ML23333A139
| ML23333A139 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Nine Mile Point |
| Issue date: | 12/13/2023 |
| From: | Constellation Energy Generation |
| To: | Christopher Lally NRC/RGN-I/DORS/OB |
| References | |
| EPID L-2023-OLL-0044 | |
| Download: ML23333A139 (1) | |
Text
Form 3.3-1 Scenario Outline Facility:
Nine Mile Point Unit 1 Scenario #: NRC Re-exam #1 Scenario Source:
New Op. Test #: 2023 Examiners:
Applicants/
Operators:
Initial Conditions:
The plant is operating at approximately 85% power.
Turnover:
Swap Turbine Building Ventilation exhaust fans in accordance with N1-OP-26 section F.1. Then, raise Reactor power to 90%
using Recirculation flow in accordance with the provided instructions.
Critical Tasks:
CT-1: Given a Station Blackout and failure of EDG 103 to automatically start, the crew will manually start EDG 103 and re-energize PB 103, in accordance with N1-SOP-33A.1 and/or N1-SOP-33A.2. PB 103 must be re-energized within 15 minutes of the start of the Station Blackout.
CT-2: Given a coolant leak inside the Containment, the crew will spray the Containment prior to exceeding the Pressure Suppression Pressure, in accordance with N1-EOP-PC.
Event No.
Malf.
No.
Event Type*
Event Description 1
N/A N - BOP, SRO Swap Turbine Building Ventilation Exhaust Fans N1-OP-26 2
N/A R - ATC, SRO Raise Reactor Power with Recirculation Flow N1-OP-43B 3
SRO MC -
BOP Feedwater Booster Pump Trip with Failure of Standby Pump to Auto-Start N1-SOP-16.1, Technical Specifications 4
SRO Powerboard 102 Electrical Fault N1-SOP-33A.4, Technical Specifications 5
RP01A I - ATC, SRO RPS MG Set 131 Trips ARP F1-3-7, N1-SOP-16.1 6
CW04 C - All Loss of All RBCLC Pumps N1-SOP-11.1, N1-SOP-1, N1-EOP-RPV 7
ED01A ED02A M - All Loss of 115 KV Offsite Power N1-SOP-33A.1 8
BOP Emergency Diesel Generator 103 Fails to Automatically Start N1-SOP-33A.1, N1-SOP-33A.2 9
MS04 C - All MC -
- (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor, (TS)Tech Spec, (MC)Manual Control
Facility: Nine Mile Point Unit 1 Scenario No.: NRC Re-exam #1 Op-Test No.: 2023
- 1. Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2)
Events 8 & 9 2
- 2. Abnormal events (2-4)
Events 3, 4, 5, 6 4
- 3. Major transients (1-2)
Event 7 1
- 4. EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1-2)
- 5. Entry into a contingency EOP with substantive actions (1 per scenario set) 0
- 6. Pre-identified critical tasks (2) 2
NOTES Page 1 of 30 NMP1 NRC 2023 Scenario 2 January 2023 Copy ___ of ___
Training Id: NMP1 NRC 2023 Re-exam Scenario #1 Revision:
0.0 Title
Re-exam Simulator Scenario #1 Signature / Printed Name Date Developed By Signature on File / Mike Dougherty 03/28/23 Validated By Eric Larson 05/22/23 Tom Wallace Keith Stoutenger Facility Reviewer Signature on File / Ryan Bracht 05/22/23
NOTES Page 2 of 30 NMP1 NRC 2023 Scenario 2 January 2023 References
- 1.
N1-OP-26, Turbine Building Ventilation System
- 2.
N1-OP-43B, Normal Power Operations
- 3.
N1-SOP-16.1, Feedwater System Failures
- 4.
N1-SOP-33A.4, Loss of PB-102 or PB-103
- 5.
N1-SOP-11.1, RBCLC Failure
- 6.
N1-SOP-1, Reactor Scram
- 7.
N1-EOP-RPV, RPV Control
- 8.
N1-EOP-PC, Primary Containment Control
- 9.
N1-EOP-1, NMP1 EOP Support Procedure
- 10.
N1-SOP-33A.1, Loss of 115 KV
- 11.
N1-SOP-33A.2, Station Blackout
- 12.
Unit 1 Technical Specifications
Page 3 of 30 NMP1 NRC 2023 Scenario 2 January 2023 Instructor Information A.
Scenario Description Sequence of Events / Expected Crew Response:
The scenario begins at approximately 85% power. The crew will begin by swapping Turbine Building Ventilation exhaust fans in accordance with N1-OP-26 section F.1. Then, the crew will raise Reactor power to 90% using Recirculation flow in accordance with the provided instructions.
An operating Feedwater Booster pump will trip. The standby Feedwater Booster pump will fail to auto-start. The crew will manually start the standby Feedwater Booster pump to restore normal system pressures. The SRO will determine the Tech Spec impact for loss of a redundant HPCI component.
An electrical fault will cause Powerboard 102 to de-energize. The crew will respond per N1-SOP-33A.4. The crew will shutdown EDG 102 and take action to re-energize Powerboard 16B. The SRO will determine the Tech Spec impact for loss of this power source.
Then, RPS MG set 131 will trip. The crew will enter N1-SOP-16.1 due to the resulting partial loss of Feedwater heating. The crew must recover the RPS trip bus by shifting to its alternate supply.
Next, the running RBCLC pumps will trip. RBCLC pump 12 is out of service for maintenance. The crew will enter N1-SOP-11.1, RBCLC Failure. The crew will scram the Reactor, trip Recirculation pumps, initiate Emergency Condensers, and shut the MSIVs.
Following the scram, a loss of 115KV power will occur. EDG 103 will fail to automatically start, resulting in a Station Blackout. The crew will manually start EDG 103 to exit the Station Blackout (Critical Task). A steam leak will develop in the Drywell. The crew will enter N1-EOP-PC and re-enter N1-EOP-RPV. The crew will initiate Containment Sprays to prevent exceeding Pressure Suppression Pressure, in accordance with N1-EOP-PC (Critical Task).
- 1.
Termination Criteria
- a. RPV water level controlled in assigned band, Powerboard 103 energized, Primary Containment pressure maintained per N1-EOP-PC
Page 4 of 30 NMP1 NRC 2023 Scenario 2 January 2023
- 2.
Critical Tasks
- 3.
Length
- a.
~60 minutes
- 4.
Mitigation Strategy Code
- a.
DMS-SE-01, Station blackout
- b.
DMS-SE-02, loss of off-site power or loss of grid CT-1, Given a Station Blackout and failure of EDG 103 to automatically start, the crew will manually start EDG 103 and re-energize PB 103, in accordance with N1-SOP-33A.1 and/or N1-SOP-33A.2. PB 103 must be re-energized within 15 minutes of the start of the Station Blackout.
Justification:
Safety Significance: Loss of all AC power significantly degrades the ability to control the plant.
Cueing: Multiple annunciators and equipment losses will indicate the loss of all AC power.
Measurable Performance Indicators: Manipulation of EDG 103 controls will provide observable action for the evaluation team.
Performance Feedback: Restoration of AC voltage and multiple systems will provide performance feedback to the crew regarding the start of EDG 103.
Bounding Criteria: Based on recommendation of Operations department personnel involved in scenario review.
CT-2, Given a coolant leak inside the Containment, the crew will spray the Containment prior to exceeding the Pressure Suppression Pressure, in accordance with N1-EOP-PC.
Justification:
Safety Significance: Initiating Containment Sprays reduces Primary Containment pressure. This reduces stresses on the Drywell and Torus, assists in avoiding chugging that may cause fatigue failure of the LOCA downcomers, and avoids the need for a blowdown. These benefits reduce challenges to the fuel cladding, the RPV, and the Primary Containment.
Cueing: Multiple Primary Containment pressure and temperature indications and annunciators will indicate degrading conditions. N1-EOP-PC provides direction to initiate Containment Sprays.
Measurable Performance Indicators: Manipulation of Containment Spray pump control switches will provide observable actions for the evaluation team.
Performance Feedback: Containment Spray flow and lowering Primary Containment pressure and temperature indications will provide performance feedback regarding success of crew actions to initiate Containment Sprays.
Bounding Criteria: Based on procedural requirements in N1-EOP-PC. Exceeding the Pressure Suppression limit would require an RPV Blowdown.
Page 5 of 30 NMP1 NRC 2023 Scenario 2 January 2023
- c.
DMS-PC-03, high containment pressure; drywell sprays required; maintain safe region PSP; no blowdown required
- 5.
Technical Specifications
- a.
- b.
- 6.
EAL Classification
- a.
Alert EAL MA1 - Loss of offsite power with only single EDG available >15 min
- b.
Possible Site Area Emergency EAL MS1 - Station Blackout >15 min
- c.
Alert EAL FA1 - Loss of RCS barrier
- 7.
Special Orders
- a.
None
Page 6 of 30 NMP1 NRC 2023 Scenario 2 January 2023 B.
Initial Conditions
- 1.
IC Number
- a.
IC-148
- 2.
Presets / With Triggers
- a.
Malfunctions
- 1)
CW04B, RBCLC Pump 12 Trip Inserted
- 2)
FW02A, FEEDWATER BOOSTER PUMP TRIP 11 TRG 1
- 3)
ED07, PB 102 Electrical Fault TRG 2
- 4)
RP01A, Reactor Trip Bus Motor Generator Trips 131 TRG 3
- 5)
CW04A, RBCLC Pump 11 Trip TRG 4
- 6)
CW04C, RBCLC Pump 13 Trip, DT=30 TRG 4
- 7)
ED01A, 115 kV Line 4 (JAF) Loss of Offsite Power, DT=5:00 TRG 5
- 8)
ED02A, 115 kV Line 1 (South Oswego) Loss of Offsite Power, DT=5:00 TRG 5
- 9)
DG04B, DG 103 Fail Auto Start Contact 27Y-2 Inserted
- 10)
MS04, Steam Line Break in PC Area, FV=7, RT=2:00 TRG 6
- b.
Remotes
- 1)
RP21, RPS UPS 162 TROUBLE ANN RESET, FV=reset TRG 25
- 2)
RP01, Rx Trip Bus 131 Pwr Source, FV=maint TRG 26
- 3)
MS04, FW Htr String 11 LVL Reset Pushbutton, FV=reset TRG 30
- 4)
MS06, FW Htr String 13 LVL Reset Pushbutton, FV=reset TRG 30
- 5)
MS01, HP FW Htr 115 LVL Reset Pushbutton, FV=reset TRG 30
- 6)
MS03, HP FW Htr 135 LVL Reset Pushbutton, FV=reset TRG 30
- c.
Overrides
- 1)
DI-3415, 4H17/51-02A C FRM B, FV=off (FWBP 12 auto-start failure)
Inserted
Page 7 of 30 NMP1 NRC 2023 Scenario 2 January 2023
- d.
- 1)
None
- e.
Event Triggers Event #
Event Action Command TRG 5, Triggers the loss of 115 KV after the Reactor Mode Switch is taken to Shutdown zdrpstdn==1 None
- f.
Equipment Out of Service
- 1)
RBCLC pump 12 is out of service with an info/caution tag
- g.
Support Documentation
- 1)
N1-OP-26 section F.1
- 2)
ReMA for power change with Recirc
- 3)
N1-OP-43B marked up to step F.3.27.
- h.
Miscellaneous
- 1) Verify Turbine Building Exhaust fan 11 and Turbine Building Supply fans 111/121 are operating in fast speed.
- 2) Verify HWC is lineup up to FWBP 11.
Page 8 of 30 NMP1 NRC 2023 Scenario 2 January 2023 SHIFT TURNOVER INFORMATION ON COMING SHIFT: N D
DATE: Today PART I:
To be performed by the oncoming Operator before assuming the shift.
Control Panel Walkdown (all panels) (SRO, ROs)
PART II:
To be reviewed by the oncoming Operator before assuming the shift.
LCO Status (SRO)
Shift Turnover Information Sheet Evolutions/General Information/Equipment Status:
Reactor power is approximately 85%.
RBCLC pump 12 is out of service for maintenance.
PART III:
Remarks/Planned Evolutions:
Shift Turbine Building Ventilation fans from fast to slow speed per N1-OP-26 section F.3.1.
Then, swap Turbine Building Ventilation exhaust fans in accordance with N1-OP-26 section F.1. Then, return Turbine Building Ventilation fans to fast speed per N1-OP-26 section F.3.2.
Then, raise Reactor power to 90% using Recirculation flow per the provided ReMA and N1-OP-43B. N1-OP-43B step F.3.27 is in progress.
Page 9 of 30 NMP1 NRC 2023 Scenario 2 January 2023 Shift Turnover Instructor Actions / Plant Response Operator Actions Take the Simulator out of freeze before the crew enters for the pre-shift walkdown.
- Verify annunciator sound turned on
- If recording scenario, start the recording device during the pre-shift walkdown Allow no more than 5 minutes to walkdown the panels.
Crew
- Walkdown panels
- Conduct shift turnover brief
- Assume the shift
Page 10 of 30 NMP1 NRC 2023 Scenario 2 January 2023 Event #1: Swap Turbine Building Ventilation Exhaust Fans Event Information
- Crew will swap Turbine Building Ventilation Exhaust fans per N1-OP-26 SRO
- Direct shifting Turbine Building Ventilation fans from fast to slow speed per N1-OP-26 section F.3.1
- Direct swap of Turbine Building Ventilation Exhaust fans per N1-OP-26 section F.1
- Direct shifting Turbine Building Ventilation fans from slow to fast speed per N1-OP-26 section F.3.2 BOP
- Acknowledge direction from the SRO
- Shifts Turbine Building Ventilation fans from fast to slow speed per N1-OP-26 section F.3.1:
o Place in service Turbine Building Supply Fan control switch to SLOW o
Place in service Turbine Building Exhaust Fan control switch to SLOW o
Verify Turbine Building D/P being maintained at a negative pressure
- Swaps Turbine Building Ventilation Exhaust fans per N1-OP-26 section F.1:
o Verify running fan (11) is in SLOW speed o
Start standby fan (12) in SLOW speed o
Place desired fan (11) in STOP o
Place running fan (12) in FAST speed
- Shifts Turbine Building Ventilation fans from slow to fast speed per N1-OP-26 section F.3.2:
o Place in service Turbine Building Exhaust Fan control switch to FAST o
Place in service Turbine Building Supply Fan control switch to FAST o
Verify Turbine Building D/P being maintained at a negative pressure
Page 11 of 30 NMP1 NRC 2023 Scenario 2 January 2023 Event #2: Raise Reactor Power with Recirculation Flow Event Information
- The crew will raise power with recirc flow per the REMA SRO Directs power ascension with Recirculation flow in accordance with N1-OP-43B and the Reactivity Maneuver Instruction (REMA)
Provides oversight of reactivity maneuver ATC Acknowledges direction from SRO Raises Recirculation flow with master Recirculation flow controller Monitors APRMs Monitors Recirculation flow Monitors Feedwater flow and RPV water level Observes power-to-flow map restrictions Note:
Recommend initiating the next event once Reactor power has been raised 2-3%.
BOP Monitors individual RRPs for response Individual M/A-Speed Control stations trending uniformly Individual RRP indications trending normally for speed increase Monitors Feedwater controls for proper response FWP 13 FCV responding to power change RPV water level remains within program band (65 - 83)
Page 12 of 30 NMP1 NRC 2023 Scenario 2 January 2023 Event #3: Feedwater Booster Pump Trip Event Information
- FWBP 11 will trip and FWBP 12 will fail to auto start
- The crew will respond by starting the standby FWBP
FW02A, FEEDWATER BOOSTER PUMP TRIP 11 TRG 1 The following override prevents Feedwater Booster Pump 12 from Auto Starting on low header discharge pressure:
DI-3415 4H17/51-02A C FRM B, FV=off Inserted RPV water level lowers Feedwater Booster Pump header pressure lowers Expected Annunciators:
H3-1-6, REACTOR FW BOOSTER P11 TRIP H2-3-5, HWC Trouble CREW Acknowledge/report annunciator H3-1-6 REACTOR FW BOOSTER P11 TRIP Diagnose trip of Feedwater Booster Pump 11 SRO Acknowledges report If BOP does not manually start FWBP 12, directs starting FWBP 12 Enters Tech Spec 3.1.8.b Determines redundant component inoperable in HPCI train 11, thus 15 day LCO applies Initiates surveillance requirement 4.1.8.c for redundant component operability verification, as time permits
Page 13 of 30 NMP1 NRC 2023 Scenario 2 January 2023 ATC Monitors plant parameters May perform Emergency Power Reduction per N1-SOP-1.1, if required to maintain RPV water level
Page 14 of 30 NMP1 NRC 2023 Scenario 2 January 2023 Note:
The operator may start FWBP 12 prior to referencing a procedure as a backup to a failed automatic action.
In this case, the operator should follow up by reviewing the applicable procedure.
Role Play: When dispatched as Operator to investigate, wait 2 minutes, then report:
FWBP 11 breaker tripped on overcurrent No abnormal indications at FWBP 12 breaker No abnormal indications at FWBP 11 or 12.
Role Play: If dispatched as Operator to swap HWC to FWBP 12(13), wait 5 minutes and insert the following remote:
FW46B(C), HWC H2 IV 214.1-16(20) SW553(2) to FWBP 12(13), FV=auto Then report that HWC injection has been transferred from FWBP 11 to FWBP 12(13).
Role Play: If asked to report the alarm on the HWC control panel, wait 2 minutes and then report H2 Flow Setpoint Mismatch is in alarm.
Role Play: If dispatched to reset the HWC alarm, wait to minutes and insert remote:
FW36C, Hydrogen Water Chemistry Annunciator Remote Reset, FV=Reset Then report task completion.
BOP Report alarm and respond per H3-1-6 Confirms alarm on computer (E049 RX FW BOOST PMP 11 TRIP)
Recognizes/diagnoses failure of the standby pump to automatically start Manually starts FWBP 12 Notifies crew of failure of FWBP 12 to auto start Dispatches operators to shift Hydrogen Water Chemistry injection from FWBP 11 to FWBP 12 May green flag FWBP 11 May take the FWBP 11 control switch to PTL
Page 15 of 30 NMP1 NRC 2023 Scenario 2 January 2023 Event #4: Powerboard 102 Electrical Fault Event Information
- A fault occurs on PB 102
- Crew will respond per N1-SOP-33A.4 When directed by examiner, insert malfunction:
ED07, PB 102 ELECTRICAL FAULT TRG 2 A4-4-2, POWER BD 16 LOW BUS VOLTAGE A4-1-6, POWER BD 102 BUS VOLTAGE LOW A4-3-5, DSL GEN 102 START-RUN OFFNORMAL (possible if EDG not secured rapidly with loss of cooling water)
The following major loads will be lost as a result of the loss of PB 102 and PB 16B:
Core Spray Pumps/Topping Pumps 111/121 Containment Spray Pumps 111/112 Static Batt Charger 161A/B RPS UPS 162A/B ESW Pump 11 CRD Pump 11 RBCLC Pump 11 Liquid Poison Pump 11 CREVS 11 RBEVS 11 EDG 102 Auxiliaries Condensate Transfer Pump 11 Emerg. Cond. 12 Inside Steam IV (39-10R)
CREW Acknowledge/report annunciators Recognize/report the following:
Loss of PB 102 and PB 16B EDG 102 started but not supplying PB 102 R1012 tripped (PB 102 normal supply)
Page 16 of 30 NMP1 NRC 2023 Scenario 2 January 2023 Note: N1-SOP-33A.4 and N1-OP-45 provide guidance for determining the TS impact of this event.
SRO Acknowledge report from crew Directs entry into N1-SOP-33A.4, Loss of Powerboard 102 or 103 Reviews loads lost as result of PB 102 Reviews Tech Specs for impact of loss of PB102:
o Exited when PB 16B is re-energized:
o TS 3.1.2, Liquid Poison System o
TS 3.2.7, Reactor Coolant System Isolation Valves (Limiting LCO before PB 16B is reenergized - requires initiating a normal orderly shutdown within one hour and having reactor in the cold shutdown condition within ten hours.)
TS 3.4.4, RBEVS o
Not exited when PB 16 B is re-energized:
o TS 3.1.4, Core Spray System o
TS 3.1.5, ADS (Requires to be less than 110 psig in 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br />) o TS 3.3.7, Containment Spray o
TS 3.6.3, Emergency Power Sources Recognize that TS 3.1.5 is the most limiting TS when PB 16B is restored Role Play: If directed to shift RPV level CRD backfill per N1-OP-58, H.2.0 reply that you will get the procedure and shift RPV level CRD backfill. Wait 5 minutes and report backfill has been shifted.
ATC Monitor plant parameters
Page 17 of 30 NMP1 NRC 2023 Scenario 2 January 2023 Role Play:
When directed in investigate Powerboards, wait two minutes, then report:
Powerboard 102 breaker R1012 tripped on overcurrent Nothing is abnormal at Powerboard 16 Electrical Maintenance reports Powerboard 16 is free of faults.
If asked, Electrical Maintenance reports Powerboard 102 is faulted.
If asked, report EDG 102 has been shutdown and nothing abnormal to report.
Role Plays:
When directed to perform battery load reductions, acknowledge direction.
When directed to monitor ICVs, acknowledge direction.
If asked to verify PB 16A amps, wait 2 minutes, then report that they are <962 amps.
BOP Executes N1-SOP-33A.4 Answers Is EDG 102 Running? Yes Places breaker R1012 in PTL Places EDG 102 control switch in emergency stop Answers Is loss of PB 102 due to a fault on PB 16B? Unknown Dispatches operator / maintenance to investigate PB 102 and PB 16B Dispatches operator to perform load shedding per attachment 1 Coordinates with Electrical Maintenance to monitor battery ICVs Dispatches operator to charge Battery 11 with MG 167 per N1-OP-48 section H Acknowledge report PB 16 is free of faults Re-enters N1-SOP-33A.4 Re-energizes PB 16B:
Verifies Breaker R1012 in PTL Verifies open R1043, PB 16B Supply Bkr Verifies CRD Pump 12 running Verifies the following loads are green flagged:
ESW Pump 11 RBCLC Pump 13 SDC Pump 11 & 13 Verifies RBCLC Header Pressure 40 psig Resets Lockout 86-16 Places CRD Pump 11 Control Switch to Stop Closes R1042, PB 16A-B Tie Breaker Re-energize loads on PB 16B NOT to exceed 962 amps on PB 16A (local indicator)
Verifies reference leg backfill aligned to running CRD pump per N1-OP-58 as time permits
Page 18 of 30 NMP1 NRC 2023 Scenario 2 January 2023 Role Play:
When dispatched to reset UPS 162 trouble alarm, wait 1 minute, then insert remote:
RP21, RPS UPS 162 TROUBLE ANN RESET, FV=reset TRG 25 Then report that UPS 162 has transferred back to the normal source and the trouble alarm has been reset.
BOP Continued Dispatches operator to reset UPS 162 trouble alarm
Page 19 of 30 NMP1 NRC 2023 Scenario 2 January 2023 Event #5: RPS MG Set 131 Trip Event Information
- RPS MG Set 131 trips causing a half scram on RPS 11 When directed by examiner, insert malfunction:
RP01A, Reactor Trip Bus Motor Generator Trips 131 TRG 3 CREW Recognize/report RPS 11 half scram Diagnose trip of RPS MG set 131 Scram solenoid lights for RPS 11 de-energize Feedwater temperature slowly lowers Reactor power slowly rises Expected annunciators: (Immediate)
F1-3-7, RX. TRIP BUS M-G SET 131 TROUBLE F1-3-1, RPS CH 11 MAN REACTOR TRIP F1-2-1, RPS CH 11 AUTO REACTOR TRIP SRO Acknowledges reports Directs execution of ARPs Directs entry into N1-OP-48 Section H.4 Directs entry into N1-SOP-16.1 for loss of Feedwater heating May direct emergency power reduction per N1-SOP-1.1 if needed to control Feedwater temperatures or Reactor power Provides oversight of reactivity changes Note: A power reduction is possible, but not expected.
RO Monitors plant parameters Lowers power per SOP-1.1 as required to control Feedwater temperatures or Reactor power Resets half scram
Page 20 of 30 NMP1 NRC 2023 Scenario 2 January 2023 Role Play: When dispatched as operator to investigate problem with MG Set 131, wait two minutes then report that you can smell burnt insulation in the vicinity of MG Set 131 motor. Report that the drive motor breaker tripped on overcurrent. If asked, report no overvoltage trip occurred.
Role Play: When dispatched as operator to transfer Reactor Trip Bus 131 to I&C Bus 130A, wait 2 minutes and insert remote:
RP01, Rx Trip Bus 131 Pwr Source, FV=maint TRG 26 Then report Reactor Trip Bus 131 has been re-energized from I&C Bus 130A, and that half scram and Feedwater heaters can be reset.
Role Play: When dispatched as operator to reset Feedwater heaters, wait 2 minutes and insert remotes:
MS04, FW Htr String 11 Reset, FV=reset MS06, FW Htr String 13 Reset, FV=reset MS01, HP FW Htr 115 Reset, FV=reset MS03, HP FW Htr 135 Reset, FV=reset TRG 30 Then report 11/13 Feedwater heaters have been reset.
BOP Executes ARPs Dispatches an operator to investigate MG Set 131 Determines I & C Bus 130A is available Obtains SRO permission to perform dead bus transfer of Reactor Trip Bus 131 Dispatches an operator to perform dead bus transfer of Reactor Trip Bus 131 per OP-48 section H.4.0 Enters N1-SOP-16.1 due to loss of Feedwater heating Monitors Feedwater temperatures Acknowledges that Reactor Trip Bus 131 is re-energized Coordinates with RO to reset half scram by depressing the scram reset pushbutton on the E Console Dispatches operator to reset Feedwater heaters
Page 21 of 30 NMP1 NRC 2023 Scenario 2 January 2023 Event #6: All RBCLC Pumps Trip Event Information
- A trip of the running RBCLC pumps occurs with no standby pump available.
- The crew will execute the override actions of N1-SOP-11.1.
When directed by lead examiner, insert malfunction:
CW04A, RBCLC Pump 11 Trip CW04C, RBCLC Pump 13 Trip, DT=30 TRG 4 RBCLC pumps trip RBCLC pressure lowers RBCLC temperature Expected Annunciators:
H1-1-1, REACTOR BLDG COOL PUMP 11 TRIP-V-SUCT H1-3-1, REACTOR BLDG COOL PUMP 13 TRIP-V-SUCT H1-4-1, R BUILDING COOLING WATER PRESS TEMP MAKEUP FLOW K3-4-4, CLEAN-UP SYSTEM ISOLATION K2-4-3, DRYWELL PRESSURE HIGH-LOW CREW Recognize/report trip of RBCLC pump 11 Recognize/report trip of RBCLC pump 13 (30 seconds later, if not in PTL)
Page 22 of 30 NMP1 NRC 2023 Scenario 2 January 2023 SRO Acknowledges reports Directs entry into N1-SOP-11.1 Acknowledges trip of all RBCLC pumps Directs execution of override, including:
Trip Recirculation pumps o
Initiate Emergency Condensers o
Close MSIVs o
Trip RWCU pump Acknowledges scram report Enters N1-EOP-PC, RPV Control, on low RPV water level Answers Are all control rods inserted to at least position 04? YES Directs entry into N1-SOP-1, Reactor Scram Directs RPV water level controlled between 53 and 95 using Feedwater Directs RPV cooldown <100oF/hr using Emergency Condensers Enters N1-EOP-PC, Primary Containment Control, on high Drywell temperature o
Directs lockout of Containment Spray pumps
Page 23 of 30 NMP1 NRC 2023 Scenario 2 January 2023 ATC Depressed manual scram pushbuttons Places Reactor Mode Switch to SHUTDOWN Provides scram report Performs scram verification actions of N1-SOP-1, Reactor Scram:
Confirms all rods inserted Observes Reactor power lowering Places IRMs on range 9 Inserts IRM and SRM detectors Down-ranges IRMs as necessary Verifies main turbine and generator tripped Places Containment Spray pumps in PTL
Page 24 of 30 NMP1 NRC 2023 Scenario 2 January 2023 Note: Depending on timing, Lo-Lo Reactor water level may trip Recirculation pumps, initiate Emergency Condensers, and close MSIVs before operator action.
Note: RWCU will likely trip on high temperature before operator action.
Note: The next event will automatically trigger when the Reactor Mode Switch is taken to shutdown and occur after time delays.
BOP Executes N1-SOP-11.1 Informs crew of need to execute override Enters N1-SOP-1 Performs SOP-1, Reactor Scram, level actions:
Restores RPV level to 53-95 by controlling injection and rejecting through RWCU, as necessary Verifies at least one Electric FWP running Determines RPV water level is recovering Terminates 13 FWP injection as follows:
Places 13 FWP VALVE CONTROL in MANUAL and closes Disengages 13 FWP Gives 29-10, FEEDWATER PUMP 13 BLOCKING VALVE a CLOSE signal Verifies 11/12 FWP controllers in MANUAL and set to zero output Verifies RPV water level above 53 Resets HPCI signal, if required Places desired BYPASS Valve in AUTO, sets to 65-70 inches When RPV level is stable, lines up one FWP, one FWBP, and one Condensate pump If required, closes running electric FWP discharge BV If RPV level reaches 85 and rising, then:
Verifies all Feedwater Pump FCV controllers in manual and set to 0 Secures CRD Pumps not required Maximizes RWCU reject flow Closes FWIVs if required Closes MSIVs if required Maintains RPV water level in assigned band Trips Recirculation pumps Initiates Emergency Condensers
Page 25 of 30 NMP1 NRC 2023 Scenario 2 January 2023 Closes MSIVs Controls RPV pressure as directed using Emergency Condensers Verifies RWCU pump tripped
Page 26 of 30 NMP1 NRC 2023 Scenario 2 January 2023 Events #7, #8, & #9: Loss of 115 KV, EDG 103 Fails to Automatically Start, Steam Leak in Drywell Event Information
- A loss of 115 KV offsite power will occur
- EDG 103 will fail to automatically start, resulting in a Station Blackout until the crew manually starts the EDG
- Rising Drywell pressure and temperature occur The following malfunctions are automatically inserted when the Reactor Mode Switch is placed in Shutdown:
ED01A, 115 kV Line 4 (JAF) Loss of Offsite Power, DT=5:00 ED02A, 115 kV Line 1 (South Oswego) Loss of Offsite Power, DT=5:00 TRG 5 The following preset malfunction prevents EDG 103 from automatically starting:
DG04B, DG 103 Fail Auto Start Contact 27Y-2 Once the crew is at a stable point in N1-SOP-33A.1 with PB 103 re-energized, and when directed by lead examiner, insert malfunction:
MS04, Steam Line Break in PC Area, FV=7, RT=2:00 TRG 6 Role Play: If dispatched to investigate EDG 103 wait 5 minutes and report conditions are normal at EDG 103.
CREW Acknowledges/reports annunciators Recognizes/reports loss of 115 KV Lines 1 and 4 Recognizes/reports EDG 103 fails to automatically start Recognizes/reports degrading Primary Containment conditions (pressure, temperature, humidity, rad levels) (later)
Page 27 of 30 NMP1 NRC 2023 Scenario 2 January 2023 SRO Acknowledges reports Acknowledges loss of 115 KV power and failure of EDG 103 to automatically start Directs manual start of EDG 103 (CT-1.0)
May enter N1-SOP-33A.2 Enters N1-SOP-33A.1 Re-enters N1-EOP-RPV on low RPV water level and high Drywell pressure, as necessary Enters N1-EOP-PC on high Drywell pressure and temperature Directs Containment Spray pumps locked out, if not done previously (unless pump is in Torus cooling)
When torus pressure exceeds 13 psig or drywell temperature approaches 300oF:
Answers Below the Containment Spray Initiation Limit? - Yes Verifies all Recirc pumps are tripped Directs trip of all Drywell cooling fans Directs operation of Containment Spray per EOP-1 attachment 17 (CT-2.0)
Evaluates/monitors position on Pressure Suppression Pressure curve May direct vessel/containment isolation per N1-SOP-40.2
Page 28 of 30 NMP1 NRC 2023 Scenario 2 January 2023 Role Play: When dispatched to perform Attachment 3, Section 1 load reductions, wait 3 minutes, then report task completion.
Role Play: If asked as Power Control to report estimated time of Line 1 and/or Line 4 restoration report that the cause of loss of Line 1 and Line 4 is unknown and crews have been dispatched to investigate. Current estimated time of return will be greater than 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.
ATC/BOP Executes ARPs May execute N1-SOP-33A.2 Starts EDG 103 (CT-1.0)
Executes N1-SOP-33A.1:
Answers Are PB 11 and 12 energized? No Answers Is any EDG running? Yes Verifies the following:
PB 16A-B Tie Bkr R-1042 is tripped PB 17A-B Tie Bkr R-1052 is tripped Inst. Air Comp. (IAC) 11 AND 12 in PTL Continues at Arrow C WHILE continuing, SEND operator to perform load reductions of Attachment 3, Section 1.
PLACES FEEDWATER PUMP 12 in PTL PLACES COND TRANS PUMP 12 in PTL PLACES IAC 12 in PTL RESTORES PB 17B loads as follows:
VERIFIES lockout 86-17 is RESET VERIFIES RBCLC Pump 12 started STARTS ESW PUMP 12 AND MONITOR equipment temperature listed in N1-SOP-18.1, Tables 18.1 AND 18.2 VERIFIES the following:
CRD Pump 12 started, IF required, UNLESS secured in override above MG Set 167 transfers back to AC drive (IF on PB 17B)
UPS 172 Re-energizes SBC 171 Re-energizes RE-ESTABLISHES Rx Bldg differential pressure as follows:
VERIFIES RB Supply AND Exhaust fan tripped CLOSES RB Supply AND Exhaust valves
Page 29 of 30 NMP1 NRC 2023 Scenario 2 January 2023 Role Play: When dispatched to restore power to I&C Bus 130, wait 2 minutes, then insert remotes:
ED40A, I&C Bus 130 NC Supply Breaker from IC XFMR(PB13B), FV=Open ED40B, I&C Bus 130 NO Supply Breaker from PB 167A, FV=Close Then report task completion.
Role Play: When dispatched to perform Attachment 3, Section 2 load reductions, acknowledge direction.
Role Play: When dispatched to perform Attachment 3, Section 3 load reductions, acknowledge direction.
ATC/BOP Continued VERIFIES RBEV Train 12 initiated Dispatches operator to RESTORE power to I&C Bus 130 as follows (Aux CR 1S54):
TRIP NORMAL supply bkr (lower) from PB13 CLOSE MAINTENANCE supply bkr (behind 2)
VERIFIES load reductions of Attachment 3, Section 1 completed Answers Is Core Spray Injecting? No PLACES ESW Pump 12 in PTL RESTORES power to PB17A as follows:
TRIPS R-1051, PB17A Supply Bkr CLOSES R-1052, PB17A-B Tie Bkr VERIFIES IAC12 started VERIFIES RBCLC Pump 12 running Dispatches operator to PERFORM load reductions of Attachment 3, Section 2 MAINTAINS RBCLC temp less than 95 °F by running ESW Pump 12 as required FOLLOWS N1-OP-6 for recovery of Spent Fuel Pool Cooling requirements, as time permits WHILE continuing, SENDS operator to perform load reductions of Attachment 3, Section 3 IF Required to maintain Control Room habitability, THEN RESTARTS CR Chilled Water Recirc Pump 12 AND Chiller 12 on PB1671C.
Page 30 of 30 NMP1 NRC 2023 Scenario 2 January 2023 ATC/BOP Continued Updates crew on Reactor and Containment parameters May insert manual containment/vessel isolations Locks out Containment Spray pumps When torus pressure exceeds 13 psig or drywell temperature approaches 300oF:
Verifies all Recirc pump are tripped Trips all Drywell cooling fans Initiates Containment Spray per N1-EOP-1 attachment 17 (CT-2.0)
Verifies started two Containment Spray pumps (111 or 122 preferred)
May start additional Containment Spray and Containment Spray Raw Water pumps as necessary Event Termination Criteria RPV water level controlled in assigned band EDG 103 is supplying power to PB 103 Primary Containment pressure maintained per EOP-PC
Form 3.3-1 Scenario Outline Facility:
Nine Mile Point Unit 1 Scenario #: NRC - Re-Exam 2 Scenario Source:
New Op. Test #: 2023 Examiners:
Applicants/
Operators:
Initial Conditions:
The plant is operating at approximately 100% power.
Turnover:
Lower Reactor power to 95% using Recirculation flow in accordance with the provided instructions. Then, place the second RWCU pump in service in accordance with N1-OP-3, section E.7.
Critical Tasks:
CT-1: Given a failure to scram with Reactor power above 6%,
the crew will lower Reactor power by one or more of the following methods, in accordance with N1-EOP-C5:
Terminating and preventing all injection into the RPV except boron and CRD Tripping all Recirc pumps Injecting boron The Reactor power reduction must be initiated within ten minutes of the start of the failure to scram.
CT-2: Given a coolant leak inside the Containment, the crew will spray the Containment prior to exceeding the Pressure Suppression Pressure, in accordance with N1-EOP-PC.
Event No.
Malf.
No.
Event Type*
Event Description 1
N/A N - BOP, SRO Place a second RWCU pump in service N1-OP-3 2
N/A R - ATC, SRO Lower Reactor Power with Recirculation Flow N1-OP-43B 3
ED12B C - All TS -
SRO Power Board 16B Electrical Fault N1-ARP-A4, Technical Specifications 4
HV01A C - BOP, SRO Reactor Building Exhaust fan 11 trips N1-ARP-L1 5
RR06?
RR07?
SRO RRP Seal Failure N1-SOP-1.2, Technical Specifications (NRC 2018) 6 RD35 C - BOP SRO Second CRD pump trips N1-SOP-5.1, N1-SOP-1, N1-EOP-RPV 7
RD33 M - All MC -
ATC ATWS - Hydraulic N1-EOP-C5 8
BOP EC Fails to auto initiate N1-EOP-HC, HU-AA-104-101, OP-AA-101-113 9
RR29 C - All MC -
- (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor, (TS)Tech Spec, (MC)Manual Control
Facility: Nine Mile Point Unit 1 Scenario No.: NRC Re-exam 2 Op-Test No.: 2023
- 1. Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2)
Events 8 & 9 2
- 2. Abnormal events (2-4)
Events 3, 4, 5, 6 4
- 3. Major transients (1-2)
Event 7 1
- 4. EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1-2)
- 5. Entry into a contingency EOP with substantive actions (1 per scenario set) N1-EOP-C5 1
- 6. Pre-identified critical tasks (2) 2
NOTES Page 1 of 32 NMP1 NRC 2023 Scenario 2 January 2023 Copy ___ of ___
Training Id: NMP1 NRC 2023 Re-exam Scenario #2 Revision:
0.0 Title
Re-exam Simulator Scenario #2 Signature / Printed Name Date Developed By Signature on File / Mike Dougherty 03/28/23 Validated By Eric Larson 05/24/23 Tom Wallace Keith Stoutenger Facility Reviewer Signature on File / Ryan Bracht 05/24/23
NOTES Page 2 of 32 NMP1 NRC 2023 Scenario 2 January 2023 References
- 1.
N1-ARP-A4, Alarm Response Procedure, Control Room Panel A4
- 2.
N1-ARP-L1, Alarm Response Procedure. Control Room Panel L1
- 3.
N1-OP-3, Reactor Cleanup System
- 4.
N1-OP-43B, Normal Power Operations
- 5.
N1-SOP-1.2, Reactor Recirculation Pump Seal Failure
- 6.
N1-SOP-5.1, Loss of Control Rod Drive
- 7.
N1-SOP-1, Reactor Scram
- 8.
N1-EOP-RPV, RPV Control for Modes 1 and 2
- 9.
N1-EOP-PC, Primary Containment Control for Modes 1 and 2
- 10.
N1-EOP-C5, RPV Control - ATWS for Modes 1 and 2
- 11.
N1-EOP-HC, NMP1 EOP Hard Cards Procedure
- 12.
N1-EOP-1, NMP1 EOP Support Procedure
- 13.
N1-EOP-3.1, Alternate Control Rod Insertion
- 14.
HU-AA-104-101, Procedure Use and Adherence
- 15.
OP-AA-101-113, Operator Fundamentals
- 16.
Unit 1 Technical Specifications
Page 3 of 32 NMP1 NRC 2023 Scenario 2 January 2023 Instructor Information A.
Scenario Description Sequence of Events / Expected Crew Response:
The scenario begins at approximately 100% power. The crew will begin by lowering Reactor Power to 95%
power using Recirculation flow in accordance with the provided instructions. The crew will then place a second RWCU pump in service in accordance with N1-OP-3, Section E.7.
An electrical fault will cause Powerboard 16B to de-energize. The crew will respond per N1-ARP-A4 and N1-SOP-5.1. Powerboard 16B will not be re-energized due to a faulted bus. The SRO will determine the Tech.
Spec. impact for the loss of the power source.
The operating Reactor Building Exhaust fan will trip. The crew will start the standby Reactor Building Exhaust fan in accordance with N1-ARP-L1. During the restoration of the Reactor Building Ventilation system, the inner seal will fail on Reactor Recirculation Pump 11. A few minutes later, the outer seal will fail, affecting drywell leakage.
The crew will remove the pump from service and isolate it. The SRO will review Technical Specifications for drywell leakage and partial loop operation.
The remaining CRD pump will trip. The crew will enter N1-SOP-5.1 and determine that a reactor scram will be required once CRD accumulator low pressure alarms are received.
The crew will attempt to scram the reactor in accordance with N1-SOP-1. When the scram occurs the control rods will not fully insert. The crew must lower power by either terminating and preventing injection, tripping Recirc pumps, and/or injection boron (Critical Task).
Following the failure to scram, the Emergency Condenses will fail to automatically initiate following Reactor Water Level lowering to <5 (Lo-Lo). The crew will have to manually initiate Emergency Condensers in accordance with N1-EOP-HC, Att. 8. Additionally, a LOCA will develop into the Primary Containment. The crew will initiate Containment Sprays to prevent exceeding Pressure Suppression Pressure, in accordance with N1-EOP-PC (Critical Task).
- 1.
Termination Criteria
- a. RPV water level controlled in assigned band, Reactor Power <6%, Control rod insertion in progress or complete, Primary Containment pressure is being maintained less thant PSP utilizing Containment Spray Pumps.
Page 4 of 32 NMP1 NRC 2023 Scenario 2 January 2023
- 2.
Critical Tasks
- 3.
Length
- a.
~60 minutes CT-1, Given a failure to scram with Reactor power above 6%, the crew will lower Reactor power by one or more of the following methods, in accordance with N1-EOP-C5:
Terminating and preventing all injection into the RPV except boron and CRD Tripping all Recirc pumps Injecting boron The Reactor power reduction must be initiated within ten minutes of the start of the failure to scram.
Justification:
Safety Significance: High Reactor power after a scram represents a challenge to nuclear fuel and to plant heat sinks. In the event of a loss of the normal heat sink, this may result in adding heat to the Torus and challenging the Primary Containment. Lowering Reactor power reduces these challenges.
Cueing: Control rod position and Reactor power indications will indicate a failure to scram with Reactor power above 6%.
N1-EOP-C5 provides direction.
Measurable Performance Indicators: Manipulation of Recirculation pump control switches, Feedwater system components, and Liquid Poison pumps will provide observable actions for the evaluation team.
Performance Feedback: Lowering Recirculation flow, Feedwater flow, Reactor water level, and Reactor power will provide performance feedback regarding the success of crew actions.
Bounding Criteria: Time limit based on Operations representative recommendation.
CT-2, Given a coolant leak inside the Containment, the crew will spray the Containment prior to exceeding the Pressure Suppression Pressure, in accordance with N1-EOP-PC.
Justification:
Safety Significance: Initiating Containment Sprays reduces Primary Containment pressure. This reduces stresses on the Drywell and Torus, assists in avoiding chugging that may cause fatigue failure of the LOCA downcomers, and avoids the need for a blowdown. These benefits reduce challenges to the fuel cladding, the RPV, and the Primary Containment.
Cueing: Multiple Primary Containment pressure and temperature indications and annunciators will indicate degrading conditions. N1-EOP-PC provides direction to initiate Containment Sprays.
Measurable Performance Indicators: Manipulation of Containment Spray pump control switches will provide observable actions for the evaluation team.
Performance Feedback: Containment Spray flow and lowering Primary Containment pressure and temperature indications will provide performance feedback regarding success of crew actions to initiate Containment Sprays.
Bounding Criteria: Based on procedural requirements in N1-EOP-PC. Exceeding the Pressure Suppression limit would require an RPV Blowdown.
Page 5 of 32 NMP1 NRC 2023 Scenario 2 January 2023
- 4.
Mitigation Strategy Code
- a.
DMS-AT-01, high power ATWS (greater than APRM downscale); heat addition to suppression pool or torus requires entry into level power control; RPV level controlled below feedwater spargers; RPV blowdown not required
- b.
DMS-PC-03, high containment pressure; drywell sprays required; maintain safe region PSP; no blowdown required
- 5.
Technical Specifications
- a.
TS 3.1.6, 3.1.8
- b.
- 6.
EAL Classification
- a.
Alert EAL FA1 - Loss of RCS barrier
- 7.
Special Orders
- a.
None
Page 6 of 32 NMP1 NRC 2023 Scenario 2 January 2023 B.
Initial Conditions
- 1.
IC Number
- a.
IC-149
- 2.
Presets / With Triggers
- a.
Malfunctions
- 1)
ED12B, PB 16B Electrical Fault TRG 1
- 2)
ED15, PB 1671 Kirk Key Interlock Defeat, FV = True TRG 27
- 3)
HV01A, RB Exhaust Fan Trip 11, FV = True TRG2
- 4)
RR06A, RR Pump 11 Lower (Inner) Seal Failure, RT=3:00, FV=75 TRG3
- 5)
RR07A, RR Pump 11 Upper (Outer) Seal Failure, DT=4:00, RT=5:00, FV=60 TRG3
- 6)
RD35B, CRD Hydraulic Pump 12 Trip, FV = True TRG 4
- 7)
RD03R1831, 18-31 Control Rod Failure - Accumulator Trouble, FV = True TRG 5
- 8)
RD03R3823, 38-23 Control Rod Failure - Accumulator Trouble, FV = True, DT =
5 sec TRG 5
- 9)
RD03R2219, 22-19 Control Rod Failure - Accumulator Trouble, FV = True, DT =
10 sec TRG 5
- 10)
RD33A, Control Rod Bank Blocked Bank 1, Insert Fail Position(0-48), FV=24 Inserted
- 11)
RD33B, Control Rod Bank Blocked Bank 2, Insert Fail Position(0-48), FV=28 Inserted
- 12)
RD33C, Control Rod Bank Blocked Bank 3, Insert Fail Position(0-48), FV=24 Inserted
- 13)
RD33D, Control Rod Bank Blocked Bank 4, Insert Fail Position(0-48), FV=28 Inserted
- 14)
RD33E, Control Rod Bank Blocked Bank 5, Insert Fail Position(0-48), FV=20 Inserted
- 15)
EC10A, EC CH 11 Auto Initiation Failure inserted
- 16)
EC10B, EC CH 12 Auto Initiation Failure inserted
- 17)
RR29, RR Loop Rupture on Pump 15 Suction Line (LOCA), IV=0% FV=20%,
Delay=4:00, Ramp=15:00 TRG 6
Page 7 of 32 NMP1 NRC 2023 Scenario 2 January 2023
- b.
Remotes
- 1)
LS04, UPS 162B Disconnects (ACOSW, BPSW, DCISW, ACISW) (close, open),
- 2)
LS08, DG102 Starting Air Block Valve (96-82) (normal, close), FV=close TRG 26
- 3)
LS09, DG102 Circ Oil Pump (normal, stop), FV=stop TRG 26
- 4)
LS10, DG102 Turbo Oil Pump (normal, stop), FV=stop TRG 26
- 5)
ED35A, PB 1671A NC Supply Breaker, DT = 1 Sec, RV = Open TRG 27
- 6)
ED35C, PB 1671 NO Bus Tie Breaker Section A-B, DT = 6 sec, RV = Close TRG 27
- 7)
FW52A, RMC-29-439 Switch: HPCI Channel 11 Power Switch, RV = Off TRG28
- 8)
FW52B, RMC-29-440 Switch: HPCI Channel 12 Power Switch, RV = Off TRG28
- c.
Overrides
- 1)
None
- d.
- 1)
None
Page 8 of 32 NMP1 NRC 2023 Scenario 2 January 2023
- e.
Event Triggers Event #
Event Action Command TRG 6 - Activates when the Mode Switch is taken to SHUTDOWN zdrpstdn==1 TRG 16 - Activates when ARI is overridden, RPS has been reset and SDV has drained to allow a manual scram to achieve full inward rod movement hzlrp12g1==1&&zdrr arov==1&&anxstat2(
177)==0 dmf RD33A TRG 17 - Activates when ARI is overridden, RPS has been reset and SDV has drained to allow a manual scram to achieve full inward rod movement hzlrp12g1==1&&zdrr arov==1&&anxstat2(
177)==0 dmf RD33B TRG 18 - Activates when ARI is overridden, RPS has been reset and SDV has drained to allow a manual scram to achieve full inward rod movement hzlrp12g1==1&&zdrr arov==1&&anxstat2(
177)==0 dmf RD33C TRG 19 - Activates when ARI is overridden, RPS has been reset and SDV has drained to allow a manual scram to achieve full inward rod movement hzlrp12g1==1&&zdrr arov==1&&anxstat2(
177)==0 dmf RD33D TRG 20 - Activates when ARI is overridden, RPS has been reset and SDV has drained to allow a manual scram to achieve full inward rod movement hzlrp12g1==1&&zdrr arov==1&&anxstat2(
177)==0 dmf RD33E TRG 21 - Activates when the EC Condensate return valve 11 control switch is taken to OPEN hzdec905o==1 dmf ec10a TRG 22 - Activates when the EC Condensate return valve 11 control switch is taken to OPEN hzdec906o==1 dmf ec10b
- f.
Equipment Out of Service
- 1)
None
- g.
Support Documentation
- 1)
N1-OP-26 section F.1
- 2)
ReMA for power change with Recirc
- 3)
N1-OP-43B marked up to step F.3.27.
- h.
Miscellaneous
- 1) Verify RWCU pump 12 is in service and 11 is secured.
- 2) Verify HWC is lineup up to FWBP 11.
Page 9 of 32 NMP1 NRC 2023 Scenario 2 January 2023 SHIFT TURNOVER INFORMATION ON COMING SHIFT: N D
DATE: Today PART I:
To be performed by the oncoming Operator before assuming the shift.
Control Panel Walkdown (all panels) (SRO, ROs)
PART II:
To be reviewed by the oncoming Operator before assuming the shift.
LCO Status (SRO)
Shift Turnover Information Sheet Evolutions/General Information/Equipment Status:
Reactor power is approximately 100%.
PART III:
Remarks/Planned Evolutions:
Lower Reactor power to 95% using Recirculation flow in accordance with the provided instructions Then, start Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) pump 11 per N1-OP-3 section E.7.0. This section is in progress up to step 7.4. Maximum RWCU flow is desired due to Chemistry concerns.
Page 10 of 32 NMP1 NRC 2023 Scenario 2 January 2023 Shift Turnover Instructor Actions / Plant Response Operator Actions Take the Simulator out of freeze before the crew enters for the pre-shift walkdown.
- Verify annunciator sound turned on
- If recording scenario, start the recording device during the pre-shift walkdown Allow no more than 5 minutes to walkdown the panels.
Crew
- Walkdown panels
- Conduct shift turnover brief
- Assume the shift
Page 11 of 32 NMP1 NRC 2023 Scenario 2 January 2023 Event #1: Lower Reactor Power with Recirculation Flow Event Information
- Reactor power is approximately 100%
- The crew lowers Reactor power with Recirc SRO Directs power reduction with recirculation flow in accordance with N1-OP-43B and the Reactivity Maneuver Instruction (ReMA)
Provides oversight of reactivity maneuver Note: Lead examiner may move to the next event once sufficient action is observed on the reactivity manipulation.
ATC Acknowledges direction from SRO Lowers recirculation flow with master recirculation flow controller Monitors recirculation flow Monitors Feedwater flow and RPV water level Monitors APRMs BOP Monitors individual RRPs for response Individual M/A-Speed Control stations trending uniformly Individual RRP indications trending normally for speed decrease Monitors Feedwater controls for proper response FWP 13 FCV responding RPV water level remains within program band (65 - 83)
Page 12 of 32 NMP1 NRC 2023 Scenario 2 January 2023 Event #2: Places Second RWCU Pump in Service Event Information
- The crew will raise power with recirc flow per the REMA SRO Directs start of RWCU pump 11 per N1-OP-3 section E.7.0 Provides oversight of evolution ATC Monitors plant parameters BOP Acknowledges direction Reviews N1-OP-3 section E.7.0 Verifies closed 33-15, CLEANUP PUMP 1 DISCHARGE VALVE Adjusts 33-40, CLEANUP SYS FLOW, using RMC-33-151 to establish cleanup system flow between 180 x 103 AND 220 x 103 lbm/hr (360-440 gpm)
Verifies open 33-160, CLEANUP PUMP RECIRC VALVE 11 Verifies system pressure as indicated on PI 131A is being maintained 80 to 100 psig Starts Cleanup Pump 11 Performs the following simultaneously to maintain system pressure AND establish pump AND system flow:
Slowly jogs open 33-15, CLEANUP PUMP 1 DISCHARGE VALVE Verify system pressure is maintained between 80 AND 100 psig as follows:
Page 13 of 32 NMP1 NRC 2023 Scenario 2 January 2023 BOP (continued)
IF PC-33.1-01B OR PC-33-39B is in AUTO, THEN verifies proper operation to maintain system pressure at approximately 90 psig IF PC-33.1-01B AND PC-33-39B are in MANUAL, THEN adjusts the in-service PCV WHILE jogging open 33-15 to maintain system pressure 80 to 100 psig Maintains pump discharge pressure less than 1400 psig by slowly opening 33-40, CLEANUP SYS FLOW, using RMC-33-151 WHEN 33-15, CLEANUP PUMP 1 DISCHARGE VALVE, is fully open, adjusts 33-40 using RMC-33-151, CLEANUP SYS FLOW, to maintain desired flow 250 x 103 to 380 x 103 lbm/hr (500 to 760 gpm)
Verifies cleanup system computer point inputs to core thermal power calculations (OD-3 option 2 AND 3D Monicore) are in scan AND updating Adjusts thumbwheel on FC-33-169 to indicate current system flow rate in gallons per minute (gpm)
BOP Monitors individual RRPs for response Individual M/A-Speed Control stations trending uniformly Individual RRP indications trending normally for speed increase Monitors Feedwater controls for proper response FWP 13 FCV responding to power change RPV water level remains within program band (65 - 83)
Page 14 of 32 NMP1 NRC 2023 Scenario 2 January 2023 Event #3: Powerboard 16B Electrical Fault Event Information
- Plant is at power with CRD Pump 11 in service
- PB 16B de-energizes due to a fault
- The crew responds to the loss of the CRD Pump per N1-SOP-5.1
- The crew responds to transfer loads per the N1-ARP-A4 When directed by lead examiner, insert malfunction:
ED12B, PB 16B Electrical Fault TRG 1 PB16B trips CREVS initiates CR Chill Water Pump 11 trips CR Circ Fan 11 Trips Both CR Chillers Trip SBC 161A/B trips RPS Bus 11 shifts to DC power A4-3-2, POWER BD. 16 R1043 TRIP A4-4-2, POWER BD. 16 LOW BUS VOLTAGE A3-1-2, RPS UPS 162 TROUBLE A3-2-1, BATTERY CHGR 161 A-B OFF NORMAL F1-3-8, COMPUTER PWR INPUT MG SET 167 F3-1-5, CRD CHARGING WTR PRESS HI/LO H3-1-8, REACTOR FW PUMP 11 AUX SYSTEM CREW Recognize and report loss of PB 16B Recognize and report loss of power to CRD Pump 11 Provide a critical parameter update Dispatches Equipment Operator to PB 16B to investigate Role Play:
As Equipment Operator sent to investigate the loss of PB 16B, wait five (5) minutes and report an overcurrent flag on breaker R1043 SRO Acknowledge report from RO Verifies RO performs actions per N1-ARP-A4
Page 15 of 32 NMP1 NRC 2023 Scenario 2 January 2023 Note:
The loss of PB 16B requires entry into the LCOs for the following Tech Specs:
3.1.2, Liquid Poison 3.1.6, Control Rod Drive Coolant Injection 3.1.8, High Pressure Coolant Injection 3.2.7, Isolation Valves 3.3.5, PC Isolation Valves 3.4.4, Emergency Ventilation 3.4.5, Control Room Ventilation 3.6.3, Emergency Power Sources The most limiting of these is 3.2.7.c Due to the loss of power to several motor operated isolation valves, a shutdown shall commence within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> and the reactor in cold shutdown conditions within 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br />.
SRO Acknowledge report from RO Consults Tech Specs N1-ARP-A4-4-2 Actions Role Play As Equipment Operator sent to investigate the loss of PB 16B, wait five (5) minutes and report an overcurrent flag on breaker R1043 As the FIN Electrician sent to investigate the loss of PB 16B, wait five minutes and report that PB 16B is faulted and it is not recommended for restoration As Equipment Operator or the FIN Electrician, sent to investigate PB 1671A free of faults, wait 5 minutes and report the PB 1671A is free of faults BOP Executes ARP for A5-4-7 Acknowledges report from Equipment Operator Inform the US Verify R1043 tripped Verifies CRD Pump 12 is running Verifies RBCLC pressure is > 40 psig Verifies EDG 102 is not running Monitors Battery 12 Terminal voltage Takes Critical parameter to remove Battery 12 from service before terminal voltage reaches 110VDC Sends an Equipment Operator to investigate the loss of PB 16B Sends an Equipment Operator to investigate if PB 1671A free of faults Acknowledges reports from the Equipment Operator and informs the US SRO Acknowledge report from BOP Directs BOP to perform actions of N1-ARP-A4-4-2
Page 16 of 32 NMP1 NRC 2023 Scenario 2 January 2023 N1-ARP-A4-4-2 Actions for PB16B being faulted Role Play As Equipment Operator acknowledge direction to secure 162 Standby UPS. Wait 3 minutes and insert the following remote:
LS04, UPS 162B Disconnects (ACOSW, BPSW, DCISW, ACISW) (close, open)
TRG 25 Report completion to the Control Room BOP Acknowledges direction from US Within 15 minutes OPEN the following at 162 Standby UPS Control Cabinet:
ACOSW BPSW DCISW ACISW
Page 17 of 32 NMP1 NRC 2023 Scenario 2 January 2023 Role Play As Equipment Operator acknowledge direction to load shed EDG 102. Wait 3 minutes and insert the following remote:
LS08, DG102 Starting Air Block Valve (96-82)
(normal, close)
LS09, DG102 Circ Oil Pump (normal, stop)
LS10, DG102 Turbo Oil Pump (normal, stop)
TRG26 Report completion to the Control Room Role Play This scenario has been set up with MG 167 being aligned to BB 12. If sent as an Equipment Operator to verify the Computer Power Input MG 167 motor breaker on BB11 is open, then wait 5 minutes and report the breaker on BB 11 is open.
BOP Within 30 minutes perform the following at the EDG room::
EDG did NOT run, => shutdown associated TURBO OIL PUMP 79.1-01 Shutdown EDG 102 Circulation Oil Pump Close 96-82, EDG Starting Air Block Valve
- If MG 167 NOT available to charge battery:
THEN at Batt Board 12, verify Computer Power Input MG 167 motor breaker tripped
- References N1-ARP-H3 and starts Condensate Transfer Pump 12
- References N1-ARP-H1 and starts RBCLC Pump 12 and green flags RBCLC Pump 13 Informs US a tagout is required for EDG 103 due to loss of auxiliaries SRO
- Acknowledges the report from the RO that PB 1671 is free of faults
- Directs the Reactor Operator to cross-tie PB 1671A with the B, C section per N1-ARP-A4
Page 18 of 32 NMP1 NRC 2023 Scenario 2 January 2023 N1-ARP-A4-4-2 actions for cross typing PB 1671A with PB 1671 sections B&C Role Play As Equipment Operator acknowledge direction to crosstie PB 1671, wait 5 minutes and insert the following malfunction/remotes:
ED15, PB 1671 Kirk Key Interlock Defeat, FV = True ED35A, PB 1671A NC Supply Breaker, DT = 1 Sec, RV = Open ED35C, PB 1671 NO Bus Tie Breaker Section A-B, DT = 6 sec, RV = Close TRG27 Report completion to the Control Room BOP
- Acknowledges direction from the US to cross-tie PB 1671 per N1-ARP-A4 Send and Equipment Operator to cross tie PB 1671A with PB 1671B,C section per N1-ARP-A4-4-2 BOP
- Acknowledges the report that PB1671A section has been cross-tied with the B-C section
Page 19 of 32 NMP1 NRC 2023 Scenario 2 January 2023 Event #4 & #5: Reactor Building Exhaust Fan 11 trips, RRP Seal Failure Event Information
- Reactor Building Exhaust Fan 12 trips
- The crew will respond to restore Reactor Building Ventilation lineup per N1-ARP-L1
- Both the inner and outer seals will fail for Reactor Recirc pump 11, requiring isolation of the pump per N1-SOP-1.2
- SRO will evaluate Tech Specs 3.2.5 and 3.1.7 When directed by the lead examiner, insert malfunction:
HV01A, RB Exhaust Fan Trip 11, FV = True TRG2 Plant Response:
RB Exhaust Fan 11 trips RB d/p goes positive L1-1-5, RB VENT EXH FAN 11-12 TRIP-VIB L1-2-2, RB VENT SUP SYSTEM L1-2-3, RB VENT EXH FLOW LOW L1-3-3, REACT BLD/ATM DIFF PRESS CREW Diagnoses/reports trip of Reactor Building Exhaust fan #11 SRO Acknowledges report Directs BOP to restore Reactor Building ventilation to normal lineup per N1-ARP-L1-1-5
Page 20 of 32 NMP1 NRC 2023 Scenario 2 January 2023 Role Play: If dispatched to investigate RB Exhaust Fan #11 trip, wait 3 minutes and report RB Exhaust Fan #11 tripped on overcurrent, with smell of burnt insulation near motor.
BOP IF Reactor Building Exhaust fan trip THEN perform the following:
o Verify 202-08, REACTOR BLDG EXHAUST FAN 11 OUTLET DAMPER for tripped Reactor Building Exhaust fan o
Start standby Reactor Building Exhaust Fan on SLOW speed o
Confirm 202-07, REACTOR BLDG EXHAUST FAN 11 OUTLET DAMPER for Reactor Building Exhaust fan in service o
Adjust Reactor Building Ventilation Supply and Exhaust fan speeds to maintain Reactor Building Atmosphere dP from -0.25 to -.4 H2O Reports completion to SRO and RB dP has returned to normal pressure band SRO Acknowledges report When directed by lead examiner, insert malfunction:
RR06A, RR Pump 11 Lower (Inner) Seal Failure, RT=3:00, FV=75 RR07A, RR Pump 11 Upper (Outer) Seal Failure, DT=4:00, RT=5:00, FV=60 TRG3 Initial response:
RRP 11 LP seal pressure rises Delayed response:
RRP 11 HP seal pressure lowers RRP 11 LP seal pressure lowers DW temp, pres and humidity slowly rise DW leakage rises CREW Diagnoses/reports RRP 11 inner seal failure Diagnoses/reports RRP 11 outer seal failure (later)
Recognizes/reports degrading Primary Containment parameters (later)
Page 21 of 32 NMP1 NRC 2023 Scenario 2 January 2023 Expected annunciators:
H2-4-7, Drywell Water Leak Detection Sys (HP Seal
~35%)
Potentially K2-4-3, DW Pressure High SRO Acknowledges reports Directs entry into N1-SOP-1.2, RRP Seal Failure Reviews Technical Specifications Determines Drywell leakage rates are affected in Tech Spec 3.2.5.a, be in cold shutdown w/in 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
Determines Tech Spec 3.1.7.e requires power be maintained < 90.5% until the pump isolation is complete Verifies power < 90.5%
Provide oversight of reactivity change during evolution RO Monitors plant parameters Monitor total recirculation flow and APRM power levels while RRP 11 is being shutdown and isolated Verifies position on four loop Power to Flow Map
Page 22 of 32 NMP1 NRC 2023 Scenario 2 January 2023 Note: Depending on when in the transient N1-SOP-1.2 is executed, the crew may opt to secure the RRP per N1-OP-1.
Note: Crew may discuss venting per OP-9. Scenario will progress prior to any vent actions.
Note: N1-SOP-1.2 defines a seal failure as catastrophic if it results in a noticeable rise in DW pressure or floor drain leakage.
Note: Closing RRP suction and discharges valves during this event is an approved two-handed manipulation.
Note: Allow Reactor water level to begin trending towards recovery prior to moving on.
BOP Enters N1-SOP-1.2, RRP Seal Failure Initially answers Is there indication of LP seal failure? YES Monitors DW floor drain tank level and DW pressure Contacts Engineering for evaluation Monitors RRP 11 seal indications for signs of degradation Determines 2nd seal is failing Re-enters N1-SOP-1.2 Answers Is failure catastrophic? YES Places RRP 11 control switch to STOP Closes RRP 11 bypass valve Simultaneously closes RRP suction and discharge valves Verifies proximity to restricted zone using four loop Power to Flow Map Monitors containment parameters
Page 23 of 32 NMP1 NRC 2023 Scenario 2 January 2023 Event #6, #7, #8: Second CRD pump trips, ATWS - Hydraulic, EC Fails to auto initiate, Coolant Leak in Drywell Event Information
- The second CRD pump trips.
- The crew will re-enter N1-SOP-5.1
- The crew will attempt to Scram the reactor once CRD Accumulator alarms activate
- Multiple control rods will fail to insert
- Shortly following the scram a LOCA will develop in the Drywell forcing the crew to utilize Containment Sprays to ensure Drywell pressure does not exceed PSP.
Verify the following malfunctions are preset:
RD33A, Control Rod Bank Blocked Bank 1, FV=18 RD33B, Control Rod Bank Blocked Bank 2, FV=18 RD33C, Control Rod Bank Blocked Bank 3, FV=20 RD33D, Control Rod Bank Blocked Bank 4, FV=18 RD33E, Control Rod Bank Blocked Bank 5, FV=18 EC10A, EC CH 11 Auto Initiation Failure, FV=True EC10B, EC CH 12 Auto Initiation Failure, FV=True When directed by examiner, insert malfunction:
RD35B, CRD Hydraulic Pump 12 Trip TRG 4 CRD pump 12 trips Expected Annunciators:
F3-1-3, Control Rod Drive Pump 12 Trip-Vib F3-1-5, CRD Charging Wtr Pressure High/Low CREW Acknowledge/report annunciators Diagnose trip of CRD pump 12 Note: Due to time frame of event, Tech Spec call may be discussed as a follow-up question.
SRO Acknowledges report of trip of CRD Pump 12 Directs entry into N1-SOP-5.1, Loss of CRD References Tech Spec 3.1.6; The reactor coolant temperature shall be reduced to 212ºF or less within 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br />; LCO following pump trip ATC Monitors plant parameters
Page 24 of 32 NMP1 NRC 2023 Scenario 2 January 2023 Note: CRD pump 11 is powered from PB 16B which was faulted at the start of the scenario Role Play: If dispatched to investigate CRD pump trip, wait 2 minutes and report CRD pump 12 tripped on overcurrent, with smell of burnt insulation near motor.
BOP Executes N1-SOP-5.1 Acknowledges the report from the Equipment Operator Informs the SRO that no CRD pumps are available to start and have entered the override statement of N1-SOP-5.1 that states the following:
o NO CRD pump is running AND Any accumulator alarm(s) is received AND Reactor pressure is >900 psig THEN:
o Restart at least one CRD pump within 20 minutes OR SCRAM the Reactor per N1-SOP-1 SRO Acknowledges reports Role Play: 3 minutes following the report from the Equipment Operator on the status of CRD pump 12, or at the discretion of the Lead Examiner, insert the following malfunctions:
RD03R1831, 18-31 Control Rod Failure -
Accumulator Trouble, FV = True RD03R3823, 38-23 Control Rod Failure -
Accumulator Trouble, FV = True, DT = 5 sec RD03R2219, 22-19 Control Rod Failure -
Accumulator Trouble, FV = True, DT = 10 sec TRG5 Crew Reports Accumulator alarms to the SRO SRO Acknowledges reports Directs Reactor Scram per N1-SOP-1 Acknowledges Scram report
Page 25 of 32 NMP1 NRC 2023 Scenario 2 January 2023 Control rods partially insert Reactor power remains > 6%
ATC Monitors plant parameters Depresses Reactor Trip 11 and 12 pushbuttons and Places Mode Switch in SHUTDOWN Provides scram report BOP Monitors plant parameters Initiates ARI on failure of rods to insert SRO Enters EOP-RPV (1-2), RPV Control for Modes 1 and 2, due to Reactor power above 6% when scram required Answers Override statement IF you cannot verify the reactor will stay shutdown without boron NO THEN exits EOP-RPV and enters EOP-C5 (1-2), RPV Control - ATWS for Modes 1 and 2
Answers Reactor Power Above 6% OR Unknow? - YES Directs rapid lowering of RPV water level (Detail J)
Directs terminate and prevent all RPV injection into RPV except boron and CRD Directs injection of Boron using Liquid Poison Directs defeating the Low-Low RPBV water level MSIV isolation per EOP-1 Att. 2 Directs the prevention of Core Spray Injection per EOP-1 Att. 4 Directs ADS bypassed May enter EOP-PC (1-2) on high torus temperature Directs lockout of Containment Spray pumps except pump(s) used for torus cooling
Page 26 of 32 NMP1 NRC 2023 Scenario 2 January 2023 SRO Continued EOP-C5 (1-2) Level Leg Actions:
Directs bypass of low-low RPV water level MSIV isolation per EOP-1 att 2 Determines Reactor power is above 6% and RPV water level is above -41 inches Directs terminate and prevent of all RPV injection except boron and CRD per EOP-1 att 24 (CT-1.0)
Directs RPV level lowered to at least -41 inches Directs RPV water level controlled -126 to -41 inches with Condensate/FW, CRD and Core Spray EOP-C5 (1-2) Pressure Leg Actions:
If any ERV is cycling:
Directs initiation of Emergency Condensers Directs ERVs opened to lower RPV pressure to less than 965 psig Directs RPV pressure controlled between 350 psig and 1080 psig using TBVs, ECs and/or ERVs Monitors Figure M, Heat Capacity Temperature Limit
Page 27 of 32 NMP1 NRC 2023 Scenario 2 January 2023 SRO continued EOP-C5 (1-2) Power Leg Actions:
Directs initiation of ARI Answers Is the Turbine Generator On-line? NO Answers Reactor power? Above 6%
Directs Recirc pumps verified tripped Directs execution of EOP-3.1, Alternate Rod Insertion (CT-2.0)
If power is oscillating more than 25% or before Torus temperature reaches 110oF:
Records Liquid Poison tank level Verifies/Directs Liquid Poison injection (CT-1.0)
ATC Depresses Reactor Trip 11 and 12 pushbuttons and places the Mode Switch in SHUTDOWN Initiates ARI Bypasses Core Spray IV interlocks per N1-EOP-1 Att 4 by installing six jumpers (17, 18, 19, 24, 25,
- 26) inside Panel N Bypasses low-low RPV water level MSIV isolation per EOP-1 att 2 by installing four jumpers (1, 2, 8,
- 9) inside Panel N Performs EOP-3.1, Section 3 (driving rods) and/or 4 (manual scrams) (see actions below)
Inserts SRMs Inserts IRMs Controls IRM recorders and range switches as required to monitor power Reports when APRMs are < 6%
Reports status of control rod insertion
Page 28 of 32 NMP1 NRC 2023 Scenario 2 January 2023 Note: Control rods will successfully insert using RMCS.
Note: RO will likely have to fully open the CRD flow control valve and/or close 44-04 in order to achieve rod movement via RMCS; these methods are preferential to closing 44-167 due to ability to perform from the control room and not preventing further scram attempts by blocking the charging water header.
Note: When ARI is overridden, the scram is reset, and annunciator F4-1-1 clears, then TRG 20 will activate. Verify this occurs and the RD33 malfunctions all delete. This allows all control rods to insert on the next manual scram attempt.
As directed by the examiner, if its desired to time compress scramming to all rods in, insert TRG 10 to fail off appropriate annunciators and insert TRG 20 to remove ATWS malfunctions all AFTER verifying the scram is reset.
RO Continued Possible EOP-3.1 Section 3 Actions:
Verify a CRD Pump running Place Reactor Mode Switch in REFUEL Place ARI OVERRIDE switch in OVERRIDE Installed RPS jumpers (5, 6, 12, 13)
Reset the scram Insert rods to 00 using EMER ROD IN starting with high power regions of core (use LPRM indications)
If more drive pressure is required, then perform one of more of the following:
Fully open CRD Flow Control Valve (F panel)
Close 44-04, Control Rod Drive Water Cont V (F Panel)
Close 44-167, Charging Water Header Blocking Valve (RB 237)
Possible EOP-3.1 Section 4 Actions:
Place ARI OVERRIDE switch in OVERRIDE Installed RPS jumpers (5, 6, 12, 13)
Reset the scram Verify open 44-167, Charging Water Header Blocking Valve (RB 237)
When the SDV is drained, then initiate a manual scram
Page 29 of 32 NMP1 NRC 2023 Scenario 2 January 2023 Events 6 and 7 continued Role Play: When directed as in plant operator to place HPCI keylock selector switches Ch11 and Ch 12 in OFF, wait one minute and insert remotes:
FW52A, RMC-29-439 Switch: HPCI Channel 11 Power Switch, RV = Off FW52B, RMC-29-440 Switch: HPCI Channel 12 Power Switch, RV = Off TRG 28 Then report that HPCI switches are off.
Note:
Both ECs will fail to auto initiate when RPV water level lowers to <5 (Lo-Lo), The Operators will be able to manually open the EC condensate return IVs from the control room.
BOP Bypasses ADS Terminates and prevents all injection except boron and CRD per N1-EOP-1 Att 24 (CT-1.0):
Attempts to close both FEEDWATER ISOLATION Valves 11 and 12 Initiates a close signal for FEEDWATER PUMP 13 BLOCKING VALVE Selects MANUAL on 11, 12 and 13 FWP Valve Yokogawa Controllers with potentiometer demand output of 0 and FCVs fully shut Verifies FWP 11 and 12 BYPASS VALVEs in MAN and set to Zero output Directs EO to place HPCI keylock selector switches in the Aux Control Room to OFF position Verifies closed, FEEDWATER PUMP 13 BLOCKING VALVE Answers Is there still flow to the Reactor? -
NO Verifies open at least one FW IV.
Verifies FW Pumps 11 OR 12 are operating Informs SRO when RPV water level reaches -41 inches When directed, maintains RPV water level in the assigned band (-126 to -41 ECs fail to Auto Initiate Role Play: Verify the following malfunctions are deleted when the Reactor Operator takes the EC Condensate Return IV control switches to OPEN:
EC10A, EC CH 11 Auto Initiation Failure EC10B, EC CH 12 Auto Initiation Failure RO Recognize and report ECs have failed to auto initiate Take the Condensate Return IV control switches to open for both ECs Report to SRO that the Condensate Return Valves have successfully opened.
Page 30 of 32 NMP1 NRC 2023 Scenario 2 January 2023 SRO Acknowledges report of ECs being placed in service.
Page 31 of 32 NMP1 NRC 2023 Scenario 2 January 2023 Event #9: Coolant Leak in Drywell Event Information
- The plant is in an ATWS condition
- The crew is executing N1-EOP-C5
- Following the Failure to Scram a LOCA will develop into the Drywell
- The crew will enter N!-EOP-PC to stabilize Primary Containment parameters Verify the following malfunction automatically inserts when the Reactor scrams:
RR29, RR Loop Rupture on Pump 15 Suction Line (LOCA), IV=0% FV=20%, Delay=4:00, Ramp=15:00 TRG 6 Drywell pressure and temperature rise Drywell leakage rises Expected annunciators:
H2-1-1, Drywell Floor Drain Level High H2-4-7, Drywell Water Leak Detection Sys K2-4-3, Drywell Pressure High-Low F1-1-5(4-1-4), RPS Ch 11(12) Drywell Press High CREW Diagnose/report degrading containment parameters Acknowledge/report annunciators SRO Acknowledges reports Enters N1-EOP-RPV on low RPV water level and high Drywell pressure Enters N1-EOP-PC on high Drywell pressure and temperature o
Direct lockout of Containment Spray pumps May direct vessel/containment isolation per N1-SOP-40.2 When torus pressure exceeds 13 psig or drywell temperature approaches 300oF:
Answers Below the Containment Spray Initiation Limit? - Yes Verifies all Recirc pumps are tripped Directs trip of all Drywell cooling fans Directs operation of Containment Spray per EOP-1 attachment 17
Page 32 of 32 NMP1 NRC 2023 Scenario 2 January 2023 ATC/BOP Updates crew on Reactor and Containment parameters Locks out Containment Spray pumps When torus pressure exceeds 13 psig or drywell temperature approaches 300oF:
Verifies all Recirc pump are tripped Trips all Drywell cooling fans Initiates Containment Spray per N1-EOP-1 attachment 17 Verifies started two Containment Spray pumps (111 or 122 preferred)
May start additional Containment Spray and Containment Spray Raw Water pumps as necessary Event Termination Criteria RPV water level controlled in assigned band EDG 103 is supplying power to PB 103 Primary Containment pressure maintained per EOP-PC
Form 3.3-1 Scenario Outline Facility:
Nine Mile Point Unit 1 Scenario #: NRC - Re-Exam 3 Scenario Source:
New Op. Test #: 2023 Examiners:
Applicants/
Operators:
Initial Conditions:
The plant is operating at approximately 100% power.
Turnover:
Perform the EDG 102 Load Run in accordance with N1-ST-M4A starting at step 6.2.15 Critical Tasks:
CT-1: Given the plant with a LOCA due to a Feedwater Line Rupture into the Primary Containment, the crew will inhibit ADS prior to ADS performing its depressurization function in accordance with N1-EOP-RPV (1-2).
CT-2, Given a LOCA with the inability to maintain containment parameters within PSP, within 15 minutes the crew will enter N1-EOP-C2 (1-2), RPV Blowdown for Modes 1 and 2.
Event No.
Malf. No.
Event Type*
Event Description 1
N/A N -
SRO EDG 102 Governor Failure N1-ST-M4A, Technical Specifications 3
Report C - ATC SRO Power Control Requests Emergency MVAR Support N1-OP-32 4
MC01C C -
SRO R - ATC Loss of Main Condenser Vacuum N1-SOP-25.1 5
ED06 C - ALL PB 101 Electrical Fault N1-ARP-A4 6
Override C -
SRO Reactor Recirculation Pump Discharge Valve fails to close N1-SOP-1.3, Technical Specification 7
FW30 M - ALL MC -
ATC Feedwater Line Break into the Drywell N1-EOP-PC, N1-EOP-RPV, N1-EOP-C2 8
Overrides C - All Feedwater Isolation Valves fail open NRC 2020
- (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor, (TS)Tech Spec, (MC)Manual Control
Facility: Nine Mile Point Unit 1 Scenario No.: NRC Re-exam 3 Op-Test No.: 2023
- 1. Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2)
Events 8 1
- 2. Abnormal events (2-4)
Events 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 5
- 3. Major transients (1-2)
Event 7 1
- 4. EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1-2)
- 5. Entry into a contingency EOP with substantive actions (1 per scenario set)
EOP-C2 1
- 6. Pre-identified critical tasks (2) 2
NOTES Page 1 of 22 NMP1 NRC 2023 Scenario 2 January 2023 Copy ___ of ___
Training Id: NMP1 NRC 2023 Re-exam Scenario #3 Revision:
0.0 Title
Re-exam Simulator Scenario #3 Signature / Printed Name Date Developed By Signature on File / Mike Dougherty 04/28/23 Validated By Eric Larson Tom Wallace Keith Stoutenger Facility Reviewer Signature on File / Ryan Bracht 05/22/23
NOTES Page 2 of 22 NMP1 NRC 2023 Scenario 2 January 2023 References
- 1.
N1-ARP-F2, Alarm Response Procedure, Control Room Panel F2
- 2.
N1-SOP-1.3, Recirc Pump Trip at Power
- 3.
N1-SOP-25.1, Unplanned Loss of Condenser Vacuum
- 4.
N1-SOP-1, Reactor Scram
- 5.
N1-SOP-1.1, Emergency Power Reduction
- 6.
N1-ST-M4A, Emergency Diesel Generator 102 and PB 102 Operability Test
- 7.
N1-EOP-RPV (1-2), RPV Control for Modes 1 and 2
- 8.
N1-EOP-PC (1-2), Primary Containment Control for Modes 1 and 2
- 9.
N1-EOP-C2 (1-2), RPV Blowdown for Modes 1 and 2
- 10.
N1-EOP-HC, NMP1 EOP Hard Cards Procedure
- 11.
N1-EOP-1, NMP1 EOP Support Procedure
- 12.
HU-AA-104-101, Procedure Use and Adherence
- 13.
OP-AA-101-113, Operator Fundamentals
- 14.
Unit 1 Technical Specifications
Page 3 of 22 NMP1 NRC 2023 Scenario 2 January 2023 Instructor Information A.
Scenario Description Sequence of Events / Expected Crew Response:
The scenario begins at approximately 100% power. The crew will begin by performing a load run on EDG 102 in accordance with N1-ST-M4A. During the load run the EDG 102 governor will fail forcing the crew to perform an emergency trip of EDG 102. The SRO will review Technical Specifications for an inoperable Emergency Diesel Generator.
Power Control will call the Control Room and request increased reactor load support to ensure grid voltage is maintained due to loss of generation capacity. The crew will utilize N1-OP-32 and raise MVARs to the grid using the Main Generator automatic voltage regulator.
An air leak into the Main Condenser will result in a lowering of vacuum. The crew will respond per N1-SOP-25.1.
The crew will lower reactor power using Reactor Recirculation pumps and Control Rods per N1-SOP-1.1 to successfully stabilize and recover Main Condenser Vacuum.
An electrical fault will cause Powerboard 101 to de-energize. The crew will respond per N1-ARP-A4 and N1-SOP-1.3. Powerboard 101 will not be re-energized due to a faulted bus. During the isolation of Reactor Recirculation Pump #13 the pumps discharge valve will fail to close causing the crew to close the pumps suction valve per N1-SOP-1.3. The SRO will review Technical Specifications for an isolated Reactor Recirculation pump and 4 loop operation.
A Feedwater Line Break into the Drywell causing adverse trends in Primary Containment parameters. The crew will determine a Reactor Scram will be required based on the rapid changes in Primary Containment parameters per N1-EOP-PC (1-2). The crew will perform actions following the Reactor Scram per N1-SOP-1 and N1-EOP-RPV (1-2) to stabilize plant conditions.
With a significant Feedwater Line rupture into the Primary Containment the crew will be unable to maintain Primary Containment pressure below PSP and will be required to perform a RPV Blowdown per N1-EOP-C2 (1-
- 2) (Critical Task). With a loss of the Feedwater HPCI the crew will be required to utilize all available injection sources to restore and maintain RPV level above TAF per N1-EOP-RPV (1-2) (Critical Task). Prior to RPV water level lowering to < -10 inches, the crew will be required to bypass ADS per N1-EOP-RPV (1-2) (Critical Task).
Following the scram, the Feedwater Isolation Valves will fail to close when the crew attempts to isolate the Feedwater rupture into the Drywell.
Page 4 of 22 NMP1 NRC 2023 Scenario 2 January 2023
- 1.
Termination Criteria
- a. RPV water level controlled in assigned band utilizing low pressure injection sources, Primary Containment pressure is being maintained less than PSP utilizing Containment Spray Pumps.
Page 5 of 22 NMP1 NRC 2023 Scenario 2 January 2023
- 2.
Critical Tasks
- 3.
Length
- a.
~60 minutes
- 4.
Mitigation Strategy Code
- a.
DMS-RL-03, LOCA; unable to maintain level above TAF; RPV blowdown; adequate core cooling provided by RPV level restored and maintained above MSCRWL (Unit 1, -126) or core spray cooling (Unit 2, -62)
CT-1, Given the plant with a LOCA due to a Feedwater Line Rupture into the Primary Containment, the crew will inhibit ADS prior to ADS performing its depressurization function in accordance with N1-EOP-RPV (1-2).
Justification:
Safety Significance: ADS actuation is prevented if RPV water level cannot be maintained above -10 inches. Subsequent steps in N1-EOP-RPV provide explicit and detailed instruction for RPV water level control and identify the specific conditions when a blowdown is required. Permitting automatic ADS initiation may be undesirable for the following reasons: 1) ADS Actuation can impose a severe thermal transient on the RPV and may complicate efforts to control RPV water level, 2) The conditions assumed in the design of the ADS actuation logic may not exist when the actions specified in this step are being performed, 3) The operating crew can evaluate more information that is available to the ADS logic and can better judge when and how to depressurize the RPV.
Initiating Cue: Lowering RPV water level and degrading conditions in the Primary Containment will provide indications of a LOCA. N1-EOP-RPV (1-2) provides direction to bypass ADS in Detail L4 of the Center Leg.
Success Path: The crew will bypass ADS at the Unit Supervisors directions in accordance with N1-EOP-RPV (1-2).
Performance Feedback: Manipulation of the ADS bypass switches and ADS bypassed indicating lights will provide observable actions for the evaluation team.
Measurable Performance Standard: Multiple ADS bypassed indicators will provide performance feedback regarding the success of the ADS bypassing operation and provide observable indications for the evaluation team. Bounding Criteria: Prior to RPV water level lowering to < -10 inches.
CT-3, Given a LOCA with the inability to maintain containment parameters within PSP, within 15 minutes the crew will enter N1-EOP-C2 (1-2), RPV Blowdown for Modes 1 and 2.
Justification:
Safety Significance: A Blowdown is required to limit further release of energy into the Primary Containment and to ensure that the RPV is depressurized while pressure suppression capability is still available. This protects the integrity of the Primary Containment.
Initiating Cue: Multiple Primary Containment pressure indicators and annunciators will provide indications. N1-EOP-PC (1-2) provides direction to monitor the Pressure Suppression Pressure limit and blowdown if required.
Success Path: The crew will open 4 ERVs to commence a rapid RPV depressurization in accordance with N1-EOP-PC (1-2) to minimize the amount of energy released into the Primary Containment.
Performance Feedback: Emergency Condenser and ERV instrumentation will provide indication that these systems are functioning properly once placed in service. Multiple Reactor pressure indicators and annunciators will provide performance feedback regarding the success of the blowdown.
Measurable Performance Standard: The crew will manually open valves to initiate Emergency Condensers. The crew will manually open ERVs. Bounding Criteria: Time requirement based on Operations representative recommendation.
Page 6 of 22 NMP1 NRC 2023 Scenario 2 January 2023
- b.
DMS-PC-03, high containment pressure; drywell sprays required; maintain safe region PSP; no blowdown required
- 5.
Technical Specifications
- a.
- b.
- 6.
EAL Classification
- a.
Alert EAL FA1 - Loss of RCS barrier
- 7.
Special Orders
- a.
None
Page 7 of 22 NMP1 NRC 2023 Scenario 2 January 2023 B.
Initial Conditions
- 1.
IC Number
- a.
IC-149
- 2.
Presets / With Triggers
- a.
Malfunctions
- 1)
MC01C, Main Condenser - HP Section Air Inleakage (0-100%), SV=0.5%
TRG2
- 2)
ED06, PB 101 Electrical Fault, FV = True TRG3
- 3)
FW30, Main FW Line Break Inside Drywell, RT=10:00, RSV=0%, FSV=100%
TRG4
- b.
Remotes
- 1)
DG01, DG 102 Governor Speed Droop, FV=DROOP Inserted
- 2)
- c.
Overrides
- 1)
DI-1114, INOP DG #102 GOV CS-RAISE, FV=ON TRG1
- 2)
DI-3078, POS_2 2f29/NG03A-A POS A, FV=OFF (Fails RRP 13 Discharge Valve Open)
Inserted
- 3)
DI-2937, INOP 1F10/31-03A POS A, FV=Off (Fails FW IV 31-07 open)
Inserted
- 4)
DI-2938, INOP 1F10/31-03A POS C, FV=On (Fails FW IV 31-07 open)
Inserted
- 5)
DI-2940, POS 1F10/31-03A POS A, FV=Off (Fails FW IV 31-08 open)
- 6)
DI-2941, POS 1F10/31-03A POS C, FV=On (Fails FW IV 31-08 open)
Inserted
- d.
- 1)
None
Page 8 of 22 NMP1 NRC 2023 Scenario 2 January 2023
- e.
Event Triggers Event #
Event Action Command TRG Activates when EDG 102 KW meter exceeds 2600KW hzadg2kwm >0.742
- f.
Equipment Out of Service
- 1)
None
- g.
Support Documentation
- 1)
N1-ST-M4A, marked up to and including step 6.2.14
- h.
Miscellaneous
- 1) Verify HWC is lineup up to FWBP 11.
- 2) Verify EDG 102 Governor set to DROOP
- 3) Verify 2 stop watches are available for performance of N1-ST-M4A
Page 9 of 22 NMP1 NRC 2023 Scenario 2 January 2023 SHIFT TURNOVER INFORMATION ON COMING SHIFT: N D
DATE: Today PART I:
To be performed by the oncoming Operator before assuming the shift.
Control Panel Walkdown (all panels) (SRO, ROs)
PART II:
To be reviewed by the oncoming Operator before assuming the shift.
LCO Status (SRO)
Shift Turnover Information Sheet Evolutions/General Information/Equipment Status:
Reactor power is approximately 100%.
PART III:
Remarks/Planned Evolutions:
Perform a Load Run on EDG 102 in accordance with N1-ST-M4A. The procedure is in progress up to step 6.2.15.
Page 10 of 22 NMP1 NRC 2023 Scenario 2 January 2023 Shift Turnover Instructor Actions / Plant Response Operator Actions Take the Simulator out of freeze before the crew enters for the pre-shift walkdown.
- Verify annunciator sound turned on
- If recording scenario, start the recording device during the pre-shift walkdown Allow no more than 5 minutes to walkdown the panels.
Crew
- Walkdown panels
- Conduct shift turnover brief
- Assume the shift
Page 11 of 22 NMP1 NRC 2023 Scenario 2 January 2023 Event #1 & #2: EDG 102 Surveillance Test and Governor Failure Event Information
- Reactor power is approximately 100%
- Prerequisites for performing the EDG 102 Surveillance test have already been completed
- N1-ST-M4A has been completed up to and including step 6.2.14 SRO Directs performance of N1-ST-M4A, starting at step 6.2.15 Provides oversight for evolution Directs tripping EDG 102 when KW limit is exceeded Declares EDG 102 inoperable Reviews Technical Specifications for inoperable EDG (14 day LCO per TS 3.6.3.c)
ATC Monitors plant parameters Assist in timing of EDG 102 start Note: The crew should mark step 6.2.16 as N/A. The 24-month LOOP/LOCA DBA Load test has been marked as N/A in the preceding steps.
Expected Alarms:
A4-2-3, DG Gen 102 Start Role Play: If asked to report on the status of EDG 102 Raw Water Pump report good start of EDG 102 Raw Water Pump.
BOP Performs N1-ST-M4A, starting at step 6.2.15 Places EDG 102 control switch to START Records time to reach running frequency and voltage Adjusts speed to 60 Hz using DIESEL GOV control switch Inserts Sync Key in R1022 SYN and places to ON Adjusts EDG to establish a slow clockwise rotation on the synchroscope When sync scope is 5 minutes before 12 oclock, closes R1022
Page 12 of 22 NMP1 NRC 2023 Scenario 2 January 2023 Note:
When EDG load is raised above 2600 KW, verify the following override is automatically inserted:
DI-1114, INOP DG #102 GOV CS-RAISE, FV=ON TRG 1 EDG load rises to approximately 3000 KW Role Play: If contacted as an operator at the EDG, report that the EDG is shutdown with no abnormal indications.
Role Play: If contacted as Ops Management or as directed by lead examiner to facilitate next event, inform crew that a team has been dispatched to investigate the EDG 102 failure.
BOP continued Adjusts DIESEL GOV control to establish at least 100 KW Adjusts VOLT ADJ RHEO GEN 102 switch to establish reactive load between 300 and 800 KVARs to the bus Adjusts DIESEL GOV control switch to raise load to at least 2650-2750 KW Recognizes/reports EDG 102 governor malfunction Recognizes/reports EDG 102 load is above the 2845 KW trip criteria of N1-ST-M4A step 6.2.15 Places Diesel Generator 102 Control Switch to Emergency Stop Verifies R1022 open
Page 13 of 22 NMP1 NRC 2023 Scenario 2 January 2023 Event #3: Power Control Requests Emergency MVAR Support Event Information
- Reactor Power is approximately 100% power
- The crew will respond to Power Controls request to raise MVAR to the Grid per N1-OP-32.
When directed by lead examiner, call the crew as Power Control and make the following report:
This is Power Control. We are about to lose some generation capacity on the grid due an emergent shutdown of another plant. We need Nine Mile Point Unit 1 to supply an additional 100 MVARs to the grid as soon as possible to ensure stable grid voltage.
CREW Acknowledge/report Power Control communication Role Play:
If informed as Shift Manager, GSO, Operations Manager or CENG Generation Dispatch, acknowledge report and concur with actions to raise MVARs as needed.
SRO Acknowledges report from crew Directs raising Main Generator reactive load by 100 MVARs per N1-OP-32 section F ATC Executes N1-OP-32 section F Adjusts VOLTAGE REG ADJUSTMENT switch at E console to raise 100 MVARS Adjusts EXCITER RHEOSTAT switch at E console to establish AND maintain between 10 AND 20 Volts Boost on the VOLTAGE REG AMPLIDYNE meter
Page 14 of 22 NMP1 NRC 2023 Scenario 2 January 2023 Event #4: Loss of Main Condenser Vacuum Event Information
- Plant is at approximately 85 power with 4 Reactor Recirculation loops in service
- An Air leak will develop in the Main Condenser resulting in a loss of vacuum
- The crew will respond to the loss of vacuum per N1-SOP-25.1 and N1-SOP-1.1
- The crew will have to use Cram rods to reduce power less than 85%
When directed by lead examiner, insert malfunction:
MC01C, Main Condenser - HP Section Air Inleakage (0-100%), SV=0.5%
TRG2 Main condenser vacuum slowly lowers Offgas flow rises Expected Annunciator:
H1-2-6, AIR EJECTOR OFF GAS FLOW-PRESS TEMP HIGH CREW Recognize/report lowering main condenser vacuum Acknowledge/report annunciators:
H1-2-6, AIR EJECTOR OFF GAS FLOW-PRESS TEMP HIGH SRO Acknowledges reports Directs execution of N1-SOP-25.1, Unplanned Loss of Condenser Vacuum Directs Emergency Power Reduction per N1-SOP-1.1 to stabilize condenser vacuum Provides oversight for reactivity manipulation
Page 15 of 22 NMP1 NRC 2023 Scenario 2 January 2023 ATC Monitor plant parameters Lower recirc flow and insert cram rods per N1-SOP-1.1 to stabilize vacuum Reports to US when Main Condenser vacuum has stabilized Role Play: If dispatched as operator to check for condenser leaks, acknowledge order. If asked about status, report that you have not found any leaks yet BOP Executes N1-SOP-25.1, Unplanned Loss of Condenser Vacuum Verifies proper operation of the following:
Circ Water System SJAEs Off Gas System Condensate System Turbine Gland Seal System Dispatches operator to check for condenser leakage SRO Acknowledge report from ATC that Main Condenser Vacuum has stabilized
Page 16 of 22 NMP1 NRC 2023 Scenario 2 January 2023 Event #5 & 6: PB 101 Electrical Fault and RRP #3 Discharge Valves fails to close Event Information
- PB 101 Electrical Fault
- N1-SOP-1.3 will need to be executed due to the loss of Recirc. Pump #13.
When directed by examiner, insert malfunction:
ED06, PB 101 Electrical Fault TRG3 Loss of voltage on PB 101 Lowering Reactor power Lowering Recirc flow Expected Annunciators:
A5-1-1, POWER BOARD 101 R1014 TRIP A4-2-7, POWER BOARD 101 LOCKOUT 86BT F2-2-3, React Recirc M-G Set 13 F2-3-5, React Recirc Pump M-G Set Lockout Rel 86 Blocked CREW Diagnose/report loss of PB 101 Diagnose/report the trip of RRP 13 SRO Acknowledges reports Directs entry into N1-SOP-1.3 for RRP trip May direct entry into N1-SOP-1.5 for unplanned power change Acknowledges APRMs are inoperable for scram and rod block functions of TS 3.6.2 Provides oversight of reactivity change during closure of RRP 13 discharge valve Reviews Powerboard 101 loads Acknowledges report that RRP #13 Discharge Valve has failed to close Reviews TS 3.1.7.e and determines Reactor power is limited to 90%
Determines thermal limits penalty RO Monitors plant parameters
Page 17 of 22 NMP1 NRC 2023 Scenario 2 January 2023 Monitors Reactor power and recirculation flow during closure of RRP suction valve Verifies position on four loop P/F map May take a critical parameter of number of operating recirc pumps Role Play: If dispatched to PB 101, wait 2 minutes to report R1014 tripped on overcurrent and that Electrical Maintenance is at the PB investigating.
Note: When BOP attempts to close RRP #11 Discharge Valve they will notice the valve will fail to close.
BOP May execute N1-SOP-1.5 for unplanned power change Monitors RPV water level response to transient Enters N1-SOP-1.3 for RRP trip Verifies proximity to restricted zone on four loop Power to Flow Map Notifies SRO that APRMs are inoperable Attempts to close RRP 13 discharge valve Will report to US that RRP #13 Discharge Valve has failed to close.
Closes RRP #13 Suction Valve Opens RRP #13 Suction Valve for 2-3 seconds Notifies SRO that APRMs are operable Green flags RRP 13 control switch Places RRP 13 M/A station to MAN
Page 18 of 22 NMP1 NRC 2023 Scenario 2 January 2023 Event #7 & #8: Feedwater Line Rupture into the Drywell and Feedwater Isolation Valves are failed open Event Information
- Feedwater Line rupture occurs into the Drywell
- The Crew will scram the reactor due to rapidly degrading parameters in the Drywll
- The crew will enter N1-EOP-PC, N1-EOP-RPV, and N1-EOP-C2
- The crew will attempt to isolate the Feedwater Line rupture but the FW Isolation Valves will fail to close.
When directed by examiner, insert malfunction:
FW30, Main FW Line Break Inside Drywell, RT=10:00, RSV=0%, SV=100%
TRG4 RPV water level will lower as FW Flowrate rises Drywell pressure and temperature rise Drywell leakage rises Expected annunciators:
H2-1-1, Drywell Floor Drain Level High H2-4-7, Drywell Water Leak Detection Sys K2-4-3, Drywell Pressure High-Low F1-1-5(4-1-4), RPS Ch 11(12) Drywell Press High CREW Acknowledge/report annunciators Report the rapidly degrading conditions in the Drywell SRO Acknowledges reports Directs Reactor Scram per N1-SOP-1 Acknowledges Scram report ATC Monitors plant parameters Depresses Reactor Trip 11 and 12 pushbuttons and Places Mode Switch in SHUTDOWN Provides scram report
Page 19 of 22 NMP1 NRC 2023 Scenario 2 January 2023 BOP Monitors plant parameters Note: Due to time frame of event, Tech Spec call may be discussed as a follow-up question.
SRO Acknowledges reports Enters N1-EOP-RPV on low RPV water level and high Drywell pressure Enters N1-EOP-PC on high Drywell pressure and temperature o
Direct lockout of Containment Spray pumps May direct vessel/containment isolation per N1-SOP-40.2 When torus pressure exceeds 13 psig or drywell temperature approaches 300oF:
Answers Below the Containment Spray Initiation Limit? - Yes Verifies all Recirc pumps are tripped Directs trip of all Drywell cooling fans Directs operation of Containment Spray per EOP-1 attachment 17 ATC/BOP Updates crew on Reactor and Containment parameters Updates the crew on lowering RPV water level Locks out Containment Spray pumps When torus pressure exceeds 13 psig or drywell temperature approaches 300oF:
Verifies all Recirc pump are tripped Trips all Drywell cooling fans Initiates Containment Spray per N1-EOP-1 attachment 17 Verifies started two Containment Spray pumps (111 or 122 preferred)
Page 20 of 22 NMP1 NRC 2023 Scenario 2 January 2023 May start additional Containment Spray and Containment Spray Raw Water pumps as necessary Notifies SRO that Torus pressure has exceeded PSP SRO Acknowledges reports Directs a RPV Blowdown per N1-EOP-C2 (1-2)
Will direct initiation of both Emergency Condensers Will direct the opening of 4 ERVs BOP/ATC Acknowledges direction to perform a RPV Blowdown Initiates both Emergency Condensers Opens 4 ERVs Reports completion to SRO SRO Enters EOP-RPV (1-2), RPV Control for Modes 1 and 2 Directs Operators to perform actions of N1-SOP-1 Directs BOP to maintain RPV water level in a band of 53 to 95 using Condensate, Feedwater and CRD Directs BOP to maintain RPV pressure between 800 to 1000 psig using TBVs ATC/BOP Acknowledges direction to enter N1-SOP-1 Maintains RPV water level in assigned band utilizing Condensate, Feedwater, and CRD
Page 21 of 22 NMP1 NRC 2023 Scenario 2 January 2023 Maintains RPV pressure within the assigned band utilizing TBVs Report indications of a Feedwater Rupture inside the Drywell Note: The SRO should NOT direct the Core Spray jumpers to be installed because Core Spray, in this event, will be required for core cooling.
SRO Acknowledges report that FW Isolation Valves have failed to close Acknowledges report of possible FW Rupture inside the Drywell Directs ADS bypassed prior to RPV level lowering to -10 inches When determines RPV level cannot be restored and maintained above -84 Will enter N1-EOP-C2 Will direct initiation of both Emergency Condensers Will direct the opening of 4 ERVs Directs Core Spray jumpers to be installed once Core Spray isolation valves are open Direct the BOP to maintain RPV water level within his assigned band using Core Spray, Liquid Poison, and CRD pumps.
BOP/ATC Bypasses ADS Stands by and installs Core Spray jumpers once the Core Spray Isolation valves are fully open per N1-EOP-1, Att. 4 Maintains RPV water level in the assigned band utilizing Core Spray, Liquid poison, and CRD pumps
Page 22 of 22 NMP1 NRC 2023 Scenario 2 January 2023 Event Termination Criteria RPV water level controlled in assigned band RPV pressure controlled in the assigned band Primary Containment pressure maintained per EOP-PC
Form 2.3-3 Operating Test Review Worksheet (JPMs)
Facility: Nine Mile Point Unit 1 Exam Date: 7/13/23 1
JPM # or title 2
Type (S/P/A) 3 ALT (Y/N) 4 LOD (1-5) 5 JPM Errors 6
U/E/S 7
Explanation LOD REF IC TSK CUE CS TL N/A
Form 2.3-3 Instructions for Completing the JPM Table
- 1. Enter the JPM number and/or title.
- 2. Enter the type of JPM(S)imulator, (P)lant, or (A)dministrative.
- 3. Enter (Y)es or (N)o for an Alternate Path JPM.
- 4. Rate the level of difficulty (LOD) of each JPM using a scale of 1-5 (easy-difficult). A JPM containing less than two critical steps, a JPM that tests solely for recall or memorization, or a JPM that involves directly looking up a single correct answer is likely LOD = 1 (too easy). Conversely, a JPM with over 30 steps or a JPM that takes more than 45 minutes to complete is likely LOD = 5 (too difficult).
- 5. Check the appropriate block for each JPM error type, using the following criteria:
LOD = 1 or 5 is unsatisfactory (U).
REF: The JPM lacks required references, tools, or procedures (U).
IC: The JPM initial conditions are missing or the JPM lacks an adequate initial cue (U).
CUE: The JPM lacks adequate evaluator cues to allow the applicant to complete the task, or the evaluator cues are subjective or leading (U).
TSK: The JPM lacks a task standard or lacks completion criteria for a task standard (U).
CS: The JPM contains errors in designating critical steps, or the JPM lacks an adequate performance standard for a critical step (U).
TL: The JPM validation times are unreasonable, or a time-critical JPM lacks a completion time (U).
- 6. Mark the JPM as unsatisfactory (U), satisfactory (S), or needs enhancements (E). A JPM is (U) if it has one or more (U) errors as determined in step 5. Examples of enhancements include formatting, spelling, or other minor changes.
- 7. Briefly describe any JPM determined to be unsatisfactory (U) or needing enhancement (E). Save initial review comments and detail subsequent comment resolution so that each exam-bound JPM is marked by a satisfactory (S) resolution on this form.
Form 2.3-3 Operating Test Review Worksheet (Scenarios)
Facility: Nine Mile Point Unit 1 Scenario: 1 Exam Date: 7/13/23 1
Scenario Event ID/Name:
2 Scenario event errors 3
U/E/S 4
Explanation Realism/
Credibility Performance Standards Verifiable Actions Critical Task TS 1
E Add in applicable steps/actions for boration and turbine load reduction 4
E Add in more details of steps operators will take for charging pump swap Facility: Nine Mile Point Unit 1 Scenario: 2 Exam Date: 7/13/23 Sim Setup E
Add note for sim setup to ensure CRD pump 11 is running. Station agreed to correct.
2 E
Event information says the crew will raise power with recirc flow The event is to start a second RWCU pump.
Station agreed to correct.
3 E
BOP actions for monitoring battery voltage say Battery 12, should be 11.
Station agreed to correct.
3 E
BOP actions for taking critical parameter to remove Battery 12, should be 11. Station agreed to correct.
3 E
Typo at top of page 18. Cross-typing vs cross-tying. Station agreed to correct.
4/5 E
Event information says Reactor Building Exhaust Fan 12 trips; event is Fan 11 trips. Station agreed to correct.
6/7/8 E
Two typos, power above 6% or unknow? and Low-Low RPBV water level. Station agreed to correct.
Form 2.3-3 Instructions for Completing the Scenario Table
- 1. For each scenario, enter the scenario event names and descriptions.
- 2. Review the individual events contained in each scenario, and identify and mark event errors:
The scenario guide event description is not realistic/credibleunsatisfactory (U).
The scenario guide event description lacks adequate crew/operator performance standardsneeds enhancement (E).
The scenario guide event description lacks verifiable actions for a credited normal event, reactivity event instrument/component malfunction, or technical specification (TS) event (or a combination of these) (U).
The scenario guide event description incorrectly designates an event as a critical task (i.e., a noncritical task labeled as critical or a critical task labeled as noncritical). This includes critical tasks that do not meet the critical task criteria (i.e., the critical task does not have a measurable performance standard) (U).
The scenario guide event description incorrectly designates entry into TS actions when not required or does not designate entry into TS actions when required (U).
6/7/8 E
Validation comment: add in trip of drywell fans to drive drywell pressure faster.
Station agreed to add.
6/7/8 E
Termination criteria are carryovers from Scn 1, need to correct to Scn 2 termination criteria. Station agreed.
CT X
E Critical task needs to be updated to require two or more methods of power reduction. Station agreed to correct.
Facility: Nine Mile Point Unit 1 Scenario: 3 Exam Date: 7/13/23 7/8 E
Validation comment: added failure of Core Spray pumps to automatically start.
Station agreed.
CT E
Remove ADS inhibit as critical task, as blowdown is precluded by scenario pace.
Station agreed.
- 3. Based on the outcome in step 2, mark the scenario event as unsatisfactory (U), satisfactory (S), or needs enhancements (E). An event is (U) if it has one or more (U) errors as determined in step 2. Examples of enhancements include formatting, spelling, or other minor changes.
- 4. Briefly describe any scenario event determined to be unsatisfactory (U) or needing enhancement (E). Save initial review comments and detail subsequent comment resolution so that each exam-bound scenario event is marked by a satisfactory (S) resolution on this form.