ML23261A596
| ML23261A596 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vallecitos, Vallecitos Nuclear Center File:GEH Hitachi icon.png |
| Issue date: | 03/31/2023 |
| From: | Brautigam T Enercon Services, ReNuke Services Inc |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards |
| Shared Package | |
| ML23261A591 | List: |
| References | |
| M230128 REN-TR-22-010, Rev 0 | |
| Download: ML23261A596 (1) | |
Text
Enclosure 4 VNC Historical Site Assessment REN-TR-22-010 Revision 0
Vallecitos Nuclear Center Decommissioning Historical Site Assessment GE-Hitachi Nuclear Energy Alameda County, California REN-TR-22-010 Revision 0 Prepared by:
ENERCON tomonuw 500 Townpark Lane Kennesaw, GA 30144 704 S.lllinois Ave, STE C-202 Oak Ridge, TN 37830 Compiled by: _.J;.ff;f;l;l{vr'~
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Todd S. Brautigam, Radiological Speciali t Reviewed by: ----------------------------------------------
Charles Beatty, Senior Technical Specialist
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Ryan Larochelle, Radiological Protection Manager Approved by: --~-~-~---------------------
Dane M. Watson, PMP, Project Manager IP.-6~
Approved by: _____________________________ _
Mark Kirshe, ReNuke Principal
ENERCON Vallecitos Nuclear Center Decommissioning Historical Site Ass ssment REN-TR-22-010 Revision 0 Table of Contents Page Historical Site Assessment....................................................................................................................... 1 Table of Contents..................................................................................................................................... i List ofTables.......................................................................................................................................... ii List of Acronyms.................................................................................................................................... iii Summary of Changes............................................................................................................................. iv 1.0 Purpose....................................................................................................................................... !
2.0 2.1 2.2 3.0 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 4.0 4.1 5.0 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 6.0 Property Identification................................................................................................................ 2 Physical Characteristics............................................................................................................ 2 Environmental Setting.............................................................................................................. 3 Historical Site Assessment Methodology..................................................................................... 5 Approach and Rationale........................................................................................................... 5 Site Boundaries........................................................................................................................ 6 Documents Reviewed............................................................................................................... 6 Personal Interviews.................................................................................................................. 6 History........................................................................................................................................ 8 Licensing History..................................................................................................................... 8 Findings.................................................................................................................................... 13 Interview Results................................................................................................................... 13 Potential Contaminates........................................................................................................... 13 Past Spills and Releases ofRadjoactive Material.................................................................... 15 Potentially Contaminated Areas.............................................................................................. 16 Related Environmental Concerns............................................................................................ 20 Conclusion................................................................................................................................ 21
- 7. 0 References................................................................................................................................ 22 Appendix 1: Notes from [nterviews....................................................................................................... 24 Appendix 2: Incident Report Summary.................................................................................................. 28
ENERCON List of Tables Vallecitos Nuclear Center Decommissioning Historical Site Ass ssment REN-TR-22-010 Revision 0 Table 3.1 : Interviews................................................................................................................... 7 Table 5.1 : Preliminary Radionuclides of Concern for Shutdown Reactors................................. 14 Table 5.2: Spill and Release Events at VNC.............................................................................. 15 Table 5.3: 200 Area Preliminary MARSSIM Classifications..................................................... 16 Table 5.4: 300 Area Preliminary MARSSIM Classifications..................................................... 17 11
Acronvm AEC CFR ESADA EVESR FSS GE GEH GETR HSA MARSSIM N/A Nl NIST NRC NTR NUREG TBD VBWR VNC WEP ENERCON Vallecitos Nuclear Center Decommissioning Historical Site Ass ssment REN-TR-22-010 Revision 0 List of Acronyms Meanino Atomic Energy Commission Code ofFederal Regulations Empire State Atomic Development Agency ESADA Vallecitos Experimental Superheat Reactor Final Status Survey General Electric GE-Hitachi Nuclear Energy Americas LLC GE Test Reactor Historical Site Assessment NUREG-1575, Multi-Agency Radiation Survey and Site Investigation Manual Not Applicable Non-Impacted National Institute of Standards and Technology United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Nuclear Test Reactor Nuclear Regulatory Commission Regulation To Be Determined Vallecitos Boiling Water Reactor Vallecitos Nuclear Center Waste Evaporator Plant 111
Revision Number 0
ENERCON Vallecitos Nuclear Center Decommissioning Historical Site Ass ssment REN-TR-22-010 Revision 0 Summary of Changes Date Comments 1013/2022 Initial Issuance IV
ENERCON Vallecitos Nuclear Center Decommissioning Historical Site Ass ssment REN-TR-22-010 Revision 0 1.0 Purpose The purpose of this Historical Site Assessment (HSA) is the identification of potential, likely, or known sources of radioactive material and radioactive contamination based on existing or derived information for th purpose of classifying a facility or site, or parts th reof, as impacted, or non-impacted and to identify, collect, organize, and evaluate historical infonnation relevant to the site. This historical infom1ation is used to guide further radiological surveys and provide initial survey area classifications based on guidance contained in NUREG-1575, Multi-Agency Radiation Survey and Site Investigation Manual (MARSSIM)
Ill_ The classifications will be used to guide characterization and remediation efforts. Final structure and land area classifications used for the final status survey will be based on the HSA and other characterization programs. This HSA bas been prepared, to the extent feasible, in accordanc with the guidance provided in NUREG-1757 Consolidated Decommissioning Guidance, Characterization, Survey, and Determination of Radiological Criteria L2J. The HSA is limited to consideration of the three shutdown nuclear reactors and does not consider the remainder of the site.
The HSA describes the physical configuration, identifies potential radioactive constituents of contamination, assesses the migration of contaminants, identifies contaminated media, identifies non-impacted and impacted areas, and classifies impacted areas.
The primary objectives of the HSA include the following:
- identify potential sources of residual radioactivity
- determine if sites pose a threat to human health and the environment
- differentiate impacted from nonimpacted areas
- provide input to scoping and characterization survey designs
- assess the likelihood of residual radioactivity migration
- identify additional potential radiation sites related to the site being investigated The HSA typically consists of three phases: 1) preliminary investigation of the facility or site, 2) site visits or inspections, and 3) evaluation of the site based on the information collected. The HSA should identify special survey situations that may need to be addressed, such as subsurface radioactivity-sewer systems, waste plumbing, and floor drains; ventilation ducts; and embedded piping containing residual radioactivity.
ENERCON Vallecitos Nuclear Center Decommissioning Historical Site Ass ssment REN-TR-22-010 Revision 0 2.0 Property Identification 2.1 Physical Characteristics 2.1. 1 License Holder The original primary purpose ofthe GE - Hitachi Nuclear Energy Americas LLC (GEH) Vallecitos uclear Center (VNC) Special Nuclear Material operation was research and development, engineering studies, and storage of irradiated Light Water Reactor fuel and components previously subjected to engineering tests and evaluations awaiting transfer to the Department of Energy. In accordance with current technical specifications, the principal activity within the plant area is possession and dismantling of components and includes the possession and dismantling of the shutdown reactors. Radioactive material license SNM-960 authorized activities are co-located with the licensed activities for DPR-1 Vallecitos Boiling Water Reactor (VBWR), TR-1 GE Test Reactor (GETR), DR 10 Empire State Atomic Development Agency Vallecitos Experimental Superheat Reactor (EVESR), all in safe store, and R-33 Nuclear Test Reactor (NTR). The principal activity currently performed at VNC is by-product material activities covered under the State of California license CA 0017 01 including sealed source manufacture and research and development.
2.1.2 Location 6705 Vallecitos Rd Sunol, CA 94586 Longitude: North 37°36'39" Latitude: West 121°50'07" The VNC site (site) is defined according to R-33 license amendment 25 and is a sub-section of the larger approximate 1600-acre GEH property (property). VNC is located near the center of the Pleasanton quadrangle of Alameda County, California. VNC is east of San Francisco Bay, approximately 35 air miles east-southeast of Sao Francisco and 20 air miles north of San Jose. The properties surrounding VNC are primarily used for agriculture and cattle raising, with some residences which are mostly to the west of the property.
Within the six-mile vicinity, primary transportation routes include State Route 84 (SR-84) I Vallecitos Road and Interstate 680 (1-680) (see Figure 3). SR-84 is a highway that runs southwest I northeast and connects the community of Sunol to the city of Livermore. Livermore is located approximately six miles northeast and bad a 2020 population of 87,955 l3l l4l. A Union Pacific railroad line lies about two miles west ofVNC
[3].
A small residential area is located along the western boundary of the property, and the nearest town is Pleasanton, located four miles north-northwest. A U.S. Veterans Administration hospital is located approximately four miles east ISJ. There is light industrial activity within a I 0-mile radius ofVNC. San Jose (20 miles south), Oakland (30 miles northwest), and San Francisco (35 miles northwest) are major industrial centers within the 50-mile region (see Figure 4) 13J.
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ENERCON 2.1.3 Topography Vallecitos Nuclear Center Decommissioning Historical Site Ass ssment REN-TR-22-010 Revision 0 The property is located within the Livermore Upland physiographic area. Most of the property is tmdeveloped with hills ranging in elevation from 1,000 to 1,300 feet above mean sea level l6l.
Approximately 135 acres, located in the southwest corner of the property and situated between the 400 and 600-foot topographic contours, are developed. The property is not located within a I 00-year flood zone [sJ_
2.1.4 Stratigraphy Features in the area immediately surrounding Vallecitos Valley include the Verona fault, a major northwest-trending thrust fault northeast of the valley; the northeast-trending Las Positas fault zone, east of the valley; and the northwest-trending Calaveras fault zone, with predominant right lateral strike-slip movement, just west of the valley PJ.
The Quaternary deposits in Alameda County comprise three distinct depositional environments. One, forming a transgressive sequence of alluvial fan and fan-delta facies, is mapped in the western one-third of the county. The second, forming only alluvial fan facies, is mapped in the Livermore Valley and San Joaquin Vall y in the eastern part of the county. The third, forming a combination of Eolian dune and estuarine facies, is restricted to the Alameda Island area in the northwestern comer of the county [SJ.
2.2 Environmental Settin~:
2.2.1 Geology The property is in Vallecitos Valley within the Diablo Range, an uplifted block of Jurassic and Cretaceous rocks mantled in part with a thick sequence of marine and continental Tertiary rocks and continental Quaternary deposits. Folding and faulting has resulted in structures typical of the central Coast Ranges Geologic Province l9l Geologic units exposed in the area include upper Miocene sedimentary rocks, Pliocene and Pleistocene Livermore Gravel of Clark, and the overlying quaternary alluvial deposits. The low hills around the valley are marked with numerous small, active, or recently active, landslides that are composed mostly of unconsolidated quaternary material f9l.
2.2.2 Hydrogeology The geologic formations in the area include consolidated rock formations, i.e., upper Miocene sedimentary rocks, and unconsolidated rock deposits, i.e., Pliocene and Pleistocene Livermore Gravel of Clark, and the Quaternary alluvium.
Surface runoff in the valley is drained by Vallecitos Creek and tributary streams, which flow generally westward and out the mouth of the valley to join with Arroyo de Ia Laguna before entering Alameda Creek.
The low hills that border Vallecitos Valley on the northwest are drained westward by an unnamed stream tributary to Arroyo de Ia Laguna. In the valley area, an unknown part of precipitation directly infiltrates the soil and percolates downward to recharge the ground-water basin. Infiltration of water along stream courses provides additional ground-water recharge while decreasing streamflowl9l.
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ENERCON Vallecitos Nuclear Center Decommissioning Historical Site Ass ssment REN-TR-22-010 Revision 0 The source of ground-water recharge in the area is direct infiltration of precipitation and seepage along Vallecitos Creek; some seepage along a canal which is a part of the South Bay Aqueduct may be an additional recharge source f9l The amount of water that infiltrates to the zone of saturation depends on the permeability of the earth materials at the surface and the steepness of the surface slope. Soils in the area are generally well drained but the subsoil has low permeability. Runoff is rapid on hillsides and slow on more level ground. Little infiltration occurs where the Livermore Gravel is exposed on the hills around the valley. Infiltration on the alluvial d posits is r latively high because of the mod rate permeability and b caus the alluvium is present mainly along the more level parts of the valley floor l9J.
Ground water in Vallecitos Valley occurs in the alluvium and the Livermore Gravel of Clark. The consolidated upper Miocene sedimentary rocks underlying the Livermore Gravel are not considered to be an aquifer in this area f91.
Within the Livermore Gravel and the alluvium, beds of coarse-grained material (coarse sand, gravel, and boulders) are interbedded with beds of fine-grained material (clay and silt). The beds of coarse-grained material, where saturated yield water to wells; the beds of fine-grained material, even where saturated, do not yield significant quantities of water to wells but do store water that may be slowly released to the coarse-grained materials, and ultimately to wells f9J.
The area where the buildings are located is drained by ditches leading to Vallecitos Creek. This creek discharges to Arroyo de la Laguna near the north end of Sunol Valley, two or three miles southwest of the property.
2.2.3 M teorology The climate in Alameda County is mild, generally warm, and temperate. The historic average daily temperature since 1970 for Alameda County is 67°F with corresponding record high temperature of 1 09"F and record low temperature of26°F [tol. On average, there are 69 precipitation days LI OJ and 259 sunny days per year [I OJ in Alameda County. The rain in Alameda County falls mostly in the winter, with relatively little rain in the summer. Average rainfall per year is 24 inches (IOJ with an average ofO inches of snow.
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ENERCON Vallecitos Nuclear Center Decommissioning Historical Site Ass ssment REN-TR-22-010 Revision 0 3.0 Historical Site Assessment Methodology The methodology used for the GEH VNC VBWR and EVESR Historical HSA is that found in NUREG-1575, MARSSIM. As described in MARSSIM, VNC, being an NRC licensee has much of the HSA related information within the records management system maintained throughout its licensed history_
3.1 Approach and Rationale The search ofHSA records was to identify those events posing a significant probability of impacting the hazardous or radiological characterization of the site. These included system, stmctur, or area contamination from system failures resulting in airborne releases, Liquid spills or releases, or the loss of control over solid material management.
This HSA documents those events and circumstances occurring during the history that contributed to the contamination of portions of the site above background levels. lnformation relevant to changes in the radiological status of the site following publication of this HSA will be considered part of the ongoing characterization evaluations and decommissioning activities. These ongoing activities include the expansion of the site groundwater investigation and evaluations of subsurface contamination. The results of ongoing investigations into the extent of subsurface contamination will drive continuing remediation and/or mitigation efforts as appropriate.
Included in the research associated with the development of the HSA were:
Relevant excerpts from written reports and correspondence Personnel interviews, including the use of questionnaires, of current, former, and retired plant personnel to confirm documented incidents and identifY undocumented incidents Site inspection, utilizing historic site drawings, photographs prints, and diagrams to identify, locate, confirm, and document areas of concern Information from this research was used in the HSA development including the compilation of data, evaluation of results, documentation of findings, and the characterization and identification of areas and survey units.
The general criteria used to classify the survey areas are drawn from the regulatory guidance ofMARSSIM as follows [l l:
Non-impacted Area: Areas with no reasonable possibility (or extremely low probability) of residual contamination. on-impacted areas are typically off-site and may be used as background reference areas.
Impacted Area: Areas that may contain residual radioactivity in excess of natural background or fallout levels. All impacted areas must be classified as Class 1, 2, or 3 as described in MARSSIM.
Class!: Impacted areas that have, or had prior to remediation, a potential for radioactive contamination (based on site operating history) or known contamination (based on prev10us radiological surveys) above the anticipated DCGL.
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ENERCON Vallecitos Nuclear Center Decommissioning Historical Site Assessment REN-TR-22-010 Revision 0 Class 2: Areas that have, or had prior to remediation, a potential for radioactive contamination or known contamination, but are not expected to exceed the DCGL.
Class 3: Any impacted areas that are not expected to contain any residual radioactivity or are expected to contain levels of residual radioactivity at a small fraction of the DCGL, based on site op rating history and previous radiation surveys.
3.2 Site Boundaries The sit is on the north side of Vallecitos Road (State Route 84). The front of the site is fenced with 8-foot commercial chain-link fencing which wraps around to the west past Building 103 and terminates to the rear at a major ditch and to the east completely around Buildings 102 and 102A. A security gate at the entrance provides access control to the site. Hillside Storage is also fenced with 8-foot commercial chain link fencing.
The Waste Evaporator Plant (WEP) is not fenced due to the small quantities of material processed there.
3.3 Documents Reviewed ln developing this HSA, the following types of documents were reviewed:
- Radiological Characterization Reports Environmental Reports Environmental Monitoring Reports Licensee Event Reports Construction Photographs Historical Photographs Topographical Maps Construction Drawings
- As Built Drawings Plant Operating Reports Plant Safety Analyses Radiological Surveys Plant Operating Logs 3.4 Personal Interviews Personal interviews of current and former VNC personnel were conducted in-person and via telephone during the HSA process. Personnel were selected based on their employment history at VNC. Personnel were interviewed that held positions in maintenance, qualified reactor operators, and radiation protection.
Undocumented events were not discovered during this process, but the interviews were helpful in assessing the historical operations. In total eleven (11) current and former employees were contacted and seven (7) were intervi wed (I ll_
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Table 3.1: Interviews ENERCON Vallecitos Nuclear Center Decommissioning Historical Site Ass ssment REN-TR-22-010 Revision 0 Number Name Position 1
Edward Hagberg GETR Reactor Operator, Hot Cell Technician, Radiation Monitor Technician, and Reactor Support Department Manager 2
Brain Neri Facility Technician 3
Craig Saunders Hot Cell Technician 4
Mike Arnerich Radiation Monitor Technician 5
Juan Ayala Radiation Monitor Technician 6
Scott Mickle Facility Technician 7
Joe Tenorio Hot Cells Manager 7
ENERCON 4.0 History 4.1 Licensing History Vallecitos Nuclear Center Decommissioning Historical Site Ass ssment REN-TR-22-010 Revision 0 4.1.l DPR-1 Docket 50-18 Vallecitos Boiling Water Reactorl'2J 01/10/ 1956-Application by GE for license to construct and operate VBWR 05/14/1956-Construction Permit CPPR-3 issued 07/2911957-Low power operating license CX-2 issued with expiration of 511411963 08/03/ 1957-First Criticality 08/31/1957-Operating license DPR-1 issued to VBWR with expiration date of 5/14/1963 10/19/1957-Full power operation 05/14/1963-License extended beyond 5/14/1963 10/21 / 1957-Full Power Operation 12/9/1963 - VBWR shutdown 12/24/ 1963-Defueled 09/09/ 1965-Possession Only license issued as amendment 18 02/05/1965-Final Report on Deactivation of Vallecitos Boiling Water Reactor 07/2511966 - Order to dismantle issued10/23/1973 Amendment 19 to extend license to 05/14/ 1996 05/14/1996-DPR-1 continued until termination pursuant to 10 CFR 50.51(b)
Identified certain systems/areas were turned over to the EVESR. As per the Deactivation Report: [I3J "Equipment and facilities turned over toE VESRfor control and utilization include:
- l. The VBWR control room and office building including the change room
- 2. The turbine building including the turbine generator and associated equipment
- 3. The cooling water tower and associated equipment
- 4. All ofthe VBWR wastewater and makeup water system outside of the enclosure
- 5. All outside buildings including the former instrument shop, the maintenance shop, the turbine test loop building, the warehouse, the resin storage shed, the paint shed and the hot storage building. The bot storage building has been decontaminated and is no longer used for bot storage
- 6. The drips and drains deionizer room locat d adjacent to the VBWR waste area."
Those systems retained under VBWR included: the reactor enclosure and contents, the 70-ft stack, the VBWR valve pit certain wastewater, makeup and air lines outside the containment, some equipment in the 8
ENERCON Vallecitos Nuclear Center Decommissioning Historical Site Ass ssment REN-TR-22-010 Revision 0 Turbine Building including the Rx feed pumps and instrument atr compressor. some control room instruments.
02/09/1965-VBWR License Application Amendment No. 52 Based on Final Report on Deactivation of Vallecitos Boiling Water ReaclOr P1J "To reque t amendment of the Licen e to authorize GE to possess, but not to operate as a nuclear reactor, the VBWRfacility."
09/09/1965-VBWR Possession Only License Amendment No. 18 Authorized opera6on according to the 1965 Deactivation Report stated that "VBWR facilities external to the containment building have been deactivated OR turned over to EVESR for operation in conjunction with that reactor" ruJ.
"VBWR facilities external to the containment building have been deactivated or turned over to EVESRfor operation in conjunction with that reactor."
Survey was completed on Dec I 5, 1964, of all retired areas.
06/15/1966 - VBWR License Application Amendment No. 53 Requested authorization to dismantle and remove essentially all remaining components with the VBWR except the reactor pressure vessel, and certain external components.
07/25/ 1966 - AEC issued authorization for further dismantlement of VBWR lAW License Application Amendment No. 53.
11/29/ 1989 - VBWR Request to Complete Transfer of Subsidiary Facilities to Cal 0017-60 Per 9/9/1965 DPR -1 Amendment 18 and 4/15/70 DR -10 Amendment 2, only the reactor building, ventilation system, stack, main valve pit, and outside piping remained under License DPR-J. This request was that everything except for the containment building be transferred to the state 0017-60 license.
"The requested modification of License condition 3a. will restrict License DPR-1 to the VBWR reactor building and its contents. The other facilities will be held under the California broad site byproduct material License 0017-60."
07/22/1992-VBWR (DR-I) I EVESR (DR-10) Internal L tter on VBWR/EVESR status:
This Letter clarified that VBWR Final Report on Deactivation dated 2/5/65 retained the following facilities under License DPR-1 P3l:
- a. Reactor enclosure and contents.
- b. Stack.
- c. Valve pit between the turbine and reactor buildings.
- d. Some wastewater and makeup waier equipment and air lines.
- e. The reactor feed pumps, and instrument air compressor located in the turbine buildin "
"The following facilities were transferred to EVESR:
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ENERCON Vallecitos Nuclear Center Decommissioning Historical Site Assessment REN-TR-22-010 Revision 0
- a. Turbine building, including the generator and associated equipment.
- b. VBWR cooling tower and associated equipment.
- c. Waste and makeup water system located outside the VBWR. enclosure.
- d. All outside buildings (instrument shop, maintenance shop, turbine test loop building, resin storage shed, hot storage shed).
- e. "Drip and drains" deionizer room adjacent to VBWR. Waste area.
Note: There is no document in the EVESR.file adding the facilities."
"Amendment No.2 to DR-10, 4115170, redefines the plant area as the reactor containment building and its ventilation system (not including the stack). Specifically eliminated in the NRC-approved application are the dump condenser and miscellaneous equipment building, the boiler, the EVESR cooling tower, and the stack."
"The VBWR License DPR-1 still has the items listed in the 21511965 submittal. VNC has requested an amendment to limit the plan/to the reactor building and its contents. "
11/16/1992-VBWR License Amendment No. 20 NRC Denies GEH 11/29/1989 request to transfer materials outside of the VBWR containment building to th state 0017-60 license.
"The amendment request to transfer all other facilities other than the VBWR reactor building and its contents to the California broad site Byproduct Material License 0017-60 is denied."
10/22/2007-VBWR License Amendment No.21 4.1.2 DR-10 Docket 50-183 ESADA Vallecitos Experimental Superheat Reactor [I 4J 02/0 Ill 961 -Construction Permit CPPR-11: Application for license to constmct and operate the ESADA Vallecitos Experimental Superheat Reactor.
08/J0/1961 - Constmction permit CPPR-11 issued 10/05/1962 -Provisional Operating License DR -10 was issued 11/1311963-Provisional low-power operating license DR-10 issued 0 l/26/1966-Operating License DR -1 0 was issued authoring operation for a period of ten years 02/0 I/l967 - Operation of the EVESR was discontinued as operational objectives of the superheat program had been achieved I 0/12/1967-Amendment o. 14 proposed to surrender (terminate) License DR-I 0 "A deactivation and dismantling program conducted at EVESR since shutdown has resulted in conditions which GE believes will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public. "
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ENERCON Vallecitos Nuclear Center Decommissioning Historical Site Ass ssment REN-TR-22-010 Revision 0 12/2 1/ 1967 - Amendment No_ 15 withdrawal of request for termination of License DPR-1 0 as filed in Application Amendment No.14. Requests instead:
"Issuance of an amendment authorizing GE to possess the E VESR facility and residual radioactive byproduct material. "
06/17/1968 -
ESADA Vallecitos Experimental Reactor Superheat Reactor (EVESR)
Possession Only License Amendment 1 Submitted with Amendment 15 of operating license_ Expiration date given as Ol/26/2016_
10/16/1969 - EVESR GE Amendment Request for Amendment 2 to Tecb Specs to Redefine "EVESR Plant Area" Sent to AEC and proposed the plant area be defined as the containment building and its ventilation system.
03/09/1970 - EVESR GE Application Amendment 16, Modification 1, to redefine "EVESR Plant Area" Clarifying supplemental information concurrent with Amendment 29 to State License 0017-59 to possess radioactive material within the complex will be under state license.
"All radioactive material within the complex will be possessed and used under the authority of a license is ued by the AEC or the State of California."
0411511970- EVESR GE Amendment 2 AEC changes the Technical Specification definition of EVESR plant area to the reactor containment building and its ventilation system and assigns all buildings and structures external to the containment to activities subject to AEC or State of California materials licenses. Specifically removed from the defmition of plant area were the dump condenser, misc. equipment building, gas-fired boiler, cooling tower, the stack, and the control room.
"The Atomic Energy Commission has issued, effective as of the date of issuance, Amendment No. 2 to Facility License No. DR-10. The amendment removes from the conditions and requirements of this licen e certain buildings and structures external to the reactor containment building of the deactivated ESADA-Val!ecitus Experimental Superheat Reactor ___ "
"By Application Amendment No. 16 dated October 16, 1969, the General Electric Company (GE) submitled proposed changes to the Technical Specifications inc01porated in Amendment No. 1 to License No. DR-IO.
The proposed changes remove the dump condenser and miscellaneous equipment building, the gas-fired boiler, the cooling tower, the stack, and the control room from the defined plant area for the EVESRfacility. Additional information was ubmitted by Modification No. I (dated March 9, I 970) to Application Amendment No. I 6.
The building and structures removed from the conditions and requirements ofFacility License No. DR-I 0 will remain under the control of GE and be utilized for activities that are subject to AEC or tate of California materials licenses."
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ENERCON Vallecitos Nuclear Center Decommissioning Historical Site Ass ssment REN-TR-22-010 Revision 0 "The plant area shall consist of a controlled access area defined by the reactor containment building and its ventilation system."
06/11/1976-Amendment 3 extends DR-I 0 to 1/20/2016 Ol/02/2019 -
License expiration was 1/26/2016 but was continued per 50.5J(b) until termination 4.1.3 TR-1 GE Test Reactor l151 01107/1959-Initial GETR Operating License TR-1 was issued 10/24/1977 - GETR shutdown in response to NRC Order to Show Cause 06/26/ 1985-GETR License Amendment Request for Possession Only License 02/05/1986 - GETR Possession Only License Amendment 14 issued 07/09/1990- GETR GE Request for SAFESTOR 08/07/ 1992 - GETR License Renewal Application Aligns GETR with EVESR License Expiration Date 09/30/1992 -
GETR License Amendment No. 16 Aligns GETR with EVESR License Expiration Date 4.1.4 Oth r Amendments I Information to DPR-1, DR-10 and TR-1 09/06/2007 - "GE-Hitachi shall not dispose of the facility or the property occupied by the facility without prior approval of the Commission, except that GE-Hilachi may dispose of component parts or devices from the EVESRfacility in accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR Part 20."
12/15/2015-GEH Vallecitos requests DR-10 and TR-llicense continuation from the NRC Ol/02/2019-NRC Grants Continuance of Licenses DR-10 and TR-1 beyond given expiration date ofOJ /26/2016 Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.5l(b) 4.1.5 Licensing History Assessment VBWR DPR-l:
Possession Only License issued as Amendment 18 on 9/09/1965. Decommissioning must be completed per 10 CFR 50.82(a)(3) by 9/09/2025.
EVESR DR-I 0: Possession Only License issued as Amendment 1 on 6/17/1968.
Decommissioning must be completed per 10 CFR 50.82(a)(3) by 6/17/2028.
GETR TR-1 : Possession Only License issued as Amendment 14 on 2/5/1986. Because GETR is a test reactor, decommissioning is per 10 CFR 50.82(b) there was no date for completion however.
GETR TR-1 License Amendm nt 16 issued on 9/30/1992 aligns GETRlicense expiration date with EVESR; 04/15/2030. Both licenses were continued on Ol /02/2019.
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ENERCON Vallecitos Nuclear Center Decommissioning Historical Site Ass ssment REN-TR-22-010 Revision 0
5.0 Findings
5.1 Interview Results An important step in the HSA process is information collected from personnel familiar with site history and operations. These include former employees, contractors, and others that have been involved with site operations at some time in the past. Information may be gathered through in-person or telephone interviews, questionnaires, and other forms of communication.
A summary of information gained through the interview process is included below.
Original EVESR HV AC system filter banks still in place WEP discharge path through settling basins under the road and into Lake Lee Leak at GETR tank farm was due to dewatering resin drums and then drain/line to the tank farm sump got plugged Known onsite trench disposal area along Little Valley Road for asphalt, concrete, and soil Second known, but undisclosed disposal area Local salvagers would come on-site to claim construction debris Appendix I contains notes from the interviews.
5.2 Potential Contaminates 5.2.1 Shutdown Reactors in the 200 and 300 areas Recent historical investigations conducted have identified radionuclides of concern and are listed in Table 12 of the document Radiological Scoping and Source Term for the Shutdown Reactors at Vallecitos Nuclear Center Revision 1, dated November 13, 2019 [IGJ. Tritium has also been detected in various water samples and is includ d as a radionuclide of interest. The document concluded that results between the three reactors were similar with Cs-137 being the dominant radionuclide. The preliminary list of radionuclides of concern applicable to the shutdown reactors are shown in Table 5.1.
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ENERCON Vallecitos Nuclear Center Decommissioning Historical Site Ass ssment REN-TR-22-010 Revision 0 Table 5.1: Preliminary Radionuclides of Concern for Shutdown Reactors Radionuclide S}-mbol Half-life Americium-241 Am-241 432.2 years Carbon-14 C-14 5730 years Cesiwn-137 Cs-137 30.07 years Cobalt-60 Co-60 5.27 years Curium-243/244 Cm-243/244 29.1 years I 18.10 years Hydrogen-3 (tritium)
H-3 12.33 years Nickel-63 Ni-63 100.1 years Plutonimn-238 Pw.-238 87.7 years Plutonium-239/240 Pu-239/240 2411 0 years I 6563 years Strontium-90 Sr-90 28.79 years The shutdown reactor source term in Table 5.1 was developed from loose contamination surveys which were composited and sent for analysis at GEL Laboratory. An important decommissioning objective for GEH Vallecitos is to decontaminate reactor building structw-es to meet site release criteria.
Decontamination will occur after the removal and off-site disposition of radioactive systems, stmctures or components and hazardous materials.
5.2.2 Outside Reactor Buildings in the 200 and 300 Areas A similar scoping survey ofhjstorical areas, outside of the reactors, was performed and documented as the Radiological Assessment of Outside Contaminated Area at Vallecitos Nuclear Center, Final, dated January 15, 2020 LI 7J. The surveys included direct radiation surveys and collection of soil and groundwater samples.
Dose rates were taken in the yards of the 200 and 300 areas. The dose rates are higher than expected background across the entire 200 GETR area with the highest dose rates in the tank farm and seal and storage areas. The 300 area dose rates are also higher than background, except for the area east of the 352 building where dose rates are significantly lower than the west side. The higher dose rates on the west side of the 300 ar a may be attributed to the Waste Evaporator Plant (building 304 and 349) and storage tank, which are outside of the LT boundary.
Indicator soil samples were taken from areas considered more likely to be contaminated from historical facility operations. With that objective, four indicator samples were taken around each reactor, and two background samples taken at locations deemed to be unaffected by facility operations. A total of eighteen soil samples were obtained. Four of the indicator samples had an elevated level ofCs-137 with all analysis results included as Table 2 in document Radiolof{ical Assessment of Outside Contaminated Area at Vallecitos Nuclear enter, final, dated January 15, 2020 (I 7J.
The predominant radionuclides in soil samples include Ni-63, Cs-137 and transuranic radioisotopes. When assessed to the NRC general soil guideline levels, the four indicator samples with elevated Cs-13 7 aU exceed d unity (sum-of-fraction > 1 ).
14
ENERCON Vallecitos Nuclear Center Decommissioning Historical Site Assessment REN-TR-22-010 Revision 0 Groundwater samples were collected from the three recently constructed wells installed specifically for monitoring dowugradient flow from the shutdown reactors. Tritium was detected at small fractions of the EPA Drinking Water Standard of20,000 pCi!L. The maximum tritium level of92,100 pCi/L was detected in the effluent retention basin [ IJ]. Subsequent sampling indicates elevated tritium results were an anomaly.
5.3 Past Spills and Releases of Radioactive Material A review of available historical documents provides information on the potential releases of radioactive material to the environment.
wnerous documents discuss tasks that raise the potential for an unplanned release of radioactive material, but do not provide confirmation of a spill or release. In each confirmed spill or release event, the spill or release was stopped, aod cleanup was performed to allow continued nonnal operations. Table 5.2 summarizes documents that verify spill or release events that have occurred at VNC.
Table 5.2: Spill and Release Events at VNC Date Area Event Description Reference 9/6/1973 Area 200 There was a spill of 270 grams or 40,000 pellets 1982-10-05 GETR Post-
-GETR of Cobalt-60. The spilled cobalt pellets lodged 1973 Cobalt Spill flSJ themselves in various equipment in the plant.
Does rates were determined to be 3 orders of magnitude above normal.
3/4/1980 Area 200 GETR Tank Farm and Ground Water Tritium. It 1980-03-04 GETR Tank
-GETR was detenuined that above background Farm & Ground Water contamination levels were detected at the GETR Tritium [I9J facility in water samples from a soil test well. The highest level was about I OX above background contamination but "several orders of magnitude below l OCFR20 restricted areas/limit. Two (2) samples were taken from a well near the control building 8/28/1980 Area 200 Water sample analysis from the GETR primary 1980-08-28 GETR
-GETR pool that showed various concentrations ofi-131 Primary Water Isotope and I-135 isotopes during Rx operations in mid-Inventory [20J 1977. The iodine isotopes were determined to remain in tbe ICRP-9, 50-year organ dose limit, for the public at that time.
5/21/1992 WEP Low level radioactive contamination was detected CA-92-25 WEP Culvert in a 40-foot section of a 12" culvert.
Cleaning [2IJ 5/25/1994 WEP Low level radioactive contamination was detected CA-92-25 WEP Cttlvert in a portion of the creek below the WEP and an Cleanino [ZlJ 0
asphalt/concrete area in front of the WEP.
8/5/l992 GETR Low level radioactive contamination was detected CA-92-39 GETR Ditch in - 30ft section of a 10" culvert, ditch and catch Cleaning [221 basin in the GETR 200 area.
12/2/1981 WEP A spill of approximately 5 gallons of water to the Radiological A se sment outside areas while transferring water from the of Outside 15
ENERCON Vallecitos Nuclear Center Decommissioning Historical Site Ass ssment REN-TR-22-010 Revision 0 Date Area Event Description Reference holdup tank (HUT) to the chemical treatment tank Contaminated Areas at (CIT) at the waste evaporator facility. Most of the the Vallecitos Nuclear spill was contained within a berm area Center, January 15, surrounding the tank; approximately 5 gallons 2020, Chesapeake overflowed the berm into rhe adjacent office ar a Nuclear Services [t?J and then to the asphalt roadway and adjoining soil. The contaminated asphalt and soil were removed and disposed of as radioactive waste.
Concrete areas were decontaminated, and any residual contamination was fixed (nature of this "fixed" is unknown). Analysis of spill water indicated 4.1E-03 ~-tCilml gross beta (assumed to be primarily Cs-134, Cs-137 and Co-60) and 9.lE-06 ~-tCi/ml gross alpha.
Appendix 2 contains an incident report summary maintained for all VNC. While the appendix includes incidents that occurred in areas outside the scope of decommissioning, they may impact decommissioning efforts for VBWR, EVESR, and/or GETR.
5.4 Potentially Contaminated Areas 5.4.1 Impacted Areas-Known and Potential Areas potentially meeting the definition of an impacted area are identified below. Classifications listed below are pr liminary and likely will be revised as data gaps are filled and additional information is collected throughout the HSA, scoping, and characterization processes. Areas within radiologically controlled areas are assumed to be a minimum ofMARSSIM Class 3 unless survey results support a non-impacted classification.
5.4.1.1 Buildings and Structures 5.4.1.1.1 200 Area Table 5.3: 200 Area Preliminary MARSSIM Classifications BUILDING ROOM Preliminary MARSSIM Class 200 102 2
200 103 2
200 104 2
200 106 2
200 108 I
200 11 ()
2 200 111 2
200 l L 2
16
BUILDING 200 200 200 200 200 200 201 202 210 210 213 214 217 200-YARD.l 200-YARD.2 5.4.1.1.2 300 Area ENERCON ROOM 113
]14 115 116 117 118 All levels All Rooms 1st Floor Rooms 2d Floor Rooms Rooms TBD Rooms TBD Rooms TBD Vallecitos Nuclear Center Decommissioning Historical Site Ass ssment REN-TR-22-010 Revision 0 Preliminary MARSSIM Class 2
2 2
I 2
2 1
]
l 2
2 3
2 Land areas within RCA 2
Laud areas outside RCA 3
Table 5.4: 300 Area Preliminary MARSSIM Classifications BUILDING ROOM Preliminary MARSSIM Class 300 103 1
300 105 2
300 113 2
300 114 Non-impacted (Nl) 300 1]5 2
300 1]6 Nl 300 117 NI 300 118 3
300 1 19 300 121 2
300 122 3
300 201 2
300 203 2
300 207 Nl 17
BUILDING 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 ENERCON Vallecitos Nuclear Center Decommissioning Historical Site Assessment REN-TR-22-010 Revision 0 ROOM Preliminary MARSSIM Class 208 NI 2Jl N1 212 Nl 213 Nl 216 2
217 NI 218 Nl 2]9 NT 108A I
1088 2
108C 3
120C 1
208A N1 208B N1 209A 2
209B 2
209C 2
Exterior Platfonn NI HaLVWest Entry 2
Hot Cell I
Hot Cell Airlock 1
Main Halll 3
Main Hall2 Nl Main Hall3 3
Mechanical access 2
Mechanical access N1 Open Land 3
Staircase l-1 Nl Stai tease 1-2 NT Staircase 2-1 3
Staircase 2-2 Nl Water Collection 1
18
ENERCON BUILDING ROOM 302 101 302 102 302 103 302 104 302 105 303 304 WH.O 304 WH.l 308 309 310 311 313 348 101 348 102 348 103 348 104 348 105 348 Hall 352 MAIN 352 352A 352 1
352 1
352 3
352 4
352 5
352 6
352 7
352 8
353 354 355 19 Vallecitos Nuclear Center Decommissioning Historical Site Assessment REN-TR-22-010 Revision 0 Preliminary MARSSIM Class 1
I 1
1 I
n/a nla I
n/a n/a n/a 1
n/a Nl NJ Nl Nl NI NJ I
2 I
1 I
1 I
1 1
I 1
n/a 1
BUILDING 356 358 361 300 Annex 301 VBWR 301 VBWR 301 VBWR 301 VBWR 351 EVESR 351 EVESR 35I EVESR 351 EVESR 351 EVESR 35I EVESR 300YARD.I 300 YARD.2 5.4.1.2 Land Areas ENERCON ROOM Annex Basement Levell Personnel Portal Vallecitos Nuclear Center Decommissioning Historical Site Assessment REN-TR-22-010 Revision 0 Preliminary MARSSIM Class 1
n/a n/a 1
1 1
I Equipment Portal I
487 level I
500 level I
503 level I
519 level 1
534 level I
549 level I
Land areas within RCA 2
Land areas outside RCA 3
Land areas within the radiologically controlled area are assumed to be a minimum MARSSIM Class 2.
Defined land areas outside of and bordering the radiologically controlled area are assumed to be a minimum MARSSIM Class 3. Land areas beyond the defined Class 3 areas are assumed non-impacted.
5.5 Related Environmental Concerns Decommissioning includes removal of additional known contaminants in plant systems and structures.
Mercury switches, lead components, and PCB light ballasts are some examples of hazardous materials that can be present in plant components and structures.
The Vallecitos Nuclear Center Decommissioning Industrial Hygiene Scoping Report l231 discusses the presence of lead, asbestos, and biological hazards. Lead bricks are prominent as shielding in the reactor areas. Asbestos insulation, floor tile, and building materials have been identified in various areas. Asbestos has been abated but some remains, and recent air sampling results show asbestos fibers in all samples taken in VBWR, EVESR, and GETR.
Decommissioning activities are expected to include asbestos abatement as various components are removed. Asbestos is typically found in some floor tiles, building siding, and pipe insulation. Other non-radioactive hazardous chemicals are potentially present at the site.
20
ENERCON Vallecitos Nuclear Center Decommissioning Historical Site Ass ssment REN-TR-22-010 Revision 0 6.0 Conclusion Little information is available detailing historical operations directly relating to the current radiological conditions ofVBWR, EVESR, and GETR. There are portions of the facility that require remediation prior to license termination and other areas where additional information must be coUected before an appropriate determination can b made regarding the next steps.
The radiologically controlled areas, defined by each fence surrounding GETR and VBWR/EVESR, are mostly impacted areas as defined by MARSSIM[Il However, specific rooms within impacted area buildings have been determined to be non-impacted. Preliminary survey unit classifications, i.e., non-impacted, Class 1, Class 2, or Class 3, have been defined and are listed for GETR and VBWR/EVESR in Table 5.3 and Table 5.4, respectively.
21
ENERCON Vallecitos Nuclear Center Decommissioning Historical Site Ass ssment REN-TR-22-010 Revision 0 7.0 References
[1] NRC/DOD/EPA/DOE, "Multi-Agency Radiation Survey and Site Investigation Manual (MARSSIM)," United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC, 2002.
[2] U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NUREG-1757 Consolidated Decommissioning Guidance:
Decommissioning Process for Materials Licenses, 2006.
[3) U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Federal Register, Vol. 81, No. 92, pp 29581-29584, 2016.
[4] U.S. Census Bureau, Census-Geographic Profile, Livermore and Sunol, 2020.
[5] Stantec Consulting Services, Inc., Phase 1 Environmental Site Assessment for the Vallecitos Site, Sunol, CA, 2019.
[6] USGS, La osta, alifornia 7.5 Minute Quadrangle Map.
[7] USGS, Quatenary Fault and Fold Database of the United States.
[8] E. Helleyl and R. Graymerl, Geological Survey Quaternmy Geology of Alameda County, and Parts Of Contra Costa, Santa Clara, San Mateo, San Francisco, Stanislaus, and San Joaquin Counties.
California, United States Department of the Interior, 1997.
[9] USGS, A Water-Quality Monitoring Network for Vallecitos Valley, Cal~fornia, 1980.
[10] National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), "Online Weather Data".
[II] C. Ma1tiuez, Memo to D&D File: Historical Site Assesment Interviews, 2022.
[12] U.S. Nuclear R gulatory Commission, Radioactive Materials License DPR-1 (as amended), 1956.
[13] General Electric Company, Final Report on Deactivation of Vallecitos Boiling Water Reactor, 1965.
[ 14] U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Radioactive Materials License DR-1 0 (as amended).
[ 15] U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Radioactive Materials Licen e TR-1 (as amended), 1959.
[16] Chesapeake Nuclear Services, Inc., Radiological Characterization and Source Term for the Shutdown Reactors at Vallecitos Nuclear enter, Annapolis, MD, 2019.
22
ENERCON Vallecitos Nuclear Center Decommissioning Historical Site Assessment REN-TR-22-010 Revision 0
[17] Chesapeake Nuclear Services, Inc., "Radiological Assessment of Outside Contaminated Areas at the Vallecitos Nuclear Center," Anapolis, MD, 2020.
[18] D. Smith, Letter to WH King; RE: GETR Background Dose Rates, October 5, 1982.
[19] D. Simpson, Memo to Wayne Springsteen; RE: Various Water Samples from GETR etc for Tritium, March 4, 1980.
[20] R. Dannitzel, Letter to Robert A. Clark; RE: Addition of iodine isotopes to the Calculated 50 Year Organ Doses, August 28, 1980.
[21] F. Arlt, Change Authorization 92-25; WEP Culvert Cleaning, May 21, 1992.
[22] F. Arlt, Change Authorization 92-39; RE: GETR Ditch Cleaning, August 6, 1992.
[23] ENERCON I ReNuke, Vallecitos Nuclear Center Decommissioning Industrial Hygiene Scoping Report, 2022.
23
ENERCON Vallecitos Nuclear Center Decommissioning Historical Site Ass ssment REN-TR-22-010 Revision 0 Appendix 1: Notes from Interviews
- 1.
There were common support services (water and electrical) for VBWR and EVESR. "May not be to code due to age." VBWR was P' and EVESR services were "scabbed" from VBWR. Incident occurred later when jackhamrnering concrete and laborer cut through a live electrical line_ Laborer was injured and lucky not to have been killed.
- 2. Vent system for EVESR was "split" but original filter banks are still in place.
- 3. Asbestos removed from VBWR and then interior was pressure washed. Not sure if removal included all the asbestos shield blocks around VBWR as interviewee did not visually see this area.
EVESR asbestos blocks were removed - interviewee did see - but not all asbestos from pipes was removed. This took place in the early 1990s.
- 4.
GE used VBWR basin under cooling tower for "decay" of leaked RCS. Same for EVESR. After decay period-not specified nor were radionuclides identified-RCS was "dumped to basins."
- 5. Sounds like discharge path for WEP was through a couple settling basins, under the road, and then into Lake Lee. Interviewee collected a muck sample from the bottom of Lake Lee in the past -
tmsure of sample results. Interviewee mentioned that the original piping was replaced with PVC and there are five manholes along the system run. There was an above or on grade discharge Line from the GETR to the WEP.
- 6. Leak at GETR tank farm was due to dewatering resin drums and then drain/line to the tank fam1 sump got plugged. The dewatering then backed up on the pad and spilled over the berm contaminating soil on the north side of the pad. There are still resin drums in a shed near the tank farm. Not stated but assume they were never used.
- 7. There is a well, up the hill, where a local rancher got water for his cattle. Interviewee did not believe anything was ever identified.
- 8. interviewee was asked about three possible onsite trench "dumps" where the site disposed asphalt, concrete, and soil. One went out to Happy Valley Road, along an access road. Interviewee was only sure about two "dumps", however, interviewee mentioned that the site had piles of construction debris and local salvagers would come and take the stuff away for other projects. Also - GE employees would bring their household waste onto site to dispose of. Not sure if this was tossed into piles, trenches, or waste bins.
- 9. Further discussing the tank farm cleanup remediation method; dig, place waste in drum, take drum to low background ar a, survey/sampl. Rep at w1til no activity was detected. Interviewee did not mention how "no activity" was quantified.
I 0. Hillside/ bunker area has two drains on the west side, one by gate the other on the north fence.
These drain to the facility drain system (storm?) which "funnel" water offsite (assume through basin). In this Radioactive Material Area, a seavan with no bottom (rusted through) was moved and interviewee was going to survey I sample the ground where the seavan bad been. Interviewee was "chastised" by some GE manager for performing the survey. Iuterviewee did not find any 24
ENERCON Vallecitos Nuclear Center Decommissioning Historical Site Ass ssment REN-TR-22-010 Revision 0 contamination in the area where the seavan had been. Int rviewee mentioned that ali water that accumulates in the hillside I bunker area flows into these two drains.
11. Another sea van, in this same area, caught fire, which was extinguished with water - which drained into the two drains. The seavan was being loaded and a pipe broke through a side wall of the seavan
- sound d like the forklift operator was at fault. Instead of removing the pipe, GE decided to flame cut the pipe sticking out of the side of the sea van. This caused the fire.
- 12. Interviewee was asked about other radioactive work taking place in the hillside area. "All the time
- primarily decontamination of materials by hand wipe, very little water was used". Interviewee believes most radioactive material placed into seavans is still onsite as individuals who were responsible for the material didn't want to get rid it. Remains a "dose rate problem." Interviewee asked where waste was currently being shipped. Energy Solutions was mentioned-unclear when last shipment was made. No shipments to Barnwell SC since 2008 when it closed to out-of-compact waste. Trying to negotiate a contract with Waste Control Specialists in Texas.
- 13. Another incident occurred while transferring building 103 waste from one seavan to another. A plastic bag was dropped, and the forklift ran over top which spread contamination on the asphalt.
Sounds like the asphalt was removed as radwaste and then replaced. Didn't bear if they collected samples beneath the asphalt.
- 14. "Within the GETR, a cobalt irradiation target was spinning and somehow the bottom was cut, and all the pellets fell out in the reactor. GE was on a "production run" and continued to operate the reactor to complete the cycle. The irradiated pellets went into a strainer, the nickel cover came off and the cobalt began to oxidize and spread in the system. GE made a number of "fixtures" to try and captur the cobalt after shutdown and removal of fuel. Couldn't g t all the pellets. Fixtures are stored in the GETR pool. The exposure (rate) was "sky high" in the equipment room of the GETR.
Bigge was contracted to come in to clean to strainer. All workers were bmnped up to an annual allowable exposure of 12 Rem; previous site limit was 5 Rem per year. GE was cited for a worker exceeding limit by NRC."
- 15. The NRC was also interested in the GETR "stuck rod" incident. A test procedure from INL -
remov the most r active rod and see if the Rx stays sub critical. Operators were performing the procedure pre-startup and the GETR went critical. Ops shut GETR down and notified management
-and the manager stated be did not believe the procedure result and ordered Ops to do the procedure again. The Ops supervisor told the manager he wasn't going to do it again. The manager told the supervisor "you will do it again or well get you relieved". The supervisor noted the conversation in the logbook, performed the test again, and the GETR again went critical. The NRC was notified, and GE was "swarming with people wanting to know what the hell happened". Personnel and program changes were made. Interviewee believes the critical condition, during the test, was due to a calculation error during the previous GETR fuel reload.
- 16. Interviewee was asked about fuel leaks at the GETR and immediately mentioned the "water leaks" in the GETR pool. The plan was to move irradiated fuel to the Rx vessel portion, drain the fuel storage pool and s nd in welders to repair I patch up 1 aking areas on the "new" liner. High dos 25
ENERCON Vallecitos Nuclear Center Decommissioning Historical Site Ass ssment REN-TR-22-010 Revision 0 rate were "burning out welders". GE placed "cement... lead" blocks in pool area to stop the leaks.
Still leaked and then they injected "tar type" substance through the biowall in hopes to seal the leaks from the other side. Stayed like that until they completely drained the water.
- 17. There were two 5000-gallon underground tanks outside the GETR that were used to receive the air and water from flushed fuel Lements that would be pinched and then cut in the canal. GE stopped this and sent the flush to the 2nd floor "gas trap.. recovery system.. a tank.. previously used for "Gale experiments" - Still 2 to 5 mrem/hr on the door to the room." The fuel elements would be placed into the 300 cask. "And sent to you so your pool got contaminat d from our system".
(Unsure of where the GETR fuel was sent).
- 18. Back to cobalt in the GETR vessel; the cobalt in the vessel was retrieved in a hot cell. The container looked little a canteen with Swagelok fittings. "Cut the container up in the 200 lunchroom".
- 19. There was a procedure where "racks" were backed out. A test backed the racks the other way and while backing racks for the test they impacted the pressure vessel and upon startup they "blew it up".
- 20. Interviewer asked for information on GETR operational output. Outputs were "drawn" on a board and should be stored in GETR offices.
- 21. Interviewer asked how EVESR was left; "the crane is broken so we can't pull the plug and can't find any drawings of the internals."
- 22. "Drained pool, drained vessel, placed radioactive contaminated (couldn't make out what was said) in the vessel and put the lid on the vessel. Cleared asbestos all around, removed sampling station above reactor. Pulled out a cask from the bottom and got rid of it, basically everything is pretty much the same as when they walked away."
- 23. "They were going to tum the containment into a conference room. They hung insulation on the walls and some of it may still be there. Surveys wer perfom1ed and a couple areas had fixed contamination and they were talking about sealing that.. things like that. Too much echo so they abandoned the idea of a conference room."
- 24. "They had a flooding incident years ago-it came in from the two lines that go to the pipe trench.
Water filled up on the steam inlet and discharge due to a broken sump in the trench. A submersible pump was left in the EVESR basement in the event it. The flooding happened again. Water was processed through charcoal and an organic filter system which is still setting on the first floor. On the next level down are the reactor head and a manifold with valves-these were sampling valves for each bundle." These valves would direct flow to the sample station on the first floor.
- 25. There are two large emergency discharge valves which would dump into the pool on the first floor."
- 26. "Second level down is a steam diffusion thing; valves would open in series and dump steam to condense and then fifteen seconds later the water would discharge into the pool."
26
ENERCON Vallecitos Nuclear Center Decommissioning Historical Site Assessment REN-TR-22-010 Revision 0
- 27. Interviewer asked about internals of EVESR and VBWR being loose. "Down inside VBWR, looked like a Tetris piece"
- 28. Interviewee responded that "fuel would be moved to VBWR pool or laid it on floor and slide it out of the airlock and take it over to the pool in building 304 (Cart roller and gantry system in place to move the fuel). Also discussed reactor physics protocol and positioning of fuel rods or storage-again mentioned the incident at GETR.
- 29. Interviewee asked about pipes on top of the EVESR: steam valves-interviewee believes the these were removed.
- 30. The interviewee was asked about tooling used in EVESR and VBWR. No real answer. GETR's tooling is still there.
31. Interviewer mentioned that someone was scabbling concrete behind VBWR (sounds like recent activity) and mercury came out of the ground (concrete). Could've been a vess l of mercury that was there when concrete was poured. Interviewee didn't know anything. Interviewer mentioned that a mercury cleanup was performed in the early 1990s. Interviewee didn't know.
- 32.
Interviewee then offered: "There was cobalt (couldn't understand) over by building 103." There was a spill and scabbling took place - you can still see where this occurred. Transport tank overflowed. Also went into drain by west end of building 103. Supposedly, "they" got it out, cleaned everything up.
- 33.
Lnterviewer asked if the head bolts were tight on the VBWR; interviewee thought that they were just set in place.
27
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Facility Location Bl02 Personnd 8 102 Personnel 11 102 Personnel 8102 Personnel 8 102 Personnel BI02 Asphalt ENERCON b!ctiiMCt-i~tt'l pfO}f.cL lVt.li daY.
Vallecitos Nuclear Center Decommissioning Historical Site Assessment REN-TR-22-010 Revision 0 Appendix 2: Incident Report Summary Date of Date of Type *Of Incident Jncident Report Incident Summary Incident Description A chemist started work in the radiochemistry laboratory. The work consisted of adjustment of a vessel containing 0.2 curie of Sulphur-35, l 0/ 1/1957 10/4/ 1957 Personnel Radiation which was contained in a hood. The chemist's right glove had been Contamination Incident NO. I contaminated. Unknowing to the chemist, they adjusted their gloves and received contamination on their left hand. There was a small abrasion on the chemist's left: hand.
A laboratory assistant began cleanup and decontamination of hood No.2 in Personnel and Radiation Bldg. I 02, Room 214 chemistry laboratory. Contaminated lead bricks, 2/25/1958 3/7/1958 Facility used inside the hood for shielding purposes, were removed to a metal cart.
Contamination Incident NO. 6 During transfer of the bricks, contamination was spread to the Ooor are and shoes of the assistant.
Transfer of an intentionally defected fuel element, which had been in the VBWR core, was scheduled from the V8WR to the RML pool in Building Personnel and I 02 for visual examination. The shi"ft: foreman found contamination on 4/27/11}5'}
5/'6/ 1 !)51}
Facility Radiation tht:ir hanu anu fouL A lol<d uflwu (;aiSt:S if skin wnlaminaliun ami six Contamination Incident NO. l l cases of shoe contamination were discovered. Spots of contamination were found in the airlock, on the concrete pad outside the airlock, on the fork lift, and cask.
An employee from the RML operating group noticed that two contracto1*
6/22/1959 7/6/J959 Personnel Radiation employees, who had been working in the Radiochemistry Laboratory had Contamination Lncident N0.12 high hand counts on the hand and foot counter in the change room.
Investigation revealed skin, clothing, and tool contamination.
A circuit breaker which controls the main exhaust fans in Building I 02 Personnel and tripped, cutting off the exhaust fans. Personnel were not immediately Radiation aware of the ventilation failure or airborne contamination. Skin and 6/23/ 1959 7/ 10/1959 Facility lnci"dent # 13 clothing contamination of seven men resulted. Contamination was Contamination deposited on all surfaces in the RML operating area and was spread to Building I 02 office area corridors.
A cask containing a defective fuel element from the boiling water loop was being moved fi*om the GETR reactor to the RML in Building I 02. When 7/23/ 1959 9/211959 Facility Radiation the forklift carrying the cask arrived at Bui lding I 02, water was observed Contamination Incident NO. 16 dripping from the cask to the asphalt in front of the loading dock. The water was checked and found to be contaminated.
28
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ENERCON Date of Date of Type of Fac.ility Location Incident Report Incident 8 102 Personnel 6/14/1969 8/8/ 1969 Personnel Contamination 8 102 Personnel 10/2711969 10/31/1969 Personnel Contamination 8 102 Environment 1/22/ 1970 2/18/1970 Environment Contamination BI02 Personnel 6/29/ 1970 7/ 1/ 1970 Personnel Contamination 8 102 Asphalt 8/1611970 8/24/1970 Facility Contamination Personnel and 8102 Pu Lab 5/10/197 1 5/25/ 1971 Facility Contamination Personnel and 81 02 Environment 6/23/197 1 7/20/1971 Facility Contamination Incident Summary Plutonium Laboratory Contaminated Lnjury lnfonmal Investigation of a Technician Removing a Thermocouple from Plutonium Sintering Furnace.
Investigation of lodine-13 Release from Building 102 Contamination of Russ Vital Formal Investigation NO. 80 Ove.rrlow of RP&S Pool and Hold Tank PAL Contamination Spread-l.nvestigation NO. 84 per VSS 2.0.3 Release of Radiation Iodine
- Investigation NO. 85 31 Vallecitos Nuclear Center Decommissioning Historical Site Assessment REN-TR-22-010 Revision 0 l ncident Description A plutonium lab technician was cle81ling glove box #35 when a piece of wire punctured two pair of gloves and inflicte.d a minor puncture wound to the right index finger. Ln the process of glove removal, the back of their hand was contaminated.
An instrument technician was assigned to test the continuity of the thermocouples on the sintering furnace in the Plutonium Fuels Laboratory.
The engineer requested disassembly of the cone fitting in the thenmocouple. The technician brought the thern1ocouple from the ft~rnace and evacuation was ordered in that portion of the Plutonium Fuels Laboratory. Only contamination found was on the technician's hands An interaction Capsule lA SC-I had been removed from GETR at the end of cycle 113. The capsule was transferred to the Hot Cell Operation where they started a series of fuel examinations. During the first week of operation, -4mc were emitted to d1e environment.
XXXX w:1s lining work on ~ m~nipu l ator in hot stor11ee. He removerl the slave from the storage room to the Manipulator Repair Room. XXXX washed the hot end with Chemtrust and started to work on the manipulator.
XXXX checked out for lunch and found contamination on his hands, face.
neck, and back.
The 16,000-gallon underground hold tank, located outside of Building I 02, filled to capacity and overflowed across the asphalt access driveway and into the site surface water drainage ditch. Contamination of these areas was 2500 to 3000 elm beta gamma.
There was a spread of plutonium contamination throughout the Plutonium Analytical Laboratory (PAL). The spread occurred during the modification of a glove box when a highly contaminated fttrnace dropped !Tom the bottom of the box to the floor.
An Iodine release of about 80 millicuries of iodine-131 occurred from the Radioactive Materials Laboratory in Building I 02.Source fission product molybdenum-99 that was undergoing processing is believed to be the source of the iodine release.
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ENERCON Date of Date of Type of Facility Location Incident Report Incident Personnel and 8 102 Personnel 6/26/ 1971 7/20/ 1971 Faci Lity Contamination Personnel and 8 102 Pu Lab 5/ 1011973 5/21/1973 Facility Contamination 8 102 Pu Lab 6118/1973 7/8/ 1974 Facility Contamination Personnel and 8102 Personnel i 1/1211973 12/4/1973 Facility Contamination RI02 Personnel 1/2211 974 2/81 1974 Personnel Contamination Bl02 Gallery 4/3/ 1974 4/12/1974 FaclLfty Contamination Incident Summary Con tam i nation Spread in RML While Changing a Cell2 Manipulator Fire in Plutonium Lab Glovebox #44 (Incident NO.
73-4, Type II)
Liquid Waste Spill fTom Scrap Recovery Hood -
Pu Lab-Type IJ, 74-18 Sprellcl of Contamination-RHO, RP&S Cell #I (Incident NO. 73-8, Type
[J)
Contamination of Personnel While They Were Removing Cored Drain I ine in RP&S-Incident 74-2, Type Ll Fission Product Contamination Backup in Helium Supply Line Outside Cell 3 F. P. Box
-Type n. 74-8 32 Vallecitos Nuclear Center Decommissioning Historical Site Assessment REN-TR-22-0 I 0 Revision 0 1 ncident Description A manipulator was removed from Cell 2. Technicians A and B proceeded to decontaminate the manipulator which was sti II located in the main corridor. A monitor worki.ng in other areas of building I 02 walked into the main corridor and noticed contamination on the corridor floor. Surveys were taken ofTeclmicians A and B. Teclmician A had contamination on their hands, face, neck, and T-shirt.
A small fire occurred in glovebox #44 ofthe Plutonium Fuels Development Laboratory. The fire was caused by the oxidation of unreacted cesium metal and mixed oxide Thermal Gradient Studies pellets.
A small amount of plutonium contaminated liquid waste from the scrap recovery waste loadout process leaked on the floor beneath hood SOA. The leak occurred in a modified area of the waste disposal bag.
The RHO operating area became widely contaminated with fixed fission products from Cell #I. A modified charcoal air filter had been installed that morning. The filter caused a reduction in exhaust air flow in Cell #I, Twenty-eight people received clothing contamination !Tom slightly detectable to a maximum of 10,000 elm.
XXXX, YYYY, and Z:ZZZ entered the basement of Bldg. I 02 to remove a radioactive drain line and a piece of cored cement from the wall of Cell # l.
XXXX and YYYY both received personal contamination to the face and head. In addition, YYYY had personal clothing contamination The dissolver tank was cleaned out by air sparging 2 liters of 4.5 M NaOH and draining the liquid. The following morning the He line was plugged. 2~
3 mL of water was put into the line. The water leaked to the back panel.
The water carried soluble F. P. 's to the outside panel.
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ENERCON Date of Date of Type of Facility Location Incident.
Report lnc.ident Personnel and 8 102 Personnel 4/25/1974 5/8/ 1974 Facility Contamination Bl02 Pu Lab 6/ 15/'1974 6/26/ 1974 Facility Contamination Facility and 8 102 Roadway 9116/1974 10/2/1974 Environmental Contamination B!02 Personnel Personnel J/23/1975 2/25/1975 Contamination Personnel and Bl02 Floor 1/28/1975 2/25/1975 Facility Contamination Personnel and 8102 Floor 2/ L0/.1975 2/27/L975 Facility Contamination Personnel and Bl02 Personnel 1/22/1976 1/22/1976 Facility Contamination Incident Summary Xenon Release in Cell #9nArea on April 12, 1974 (Type J I, 74-9)
PAL Alpha Contamination (6/ 15/1974),
Type ll, 74-16 Investigation of Bldg. I 02 Waste Tank Overflow (Incident NO.
74-20, Type II)
Internal Deposition ofl-13lforD.J.
Morrison, Type l, 75-5 Spread pf Americium Con tam i nation in Bldg. I 02, Type I, 75-4 Chromium-51 Spil l and Cleanup, Type II, 75-6 Report of Unusual Circumstance I (RMLMain Corridor) 33 Vallecitos Nuclear Center Decommissioning Historical Site Assessment REN-TR-22-010 Revision 0 1 ncident Description Five ampuls were each loaded with three to.five curies of xenon gas. Each ampul was placed in a lead-shielded container, and three of these were sealed in one can and two in another. One ampul had leaked, and when rhe can was opened, gas escaped into the room exposing six employees.
The RADeco (CAM) alarmed, and personnel immediately went "on mask."
The PAL had in place under the exhaust lines a plastic drape. The drape was behind Box I 02 and was found to be moist with smearable contamination level of a200-2000 dpm. Direct surveys of the ducting immediately upstream of lhe secondary filter showed levels of a 2000-4000 dpm.
The waste transfer tank was brought to Bldg. I 02 to transport a load of liquid waste to the waste evaporator. The technicians were relying on the level alarm to sound when the liquid level reached the 1400-gallon level. A few gallons of radioactive water spilled onto the blacktop roadway and into the ditch.
Earlier in the day, XXXX had removed a manipulator from the mixed fission product moly cell (Cell 3). The employee was asked to clean up the room while final adjustments were being made to the manipulator. The paper from the floor was picked up and placed in a 55-gallon drum, and radioactive material flew into XXXX's face.
A technician opened a glove box used for the fabrication of Americium Beryllium neutron sources and spread alpha contamination to several rooms in Bldg. I 02. Contamination was found on the technician, main corridor, and inner dock. The major contaminant detected was Am-241.
The lP technician was making a transfer from Cell 6 to the pipette station using~ standard thin-walled pig. The IP technician had dropped the pig and spilled the Cr-51 product on the floor. Contamination was found on the floor and on lP technician.
Total area smear of main corridor read 500k cpm. Monitors asked Corridor Technicians to leave corridor. Survey showed the area was found to read in excess of 50k cpm/1 ft2 lOft into the corridor. Randy Burton was found with contamination on their person.
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tJ!ctlltMt-f~riV Dtt>/ICL lVt.fj day, ENERCON Date of Date of Type of Facility Location Incident Report Incident Facility 8102 Cell7 1/27/ 1976 1/27/ 1976 Contamioation 8102 Cell7 2/9/ 1976 2/9/ 1976 Facility Contamination Personnel and 8102 Personnel 3/5/ 1976 3/5/ 1976 Facility Contamination Pt:rsunnt:l 8102 Personnel 3/18/1976 3/24/1976 Conlami nation Personnel 8102 Personnel 3/25/1976 3/251!97o Contamination Bl02 Personnel 5/5/ 1976 5/511976 Personnel Contamination Incident Summary Report of Unusual Circumstance 2 (RML)
Nuclear Safety Report of Unusual Circumstances A-lO (RML)
Nuclear Safety Report of Unusual Circumstances A-22 (RML)
Personnel Cunlaminaliun -
Incident 76-3, Type ((
Nuclear Safety Report of Unusual Circumstances A-29 (RML)
Nuclear Safety Report of Unusual Circumstances (RML) 34 Vallecitos Nuclear Center Decommissioning Historical Site Assessment REN-TR-22-010 Revision 0 1 ncident Description Cell #7 was contaminated with Am141 and all entry had been done with masks. The cell had been posted with "No Entry, Contact NSO Personnel" and was dated two days prior to incident. :XXXX was fouod working in Cell #7 without a mask and without any knowledge ofNSO Personnel.
The door to Cel I #7 was found propped open with a mop handle. No one was in attendance at the Cell #7 area and entry into the area was not controlled. Cell #7 was contaminated with Am 241.
Three G.E. employees were found to have substantial contamination on their shoes after working in the RML clean area. The contamination found on their shoes was lr192. Specks reading 50k cpm were foood next to cell
- I and Cell #2 operating areas.
Two RML corridor technicians were doing routine work and cleaning.
Once the work was complete both technicians were found to be contaminated. All contamination was Jr192 except for one technician's nasal smear, which contained a small amount of Hg203.
After working in the Manipulator Repair Room, XXXX and YYYY were crossing Main Corridor SOP without removing all of their protective clothing. XXXX and YYYY then proceeded to Cell #3 via operating area where they were tinally stopped and sent back. The two were returning, a slave to Cell #3. XX.XX was found wilh contamination on himself three times.
A manipulator slave was deconned in the RML manipulator decon room by XXXX and YYYY. After the decon work was completed, :XXXX surveyed and found himselfto be contaminated. Thousands of counts were found on XXXX's ear, groin, hand, and watch.
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ENERCON lJlcttltnct-i.~rrvprojtcL E.t~t.rt daY.
Date of Date of Type of Facility Location Incident Report Incident 8 102 Pu Lab 5/ 11/ 1976 6/ 17/1976 Facility Contamination Facility 8 102 Radiochem 5114/ I 976 5/14/1976 Contamination Personnel 8102 Personnel 9/2/1976 12/15/1976 Contamination Personnel 8102 Personnel 9/9/ 1976 9/17/ 1976 Contamination Personnel and 8102 Personnel 10/20/1976 I 1/2/ 1976 Facility Contamination Incident Summary Water Overflow from Hood 50A to the Plutonium Fuel Laboratory Floor and Subsequent Low-Level Comamination, Investigation
- 76-8 Unusual Circumstance BLDG 102 Radiochem Investigation of RP&S Tritium Deposition, 76-17, Type I Nitric Acid Spill
- RP&S Tracer Laboratory -
Incident Investigation
- 76-14, Type ll Cell#9.
Contamination Spread Incident Jnvestigation
- 76-1 8, Typell 35 Vallecitos Nuclear Center Decommissioning Historical Site Assessment REN-TR-22-0 I 0 Revision 0 l ncident Description Water was required for volumetric calibration of scrubber vessels in Box 51 B of the nitrate conversion system in the Plutonium Fuels Development Laboratory. All head tanks are vented to a IS-liter vessel in hood SOA and then to the hood atmosphere. Approximately 30 gallons of water were released to the laboratory tloor. Contamination was limited to 30 square ft of floor surrounding the fume hood.
A bag containing water samples was taken from Cell #2 and placed in the Radiochem storage cave by XXXX. Smearable contamination on the outside of the bag was found to be >SOOk cpm Br, 350 mr/hr Br/cp.
Contamination in the usually clean cave was 400 cpm Br/!V.
Five RP&S personnel were exposed to tritium.in Cell #3 while doing cold runs. Only XXXX's bioassay results show that his exposure to tritium'""'~-
in excess of limits shown in 17 CAC, section 30355 An experiment to determine the retention ofU235 on a filter was being conducted in a fume hood in the Tracer Laboratory. The reaction progressed at a rapid rate and the tygon tubing blew off the filter. The experimenter went to replace the tubing and a small amount of HNOJ squirted into the experimenter's left eye.
A new manipulator boot was installed in the left-hand port at Cell #9 workstation by RP&S maintenance personnel. Air monitor alarm located six feet from the manipulator began to alarm, and a few seconds later th~
a I arm in Call # II began to alarm. Cell #9-I I were closed off and decontaminated. The technicial!l replacing the boot had contamination on their hands and personal clothing.
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Date of Date of Type of Facility Location In cident Report Incident 8 102 Personnel 11/24/1976 12/ 10/ 1976 Personnel Contamination Personnel and 8!02 Personnel 12/6/1976 1/ 14/1977 Facility Contam.i nation 8 102 Personnel 1/1911 977 2118/1977 Personnel Contamination Bl02 Personnel 2/ 1 S/1977 4/6/L977 Personnel Contamination Personnel BW2 Personnel 9/ 11/1977 10/7/ 1977 Contamination 8102 Hot Dock 4/ L 1/ 1978 4/ 17/ 1978 Facility Contamination Incident Summary Acid Spill-Incident Investigation 76-21, Type 11 lodine-131 Inhalation
- Incident, Investigation 76-22, Type I, (Response ro Request) 1-1 31 Release to RP&S Operating Area (77-1,
Type H)
Investigation Concerning Lhe Contamination of Laboratory Tech11ician's Hand with Radioactive Material. (77-4, Type ll)
Internal Deposition of Iodine in R. J.
Po mares (77 - 13 Type ll)
Waste Box
- Leakage, Investigation NO. 78-6, Type u
36 Vallecitos Nuclear Center Decommissioning Historical Site Assessment REN-TR-22-0 I 0 Revision 0 l ncident Description Chemist was working on dissolving samples containing trace levels of natural uranium in stainless steel in a Plutonium Analytical Laboratory fume hood. The chemist's gloves were wet and a flask, containing hydrogen peroxide, nitric and hydrochloric acids, slipped and broke. The contents of the flask landed on the chemist's face and into their left eye.
The release of 1-13 I into the Radiochemistry Laboratory was due to the disposal of [-13 1-containing Mo-99 solution down an open sink drain, which leads to the rad-waste tank. Contact of this basic waste solution with a source of acid in the drain lines released 1-131 as vapor. l-131 activity was found in XXXX.
There was mechanical or operational failure of one or all four valves which allowed the 1-131 to back up to a leak in the flow meter outside of Cell #3.
From the 18 people counted only six had detectable amounts ofl-131.
Samples of dissolved irradiated fuel (U02) were being sampled for bumup analysis in Hood #4 in the Radiochemistry Laboratory. The technician was interrupted by a phone call. Returning to work, the technician was using a single pair of gloves. After work, the technician had traces of contan1ination on their thumb and forefinger.
The gamma scan fixture in Cell 3 was moved to the interlock and decontaminated. It was bagged and carried to the manipulator room hood where the necessary modifications were made. XXXX found his face and hair contaminated at the change room checkout station.
The Supervisor, Remote Handling, observed liquid seeping from the 4 X 8 waste box positioned nest to the hot dock. The.item containing the ]jquid was identified as a gallon can from Cell4 Lock. Contamination levels were high but contained in small spots in a radiation zone.
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ENERCON Date of Date of Type of Facility Location Incident Report Incident Personnel and 8 102 Persoru1el 5/10/1978 6/28/ 1978 Facility Contamination Personnel and 8102 Personnel 8/ 16/ 1978 9/ 13/ 1978 Facility Contamination Personnel 8102 Personnel 5/28/ 1980 6/20/1980 Contamination Facility 8 102 Gallery 7/29/1980 9/20/i980 Contamination Personnel 8102 Personnel 2/10/1981 2/20/ 19g I Contamination Incident Summary Plutonium Analytical Laboratory Floor Contamination
- Incident, Investigation 78-7, Type II (Response to Request)
Cell2 Manipulator Contami.nation Spread-Investigation 78-J 3 (Category J, Type II)
Tank #!
Contamination Incident (Category I, Type rr, 80-3)
Contamination Release to RHO Operating Area (Category l, Type II, 80-6)
Investigation of Facial Contamination, Category I, Type II, 81-1 37 Vallecitos Nuclear Center Decommissioning Historical Site Assessment REN-TR-22-0 I 0 Revision 0 1 ncident Description During a bag-out operation of one-gallon cans containing solidified liquid waste a slit developed in the vinyl bag. Contaminates from the bag interior were deposited on the tloor and tracked around the laboratory. One technician had contamination of their coveralls.
A manipulator had broken in Cell 2, workstation 203. Upon replacing the manipulator, a technician received localized contamination to the shoulder, hip, and knee and general contamination iJ1cluding the face and cbeek.
Another technician install.ed the manipulator, but a bearing cover plate broke resulting in minor contamination to the technician's fi nger.
Tank # I had been emptied aJld prepared for cleaning in order to perfonm an inspection orthe tank. In a deviation from procedure, the RP&S technician partially cleaned the tank before wetting the solid material. This caused contamination to become airborne, and the technician was found to have minor skin and clothing contamination.
Radioactive contamination was released from Cell 2 to the cell operating area as a result of moving the Cell 2 crane and GM manipulator !Tom the interlock into the main cell before the previously removed crane and GM cable enclosure panel had been re-installed.
There was a 60 mr/hr dose rate coming through the Access Corridor wall between Cells 4 and 5. The dose rate came from a roll-around cart that had been moved from Cell 3. Employee moved the cart and was found with contamination on their right hand, nose, head, and underwear.
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ENERCON Date of Date of Type of Facility Location Incident Report Incident Personnel 8 102 Personnel 12/8/1981 12/14/1981 Contamination Bl02 Personnel 1/7/ 1982 1/27/ 1982 Personnel Contamination Personnel and 8 102 Personnel 7/9/ 1982 7/22/1982 Facility Contami!]ation B102 Offices 9/29/1982 I 0/111982 Facility Contamination Facility
£H02 Personnel 3/2/1984 4119/1984 Contamination Incident Summary Investigation of an RP&S Technician's Contamination Incident (Category I, Type I, 81-6)
Spread of Contamination ofCell6-Category I, Type II (82-2)
Spread of Contamination in Cell Access Areas and Main Corridor-Category I, Type n (82-4)
Nuclear Safety Report of Unusual Circumstance A-82-4 VNC Incident Investigation NO. 84-1 (Category I, Type H):
Contamination ofRP&S Facflities 38 Vallecitos Nuclear Center Decommissioning Historical Site Assessment REN-TR-22-0 I 0 Revision 0 1 ncident Description A wooden box had been loaded with part of the Cell 9 stainless steel inner enclosure and other waste material. Radiation levels were too high to ship for burial. The box was brought back to Bldg. I 02 to have the high-level waste removed. One of the two technicians became extremely contaminated while removing waste from d1e box.
RP&S technician and supervisor changed the Cell 6 high efficiency particulate (HEPA) fi lter. Loose charcoal was found on d1e inlet side oftJ1e filter and in and around filter housing. A vacuum was used to pick up charcoal. Afler work was done, both employees found contamination on themselves when checking out.
High levels of predominantly MFP contamination (up to SOOK cpm smearable) were found on the floors ofthe RP&S main corridor, Cell 1-5 access area, inner dock, Call I I lock, and Cell 9-11 access areas. Two technicians were reported having contamination. Highly contaminated interior of the MET cask was the source of contamination.
Carpet surveyed at North exit of Building I 02 was found with specks reading 3300 d/m Br.
A series of radioactive contamination events occurred in the RP&S Cell Access Corridor, Main Corridor, and Basement Areas of Bldg. I 02, and 01 the Hillside Storage Facility bunker area. Widely spread smearable contamination ranging from I OOK to >500K cpm was found in dlese are;J~.
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ENERCON Date of Date of Type of Facility Location In cident Report Incident 8 102 Personnel J0/3/ 1984 10/24/1984 Personnel Contamination Personnel 8 102 Personnel 2/25/1986 3/24/1986 Contamination Personnel 8102 Personnel 9/4/ 1986 9/24/ 1986*
Contamination 611 S/1988 Personnel fll02 Person neil 6/22/1988 Contamination Incident Summary VNC Incident Investigation NO. 84-3 (Category I, Type II): Pencil Dosimeter and Personnel Contamination-RP&S Technician VNC Incident Investigation NO. 86-1 (Category I, Type II):
Contamination in the Building 102 Hot Shop and Manipulator Repair Room VNC Incident Investigation NO. 86-6 (Category I, Type Ll):
Personnel Con tam i nation During Work in Cell2 Incident Investigation NO. 88-2 (Category I.
Type Ll):
Personnel Contamination 39 Vallecitos Nuclear Center Decommissioning Historical Site Assessment REN-TR-22-0 I 0 Revision 0 Incident Description An RP&S technician's penci l dosimeter was found to be grossly contaminated (250K cpm) during a routine checkout from the Hot Cell operating area. Contamination was found on their shirt pocket (6k cpm),
chest area (2K cpm), and their left foreann ( I K cpm).
Three reactor shroud bolts were taken to the building 102 Hot Shop for the removal of a sleeve attached to each bolt. Poll owing completion of work, two employees detected contamination during personnel surveys.
Contamination levels of3,00 to 40,00 elm beta-gamma were detected on the hands and beard of an employee following work in Cell 2. Employer failed to follow thew proper clothing requi.rements of the RWP.
Remote Handling Operation (RHO) operator detected contamination in their hair dLtring a personal survey afl.er doing work in the RML corridol" area.
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ENERCON Date of Date of Type of Facility Location In cident Report Incident Facility 8 102 Personnel 1/29/1990 2/22/1990 Contamination Personnel and 8 102 Manip Room 2/2 1/ 1991 3/1 1/1991 Facility Contamination B I 03 Personnel 6/IS/ 1961 7/5/J 96 1 Personnel Contamination Personnel and 8103 Personnel 9/3/1964 9/14/1964 Facility Contamination Personnel 8103 Personnel 1/29/ 1970 2/25/ 1970 Contamination Incident Summary Incident l.nvestigation NO. 90- 1 (Category I, Type 1):
Contaminated Tissue Paper in a Dumpster Near Bui lding 102 Category I, Type 1.1 Incident Investigation NO. 91-1:
Control Rod Drive Tool Contamination Lncident Radiation Lncident #31 Radiation Incident Investigation NO. 58 Shoe Contamination l.ncident in Bui lding 103 40 Vallecitos Nuclear Center Decommissioning Historical Site Assessment REN-TR-22-0 10 Revision 0 l ncident Description While perfom1ing a routine survey of the dumpster located southwest of Building I 02, a nuclear safety technician found some contaminated facial tissue that indicated 10,000 cpm on the survey instmment.
A shipping loox containing a CRD removal fixture and associated hardware was opened in the Manipulator Repair Room. Technician and RML escort reported that the Manipulator Repair Room floor had smearable activity of 50,000 cpm per a large area. Additionally, the Main Corridor floor had smearable contamination of greater than I 0,000 cpm. The RML escort reported no contamination on their body, but the technician reported contamination on their face, glasses, and dosimeter. Contamination was caused by the release of contaminants from the CRD sled chai.n drive system.
While swaging A 1-5% U (93% enriched) alloy rods in Room I 0 I, Building I 03 an air sample, obtained adjacent to the swaging machine, indicated alpha concentrations greater than the M.P.G. A Personal surve,v of the machine operator indicated clothing contamination and nasal contamination.
Two employees from the Mass Spectrometer Laboratory discovered alpl'tB contamination on their hands through the use of the alpha hand counter.
Surveys by Radiation Monitoring detected contamination ofthe hands; contamination was also found in a small hood used to prepare hats" for the mass spectrometer.
XXX:X, a technician in the building 103 Metallography Lab, while monitoring himself on a Hand and Foot Counter, found one of their shoes contaminated.
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ENERCON tJ!ctlltMt-E.~riVDtt>/fCL lW!-11 daY, Date of Date of Type of Fac.ility Location Incident Report Incident 8 103 L206 7/27/1970 8/14/1970 Faci lity Contamination Personnel and 8 103 LJ09 I LILS 8/24/ 1971 9/1/ 197 1 Facility Contamination 8 103 LJ 12 9/28/1972 10/3/ 1972 Facility Contamination Personnel and 8 103 LIOI 1/23/1975 2/14/1975 Facility Contamination BIOJ Environment 3/ I 5/1978 4/14/ I 978 Facility Contamination Personnel and 8 103 Personnel 6/28/1979 7/26/1979 Facility Contamination Incident Summary Fom1al Investigation NO. 79 Contamination of Room 206, building I 03 Formal Investigation
- 86 Tritium Release into Lab 112 Type II Investigation NO. 75-3 (U-234 Contamination Spread in Bui lding 103-Lab 101 B)
Leakage of Radioactive Water at Bui lding 103, Type II. 78-05 Radioactive Chemical Spill, Lab 114, Bldg.
103 (Category I, Type II, 79-4) 41 Vallecitos Nuclear Center Decommissioning Historical Site Assessment REN-TR-22-0 I 0 Revision 0 1 ncident Description A primary water sample was taken to verify the accuracy of the recorder system by comparison with a portable instrument at GETR. The sample was erroneously taken from the GETR Radiochemistry Laboratory, Room 207, Building I 03. Unexplained contamination was found in the bioassay laboratory, Room 206, and the sample bottle containing a slight amount (lf sample found in Ute radiation waste box in Room 207.
The barrel of the scanning electron microscope, that was having periodic maintenance, was contaminated from one of the samples scanned. Titis led to the contamination in laboratories I 09 and I I S, in Building 103.
The source of tritium escape into the room was found to be from a polyethylene line and Swagelok fitting at a valve. This was a controlled leak which was anticipated under the operating procedure which allowed the detection of this leak.
XXXX was requested by C&l to convert I gram U-234 in the form of UJOs to UNH crystals. During conversion, this material was apparently spilled outside the hood area and spread over a significant part of Lab 1018.
The site 1500-gallon liquid waste transfer tank had been positioned beside building I 03. The liquid waste operator went to the basement to begin the pumping opera1*ion only to find water spraying from a crack in the PVC pipe. Approximately 15 to 20 gallons of contaminated water had been spilled onto U1e concrete pad.
A one-liter glass flask containing contaminated perchloric acid electropolishing solution was broken while being removed from a liquid nitrogen Dewar. The contents spilled on top of the lab bench and rolled down the back of bench onto the noor. Technician received Co-58 contamination on their hand and knee brace.
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ENERCON Date of Date of Type of Facility Location Incident Report Incident Facility 8103 Environment 6/ 14/ 1981 7/ 17/ 1981 Contamination 8 103 Personnel 1/6/1982 2/9/ 1982 Personnel Contamination Bl03 Lll7 3/4/ 1982 3/5/ 1982 Facility Contamination Bl03 Floor 3/25/ 1991 3/29/ 1991 Facili ty Contamination BI*OJ HVAC 6/3/ 1994 7/ 18/ 1994 Facility Contamination 4/ 16/ 1976 4/23/ 1976 Facili ty 8104 Environment Contamination Incident Summary Investigation of Bui lding 103 Radiation Waste Spill Incident, Category I, Type ll, 8 1-4 Contamination of Service Engineer for Spectrometric Inc., Category I, Type II, 82-1 Nuclear Safety Report of Ur1usuat Ci.rcumstance E-82-1 Incident Investigation
- 94-3 (Category I, Type II)
Building 103 Cooting Tower Discovery of Localized Spots of Contamination on VNC Roadways.
(Investigation 76-6, Type II) 42 Vallecitos Nuclear Center Decommissioning Historical Site Assessment REN-TR-22-010 Revision 0 l ncident Description The radioactive waste transport overflowed at Building 103. Less than 100 gallons of radioactive liquid waste ran onto the ground and into the storm drain.
Service Engineer from Spectrometric Co. was cleaning and adjusting the spectrometer in Lab. 20 I of Bldg. I 03. Their work survey found contamination on their fingertips. After full body scan, their shirt. pants, and tie all had traces of contamination.
XXXX (Bldg. I 03 materials custodian) requested a survey of lead pig # 12 in tab 117. A technician had found the lab to be contaminated. The survey of the pig showed the surface to be contaminated. However, the personnel and area surrounding the lead pig was free of contamination Waste Water Retention Basin (Basin #3) had excess contamination levels (
-400 ).ICi). A combination of a leak in the liquid radwaste water line and heavy rains entered the building I 03 basement and carried contamination into a floor sump.
A survey of an air conditioning cooling tower removed from the building 103 roof disclosed general level of beta-gamma contamination of200 cpm on the redwood slats. A sample of the sludge at the bottom of the cooling unit was analyzed with results of 510 pCi/gm of Co-60 and 300 pCi/gm of Zn-65 XXXX found contamination on d1e pavement near the North side of Bui !ding I 04. Further analysis of the pavement showed I I other places with contamination. The large Hyster forklift was surveyed and was found to be very contaminated. Contamination most likely came from leakage from contaminated shipping containers
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ENERCON Date of Date of Type of Facility Location Incident Report Incident Personnel and 8 104 Personnel 4/27/!976 5/17/1976 Facility Contamination BI04 Environment 317/1978 3/ 17/ 1978 Facility Contamination BIOS Personnel 7/2/1974 7/!0/!974 Personnel Contamination Facility 8 106 Shop 5/2'd/ 1987 6/ 17/ 1987 Contamination Facility R214 B214 7/:! 1/ 1987 WW1'987 Contamination Incident Summary Type 11 Accident Investigation Report- #76-1 0 Waste Box Leakage of Radioactive Water (Type fl.
78-01)
Personnel Contamination of a Security Guard (Type ll-74-14)
Incident Investigation NO. 87-3 (Category I, Type 1£)
Contaminated Punch Press Incident Investigation NO. 87-4 (Category I.
Type I):
Contaminate Tables 43 Vallecitos Nuclear Center Decommissioning Historical Site Assessment REN-TR-22-0 I 0 Revision 0 1 ncident Description Various laboratory supplies, includi11g different acids were delivered by common carrier truck to VNC warehouse. The receiving clerk loaded the acid on a pallet. The acids were being unloaded in the storage area and one of the boxes had a bottom comer break. A bottle ofNitric acid shattered on the cement tloor, of the storage area, and splashed onto the personnel unloading the acid.
A loaded radioactive waste box was transported by forklift from Bldg.l02 to Bldg. I 04 to be weighed. Water was seen rwming out of the corner of the box after it was placed on the scales. The surface of the scales and dock area of Bldg. l 04 was covered in plastic and decontaminated the next day.
New employee was unfamiliar with checkout procedures. Employee did not know how to use radiation safety equipment. Contamination was found on employee's left fooL, sock. shoe, and clothing. Bldg. I 05 and employee's car were surveyed, and no contamination was found.
A Facilities Maintenance employee was walking tl1rough the Sheet Metal Shop in Bui lding I 06 carrying an operating radiation detection instrument when the instrument began to respond audibly. The source of the radiation came from a nearby punch press. Contamination was localized to three areas of the pw1ch press, with a maximum level of20,000 dim beta-gamma.
During a survey of Building 214, a Specialist, Facilities Protection, fourtll two metal roll-about tables contaminated to 300,00 d/m beta-gan1ma. A plastic sheet and spots on the floor, near the tables. were contaminated tO 150,000 dim.
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ENERCON Date of Date of Type of Facility Location Incident Report Incident 6/ L 9/ 1980 7/ L 1/ 1980 Personnel 8400 Personnel Contamination Facility and B400 Environment 817/1987 2/1/1988 Environmental Contamination Personuel and GETR Basement 3114/ 1959 3/23/1959 Facility Cuntwra ia)atiull GETR Personnel 711 111959 7/2 111959 Personnel Contamination GETR Personnel 8/5/ 1959 8/4/1959 Personnel Contamination Incident Summary Nitric Acid Carboy Explosion, Building 400 -
VNC (Category I, Type ll, Investigation 80-4 Confinnatory Radiological Survey Building 400 Radiation Incident NO. I 0 Radiation l.ncident NO. 14 Radiation Incident NO. 17 44 Vallecitos Nuclear Center Decommissioning Historical Site Assessment REN-TR-22-0 I 0 Revision 0 1 ncident Description A 75 lb. carboy of Nitric Acid was being transferred from the storage area in Building 400A to the High Bay of Building 400. The employees noticed a discoloration of the Nitric Acid. They removed the cap and could not detect the odor of Nitric Acid. About a minute after recapping the carboy, the carboy exploded, and two employees suffered burns.
The survey objective was lo verify the licensee's survey findings by measuring SLirface contamination levels and comparing the results with the appropriate NRC guidelines. Room 114, 115, 129, High Bay Area, Drain lines, and soil outside of Building 400 all had traces of contamination.
The compressors in the helium gas loop at GETR were tested by construction personnel. During one phase of the testing, one set of compressors was connected so that air was circulated through the reactor loop portion of the facility and exhausted into the helium loop equipment room, in the basement ofGETR. Surface and personnel contamination checks were started. Floor contamination was detected in the GETR basement area and seventeen construction personnel were contaminated.
The General Electric Test Reactor was started. After startup the Pressurized Water Loop fission product monitor indicated a possible fission break in the tesr assembly. Periodic spikes were noted on the PWL Fission product monitor chart as well as occasional increases on the stack monitor, the Victoreen Area Monitor in the PWL experimental space, and the Victoreen Area Monitor adjacent to the experimental cubicle exhaust duct Body surveys were done of all personnel in the area, and only smaJI amounts of contamination were found on the operator's chest.
Three reactor technicians, at GETR, worked in the reactor tank, pool, and canal. 1l1e pool and canal were full of water, and the work was done under water. After they finished working, the technicians found contamination on their skin.
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bctlltMt-f~rrv projtcL lVt.lt daY, ENERCON Date of Date of Type of Facility Location Incident Report Incident Facility GETR GETR 11/30/ 1959 12/ 16/1960 Contamination Personnel and GETR 1st Floor 1/16/ 1960 Il l 811960 Facility Contamination Facility GETR GETR Ill!)/ I 960 2/12/1960 Contamination Facility and GETR GETR 1/22/1960 2/12/ 1960 Environment Contamination GETR GETR 2/10/1960 J/4/1960 Facility Contamination Incident Summary Radioactive contamination in theGETR containment vessel Low level radioactive contamination spread inside the GETR containment vessel Automatic shutdown of GETR Reactor scram, emergency cooling trip, GETR Radioactive gas detected in GETR containment vessel 45 Vallecitos Nuclear Center Decommissioning Historical Site Assessment REN-TR-22-010 Revision 0 1 ncident Description The GETR was routinely shut down. Primary coolant water was circulated and after fi ll and fl ush operations were started. During the course of the operation a rise in stack activity level was noted and operators were requested to leave the containment vessel. The high stack activity levels resulted from the evolution of fission gases from the primary coolant water to the retention tank. 1l1e high stack activity levels caused the isolation valve to close, which made the containment vessel ventilation system inoperative.
It appears that particles were emitted from the faci lity tube gas annulus when the diaphragm ruptured and these were spread throughout the first-floor equipment room Subsequently, the radioactive material moved through the open doorway and then to areas in the building normally free of radioactive contamination. Personnel working became contaminated while present in these nom1ally non-radiation areas.
An automatic shutdown ofGETRoccurred at 5:18pm due to malfunction of one of the two process control instruments that sense differential water pressure across the reactor core. Failure resu lted from partial plugging ol' the pressure sensing line. Air particulate contamination levels of 5 x I o**
j.lc!Cc were found in tbe building.
The reactor was operating with a 124 degrees Fahrenheit outlet water temperature. Which is well within nom1al operating limits, when it was scrammed by the high temperature control. This control should have been set to alarm at 125 degrees Fahrenheit and scram the reactor at 130 degrees Fahrenheit, but it had been set to alarm and scram at 125-degree Fahrenheit. Air particulate contamination levels of 8 x I o*~ !lclcc were found in the containment building following the evacuation.
At approximately 3:00 pm all personnel were evacuated from the GETR containment vessel when radioactive gas was detected within the containment vessel. The release of radioactive gas was cause by a leak during irradiation of a capsule in the reactor pool.
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ENERCON Date of Date of Type of Facility Location Incident Report Incident Personnel and GETR Personnel 3/ I 0/ 1960 4/26/ 1960 Faci lity Contarni nation Facility and GETR GETR 4/2/1960 4/27/1960 Environment Contamination Faci lity and GETR GETR 5/ 17/ 1960 6/8/J 960 Environment Contamination Facil[ty and GETR GETR 5/27/ 1960 6/10/ 1960 Environment Contamination GETR Personnel 8/27/ 1960 9/ 14/ 1960 Personnel Contamination Incident Summary Employee inhalation of lodine-131 3 occurrences of personnel evacuation from GETR 2 Isolation trips in GETR Containment Building Personnel evacuation of the GETR Personnel Contamination, GETR 46 Vallecitos Nuclear Center Decommissioning Historical Site Assessment REN-TR-22-0 I 0 Revision 0 l ncident Description Three technicians were cleaning a cask which contained a defective fuel element prior to transpot1ing the element to the Radioactive Materials Laboratory for li.trther study. Fission gas release from the element had been noted prior to removal from the reactor and no further release was expected. One employee was found contaminated to levels of 6000 elm at one inch and six other employees had contamination levels around 200-500 elm/inch. During the investigation of this incident, post-accident air sample results showed low level of Iodine contamination in the GETR containment vessel.
The Reactor scrammed when a burst diaphragm failed. The emergency cooling trip allowed primary water to enter the pool, and radioactive gas was thereby admitted to the vemtilation system causing automatic isolation of the containment building. The radioactive gas diffused into the containment building resulting in a maximum air concentration pf I x I o-s IJ.Cicc. Later, on two separate occasions, high stack activity caused momentary automatic containment vessel isolations, and personnel evacuated the vessel.
An isolation trip resulted fTom low level beta activity in the ventilation system and personnel were evacuated. The activity had been released fTom the primary coolant system demineralizer during a resin change operation.
Contamination was confined to the ventilation system. Later in the afternoon another isolation trip occurred due to power failure because of a blown fuse. This resulted in the building's air to be contaminated to a maximum of 6.2 X I o-*0 The GETR containment vessel was evacuated when the stack gas monitor showed a significant increase in particulate activity. The reactor was shut down and a search initiated for the source of activity. A gas leak in the capsule sampling system was fOlmd and reported. Maximum building ai(r contamination was approximately 5 x 10*7 ~tc/cc.
A routine personnel survey of two maintenance employee showed nasal contamination upon leaving the containment building. The men revealed that they had transferred contamination from their gloves to their nose when they stepped outside their confined workspace and removed their masks for a few minutes.
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tJ!ctlltMt-E.~tiVDto/fCL lVt.fj day, ENERCON Date of Date of Type of Facility Location Incident Report Incident Facility GETR Shop 2/ ICJ/1961 3/6/ 1961 Contamination Personnel GETR Personnel I 0/23/1961 11/ 17/ 1961 Contamination GETR Floor l 1/20/1961 11/28/ 1961 Facility Contamination Facility GETR AGNLoop 4/16/ 1962 4/24/1962 Contamination Personnel and GETR Personnel (i/ 1 1/ 1963 6/2 111963 Facility Contamination GETR Personnel 6/ 17/ 1963 7/8/1963 Personnel Contamination Incident Summary Radiation Incident #27 Radiation Incident #34 Radiation Incident NO. 36 Radiation Incident NO. 40 GETRAGN Loop Heater Failure Radiation Incident Investigation
- 47 Radiation Incident Investigation N0.48 47 Vallecitos Nuclear Center Decommissioning Historical Site Assessment REN-TR-22-0 I 0 Revision 0 l ncident Description A site service machinist, assigned to GETR, went to the 3rd floor, enclosure to remove a lead support tube nange, from over the vessel, for machine work. The machinist took the nange to the GETR mock-up shop and proceeded to drill and tap the nange. The next shift machinist came requested a survey of the area. After the survey, contamination was found in various parts of the shop.
While removing the contaminated GETR Spool Piece !Tom the reactor pool to the third-floor area, several people received detectable intemal contamination from 1-132.
A cask shipped by General Atomics was received according to normal procedures at the Vallecitos Warehouse. The cask was found to be contaminated and sent to the GETR for decontamination. XXXX transferred the cask into the canal. When the cask was removed from the canal sludge and water spilled on the floor.
The GETR had been shut down for a scheduled outage at 1600 hours0.0185 days <br />0.444 hours <br />0.00265 weeks <br />6.088e-4 months <br />. The scheduled v..-ork was proceeding nonnally and included in the work was the shutdown of the AGN loop currently operating on a nitrogen-oxygen mixture approximating air. People in the containment vessel noted a slight vibration followed by a puff of red smoke issuing from the floor plug above the AGN penthouse. Contamination was found in the building reading up to 80,000 elm smearable contamination and 48 mradlhr readings at the GAIL cubicle.
WWWW and XXXX were in the GETR pool replacing plateout sleeves i.11 the GAIL loop. YYYY was at the top of the pool acting as timekeeper, ru1d ZZZZ was working around the pool canal. The CAM on the third noor alarmed and YYYY was instructed to get checked out. After work was done 2 workers had nasal contamination and 2 had skin contamination.
Contamination was also tracked through the building as well.
An antimony source clad in tantalum, had been irradiated for two cycles in the GETR inner capsule ring. Jr was loaded into a SO l cask. 1l1e cask was covered in plastic in the reactor building, but then transferred to the cask pad in the GETR yard. The cask was then shipped to RM L. The two employees that were working with the cask had found they had nasal and skin contamination.
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~b1Ah1'9l tJ!ctlltnct-!.~tlyptO}tcL lVt.f'J d(fv, ENERCON Date of Date of Type of Facility Location Incident Report Incident Personnel and GETR Personnel 6/26/1963 7/8/ 1963 Facility Contamination Personnel and GETR Personnel 3110/1964 3/20/ 1964 Facility Contamination GETR Roadway 4/20/ 1964 5/6/1964 Facility Contamination Personnel and GETR Personnel 8/27/ 1964 9/9/J 964 Facility Contamination Facility GETR GETR Ill 0/196 7 1/ 1711967 Contamination GETR GETR 8/29/1967 8/3 1/2967 Pacility Contamination Incident Summary Radiation fncident Investigation N0. 49 Contamination Spread to Personnel and to Clean Areas (Radiation Incident #54 Radiation lncident Investigation N0.55 Radiation Incident Investigation NO. 57 Radiation Incident rnvestigation NO. 65 VNC Incident Investigation NO. 66 48 Vallecitos Nuclear Center Decommissioning Historical Site Assessment REN-TR-22-0 I 0 Revision 0 1 ncident Description The GETR was on a programmed power rise following cycle 45 outage.
The reactor was increasing power at a rate of I Mw every fifteen minutes and had reached 27 Mw at 1208. The reactor scrammed as a result of a high radiation signal in the PWL. After the scram all personnel were evacuated. Contamination was found on personnel and the GETR office area.
Following tbe HPD Trail Cable assembly work in the RM L hot cells, the unit was loaded in a series 300 cask with the cable coiled and attached to the outside of the cask in preparation for transfer back to GETR. The cable was grossly contaminated. After the transfer, gross levels of contamination were found in the general area where the plastic was removed from the cask. Also, two operators received skin contamination.
The radioactive liquid waste transfer tank was fi lled at the GETR with radioactive liquid from the PWL liquid waste tank. 1l1e tank was being moved with a forklift and as the forklift was about to turn at the intersection of the OETR and VBWR. the operator noticed water leaking from the tank. The road was found contaminated up to 120 mrad/hr.
Persons leaving the GETR containment building were fou nd to have contaminated shoes. A radiation survey shortly thereafter indicated that the third-floor clean area was contaminated. Further investigation revealed that the source of contamination was two shipping cask waste liners which had just been brought to the third noor.
While attempting to diagnose the suspected malperformanceofa valve (FCV-16) that controls flow of steam coolant through fuel bundle (KB-39),
the valve was inadvertently closed too far. The fuel bundle overheated for about two minutes and then released a modest amount of radioactive material into the steam. Radiation and contamination levels in the plant increased significantly but were not particularly unusual when comparee.!
with past operations with defective fuel.
During shutdown work a temporary "inflatable plug" in the 10-inch pool cooling suction line was lmexpectedly ejected from the line causing very rapid loss of water from the pool and canal. There was no over exposure of personnel, significant spread of contamination, or extensive property damage associated with the incident.
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ENERCON Date of Date of Type of Facility Location Incident Report Incident Personnel and GETR GETR 12/ 18/ 1967 1/9/1968 Facility Contamination Facility GETR Shop 5/27/ 1968 6/6/1968 Contamination Facility GETR Canal 5/20/ 1969 5/20/ 1969 Contamination Facility GETR GETR 6/2/ 1969 7/24/1969 Contamination Personnel and GETR Personnel 7/10/1969 7/ 10/ 1969 Faci lity Contamination Personnel and GETR Personnel S/ 15/ 1972 5/ 19/ 1972 Facility Contamination Incident Summary NEBS Trail Cable Experiment Failure Fom1al Investigation NO. 69 Fire in 106 Development Shop Cesium Source Leakage in GETRCanal GETR Containment Contamination from IAJ-SA Capsule Removal Dosimetry Analysis of the GGA Capsule Incident at GETR Formal Investigation NO. 92 49 Vallecitos Nuclear Center Decommissioning Historical Site Assessment REN-TR-22-0 I 0 Revision 0 1 ncident Description A NEBS chamber apparently fai led in the new faci lity due to a leak and subsequent loss of boiler water. The fai lure required a building evacuation and reactor shutdown to secure the chambers from further irradiation.
Slight personnel contamination was received.
During their regular patrol through the Development Shop, a guard discovered the workbench on fire and cal led the GETR at approximately 12:05 A.M. Monday morning. The guard reported a fire in the "DE" shop and the GETR interpreted this as "TV" shop and assumed it was the lnstnuuent Shop.
A cesium-137 isotopic source was encapsulated at RML and delivered to GETR to be used as a calibration source. When not in use, the source was stored in the GETR canal. After approximately six weeks, the source was returned to RML for disassembly. Upon opening of the capsule, it was found that the source wafers had been reduced to a black sludge substances, indicating water in-leakage.
The LA3-8A capsule was to be removed after radiation levels in the lA-penthouse around the capsule exhaust lines indicated a fuel pin failure.
After erecting temporary shielding around the highest reading areas, the lines to the capsule were crimped and cut. During the operation, a drop of water escaped and released airborne contamination to the reactor containment.
Several I ines from the Gulf General Atomic (GGA) capsule were crimped at the General Electric Test Reactor. Integrity was unexpectedly lost in Me of the lines and pressurized water was ejected. The individual performing the work was contaminated over a small portion of their arm.
The GETR was being brought to power fo llowing the scheduled outage 138-1. The reactor went critical after just reading 40 MW, a radiation alarm was received from Victoreen detector #5, and an abnormally high reading was observed on detector #4. Subsequent work showed that NFD capsules DV I A and DV8A had not been properly hooked up. Minor internal contamination was found in two employees.
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ENERCON Date of Date of Type of Facility Location Incident Report Incident Personnel GETR Personnel 2/2 1/1974 2/27/1974 Contamination GETR Personnel 6/22/ 1974 7/ 12/1974 Personnel Contamination Personnel, OETR GETR
~/9/1.974 II/2M1974 Environment, and Facility Contamination Personnel and GETR Personnel 3/24/ 1976 4/ 1/1976 Facility Contamination Incident Summary Incident at GETR resul ting in Internal Contamination of R. R. Snyder with Co-60, Incident 74-4 Contamination of Personnel During Removal ofGETR Control Rod Drives-Incident Investigation NO. 74-13 (Type I)
Investigation Committee Report for Type I Incident #74-21- -
Inadequately-Controlled Radioactive Contamination in Areas Near the GETR Excessive Contamination of the GETR Containment -
- 76-5, Type L 50 Vallecitos Nuclear Center Decommissioning Historical Site Assessment REN-TR-22-0 I 0 Revision 0 1 ncident Description XXXX discovered contamination on his moustache and on his face in the vicinity of ltis nose and mouth when he surveyed himself with the HP-21 0 probe. He had just left the third floor GETR where he and another technician had removed the pool top with a hoist. Snyder also had contam ination around his lower abdomen.
During Cycle 160-1 shutdown, Control Rods Nos. 5 and 6 mal functioned during rod-drop tests. It was decided that the two drives would be removed, disassembled and inspected. Wl1ile performing this work, several persons received head, face, or hand contamination.
Contamination was found in the soil at the east end of the GETR, lnstn1ment Shop floor, soil east of Cask Pad, Cask Pad, areas ElSE of Bldg.21 0, and parking lot south of Bldg. 21 0. In the Radiation Protection Survey Records, contami nation was found on personnel, their clothing, and on surfaces in clean areas of the GETR An empty 310 cask was shipped from Building I 02 to GETR, but excessively contaminated leaker cans. After further survey the operators found the cans were unusually hot and one of the stoppers was the sourc!!.
Shortly after, the cask, enclosure, and both operators were found to be contaminated.
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~ti!Ahf'WJ<i bctlltMt-!.myprojtcL lW!-11 daY, ENERCON Date of Date of Type of Facility Location Incident Report Incident GETR Personnel 9/ 13/ 1977 10/6/ 1977 Personnel Contamination GETR Dumpster 11119/ 1979 11/20/1979 Environment Contamination GETR Personnel 317/1981 4/20/1981 Personnel Contamination Environmental GETR Environment I 1/5/ 1992 11/S/ 1992 Contamination 06/ 1973 Personnel and GBTR B210 (exact date 6/12/1974 Facility unknown)
Contamination Incident Summary Exposure of a GETR Technician to Decay Gases from a Failed BWRSD Capsule Alter Breakage of the Lead Tube During Handling Nuclear Safety Report of Unusual Circumstances C-79-2 GETR Tank 101 Cleaning Lncident (Category I, Type II, 81-2)
Area 200 Soil Beryllium Handling in BLDG. 210-Incident lnvestigation NO. 74-12, Type II 51 Vallecitos Nuclear Center Decommissioning Historical Site Assessment REN-TR-22-010 Revision 0 l ncident Description Failed BWRSD capsules were placed in Ieaker cans in preparation for cutting and shipping. Upon picking up the flex hose of SRP 3/28 or SRP 3/27, one of the quick disconnectors broke off. The technician held theii finger over the open end of the lead tube, resulting in skin contamination levels of20,000 cpm and internal deposition ofCs-137, 1-131, and Co-58 being detected.
Small animal fecal material was found in a dumpster at GETR. Material had a reading of 60k elm through a plastic bag. Material was removed and all dumpsters were checked for fecal material. Water in basin under TK-J 15 at GETR contained same kind of isotope and in the same ratio as the fecal material sampled.
Water storage tank, Tank I 0 I, was scheduled for cleaning. Two custodians and two GETR reactor operators were present to assist with cleaning. A fler cleaning was complete, many of the workers had slight facial contamination. Co-60 was detected on the two custodians and reactor operators.
Soil around the 200 area had a potential PCB-contamination. Soil samples were analyzed for gross alpha, gross beta-gamma, Co-60, CS0137, U-235, Sr-89/-90, Am-241, and Pu-239 A GETR Mechanical Applications Technician performed minor machine work on a small beryllium block without knowing the potential hazards associated with beryllium work. A GETR Plant Engineer noticed the unusual material and noti11ed the technician that beryllium work is not done in the GETR shop. The beryllium was cleaned up. The technician was hospitalized six months later leading to a review of their work.
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ENERCON Date of Date of Type of Facility Location In cident Report Incident HSP Environment 3/ 19/1992 5/ 15/ 1992 Facility Contamination 9/23/1992 Facility HSF Environment 3/12/1993 Cont811lination NTR North Room 12/ 1/1967 1/ I 0/1968 Facility Contamination NTR Personnel 12/6/1973 1/4/ 1974 Personnel Contamination Personnel and NTR North Room 7/7/1977 7/7/'1977 Facility Contamination Incident Summary Lncident Investigation NO. 92-3 (Category I, Type II):
Radioactive Metal Shaving Found at Hillside Storage Incident Investigation NO. 92-6 (Category I, Type ll):
Rupture of Contamination Containment Report ofNTR Incident Review NTR Personnel Contamination (Incident NO.
73-10, Type II)
Unusual Circumstance BLDG 102 and BLDG 105 52 Vallecitos Nuclear Center Decommissioning Historical Site Assessment REN-TR-22-0 10 Revision 0 l ncident Description During a routine weekly radiation survey of the Hillside Storage Facility, a small hot particle reading 500 mRem/hr was discovered. The particle appeared to be a stainJess-steel metal shaving ofCo-60.
RHO employee was moving radioactive waste contained in plastic bags from the Sandblast Room at the Hillside Storage Facility (HSF) to a nearby C-van. During the transfer, the forklift operator noticed granular material leaking from one of the bags. T11e bags were removed, and after removal, the employee inadvertently rammed the forklift into the bags, increasing the spill area.
The cause oft he incident is believed to be supply of a damaged fuel segment holder by RHO. The damage led to opening of the cover and the fuel segments spilling out The facil ity damage consisted entirely of contamination and neutron radiography shield downtime.
An Operator and the operations supervisor entered the NTR reactor cell ttl perform maintenance on the experiment facility tube that traverses the reactor core. The supervisor noted cont811lination on their tie and trousers,.
and the operator had contamination on their clothing, face, and hair.
A 31 0 cask with extension was received on the hot dock at Bldg. I 02 (RND). The cask had been up at NTR for neutograph of a fuel rod. The cask had been initially surveyed and had not been released due to smearable contamination on the lifting ears. The cask caused the North Room to be significantly comaminated including the floor, step off pad, and personnel.
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ENERCON Date of Date of Type of Facility Location Incident Report Incident NTR Personnel 11/2711978 11/2911978 Personnel Contamination Personnel NTR Personnel 817/1985 8/27/ L 985 Contamination Personnel and NTR Personnel 10/ 13/1992 1/6/1993 Facility Contamination Facility and VBWR Environment 11/ 11 /1957 12/4/ 1957 Environment Contami.oatioo Facility and VBWR Reservoir 1/ 18/1958 1/30/ 1958 Environment Contamination Incident Summary Investigation Doug Cross Contamination
(#78-1 8)
VNC Incident Investigation NO. 85-3 (Category I, Type II):
Con tam i nation of Contract Personnel Incident Investigation NO_ Q2-8 (Category 1, Type II):
Contamination atNTR Radiation Incident NO. 3 Radiation Incident NO. 4 53 Vallecitos Nuclear Center Decommissioning Historical Site Assessment REN-TR-22-0 I 0 Revision 0 1 ncident Description Tape break was received, 11nd the irradiator was removed 1rom the reactor and positioned on the cell floor by NTR operations to prepare for rethreading by Nucleopore personnel. XXXX, after rethreading, found contamination on his head and in his nose.
Contamination was discovered on contract personnel when they were surveyed after load testing the crane in the north room at NTR. The source of the contamination was traced to a concrete block used as a weight for the load test.
An instrument technician detected conlamination (6,000 dim in their hair; 2,500 d/m on their wrist) when surveyed themselves after working in the NTR reactor ce.l l. Additional surveys found additional smearable contamination on the Control Room tloor (5,000 d/m) and hnllwny outside the Control Room door (2,500 d/m).
A Health Physicist, working near the BWR enclosure, observed expulsion of steam and gallon quantities of water from the BWR air exhaust stack.
The water fell on and ran off the turbine building roof. A substantial quantity of water was observed tlowing over the ground in the direction of the pond.
A Health Physicist arrived at the YBWR site and observed water overtlowing from the thousand-gaLlon YBWR main waste sump to a sewer manhole, whicb discharged into tbe artificial reservoir via a tile line and open ditch. Soft water flow to the waste sump resulted in an estimated discharge of 6,000 gallons of a mixture of contamination and soft water.
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ENERCON Date of Date of Type of Facility Location In cident Report Incident VBWR Floor 2/ 1/ 1958 2/28/1958 Facility Contamination Personnel VBWR Personnel 9/4/ 1958 9/ L 7/ L958 Contamination Facility and VBWR Reservoir 11/10/1958 11/ 12/ 1958 Environment Contamination Personnel, VBWR Personm:l 2110/19.59 2/ ll)/ 1959*
Environment, and F'aci lity Contamination Personnel and VNC Trailer l/4/ l963 l/1011%3 Facility Contamination Incident Summary Radiation Incident NO. 5 Radiation Incident NO. 7 Radiation Incident NO. 8 VBWRFuel Element Rupture Contamina6on Spread Occurring During the Shipment of Small Amounts of Spent Fuel 54 Vallecitos Nuclear Center Decommissioning Historical Site Assessment REN-TR-22-010 Revision 0 1 ncident Description VBWR staff members and a Health Physicist entered the reactor enclosure for the purpose of area clean-up and removal of filter cartridges from the No. I clen-up fi lter. Surveys of the main floor area indicated the presence of high-level particulate contamination in areas adjacent to the reactor missile shield.
An electronics technician and two VBWR staff members entered the reactor enclosure basement to replace faulty cable on the safety amplifier.
Reactor water, which was dripping !Tom leaks in the sight glass level system located above the immediate work area, dripped on the hair and clothing ofthe technician. This resulted in contamination on their hand, neck, hair, shoe, and underclotl1ing.
A VBWR Reactor Technician observed water overflowing from the VBWR main waste sump to a sewer manhole, which discharged into the artificial reservoir via a tile line and open ditch. An estimated 1200 gallons ofa mixture of contaminated sump water and reactor make-up water was discharged to the reservoir.
A fuel element in the VBWR ruptured, releasing fission products to the reactor steam system. The resu lting radioactive isotope concentration in the off-gasses activated the off-gas stack monitor and the reactor scrammed automatically. Contamination was found on personnel's skin, and cloth i1,g.
Very little contamination was found on the vegetation around the reactor.
Also, radiation levels spiked within the fac ility.
A Cask was delivered to the Vallecitos Atomic Laboratory. Upon arrival, the cask was found free of smearable contamination. The truck del ivered another cask on a separate day, but the bed of the truck had contamination.
The driver was also found with contamination on their shoe.
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tJ!ctlltMt-f~tiV Dto/fCL lVt.lt daY, ENERCON Date of Date of Type of Facility Location In cident Report Incident Facility VNC Truck 1/7/1963 1/16/1963 Contamination VNC Truck 4/ 19/ 1963 4/19/1963 Facility Contamination VNC Roadway 12/3/ 1969 12/19/1969 Facility Contamination VNC Roadway 7/ 17/ 1970 7/31/1970 Facility Contamination WEP Floor 10/5/1964 I 0/ 16/ 1964 Facility Contamination Facility WEP Roadway 6/ 12/ 1977 6/24/ 1977 Contamination Incident Summary Radiation Incident NO. 43 Security Truck Lines Trailer Decontamination Fom1al lnve,stigation N0.75 Dropped Cask Investigation of Leaky Oil Drum Radiation Incident Investigation N0.59 Leakage of Uranyl Nitrate at Waste Evaporator (77-9, Type l) 55 Vallecitos Nuclear Center Decommissioning Historical Site Assessment REN-TR-22-0 I 0 Revision 0 1 ncident Description A security Truck Line van delivered an empty cask and two wood crated U.S. Nuclear consoles to Site receiving. The van floor had contamination, so the console crates were tagged with a radioactive material sticker. The contents of the crates were taken out and the wood was taken by two employees. Contaminated wood chips were found on the floor in the area.
A security truck was found with contamination. The truck was transporting cargo and loose contamination was discovered.
A forklift driver placed a 100 series cask on the Hysler Forklift truck and proceeded from Building I 02 to Building 200. At approximately J 00 yards downhill from the west storage area the cask slipped in between the forks onto the roadway. The driver stopped and noticed liquid drain.ing onto the roadway.
Four 55-gallon drums of waste mineral oil \\Vere loaded onto Nuclear Engineering's waste handling truck for disposal at their Nevada burial site.
Aller the truck was loaded, the operator noticed liquid leaking through the trailer bed. The tractor and trailer were contaminated along with approximately I 00 feet of black top.
A routine survey was being made in the Water Bvaporator Building. The Monitor checked the boiler used to generate steam and noted hot spots near the drain fitting of the boiler. A leak was fow1d in the evaporator causing contamination and hot spots.
Approximately 17 gallons of0.7-1.0 molar natural and depleted uranyl nitrate is acidic solution, and approximately 0.2 molar free acid were placed in a 30-gallon drum in building 400. The drum was placed in a 55-gallon drum and the whole package was transported to the Waste Evaporator for solidification with microcell and concrete. Thirty days later, 5-l 0 gallons oft he unsolidi lied uranyl nitrate solution leaked out and contaminated approximately 60 feet of the roadway in front of the Waste Evaporator Building
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ENERCON bctlltMt-E.~rrvprojtcL lVt.rt day, Date of Date of Type of Facility Location Incident Report Incident Personnel and WEP Environment 12/2/ 1981 12/28/1981 Facility Contamination WEP Environment 6/29/ 1985 7/ 10/1985 Facility Contamination Facility Environ{nent 1/26/1960 2/ 19/ 1900 Contamination l/28/1960 2/19/1960 Facility Contamination Incident Summary Incident Investigation NO. 81-5, Contaminated Water Spill at the Waste Evaporator.
Category I, Type I.
VNC Incident Investigation NO. 85-1 (Category I, Type H):
Contamination ofGrow1d at Waste Evaporator Plant Mal function of a flow control valve in tlle secondary cooling stream Failure in the control circuitry for the ventilation system isolation valves.
56 Vallecitos Nuclear Center Decommissioning Historical Site Assessment REN-TR-22-0 I 0 Revision 0 l ncident Description The Chemical Treatment Tank at the Waste Evaporator Plant (WEP) overflowed. A few hundred gallons of contaminated water overflowed onto Evaporator Room floor. About five gallons of the water was released outside the building. Four VNC workers contaminated their shoes from the incident.
Radioactive contamination was found in an outdoors non-radioactive materials area located northwest of the Waste Evaporator Plant (WEP). Six separate areas of soil and an empty, unmarked 55-gallon drwn were found to be contaminated to levels up to 15 mRemlhr.
at 7:43 pm malfw1ction of a flow control valve (butterfly) in tl1e secondary coolant stream caused a restriction of flow and a corresponding sharp increase in reactor primary coolant temperature. The concentration of radioactive gases, thereby released from the primary system into the pod!
and withdrawn by the ventilation system to the exhaust stack, was sufficiently high to cause an automatic building isolation.
At 7:58am, a failure in the control circuitry ror the ventilation system isolation valves was caused by a wire with deteriorated insulation in the noor of the conrrol room. This wire led to the solenoids which control isolation valve action.
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ENERCON Date of Date of Type of Facility Location Incident Report Incident Facility PPE 1/29/1960 211611960 Contamination Environment 2/ 12/ 1960 3/4/ 1960 Facility Contamination Personnel and Personnel 2/20/1960 4/711960 Facility Contam.ination Personnel and Personnel 3/ 16/ 1960 4/6/ 1960 Facility Contamination 8/3 1/ IQ60 9/ 14/1960 Facility Contamination Incident Summary Radiation Incident #22 Ruptured Diaphragm in primary coolant system Radiation Incident #24 Radiation Incident #25 Stack gas monitor went full scale momentarily 57 Vallecitos Nuclear Center Decommissioning Historical Site Assessment REN-TR-22-010 Revision 0 1 ncident Description The Union Pacific Linen and Towel Supply of Oakland, California, fumishes towels and non-regulated coveralls to Vallecitos Atomic Laboratory. Clean clothing was being deLivered to the Vallecitos warehouse. Eight with RWP coveralls which are used for protect ion against contamination were delivered. However, these coveralls had a localized spot of contamination on them.
At 12:16 pm, a rupture diaphragm in the primary coolant system burst allowing primary coolant and entrained gasses to pass into the reactor pool.
The gases escaped from the pool water and entered the ventilation systems at high enough concentrations to cause the isolation system to trip.
A faulty cable pulley in the interlock of Well #l needed repair. The cable pulley was knocked down and hit the floor. The technicians working were unaware of a spread of contamination.
Internal deposition of radioactive iodine fo llowing uncontrolled release of radioactive material from a known defective PWL fuel element. During the period of cask decontamination, the radioactive gases fi"om the General Atomic capsule were being vented directly to the exhaust air duct at the west end of the canal. One reactor technician had gloves which were contaminated and showed body contamination to 6,000 counts per minute at one inch.
During a scheduled reactor shutdown, the stack gas monitor went full scale momentari ly and isolated the containment building. All personnelletl the enclosure in accordance with normal procedllre. The trip was apparently caused by either a sporadic increase ln the stack gas monitoring instrument or by a momentary release of radioactive gas from the welding operation.
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ENERCON Date of Date of Type of Facility Location Incident Report Incident Personnel and Personnel 4/8/ 1961 4/14/1961 Facility Contamination Personnel 1\\/ 13/1961 11/14/196!
Personnel Contamination Personnel 1/2/1962 1/ 15/1962 Personnel Contamination Personnel and 6/4/ 1963 6/ 1 l!l963 Facility Contamination Personnel Personnel 11/ 1/ 1963 1117/1963 Contamination Personnel Personnel 3/1/ 1968 3/25/1968 Contamination Personnel Personnel 8/ 14/ 1968 8/2711968 Contamination Incident Summary Radiation Incident #28 Radiation Lncidenl #35 Radiation Incident NO. 37 Radiation Incident Investigation
- 46 Radiation Occurrence #7 15 Informal Lnvestigation of a 147p 111 Contamination Incident Report on Skin Contamination of Ray Klien 58 Vallecitos Nuclear Center Decommissioning Historical Site Assessment REN-TR-22-0 I 0 Revision 0 1 ncident Description A SWECO employee entered the GAIL cubicle in street clothes to make preparation for replacement of a leaky section of 1/4 pipe. After entering the cubicle, the em ployee cut tbe pipe and placed the cutters in their pocket. A SWECO welder came in and finished the job. It was discovered thai both employees had been contaminated as well the tirst and second 11oor of the containment vessel.
A finger ring badge indjcated a possible exposure for the left hand of Mr.
XXXX. Upon recollection ofthe work shi ft, XXXX had torn his glove while washing glassware dirtied by lhe experiment. His hand was found with contamination.
A depleted uranium spill occurred in the UFo Conversion Semiworks. This occurred during a test run of the ADU dryer. The spi ll resulted when a hose bearing ADU slurry under pressure separated from the pipe entering the ADU dryer. ll1is act resulted in some external contamination on personnel.
32 hours3.703704e-4 days <br />0.00889 hours <br />5.291005e-5 weeks <br />1.2176e-5 months <br /> after reactor shutdown, fuel elements were being moved from the reactor to I he Fuel Storage Building pool. Two of the elements, numbers 4-E w1d 6-E, were known leakers. Element 6-E was moved without the use of a leaker can. Drippings from the cask on the dock contain 1200 mrad;;/hr to 2000 mrads/hr contamination. XXXX and YYYY were slightly contaminated, and ZZZZ was grossly contaminated.
XXXX was contaminated in the course of breaking a line in the PWL.
Preparation was being made for removal of a promethium chloride sample from the glove box. As the laboratory technician was in the process of placing vials into the interlock between glove boxes I and 2. He touched the inside edge ofthe interlock with the sleeves of his coveralls.
XXXX received contamination on their skin, and it was determined that the three major contaminates were 99Mo-99Tc, 131 1, and 1331. Main areas of contam ination was their area of the knee and right palm of their hand.
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ENERCON Date of Date of Type of Facility Location Incident Report Incident Personnel and Personnel 817/1970 911511970 Facility Contamination Personnel 1/281197 1 2/8/ 197 1 Personnel Contamination Personnel Personnel 6/ 1911972 06/2!!.1972 Contamination Personnel Personnel 8/30/1973 I 0/ 1/1973 Contamination Personnel and Personnel 7/1/ 1974 7/17/i974 Facility Contamination Personnel and Personnel 1/2111975 1/29/ 1975 Facility Contamination Incident Summary Investigation of Pump Failure Report on J. R.
StLiliS, Xe-!33.
Xe-1 35, Deposition Unusua.l Circumstances-Positive Nasal Smears of R. D.
Johnson Wound Contaminated with Uranium PAL Alpha Contamination (7/2-3/74), Type 11,74-17 Personnel and Floor Contamination Near CLA 50A (Type IJ, 75-2) 59 Vallecitos Nuclear Center Decommissioning Historical Site Assessment REN-TR-22-0 I 0 Revision 0 l ncident Description Technician A entered the cage area housing the I 02 waste tank pump transfer system. Technician B stood outside the cage area near the pump on-off switch. Initial activation of the pump incurred a small leak. TI1e pump was shut down and the pLlmp housing was tightened. At the instant of reactivation of the pump, the housing separated and radioactive liquid was sprayed in the immediate area and on Technician B.
XXX:X was exposed to and inhaled Xe-133, and Xe-135.
Analytical work was being performed in glove boxes 101, 102, 103 in PAL by XXXX and YYYY. During a thorough whole-body survey, XXXX Found the front of his coveralls contaminated. Further contamination was found on eight pairs of gloves located in boxes I 0 I, I 02, and I 03.
XXXX received a puncture wound on his third finger, right hand, which was contaminated with uranium enriched to 2.495 w/o in U-235.
The old filter housing was bolted to wall brackets. These bolts penetrated the housing and had to be removed prior to moving the housing, which resulted in two holes in the bottom of the housing. When removing the housing, liquid leaked from these holes onto the top of Box 12 and XXXX In preparation for a routine bag change on the waste loadout side ofCLA 50A, XXXX received skin contamination on his right foot and the floor tile had an undetermined amount of non-airborne (Liquid) contamination.
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lJlcttltnct-i.~rrvprojtcL lVt.rt day, ENERCON Date of Date of Type of Facility Location Incident Report Incident Personnel Personnel 2/ 12/1975 3/4/ 1975 Contamination Personnel and Personnel 8/2511976 9/15/1976 Facility Contamination Personnel Personnel S/30/1976 5/24/ 1977 Contamination Personnel 5/30/ 1978 6/29/ L978 Personnel Contamination Incident Summary Unplanned Delta Exposure of Shop Operation Technician Incident Investigation 75-7 Fluid Borne Alpha Contamination ofTwo PFDL Technician's Hands and Laboratory Surfaces - 7 6-15 Type II lnvestigation of Internal Deposition of Sn-113 in D. H.
Simpson Categ01y I, Type II Investigation NST #78-08 Personnel and Equipment Contamination During Heat Exchanger Flow Meter Removal and Cleanout 60 Vallecitos Nuclear Center Decommissioning Historical Site Assessment REN-TR-22-010 Revision 0 Incident Description Film badge results from Radiation Detection Company (ROC) for XXX:X indicated unplanned beta exposure of 15 Rads. The causes of unplanned exposure were, mishandling of survey equipment and use of contaminated protective clothing.
Two PFDL technicians made two cuts into an existing fluid overflow and vent line during modification of the system. The first cut was made behind Hood 50A (waste loadout) with the operators in proper protective clothing.
The second cut was made without proper protective clothi ng and a little fluid fell on the technicians and laboratory floor.
A spectrophotometric analysis ofSn-113 was being performed. During these analyses, Sn-1 13 was deposited in XXXX. YYYY, also showed deposition of Sn-1 13 but to a much lesser extent Low level contami nation occurred when two technicians worked on allow meter in a water system that was previously sampled, and no detectable contam ination was found. Maximum personnel contamination 1600 dpm direct reading on one finger, and max equipment contamination was 200n dpm total surface smear.
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ENERCON Date of Date of Type of Facility Location Incident Report Incident Personnel and Personnel 8/ I 0/ 1978 9/26/1978 Facility Contamination Personnel 3/22/1979 4/6/1979 Personnel Contamination Personnel 9/4/ 1979 911911979 Personnel Contamination Facility and Environment 3/4/ 1987 4/29/ 1987 Envirorunental Contamination Personnel Personnel 11/2111991 J J/22/1991 Contamination Incident Summary Investigation of high Alpha Counts on Fuels Laboratory Fixed Air Samplers (Category I, Type fl. NST 78-14)
Glove Box #44 Contamination Incident (Category I, Type Ll, 79-I Radioactive Contamination Release During Separation of Glove Boxes
- 41 and#42 (Category I, Type II, 79-5)
VNC Incident Investigation NO. 87-2 (Category I, Type II):
Contaminated Drinking Fountain 61 Vallecitos Nuclear Center Decommissioning Historical Site Assessment REN-TR-22-0 I 0 Revision 0 l ncident Description The AFL was notified by Radiological and Environmental Protection (R&EP) Lhat an apparent airborne contamination release had occurred in tbe ceramics are of the Fuels Laboratory. Personnel potentially exposed were identified and placed on special urine and fecal bioassay program.
The interior of Glove Box #44 was being decontaminated for disposal. The HNOJ acid solution spray leaked and ran down behind the glove box. An electrician working on the box was unaware and received contamination on their coveralls, lab coat and hands.
A contamination release occurred while AFL technicians were removing the SS tunnel between glove boxes #41 and #42 to provide access to and bag-out from the 18" bag ports of the two glove boxes. No skin contamination, but very minor contamination was detected on the technician's clothes A drinking Jountain intended tor disposal was surveyed, and contaminatibn was detected near the fountain's base. Contamination was also found in lhi!
soil beneath the fountain.
A speck of contamination was found on the employee's chest. The speck read 6,000 counts/minute and was Ce-141, Ce-144, and Zr-Nb-95.
VNC Historical Site Assessment Rev 0 Final Audit Report 2022-10-06 Created:
2022-10-05 By:
Wendy Lambert (wendy@l2groupconsultlng,col
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