 55996 Power Rea ML22266A194, ML2225/19/2022 7/18/2022 55999 Part 21 7/29/2022 7/30/2022 56023 Power Rea 8/19/2022 8/20/2022 56060 Power Rea 9/26/2022 9/26/2022 56120 Power Rea 10/7/2022 10/7/2022 56153 Power Rea
- 11/1/2022 56194 Part 21
- 11/1/2022 56196 Part 21 11/4/2022 11/4/2022 56203 Power Rea 11/4/2022 11/4/2022 56210 Power Rea
9/11/2022 ######## 56219 Part 21 1/31/2023 2/1/2023 56328 Power Rea 2/6/2023 2/6/2023 56338 General Inf 2/6/2023 2/16/2023 56352 Power Rea 2/6/2023 2/6/2023 56354 Power Rea 2/6/2023 2/6/2023 56356 Power Rea 2/6/2023 2/6/2023 56357 Power Rea 2/6/2023 2/6/2023 56361 Power Rea 2/6/2023 2/6/2023 56364 Power Rea 3/4/2023 3/4/2023 56389 Power Rea 4/17/2023 4/17/2023 56471 Power Rea 6/14/2023 6/15/2023 56576 Power Rea 7/3/2023 7/3/2023 56606 Power Rea 8/11/2023 8/11/2023 56676 Power Rea 8/25/2023 8/25/2023 56698 Power Rea 9/18/2023 9/18/2023 56745 Power Rea 56865 Power Rea 56866 Power Rea 56899 Part 21 56907 Part 21 2/8/2024 2/8/2024 56954 Power Rea 3/25/2024 3/25/2024 57050 Power Rea 3/27/2024 3/28/2024 57058 Power Rea 4/20/2024 4/20/2024 57083 Power Rea 5/5/2024 5/5/2024 57107 Power Rea 5/23/2024 5/24/2024 57141 Power Rea 7/7/2024 7/7/2024 57211 Power Rea 9/4/2024 9/4/2024 57304 Part 21 9/13/2024 9/13/2024 57321 Power Rea 1/15/2025 1/16/2025 57494 Power Rea 1/26/2025 1/26/2025 57515 Power Rea ClearinghouseDescription
On October 16, 2021 at 0428 CDT, an automatic reactor protection system actuation occurred due to
On 10/3/21, with Clinton Power Station (CPS) in Mode 5 (refueling) with core alterations in progress, i
<a href="https://adamsxt.nrc.gov/navigator/AdamsXT/content/downloadContent.faces?objectStoreNa
INADVERTENT SIREN ACTUATIONS
The following information was provided b
INADVERTENT SIREN ACTUATION
The following information was provided by
INADVERTENT SIREN ACTUATION
The following information was provided by
On 10/3/21, with Clinton Power Station (CPS) in Mode 5 (refueling) with core alterations in progress, i
DEGRADATION OF TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER
The following information AAANSUhEUgAABNwAAAK9CAYAAAD/tHHVAAAgAElEQVR4nOzd7bKzKtYo0JVdff+3nPPjPem2bYUJT
FITNESS-FOR-DUTY REPORT - CONTRACT SUPERVISOR FAILED FITNESS-FOR-DUTY TEST</
PART 21 - WESTINGHOUSE ACTUATOR FULL VOLTAGE REVERSING CONTACTORS DEFICEN
ULTRASONIC EXAMINATION RESULTS - REACTOR VESSEL HEAD PENETRATION
EN Revision Imported Date: 5/2/2022
EN Revision Text: ULTRASONIC EXAMIN
EN Revision Imported Date: 5/12/2022
EN Revision Text: BOTH TRAINS OF LO
Full LER can be found at <a href="https://adamsxt.nrc.gov/navigator/AdamsXT/content/downloadCon
BOTH TRAINS OF CONTROL ROOM AREA FILTRATION SYSTEM AND AREA VENTILATION AIR
BOTH TRAINS OF CONTROL ROOM AREA VENTILATION AIR CONDITIONING SYSTEM INOPER
Abstract:
On 12/4/21 during surveillances of the turbine stop valves (TSV),
Full LER can be found at <a href="https://adamsxt.nrc.gov/navigator/AdamsXT/content/downloadCon
INADVERTENT SIREN ACTIVATION
The following information was provided by
<a href="https://adamsxt.nrc.gov/navigator/AdamsXT/content/downloadContent.faces?objectStoreNa
Byron U2 LER (2022-001-00) - <a href="https://adamsxt.nrc.gov/navigator/AdamsXT/content/downloa
PART 21 REPORT-FAILURE OF FLOWSERVE SOLENOID COIL
The following
REACTOR MANUAL SCRAM DUE TO LOWERING REACTOR WATER LEVEL
BOTH TRAINS OF STANDBY GAS TREATMENT INOPERABLE
The following i
<a href="https://adamsxt.nrc.gov/navigator/AdamsXT/content/downloadContent.faces?objectStoreNa
AUTOMATIC REACTOR SCRAM DUE TO TURBINE TRIP ON HIGH REACTOR WATER LEVEL</p
FITNESS-FOR-DUTY REPORT
The following information was provided by the li
Date Originally Screened: 7/21/2022 EN Revision Imported Date: 9/13/2022
EN
<a href="https://adamsxt.nrc.gov/navigator/AdamsXT/content/downloadContent.faces?objectStoreNa
RHR CAPABILITY LOST DUE TO SUCTION BAY LEVEL
The following informat
ALCOHOL DISCOVERED WITHIN THE PROTECTED AREA
A non-licensed, no
LER: <a href="https://adamsxt.nrc.gov/navigator/AdamsXT/content/downloadConte
LER: <a href="https://adamsxt.nrc.gov/navigator/AdamsXT/content/downloadConte
LER: <a href="https://adamsxt.nrc.gov/navigator/AdamsXT/content/downloadConte
LER: <a href="https://adamsxt.nrc.gov/navigator/AdamsXT/content/downloadConte
LER: <a href="https://adamsxt.nrc.gov/navigator/AdamsXT/content/downloadConte
LER: <a href="https://adamsxt.nrc.gov/navigator/AdamsXT/content/downloadConte
On May 20, 2022, both Units 1 and 2 were in Mode 1 and at 100% power. The B train of the Main Con
MANUAL REACTOR TRIP DUE TO REPORTED FIRE ON ISOPHASE BUS DUCT
The follow
On July 29, 2022, at 2217 CDT, Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.3, "Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS)" Limitin
Date Originally Screened: 10/11/2022 EN Revision Imported Date: 12/14/2022
E
PART 21 - BOLTS PROVIDED WITHOUT ZINC PLATING
The following informa
PART 21 REPORT - SOLA / HEVI-DUTY UNINTERRUPTIBLE POWER SUPPLY OUT-OF-SPECIFIC
LER: <a href="https://adamsxt.nrc.gov/navigator/AdamsXT/content/downloadConte
LER: <a href="https://adamsxt.nrc.gov/navigator/AdamsXT/content/downloa
LER: <a href="https://adamsxt.nrc.gov/navigator/AdamsXT/content/downloadConte
BOTH TRAINS OF CONTROL ROOM AREA VENTILATION AIR CONDITIONING SYSTEM INOPER
MANUAL SCRAM DUE TO RISING WATER LEVEL
The following information was provided b
PART 21 - FLOWSERVE SOLENOID VALVE DEFICIENCY REPORT
The follow
LER: <a href="https://adamsxt.nrc.gov/navigator/AdamsXT/content/downloadContent.faces?objectSto
LER:<a href="https://adamsxt.nrc.gov/navigator/AdamsXT/content/downloadContent.faces?objectSto
LER: <a href="https://adamsxt.nrc.gov/navigator/AdamsXT/content/downloadContent.faces?objectSto
LER:<a href="https://adamsxt.nrc.gov/navigator/AdamsXT/content/downloadContent.faces?objectSto
LER: <a href="https://adamsxt.nrc.gov/navigator/AdamsXT/content/downloadContent.faces?objectSto
AUTOMATIC SCRAM DUE TO TURBINE TRIP
The following information was pr
Date Originally Screened: 2/9/2023 EN Revision Imported Date: 2/15/2023
EN R
LER: <a href="https://adamsxt.nrc.gov/navigator/AdamsXT/content/downloadContent.faces?objectSto
LOSS OF COMMUNICATIONS AND ASSESSMENT CAPABILITIES
The followi
LOSS OF COMMUNICATIONS AND ASSESSMENT CAPABILITIES
The followi
LOSS OF COMMUNICATIONS AND ASSESSMENT CAPABILITIES
The followi
LOSS OF COMMUNICATIONS AND ASSESSMENT CAPABILITIES
The followi
LOSS OF COMMUNICATIONS AND ASSESSMENT CAPABILITIES
The followi
LOSS OF COMMUNICATIONS AND ASSESSMENT CAPABILITIES
The followi
AUTOMATIC ACTUATION OF REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM (RPS)
The f
LER: <a href="https://adamsxt.nrc.gov/navigator/AdamsXT/content/downloadConte
SINGLE TRAIN OF LOW PRESSURE CORE SPRAY INOPERABLE
The followi
On 2/17/2023, during performance of outage surveillances, the A Standby Liquid Control (SLC) storag
On 2/24/2023, during performance of the operability surveillance testing of the Unit 2, Divisio
At 0910 CST on March 4, 2023, with Unit 2 in Mode 4 at 0 percent power, an actuation of a reactor sc
On March 16, 2023, at 14:40 CDT, the 0A Control Room Ventilation (VC) failed to actuate wh
On May 31, 2021, LaSalle Unit 2 was operating at 100 percent power, when the 2A reactor p
FITNESS-FOR-DUTY REPORT
The following is a summary of information provid
LER 2023-001-00 (<a href="https://adamsxt.nrc.gov/navigator/AdamsXT/content/downloadContent.fa
LER 2022-003-02 (<a href="https://adamsxt.nrc.gov/navigator/AdamsXT/content/downloadContent.fa
OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
The following information was provided by the license
<a href="https://adamsxt.nrc.gov/navigator/AdamsXT/content/downloadContent.faces?objectStoreNa
AUTOMATIC REACTOR SCRAM
The following information was provided by the
LOSS OF EMERGENCY ASSESSMENT CAPABILITY
The following information
<a href="https://adamsxt.nrc.gov/navigator/AdamsXT/content/downloadContent.faces?objectStoreNa
OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
The following information was provided by the licensee via email:</
<a href="https://adamsxt.nrc.gov/navigator/AdamsXT/content/downloadContent.faces?objectStoreNa
<a href="https://adamsxt.nrc.gov/navigator/AdamsXT/content/downloadContent.faces?objectStoreNa
FITNESS FOR DUTY REPORT
The following information was provided by the lic
Date Originally Screened: 11/27/2023 EN Revision Imported Date: 4/8/2024
EN
<a href="https://adamsxt.nrc.gov/navigator/AdamsXT/content/downloadContent.faces?objectStoreNa
<a href="https://adamsxt.nrc.gov/navigator/AdamsXT/content/downloadContent.faces?objectStoreNa
LER 2023-001-01
ABSTRACT:
O
Date Originally Screened: 12/21/2023 EN Revision Imported Date: 1/18/2024
EN
EN Revision Imported Date: 12/27/2023
EN Revision Text: PART 21 REPORT -
<a href="https://adamsxt.nrc.gov/navigator/AdamsXT/content/downloadContent.faces?objectStoreNa
FITNESS FOR DUTY VIOLATION
The following information was provided by the
<a href="https://adamsxt.nrc.gov/navigator/AdamsXT/content/downloadContent.faces?objectStoreNa
EN Revision Imported Date: 3/27/2024
EN Revision Text: FITNESS FOR DUTY<
AUTOMATIC ACTUATION OF REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM
The followin
AUTOMATIC ACTUATION OF EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS
The follo
On February 21, 2024, while performing the water rod inspection of fuel bundle GGJ319 during a plan
Date Originally Screened: 5/6/2024 EN Revision Imported Date: 7/8/2024
EN Re
<a href="https://adamsxt.nrc.gov/navigator/AdamsXT/content/downloadContent.faces?objectStoreNa
<a href="https://adamsxt.nrc.gov/navigator/AdamsXT/content/downloadContent.faces?objectStoreNa
AUTOMATIC SCRAM DUE TO TURBINE TRIP SIGNAL
The following informatio
LER 2024-004-00 (<a href="https://adamsxt.nrc.gov/navigator/AdamsXT/content/downloadContent.fa
LER 2024-001-00 (<a href="https://adamsxt.nrc.gov/navigator/AdamsXT/content/downloadContent.fa
BOTH TRAINS OF CONTROL ROOM VENTILATION TEMPERATURE CONTROL SYSTEM INOPER
LER 2024-002-00 (<a href="https://adamsxt.nrc.gov/navigator/AdamsXT/content/downloadContent.fa
LER 2024-003-01 (<a href="https://adamsxt.nrc.gov/navigator/AdamsXT/content/downloadContent.fa
LER 2024-004-01 (<a href="https://adamsxt.nrc.gov/navigator/AdamsXT/content/downloadContent.fa
Date Originally Screened: 9/5/2024 EN Revision Imported Date: 9/6/2024
EN Re
LER 2024-001-00 (<a href="https://adamsxt.nrc.gov/navigator/AdamsXT/content/downloadContent.fa
Date Originally Screened: 9/16/2024 EN Revision Imported Date: 9/17/2024
EN
LER 2023-002-01 (<a href="https://adamsxt.nrc.gov/navigator/AdamsXT/content/downloadContent.fa
*Title appears to have been a typo on first state of LER number. Second one was able to be corrected
LER 2024-002-01 (<a href="https://adamsxt.nrc.gov/navigator/AdamsXT/content/downloadContent.fa
LER 2024-002-00 (<a href="https://adamsxt.nrc.gov/navigator/AdamsXT/content/downloadContent.fa
*This is a title correction from previous submission from 10/10/24 where the title was incorrectly subm
EN #<a href="https://bmvwbrsprorps04.nrc.gov/reportserver/Pages/ReportViewer.aspx?%2fOversight
LER # <a href="https://adamsxt.nrc.gov/navigator/AdamsXT/content/downloadContent.faces?objectS
LER <a href="https://adamsxt.nrc.gov/navigator/AdamsXT/content/downloadContent.faces?objectSto
CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY VENTILATION AIR CONDITIONING SYSTEM INOPERABLE
< failure of the main power transformer. The safety significance of this event was minimal. All control rod it was determined CPS had operated in a condition prohibited by Technical Specifications (TS).
me=MainLibrary&ForceBrowserDownloadMgrPrompt=false&vsId={E8F48291-825A-C6AB-A by the licensee via fax or email:
"At approximately 1025 CST, the Dresden Main Co the licensee via fax or email:
"At approximately 1025 CST on 2/1/22, the Braidwo the licensee via fax or email:
"At approximately 1328 CST on 2/1/2022, LaSalle G it was determined CPS had operated in a condition prohibited by Technical Specifications (TS). At 0950 n was provided by the licensee:
"At 2115 CST on March 5, 2022 Byron Station Te TBSTMaq6ej8r8iGi4gST1/v9fv8BAAAAACn+ubsCAAAAAPBNBNwAAAAAIJGAGwAAAAAkEnADAAAA /p>
The following information was provided by the licensee via fax or email:
<b NCY REPORT
The following information was provided by the licensee via email:</p
The following information was provided by the licensee via email:
"At 085 NATION RESULTS - REACTOR VESSEL HEAD PENETRATION
The following inf OW PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION (LPCI) INOP
The following information w tent.faces?objectStoreName=MainLibrary&vsId={4A787C28-4D9E-CE49-87A6-80E1E2F00000}& CONDITIONING SYSTEM INOPERABLE
The following information was provided RABLE
The following information was provided by the licensee via fax:
<br limit switch 1 C71-N006C failed. The component was sent offsite for failure analysis. Component failur tent.faces?objectStoreName=MainLibrary&ForceBrowserDownloadMgrPrompt=false&vsId={ y the licensee via email followed by phone call:
"At approximately 1043 CDT, the Q me=MainLibrary&ForceBrowserDownloadMgrPrompt=false&vsId={14FF0540-4393-C861-8E adContent.faces?objectStoreName=MainLibrary&vsId={873FFDD5-1B89-CA8A-857A-818B5BF00 g is a synopsis of information received via facsimile:
A Model 38878-8 solenoid va >The following information was received from the licensee via facsimile:
"On July 4 nformation was received from the licensee via email:
"At 0130 CDT on July 4 202 me=MainLibrary&vsId={9EE8C389-D9AA-CD13-87AC-81DDAE700000}&ForceBrowserDow >
The following information was provided by the licensee via fax or email:
censee via email:
"At 1035 CDT on 7/15/2022, it was determined that a non-licens Revision Text: PART 21 REPORT - POTENTIAL PREMATURE FAILURES OF VALCOR COIL SHELL me=MainLibrary&vsId={DB73884A-C9FF-C00D-8CE9-8211CAA00000}&ForceBrowserDown tion was provided by the licensee via email:
"At 2217 CDT on 7/29/22, cribhouse s on-supervisory employee had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a for-cause fitness-for-duty test. S ent.faces?objectStoreName=MainLibrary&ForceBrowserDownloadMgrPrompt=false&vsId={3 ent.faces?objectStoreName=MainLibrary&ForceBrowserDownloadMgrPrompt=false&vsId={D ent.faces?objectStoreName=MainLibrary&ForceBrowserDownloadMgrPrompt=false&vsId={F ent.faces?objectStoreName=MainLibrary&ForceBrowserDownloadMgrPrompt=false&vsId=% ent.faces?objectStoreName=MainLibrary&ForceBrowserDownloadMgrPrompt=false&vsId={B ent.faces?objectStoreName=MainLibrary&ForceBrowserDownloadMgrPrompt=false&vsId={A ntrol Room Ventilation (VC) and Auxiliary Electric Room Ventilation (VE) was inoperable due to a plann wing information was provided by the licensee via fax email:
"At 0238 CDT on 9/26/2022 with U ng Conditions for Operation (LCO) was not met, and Condition A, UHS inoperable, was entered since U EN Revision Text: CONTROL ROD DRIVE MECHANISM (CRDM) PENETRATION DEGRADED
<p ation was provided by Emerson via fax:
A deficiency was identified in Rosemount 3 CATION
The following is a synopsis of information provided by Nutherm Internatio ent.faces?objectStoreName=MainLibrary&ForceBrowserDownloadMgrPrompt=false&vsId={1 adContent.faces?objectStoreName=MainLibrary&ForceBrowserDownloadMgrPrompt=false&v ent.faces?objectStoreName=MainLibrary&ForceBrowserDownloadMgrPrompt=false&vsId={A RABLE
The following information was provided by the licensee via email:
< by the licensee via email:
"On November 4, 2022, at 1400 hours0.0162 days <br />0.389 hours <br />0.00231 weeks <br />5.327e-4 months <br />, with Unit 2 (U2) i wing is a synopsis of information provided by Flowserve via fax:
Flowserve Corpor oreName=MainLibrary&ForceBrowserDownloadMgrPrompt=false&vsId={4E19F7AF-E557-CE reName=MainLibrary&ForceBrowserDownloadMgrPrompt=false&vsId={B9F52A8E-39A5-C2 oreName=MainLibrary&ForceBrowserDownloadMgrPrompt=false&vsId={11BE8747-F8A3-C4 reName=MainLibrary&ForceBrowserDownloadMgrPrompt=false&vsId={9BE6FDF7-65EA-C8 oreName=MainLibrary&ForceBrowserDownloadMgrPrompt=false&vsId={7043BD14-2586-CC rovided by the licensee via fax and telephone:
"Generator trip due to power load u Revision Text: LOSS OF COMMUNICATIONS AND ASSESSMENT CAPABILITIES
<p oreName=MainLibrary&ForceBrowserDownloadMgrPrompt=false&vsId={AD111B6B-CDE7-C ng information was provided by the licensee via email:
"On 02/06/2023 at 0416 EST, the Const ng information was provided by Constellation via email:
"On 02/06/2023 at 0416 EST, the Cons ng information was provided by Constellation via email:
"On 02/06/2023 at 0416 EST, the Cons ng information was provided by Constellation via email:
"On 02/06/2023 at 0416 E ng information was provided by Constellation via email:
"On 02/06/2023 at 0416 E ng information was provided by Constellation via email:
"On 02/06/2023 at 0416 E following information was provided by the licensee via email:
"At 0910 [CST], with ent.faces?objectStoreName=MainLibrary&ForceBrowserDownloadMgrPrompt=false&vsId={7 ng information was provided by the licensee via email:
"At 0246 CDT on April 17, ge tank outlet valve, 2C41-F001A, failed to open. The failure was due to binding of the Motor O on 2 Air Circuit Breaker (ACB) 2424, the Unit 1, Division 2 Cross Tie ACB 1424 failed to close. cram on low charging water header pressure occurred during restoration from ASME Class 1 System L hen performing the 1A Diesel Generator (DG) sequencer testing due to installed jumpers on 0 protection system (RPS) motor generator (MG) set output breaker tripped due to an overload condition, ded by the licensee via email:
A non-licensed, non-supervisory employee was iden ces?objectStoreName=MainLibrary&ForceBrowserDownloadMgrPrompt=false&vsId={D2178 ces?objectStoreName=MainLibrary&ForceBrowserDownloadMgrPrompt=false&vsId={3FA80 ee via phone and email:
"At 1530 [EDT] on July 3, 2023, Constellation Generation me=MainLibrary&ForceBrowserDownloadMgrPrompt=false&vsId={01024B1F-556C-CFFA-8 e licensee via phone and email:
"At 0329 [CDT] on August 11, 2023, with Unit 2 in n was provided by the licensee via email:
"At approximately 1600 CDT on 8/25/202 me=MainLibrary&ForceBrowserDownloadMgrPrompt=false&vsId={4CA35502-304B-CA48-8 /p>
"On 9/18/2023 at 2007 CDT, Clinton reported to the Illinois Emergency Management Agency, N me=MainLibrary&ForceBrowserDownloadMgrPrompt=false&vsId={BB16E698-BF53-C705-8 me=MainLibrary&ForceBrowserDownloadMgrPrompt=false&vsId={69F94822-66FD-C76A-84 censee via phone and fax:
"On November 18, 2023, the presence of alcohol was d Revision Text: HPCI DECLARED INOPERABLE
The following information was pr me=MainLibrary&ForceBrowserDownloadMgrPrompt=false&vsId={C74FA29B-0103-C089-85 me=MainLibrary&ForceBrowserDownloadMgrPrompt=false&vsId={C07D5076-BA8D-C7D0-8 On August 11, 2023, at 0329, Quad Cities Unit 2 had an automatic scram from full power due to a trip o N Revision Text: INITIAL PART 21 REPORT - DEFICIENT FUEL INJECTORS
The DEFECT IN VALCOR SOLENOID VALVES
The following is a synopsis of informa me=MainLibrary&ForceBrowserDownloadMgrPrompt=false&vsId={84494572-C213-C560-85 e licensee via email:
A supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a ran me=MainLibrary&ForceBrowserDownloadMgrPrompt=false&vsId={8932FE91-C886-C180-86
The following information was provided by the licensee via email and phone call:< ng information was provided by the licensee via email:
"At 2046 [CDT] on 3/27/24 w owing information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:
"At 0704 CDT nned refueling outage, it was identified that several fuel spacers had propagated up within the evision Text: AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP DUE TO LOWERING STEAM GENERATOR WATER LEV me=MainLibrary&ForceBrowserDownloadMgrPrompt=false&vsId={CE4288E4-887D-C604-9 me=MainLibrary&ForceBrowserDownloadMgrPrompt=false&vsId={35BDB1BB-49A0-C6B9-9 on was provided by the licensee via email:
"At 2223 CDT on May 23, 2024, with Q ces?objectStoreName=MainLibrary&ForceBrowserDownloadMgrPrompt=false&vsId={D0156 ces?objectStoreName=MainLibrary&ForceBrowserDownloadMgrPrompt=false&vsId={ED19F RABLE
The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and em ces?objectStoreName=MainLibrary&ForceBrowserDownloadMgrPrompt=false&vsId={157F7 ces?objectStoreName=MainLibrary&ForceBrowserDownloadMgrPrompt=false&vsId={C6CD ces?objectStoreName=MainLibrary&ForceBrowserDownloadMgrPrompt=false&vsId={EAD8 evision Text: PART 21 - STRESS CORROSION CRACKING IN CONTROL ROD BLADES
ces?objectStoreName=MainLibrary&ForceBrowserDownloadMgrPrompt=false&vsId={BD061 Revision Text: DEGRADED REACTOR VESSEL CLOSURE HEAD PENETRATION
< ces?objectStoreName=MainLibrary&ForceBrowserDownloadMgrPrompt=false&vsId={73F8D d to LER 2023-002-01*
LER 2023-002-01 (<a href="https://adamsxt.nrc.gov/navigator/AdamsXT ces?objectStoreName=MainLibrary&ForceBrowserDownloadMgrPrompt=false&vsId={E8FFB ces?objectStoreName=MainLibrary&ForceBrowserDownloadMgrPrompt=false&vsId={DDE3 mitted with LER-2023-001-01. Nothing has changed to LER-2023-002-01.*
LER 20 t%2fReports%2fEvent+Notification&rs:Command=Render&EventNumber=57494" rel="noope toreName=MainLibrary&ForceBrowserDownloadMgrPrompt=false&vsId={B92A9865-30DA-C reName=MainLibrary&ForceBrowserDownloadMgrPrompt=false&vsId={77869C33-554E-CC
The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:
< ds inserted to their full-in position. Following the reactor scram, all systems operated as expected.
< >At 0950 CDT it was identified that a fuel bundle had been placed in the North-West quadrant of the co A525-7E9757400005}&wId=637789519007744805" target="_blank">Full LER Text</a>
"At 1338 CDT on 3/14/2022, it was determined that a contract supervisor tested positive dur p>
"The following information is provided pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR Part 54 [CDT] on April 23, 2022, while performing volumetric inspections required by ASME Code Case N-72 formation was provided by the licensee via email:
"At 0854 [CDT] on April 23, 202 as provided by the licensee via fax:
"At 1359 CDT on May 10, 2022, the 1B LPCI &ForceBrowserDownloadMgrPrompt=false" target="_blank">ML22140A128</a>.
d by the licensee via email:
"At 0905 CST on 05/20/2022, it was discovered both tr r>
"At 1256 CST on 05/23/2022, it was discovered both trains of Control Room Area Ventilation re analysis was complete on 2/4/2022 and determined that the cause was attributed to degradation of s {5A6BA1A7-8CEF-C27C-B274-8106C5C00000}&wId=637893198116430741" target="_blank">ML Quad Cities Main Control Room was notified that the Scott County Iowa warning sirens were activated i EFD-8162EC100000}&wId=637908786264276630" target="_blank">LER 2021-001-01</a>
"At 0803 EDT on 7/12/2022, with the Unit 2 in Mode 1 at 100% power, an automatic scram wa sed supervisor tested positive in accordance with the fitness-for-duty testing program. The individual's a L ASSEMBLIES
The following is a synopsis of information received via facsimile:< nloadMgrPrompt=false" target="_blank" style="color: rgb(5, 56, 107); background-color: rgb(255, 255, 2 suction bay levels were reported less than 501.5 feet due to buildup of grass on bar racks.
Subsequent investigation revealed the presence of alcohol within the Protected Area. The employee's a 3C7C041F-B184-CC40-85E3-82F54EA00000}&wId=637976215222051722" target="_blank">ML2 DAEA62C0-82EE-C974-86AB-82F9F9600000}&wId=637977078304792207" target="_blank">ML2 F1BF3D07-AA20-CBC2-9645-82F9FEE00000}&wId=637977942095637992" target="_blank">ML2
%7bDAEA62C0-82EE-C974-86AB-82F9F9600000%7d&wId=637977078304792207" target="_blan B537DBB7-D29E-C97E-85A9-8322E4D00000}&wId=637985682805976185" target="_blank">ML2 A175B0C1-DD82-C20B-8464-83239A200000}&wId=637986547079938971" target="_blank">ML22 ned maintenance window. The Main Control Room ventilation envelope consists of both the Main Contr Unit 2 in Mode 1 at 100 percent power, the reactor manually tripped due to a reported fire on the isopha UHS water level was determined to be below 501.5 feet mean sea level. On July 30, 2022, at 0135 CDT p>
The following information was provided by the licensee via fax:
"Co 3153N series pressure transmitters with Rosemount 3159 remote seals with the LG1 option. The remot onal via fax:
Nutherm was notified by the customer that a Sola / Hevi-Duty uninterr BA1BC2E-FFD4-C2AD-A81F-842F7D800001}&wId=638029891082786816" target="_blank">ML vsId={918F5963-521F-CE1B-84DB-842F83000000}&wId=638029891100760511" target="_blank" A3E41660-EAD2-C885-90D0-8442D0400000}&wId=638032302140528937" target="_blank">ML22
"At 0006 CDT on 11/04/2022, it was discovered that both trains of control room area ventil n Mode 1 at 100 percent power, a manual scram was inserted on U2 due to rising reactor water level, w ation hereby submits the enclosed written notification of the identification of a defect, in accordance wit E8E-850A-847B60200000}&wId=638041807973404260" target="_blank">ML22319A015</a>
25A-B039-84C873B00000}&wId=638054766181800605" target="_blank">ML22334A008</a>
4F0-85A2-8558BE500000}&wId=638078996435670821" target="_blank">ML22362A013</a>
8E8-843D-8558C3D00000}&wId=638078996449733703" target="_blank">ML22362A015</a>
C2E-8678-856402400000}&wId=638081515494773718" target="_blank">ML22364A273</a>
unbalance which caused a turbine trip and subsequent reactor scram. Experienced a trip on circulating p>The following information was provided by the licensee via email:
"On 02/06/2023 at 0416 ES C5D1-8C8B-8636B3A00000}&wId=638116218198587697" target="_blank">ML23040A104</a>
ML2 2023, it was discovered that the single train low pressure core spray system was inoperable. Due to th Operated Valve (MOV) full voltage reversing (FVR) contactor mechanical interlock. Failure an
> It was identified that that contacts on the Unit 1 System Auxiliary Transformer (SAT) feed to Division 2 eakage Test conditions. All control rods were already fully inserted prior to the receipt of the scram sign 0PR031J and 0PR032J, Main Control Room Outside Air Intake A Monitors which prevented th
, which resulted in a loss of 2A RPS bus. Loss of power to this bus created a half-scr ntified bringing a prohibited item into the protected area. The employee's access to the plant has been 8D2C-B017-CC03-8C36-88C46E500001}&wId=638225119078503325" target="_blank">ML23167 064D-0494-C09E-AFEF-88C473D00001}&wId=638225119090222690" target="_blank">ML23167 Company, LLC reported to the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency and the Illinois Emergency Ma 488-881F8FA00000}&wId=638252011425373340" target="_blank">ML23135A079</a>
< Mode 1 at 90 percent power, the reactor automatically tripped due to a turbine trip. The trip was uncom 23, a partial loss of the commercial phone communications system occurred that affects the emergency 5CA-8A4C5B000000}&wId=638290891502447848" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">LE National Response Center and DeWitt County a hazardous substance release of 1300 gallons of Sodium 6AD-8B23D5600000}&wId=638327071786184549" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">LE 4E7-8B1FE5600001}&wId=638326964111564710" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">LE discovered inside the protected area. In accordance with the Constellation Fitness For Duty (FFD) Prog rovided by the licensee via email:
"At 0956 [CST] on November 20, 2023, accumu 510-8C35BAE00000}&wId=638379677290808248" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">LE 8465-8BDF18700000}&wId=638379775673054909" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">LE of the main turbine. A
fault in the Essential Service System (ESS) caused a feedwater heater (F e following is a synopsis of information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:
ation received via facsimile:
Valcor Engineering Corporation (VEC) identified a def 525-8D2213500000}&wId=638412643821673189" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank"><str ndom fitness for duty test. The supervisor's access to the plant has been terminated.
64C-8DC749E00000}&wId=638440975674499484" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">LE
"At 1027 CDT on 3/25/24, it was determined that a contract supervisor tested pos with the unit 2 in Mode 5 at 0% power, an actuation of the Reactor Protection System occurred during t T on 4/20/24 with Unit 1 in Mode 1 at 100 percent power, an actuation of the emergency AC power sys bundle toward the upper tie plate. It was determined through analysis that spacer positioning VEL
The following information was provided by the licensee via email and phone:<
431-8F626DB00000}&wId=638509483420597997" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">LE
94FC-8F865C000000}&wId=638515567223027756" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">LE Quad Cities Unit 2 at 38 percent power, the reactor automatically tripped due to a turbine tr 6810-F898-CCB5-878B-9030BE800000}&wId=638544763171056554" rel="noopener noreferrer" t FBA6-9B17-C7DB-A067-90796C000001}&wId=638557795466683373" rel="noopener noreferrer" ail:
"At 1440 CDT on 7/7/2024, it was discovered that both trains of the control roo 7550-841E-CFC0-874F-90DB34300000}&wId=638572555201350526" rel="noopener noreferrer" t D74A6-779F-C8DB-8C8E-9108AC300000}&wId=638580295307893898" rel="noopener noreferrer 9F96-6239-CE7B-9D8D-917ABDD00000}&wId=638600023581171473" rel="noopener noreferrer >
The following information was provided by Westinghouse Electric Company via phone and em 1B49-2D24-CA62-86B9-91C248100000}&wId=638612120276482504" rel="noopener noreferrer"
The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:
" DEBE-657B-C018-933C-922E5D700000}&wId=638630155258237636" rel="noopener noreferrer" T/content/downloadContent.faces?objectStoreName=MainLibrary&ForceBrowserDownloadMgrPr BCCF-EF72-C8B0-A264-92DDB7400000}&wId=638659747683705169" rel="noopener noreferrer EAC0-96CB-C41A-856D-930744C00000}&wId=638667991115559279" rel="noopener noreferrer 23-002-01 (<a href="https://adamsxt.nrc.gov/navigator/AdamsXT/content/downloadContent.faces?obje ener noreferrer" target="_blank">57494</a>
FITNESS FOR DUTY
</p C262-96FB-94895E000000}&wId=638730739782566173" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blan C71-B18A-948EE4A00000}&wId=638731496130129745" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank
"On January 26, 2025, at 1450 CST, it was discovered that the Control Room Em
The cause of this event was due to a sudden, unanticipated, catastrophic failure of the ore while Source Range Monitor (SRM) 'A' was inoperable, contrary to TS 3.3.1,2, Instrumentation - SR br>
On December 1, 2021, Unit 1 was at 100% power with a High Pressure Coolant Injection (H dy County scheduled monthly siren test had issues with siren activation from the County's primary cont n affecting Braidwood station in Will County, Illinois while testing sirens.
"This eve sirens sounding. The Grundy County monthly siren test had issues with siren activation from the Coun e Source Range Monitor (SRM) 'A' was inoperable, contrary to TS 3.3.1.2, Instrumentation - SRM Instru d the ability of the TSC ventilation system to maintain adequate radiological habitability in the event of a AAJBJwAwAAAIBEAm4AAAAAkEjADQAAAAASCbgBAAAAQCIBNwAAAABI9K8Zmb5erxnZ/pT3+/339 ring a random fitness-for-duty test. The individual's authorization for site access has been terminated.</ 21 to report a defect that could lead to a substantial safety hazard.
"Name and ad 29-6, a rejectable indication on Reactor Vessel Head Penetration 75 Core Exit Thermocouple (CETC) w 2, while performing volumetric inspections required by ASME Code Case N-729-6, a rejectable indicati Loop Upstream Injection valve (1-1001-28B) was found to have a motor operated torque switch issue a >
Abstract:
"On March 21, 2022, with Unit 2 in shutdown, Electromatic Re rains of Control Room Area Filtration and Area Ventilation Air Conditioning Systems were simultaneous Air Conditioning Systems were simultaneously INOPERABLE. Due to this INOPERABILITY, the syste switch lubricant which established firm evidence that a past inoperability condition existed.
L22147A132</a>
Abstract:
On 6/13/2020 during surveil n error at 1001 CDT. The sirens were not intentionally activated to notify the public of severe weather o p>
Abstract: On October 16, 2021, at 0428 CDT, an automatic reactor protection system ac background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);">ML22173A039</a>
Abstract:
tion valve actuator. The solenoid valve was returned to Flowserve where the low resistance was confirm due to lowering reactor water level, which occurred following an unexpected closure of the 2A Feedwa e to failure to reach required flow rates. Both trains were capable of starting but failed to reach the requ 5, 255);">ML22189A029</a>
Abstract: On May 10, 2022, with Unit 1 operating at 1 as received on Unit 2 following a turbine trip due to high reactor water level. The trip was uncomplicated authorization for site access has been terminated.
"The NRC Resident Inspector h
Valcor Engineering Corporation (VEC) was notified via a letter dated 5/19/2022 tha 255);">ML22199A052</a>
Summary: On May 20, 2022, both Units 1 and 2 were i >
"Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS) is INOPERABLE due to Surveillance Requirement 3.7.3.1 not met access to the plant has been terminated.
22243A193</a>
Abstract: A pressurizer safety valve (PSV) was 22244A134</a>
Abstract: On 7/4/22 at 0104, Unit 2 experienced 22244A135</a>
Abstract: On July 4, 2022, Unit 2 was at 100% nk">ML22244A134</a>
Abstract: On 7/4/22 at 0104, Unit 2 expe 22252A138</a>
Abstract: On July 12, 2022, the 0B Control Roo 2252A219</a>
Abstract: On July 12, 2022, at 0803 CDT, an au rol Room and the Auxiliary Electric Equipment Room. Both trains of VC and VE were required to be ope ase bus duct. The trip was uncomplicated with all systems responding normally post-trip with the except T, UHS water level was restored to be >/= 501.5 feet. On July 30, 2022, at 1116 CDT, TS 3.7.3 LCO ontrol Rod Drive Mechanism (CRDM) penetration 69 degraded.
"At 0119 [CDT] on te seal bolts in this single manufacturing lot were lacking the zinc-plating specified for corrosion resista ruptible power supply provided under an Exelon purchase order did not power up properly. The unit wa 22304A225</a>
Abstract: On July 29, 2022, at 2217 CDT, Tech ">ML22304A228</a>
Abstract: On July 12, 2022, at 0803 2308A068</a>
Abstract: On 10/3/21, with Clinton Power Statio ation air conditioning systems were simultaneously inoperable. Due to this inoperability, the system wa which occurred following an unexpected opening of the 2B Feedwater Regulating Valve. Following the
th the requirements of 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(ii). This notification pertains to the failure of a solenoid valve
>
Abstract:
At 0238 CDT on September 26, 2022 with Unit 2 >
Abstract:
On October 7, 2022, du >
Abstract:
On May 20, 2022, both Units 1 and 2 we >
Abstract:
On November 3, 2022, both Units 1 and
Abstract:
On November 4, 2022, Unit 2 was at 100 water pump A.
"NRC Resident Inspector notified."
The follow ST, the Constellation Emergency Response Organization (ERO) Notification Database System uploade p>
Abstract:
At 0238 CDT on Septemb nto the Mass Notification System (Everbridge) which is used to notify ERO personnel when activated. A into the Mass Notification System (Everbridge) which is used to notify ERO personnel when activated.
into the Mass Notification System (Everbridge) which is used to notify ERO personnel when activated.
ded data files into the Mass Notification System (Everbridge) which is used to notify ERO personnel wh ded data files into the Mass Notification System (Everbridge) which is used to notify ERO personnel wh ded data files into the Mass Notification System (Everbridge) which is used to notify ERO personnel wh essure occurred during restoration from hydrostatic test conditions. All control rods were already fully in 23094A112</a>
Abstract: On 1/31/23, at 2343 CST, while opera his inoperability, the system was in a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety funct nalysis revealed that the mechanical interlock would have become bound the previous time the contacto 2, ACB 1422, Mechanically Operated Contacts (MOC) switch remained in the open position w nal.
The scram occurred due to a valid signal and all systems responded as expec he actuation of 0A VC train. Jumpers were installed to support Unit 1 Bus Outage and ram and initiated closure of outboard isolation valves in multiple systems. The condition was a terminated.
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
7A071</a>)
Abstract
During station surveillance testing, the Low P 7A076</a>)
Abstract
At 0238 CDT on Septembe anagement Agency and Office of Homeland Security (IEMA-OHS) that tritium concentrations in existing br>
ABSTRACT
On March 16, 2023, at 14:40 CDT, the 0A C mplicated with all systems responding normally post-trip. The cause and details of the event are under i y notification system (ENS) and the functionality of an emergency response facility.
<p ER 2022-001-01</a>
During the Byron Station, Unit 2, spring 2022, refueling outag m Bisulphite. The release was at the site's flume discharge building due to a crack on a fitting inside the ER 2023-001-01</a>
<a href="https://adamsxt.nrc.gov/navigator/AdamsXT/conten R 2023-001-00</a>
<a href="https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/even gram, the individual has been escorted offsite and access to the plant denied pending the results of an lated gas was identified in the Dresden Unit 2 high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) system discharge ER 2023-002-00</a>
ABSTRACT
O ER 2023-001-00</a>
On September 1, 2023, an oil sample from the 2B auxiliary f FWH) system transient. The drain valve for the 2A
Moisture Separator Drain Tank (MSDT) did >
Pursuant to 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(i), Paragon provided initial notification of a defect associated fect with Valcor solenoid valves with part number V52600-5890-1 on October 23, 2023. The defect iden rong>LER 2023-001-00</a>
<a href="https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/ ER 2023-002-00</a>
On October 10, 2023, at 23:02 CST, the Reactor Core Isolati itive in accordance with the fitness for duty testing program. The individual's authorization for site acces testing of the scram discharge volume. The cause of the Reactor Protection System actuation was leak stem, specifically the Division 1 and Division 3 emergency diesel generators (EDGs) occurred had a direct effect on the Minimum Critical Power Ratio (MCPR). On March 4, 2024, an analysis of the /p>
"At 0338 CDT, with the unit 1 in mode 1 at 6 percent power, the reactor automatica ER 2024-001-00</a>
At 2046 on 3/27/24, with Unit 2 in Mode 5, an automatic actua ER 2024-002-00</a>
On March 25, 2024, LaSalle Unit 1 was operating at 100 per rip signal resulting in main stop valve closure, creating a <e target="_blank">ML24171A003</a>)
On April 20, 2024, with La target="_blank">ML24185A160</a>)
Event Notification EN <a href="https://bmvwbrsprorps04. om ventilation temperature control system were simultaneously inoperable. Due to this inoperability, the target="_blank">ML24204A105</a>)
On May 23, 2024, " target="_blank">ML24213A022</a>)
On April 9, 2024, while p r" target="_blank">ML24235A178</a>)
Originating EN <a href="https://bmvwbrsprorps04.nrc.go mail:
This issue concerns the Westinghouse designed and manufactured CR99 an target="_blank">ML24249A074</a>)
Event Notification <a href="https://bmvwbrsprorps04.nrc.g On 9/13/2024 at 0823 CDT, during the Byron Unit 1 refueling outage, it was determined that a previous target="_blank">ML24270A035</a>)
Original <a href="https://adamsxt.nrc.gov/navigator/Adam rompt=false&vsId={706D5FCC-4FEA-C8C9-8CA9-927205100000}&wId=6386414237497058 r" target="_blank">ML24304A856</a>)
Original LER 2024-002-00 (<a href="https://adamsxt.nrc r" target="_blank">ML24312A225</a>)
Original EN <a href="https://bmvwbrsprorps04.nrc.gov/r ectStoreName=MainLibrary&ForceBrowserDownloadMgrPrompt=false&vsId={706D5FCC-4F p>
The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:
2024-001-00</a>
On November 22, 2024, it was discovered that an event tha k">2024-002-00</a>
On 11/20/2024 at 1407 CST, the Main Control Room was no mergency Ventilation Air Conditioning (CREVAC) system was inoperable. Due to this inoperab
e main power transformer high voltage oil impregnated paper bushing. The cause of the bushing failure RM Instrumentation. Additionally, at time of discovery, a second fuel bundle move within the quadrant w HPCI) surveillance in progress. HPCI was declared inoperable at 1809 per the surveillance instructions.
troller. The buttons to activate were being pressed but the intended sirens were not initiating. The Grun ent is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), News release or notification of other Government Agencies nty's primary controller. The buttons to activate were being pressed, but the intended sirens were not in umentation. Additionally, at time of discovery, a second fuel bundle move within the quadrant was in pr an emergency with an airborne radiological release. All other capabilities of the TSC are unaffected by t 9/eftvz8+8jr9Sp+DgAAAMB1Xu/kSM022PZNQSBBRACo208Ybf+2tb+vftOYAQAABNwAuFxk9W5LXp
/p>
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
ddress of the individual informing the Commission:
Camille T. Zozula
Westinghouse Ele was identified. The indication is located inboard of the J-groove weld and is OD-initiated [outer diamete ion on Reactor Vessel Head Penetration 75 Core Exit Thermocouple (CETC) was identified. The indica and inadequate lubrication. This issue called into question the ability of the valve to close when require elief Valve (ERV) 2-O2O3-3B, 2B Main Steam Line Relief Valve, did not stroke in accordance with work sly INOPERABLE. Due to this INOPERABILITY, the system was in a condition that could have prevent m was in a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function; therefore, this condit >
The component 1C71-N006C is the TSV-3 Closure Reactor Protection System (RPS) channe lances of the turbine stop valves (TSV), limit switch 2C71-N006G failed. The component was sent offs or pending emergency.
"This event is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), News ctuation occurred due to failure of the main power transformer. The safety significance of this event was >During the Byron Station, Unit 2, spring 2022, refueling outage, volumetric examinations of the Reacto med. The solenoid coil was then sent to the Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) for further evalua ater Regulating Valve. Following the reactor scram, reactor water level decreased to approximately min uired flow of 4000 SCFM. Secondary Containment differential pressure was not able to be maintained a 100% power, motor operated valve (MOV) thrust testing was being performed on Residual Heat Remov d with all systems responding normally post trip. All rods inserted to their full-in positions.
<
has been notified."
at Catawba Nuclear Station (CNS) discovered two failed Coil Shell Assemblies, part number V52653-6 in Mode 1 and at 100% power. The B train of the Main Control Room Ventilation (VC) and Auxiliary Ele
. ENTER Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.3 condition A (Required Action (RA) A.1 mode 3 in 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, removed and tested during the Unit 1 fall 2021 refueling outage (B1 R24) under the lnservice Testing (
d a reactor scram. As a result, the 1/2 B Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) train auto started and was foun power with no surveillance activities in progress that contributed to the event. At 0103 hours0.00119 days <br />0.0286 hours <br />1.703042e-4 weeks <br />3.91915e-5 months <br /> the 2A Fe erienced a reactor scram. As a result, the 1/2 B Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) train auto started and w om Ventilation (VC)[VI] supply fan (0VC01 CB) failed to start when commanded due to an erroneous po utomatic reactor protection system actuation occurred following a main turbine trip due to high reactor w erable at the time of these events.
On 5/20/22 at 0905 and again on 5/23/22 at 12 tion of the 2A reactor protection system power supply, which tripped and power was transferred to the a O was not met, and Condition A was entered for water level identified to be less than 501.5 feet. At 18 October 7, 2022, it was determined that the CRDM penetration 69 was degraded because examinatio nce. Non-conforming bolts in Emerson inventory have been returned to the vendor for zinc-plating. Bac s returned to Nutherm for failure analysis. Inspection of the internals showed damage to transistors. W hnical Specification (TS} 3.7.3, "Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS)" Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCO) wa 3 CDT, an automatic reactor protection system actuation occurred following a main turbine trip due to h on (CPS) in Mode 5 (refueling) with core alterations in progress, it was determined CPS operated in a c as in a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function. Therefore, this condition i reactor scram, reactor water level decreased to approximately 0 inches, which resulted in an automati e (model 38878-8) at Catawba Nuclear Station.
List of plants / customers potential in Mode 1 at 100 percent power, a manual scram was initiated due to a reported fire in the isophase b uring a Liquid Penetrant examination on the embedded flaw seal weld repair of Control Rod Drive Mech re in Mode 1 and at 100% power. The B train of the Main Control Room Ventilation (VC) and Auxiliary 2 were in Mode 1 and at 100% power. At 2308 CDT the A Main Control Room Ventilation (VC) Compr % power with no surveillance activities in progress that contributed to the event. At 1359 hours0.0157 days <br />0.378 hours <br />0.00225 weeks <br />5.170995e-4 months <br /> the 2B wing additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations ed data files into the Mass Notification System (Everbridge) which is used to notify ERO personnel whe ber 26, 2022 with Unit 2 in Mode 1 at 100 percent power, a manual scram was initiated due to a reporte At 0630, the individual reviewing the uploaded files discovered that the data files did not upload properl At 0630, the individual reviewing the uploaded files discovered that the data files did not upload prope At 0630, the individual reviewing the uploaded files discovered that the data files did not upload prope hen activated. At 0630, the individual reviewing the uploaded files discovered that the data files did not hen activated. At 0630, the individual reviewing the uploaded files discovered that the data files did not hen activated. At 0630, the individual reviewing the uploaded files discovered that the data files did not nserted prior to the receipt of the scram signal.
"This event is being reported in acc ating at approximately 100% power, a phase-to-phase fault occurred on a 345 KV transmission line app tion; therefore, this condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR or picked up to close the MOV during the 2021 refueling outage. This established firm evidence that a p when they should have been closed. This resulted in the ACB 1422 closing permissive not bein cted. Low charging water header pressure is not required to be operable in Mode 4 but is active if not b d were not removed during the completion and restoration of the bus outage. This resulted in an invalid actuation because it was not the result of actual plant conditions and not an intentional manu Pressure Core Spray (LPCS) pump discharge flow differential pressure switch malfunctioned, preventin er 26, 2022 with Unit 2 in Mode 1 at 100 percent power, a manual scram was initiated due to a reported monitoring wells in a known [10 CFR] 50.75(g) recovery area were found higher than normal [at Quad Control Room Ventilation (VC) failed to actuate when performing the 1A Diesel Generator (DG) sequen nvestigation. Containment isolation valves actuated closed in multiple systems on a valid Group II sign p>"This is an eight-hour, non-emergency notification of a loss of emergency assessment capability. Thi ge, volumetric examinations of the Reactor Vessel Head Core Exit Thermocouple Penetration (CETC) e building. This release did not exceed any NRC regulations or reporting criteria. This notification is bei t/downloadContent.faces?objectStoreName=MainLibrary&ForceBrowserDownloadMgrPrompt=fal nt-status/event/2023/20230814en.html#en56676" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">EN </a><a investigation.
"This event is being reported under 10 CFR 26.719(b)(1) as it repre e header. As a result, the HPCI system was declared inoperable. Since HPCI is a single-train system, th On 9/7/2023 during surveillances of the turbine stop valves (TSV), limit switch 1 C71-N006 eedwater (AF) pump diesel engine was obtained. On September 21, 2023, the oil sample results were not open rapidly enough to prevent water level in the moisture separators from
reaching the es with the auxiliary feedwater pump diesel engine fuel injectors supplied to Constellation. The injectors w ntified is that stroke matching of internal components was not performed in accordance with internal pro /event-status/event/2023/20231122en.html#en56866" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank"><stron on Cooling (RCIC) system tripped during performance of
Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.5.3. ss has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
kage of water into the scram discharge volume causing a high level condition while drains were isolated during an unexpected loss of the Unit 1 system auxiliary transformer (SAT). The cause of the e operating conditions by Global Nuclear Fuel (GNF) of fuel bundle GGJ319 was reviewed and accepte ally tripped due to lowering steam generator water level. The trip was uncomplicated with all systems re ation of the Reactor Protection System (RPS) occurred during a
Local Leak Rate Test (LLRT) o rcent power, when the 1 B reactor protection system (RPS) motor-generator
(MG) set electric p em>valid reactor protection system signal. Reactor vessel aSalle Unit 1 operating at 100 percent power and gas circuit breaker (GCB) 11-13 open to sup .nrc.gov/reportserver/Pages/ReportViewer.aspx?%2fOversight%2fReports%2fEvent+Notification& e system was in a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function; therefore, this at 2223 CST, Quad Cities Unit 2 had an automatic scram from 38 percent power due to a trip of the m preparing for the Unit 1 traversing in-core probe (TIP) system shear valve actuating cartridge o ov/reportserver/Pages/ReportViewer.aspx?%2fOversight%2fReports%2fEvent+Notification&rs:Co nd Trident X boiling water reactor (BWR) control rod blades (CRBs). The CR99 CRBs were designed w gov/reportserver/Pages/ReportViewer.aspx?%2fOversight%2fReports%2fEvent+Notification&rs:C s overlay repair on penetration number 31 of the reactor vessel closure head was degraded because th msXT/content/downloadContent.faces?objectStoreName=MainLibrary&ForceBrowserDownloadMg 838" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">ML24283A102</a>)
Original LER 2023-002-00 c.gov/navigator/AdamsXT/content/downloadContent.faces?objectStoreName=MainLibrary&ForceB reportserver/Pages/ReportViewer.aspx?%2fOversight%2fReports%2fEvent+Notification&rs:Comm FEA-C8C9-8CA9-927205100000}&wId=638641423749705838" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="
p>"At 1302 CST on 1/15/2025, it was determined that a [non-licensed] supervisor tested positi at occurred on March 28, 2023, resulted in a condition that was prohibited by the plants' Techn tified that the operating handle for the 3A Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) Suction Relie bility, the system was in a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function, and th
has not yet been determined. A root cause investigation and failure analyses are ongoing. Results of t was in progress with the fuel bundle seated, but not released from the fuel handling machine grapple.</p With HPCI running at rated speed, Main Control Room alarms were received for the HPCI Gland Exha ndy County operator continued to attempt activation unknowingly activating the sirens in the northeast q s.
"Braidwood NRC Resident has been notified. "
itiating. The Grundy County operator continued to attempt activation unknowingly activating the sirens rogress with the fuel bundle seated, but not released from the fuel handling machine grapple. Operators this condition. If an emergency was declared requiring TSC activation during this period, the TSC would F8ohMn27wyJlve73cxuFS6b57tW8u+mDACAODbrRh/EnAD4HKZATcAvpt7BgBnVo5B+dEEAAAAAB ectric Company
1000 Westinghouse Drive
Cranberry Township, Pennsylvania 16066</p r - initiated]. This event is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.7 ation is located inboard of the J-groove weld and is OD-initiated [outer diameter - initiated]. This event is d.
"At 1746 CDT on May 10, 2022, both trains of Unit 1 LPCI were made simultan k package instructions. The valve was being tested to satisfy Technical Specification Surveillance Requ ed the fulfillment of a safety function; therefore, this condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-e tion is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v).
el A2 scram limit switch. This device is required by technical specifications to support LCO 3.3.1.1 funct ite for failure analysis. Component failure analysis was complete on 3/24/2021 and found only a small a s Release or Notification of Other Government Agencies. This is a 4-Hour Reporting requirement.
< s minimal. All control rods inserted to their full-in position. Following the reactor scram, all systems ope or Vessel Head Core Exit Thermocouple Penetration P-75 identified a recordable indication that did not tion.
The OEM (Ohmega) completed their analysis and found the reason for failure to be assoc nus 16 inches, which resulted in an automatic Group II and Group III isolation (expected response). Foll at greater than or equal to 0.25 inches of vacuum water gauge, causing Secondary Containment to also val (RHR) Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) valve 1-1001-28B, 1B LPCI Loop Upstream Stop Valv
"Due to the Reactor Protection System actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a 6040-7, which were removed from V70900-39-3-1 Solenoid Valves and returned to VEC for evaluation.
ectric Room Ventilation (VE) was inoperable due to a planned maintenance window. The Main Control R
, RA A.2 mode 4 in 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />). Dresden Lockmaster reports river level normal at 504.89 feet. Commenc (1ST) program. The as-found lift setting was outside the Technical Specifications (TS) 3.4.10 and 1ST p nd to have lower than Technical Specification (TS) required flow. The 1/2 B SGT train was secured and edwater Regulating Valve (FRV) failed in the closed position and locked up, causing a decrease in rea was found to have lower than Technical Specification (TS) required flow. The 1/2 B SGT train was secu osition indication from the closed limit switch (0ZS-FP432B-A) for the 0B VC recirculation charcoal delu water level. The safety significance of this event was minimal. All control rods inserted to their full in pos 256, various equipment on the A VC/VE train tripped following train swaps to support ongoing maintena alternate source. The fire was reported extinguished at 0240 CDT on 9/26/2022. Due to the reactor pro 00 CDT, UHS water level was restored to be>/= 501.5 feet.
The cause of low w on identified unacceptable indications in accordance with ASME Code Case N-729-6. Therefore, this ev cklogged orders were confirmed to have correct zinc-plating. Rosemount recommends end users evalu hen energized, the output was out of specification.
This UPS had been supplied fo s not met, and Condition A, UHS inoperable, was entered since UHS water level was determined to be high reactor water level. The safety significance of this event was minimal. All control rods inserted to th condition prohibited by Technical Specifications (TS). At 0950 CDT it was identified that a fuel bundle ha is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v).
c Group II and Group III isolation (expected response). Reactor Water Level control has been establish
ly impacted:
Duke - Catawba
Luminant - Comanche Peak
Exelon - Byron
< us duct. The scram was uncomplicated with all systems responding normally with the exception of a lo hanism Penetration 69, five 1/4-inch rounded indications were discovered that were determined to be u Electric Room Ventilation (VE) was inoperable due to a planned maintenance window. The Main Contr ressor tripped on low oil pressure. The A train of the Main Control Room Ventilation (VC) was declared Feedwater Regulating Valve (FRV) failed in the open position and locked up, causing an increase in re s Officers Report Guidance:
Off-site power available and unaffected. Decay heat r en activated. At 0630, the individual reviewing the uploaded files discovered that the data files did not up ed fire on the isophase bus duct. The scram was uncomplicated with all systems responding normally w ly and that Everbridge may not notify all ERO individuals within the required 10 minutes of system initia rly and that Everbridge may not notify all ERO individuals within the required 10 minutes of system initi rly and that Everbridge may not notify all ERO individuals within the required 10 minutes of system initi upload properly and that Everbridge may not notify all ERO individuals within the required 10 minutes o upload properly and that Everbridge may not notify all ERO individuals within the required 10 minutes o upload properly and that Everbridge may not notify all ERO individuals within the required 10 minutes o cordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the Unit 2 RPS s proximately 16 miles from Clinton Power Station (CPS). Gas Circuit Breaker Generator Output Breaker R 50.72(b)(3)(v). All other emergency core cooling systems remained operable during this time period.< past inoperability condition existed.
Failure of this valve to open results in inoperab ng actuated and preventing closure of ACB 1424. Troubleshooting identified a misaligned linka bypassed. The scram signal should have remained bypassed per station procedures.
< 0PR031J and 0PR032J being inoperable for approximately 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />s. Once identified ual action. Actuations and isolations that occurred performed as designed, except for the outboard 2D m ng the LPCS pump minimum flow valve from opening on a low flow condition. As a result the LPCS pum d fire on the isophase bus duct. The scram was uncomplicated with all systems responding normally w Cities Nuclear Generating Station]. This higher than normal tritium concentration did not exceed any N ncer testing due to installed jumpers on 0PR031J and 0PR032J, Main Control Room Outside Air Intake al.
"Due to the reactor protection system actuation while critical, this event is being s event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii).
"Communication P-75 identified a recordable indication that did not meet the applicable acceptance criteria.
ng made solely as a four-hour, non-emergency notification for a Notification of Other Government Agen lse&vsId={01024B1F-556C-CFFA-8488-881F8FA00000}&wId=638252011425373340" rel="n a href="https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/event-status/event/2023/20230814en.html#en5 esents a significant FFD violation.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. his is a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function; therefore, this condition i 6G failed. The component was
sent offsite for failure analysis. Component failure received which indicated oil viscosity and fuel percent in the Fault range, and a confirmatory sample w tablished turbine trip setpoints. The Unit 2 Main Turbine tripped as designed and generated an automa were provided to Paragon for refurbishment. Constellation provided Paragon with root cause report # 47 ocedures causing valve flow coefficient (Cv) to be only approximately 50 percent of the minimum requi ng>EN 56866</a>
On 11/20/2023 at 0956 CST, a section of High-Press .3. This SR is performed when RCIC steam supply pressure is at the higher operating
ranges o d for testing. The Reactor Protection System automatically actuated as designed when the high scram e emergency AC power system auto-start was an unexpected loss of the Unit 1 SAT during sw ed by the station. The report confirmed that during the previous cycle, the Operating Limit MCPR excee esponding normally post-trip. Due to the reactor protection system actuation while critical, this event is of the Scram Discharge Volume (SDV). The LLRT procedure did not bypass the scram signal and
< power monitoring assembly (EPMA) output breaker tripped due to an under frequency condition,
57107<
s condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v).</
ain turbine. A Digital Electro-Hydraulic Control (DEHC) erroneous Speed Difference Trip signa operability test to meet Technical Specification (TS) Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.6.1.3.9, ommand=Render&EventNumber=57083" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" style="backgro ith dimensional and material choices for mechanical stability such that the mechanical function is maint Command=Render&EventNumber=57211" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" style="color:
he results of a planned liquid penetrant test did not meet applicable acceptance criteria. Any required re grPrompt=false&vsId={8932FE91-C886-C180-864C-8DC749E00000}&wId=6384409756744 0 (<a href="https://adamsxt.nrc.gov/navigator/AdamsXT/content/downloadContent.faces?objectStoreNa BrowserDownloadMgrPrompt=false&vsId={157F7550-841E-CFC0-874F-90DB34300000}&w mand=Render&EventNumber=57321" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" style="color: rgb(5
"_blank" style="color: rgb(48, 132, 250);">ML24283A102</a>)
Original LER 2023-002-00 (<a hr ve [for a controlled substance] in accordance with the Fitness for Duty (FFD) testing program
nical Specifications (TS). Specifically, at approximately 0946 CDT on March 28, 2023, with <s ef Valve was found positioned higher than the operating handles for the other relief valves in the system erefore, this condition is being reported as an eight-hour non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72
the root cause report and failure analyses will be provided in a supplemental report.
Corrective p>
Operators verified the following actions were met: TS 3.3.1.2 Action E.1 - Immediately Suspend auster at 1843. At 1847, Operators in the plant reported smoke and acrid odors from cubicles at a Moto quadrant between 1000-1015 CST.
"This event is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b) in the Northeast quadrant several times between 1000-1015 CST.
"This event is r s verified the following actions were met: TS 3.3.1.2 Action E.1 - Immediately Suspend Core Alterations d be staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedures. If the TSC becomes uninhab B5ntSDb1rSA28o7DQAAAACzTPmVUgC4y9F3lpkEWnu5PQAAfBsBNwAeLfKjAN/+i5itvwjakwfAk/3yNe p>
(412) 374-2577
zozulact@westinghouse.com
"Commercially dedica 72(b)(3)(ii)(A).
"There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plan s being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A).
<b eously inoperable. TS 3.6.1.3 Condition A required de-activation of 1B LPCI Loop Downstream Injectio uirement (TS SR) 3.5.1.10, verify each Automatic Depressurizing System (ADS) valve actuator strokes emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v).
"There was no impact on the he
"There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel.
<b tion 8 (RPS) and LCO 3.3.4.1 (End of Cycle - Recirculation Pump Trip or EOC-RPT). Each TSV positio amount of grease on the internal components. It was determined the switch failed due to dried out and
"The Quad Cities NRC Resident has been notified."
rated as expected. The cause of this event was due to a sudden, unanticipated, catastrophic failure of meet the applicable acceptance criteria. The cause of the P-75 unacceptable indication is attributed to ciated with the magnet wire, but the exact point of failure could not be located due to the construction of lowing the scram, reactor water level rose to plus 75 inches resulting in a trip of all three Reactor Feedw o be inoperable. Due to this inoperability, the system was in a condition that could have prevented the f ve. Inadequate thrust conditions were discovered on this valve, which also serves as a Primary Contain a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B).
"The cause VEC has not concluded this is a reportable condition in accordance with 10 CFR 21.22(d) and requires Room ventilation envelope consists of both the Main Control Room and the Auxiliary Electric Equipmen ced trash rake operations to clear grass debris off of intake bar racks.
"At 0135 CD program limits. This required the removal and testing of the remaining two PSVs. The remaining two PS d the 1/2 A SGT train was manually started and found to have the same low flow condition. On 7/4/22 a ctor vessel water level. Attempts at manual control of the feedwater system to increase level were not s ured and the 1/2 A SGT train was manually started and found to have the same low flow condition. On 7 uge valve (0FP432B). The deluge valve was closed but the limit switch operating lever had rolled under sition. Following the reactor scram, all systems operated as expected.
The cause o ance activities. This resulted in the A VC/VE train being declared inoperable. With both the A and B train otection system actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notif water level was due to accumulation of river vegetation and grass on the Unit 2/3 Intake Bay 13 bar rac vent is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A).
< uate the significance of this notice to their specific pressure transmitter applications and environments. R or use at Clinton Power Station.
No other units are impacted by this defect or failu e below 501.5 feet. On July 30, 2022, at 0135 CDT, UHS water level was restored to be>/= 501.5 fe heir fullin position. Following the reactor scram, all systems operated as expected.
ad been placed in the North-West quadrant of the core while Source Range Monitor (SRM) A was inop
>
"There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel.
</
hed in a normal band. The cause and details of the event are under investigation.
Exelon - Braidwood
NextEra Energy - Seabrook
The solenoid valve rec ss of 2A reactor protection system (RPS) normal power supply. The 2A RPS normal power supply outp unacceptable per the acceptance criteria in ASME Section Ill.
The cause of these i rol Room ventilation envelope consists of both the Main Control Room and the Auxiliary Electric Equipm inoperable. The station swapped to the B VC/VE train.
On November 4 at 0006 C eactor vessel water level. Attempts at manual control of the feedwater system to decrease level were no removal via main steam line and drains to condenser. Plant is stable in mode 3.
pload properly and that Everbridge may not notify all ERO individuals within the required 10 minutes of with the exception of a loss of 2A reactor protection system (RPS) normal power supply. The 2A RPS n ation. Constellation resolved the issue by 0752.
"During the time period of 0416 to 0752, control ation. Constellation resolved the issue by 0752.
"During the time period of 0416 to 0752, contro ation. Constellation resolved the issue by 0752.
"During the time period of 0416 to 0752, contro of system initiation. Constellation resolved the issue by 0752.
"During the time per of system initiation. Constellation resolved the issue by 0752.
"During the time per of system initiation. Constellation resolved the issue by 0752.
"During the time per system.
"There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant perso rs (GCBs) 4510 and 4514 tripped open to clear the fault. GCB 4510 failed to trip open properly, resultin
"There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. T bility of the A SLC system required by LCO 3.1. 7 (SLC System). At the time of discovery of the breake age on the ACB 1422 MOC switch. This linkage misalignment occurred during the la
Following completion of required ASME Class 1 System Leakage Testing, actions were taken to co d, the jumpers were removed from 0PR031J and 0PR032J and the monitors were restored to operable main steam line isolation valve (MSIV) drain valve that was discovered later as having a slow closure tim mp was declared inoperable. The cause of the differential pressure switch failure was water leakage int with the exception of a loss of 2A reactor protection system (RPS) normal power supply. The 2A RPS no NRC regulations or reporting criteria and there is no indication of a liquid release beyond the site bound A Monitors. Jumpers that were installed during the Bus 141 outage to defeat Main Control Room Radi g reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), and an eight-hour ns via alternate methods were subsequently established. The telecommunications provider has not pro >
The cause of the P-75 unacceptable indication is attributed to ncy. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi).
"There wa noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">LER 2023-001-00</a>
On March 16, 2023, 56676" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" style="color: rgb(5, 93, 216); background-color: rgb(2 ."
is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The HPC e analysis was complete on 10/18/2023 and determined that the cause
was attributed to degrad was drawn. On September 22, 2023, resample results were received confirming the original analysis, an atic
reactor scram. All control rods inserted and the scram was uncomplicated. Containment iso 703982 on November 12, 2023. The associated failure analysis report documented potential defects wi red Cv of 2. Substantial safety hazard could be created if the flow rate through the solenoid valve exce ure Coolant Injection (HPCI) discharge piping was found to have an air void during the monthly perform of the system to verify that the RCIC pump can develop the required flow rate against a system head co discharge volume signal was received. All rods were previously fully inserted and the Control Rod Driv witchyard maintenance. Bus 141Y did not fast transfer as designed resulting in the actuation o eded limits set by Technical Specifications (TS) 3.2.2. Since the Operating Limit MCPR was exceeded f being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and an eight-h
leakage of water from a Hydraulic Control Unit (HCU) scram outlet valve into the SDV caused a hig p>which resulted in the loss of the 1 B RPS bus. The loss of power to this bus created a half-scram ainment actuation signals. The trip was not complex with all systems responding as expected post-trip. pped open on differential current resulting in the loss of the Unit 1 station auxiliary transformer (SAT
At 0338 CDT on May 05, 2024, with Braidwood Station, Unit 1 operating in MO p>
"There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The al initiated a Turbine Trip signal. The Unit 2 Main Turbine tripped as designed and generated it was identified that three of the five installed shear valve squib cartridges had expired in Oct ound-color: rgb(255, 255, 255); color: rgb(48, 132, 250);">57083</a>
On April 20, tained throughout the life of the control rod. However, observed cracking at United States licensees, re rgb(48, 132, 250); background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);">57211</a>
At 1440 CD epairs will be completed in accordance with the ASME code of record prior to returning the vessel head 99484" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" style="color: rgb(48, 132, 250); background-color: rg ame=MainLibrary&ForceBrowserDownloadMgrPrompt=false&vsId={889F6BC6-F0E0-C1BE-8 wId=638572555201350526" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" style="background-color: rgb(255 5, 93, 216); background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);">57321</a>
On September 13 ref="https://adamsxt.nrc.gov/navigator/AdamsXT/content/downloadContent.faces?objectStoreName=M >. The individual's authorization for site access has been terminated.
"The NRC Se strong>Quad Cities Unit 1 at 0% power, when a scram was inserted to support Operations ref m, making the valve inoperable as a Primary Containment Isolation Valve (PCIV). Technical S 2(b)(3)(v)(D). The CREVAC system is a single train system.
"Th actions included replacement of the failed main power transformer. Other corrective actions will be pro Core Alterations except control rod insertion and TS 3.3. 1.2 Action E.2 - Immediately initiate Action to or Control Center (MCC) associated with Unit 1 HPCI and the Gland Exhauster. Operations aborted the (2)(xi), News Release or Notification of Other Government Agencies. This is a 4-Hour Reporting require reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), News Release or Notification of Other Government Agencies. Th s except control rod insertion and TS 3.3.1.2 Action
E.2 - Immediately initiate Action to fully inse bitable, the Station Emergency Director would relocate the TSC staff to an alternate TSC location in acc e7b74EAqxJwA+CRzoJIR7/0eZT2Wx449vt3tG+ff3+23W/jl0yBbxa5Tj6VYBrAugTcAHicltdG98GmbR6lo ated Eaton Freedom Series NEMA Size 1 and 2 full voltage reversing (FVR) contactors with mechanica nt personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
The following additio br>
"There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC R on valve (1-1001-29B) which was completed at 1746 CDT. Because of the de-activation of the 1B LPCI when manually actuated. All other Unit 2 ADS valves were found to stroke satisfactorily.
<
ealth and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
br>
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
on is monitored by two limit switches (for TSV-3, A2 and 81 channels). This condition results in the TSV gritty grease, likely due to a missing boot which could have cause the limit switch to dry out. This estab the main power transformer high voltage oil impregnated paper bushing. Corrective actions included re o Primary Water Stress Corrosion Cracking.
A flaw growth analysis determined the f the coil.
Additionally, Flowserve compiled shipment data for the subject coil and found there to water Pumps. At 0114 CDT, Reactor Water Level lowered to less than the Feedwater Pump High Leve fulfillment of a safety function; therefore, this condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergen nment Isolation Valve (PCIV). Technical Specification (TS) 3.6.1.3 Condition A requires that a containm e of the transient is under investigation.
"Operations responded using the Emergen s additional time to complete testing and evaluation.
VEC is submitting this 60-day nt Room. Both trains of VC and VE were required to be operable at the time of these events.
<b DT on 7/30/22, cribhouse suction bay levels were reported at greater than 501.5 feet. Exit TS 3.7.3 cond SVs were also
outside the TS and 1ST program limits.
The three PSVs we at 0130, both units entered TS 3.6.4.3 Condition D for having both SGT trains inoperable. On 7/4/22 at 0 successful. At 0104, a manual scram was inserted in accordance with operating procedures. All contro 7/4/22 at 0130, both units entered TS 3.6.4.3 Condition D for having both SGT trains inoperable. On 7/4 r the limit switch finger, causing the operating lever to be in the same position as if the deluge valve wer of high reactor water level is due to a feedwater regulating valve unexpectedly failing full-open. The roo ns being simultaneously inoperable, the system was in a condition that could have prevented fulfillmen fication per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B).
"Operations responded using the emergenc cks. The root cause will be provided in a supplemental report. Corrective actions included clearing river
"There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NR Rosemount further recommends that end users replace the un-plated bolts in susceptible applications t re to comply. This issue has been identified as a single failure on this component only. This issue will n et. On July 30, 2022, at 1116 CDT, TS 3.7.3 LCO was not met, and Condition A was entered for water
>The cause of high reactor water level is due to a feedwater regulating valve unexpectedly failing full-op erable, contrary to TS 3.3.1.2, Instrumentation - SRM Instrumentation. Additionally, at time of discovery
/p>
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
The following additional i "The Unit 2 scram was not complicated. Operations responded using the Emergency Operating Proced ceived by Duke Energy failed to shift position when the coil was initially energized. This solenoid valve i put breaker tripped on over voltage. Operations successfully transferred 2A RPS power to the alternate ndications is attributed to existing mechanical discontinuities/minor subsurface voids growing or openin ment Room. Both trains of VC and VE were required to be operable at the time of these events.
CDT, the B Auxiliary Electric Room Ventilation (VE) compressor tripped on high oil temperature and the ot successful. At 1400, a manual scram was inserted in accordance with operating procedures. All cont f system initiation. Constellation resolved the issue by 0752.
"During the time period of 0416 to ormal power supply output breaker tripped on over voltage. Operations successfully transferred 2A RP l room operators would have been unaware that the ERO notification was not successful. Therefore, th ol room operators would have been unaware that the ERO notification was not successful. Therefore, t ol room operators would have been unaware that the ERO notification was not successful. Therefore, t riod of 0416 to 0752, control room operators would have been unaware that the ERO notification was n riod of 0416 to 0752, control room operators would have been unaware that the ERO notification was n riod of 0416 to 0752, control room operators would have been unaware that the ERO notification was n onnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
ng in actuation of the GCB 4510 breaker failure protective relay, tripping open GCB 4506 and disconnec he NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
The following additional informatio er failure the unit was in Mode 5, and LCO 3. 1. 7 was not in the mode of applicability. There were no re ast time the breaker was racked out of service during the Unit 1 refueling outage in 2022. This ommence reactor depressurization. As governed by the testing procedure, the Control Rod Drive (CRD status.
The cause of the event was an Instrument Maintenance First Line Supervi me, rendering the component inoperable.
The cause of the MG set breaker trip wa to the switch electrical housing caused by a failure of the shaft seal. The faulty switch was replaced and ormal power supply output breaker tripped on over voltage. Operations successfully transferred 2A RPS ary. This notification is being made solely as a four-hour, non-emergency notification for a notification o ation Monitor interlocks were not removed as expected at the conclusion of the bus outage. T r, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) for the Group II isolation.
vided an estimated repair time.
"There was no impact on the health and safety of >Primary Water Stress Corrosion Cracking.
A flaw growth analysi as no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector ha at 14:40 CDT, the 0A Control Room Ventilation (VC) failed to actuate when performing the 1A Diesel G 55, 255, 255);">56676</a>
On August 11, 2023, at 0329, Quad Cities Unit 2 had a CI system was subsequently vented, and the accumulated gas has been removed, restoring the Dresde dation of switch lubricant which established firm evidence that a past inoperability con nd at 1157 Operations declared the 2B AF train INOPERABLE and entered Technical Specification (TS olation valves actuated closed in
multiple systems on a valid Group II signal.
<p th some fuel injectors supplied to Braidwood. These reported deficiencies allowed excessive fuel oil lea eded a certain threshold.
VEC has identified two of these solenoid valves at LaSa mance of a non-destructive ultrasonic testing examination for gas accumulation in the Emergency Core orresponding to
reactor pressure. The system was restored to operable on October 16, 2023, a e system was shutdown. No rod movement occurred due to the actuation.
"This e of the Division 1 EDG. Division 3 EDG actuation is expected for this condition. The Division 1 and Divisi for longer than allowed by TS Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.2.2, this event is reportable as a hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) for an actuation of the auxiliary feedwa gh-level condition while drains
were isolated for testing. No control rod movement occurred due m condition and initiated closure
of isolation valves in multiple systems. <stro Due to the reactor protection system actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour trong>). Bus 141 Y (Division 1 ), normally supplied by the Unit 1 SAT, failed to fast transfer to the Unit ODE 2, the reactor automatically tripped due to low water level in 1 C steam generator (SG). The 1A an e NRC resident inspector has been notified.
"One train of control room ventilation t an automatic reactor scram. All control rods inserted and the scram was uncomplicated. Containment tober 2023. The Bases for SR 3.6.1.3.9 requires that the controls that limit shelf life a 2024, with LaSalle Unit 1 operating at 100 percent power and gas circuit breaker (GCB) 11-13 open to sulting from irradiation assisted stress corrosion cracking (IASCC), occurred before the nuclear end of DT on July 7, 2024, the 0A and 0B trains of the Control Room Ventilation (VC) Temperature C d to service. This event is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.7 b(255, 255, 255);">LER 2023-002-00</a>
On October 10, 2023, at 23:02 CST, th 84BD-87B8CA200000}&wId=638192682183174057" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" st 5, 255, 255); color: rgb(48, 132, 250);">ML24204A105</a>)
On May 23, 2024, at 2 , 2024 at 08:23 CDT, during a Liquid Penetrant (PT) examination on the seal weld repair know MainLibrary&ForceBrowserDownloadMgrPrompt=false&vsId={889F6BC6-F0E0-C1BE-84BD-8 enior Resident Inspector has been notified."
The following additional information w ueling outage activities. Inadequate procedure usage and adherence resulted in a Reactor Pre Specification (TS) 3.6.1.3 Condition C was entered. At 1650 CST, the operating handle for the 3A LPC here was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspec ovided in a supplemental report.
This event is being reported in accordance with 10 o fully insert all insertable control rods in cells containing one or more fuel assemblies. The fuel bundle e surveillance and placed HPCI in Trip/Latch, and subsequently closed steam supply isolation valves to ement.
"The Dresden NRC Resident has been notified."
his is a 4-Hour Reporting requirement.
"The LaSalle NRC Resident has been notif ert all insertable control rods in cells containing one or more fuel assemblies. The fuel bundle moves we cordance with applicable procedures.
"This event is reportable in accordance with oFMkcNcTtCrle1bXo/SlbfZ5RrdtqVNkJZ0HP+AbjH5VQcu1ccbXItx1Lf6mwCZADwE3ABhUephqWVnR al interlocks that were manufactured between April 2014 until June 2018.
"The [FV onal information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers esident Inspector has been notified."
The following additional information was obta Loop downstream injection valve and LPCI Loop select logic, both trains of LPCI were made inoperab
The cause of the failure was unclear vendor guidance and insufficient procedural guidance reg V-3 input to RPS A2 as well as one channel of the EOC-RPT trip being INOPERABLE. The appropriate blished firm evidence that a past inoperability condition existed.
The component 2C eplacement of the failed main power transformer and restricting use and/or procurement of the specific e indication was acceptable for continued operation for two refueling cycles under ASME Code Case N-o be at least 273 instances where the part was shipped to customers. Of those 273+, this case is the on el Trip setpoint and the 2C Reactor Feedwater Pump was restarted. Reactor Water Level control has be ncy notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D).
"Ther ment penetration with a degraded valve be manually isolated within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. Manual closure of the com ncy Operating Procedure and stabilized the plant in Mode 3. Decay heat is being removed using the ste y Interim Report Notification per 10 CFR 21.21(a)(2).
VEC will complete the evalua br>
On 5/20/22 at 0905 and again on 5/23/22 at 1256, various equipment on the A VC/VE train dition A. Due to this INOPERABILITY, the system was in a condition that could have prevented the fulf ere replaced during the outage. An engineering analysis on the effects of these valves lifting at the asfo 0230 TS 3.6.4.3 Condition E was entered. SGT flow slowly increased with the running of the train and o l rods inserted, and the scram was uncomplicated.
The cause of this event is fore 4/22 at 0230 TS 3.6.4.3 Condition E was entered. SGT flow slowly increased with the running of the tra re in the "intermediate" or "open" position. This resulted in the 0B train of VC not being operable for 48 ot cause of the feedwater regulating valve failing full-open has not yet been determined. A root cause in t of a safety function.
The probable cause of the events was determined to be inad cy operating procedure LGA-001 and stabilized the plant in Mode 3. Decay heat is removed by dischar vegetation and grass for the Unit 2/3 Intake Bay 13 bar racks, securing one Circulating Water pump, a RC Resident Inspector has been notified."
* *
- UPDATE ON 12/13/22 AT 1825 ES to mitigate the potential for corrosion induced failure over time.
Contact Informatio not impact any future procurements.
Submitted Date
11/
level identified to be less than 501.5 feet. At 1800 CDT, UHS water level was restored to be>/= 501 pen. The root cause of the feedwater regulating valve failing full-open was due to the feedwater regulat y, a second fuel bundle move within the quadrant was in progress with the fuel bundle seated, but not nformation was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Repo dures and stabilized the plant in mode 3. Decay heat is being removed by discharging steam to the ma
is part of the feedwater isolation valve assembly and failure to shift will prevent the feedwater isolation e power supply. The fire was reported extinguished at 0240 CDT on September 26, 2022.
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ng to the weld surface due to thermal and/or pressure stresses during plant operation. The indications w
>
On 5/20/22 at 0905 and again on 5/23/22 at 1256, various equipment on the A VC/VE tra e B VE train was declared inoperable. With both the A and B control room area ventilation air conditionin trol rods inserted, and the scram was uncomplicated.
The cause of this event is fo 0752, control room operators would have been unaware that the ERO notification was not successful. T PS power to the alternate power supply. The fire was reported extinguished at 0240 CDT on September his issue constitutes a loss of offsite communications capability and is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b his issue constitutes a loss of offsite communications capability and is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(
his issue constitutes a loss of offsite communications capability and is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(
ot successful. Therefore, this issue constitutes a loss of offsite communications capability and is report ot successful. Therefore, this issue constitutes a loss of offsite communications capability and is report ot successful. Therefore, this issue constitutes a loss of offsite communications capability and is report cting the main generator from the grid. This resulted in a turbine trip and automatic reactor scram. The on was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidan eportability thresholds applicable to this issue at the time of the event, and there was no loss of safety fu s established firm evidence that a past inoperability condition existed.
Reportab ) Charging Water Stop Valve was closed. The Low Charging Water Header Pressure scram signal was isor (IM FLS) used the incorrect process to update the work instructions for installation of the jumpers. T as a degraded voltage adjustment potentiometer on the associated MG set, which ca d the LPCS pump was restored to operable status.
This condition could have prev S power to the alternate power supply. The fire was reported extinguished at 0240 CDT on September of other government agency in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi).
"There wa hese jumpers prevented 0PR031J and 0PR032J, Main Control Room Outside Air Intake A Monitors fro
"Operations responded using the emergency operating procedure and stabilized the plant in Mode the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
is determined the indication was acceptable for continued operation for two refueling as been notified."
Generator (DG) sequencer testing due to installed jumpers on 0PR031J and 0PR032J, Main Control Ro an automatic scram from full power due to a trip of the main turbine. <
en Unit 2 HPCI system to an operable status. All other emergency core cooling systems remained oper ndition
existed.
The component 1 C71-N006G is the TSV-4 closu S) Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.7.5, "Auxiliary Feedwater (AF) System," Condition A, "One A p>The cause of the event is an improperly tuned Level Controller for the 2A MSDT allowing the high lev akage which resulted in diesel lubricating oil system contamination above specified limits. Paragon con alle County Nuclear Generating Station (LaSalle) with serial numbers 33 and 34.
F Cooling Systems. Technical Specification 3.5.1 Condition G was entered and HPCI was declared inop t 02:51 CST following replacement and
calibration of the Electric Governorâ Remote (EG-R event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid a on 3 EDGs automatically started as designed when the emergency AC power system valid actuation s a condition prohibited by TS per 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B).
The fuel bundle spacers ater system.
"Operations responded using procedure 1BwEP-0 and stabilized the p to the actuation as all rods were already full-in.
The cause of the actuatio ong>The condition was an invalid actuation because it was not the result of actual plant</stron r, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and an eight-hour, non-emergency notificat 1 unit auxiliary transformer (UAT), resulting in the Division 1 emergency diesel generator (EOG nd 1B auxiliary feedwater (AF) pumps were manually started by the Control Room crew in an attempt to temperature control was restored to operable status at 1634 CDT on 7/7/2024."
isolation valves actuated closed in multiple systems on valid Group II and Group Ill signals as a result o and operating life of the explosive charge be followed, as applicable. Since the five-year expir o support transmission system operator testing of power line L0104 relays, o life. Therefore, the current depletion limits that define nuclear end of life are not sufficient to prevent cra ontrol System were simultaneously inoperable resulting in a condition that could have preven 72(b)(3)(ii)(A).
"There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant e Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system tripped during performance of Surveillance R tyle="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255); color: rgb(48, 132, 250);">ML23115A157</a>)
2223 CST, Quad Cities Unit 2 had an automatic scram from 38 percent power due to a trip of the main wn as Embedded Flaw Repair (EFR) of Control Rod Drive Mechanism (CROM) Penetration 31, four rou 87B8CA200000}&wId=638192682183174057" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" style="c was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:<
essure Vessel Water Inventory Control (RPV WIC) related drainage event through control rod drive ven I Suction Relief Valve was moved to the down position in accordance with station procedure and TS 3.
ctor has been notified."
The AC system w 0 CFR 50. 73(a)(2)(iv)(A), an event that resulted in automatic actuation of a system listed in paragraph moves were determined to be part of the planned and analyzed sequence for the refuel shuffle, Theref o HPCI making it unavailable for automatic operation.
The causes of this event are the failure of fied."
ere determined to be part of the planned and analyzed sequence for the refuel shuffle. Therefore, the 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because the discovered condition affected the functionality of an emergency r RstKsFkibrTVgCfAktetrzyTN/rPIBMr+89pET3QSp6W+Z+l8XQFAmYAbAAzKfIioPQRtA11HQbfWukTzuD VRs] are designed and qualified to open and close on demand. The FVRs sporadically failed to electrica Report Guidance:
The repair is scheduled during the refueling outage.
ained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:
<p ble. Due to this inoperability, the system was in a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a arding the orientation for the installation of the internal plunger well plastic guides. The guides were inc LCO Conditions and Required Actions were entered and tracked. The RPS and EOCRPT functions we C71-N006G is the TSV-4 Closure Reactor Protection System (RPS) channel A2 scram limit switch. Thi type of bushing that failed. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50. 73(a)(2)(iv)(A),
-729-6 ASME Section XI requirements. The indication will be repaired within the next two refuel cycles.
nly known instance of a failure associated with the coil.
Sites that Flowserve shipp een established in a normal band. The cause and details of the event are under investigation.
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re was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspecto panion PCIV valve 1-1001-29B, 1 B LPCI Loop Downstream Stop Valve, including opening of the elect eam bypass valves to the condenser and the safety relief valves did not lift as a result of the trip. React ation and provide a determination of reportability in accordance with Part 21 no later than 09/12/2022.</
tripped following train swaps to support ongoing maintenance activities. This resulted in the A VC/VE t fillment of a safety function; therefore, this condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency ound settings concluded that all acceptance criteria in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Chapte on 7/4/22 at 1122 the 1/2 B SGT train was declared operable, and TS 3.6.4.3 Condition E was exited.<
ign material partially or completely blocking hydraulic oil flow internal to a servo valve in the 2A FRV tha ain and on 7/4/22 at 1122 the 1/2 B SGT train was declared operable, and TS 3.6.4.3 Condition E was e days. Once identified, the actuator arm and limit switch were adjusted to properly make up the closed nvestigation and failure analysis are ongoing. Results of the root cause report and failure analysis will b dequate isolation between the A and B VC/VE trains. This allowed the VE return fan to spin backwards rging steam to the main condenser using the turbine bypass valves. Unit 1 is not affected.
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and transitioning to closed cycle to restore UHS water level. Additional corrective actions will be provide ST FROM KRYSTIAN JARONCZYK TO ADAM KOZIOL * * *
"The notification is be on: Gerard Hanson, Vice President and General Manager of Rosemount Nuclear Instruments, Inc. (952 /01/2022
Event Date
10/31/2022
1.5 feet. The cause of low water level was due to accumulation of river vegetation and grass on the Un ting valve pilot valve assembly not operating due to a manufacturing byproduct inside the pilot valve int re leased from the fuel handling machine grapple. Operators verified the following actions were met: T ort Guidance:
With both trains of control room area ventilation air conditioning syste ain condenser using the turbine bypass valves.
"Unit 1 was unaffected by the even valve from closing on demand.
Flowserve was initially notified on September 11, 2
The cause of the 2A RPS loss of normal power was a degraded voltage adjust potentiometer ( were reduced to an acceptable dimension by grinding/blending the indications to meet the applicable a ain tripped following train swaps to support ongoing maintenance activities. This resulted in the A VC/V ng (CRAC) trains inoperable, the system was in a condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a sa oreign material partially or completely blocking hydraulic oil flow internal to a servo valve in the 2B FRV Therefore, this issue constitutes a loss of offsite communications capability and is reportable under 10 r 26, 2022.
The cause of the 2A RPS loss of normal power was a degraded voltag b)(3)(xiii), 'The licensee shall notify the NRC as soon as practical and in all cases within eight hours of t (b)(3)(xiii), 'The licensee shall notify the NRC as soon as practical and in all cases within eight hours of (b)(3)(xiii), 'The licensee shall notify the NRC as soon as practical and in all cases within eight hours of table under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), 'The licensee shall notify the NRC as soon as practical and in all c table under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), 'The licensee shall notify the NRC as soon as practical and in all c table under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), 'The licensee shall notify the NRC as soon as practical and in all c root cause of the failure of GCB 4510 to properly open, and subsequent trip open of GCB 4506, was d nce:
LaSalle Unit 1 is in a 7 day limiting condition for operation.
< unction. The condition is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50. 73(a)(2)(i)(B) for operation or cond bility and Safety Analysis
There were no reportability thresholds met for this issue at the tim s verified to be bypassed at the start of the Hydrostatic Test. The scram signal was then restored during The IM FLS changed the installation instructions and did not change the restoration instructions of the aused the output voltage to fluctuate. The RPS bus loss resulted in general containment isolation signa ented the LPCS system from performing its safety function. This condition is reportable in accordance w 26, 2022.
The cause of the 2A RPS loss of normal power was a degraded voltage as no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has om causing 0A Train VC actuations when required during 1A DG sequencer testing. 0PR031J
- 3. Decay heat is being removed by discharging steam to the main condenser using the turbine bypass cycles under ASME Code Case N-729-6 ASME Section XI requirements. The indication will be re oom Outside Air Intake A Monitors which prevented the actuation of 0A VC train. Jumpers were installe
A fault in the Essential Service System (ESS) caused a feedwater heater (FWH) system transient</
able during this time period.
"There was no impact on the health and safety of the ure Reactor Protection System (RPS) channel A2 scram limit switch.
This device is req AF train inoperable." Maintenance was performed to repair fuel leaks and crankcase oil was changed. T vel turbine trip to be
reached following a FWH transient. Completed corrective action was a com ncluded their evaluation on December 18, 2023, which determined that this condition, if left uncorrected or corrective actions, VEC repaired and returned the valve with serial number 34 to LaSalle. To preven perable. Venting was performed to restore the system to operable, which was confirmed via non-destruc
). Engineering personnel suspected that the RCIC system trip was due to a<
actuation of the Reactor Protection System.
"There was no impact on the health a ignal was received.
"This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.7 s shifted out of position over the previous operating cycle. This condition was identified during the proc plant in mode 3. Decay heat is removed by steam dumps via the main condenser. 1A and 1B auxiliary on was a deficient procedure that allowed a scram signal to remain active when it was not required.</st ng>
conditions and not an intentional manual action. Actuations and isolations that tion per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) for the Group II and Group III isolation.
"Operat G) to automatically start and load onto the 141Y bus, causing a load shed of the 141 o restore SG water level prior to the trip. The trip was uncomplicated as all systems responded as expe of low reactor water level.
The cause of the DEHC trip signal was intermit ration date was exceeded for the three identified TIP shear valves, the Bases requirements of SR 3.6.1 oil circuit breaker (OCB) 1-13 tripped open on differential current resulting in the loss acking, and the continued use of uninspected CRBs can lead to further cracking. With severe cracking nted the fulfillment of a safety function and was reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification p t personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
Requirement (SR) 3.5.3.3. This SR is performed when RCIC steam supply pressure is at the h
>
Details of LER were not changed, only administrative changes to the document.
turbine. A Digital Electro-Hydraulic Control (DEHC) erroneous Speed Difference Trip si unded indications were discovered that were determined to be unacceptable per the acceptance criteria olor: rgb(48, 132, 250);">ML23115A157</a>)
Details of LER were not changed, o
This was determined during random FFD testing. The individual performed no saf nt valves. The procedure was not place-kept, nor were all the required physical actio 6.1.3 Condition C was exited. The valve had been replaced during refueling outage activities<
as declared inoperable due to the discovery of a tripped bre
10 f
f a level switch in the HPCI Gland Seal Condenser (GSC) Ho response facility.
DvAB3CVngDV9trcuyI6snK4tmqs9R7QWtfIqrXoynKAbyfgBgCDVgpEzXyg2QfdPmVZ3QZ8s9FJiLPv1d ally close on demand because the mechanical interlock is not returning to the de-energi p>
The repair is scheduled during the refueli a safety function; therefore, this condition is be correctly installed during rebuild which caused ere maintained due to the redund is device is required by technical specifications to suppo
, an event that resulted in automatic
This event is reportable in ac ped the Model 38878-8 Solen
"The Unit 2 scram was not complicated or has been notified."
trical breaker MCC 18/19-5 Cubicle F1 to the valve, rendered or vessel inventory and pressure are b
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Currently, Catawba Nuclear Station is the rain being declared inoperable. With both the A and B trai y notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) er 15 analyses are still met. This condition of multiple pr
The cause of the SGT low flow condition w at caused it to move rapidly from the half open p exited.
The cause of the SGT low flow conditi limit and the fan was started, restoring the be provided in a supplemental report.
s resulting in locked rotor
"There was no impact on the heal ed in a sup eing corrected to state:
"At 0119 [CDT] on October 7, 2022, it was det 2-949-5200)
Affecte nit 2/3 Intake Bay 13 bar racks. The root cause was procedure troduced during the manufacturing process S 3.3.1.2 Action E. 1 - Immediately Suspend Cor ems inoperable, the plant entered a 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> lim nt and remains at 100 percent power.
2022. Flowserve provided response to Duk POT) on the output breaker, The cause of the isophase bus duct fire rema cceptance criteria in SME Section Ill.
This e VE train being declared inoperable. With both the A and B trains bein afety function.
The cause of the A VC Compressor tr that caused it to move rapidly to the fully open pos CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), 'The licensee e adjust potentiometer (POT) on the output breaker. The most likely cause of t he occurrence of any even the occurrence of any eve the occurrence of any eve cases within eight hours of the cases within eight hours of the cases within eight hours of the ue to corrosion of the GCB 4510 air system charging valve.
p>
me of the eve g the transition into scram time work order.
This als that affecte with 10 CFR 50. 73(a)(2)(v)(D) as an event or condition that e adjust potentiometer (POT) on the output breaker. The cause of the isophase s been notified."
J and 0PR032J were declared inoperable. Once identified, the jumpers were removed fr s valves. Unit 1 is not aff epaired within the next two refuel cycles.
The indic ed to support Unit 1 Bus Outage and were not removed during the completion and restoration of the b
/u>. The drain valve for the 2A Moisture Sep public or plant personnel. The NRC Resi quired by technical specifications to support LCO 3.3.1.1 function 8 (RPS) an The 2B AF train was returned to service on September 23, 202 mponent recalibration. Planned actions d, could contribute to a su nt recurrence, VEC intends to improve the ctive ultrasonic testing at 1034 CST on 11/20/2023. This event is bei
faulty EG-R; however, subsequent failure analysis identi and safety of the public or plant personnel. The 72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid act ess of insp feedwater pumps were actuated manually prior to the trong>
The LLRT procedure did not bypass the scram signa occurred performed as designed.
tions responded using their emerg Y bus and momentary loss of power to the ected post trip.
The cause of lowering SG water level was the m ttent channel <R1 > core power supply failure, resulti
.3.9 were not met and rendered s of the Unit 1 system auxiliary transformer (SAT). Bus 141 Y (Di of the CRBs, boron loss can occur and nega per 10 CFR 50. 72(b)(3)(v)(D) under ENS 57211 to the NRC. 0B Control Room V higher operating ranges of the system to verify that the RCIC pump can develop the required flow
On 2/24/2023, during performance of the operability surveillance testing of the ignal initiated a Turbine Trip signal. The Unit 2 Main Turbine tripped as designed a in ASME Section Ill.
The cause of these ind nly administrative changes to the document.
On 2/24/2023, during performance o fety related work.
ons taken in the field. TS 3.5.2 requires either
on 11/8/2024. At 0202 on 11/15/2024, D eaker. The site is currently troubleshooting the
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sI3nNfHCKBLRGvzOnlN6rpcCvGV05fPadl2cr5/ZpA