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SECY-78-505 - Enclosure to Attachment 4 of Enclosure 1 of Enclosure E - Final Environmental Statement on the Transportation of Radioactive Material by Air and Other Modes NUREG-0170 Volume 1
	ML23164A046
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Issue date:	12/31/1977
From:	Minogue R; NRC/OSD
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	PR-71, PR-73, SECY-78-505 NUREG-0170, Vol 1
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NUREG-0170 VOL. 1 FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL STATEMENT ON THE TRANSPORTATION OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL BY AIR AND OTHER MODES, Docket No. PR-71, 73 (40 FR 23768)

December 1977 Office of Standards Development U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Reprinted October 1985

- .. UNITED STATES C1 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON. D. C. 20555 December 1977 Docket No. PR-71, 73 (40FR23768)

TO RECIPIENTS OF THE TRANSPORTATION FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL STATEMENT (NUREG-0170) statement dealing Enclosed for your information is a final environmental and other modes.

with the transportation of radioactive material by air the Nuclear Regulatory The document has been prepared in support of in the Commission's advanced notice of rule making proceeding.published a copy of which is enclosed Federal Register on June 2, 1975 (40FR23768),

for your use.

and the Pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 and Regulatory Commission's regulations in 10 CFR Part 51 "Licensing Policy and Procedures for Environmental Protection," the Commission's statement Office of Standards Development issued a draft environmental of the 28 letters on Transportation in March, 1976. After consideration and from Federal, State and local of comment received from the public of agencies, a final environmental statement on the Transportation Other Modes has been issued and Radioactive Material by Air and designated NUREG-0170.

state Taking into account the conclusions of the final environmental information, ment, public comments received on the proceeding, and other of the the Nuclear Regulatory Commission will consider the disposition views with rule making proceeding announced on June 2, 1975. Personsstatement on the content or conclusions of the final environmental file which may be helpful to the Commission in its deliberation should such comments by March 15, 1978, with the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory D. C. 20555, Attention: Director, Office of Commission, Washington, of the Standards Development. If sufficient need for clarificationof Standards final environmental statement becomes apparent, the Office for this Development will consider holding one or more public meetings purpose.

Robert B. Minogue, D ector Office of Standards Development

Enclosures:

1. Advanced Notice of Rule Making Proceeding

2. Final Environmental Statement

=368 PROPOSED RULES r

- .... NUCLEAR REGULATORY

"-,COMMISSION

_", [ CFR Pa*t* 71 nd73J RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

.Pckaingend Transportation by Air

- Following Its oranization under the

- Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 (Pub

. .cl.w 93..43). the Nuclear Regulatory S .... Commission (NRC) has stated Its Inten tion of reviewing those of Its reglaltions procedures pertaining to the licens

~~Inand

lnd a.*.- regulation of nuclear facilities and materialsby which "promulgated were originally the Atomic Energy

. - Commission. with a view to considering

- what changes should be made. As part of "thateffort, the NRC Is Initiating a rule I-.-

. making proceeding concerning.the air

.- - N* -transportation of radioactive materials.

- Including packaging, with a view to the

, , psioble amendment of its regulations In a- -. ' 10 antCFP Parts to 'the 71 and Atomic 73, adopted Energy pursua Act ot 1954.

N amended. 7be JNRC considers the re.

evaluation of these Particular regula-.

ltons to be especially In view of "mely

...... eoncerns that have been recently oz

-. .. , pressed by public ocilals and others as

- u.,~ - ' to the safety and security of air ship ment of plutonium and other special nuclear materials through high popu lated metropolitan areas.

. The Department of Transportation

.(DOT) has overlapplng Jurisdlction over g AL 3UEISTIN,VOL 40, NO. 1i-.MOHOAY. JT, O . 1977

1-PROPOSED RULES 23769 safety In packaging and transportation' NRC packain standards are amplUc and large quantity Packages. The DOT by air of radioactive materials under the ble to shipments by NRC licensees, while develops safety standards governing Transportation of Explosives and Other DOT regulations are applicable to tans handling and storage of all radioactive Dangerus Materials Act (1 U.S C. 831- portation of radicactive material by material packages while In possession of 835) and the Transportation Safety Act land In Interstate and foreign commerce. a common, contract or private carrier.

of 1974 (Pub. LU93-433. 8 Stat. 2156). on civil aircraft, and on water. DOT as well as standards for Type A Pack and the Federal Aviation Administration regulations In Titie 4) of the Code of ages,' DOT requires AEC (now NRC) has similar overlapping Jurisdiction mn- Federal Regulations and FAA regula approval prior to use of all Type B. f1s der the Federal Aviation Act Of 1958 (49 tions in 14 CM Part 103 cover labeling ails and large quantity package designs.

US C. 1421-1430.1472(b) ). It is expected and conditions for shipment and car DOT is the National Competent Author that the expertise of these agencies will riage as well as certain packaging. NRC ity with respect to foreign shipments be utilized In the subject rule making regulations exempt carriers from their under the LAKA transport standards.

proceeding, application In view of the controls exer IAFA Certificates of Competent Author Background of present reguflotis. cised over carriers by DOT and Its con ity are issued by DOT with technical as Following a prohibition againtit ship- ponent parts. including FAA. sistance provided by NRC as requested.

ment of radioactive material by mall in For the purpose of developing and Re-evaluatiox ot.present regulations.

1936 to protect unexposed film, safety implementing consistent, comprehensive Consistent with the considerations ex regulations for shipping radioactive and effective regulations for the safe premed in the first paragraph of this no material were adopted by the Interstate transport of radioactive material and to tice. the NRC has decided that Its regu Commerce Commission in 1948. T7hose avoid duplication, the DOT (then ICC) lations governing air transportation of regulations were based on a report of a and the AEC (NRC's predecessor) en radioactive material, including packag National Academy of Sciences-National tered Into a Memorandum of Under ing. should be re-evaluated from the Rerearch Council Subcommittee on standing In 1966 which was superseded standpoint of radiological health safety Transportation of Radioactive Material, by a revised Memorandum of Under and prevention of diversion and sabo The basic principles reflected In those standing signed on March 22. 1973. Un tage as well. In connection with this re regulations were reviewed and adopted. evaluation, the NRC has Instructed its with minor modifications and some der the revised memorandum, the AEC staff to. commence preparation of a elaboration, by the International Atomic (now NRC) develops performance generic environmental impact statement Energy Agency (IABA) In 1961 and re- standards for package designs and re on the air transportation of radioactive flected in recommended International views package designs for Type B ' fissile materials, including packaging and re Standards for the Safe Transport of lated ground transportation. The state Radioactive Material. In 1964. on the ment will be directed at air transporta basis of shipping experience up to that physical prottction (security) of strategic tion. However other transportation date and an analysis of transportation quantities of special nuclear material. in modes-land and water transport-will accidents prepared by the United King- eluding plutonium, in 10 Cra Part "3.are be considered in light of the requirement Authority the IAEA spefc to the mode of transport.

issm Atomic dom rviseEnergy tnspgyAuhortyregulations in- Container designs required to meet ac of the National Environmental Policy Issued revid transport regulations In- cident conditions am evaluated under cur Act of 1969 (NEPA) that the relative corporating specific accident damage test rent regulatons against the following ac* costs end benefits of alternatives to cer standards which were incorporated into dent test conditions In sequence: 30-foot tain proposed Federal actions be fully the NRC (then AMC) And DOT (then free drop of the container In the most dam. considered. It is anticipated that the within the Jurisdiction of the ICC) regu- aging p*ostlon Onto a flat. essentially un draft generic environmental impact lations by 1968. Except for changes in the yielding surface. 40-inch drop onto a steel statement wIll be available by the time regulations to deal with specific problemns bar to test the ability to withstand puncture. that any proposed changes to the regu 30-minute Are test at 1475" r and 3-foot leg. leak testing of packages contain- ater timmersion test for eight hours The lations eventuating from this rule mak ins liquids, prompt pickup and monitor- puncture teat and the drop test ar engi ing proceeding are published for ing of p*ackages, restrictions on ship-' neering qu.Llflcition tests. The test condi comment in the Fr.DgsAL RZiCISRs. While ments of plutonium on passenger air- flons were chosen to provide reproducible the generic impact statement is In prep craft, opening and closing procedures). laboratory condltions representative of severe aration. impact statements or impact the safety regulations have remained - transportation accident envlronments. For appraisals for inditidual NRC licensing sentially the same since that time, e Iaina 30-foot drop onto sit unyielding

.le. actions related to the transportation of surface produces Impact or shock loads The safety standard for tra - which arae s severe than drops of sav radioactive materials, such as import 11 tion, as set forth In NRC*s regulation In' rea thousand feet onto targets such as censes for significant quantities of plu 10 CFR Part 71 and DOT regulations In land. water. or even city streets which would tonlum and other special nuclear mate 49 CFR Parts 170-178. are based on two 'tend to yield when struck by the package. rial. will be prepared as required by main considerations: (1) Protection of Because of the conservatls of most designs. NEPA and 10 CFR Part 51.

the public from external radiation and packages, when subjected to tests Involving In order to aid the NRC in this re (2) assurance that the contents are ur- free fall from much geater heights th*n evaluation of existing regulations per likely to be released during either normal 30-ftet. have either remained undamaged Sor continued to contain their contents. For or accident conditions of transport or. example. a number of packages which pan taining to radioactive material trans ported by air. interested persons are In if the container is not designed to with- the NRC qualification teste have also been vited to submit Information, comments stand accidents, that Its contents are so tested under extra severe conditions such and suggestions with respect to those as limited In quantity as to preclude, a As a 250-foot free fail onto an essentially pects of the above-referenced NRC significant radiation safety problem if- unyielding surface. Packages currently ap regulations. The NRC is particularly in released. rhese safety standards are ap- proved for bulk shipmetit of plutonium oxide terested in receiving views on the follow plicable to packages used In anl models and nitrate will survive such test conditions ing:

of transport and were deieloped with The ettra severe testa provide added as.

tasotn teobjectiveof d i were aeope w l surance, that containers In much the same 1. Whether radioactive materials the objective of providing an acceptable "nsr as aircraft flight rcorders, could should continue to be transported by level of safety for transport of radioac- survive seere air accidents A description of air, considering the need for. and the tive material by any mode.! With respect these tfte is set forth In SC-DR-72 0587 benefits derived from such transporta.

to air shipments. It was considered that, (Sept. 1972). -Special Tests for Plutonium taking Into account the high integrity Shipping Conteiners 6i11 5P6795, and 1-1O'. tion, the risks to public health and safe of the packaging I and the low accident a- copy of which Is available fat public in ty and the common defense and security probability p fo~

fort ,d air tansort~on(n -nt noo.at the transportation (no- opeetton 717Commission's IfStreet Xw, Public Washngto.

Docu. associated with such transportation, and more than one accident per 100 miUion m1.n the relative risks and benefits of other miles. the risk of an air accident result- , A Type B package is required for quan modes of transport.

Ing in a release of radioactive material Uies in excess of a few millicurles and up to from a package was mall. - 20.000-60.000 curies, depending upon the rs *A Type A package Is required for lea th"

- - dionuclide. Such packages am required to be TypeB quantities of radioactive material

'In contrast to the safety standards de- deseiged to withstand accident conditions as and In required to be designed to withstend scribed above. NRC's requirements for the well a normal conditions of transpor. normal conditions of transport OlY.

F5N5AL KtS[fI0[. VOL 40. NO. 10&.-MONDAY. JUd 2, 197S

23770 PROPOSED RULES coas throughout the nation. Coplie Of pursuedmaking during the pendency of this and publish rule its con

2. Assuming a Justifiable need for air r uch background Information are avail proceeding Cur transportation of radioactive materials writing to zrwsxAL Ruouxsrr the OmCe chusons In the regulatlons'wil hble upon request In continue to what extent should safety require- s dfStandards Development. U.S. Nuclea rently effective be applied until a decision on this mat menta be basedon: o uegulatory Commission. Washington. to ter Is made.

,a) Aocident probabiltles; 3.C. 20555. As Indicated above, related specific is (b) Packaging; fateri evaluafton. Recently there sues (c) Procedural controls: been several requests that air ahip will be, or are presently, the subject t have of consideration in other rule making (d) Combinations of the above? nenta of plutonium and other special proceedings, and the NRC will continue

2. What As the relative risk of trans- I iuclear materials (and related ground to take appropriate action, as Justified by port of radioactive material by air com- Issnsportation of special nuclear mate Pared to other modes of transport, and the circumstances. to Assure that the siUs incidental thereto) be suspended risk associated with the transportation to other hasards faced by the public ,endlng reexamination of presently ap which may or may not be the subject of I materials remains small lcable regulations In amessing the aP of radioactive regulation? proprlateness of such action at this time. Dated at Washington. D C. this 29th

4. Are improvements In applica I he NRC has considered the following: day of May 1975.

regulations necessary, and If so, what 1. In more than 25 years Of shipping Improvements should be considered? F'or the Nuclear Regulatory Commis special nuclear material. Including plu Documentation supporting the views tonlum, In civilian aircraft, there have sion. SAXUE J CHULK, expressed by interested persons would be been no air accidents Involving the ma Secretary o1 the Commission helpful to the NRC in r-evaluation of terial its regulations relating to air transporta 2 The experience In shipping thou IR Doc 75-14510 riled 5-*0-76.8-"4 aml tion of radioactive materials and con sands of packages per year of all forms slderation of poss1bl changes to such of radioactive materials by anl modes Of regulations transport under existing NRC. DOT. and It should be noted that there are some rAA regulations has been very favorable.

related issues which will be. or are pree 3 The requests that have been received ently, the subject of consideration In do not set forth any significant new In other rule making proceedings and. formation which would indicate that therefore, will not be Included In this present package or security requirements proceeding They are: are Inadequate.

1. Physical security protection re 4. In view of the physical security quirements for strategic quantities of measures now required by 10 CPR Part special nuclear material that would ap 73. the protection provided against Se ply to all modes of transport (39 PR vere accidents by the high Integrity 40055). packaging required by N=R. DOT. and

2. Requirements for advance notice of FAA regulations (summarized supra).

shipments of strategic quantities of spe the Consitency of these requirements cial nuclear material (40 Fi 150i8). with International standards, the low ac 3 Quality assurance requirements for cident probability (supra), and the fa packages for all special nuclear material vomble experience to date, the risk in (38 FR 35150). volved In the transportation of radioac 4 Radiation levels from radioactive tive material under currently effective material transported In passenger air regulations is believed to be smalL craft. Accordingly, It is presently the view of If It subsequently appears that addi the NRC. subject to consideration of Uonal isrues should more properly be comments to be received, that its cur treated In Aseparate proceeding, or pro rently effective regulations can continue ceedings. appropriate notices to that ef to be applicable during the period In fect wil be published In the ?nssA which this rule making proceeding is In progress. More particularly. In light of Intereted persons should send com present Information as to the safety and ments an suggestions, with supporting security of air shipments of Tadioactive documentation, to the Secretary of the material, the commission finds no sound CommIsIo, U.S Nuclear Regulatory basis for the reasons stated above. f C mssoWashington. D.C. 20555. requiring the suspension of such ship Attentio*n: Docketing and Service Sec ments.

tion by August 1. 1975. Copie of Col Notwithstanding the foregoing, In viev ments received may be examined In the of the concerns exprmeI and the fao NRC Public Document Room at 1717 H that requests have been received for tl B et NW, Washingtan. D.C. =uspension of air ship-mts of plot After comments have been received and other special nuclear materials. com.

and considered. the NRC will publish Its ment, ar specifically Invited on the mnat.

views " to NRc rules Pertaining to air ter of whether asupension or other Unit transportation of radio*ctive material tationa cc the air transportation a In the FzD5Ai Rz*s*c- When the plutonium and other special nuclear MA aforementloned draft environmental im terlala are justified during the perloi pact statement is prepared, notice of Its that the subject rule making proceedbN availability will be published In the FXD Is being conducted. Views on this Par znA Jumurrza and opportunity for pub ticulsr matter, together with the sup lic comment afforded pursuant to NRC portiM basis for these views, should b reltions implementing the National submitted to the Secretary of the Corn cnvironmental Policy Act of IM9 (10 misseon. U.S. Regulatory Commisslor CPR Part 51). In Addition. background Washington, DC. 20555. Attention information on the subject of regulation Docketnug and Service Section by July I of transportation of radioactive mate 1975. The NRXC wil decie, After evslu srals has bee placed In the NRC Pub aUng the views and comments recelve" kicDcment Room at 1717 H Street whether a different course should t NW. and at Its local public document FORM IGIST5 VOL 40. NO 104..MOMOAY. ju 2. 1975

NUREG-0170 VOL. 1 FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL STATEMENT ON THE TRANSPORTATION OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL BY AIR AND OTHER MODES Docket No. PR 71,73 (40 FR 23768)

Manuscript Completed: December 1977 Date Published: December 1977 Office of Standards Development U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

SU?*MARY' AND CONC'LUSI'ONS This Final Environmental Statement was prepared by the 'staff of the Office of Standards D.C. 20555." Mr.""

Development of the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), Washington, Donald R. Hopkins is the NRC Task<Leader for this statement (telephone: 301-443-6910) .

1. This action is administrative.

2. This Final Environmental Statement has been prepared in connection with NRC reevalua tion of-*its present regulations governing. air transportation of radioactive'materials in order and of to provide sufficient analysis for determining the'effectiveness 'of 'the present rules rule possible alternatives to these rules. " This 'sta tement is not associated with any ipecific thei adequacy of'the" .

change'at'this time' but will 'be used as a partial basis for determining present transportation regulations. If a'rule change results from consideration o'f this',state to that ment, a separate or supplementary environmental statement will be issued with respect action.'

given' When NRC was beginning work on this environmental statement,' consideration was to covering all aspects of the environmental impact resulting from the transport of radioactive mterial by air. At the Federal'level, both the NRC and the'Departaent of Transportation, the safety particularly the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), are involved in regulating statement be6 cosponsored by of such transport. Therefore, NRC proposed to the FAA that the aspects be' both agencies and'that both the shipper-packa-ging aspects and the carriir-transport actively support the development of covered. In a meeting in early 1975, the FAA declined to to the shipperýpackaging such a statement. As a result, the scope of thl 'statement was' liaite~d aspects. The statement deals with the'cariier-transport area 'only to'the extent neces"s'ary to'-'

determine the influence of the conditions of transport on the shipper-packaging area, e.g.,

and accident exposures of personnel from packages of radioactive' materiais"under normil conditions. " " - ation o transpor of.radi6ictivie f ot . " r act..

lDevelopment of the statement began with o*ns..... ti....

materials by air. Howenver in order toeamine th6eevitontln impact of alternativesTother "modes of transport'were examined, again primarily' from the standpoint'of the effect s'uch trans--"

both normal and'accident port would have on packaging as related to exposure of people under arose in the alternative conditio'ns._ During the development 'f the'statement, special interest detail was added in the' sec of transporting irradiated nuclear fuel by special trains" Se broad to deil-thoroughly tion or special trains but the statement scope was not< sufficiently 4 trains for transporting irradi":

with this subject. A separate statement on the use 'of special (ICC) with NRC coopera ated nuclear, fuel has been issued by the Interstate Commerce Commission is used in the ICC study.

tion, Some of the same methodology used 'In this generic statement

111

-1 As a result of the limitations on the scope of this generic statement, only limited study of the conditions of transport, carrier controls, and routing has bee.i u'.Jertaken. For example, no evaluation has been made of safety aspects of the vehicles or of items related to carrier controls other than those directly affecting the shipper-packaging area.

Except. as noted, this statement does not specifically consider facets unique to the urban environment such as highr population densities, diurnal variation in population, con vergence of transportation routes, shielding effects of buildings, or the effect of local meteorology on accident consequences. A separate study specific to such considerations is being conducted and will result in a separate environmental statement specific to such an urban environment.

This statement was started in May 1975 and was completed prior Ito President Carter's April 7, 1977, message on nuclear power policy regarding deferral of comercial reprocessing and' recycling of plutonium. -Therefore, the 1985 projection of numbers and types of nuclear fuel-cycle shipments and their environmental -impact that has been used in this study reflects the potential development of, plutonium recycle to the extent described in the NRC's generic environ mental, statement on mixed oxide, fuel (GESMO). S*nce the analysis on non-fuel-cycle shipments remains valid, as does the analysis of all 1975 radioactive material shipments, this statement is issued with the caveat that it does not reflect changes in national energy policy origi nating with the President's April 7, 1977, message. - ,

Although this statement. has not been modified to reflect the President's policy message, it, is the NRC staff'sjudgment, based on related analyses, that the results presented as realistic in this statement would continue to be realistic and the conclusions 'reached would be essentially the same if changes were made in accordance with the President's message.

J- " nal

3. The environmental impact of radioactive material shalnts modes of transport under the regulations in effect as of June 30, 1975, is sumarized al follows:

a. Radiation exposure of transport workers and of members of the general public along the transportation route occurs from the normal permissible radiation emitted from pack--'

ages in transport. More than half of the 9800 person-rem exposure resulting from 1975 shipments was received by transport workers associated with the shipments. The remaining 4200 person-reis was divided among, approximately ten percent of the U.S. population. None of -these exposures would produce short-term fatalities. On a statistical basis, expected values for health effects that may result from this exposure are 1.7 genetic effects per year and 1.2 latent cancer fatalities distributpd'over the 30 yeas. falllowing each year of transporting radioactive material in the United States at 1975 levels (Chapter 4, Section 4.9). More than half of this effect, results from the shipment of medical-use radioactive'umaerials where the corresponding benifit' is generally accepted (Chaper 1, Table 1-2). ,

b., Transportation accidents involving packages of radioactive material present io*

tential for radiological exposure to transport workers aind: to members of the general public.

The expected values of the annual radiological imtat from such potential exposure are very small, estimated to be about one latent cancer fatality and one genetic effect for two hundred iv

impact years of shipping at 1975 rates (Chapter 5, Section 5.9). More than two-thirds of that is attributable to nuclear fuel cycle and other industrial shipments (Chapter 1, Table 1-2).

c. Radiological impacts from export and import shipments were evaluated separately (Chapter 5, and were determined to be negligible compared to impacts from domestic shipments Section 5.7).'

d. The principal nonradiological impacts from the use of resources for packaging dedicated materials'and from the use of, and accidents involving, a relatively small numberof death transport vehicles were found to be two injuries per year and less than one accidental per four years (Chapter 5, Section 5.8).

e. Examination of the consequences of a major accident and assumed subsequent are not severe for release of radioactive material indicates that the potential consequences are limited most shipments of radioactive material (Chapter 5, Section 5.6). The consequences radiotoxicity. However, by one or more parameters: short half-life, nondispersible form, low populated area, in the unlikely event of a major release of plutonium or polonium in a densely One early fatality would be a few individuals could suffer severe radiological consequences.

sufficient to expected,; and as many as 60 persons would be exposed to radiation dose levels cancer fatal produce cardiopulmonary -insufficiency and fatalities in some cases. The-latent many as 150 ities associated statistically with such a major release are estimated to be as

,associated with over a 30-year. period (Chapter 5, Section-5.6).; Costs for land reclamation dollars ,for.1975 ship such an unlikely accident could range from 250 million to 800 million such an event is ments and up to 1.2 billion dollars for 1985 shipments. The probability of 5, Section estimated to be no greater than 3 x 10"9 per year for 1975 shipping rates (Chapter conditions 5.6).; It should be noted that, to obtain the oabove result, all 'of the following would have to occur: .' .

"(1) A low-probability, extra severe accident would have to involveurban a vehicle area.

carrying a bulk shipment of plutonium or polonium in an extreme-population-density one of plutonium' There are presently about 20 large-quantity shipments of polonium per year and (Chapter 5,Section 5.2.2); -) .

to

.-(2), One or more of. the packages of plutonium or polonium that are designed to the highest of the forces withstand severe accident conditions would have to be subjected release of developed in the accident so as to cause gross failure of the package and subsequent a significant fraction of the radioactive contents from theapackage (Chapte 5, Section 5.2.3);

.,(3)_ The accident would have to create conditions in -which 'plutonium or polonium A, pckgefrmoulte esapefrw relase ... .. *" "*:":iabl (Appndi and being* fotransported, released from the package would escape from the vehicle in which it was form (Appendix A, a significant amount of material would have to become airborne in respirble Section A.4);

J 4) The meteorological conditions at the time would have to be such that the significant numersi of' plutonium or polonium remains airborne and is dispersed in a way that (Chapter 5, Section people would breathe the air containing the material in high concentrations 5.3); 4nd V

I (5) Mitigating actions such as evacuation of persons from the area are not taken.

4. Principal alternatives considered are the following:

a. Transportation mode shifts for various components of the industry (Chapter 6, Section 6.2).

b. Operational constraints on transport vehicles to minimize accidents (Chapter 6, Section 6.3).

c. Changes in packaging requirements to minimize release of radioactive materials in an accident (Chapter 6, Section 6.4).

d. Changes in the physical properties of radioactive materials to minimize conse quences in the event of a release (Chapter 6, Section 6.4.1).

Preliminary analyses were made of a number of alternatives to the present regulations and methods of transport. A few of the' alternatives examined were found to be cost effective.

However, the cost-effective alternatives dealing with changes in mode, of transport did not significantly reduce the radiological impact; the others must be analyzed further to determine, whether their adoption would reduce the radiological impact-and achieve an impact level as low as is reasonably achievable (Chapter 6).

The alternative of reducing the' amount of radioactive"material-transported, either generally or selectively, was' not'considered on the assumption that the benefits associated with the use of presently transported materials outweigh the small risk of their transportation.

While future rureinaking'may depend in part for its-justification on the analysis and conclusions of this statement, no-rulemaking is'proposed with its'-present issuance. The pri--'.

mary function of this statement is to6' etablish the NRC staff view of the environmental impact of present transportation of radioactive material and of the projected impact'in'1985. This statement provides an overview of a number of alternatives to present transportation require ments and of the changes in impact produced by those alternatives.' While this overview serves to limit the number of alternatives worthy' of further consideration, any detailed study of alternatives in support of rulemaking activities will b4 considered separately.

The alternatives considered in this statement are limited to those possible with isttg transportationisysteis. "Whie i igh,t bie possible to conceptualize new transpor tation systems that might reduce environmental impact, it Is'considered unlikely that any could be justified*n a cost-benefit basis because of the present low risk.

5. The following Federal, .State, and local agencies commented on the Draft Environmental Statement (NUREG-0034) made available in March"1976.'- Their corinents, along with those from other parties. are inAppendix J.

vi

a. Tennessee Valley Authority

b. -Department of Health, Education, and Welfare 1c. Environmental Protection Agency

- d. Department of theInterior e.. Federal Energy Administration

f. - Energy Research and Development Administration

g. Department of Transportation . ,

- h. State of New Mexico

- i., State of New York

j. - State of Georgia

'.-k.,, Cityof New York . - .

6. A draft of this Final Environmental Statement was made available to the public in February 1977 at the NRC Public Document Room in Washington, D.C., and at NRC's field offices in King of-,Prussia, Pennsylvania; Atlanta, Georgia; Glen Ellyn, Illinois; Arlington, Teias; and Walnut Creek, California... Public comments received on that draft are contained in Appendix K.

7. This Final Environmental Statement was made-available to the public, to'the Council on Environmental Quality, and to the above specified agencies in December 1977.

8. On the basis of the analysis-and evaluation set'forth in ,this statement and after, weighing the small adverse environmental impact resulting from transportation of radioactive materials and the costs and benefits of the alternatives available for reducing or avoiding the adverse environmental effects, the staff concludes that: - -

a. Maximum radiation exposure of individuals from normal transportation is generally within recommended limits for members of the general public (Chapter-3, Section 3.5). -There are transportation operations at a few locations where some transport workers receive.radiation, exposuresin -excess of the recommended limits established -for members of the general public.

In most cases, these operations employ radiation safety~personnel to establish safe procedures and to train and monitor, transport workers as though they were radiation workers.

b. The average radiation dose-to the population at risk from normal transportation is a small fraction of the limits recommended .for members of the general public from all sources of radiation-other-than natural and medical,,sources-(Chapter,3, -Section,3.5) and is a small fraction of natural background dose (Chapter.3, Section 3.3). .

-c..The radiological .risk from accidents in transportation is small, amounting to, about one-half percent of,.the normal transportation risk on an. annual basis (Chapter.4, Section

)*

.,9 5. . ,

-jd. For the types and~numbers of radioactive material shipments now being made or projected for 1985,,there is no substantial difference in environmental impact from airtrans port as opposed to that of,other transport modes (Chapter,,4, Tables.4-15 and 4-17 andAppendix I, Table 1-9).

vii

e. Based on the above conclusions, the NRC staff has determined that the environ mental impacts of normal transportation of radioactive'materialo and the risks attendant to accidents involving radioactive material shipments are sufficiently small to allow continued shipments by all modes. Because transportation conducted under present regulations provides adequate safety to the public, the staff concludes that no'immediate changes to the regulations are needed at this time. The staff has already upgraded its regulations on transportation quality assurance while this environmental statement was being prepared and has-begun studies of transportation through urban areas and of emergency response to transportation accidents and incidents. In addition, the staff is continuing to study other aspects of transportation, such as the accident resistance of packages and the physical/chemical form of'the radioactive con tents, to maintain the present high level of safety.and to determine the cost-effectiveness of changes that could further reduce transportation risk.

9. Based'on considerations' related to security and safeguards for strategic special nuclear materials'(uranium enriched to*20% or more in the U-235 isotope, U-233, and plutonium),

spent fuel, and other radioactive materials in transit, the staff concludes that:

a. ' Existing'physical- security requirement's-ari'adequate to protect at a minimum against theft or sabotage of'significant quantities of strategic special nuclear materials in transit by a postulated threat consisting of an internal threat of one employee occupying any position and an external threat' of a determined violent assault by several well-armed, well-trained persons'who might possess inside knowledge or assistance.

b. The level of protection provided by'these requirements reasonably ensures that transportation of strategic special nuclear material does not endanger the public health and safety'or common'defense'and' security."' However,'-prudence-dictates that' safeguards policy be subject to close and' continuing review. 'Thus, the'NRC' is conducting a public rulemaking pro ceeding to consider upgraded' intirim 'requirements and' longer-term upgrading actions. The objective 'of 'the -forthcomfig iue-1makind proceeding Is to c6nsider additional safeguards measures to counter the hypothetical-threats of 'internal conspiradies among licensee employees',"

and determined violent iaaultsithat viuld be'moreosevere than those postulated in evaluating the adequacy of current safeguards.

"c. The use If thi' ERDA (now the Departmen of 'Eniy (DOE)) 'transport system Is not, at this time, considered to be 'neciissary for' the protection of significant quantities of privately owned strategic special nuclear material becauie the- present level of transport' protection provided by the licensed industry is considered to be comparable to that presently required by ERDA (DOE): Similarly, the'use of'Departmentfof Defense escorts' is not presently needed -to protect domestiicshipiint, ajaihnst the postulated threat because the physical pro-

tection deemed necessary to defeat this threat can and is being provided by the private sector. L d.- Shipments of' radioactive materialsnot'now covered by NRC' physical protection requirements,- such as"spent'ftuel:containtni'ffsion prroductst an-'irradiated special 'nuclear' materials) 'and jae-sou enonfissile"raditoiotopesdo nt'i6nstitutý'a threat to the public' viii

health and safety either because of their limited potential for misuse (due in part to the hazardous radiation levels that preclude direct handling) or because of the protection afforded by safety provisions, e.g., shipping containers.

Based on the above conclusions, the NRC staff has determined that the risks of suc cessful theft of a significant quantity of strategic special nuclear material or sabotage of radioactive materials in transit resulting in a significant radiological release are suffi ciently small to constitute no major adverse impact on the environment.

10. The validity of the risk assessment has been seriously challenged within the NRC staff. The challenge is with respect to the assessment of the overall level of accident risk and the relative levels of risk of the various types of shipments on which the total accident risk is based. The challenge results from the acknowledged conservative assumptions used in the accident assessment where valid data are not available to support more realistic values for certain parameters. Principal among these are package release fractions (Chapter 5, Table 5-8), particle size (Appendix A, Table A-7), fraction of released materials becoming airborne (Appendix A, Table A-7), and areas contained within dose isopleths (Chapter 5, Figure 5-7).

These assumptions are not applied uniformly in the accident analysis over the various types of shipments (e.g., more data is available on plutonium shipment behavior in an accident situation than is available for polonium shipments; therefore, more conservative assumptions were applied to the polonium accident assessment). The resulting challenge is that the assessment is exces sively conservative and shows the total accident risk to be greater than a more realistic assessment would show and that the values of risk assessed for different types of shipments may incorrectly show that certain types of shipments are more hazardous than others. However, since the conclusion drawn from the accident assessment is simply that the total accident risk is small compared to the normal transportation risk, the assessment is considered to support that limited conclusion and therefore to be adequate for that purpose, at this time. Nonethe less, further studies to develop additional data and refine the assessments are planned for the future; some are already underway in connection with the generic study on Transport of Radio nuclides In Urban Environs and other detailed accident studies. Furthermore, rulemaking actions to reduce the risk in specific areas will not be taken until a more realistic risk assessment has been completed and the specific costs and the benefits have been evaluated.

ix

TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE VOLUME 1

,SUMIMARY AND CONCLUSIONS.... ............. ...

-TABLE OF CONTENTS . . . . . .. . . .. .. .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

LIST OF FIGURES ............. ...... ... ....................... . xiv LIST OF TABLES .................................. .XV DETAILED

SUMMARY

.. xxi Introduction ........... ....................... . ..... xx Description of the Environmental Impact of Existing Activities ..... ... xxii Relationship of Proposed Activities to Other Government Activities.. xxiii Probable Impact of Proposed Actions on the Environment .............. xxiii Alternatives to Existing Activities ........ ...... ..... xxiii Unavoidable Adverse Environmental Effects ...... . ...... xxiv Short-Term Use of the Environment Versus Long-Term Positive Effects . xxiv Irreversible'Commitment of Resources,., xxv CHAPIER 1 INTRODUCTION.-.':"................. .' . 11

1.1 Purpose and Scope

of this Environmental Statement. '. . .. 1-1 1.2 Background .... .-- ......... .... -: . 1 1.3 Accident Experience in the Transportation of Radioactive Materials. ................... ............ .. . 1-2 "1.4 An Overview of Radioisotope Uses. .... ..... ............ 1-3 1.5 Standard Shipments ..... ............ ......-..... - 1-9 1.6 Method Used to Determine the Impact ....... ................ 1-10 "1.7 The Contents of Other Chapters of the Document ....... .... 1-19

- References for Chapter I . ". . .1-21 REGULATIONS GOVERNING THE TRANSPORTATION OF RADIOACTIVEMATERIALS" 2-1 "CHAPTER 2 2.1 Introduction ........... ......... ............ 2-1

- 2.2 Regulatory Agencies. ........ ..... ... ..... ... 2-2 Regulations Designed to Ensure Adequate Containment-,.-'.'*'. . " 2-4 2.3 2.4 Radiation Control - The Transport Index. .............. 2-11 2.5 Special Considerations for Fissile Material .... .x.,. . .. 2-13 2.6 Procedures to be Followed by the Receiver.-.' .'-. u *...... 2-15

' 2.7 Labeling of Packages .. -......... . . ..... 2-17 2.8 Requirements Pertaining to the Carrier - Vehicle Placarding and "Stowage.-............................ .',-;. . . 2-17 "2.9 Reporting oT Incidents and Suspected Contamination.Nuclear.'. .-... 2-18

'2:10 Requirements for Safeguarding of Certain Special ,

Material . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-19 References for Chapter 2 .............. ... ..... ...-. *.2-23 RADIOLOGICAL EFFECTS ........ ....................... . 3 CHAPTER 3 3.1 Radiation ......... . ........- . . '-...3-1 3.2 Dose ..................... ....

3-3 3.3 Background Sources of Exposure ..... .................. ...

Hazards from Radiation ....... ...................... ... 3-6 3.4

-xi

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont'd)

PAGE 3.5 Radiation Standards ....... ........................ ... 3-9 3.6 Cost-Benefit ............................. 3-11 3.7 Health-Effects Model . ............................... . . 3-11 References for Chapter 3 .......... ..................... 3-18 CHAPTER 4 TRANSPORT IMPACTS UNDER NORMAL CONDITIONS ............... .... 4-1 4.1 Introduction ....................... ...... 4-1 4.2 Radiological Impacts Other Than Those Directly on Man ........ 4-1 4.3 Direct Radiological Impact on Man ..................... . .. 4-3 4.4 Exposure of Handlers ......... ... .. ....... ............... 29 4.5 Nonradiological Impacts on the Environment ............... .... 4-29 4.6 Abnormal Transport Occurrences .......... ..... ..... ... ... 4-31 4.7 Shipment by Freight Forwarders .... ....................... 4-34 4.8 Export and Import Shipments ...... .................... 4-34 4.9 Summary of Environmental Impacts for Normal Transport ........ 4-37 References.for Chapter 4 ..... .......................... .. 4-50 CHAPTER 5 IMPACTS OF TRANSPORTATION ACCIDENTS ....... .. .......... ... 5-1 5.1 Introduction ...... ......... ... ....... ............ 5-1 5.2 Detailed Analysis .......... .-.... . ..... .. .. 5-1 5.3 Dispersion/Exposure Model ..... . . . ... . .. 5-26 5.4 Application of the. Model to 1975 and 1985 Standard Shipments . . . 5-30 5.5 Consequences of Contamination from Accidents .. .. '. . .5-33 5.6 Severe Accidents in Very High Population Density Urban Areas . . 5-38 5.7 Export and Import Shipments. . . . . .... ... ... 5-49 5.8 Nonradiological Risks in Transportation Accidents ..... ......... 5-51 5.9 Summary of Results ......... .......... 5-52 References for Chapter 5 ........................ . .. 5-54 CHAPTER 6 ALTERNATIVES. . ....... ..... ..... .

... .. 6-1 6.1 Introduction . ...... .. .-. . .. 6 6.2 Transport Mode Shifts ...... ............ . ............. 6-2 6.3 Operational Constraints on Transport 6-11 6.4 Restrictions on Material Form, Quantity Shipped, or Packaging. 6-20 6.5- 'Sumary of Cost-Effective Alternatives L.: .: -. .*t, . 6-25 References for Chapter 6 ..... ............. .... .. . 6-27 CHAPTER 7 SECURITY AND SAFEGUARDS ....... .......... ...... ...... . .. 7-1 7.1 Introduction ...........

7.2 Radioactive Materials - Potential for Misuse ... . ... . 7-1 7.3 Safeguards Objectives and Program..... 7-...............

57 7.4' Physical Protection of Highly Enriched.Uranium and Plutonium During Transit .......... ... ..... ....... ...... ....... 7-7 7.5 Alternatives '.. .. . .. 7-10 7.6 Conclusions. ........ , .......... ............. 7-12 References for Chapter 7 ........ .............. ..... 7-14 APPENDIX A STANDARD SHIPMENTS MODEL ....................... A-1 A.1 Introduction A-1 A.2 Compilation of Standard Shipments List A-2 A.3 Simplification of Standard Shipments List ........ . ..... o. A-IO 4x11

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont'd)

PAGE A-12 A.4 Dosimetric Parameters for Standard Shipments . . . . . . . . . . .

A-20 A.5 1985 Standard Shipments ............... ... . .. .* . . . .

A-23 A.6 Export-Import Model .............. ....

References for Appendix A............ . . . .* . . . . ..

A-26 B-1 APPENDIX B EXCERPTS FROM CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS.

" B.1 Nuclear'Regulatory Commission Regulations. S.

B-1 B-15 B.2 Department of Transportation Regulations nftB rTOTV jI ft i liflj C-1

^'IrrjIULA G PLU M .LX~. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

C.1 Historical Background....... S. . .. .

C-i C-1 C.2 Chemistry and Metallurgy .. .. .................

C.3 Nuclear Properties ...... .. .. ............ .. S. . .. . C-2

.. ........ C-2 C.4 Physiological Aspects ........... C-10 C.5 'Biological Effects .. . .....

S. . .. . C-1I C.6 Plutonium Toxicity .... .. . . . ... ...........

References for Appendix C. .. ..........

S. . .. . C-14 S. . .. . D-1 APPENDIX D POPULATION DOSE FORMULAS FOR NORM,AL TRANSPORT ......

D.1- Dose to Persons Surrounding the Transport Link While the S- Shipment is Moving............ ........... D-1

. D-7 D.2 Dose to Population During Shipment Stops D-7 D.3 Dose to Warehouse Personnel While Package is in Storage ....... D-8 D.4 Dose to Crewmen. .................

D.5 Dose to Persons in Vehicles Sharing the Transport Link'with the D-8 Shipment ....... ..... ............................

D-14 References for Appendix D...... ......................

........................ E-1 APPENDIX E DEMOGRAPHIC MODEL........

E-1 E. I Introduction ....... .............................. E-1 E.2 Urbanized Areas .......... .........................

E-1 E.3 Other Urban Areas ....... ......................... E-2 E.4 Rural Areas. ....... ...............................

E-2 E.5 Extreme-Density Urban Areas ...... ....................

E-2 E.6 Sumary and Conclusions ...... ......................

E-5 References for Appendix E...... ......................

APPENDIX F INCIDENTS REPORTED TO DOT INVOLVING RADIOACTIVE KATERIAL FROM F-1 1971 THROUGH 1974 ....... .......................

G-1 APPENDIX G CALCULATION METHODOLOGY FOR ACCIDENT ANALYSIS ..............

G-1 G.1 Computation of Annual Early Fatality Probability .........

G.2 Computation of Latent Cancer Fatalities due to Airborne Releases G-6 from Accidents...........................

G.3 Computation of Latent Cancer Fatalities from External Exposure G-9 Sourco. ......... ... ..............................

G-I0 References for Appendix G...... ......................

H-1 APPENDIX H METHOD FOR DERATING ACCIDENT SEVERITY CATEGORIES ............

H-S References for Appendix H...... ......................

xiii

9-TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont'd)

PAGE APPENDIX I SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS ................................ I-1 1.1 Introduction ...................... ......... I-i 1.2 Sensitivity of Analysis to Fundamental Parameters.... ....... I-I 1.3 Sensitivity of the Accident Analysis to General Parameters . 1-2 1.4 Sensitivity of the Accident Analysis to the Shipment Parameters. 1-10 1.5 Sensitivity of the Normal Dose Calculation to Various Parameters 1-12 VOLUME 2 CHAPTER 8 COMMENTS ON NUREG-0034 AND MAJOR CHANGES THAT HAVE OCCURRED SINCE NUREG-0034 WAS ISSUED ...... ... ...................... 8-1 8.1 Introduction .............................. .......... 8-1 8.2 Major Changes Since NUREG-0034 was Issued.. ................ 8-1 8.3 Major Changes which have Resulted in Changes in Conclusions/

Analysis Since NUREG-0034 ....... ...... ....... ......... 8-6 8.4 Discussion of Comments Received During Public Response Period... 8-9 8.5 Discussion of Comments Received on the Draft Final Environmental Statement Dated February 1977 ...... .................. 8-113 APPENDIX J COMMENTS ON THE DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL STATEMENT ............. J-1 APPENDIX K COMMENTS ON THE DRAFT FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL STATEMENT'DATED FEBRUARY I977.( . . K-1

.t. I - -

'Jr

-' ,-'II.,

f -

xiv

LIST OF FIGURES PAGE 1-8 1-1 -Nuclear'Fuel Cycle... ...... . ............. ..................

3-1 Variation of Galactic Radiation Dose Rates with Altitude of Geomagnetic 3-5

-Latitude of 550 . . .

3-2 Estimated Dose Response Curves for Mortality within 60 Days from Whole 3-15 Body Exposure to External Penetrating Radiation ..................

from 3-3 Dose-Response Curves for Mortality due to Acute Pulmonary Effects 3-16 Radiation ........... ..................................

.......................... 4-2 4-1 Possible Transport Paths ..........

5-2 5-1 Flow Diagram for Accident Analysis ........ .....................

5-6 5-2 Accident Severity Category Classification Scheme - Aircraft ............

5-10 Trucks .........

5-3 Accident Severity Category Classification Scheme - Motor 5-14 5-4 Accident Severity Category Classification Scheme - Trains 5-25 in Casks .......

5-5 Release Fraction Model for Exposure-Type Sources Shipped 5-27 5-6 Possible Routes to Man from Radionuclide Release .... ...............

5-29 5-7 Downwind Dilution Factor as a Function of Area ...... ...............

5-31 Flow Chart for Latent Cancer Fatality Calculations ..... .............

5-8 5-32 5-9 Flow Chart for Early Fatility Calculation ........................

5-35

- Model II ....

5-10 Cumulative Annual Early Fatality Probability - 1975, 1985 5-37 Model I ......

5-11 Cumulative Annual Early Fatality Probability - 1975, 1985 -

5-43 Release .........

5-12 Area Contaminated to a Level of 0.65 pci/m2 for a Given 5-44 5-13 Decontamination Costs for Releases of Long-Lived Isotopes 5-45 5-14 Decontamination Costs for Releases of Short-Lived Isotopes 6-1 Variation in Plutonium Dioxide Particle Size Distribution for a Range of 0 6-21 Calcining Temperatures Between 800 C and 1200*C ...................

C-7 C-1 Biological Pathways for Inhaled Material ...... ...................

C-8 C-2 Deposition Model .......... ... ..............................

C-9 C-3 Translocation of.Pulmonary-Deposited Pu-239 in Beagle Dogs ............

D-2 D-1 Dose Received by an Individual as a Shipment Passes ................. D-3 D-2 Dose to Population Living Along the Transport Link ..................

the D-3 Dose to Persons in Vehicles Sharing the Transportation Link with D-9 Shipment ........ ..... ..................................

XV

LIST OF FIGURES (Cont'd)

PAGE F-i Hazardous Materials Incident Report ...... ...................... F-4 6-1 Flow Chart for Early Fatality Calculation .....

G_. ................... G-2 G-2 Early Fatality Computation Flow Diagram for External Penetrating Radiation Sources ......... ... .................................. G-5 G-3 Flow Chart for Latent Cancer Fatality Calculation........ ............ G-7 I I v 2'

A?

4' "I i-

- - - r

" 1/4

- - *-t.*;

L

- - -'ri.*

. "5 ,

xvi

LIST OF TABLES PAGE 1-11 1-1 Standard Shipments List - 1975 and 1985 Projections. . ...... ........

1-2 Summary of Radioactive Material Shipping and Its Major Radiological 1-18 Impacts . . . ... . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..

2-5 2-1 Quantity Limits for the Seven Transport Groups and Special Form ...........

. by DOT .- Transport

... for . by ..49* CFR . . . . and

. . 173.394 . _8. . 2-8 2-2 Type49 B 173.395 ..Permitted Packagings 49CR1339 CFR . ...... *:;--- 2-

.. 2-10 2-3 Limits for Limited Quantities, LSA Materials, and Manufactured Articles.

..... ..... ............. .......... 2-12 2-4 Package Dose Rate Limits ........

. 2-16 2-5 Type A and Type B Quantity Limits in Grams for'Certaen Fissile Materials

...... . 3-2 3-1 Quality, Factors for Various Types of Radiation ........... ....

3-4 Approximate Radiosensitivity of Various Life Forms to External Radiation 3-2

.3-............. 37 3-3 Estimates of Annual Whole-Body Doses in the United States..

3-8 3-4 Dose-Effect Relationships in Man for Acute Whole-Body Gamma Irradiation. ..

... . . .. 3-10 3-5 Effects of Cancers in the United States ...........

......... . . . . . . .. " 3-12 3-6 NCRP Dose-Limiting Recommendations..

...... 3-13 3-7 Cost in Days of Life Associated with Various Activities... ....

6 3-8 Expected Latent'Cancer Fatalities per 10 'Person-Rem Dose to the 3-14 Population ......

. 3-17 3-9 Genetic Effects'Coefficients'per 106 Person-Rem Gonadal Dose . . . . ...

for 4-1 Shipment Parameters for Calculation ofPopulation and Individual Dose -. 4-5 the Passenger Air Shipment Mode. -

4-2 Annual Doses from Transport of Radioacti e Material (RAM) in Passenger 4-9 Aircraft and Corresponding Cosmic Radistion Doses--1975........

Cargo 4-3 Shipment Parameters for Calculation of Population Dose for the Air 4-10 Shipment Mode . -...... . .. .'-

4-4 Annual Doses from Transport of Radioactive Material in Cargo Aircraft and 4-12 Corresponding Cosmic Radiation Doses - 1975.

4-5' "Dose Resulting frcm Radioactive Material Shipment by Helicopters and' 4-14 Corporate Aircraft - 1975 . . . . . . .. . .

4-6 Shipwent Parameters for Calculation of Population Dose forthe Truck

4-16 Transport Mode - ... . . . . .. . . . .... -

4-7 Shipment Parameters for Calculation of Population Dose for the Delivery 4-20 Vehicle Transport Mode .,, .- .

4-8 Dose Resulting from.Truck and Van Transport of Radioactive Materials

.. . .. .- 4-21

_1975 xvii

L_

LIST OF TABLES (Cont'd)

PAGE 4-9 Shipment Parameters for Calculation of Population Dose for the Rail Mode. .. 4-23 4-10 Doses from Rail Transport of Radioactive Material - 1975 ..... ........... 4-26 4-11 Shipment Parameters for Calculation of Population Dose for Waterborne Transport Modes ........... .... .......... ..... ........ . .... 4-27 4-12 Dose Resulting from Ship Transport of Radioactive Material - 1975 .... ...... 4-28 4-13 Environmental Impact of Normal Export Shipments (By Mode) .............. .4-35 4-14 Environmental Impact of Normal Export Shipments (By'Isotope)... . .... . .. 4-36 4-15 Annual Normal Populaton Doses (Person-Rem) for 1975, Shipments by Population Group and Transport Mode ...... . . . ; . .. ...... ........ 4-38 4-16 Annual Normal Population Doses (Person-Rem) for 1975; Shipments by Population Group.and Material .............. .......... ....... ... 4-39 4-17 AnnualNormal Population Doses (Person-Rem) for 1985. Shipments by Population Group and Transport Mode ............... ..... ........... 4-43 4-18 Annual'Normal Population Doses (Person-Rem) for'1985, Shipments by Population Group and Material . . ........ ... .... ....... ....... ... 4-44 4-19 Summary of Maximum Annual Individual Doses from Radioactive Material Transport . ......... ..... ... ..... ..... ...... ...... . . .... . 4-48 4-20 Results - Normal Transport of Radioactive Materials ... .... ............ 4-49 5-1 Accident Rates ............ .. ... . . . . ...... .. ..... 5-5 5-2 Fractional Occurrences for Aircraft Accidents by Accident Severity Category and Population Density Zone ...................... ............... 5-8 5-3 Fractional Occurrences for Truck Accidents by Accident Severity Category and Population Density Zone ........... ...... . . . . ........... 5-11 5-4 Fractional Occurrences for Delivery Van Accidents by Accident Severity Category 5"Frac and uPopulation t a Oc

-o Tr i ' Zone.........

r n e. f,! ' Density . . . ....... ........ 5-13 1 " 1 5-5 Fracticnal Occurrences for Train' Accidents-by Accident.Severity Category and Population Density Zone .......... .. ........ . ....... 5-15 5-6 Fractional Occurrences for Helicopter Accidents by Accident Severity Category and Population Density Zone ..... . . . . . . ........ . ... .. 5-17 5-7 Fractional Occurrences for Ship and Barge Accidents by Severity Category and Population Density Zone ........ ................. . ........ 5-19 5-8 Release Fractions .................... ..... 5-22 5-9 Accident Risk 49alysis Results - Expected Latent Cancer Fatalities - 1975 and 1985 - Mo#el II Release Fractions . . . 5-34 5-10 Accident Risk Analysis Results,-,1975, 1985,- Model I Release Fractions . . . 5-36 5-11 Estimated Decontamination Costs for 600 Curie Release of Vari'ous Materials.. 5-39 5-12 Integrated Population Dose and Expected Latent Cancers from Certain, Class VIII Accidents in High-Density Urban Areas. .". "..'.. ..... 5-46 5-13 Number of People Receiving Doses Greater Than or Equal tOi ViriousiSpecified Acute Doses of Interest in Certain Class VIII Accidents in High-Density Urban Areas .......... ....... ................................ 5-47 xviii

LIST OF TABLES (Cont'd)

PAGE 5-14 Expected Early Fatalities and Decontamination Costs for Certain Class- VIII . . . 5-48 Accidents in High-Density Urban Areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Export 5-15 Annual Expected Latent Cancer Fatalities from Accidents Involving 5-50 Shipments of Radioactive Materials - 1975 Export Shipments Model

...... 5-53 16 Individual Risk :f Early Fatality by Various Causes.... .....

with 6-1 Radiological Impactsfor the Baseline Case - 1985 Standard Shipments ..... 6-1 Model II Release Fractions . .... ... .. . ..... . ..... I ...

6-8

-672- Economics of Rail-Truck Mode Shift for Spent Fuel .....................

.. . 6-8

.6-3 Costs of Representative Shipping Casks . . . . . . . . . .

Railcar 6-4 Estimated Frequencies of Occurrence and Decontamination Costs for Accidents Involving Irradiated Fuel Shipments by.Regular Train Service -

6-18 in 1985 ............ ..... ..................................

................... .... 6-26 6-5 Summary of Cost-Effective Alternatives ......

. .. A-3 A-1 Total Packages Extrapolated from Detailed Questionnaire (Non-Uranium).

.............. A-6 A-2 Uranium Shipments Used in the Standard Shipments .......

............... A-7 A-3 Compilation of Total Packages Shipped per Year .......

................ A-11 A-4 Package Totals for Standard Shipments - 1975 ........

.................... A-13 A-5 Shipment Parameters for Standard Shipments ....

............ A-15 A-6 Rem-per-Curie (Inhaled) Values for Standard Shipments .....

........................ A-19 A-7 Additional Dosimetric Factors ..........

.......................... A-21 A-8 Standard Shipments - 1985 ............

............. A-24 A-9 1975 Standard Shipments Model for Export Shipments .......

C-1 Specific Activity and Dose Commitmnent from Some Isotopes of Plutonium, C-3 Americium, and Curium ............ ...........................

C-2 Isotopic Content and Dosimetric Impact of Various Mixtures of Plutonium C-4 Associated with Light Water Reactors .......... ...................

...................... C-13 C-3 Acute Toxicity of Some Substances ..........

.................... E-4 E-1 Tabular Summary of Demographic Model ..........

.......... F-2 F-1 Incidents Reported to DOT Involving Radioactive Materials .....

Flight Paths H-1 Calculated Probabilities and Characteristics of Surfaces Under ... H-3 Between Major U.S. Air Hubs ....... ........................

..... .......................... H-4 H-2 Detailed Derating Scheme ........

Increase in 1-1 Percent Changes in Normal and Accident Risks for a 10 Percent I-1 Population Density ........ ....... ............................

in a 1-2 Product of Accident Rate, Release Fraction, Fraction of Accidents by Given Population Zone, and Population Density for Type A Packages 1-3 Truck............ ...................................

. ... 1-4 1-3 Principal Contributors to Accident Risk for Truck ..................

xix

LIST OF TABLES (Cont'd)

PAGE 1-4 Principal Contributors to Accident Risk for Aircraft .......... 1-5 I-5 Principal Contributors to Accident Risk for Rail. .. .

... ........... 1-6 1-6 Principal Contributors to Accident Risk for Waterborne Modes and Various Package Types ....... ..................... . ........... I-7 1-7 Principal Contributors to Accident Risk for Secondary Modes and Various Package Types ............. ............................... 1-8 1-8 Hazard Factor Ss s . . . .... ................... . ... '-9 1-9 Overall Risk Contribution from Accidents for 1975 Standard Shipments .... 1-11 1-10 Principal Contributors to the Normal Risk ....................... 1-13

. :!q"* . ., -

A-A

A A. - * -

A A

AA A

"r-; AAAA4 AA A L - *AA A

-A I J A 4

xx

DETAILED SUlMARY INTRODUCTION This document is an assessment of the environmental impact from transportation of ship ments of radioactive material into, within, and out of the United States. Itis intended to serve as background material for a review by the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission impetus for (NRC) ofregulations dealing with transportation of radioactive materials. The regulations to ensure their such'a review results not ,only from a general need to-examine is aslow continuing consistency with the goal of limiting radiological -impact to a level that to current national discussions of as reasonably achievable. but also from a need to respond the safety and security'aspects of nuclear fuel cycle materials.

the The report consists of eight chapters and related appendices. The structure of report and its content are indicated in the following outline of its chapters:

I.' Introduction, -'The background of the study, uses,of radioactive materials, and shipping'activities in various major segments of the nuclear industry are discussed. -

2. The Regulations Governing the Transportation of Radioactive Materials - The regula and basis for tions are reviewed together with' supporting -information indicating the intent many of the transportation safety regulations., . - I

3. '. Radiological Effects -'The mechanism for radiological impact, the appropriate pro are discussed.

tection guidelines, and the health effects model used in this assessment both radiolog

,4.-- Transport Impacts Under Normal Conditions - The environmental impacts, are assessed in-terms of a ical and nonradiological, -that result from normal transportation standard shipments modael designed to represent current transport conditions.

nonradiological impacts

5. - Impacts' of Transportation Accidents - .The radiological and material *shipments ,are that -result from -accidents involving vehicles carrying radioactive discussed.

impact that would

6. " Alternatives - Assessment is made-of -differences in radiological operational constraints, result from modifying the transport mode of certain shipments, adding standards. Cost-benefit trade!7, chafgig 'form and quantity restrictions, and raising packaging

" "' " ' . r offs are discussed.,'

radioactive material

7. Security and Safeguards - The need for 'security of certain physical security require shipments is discussed together with an assessment of the present ments applied to various modes of transport; " - -

Ixxi

8. Comments on NUREG-0034 and Major Changes That Have Occurred Since NUREG-0034 was Issued - Major changes from the draft assessment (NUREG-0034) are identified.

DESCRIPTION OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT OF EXISTING ACTIVITIES The environmental impact of radioactive material transport can be described in three-distinct parts: the radiological impact from normal transport, the risk of radiological effects from accidents involving vehicles carrying radioactive material shipments, and all nonradiological impacts.

Radiological impacts 'in normal transport occur continuously as a result of radiation emitted from packages both aboard vehicles.in transport and in associated storage. The radia tion exposure of'specific population groups such as crew, passengers, flight attendants, and bystanders is calculated in the report using a computer model that considers, for the principal radionuclides shipped, radiation exposure rates, shipment information, traffic data, and transport mode splits. Using this computer model, it was estimated that the total annual population exposure- resulting from normal, transport is about 9790 person-rem. The largest percentage of this population'exposure (some 52%),results from.the shipment of medical-use radionuclides. The remaining portion results from industrial shipments (about 24%), nuclear fuel cycle shipments'(8X),- and waste shipments (155). - Shipments by truck produce the largest population exposure, resulting from relatively long exposure times at low radiation levels of truck crew and large numbers of people surrounding transport links.

The'individual radiation exposures in all.modes are generally at,low radiation levels and in most cases take on the character of a slight increase in background radiation. .,The analysis shows that radiation exposure from normal transportation, averaged over the persons exposed, amounts to 0.5 millirem pe~r year -compared-to the average natural background exposure of about 100 millirem per year. Babed on the conservative linear radiation-dose hypothesis, this would result in a total of 1.2 latent cancers distributed statistically over the 30 years following each year of transporting radioactive material-in the United States at 1975 levels. This can be compared to the existing rate of more-than 300,000 cancer fatalities per year from all1 causes. " .. 1';.: C In the' accident'-casei- risk to the population fromaccidents involving vehicles. carrying radioactive materials was estimated-in terms of the number of latent cancer fatalities and early deaths that might occur on annual and single-accident bases. The analysis resulted.in :.

estimates of annual societal risk oY 5.4 x 10"3 latent cancer fatalities and 5 x 10-4 early fatalities for'each year: of' shipments at- 1975' levels.-: These values can be compared to the 1100 (in 1969) early- fatalities from electrocution each.year; i-The latent cancer fatalities -*,

from transport accidents are related principally to industrial and fuel-cycle shipments rather.,-,

than to medical shipments, which are the dominant causes of latent cancer fatalities related to normal transport. This results principally from the larger quantities of more toxic mate rials associated with-inidustrial-and fuel cycle shipments. .... :, ....

In spite of their low annual risk, specific accidents- occurring in very-high-density urban population zones can produce as many as one early fatality, 150 latent cancer fatalities, xxiI

and decontamination costs" estimated to range from 250 million to 800 million dollars for 1975 shipments and from 250 million to 1.2 billion dollars for 1985 shipments (1975 dollars).

(estimated Although such accidents are possible, their probability of occurrence is very small to be :no greater than 3 x 10-9 per year based on 1975 shipping rates).'

Nonradiological impacts on safety were estimated to be two injuries per year and one fa tality every five years from accidents involving vehicles used for the exclusive-use transport of nuclear materials. Accidents involving vehicles carrying radioactive materials in conjunc tion'with carriage of other goods are not considered to'be chiargeable as radioactive material less shipments since the total number of radioactive material package s transported 'annually is than 1o0 of all goods transported annually in this manner.

RELATIONSHIP OF PROPOSED ACTIVITIES TO OTHER GOVERNMENT ACTIVITIES the Safety and safeguarding of radioactive materlal shipping is regulated by the NRC and Department of Transportation in conjunction with cooperating State agencies. -The-interaction that of these agencies is gove-ned by either an agreement or a Memorandum of Understanding defines the coordination of their activities. "

PROBAB'LE IMPACT OF PROPOSED ACTIONS ON THE ENVIRONMENT-' - '

Any rule changes pro~posed :as ý'result of this environmental assessment will be proposed in a future action. The impact on the environment of those rule changes will'be considered separately with that action.

ALTERNATIVES TO EXISTING ACTIVITIES "Alternatives to the .existing-practices in'the-shipment-of'radioactive material are dis cussed in Chapter 6. Mode shifts', opeirati6nal'6onstraints;-and package standards revisions were found to produce only-small changes in the population exposure associated with normal transportation:°.Although largq percenthge decreases in'the-existing risk from'transportation accidents result from some of these alternatives, the "significance-of these decreases is, lessened by the following considerations:

-1. Because the existing risk (annual early deaths plus latent-cancer fatalities)-from transportation accidents is a small percentage of the risk from normal transportation, large plus normal) decreas*e's 6acncident risk result 'in inr;ignificant changes in the total-(accident risk; and - .- -- - "- .. / - , . y; " :.

2. Because the existing risk from transportation accidents is so small, large relative decreases are actually -small 'absolute decreases' in effects (e.g.,' ;reddction in 'numbers of deaths or illnesses).- "

Where the cost-benefit ratio for an alternative is adverse, i.e., where the social and should be economic costs outweigh the decreases in environmental impact, better alternatives sought. It has been found, for example, that risk from an accident involving plutonium or xxiii

I-polonlua-210.is reduced by changing the physical form of these materials.. This technique may be capable of producing a decrease in accident risk of 0.005 latent cancer fatalities per year, (a 30% reduction) for large shipments of highly toxic materials. Detailed information on the feasibility of this alternative is not yet adequate to permit the determination of its associ-"

ated costs.

UNAVOIDABLE ADVERSE ENVIRONNENTAL EFFECTS The principal unavoidable environmental effect was found to be the population exposure resulting from normal transport of radioactive materials. Since the electromagnetic radiation emitted from a package cannot be reduced to zero by any finite quantity- of shielding, the transport of radioactive materials will always result in some population exposure.

The much smaller unavoidable risk from accidents that hav-i'thpetential for releasing radioactive material from packages will always be present but such accidents have a very small probability of occurrence.

The unavoidable nonradiological impact resulting from transport of radioactive material in exclusive-use vehicles amounts to about two injuries and one fatality every five years, mostly from accidents involving transportation of7 fuel and waste to and from nuclear, power plants. This is because exclusive-use vehicles are predominiantly -dfor'sich-shipments.

Other nonradiological impacts such as the use of, vehicle fuel and other resources were found to be insignfficant., . .

SHORT-TERM USE OF THE ENVIRONMENT VERSUS LONG-TERM POSITIVE EFFECTS The most obvious and important short-term effect is the population radiation exposure from normal transport,, which statistically, amountsto 1.2 latent cancer fatalities per year.

An additional short-term effect is the small annual accident risk.,,,- ..

,Balanced against these risks, are long-term positive results from the shipment of radio active material in such areas as:, .~i -,- ,.

1. National Health - The use of radfopharmaceuticals in the diagnosis and treatment of illnesses provides a benefit-in lives saved. ,...

2. 011 Exploration 7-Ther use of radloactive material in wel.1, logging and flow tracing,.

provides technology for intelligent exploitation of our oil resources and aids in optimizing the use of this valuable national energyresource.

3. - Quality Control'- The use of radlonuclides-for gauging the thicknesses of metal and-,

paper, measuring product density, and locating levels of contents in small packages and in large holding tanks provides a capability to minimize waste of resources and optimize quality in finished goods;'-. . - - . r-, ' * -

xxiv,

4. Electricity Generation - The use of nuclear fuels in reactors allows production of electricity for society with lower fuel costs and lower levels of chemical pollutants to the environment than is possible by more conventional methods of generating electricity.

5. Industry - Radionuclides are used in many manufactured devices and consumer products ranging from home smoke detectors to antistatic devices.

IRREVERSIBLE COM4ITMENT OF RESOURCES The only irreversible commitment of resources determined in this assessment was that resulting from use of fuels to operate the transportation network. To the extent that the resources are committed to the transportation of radioactive materials alone, the quantity of fuels used is an infinitesimal quantity, since transportation of radioactive material normally occurs incidental to the movement of general goods in commerce. Only those portions of the fuel and other resources attributable to sole-use shipments are committed directly, and that activity is less than 10-5 of the nation's total transportation activity, making this irre versible commitment of resources negligibly small.

xxv

. i CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 1.1 PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF THIS ENVIRONMENTAL STATEMENT The purpose of this environmental statement is to assess the impact* upon the environment resulting from the transportation of radioactive materials within the United States and from export and import shipments of such materials. 'The radiologicil impacts of transportation the accidents involving radioactive materials are evaluated from a risk point'of view,-although consequences of certain "worst-case" accidents are also evaluated. The data base for this States.

assessment is the 1975 Survey (Ref. 1-1) of radioactive material shipments in the United shipments in military vehicles are All shipments exclusive of weapons, weapon components, and waste considered.-.Fuel cycle shipments, shipments of medical- and industrial-use isotopes' and shipments are specifically included. The expected'radiological impacts in 1985 are also evalu ated in terms-of projections of the i975 shipment data under certain growth assumptions.

1.2 BACKGROUND

Chapters 1 through 6 of this document are the result of a'study begun in Hay 1975 by Sandia Laboratories under contract with th.e Nuclear Regulatýry omission'(NRC). NRC, organized under-the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, has the responsibility of ensuring'the safe' use of radioactive materials through licensing and regulation. Soon after its inception, NRC'stated:

that it intended to review those regulations and procedures originally set up~by the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) pertaining to the licensing and regulation of nuclear facilities and materials to determine what changes, if any, should be'made. This environmental statement Is, in part, an attempt to provide the technical data necessary for NRC to reevaluate the rules governing the transportation of radioactive materials.

In addition, ther' has been some expression of concern by members of Congress and the" public about the safety and security of air shipments of plutonium and other'special nuclear:

material (SNM) in the, vicinity, of populated areas. For example, the NRC authorization bill enacted into law on August -9; 1975,i-ncluaes -an amendment by Congressman Scheuer that states:

'The Nucleai Regulatory Comission shall notlicense any shipments by air transport of plutonium in any form, whether, exports,,imports or domestic shipments; provided, however, that any plutonium in any form contained in a medical devTie-designed for-individual'-human-application is~not~subject to

-,this restriction.-,This restriction shall be-In.force until *the Nuclear Regulatory Cominsiton has certified to the Joint Comittee on Atomic Energy of the Congress that a safe container has been developed and tested which will not rupture under crash and blast-testing equivalent to the crash and explosion of a high-flying aircraft.

A-Pending satisfaction of this Congressional restriction, NRC has ordered the cessation of plutonium air shipments by its licensees.

The NRC announced its initiation of a rule-making proceeding concerning the air transporta tion of radioactive materials, including packaging, and invited comments by the public on the existing regulations (Ref. 1-2). Of particular interest were views and comments on:

1. Whether or not radioactive materials should continue to be transported by air;

2. The extent to which safety requirements should be based on accident probabilities, packaging, procedural controls, or combinations of these;

3. The relative risk of transport of radioactive materials by air compared to other modes of transport; and

4. What improvements, if any, in the applicable regulations should be considered.

In order to-determine the quantities and typies of 'shipments of radioactive materials cur rently being transported, NRC contracted with Battelle Pacific Northwest Laboratories in Richland-,

Washington, to conduct a survey (Ref. 1-1) of the transportation of radi6acilve materials. Ques tionnaires requesting data on the numbers and characteristics (e-g., quantty and external ra'dia-'

tion level per package) of radioactive materials shipment's were Sent to about 2,300 of the approx imately 18,000 licensees. Detailed questionnaires were mailed to special nuclear material (SNM) licensees who shipped 1 gram or more of SNH between March 1, 1974, and February 28, 1975, and to approximately 150 "major shippers," i.e.., licensees who were known to have shipped large numbers of packages or large quantities of radioactive raterial. Questionnaires requesting'only summary information were sent to a sampling of the licensees selected from lists supplied by NRC and by the agreement states (listed in Chapter 2)., Data derivedIfrom that survey were usedI forI thfs assessment, as explain in Appendix A.

Section 1.3 of this chapter contains a brief discussion of accident experience in the trans portation of radioactive materials. Section 1.4 is an overview of the current industrial and medical uses of radioisotopes and their respective transportation requirements. Section 1.5 identifies the standard-shipments model on which the environmental assessment is based. Sec-ý tion,1.6 is a general discussion of the approach taken in the impact assessment. Finally, Sec tion 1.7 contains an outline of the contents of each of the remaining chapters..

1.3 ACCIDENT EXPERIENCE IN THE TRANSPORTATION OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS'(Ref. 1-3)

There are approximately 500- billion packages of all commodities shipped each year in the United States: About 100 millton'of these involve hazardo'us materials, including flamables, explosives, poisons, corrosives, and radioactive materials. There were ove'r two million packages of radioactive materials transported, in' 1975.: Thui about`2percent of hazardous material ship ments involve radioactive materials.", Z . V Radioactive materials transportation has an excellent record of safety. Of tie more than 32,000 hazardous materials transport incidents reported to the DOT during 1971-1975, only 144, or 0 45 percent, were noted to involve radioactive materials. Incidents invol'hing flammable 1-2

liquids, on the other hand, resulted in over 16,000 reports to the DOT. In only 36 of the 144 reported radioactive materials incidents was there any indication of release of contents or

,excessive radiation levels. In-most cases, the releases involved only minor contamination from packages containing only small q antities of radioactive material.

Seventy-four of the 144 reported* radioactive materials transportation incidents involved air carriers and forwarders, 65 involved highway carriers, and 5 involved rail carriers: About 40 percent of the reported aircraft incidents occurred during handling and typically involved a package falling from a cargo-handling cart and then being run over and crushed by a vehicle.

About .13 percent of the highway incident' reports resulted from'vehicular accidents in which packages were burned, thrown from moving vehicles, or rolled on by vehicles., Only one of these reports indicated a release of contents. Five reports were submitted by rail carriers in the same .five-year period: Two of these involved derailments'of flat cars carrying large packagings, but neither incident involved a release.

1.4 AN OVERVIEW OF RADIOISOTOPE USES Radionuclides used in the practice of nucleari medicine constitute the largest fraction of the packages of radioactive material transported annually in the United States. Other radio isotopes are .finding extensive applications in well-logging, 'in industrial 'radiography,' as large-curie teletherapy and irradiator sources; in some consumer 'products,' and 'in'the manu facture of certain types of gauges. Some fissile materials', such as U-235, are used as nuci.iar reactor 1uel'; others, such as Pu-239, are produced as byproductfmaterial'in nuclear reactors.

These, together with relatively small amounts of radioactive material used in research, consti tute the primary applications of radioisotopes.

1.4.1 MEDICAL APPLICATIONS During the past.25 years, clinical applications of "radioactive materials have become a major branch of medicine (Ref. 1-4). In particular, gamma-ray-emitting isotopes are now com monly used for the purpose of imaging specific areas or organs in the body. The normal'tech nique used in a scanning procedure is to give the patient an injection of the isotope In the

,,appropriate chemical form to localize "it in the desired organ or system, and collect the emitted gamma radiation on an imaging device.

In 1972, some 6,355,000 procedures were performed in 3,300 hospitals' in 1,500 cities in the United States using radiopharmaceuticals (Refs. 1-5 and 1-6). 'Radioisotopes of iodine' were among the first such materials used. Their use in the study of thyroid physiology and in the diagnosis and treatment of thyroid disorders (300,000 to 540,000 administrations/year (Ref. 1-6))

still make them an Important part of the current practice of nuclear medicine.,

.techniques An example .of,, the. -rapid-growth of the use, of organ-imagingg is, the increased application of Tc-99m, an unstable daughter of Mo-99. Tc-99m is not, in itself, a natural Radioactive material incident reports are required by Title 49 of the Code of Federal Regu lations (see Section 2.1 of Chapter 2 of this environmental statement).

1-3

component of any biological system, but its desirable properties (a six-hour half-life and 140-kev gamma ray which is well-matched to existing monitoring instruments) make it ideal for imaging.

Because of these properties, relatively large amounts of Tc-99m can be administered with little radiation dose. As a result, there has been extensive research to incorporate this isotope into medically useful forms that provide the necessary imaging and then are excreted. It is estimated that nearly 5.5 million examinations were performed in 1972 using technetium. At present, one of the most useful forms, is a pertechnetate used for brain scanning (1,000,000 administrations/year in 1972 (Rei. 1-6)).

A major source for hospital administration of Tc-99m is the Mo-99 generator or "cow," which consists of an alumina column on which the Mo-99 -is adsorbed. The daughter product, Tc-99m, may be eluted, i.e., "milked," by flushing the column with a sterile saline solution (Ref. 1-4).

Many other isotopesare now, used in scanning procedures: Au-198 or 1-131 for the liver (380,000 administrations/year in 1972 (Ref. 1-6)), 1-131 for the lungs (246,000 administrations/

year in 1972 (Ref. 1-6)), Hg-203 for the kidneys (67,000 in 1972 (Ref'. i-6)), etc.

Isotopes with more energetic emissions, such as Co-60 and Cs-137, are used in therapeutic situations where the radiation is used to destroy localized malignancies.

Because the Tc-99m generators last about a week and because of the way physicians who prac tice nuclear medicine schedule their patients, hospitals: and pharmacies prefer to receive a fresh generator on Monday mornings. Thus, significantly more radiopharmaceutical shipments tend to occur over the weekend than during the week. Radiopharmaceutical packages are frequently picked up at the airport and delivered to the hospital by taxi, person automobile, or courie-r service.

In some cases, a freight forwarder is used.

Radiopharmaceutical packages shipped to hospitals or nuclear pharmacies contain at most a few curies of the radioactive material and usually much less. The packaging usually consists of several cardboard boxes, one inside another, with a "pig," i.e., lead-shielded enclosure, inside the' innermost box." Thc radiopharmaceutica, usually a liquld, is contained in a glass or plastic vial inside the pig. The vial is surrounded by absorbent material to contain the liquid if the vial should break.

Radiopharmaceutical companies receive the raw materials used to p..r.duceadioiphrmaceuticals.

These materials are often shipped by cargo aircraft in large containers approved for up to thou sands of curies. .!ome companies have plants at more than one location and require transport of large curie quantities of materials between locations.' -.... r Most radiopharmaceuticals are produced 'in, New Brunswlck,-St.' Loufs. Bcoston', Chicigo, and San Francisco. Because of their short half-lives," they are often flown to their destination'on'regu larly scheduled'passenger'ffl ihts, although'one' large manufacturer now ships m'oii than !W 'percent of his packages by a courier service, using fixed-bed trucks. Because of new applications that ar. being discovered and because of the increased use of established techniques, "

1-4

the number of' packages shipped'is growing at a rate of approximately 10 -percent per year, (Ref. 1-7).

1.4.2 THE WELL-LOGGING INDUSTRY information on

" Well-logging fifis use radioisotopes in down-hole measurements 'to provide and tertiary recovery.

,the undergrounid strata and to assess a well's capability for secondary placed in an:instrumen In a typical logging operation, a neutron source and a gamma source are The package is tationpackage and lowered by means of a cable to the-bottom of the bore hole.

gamma-rays backscattered then withdrawn slowly while the instrumentation detects the neutrons and from the surrounding strata, and the detected signals-are displayed on a chart recorder. The of depth.,

-results yield information about the properties of rock formations as a function a Cs-137 gamma-ray Typicasly, an americium-beryllium neutron source of 5 to 20 curies and small, stainless-steel source of several curies are used. Each source is enclosed inside two in a hot cell by cylinders, one inside the other, with welded end caps. Sources are fabricated access to a produc a service company, which purchases the radioisotopes from a company having well sites (and often to tion reactor. Well-logging firms transport the sources to remote including, for, example, off-shore locations) both in the United States and in foreign countries, Canada, England (North Sea), Germany, Brazil, Venezuela, and Iran. -

Federal Aviation Many well-logging sources werb shipped by passenger aircraft prior to the Transportation Safety Act of "Administration '(FAA)'rule change implementing provisions of the materials other 1974. -That Act prohibited the shipment on passenger aircraft of any radioactive of sources to sites within approxi than those intended for research or medical use. Deliveries while deliveries to mately a 1000-mile radius of the logging firm are generally made by truck, sources to foreign off-shore well locations are frequently made by helicopter..,-Exports -of (e.g., to Alaska), are coufitries, as well as long-distance shipments within the United States sent by ship'or cargo aircraft. , .

SSome logging firms and some oil companies also ,use radioactive tracers, usually.1-131, These Kr-85,'or tritlated water, that are injected into a well to monitor its flow properties.-

metal can inside a

'materials are typically shipped in a glass-serum vial careTully packaged in a material to absorb the

'_lead-shielded container.- Surrounding this container is enough absorbent

-liquid contents in case of.breakage.--. .-. . -- - ,,

1.4.3 THE RADIOGRAPHY INDUSTRY or Co-60, both of

- -z Radiography sources are made primarily from one of two isotopes, Ir-192 used to examine the structural

. which emit relatively high energy gamma-rays. The radiation is vessels, 6or-o

-integrity of. welded Joints, principally in large pipes, .franes, and pressure

,determinethe thickness of a material.. The source Is enclosed by two small, welded, stainless facilitate han

-steel capsules and is positioned at the end of a short flexible steel cable to the d~ling nr the radiography "camera." Thegaina rays emitted by the source pass through 1-5

X_

welded joint and-expose a piece of photographic film. Voids show up as dark spots on the devel oped negative.

Only a few companies manufacture these sources (obtaining the raw materials from production reactors), but there are numerous radiographers who use them. Unlike the radiopharmaceutical industry, the radiography industry requires individual shipments of sizeable quantities of radio isotopes in both directions between manufacturer and user. A fresh source, typically 100 curies, is sent to a radiographer for use in his camera. When it has decayed, to about 30 curies, the source is returned to the manufacturer in exchange for a replacement. The new source is returned in the same shielded container in which it is shipped and stored.

Radiography'cameras are also used for field work (e.g. -at pipeline installations), which results in the need for transport from field offices to remote sites. The units are fairly port able and are-usually transported by small truck or van. However, the majority of radiography is done at fabrication' plants'and requires no transport except to and from the supplier.

1.4.4- LARGE CURIE SOURCES Teletherapy sources containing large quantities of Co-60 (up to 10,000 curies) are fabricated and shipped to cancer treatment centers both in the United States and abroad. Overseas exports are transported by ship, while domestic shipments go by truck or rail. Irradiator sources, usu ally Co-60 or Cs-137, are -used for research or in large-scale food sterilization operations and contain hundreds of thousands of curies. These sources are returned to the manufacturer after decaying to abouzt3Opercent-of-their initial activity.T They are shipped in large casks which, because of their weight, are transported by surface modes., r.

1.4.5 RADIOACTIVE GAUGING SOURCES' .' -.

A number of different gauging techniques use radioactive materials fabricatedin sealed source form. Material thickness is measured by detecting the variation in beta or gamma radiation that is'transmitied through the material." Examples are thickness measurements of paper,-rubber, plastic sheet, metal foil , and pipe wallU The material level of solids or liquids is measured by detecting a change'in transmittedirdiatio'n through tanksT bins, boxes; bottles, cans, or other containers. Fluid densities and bulk densities of solids'are measured by detecting-transmitted radiation. Coating thicknesses of adhesives, paints, or anticorrosives are measured by detecting transmitted or backscattered radiation. Moisture content is measured by detecting the degree of neutron thermalization. )'

A number of different isotopes, usually in'sealed source form and including Ra-226; Cs-137, Co-60, Kr-85, S-90, Am-241, Pm-147, and Th-204, are-u sed in the-individual sources, which contain from a few mIl'icuries up to several curies of activity.': The'radioactlve materials used by the source manufacture'rs are lobtainedfro'm suppliers of byproduct material-, Bulk'shipments'(up to several hundred curies per shipment) are generally transported in* shielded packages by motor freight. IThe gauging equipment may be shipped with' the sourie-intact, or the- source may be shipped separately and installed at the site.

1-6

1.4.6 THE NUCLEAR POWER INDUSTRY electrical energy from fission The basic nuclear fuel cycle associated with the production of supplies new fuel for power is shown schematically in Figure 1-1. The part of the cycle that U-235, U-238, Th-232, and Pu-239.

production is referred to as the "front end" and involves U-233, reactor (LWR) variety, The majority of currently operational power reactors are of the light-water and boiling water reactors (BWR).

which has two princip-al types: pressiurized water reactors (PWR)

U-238, 3 percent U-235) as Both types use slightly enriched uranium (approximately 97 percent fuel.

as follows: Ores The material flow in the front end of the fuel cycle is approximately of 99.29 percent U-238 and containing 0.1 to 0.5 percent uranium (which has an'isotopic content the mine'and shipped to a con 0.71 percent U-235) are concentrated as U3 08 (yellowcake) near to UF6 , which is shipped to a version plant. At the conversion plant, the U3 0 8 is converted U-235. Thle'enriched UF6 is sent to uranium enrichment plant to be enriched in the fissile isotope pressed into pellets. The pellets a fuel fabrication facility, where it is converted to UO2 and assemblies are sent to reactors.

are fabricated into fuel rod assemblies, and completed fuel the reactor is shut down, After a fraction of the U-235 fuel has been consumed by fission, plant. This procedure is and the irradiated fuel elements are removed and sent to a reprocessing plant, the irradiated fuel is part of the "back end" of the fuel cycle. At the reprocessing acid. The principal compo separated from the cladding and is processed in a bath of hot nitric as Cs-137 and Sr-90), unfissioned nents of irradiated fuel are-long-lived fission products (such Pu-240, Pu-241,,Pu-242, Am-241, fuel (U-233, U-235), and transuranic isotopes (Pu-238, Pu-239, the recovered uranium is con Cm-244, etc.). After non-fuel materials are chemically separated, transuranic wastes are stored in verted to UF6 and returned to the enrichment plant, while the to be solidified within five liquid form. The high-level fissioin product'wastes are required federal waste repository. Recovered years-of generation (Ref. 1-9) and 'subsequently buried in a plants as required.

plutonium is converted to PuO2 and stored or shipped to fuel fabricaton although at least one was under No commercial reprocessing plants were in operation in 1975, on site at the various power construction. In the interim, Irradiated fuel assemblies were stored wastes are currently being reactors._ Several ,plans for disposal of-intermediate and high-level and the repository site has not yet evaluated,t but the final selection of the method of disposal been made.-.- -

Th-232/U-233 portion of the fuel The high-temperature gas-cooled reactor (HTGR) uses the end of the HTGR fuel cycle is the fuel cycle shown in Figure 1-1. The unique aspect of the front coated with graphite, blended, element construction. The UO2 and ThO2 are converted to carbides, The mixed fuel is then sent to the formed into cylinders, and inserted into graphite blocks.

operation of the reactor, some of HTGR, which uses helium gas as a heat transfer medium. During at least a 90-day cooling-off period at the thorium is converted to U-233. The spent fuel, after recovered U-235, now at reduced enrichment the reactor site, is sent to a reprocessing plant. The to a conversion plant, level, is returned for re-enrichment to 93 percent. The U-233 is shipped 1-7

I-It ,t

.FIGURE 1-1. NUJCLEA. *FUEL CYtCL-E (Ref.f1-8). "..

-4 1-8

in the reactor.

where it is converted to a carbide to be used as acreplacement fuel for U-235 Currently only one HTGR is licensed In the United States.

an alter To conserve uranium resources and utilize the plutonium produced in the reactors, with uranium oxide. This native procedure has been evaluated in which-plutonium oxide is mixed assessment for oxide mixture is-then "burned" in'the reactor.L Although an environmental impact currently no recycling of plutonium mixed oxide fuels' has been Issued '(Ref. 1-10), there 'is except in a few experimental reactors.

Another reactor type is the liquid metal fast breeder reactor (LMFBR) (Ref. 1-11),,in used to fuel other which plutonium is produced in'the reactor from U-23-8 and subsequently fuel than the U-235 fuel it reactors. This 'reactor 'can, in principle, produce more plutonium consumes, thus co)nserving uranium resources.

percent U-235).in a The Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program uses highly enriched uranium (>90 gaseous diffusion for PWR system. Like other reactor types, uranium is enriched as UF6 'by fabrication into fuel elements. Because very ttle U-238 is present in the fuel, only very reactor. The reco,.-red small quantities of plutonium are produced by neutron irradiation in the U-235 is re-enriched for reapplication to the fuel cycle.

shipped "Because of the large size of virtually all fuel cycle shipments, they are normally barge, or ship..

in large containers that preclude modes of transport other than truck,,rail, 3

, and Certain quantities of'"special nuclear materials" (SNM), such as plutonium,-U-23 to a level of 20 percent or more, require physical U-235, or uranium enriched in these isotopes protection against theft and sabotage during transport because it is conceivable that they_

that prescribe the safeguards could be made into a nuclear explosive device. The regulations be discussed in Chapter 2.

for these materials' are given in 10 CFR 70 and 10 CFR 73 and will The types of shipments requiring safeguarding*include most plutonium shipments and all ship and Naval Reactor Programs.

ments of highly enriched uranium such as those involved in the HTGR the plutonium is not readily Spent LiWR fuel contains'sizeable quantities of plutonium; however, of the Irradiated fuel separable from the other radioactive material, and the radioactivity safeguards requirements.

material is sufficiently-high that it is exempted from transportation to the previously men MucWh' nirradiated SNM is'transported in cargo aircraft~and, prior aircraft. ,,The other principal mode tioned DOT restrictions, some was transported by passenger of transport-is- truck. ~ -'-. ..

1:5 STANDARD SHIPMENTS - - i " .. ,- V- t * .... "

materials transportation requires

'An assessment'of:the environmental ,impact of radioactive transport modes,,.the number.of packages a detailed knowledge of the package types, the principal package, the average "transport transported per year, the average quantity of material per the average distance traveled index" or "TI" (a measure of the external radiation .level),-and 1-9

per shipment; for:each type of radioactive material. being shipped. To make this problem tract able, a list of "standard shipments" was compiled.from, the data obtained in the 1975 Survey (Ref. 1-1). This list is shown in Table 1-1, in which the total number of packages shipped per year in 1975 and the 1985 extrapolations are given for various isotope, package type, and transport mode combinations. The list is by no means complete, but the materials listed account for'the vast majority of packages,. curies, and TI reported in the 1975 Survey. A detailed discussion of the methods used-to generate, this list from the survey data is given in Appendix A.

Table 1-2 is a summary of radioactive material shipping activity both in 1975 and pro jected to 1985, listed by isotope use categories. Thf table-lists the annual number of packages and curies,- as well as the total TIs and shipment distances, for each category, as determined from the 1975 Survey data. Also shown are the contributions of, each category to the annual" expected latent cancer fatalities (LCF) resulting from normal transport and from transportation accidenti. Detailed discussions of the methods used to obtain these results are presented in Chapters 4 and 5 and in related appendices.

1.6 METHOD USED TO DETERMINE THE IMPACT - .

Three circumstances under which impacts may be produced were considered: (1) normal transport conditions, (2) accidents involving the transport vehicle, and (3) theft or sabotage.

The radiological impacts 'produced under each of these circumstances relate directly to the radiation emitted by the material. However, economic, legal, or social impacts may also occur.

These impacts are more difficult to quantify than the radiological- impacts.-,

1.6.1 NORMAL TRANSPORT CONDITIONS '-'.*- ',' : :' **

Under normal' transport conditions the' radiological impact arises from routine exposure to freight handlers, aircraft' passengers:and crew, truck, drivers,.on-route. bystanders, etc., re sultiig' from the 'radiation- emitted by .the- contained material or radioactive contamination of the'package surface." Package shielding reduces but never completely eliminates this impact.

The' radiological impacts are evaluated- in'terns of annual expected additional latent cancer fatalities, assuming a proportionality between population dose and numbers of additional latent cancer fatalities (see Chapter 3);' The dose resulting-from a given shipment is,proportional to the total "transport'index," or "TI" (see Chapter 2, Section 2.4), of all packages, included in the shipment. Estimates of the total population dose are made by modeling the path of each package from the time it is presented for transport until it arrives at its ultimate destination. The population dose is computed for each standard shipient in Table 1-1 by using the average TI, the average distance traveled, and the total packages per year. The methods of computing the dose depend on the transport 'mode:. The total expected annual dose. due to normal *transport is given by the sum of the doses resulting fr6m each standard shipment. ,. . ,.

1.6.2 ACCIDENTS INVOLVING TRANSPORTVEHICLE'. ., 3/4 - ", ,

In the accident case, one considers the additional impact that could result from an accident Involving a vehicle transporting one or more packages of radioactive material. Three possible 1-10

TABLE 1-1 STANDARD SHIPMENTS LIST - 1975 AND 1985 PROJECTIONS Transport Packages per Packages per Year (1985)

Mode** Year (1975)

Isotope Package Type 1.72 x 104 4.47 x 104 Limited++ AF Various+ 7.67 x 105 P A/C 2.95 x 105 T 3.91 x 105 1.02 x 10 6 521 1.22 x 10(

.A AF Am-241 0 P A/C 4170 2.04 x 164 5.3 x 104 T

7 161 AF 55 0 P A/C 116 302 T

25 25

-I AF Au-198 A 1820' P,A/C 1820 2410 2410 T

267 694 AF Co-57 A 2.56 x,1 P A/C 9860 T 6180 1.61,x, 4 T 1.77,x 104 4.6 x io4 Co- 60 A 1460 3800 B T For details of package terminology, see Chapter 2.

SAF - all-cargo aircraft; P A/C - passenger aircraft; T - truck; R - rail; S - ship; "ICY - Integrated Container Vehicle.

Modeled as 1-131.

+Terminology recently applied by DOT to packages formerly referred to as "exempt."

,I TABLE 1-1 (continued)

Transport Packages per Packages per Isotope - Package-Type Mode ... Year (197.U -Year (1985)

Co-60 " LQ1* *, , ,.'-101 262 LQ2A 4 10 LSA AF 45 1440 P A/C 509, 0 T 5540 1.44 x 10 C-14 A AF 1080 2810 P.A/C 1.94 x 104 4.97 x 104 4

T 6660 1.73 x 10 Cs-137 A AF 41 2920 P A/C 1080 0

-I N

I. T 3.1 x 104 8.06 x 104 B AF 5 13 T 69 179 Ga-67 AF 175 455 P A/C 7030 5.18 x 104 1.29 x 104, ,0 T

H-3 ,7 A AF 1300 3380 P A/C 2.6 x 104 6.76 x 1"0 4, T 1.1 x 104 2.86 x 104

TABLE 1-1 (continued)

Transport Packages per Packages Per Package Type Mode Year (1975) Year (1985)

Isotope H-3 B AF 18 47 P A/c 364 946 T 151 393 LSA AF 2 5 P A/c 45 117 T 18 47 A AF 346 7500 Ir-192 P A/c 2540 6 T 1920 4990 B AP 1590 3.45 x 104 I,,

-a P A/C 1.17 x 104 6 4

T 1.37 x 10 3.56 x 104 A AF 4720, 4720, 1-131 P A/C 2.93 x 105 2.93 x i05 5

1.08 x'10 1.08'x 105 B AF 13 13 P A/c 310 310 T 292 292 AF 136 354 Kr-85 A P A/C 1530 3980

TABLE 1-1 (continued)

Transport Packages per Packages per Package Type Mode Year (1975) Year (1985)

Isotope Po-210 LQ AP 1 32 P A/C 11 0 T 7 18

,1 3 R

P-32 A AF 268 697 4

P A/C .7940 2.06 x i0 T 3820 9930 Ra-224 A T 2.6 x 1041 2.6 x 104 B A? 39 440

-I P A/c 401 0 T 2620 2620 Tc-99M A AP 1280 3330 P A/c 3.01 x 104 7.83 x 104 T 2.09 x 105 5.43 x 105 TI-20i A P A/C 0 7500 T 0 4.25 x 10 Waste A T, 1.31 x 105 3.41 x 105 B T 821 2130 LSA T 2.03 x 104 5.28 x 104 Xe-133 A AP 875 2280 P A/c 1.22 x 104 3.17 x 104 4

T 1.29 x 10 3.35 x 104

"TABLE I-I (continued)

Transport Packages per Packages .per Mode Year (1975) Year (1985)

Isotope , Package Type T 3500 9100 Kr-85 A 772 297 30 78 B AF 336 874 P A/C 634 1650 T

2.15 x 104 8.9 x 10 MF+MC A T 5000 2.07 x 104 B T 50 T '12 3.33 x 104 1.38 x 105

-a LSA AF 3260 8326 Mo-99 A 7.97 x 10 4 2.07 x' 10 5 P A/C T 5.49 x'104 1.43 x1 105 109 283 B AF 2720 7070 P A/C 1880 4890 S

16 336 Po-210 A AF 113 0 P A/C T 81 211 R 110 260

Mixed corrosion products and mixed fission products.

TABLE 1-1 (continued)

Transport Packages per Packages per Mode Year (1975) Year (1985)

Isotope Package Type A AF 115 299, Mixed*

P A/C 2260 5880 T 2.7 x 104 7.02 x 104 B P A/C 8 21 101 263 AF 26 68 LSA P A/C 513 1330 T 5830 1.52 x 104 AF 34 88 T" Pu-238 A P A/C 1980 5150 T 3250 8450 AF 2 288 B

P A/C 109 0 T 179 465 AF 17 182 Pu-239 B P A/C 165 0 T 4030 4030 AF 1 1 LB AF 8 33 U-Pu Mixture P A/C 58 240

Treated as 1-131 for purposes of radtobiologlcal modeling.

TABLE 1-1 (continued)

Transport Packages per Packages per Year (1985)

Package T' Year (1975)

Isotope Mode 330 1370 B T 1530 U-Pu Mixture 254

" .. Spent fuel Cask 652 17 R 2.24 x'105 5.4 x 10 4 U3 08 ,jl, LSA T 2.73 x 105 6.6 x 10 R 2050 8440 UF 6 (natural) A T 1.04 x 104 2500 R 2000 485 7r6 (enriched) B T 439 106 S

9690 4.01 x 104

-J UO2 (enriched) B T 2130 8820 1'

S, 5300 1280 T

U02 fuel B 282 1170 s

t 41 Recycle 0 B ICV

,,Plutonium:,

a I' *

I

TABLE 1-2 SUM4ARY OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL SHIPPING AND ITS MAJOR RADIOLOGICAL IMPACTS 1975 Shipment Packages Curies TI per Kilometers LCF (normal) LCF (acc) per Year per Year Year per Year per Year Percent per Year Percent Type 2.11 x 103 7.74 x 103 1.19 x 109 0.6 5.78 x 10-5 1 Limited 7.03 x 105 0.0077 5.78 x 106 6.43 x 105 1.12 x 109 0.616 52 6.11 x 10-4 13 Medical 9.10 x 105 2.15'x 105 9.39 x 106 3.43 x 105 3.01 x 108 0.281 24 1.60 x 10-3 34 Industrial 2.04 x 105 5.32 x 108 5.69 x 105 2.09 x 107 0.104 9 1.85 x l0-3 39 Fuel cycle 2.68 x 105 2.98 x 106 3.22 x 106 0.182 15 6.17 x 10-4 13

- Waste 1.52 x 105 2.19 x 106 5.48 x 108 4.54 x 106 2.64 x 109 1.19 100 %4.73x 10-3 100 TOTAL 1985 Limited 1.83 x 106 5.50 x 103 2.02 x 10 4 3.11 x 109 0.020 0.7 1.51 x 10-4 1 1.71 x 106 1.50 x 107 1.20 x 106 1.92 x 109 1.17 38 1.51 x 10.3 9 Medical 5.63 x 105 2.47 x 107 8.79 x 105 8.84 x 108 0.676 22 4.49 x 10-3 27 Industrial 6 7.16 x 107 15 7.88 x 10.3 48 Fuel cycle 8.36 x'10 8.41 x 109 2.46 x 106 0.469 Waste 6.27 x 105 1.11 x 106 1.23 x 10 7 1.33 x 107 0.752 24 2.54 x 10.3 15 5.57 x 106 8.45 x 109 1.68 x 107 5.97 x 109 3.08 100 1.66 x 10-2 100 TOTAL

hazardous'conditions may arise in such an accident:

1. - A loss of shielding efficiency of the package,

2. A loss of containment and subsequent dispersal of the radioactive material, and

3. Accidental assembly of a critical mass (in fissile material shipments).

to The first condition could result in persons near the accident being directly exposed radiation. The second could ultimately result in direct exposure and intake of the radioactive could material into humans by inhalation or ingestion of the dispersed material. The third case the time it occurs.

result in neutron irradiation of persons in the vicinity of the accident at Accident risk is defined as the product of the probability of an accident and its conse quences. The risk calculations incorporate accident rates and package release fraction estimates, aero both of which are functions of accident severity. Dispersible materials are assumed to be to a solized in severe accidents, and the aerosol cloud is assumed to drift downwind according Gaussian diffusion model. Inhalation of the aerosolized debris by persons downwind from the to accident produces doses to various internal organs. Nondispersible materials are assumed of undergo a partial loss of shielding and create a direct exposure hazard. The contributions each standard shipment to the accident risk are summed to obtain the total risk. Radiological early fa accident risks are expressed in terms of annual expected latent cancer fatalities and tality probabilities.

-.Isn The consequences of postulated accidents involving certain large quantity shipments are greater than evaluated. The results are presented in terms of the number of persons receiving than a given specific doses of interest and in terms of the area that is contaminated to greater level.

1.6.3 THEFT OR SABOTAGE Certain quantities of SNM, such as plutonium or highly enriched uranium, are possible targets in for theft, since they might be used to make a nuclear explosive device. Other radionuclides certain large quantities may also become targets for theft or sabotage. The need for security of together with an assessment of the radioactive material shipments is discussed in Chapter 7, present physical security requirements applied to various modes of transport.

1.7 THE CONTENTS OF OTHER CHAPTERS OF THIS DOCUMENT Chapter 2 discusses the federal regulations that apply to the transport of radioactive mate the transpor rials and the safeguarding of SNM. It is the environmental impact resulting from subject of this report.

tation of radioactive materials under these regulations that is the It Includes a Chapter 3 is a general discussion of the biological effects of radiation exposure.

The case of normal transport of summary of the health effects model used in this assessment.

4. In Chapter 5 the radioisotopes and the associated environmental impact is discussed in Chapter to present impact due to accidents is discussed. Chapter 6 includes a discussion of alternatives impact.

shipping practice, including transport mode shifts, and their effect on the environmental 1-19

L-I The diversion of SNM and an evaluation of the steps taken to avoid such diversion are discussed in Chapter 7. Chapter 8 contains responses to comments received concerning the draft versions of this document. Specific subjects such as the standard shipments model, plutonium, etc., are addressed in the appendices.-

. -11

- \r -

Z f

t

4. 4 4 .- 4 '4' ->

1 .1 1-20

REFERENCES Material Shipments in 1-1. Battelle-Pacific Northwest Laboratories, Survey of Radioactive the United States, BNWL-1972, April 1976.

1-2. Federal Register, Vol. 40, No. 206, June 2, 1975, p. 23768.

in the U.S.A. Involving Nuclear 1-3. A. W. Grella, "A Review of 5 Years Accident Experience Seminar on the Design, Copstruction, Transportation (1971-1975)," paper presented at the Materials, IAEA, Vienna, and Testing of Packaging for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Austria, August 23-27, 1976.

H. N. Wagner, Nuclear Medicine, New York, N.Y.: H. P. Publishers, 1974.

1-4.

of Radiopharmaceutlcals,"

1-5. J. Calvin Brantley, "Industry's Role in Transportation San Diego, Calif., June 12, 1974.

Society of Nuclear Medicine, Annual Meeting, in Nuclear Medicine,"

1-6. "The American College of Radiology Survey on Regionalization March 1975.

Remarks presented at Conference 1-7. J. Calvin Brantley and Atomic Industrial Forum, Inc.,

October 2-3, 1974.

on Transportation of Hazardous Materials in Air Commerce, News, February 1973.

1-8. S. Golan and R. Salmon, "Nuclear Fuel Logistics," Nuclear Plants and Related 1-9. Appendix F, "Policy Relating to the Siting of Fuel Reprocessing of Production and Utilization Waste Management Facilities," to 10 CFR 50, "Licensing Facilities."

Environmental Statement on the 1-10. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Final Generic Water Reactors, NUREG-0002, Use of Recycle Plutonium in Mixed Oxide Fuel in Light August 1976.

Fast Breeder Reactor Program,.

1-U. U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Liquid Metal WASH-1535, December 1974.

1-21

CHAPTER 2 REGULATIONS GOVERNING THE TRANSPORTATION OF RADiOACTIVE MATERIALS

2.1 INTRODUCTION

The objective of this chapter is to summarize the federal regulations pertaining to the transportation of radioactive *materials. For complete details of transportati6n regulations, the interested reader is referred to' the-appropriate sections in the Code'of Federal Regu-.

lations (some of which are provided in Appendix B to this 'document).

Thre e: basicI safety requirements that must be met when_transporting radioactive'materials are:

I: Adequate containment of the radioactive material;

2. Adequate control of the radiation emitted by the material; and

3. Prevention of nuclear criticality, i.e., prevention of the accumulation of enough reaction.

fissile material 'inone location under conditions that'could result in a nuclear chain "In'addition, "certain strategic quantities' a'n d types of spec'ilal nuclear material (SNM) age during transit.'"

require physical protection against theft and sabot the The purpose of 'the'regulations is to 'ensure that these requirements are Imet.-' 'In require subsequent sections of this chapter, the regulatioýns relating to ea'ch of these safety ments are discussed.

"NRC regulations provide the standards that must'be met rather than attempting'to specify how they are to be met. An'example of the application of this-baslc concept is the -fact'that as the the regulations do not prohibit the shipment of any specific radioisotope,* as long basic safety standards are met.'

Section 2.2 of this chapter is Ia discussion of th6e various'regulatory a'gencies and their ensure respective regulations. Section 2.3 discussis theriegulatlons and'standards designed to

'of the

. containment of radioactive mateial during' transport, inicluding the classification

'Type'B p~ckaging standards; and radioactive materials for shipment, Type A packaging'standards, packaging for large quantities, limited items, limited quantities, and low specific activity transport (LSA) materials. Section'2.4 discusses the standards for radlation' control during and introduces the concept of the transpqrt Index. '.

are dis

'The special regulations applicable to fissile materials for :critlcality control who receives a cussed in Section' 2.5. 'Section 2.6 outlines the responsibilities of a -licensee up, receiving, and opening shipment'of radioactive material and discusses procedures for picking Public Plutonium air shipments are presently prohibited by NRC order in compliance with Law 94-79 (Scheuer Amendment). ' '

2-1

- I packages. The labeling requirements for packages are covered in Section 2.7. In Section 2.8 the responsibilities of the carrier, including vehicle placarding and stowage, are discussed.

Section 2.9 covers the requirements for the reporting of incidents and decontamination proce dures. Finally, in, Section-2.10 the requirements- for the safeguarding of special nuclear material in transit are discussed.

2.2 REGULATORY AGENCIES The transportation of radioactive byproduct, source, and special nuclear materials within the United States- is regulated by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). The Department of Transportation (DOT) reglilates all radioactive mater.ials in interstate commerce.- International shipments, in most cases, are consistent with the standards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), with the DOT serving as the USA "competent authority." Certain "limited" (for merly called "exempt") quantities may be shipped by mail, and such shipments are regulated by the U.S. Postal Service. Shipments that are neither in interstate or foreign commerce nor in air transportation, as defined in the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, are controlled by NRC and by various state agencips.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission was established by. the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, which went into effect on January 19, 1975. This act also created the Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA) and abolished the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC).- The licensing and related regulatory authority held by the AEC under the Atomic Energy Act 'of 1954, as amended, was transferred to the NRC. The authority of the AEC operating divisions to approve the use of radioactive material packages by their,prime contractors was_assumed by ERDA in this reorganization. Later, Section 301(a), of Public Law 95-91, enacted August 4, 1977, transferred all functions of ERDA to the Secretary of Energy. The special package approval authority is being phased out as NRC is able to review the large number of packages in use by prime contrac tors, and it is expected to expire in 1978. Approvals were issued only In accordance with the same package standards used by the AEC regulatory staff, and now by NRC.

Chapter I of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations contains, the rules and regu lations of the NRC, including rules and definitions relating to the issuance of general and specific licenses for receiving, acquiring, owing, possessing, using, and transferring bypro duct material, source material, and special, nuclear material. A transfer of a nonlimrited quantity of these materials can.take place only between persons who are licensed either by the NRC or by certain "agreement states,* a term to be explained later in this section.

- The parts of, Title 10, Chapter I that most-directly pertain to radioactive material trans portation are Parts 26, 70, 71, and 73, which deal with "Standards for Protection Against' Radiation," "Special Nuclear Matertalr" *Packaging of Radioactive Material for Transport and Transportation of Radioactive Material, under, Certain Conditions," and "Physical Protection of Plants and Materials",.respectively..

. In referring to these, and other regulations in the Code of Federal Regulations, an abbreviated form will be used: 10 CFR 71. 35(a)," meaning "Paragraph (a) of Section 71.35 of Part 71 of Title 10 in the Code of Federal Regulations."

The AEC, through formal agreements with certain "agreement states," transferred to those states the regulatory authority over byproduct material. source material, and subcritical 2-2

quantities of special 'nuclear material. These agreement states are Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Missis California, Colorado, Florida, Ge6rgla, 'Idaho, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, York, North Carolina, North Dakota, sippi, Nebraska, Nevada, New'Hampshire, New Mexico;,.New a uniform Oregon, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Washington. -These states have adopted to the DOT set of rules requiring an intrastate "shipper of radioactive materials to conform requirements for packaging, labeling, and marking.

DOT, under the De-drtment of Transportation Act of 1966, the Transportation of Explosives Safety Act, the Dangerous Cargo Act,'the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, and the Transportation safety in transportation. The organizational Act of 1974, has regulatory responsibility for and other hazard unit of DOT concerned specifically with safety in the transport of radioactive Transporta ous materials is the Office of Hazardous Materials Operations within the Materials tion Bureau.

'and by common, The DOT regulations governing carriage of radioactive mate'rials' by rail 49 CFR 171-179, contract, or private carriers by public highway (e.g.', truck) -are found in regarding which make up Subchapter'C, "Hazardous Materials Regulations." The DOT regulations General Requirements packaging of radioactive-materials are found'in 49 CFR 173, "Shippers --

they are con for Shipments and Packagings," and' 178, "Shipping Container S~ecifications"';

DOT regulations governing the carriage of sistent with the NRC guidelines in 10 CFR 71. The DOT regulations in radioactive materials by air are in 49 CFR 175,-"Carriage by Aircraft."- The 49 CFR 176, "Carriage *by Vessel," .apply to the carriage of radioactive and other hazardous materials by barge or shlp.-' :.'s' . :.

Certain "limited"-quantities-of radioactive-material, may be~shipped through the mail.,-The_

to such shipments.

regulations of the U.S. Postal Service, found in 39 CFR 123-125, pertain material can qualify as "limited",are The criteria used to determine how much radioactive discussed later in this chapter.. . , ,.,- .: .- , ,. '1 safe transport of

-In order-to -carry out'their respective tregulatory funrtions ,for the the Interstate Coanerce radioactive materials with as little duplicationofeffortas possible,

"'memorandum of understanding" An 1966. It Commisslon"(ICC)'and-the AEC (now the NRC) signed a DOT and AEC -signed- on has been superseded by a revised memorandum of understanding ,between March 22, 1973.

According to, thememorandum, -the DOT regulations,(49 CFR 171-179)* concerning packaging,.

vehicle placarding, marking, and labeling apply to shippers, and the-regulations concerning carriers. All packagings for loading, storage, monitoring, and accident reporting apply to of radioactive material ,requlre shipment of fissile material or forType B orjlarge quantities

.or suspected -leakage from

.approval -by'the NRC. .,In case of a transportation accident, incident, DOT investigates the occur-..

a package of radioactive material discovered while in.transit. the or incident occurs, or rence and prepares an investigation report. If, however, an accident Materials, 'formerly As of April 15, 1976, the DOT Regulations for Transport'of Hazardous (water shipments) located in-49 CFR 170-189, 14 CFR 103 (air shipments), and 46-CFR,146

,were consolidated into 49 CFR. - - -, -. - ,

2-3

-1 suspected leakage is'discovered other than during~transit, the occurrence is~investigated by the NRC. The DOT is recognized as, the "national competent authority" with respect to the administrative requirements" of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for the safe transport of radioactive materials. The two agencies (NRC and DOT) have agreed to cooperate via exchange of information in the development and enforcement of the regulations.

2.3 REGULATIONS DESIGNED TO ENSURE ADEQUATE CONTAINMENT The regulations to be discussed in this section provide standards.for packaging and define limits for the package contents. The terms "package" and "packaging" are defined in 10 CFR 71.4, "Definitions," as follows:

(k) "Package" means packaging and its radioactfve contents; S(1) one or. more receptacles and "Packaging" means wrappers and their contents, excluding fissile material' and other radioactive material, but including absorbent, material;- spacing structures, thermal insulation, radiation shielding, devices for cooling and for absorb ing mechanical shock, external fittings, neutron modera tors, nonfissible neutron absorbers, and other supple mentary equipment.

In defining the packaging' standards and the package content limits,-the consequences of,,

loss of containment must be' considered."- In'the event that some of the radioactive contents escape from the package, a potential hazard to transport workers and to. the general public, exists resulting from the external radiation emitted from the exposed radionuclide and from the often more serious problem'of intake into the body, particularly through inhalation.

Since the radiotoxicity of radlonuclides varies over eight orders of magnitude (Ref. 2-1),

a realistic set of standards should take into account which isotope is being transported. For, this reason each radioisotope is classified, for transport purposes, into one of seven transport groups, labeled by Roman'numerals I through VII according to their relative toxicity and poten tial hazard: iA list of the-radionuclides'andtheir'respective transport groups may be found in Appendix C, "Tran~spor Grouping of Radionuclides,": to -10 CFR 71 (shownin Appendix B to this,-.

environmental statement) and ir49 CFR,173-390,' "Transport Groups of Radionuclides."

Another approach is used in the 1973 revised regulations of the International Atomic Energy Agency, in which eachý'radionucilde "Is 'assigned a value accordlng to its individual radlotoxicity.

In this approach the transport groups become unnecessary.t- , . ,. .. '

"Rad~tisotop'e 'antities* in each' transport group are classified-in order of increasing,,

quantity, as "limited,"o"Type A," 'Type B," and "large"' quantity.- The reason for this classifi cation'will become apparent -inthe next'section." The'limits for these quantity groupings are shown in Table'2-1. ' ~ '* ~. J Certain physical forms of a radioactive material of any of the seven transport groups are classified as "special form"- and are subjectto the'quantity limts'shown in the line inTable 2-1 entitled "Special Form." A special-form material is essentially nondispersibleýin water, 2-4

. I TABLE 2-1 SPECIAL FORM QUANTITY LIMITS FOR THE SEVEN TRANSPORT GROUPS AND Type B Large

'Limited' Type A Quantity*

Quantity* Quantity*" , Quantity**

Transport (Curies)

Group Cur es (Curies))

100lo 10-5 to 10-J 10-3 to 20 >20 II- 'I (,

0- to-5 x 10- 2 5 x 10-2 to 20 >20 3 10-3 to 3 3 to 200 >200

"" -'Sb0 v IV 10,-3 10-3 to 20 20 to 200 >200 tn

-'V ' lO-" .-"0-3 t6 20 - 20 to 5 x 103 >5 x 10

-: V ~ i .~ 10-3 to10 2 -'31't 03 to 5 x 10 4 >5x10 4

.VII S25 n 255 to 103 03 to 5 x 10 4 k 10 3.

special Form -30 16-3 to 20 20 to 5 x 10 3

>5 x 10

49 CPR 173.391.

%10 CFR 71,4,and 49 CFR 173.389.'

only, the upper limits for Limited, Note: ',The regulations actually prescribe The symbol S means "less than or equal

Type Aj and Type B quantities.

to," and',> means "greater than."

55 55

in a fire, or under severe impact conditions. The complete definition is found in 10 CFR 71.4(o) (Appendix B to this document) and in 49 CFR 173.389, "Radioactive Materials: Defini tions." The usefulness of the special-form concept is that more radioactive material may be shipped in a Type A package (one that does not resist severe accidents) because of the greatly reduced dispersibility of special-form material.

Any radioactive material that does not qualify as a special-form material is considered "normal form" and is categorized according to Its transport group. While a special-form material could, in the event of a severe accident, present an external radiation exposure hazard, it is apparent from its definition that the chance of any significant amount of the contents being released into the air, groundwater, etc., and being, ingested by a human is extremely remote.

Examples of special-form materials are sealed radiography and teletherapy sources and, in some cases, unirradiated reactor fuel rods.

2.3.1 TYPE A PACKAGE To be qualified for transport, any packaging used to contain radioactive material must meet the general requirements of 49-CFR 173.393, "General Packaging and Shipment Requirements" (Appendix 8 to this document). These requirements state, among other things, that the packaging must be adequate to prevent loss of dispersal of the radioactive contents and maintain the radiation shielding properties for the normal conditions encountered during transport. Tests to simulate normal transport conditions are outlined in 49 CFR 173.398(b), "Standards for Type A Packaging," and in Appendix A, "Normal Conditions of Transport," to 10 CFR 71 (see Appendix B to this document).

The seven transport'groupings and the Type A quantity limits have their origin in the IAEA regulations. The Type A limits were determined in the following way (Ref. 2-2): It was recog nized that the chance of a rail accident of such severity as to cause loss of the package contents was very small.' Exlperimental work had indicated that a release of 0.1 percent of the package contents would bea reasonable assumption for the vast majority of possible accidents.

Furthermore, on the basis of general handling experience, it was assumed that the actual intake of radioactive material into'the body by, a person coming 'into contact with air or surfaces contaminated by such a release was unlikely toexceed 0.1 percent of the amount released from the package. Thus, itwould-be unlikely that any one person would ingest more than one millionth of the actual package contents in the event of an accidental release. Therefore, the Type A package limits were established on the basis that neither:

1. An intake of 106 of the maximam aowediJ *package contents would result in a radiation dose to any organ in the body exceeding internationally accepted limits, assuming a 50-year life expectancy after the intake; nor

2. The external radiation from the unshielded contents'would exceed 1 rem/hour at 10 feet (3 meters).

In 49 CFR 178 there are descriptions of various DOT-approved containers for Type A pack aging, including carboys, fiberboard boxes, steel drums, etc., that may be used without specific 2-6

,egulatory approval. However, in a recent ruiemaKing (Ref. 2-3) DOT eliminated the various in 49 CFR 173.394, "hardwam-oriented" specifications for the Type A package containers listed Normal "Radioactive Material in Special Form," and 49 CFR 173.395, "Radioactive Material in for shipment must be certified according to Form," and ruled that each Type A package presented requirements for the Type A "Specificatioo 7A" design with a supporting safety analysis. The "Specification 7A; Genera.l Packaging, Type A."

this design are specified in 49 CFR 178.350, containers is The use of existing Specification B5 (as described in the former 49 CFR 178.250) 55 also authorized for Type A shipments, but the construction of additional Specification Foreign-made packagings, properly labeled containers after March 31, 1975, has been prohibited.

173.394(a)(4) as "Type A," are also acceptable by DOT for use in domestic transport (see 49 CFR and 173.395(a)(4)).

2.3.2 TYPE B AND LARGE QUANTITY PACKAGING only Quantities of radioactive material greater than the Type A limits can be transported stringent standards and hence is in Type B packaging. A Type B packaging is designed to more the stand considerably more .accideit resistant than a Type A packaging. In addition to meeting also be able to~survive certain hypothetical ards for a Type A package, a Type B package must capa accident conditions with essentially no loss of containment and limited loss of shielding of 10 CFR 71, bility. The NRC packaging standards are given in Subpart C, "Package'Standards,"

Accident and the tests to simulate accident conditions are found in Appendix B, "Hypothetical of the NRC before it Conditions," to 10 CFR 71. A Type B packaging design requires the approval can be used for hhipping radioactive material. . '

ship The Typ'e B quantity-limitsire somewhat artificial in -that-the tegulatlons permit Type B con ments of quantities greater than these limits as "large quantity" shipments in tainers. Like the Type A limits,-Type B limits have their origin In the earlier IAEA regula were'discontinued.

tions. In the 19i3 revision of the IAEA regulations, tihe upper Type B limits

'49 CFR 173.394 The types of packaging acceptable to DOT for Type B quantitiei, listed in HM-111 rule changes and 49 CFR 173.395, are "summarized in Table 2-2, whlch-includes the recent (Ref. 2-3). , r.,-.

irradiator and Certain types of sources, particularly Irradiated reactor fuel elements, radioactive materials teletherapy sources, and most plutonium shipments contain quantities of the requirements for in excess of the Type B limits. Packaging for large sources is subject to dissipation (49 Type B packaging plus additional requirements related primarily to decay heat of normal-form material CFR 173.393(e)). The DOT packaging requirements for large quantities are stated in the following exerpt from 49 CFR 173.395(c):

Large quantities of radioactive materials in normal form must be packaged as follows: (1) Specification 6M

(§178.104 of this chapter) metal packaging. Authorized only for solid or gaseous radioactive materials which 0

will not decompose at temperatures up to 250 F. Radio active thermal decay energy must not exceed 10 watts.

(2) Any other Type B packaging for large quantities of radioactive materials which meets the pertinent require ments in the regulations of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission (10 CFR 71) and is approved by the U.S.

2-1

-1 TABLE 2-2 TYPE B PACKAGINGS PERMITTED BY DOT FOR TRANSPORT BY 49 CFR 173.394 AND 49 CFR 173.395 Special Form Normal Form or'

1. Spec 55 (300 Ci Max.) 1. Spec 6M (for solid (49 CFR 178.250) gas only which does-not decompose up to 2500 F).

2. Spec 6M (49 CFP 178.104)

2. NPC (AEC) approved per

3. NRC (AEC) approved per - 1 10 CFR 71.

10 CPR 71.

3. Type B packaging meeting

4. Type B packaging meeting 1967 IAEA regulations.

1967 IAEA regulations for for which foreign which foreign competent competent authority authority certificate has certificate- has been been revalidated by DOT. revalidated by DOT.

5. Spec 20WC (49 CFR,178.194) 4. Spec 20WC jacket with outer jacket with snug snug-fitting inner fitting Spec 7A (49 CFR Spec 2R-or existing 178.350) or existing Spec Spec 55 inner package.

55 inner container. For liquid, 173.393(g) mustalso be met for

6. Spec 21WC overpack with the inner package.

single inner Spec 2R (49 CFR 178.34) or existing Spec 55 inner package securely positioned and centered.

It JI 2-8

Atomic Energy Commission. (3) Any other Type B pack aging which meets the pertinent requirements for large quantities of radioactive materials in the 1967 regu lations of the International Atomic Energy Agency, and for which the foreign competent authority certificate has been revalidated by the Department.

The packaging requirements for large quantities of special-form material are located in 49 CFR 173.394(c) and are substantially the same as for normal form except that, for special form, provision is also made for the use of existing Specification 55 containers with a 20WC overpack; that is:

-Specification 20WC (§178.194 of this subchapter) wooden

,outer protective jacket, with a single, snug-fitting

-specification 55 inner packaging., Only use of existing

-specification 55 container authorized; construction not authorized after March 31,'1975. Radioactive thermal decay energy must not exceed 100 watts.

2.3.3 RADIOACTIVE DEVICES AND LIMITED QUANTITIES Certain small quantities of radioactive materials are exempt from specification packaging, marking, and labeling' requirements and from the general packaging requirements of 49 CFR 173.393, as are certain manufactured articles, such as clocks and electronic tubes, that contain radioactive materials in a nondispersible form. These exemptions are covered in 49 CFR 173.391, "Limited Quantities of Radioactive Materials and Radioactive Devices" (Appendix B to this document)..

The "limited" quantity limits and the maximum allowable radioactivity content for exempt manufactured articles -or the-seven transport groupi and for special form are given in Table 2-3. The limited quantity limits are also given in Table 2-1. These limits were chosen in such a way that the release of up to 100 percent of the contents in an accident would still represent a very low potential radiological hazard (Ref. 2-2).

2.3.4 LOW SPECIFIC -ACTIVITY MATERIALS To meet the need for bulk transportationi 'of radioactive, ores, slag, or residues from processing, the DOT regulations in 49 CFR 173.392, "Low Specific Activity Radioactive Material,"

provide exemptions from°4the requirements of 49 CFR 173.393(a) through (e) and (g) in the case of "low specific activity"- (LSA) materials. However, LSA materials must be packed in accord ance with the requirements of 49-CFR 173.395 and must be marked and labeled as required in 49 CFR 172.300, "General Marking Requirements," and 172.400, "General Labeling Requirements." LSA materials are defined in 10 CFR 71.4(g) (Appendix-B to this'document) and include uranium and thorium ores, ore-concentrates, -materials not exceeding the specific activity limits in Table 2-3, certain contaminated-noniadioactive materials, certain solutions of tritium oxide, unir radiated natural or depleted uranium, and unirradiated natural thorium.

In defining the activity limits for LSA materials, the IAEA introduced the concept that, from a radiotoxicity point of view, LSA materials should be "inherently safe"; i.e., it is inconceivable that, under any circumstances arising in transport, a person could ingest enough 2-9

TABLE 2-3 LIMITS FOR LIMITED QUANTITIES, LSA MATERIALS, AND MANUFACTURED ARTICLES "Small or Maximum Radioactivity Transport Limited Quantity LSA Materials, Content for Manufactured Group Limit (mCi) 'Limits (mCi/gm) Articles (Curies)*

Per Device Per Package I . .01 . .0001 .0001 .001 IIV1 .005 .001 .05 0.3 .01 3 "IV 1 0.3 .05 3 C

aD - VIVi 1

1 11 1 VII 25000 25 200 Special Form .05 211 C,

49 CPR 173.391 - exempt from specification packaging, marking, and labeling requirements and from the general, packaging requirements of 49 CFR 173.393.

10 CFR 71.4(g) and 49 CFR 173.392 -'for material in which activity is uniformly distributed; exempt from 49 CFR 173.393(a) though (e) and (g),

but must'be packed in accordance with the requirements of 49 CFR 173.395 and must be marked and labeled as required in 49 CFR 173.401 and 173.402.

LSA limits are not defined for transport groups V. VI, VII, and special form.

I J

material to give rise to a significant radiation hazard (Ref. 2-2). Thus, for LSA materials, it is-the limited activity within each segment of the material itself rather than the packaging that permits shipments to meet the basic safety requirements. Nevertheless, both NRC and DOT place packaging requirements on shipments of LSA materials that are not transported on exclusive-use vehicles. NRC also has packaging requirements for Type B quantities of radio active material transported on exclusive-use vehicles.

2.4 RADIATION CONTROL--- THE TRANSPORT INDEX is The second safety requirement that must be met when transporting radioactive material the provisioh for adequate control of the radiation emitted from the material. This radiation the is only partially absorbed by the containment and.shielding systems. Some passes through the package.

packaging and exposes freight handlers and others who come into close proximity with the shipper mus-tprovide the necessary shielding In order to meet the radiation control-limits, The regula to reduce the radiation level outside the package to within the allowable limits.

and film.

tions prescribe limits that are chosen to protect, not only persons but also animals for packages reqiring In fact, the radiation control surface dose rate limit of 0.5 mrem/hour over no control was chosen to prevent fogging of sensitive x-ray film that might be transported containing the radioactive material (Ref.

a 24-hour period in close proximity to the package 2-2).

For-purposes of radiation control, packages of radioactive material are placed in one of label) three categories. Packages designated as "Category I,- White" (which display a white may be transported with no special handling or.,segregatlon.from other packages and must be, such within the 0.5 mrrem/hour surface dose- rate limit.,.If a transport worker were to handle packages close.to.his body.for 30 minutes per.week,.he would receive an average dose rate of 10 mrem/year, which isa factor of 10 less than the average.dose rate (100 mrem/year),received'by an individual from natural- background radiation -(Ref. .2-2). The *regulations ,(in 49 CFR, 173.393(c)) also prescribe a minimum package dimension of 10 cm (4 inches) so that a person cannot put the package in his. or, her pocket., The 0.5 mrem/hour surface dose rate .,limit also does not.

applies to "limited" packages, although the minimum package dimension requirement Except when carried on exclusive-use vehicles,,where packages are handled only~by~shipper.

and receiver-, packages designated as,,-"Category, IIYellow"' can have a surface dose rate no no greater than greater than 200 mrem/hour and a dose rate at 3 feet from any external surface was chosen 10 mrem/hour (the latter criterion is controlling for larger packages). -This limit period withar5aieters (15 feet) to prevent fogging of undeveloped x-ray film during a 24-hour conventional separation, 5 meters being'chosen as the U.S. Railway Express .Company's 1947 x-ray separation distance between parcels containing'radium and parcels'containingundeveloped in 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months at 5 meters film. A package giving out-lO mrem/hour at'l meteriproducesl1.5 mrem The 200 mrem/hour surface dose "rate limit wasi chosen on the basis that a transport worker day-would not receive a carrying such packages held against his or her body~for 30 minutes per 1947. Based dose exceeding 100 mrem per 8-hour working day, which was considered acceptable' in the 200 mrem/hour surface dose rate limit on current national radiological exposure guidelines, 2-I1

-1 is acceptable as long as the associated handling time is such that individual doses of handlers not treated as"'occupationaliy'exposed" are le'ss'than the currently accepted limit of 500 mrem/

year (Ref.2-4).

An intermediate package "category,' "Category II - Yellow," inicludes packages with a surface dose rate not exceeding 50 mrem/hour and a dose rate at 3 feet from any external surface not exceeding 1.0 mrem/hour. Such packages require special handling but do not present the poten tial hazard of a Category III package. If a highway or rail vehicle carries a Category III package, it must placarded. A summary of the dose rate limits for each package category is given in Table 2-4.

TABLE 2-4 PACKAGE DOSE RATE LIMITS:"

MAXIMUM ALLOWED DOSE RATE (MREM/HR)*

Category Package Surface 3 Feet from Surface (TI)"

I - White 0.5 II - Yellow 50 1.0 III - Yellow 200 10 A

49 CFR 173.393(1)

Since a number of packagei of'radioactive material are often loaded onto a single trans port vehicle that may'also carry passengers (e.g', a passenger aircraft), a simple system had to be devised to 'enabie-transport workers to'determlne'qulckly how' many packages could be loaded and how to segregate the packages from passengers and film.- For this"purpose,ý the radiation transport'Index- (TI)' was devised." This index was defined as the highest radiation dose rate in mremlhour at 3 feet from any accessible external surface'of the package, rounded" up to the next highest tenth (see 49 CFR 173.389(i)(l)). For example,'if the highest measured dose rate at 1 meter were 2.61'mrem/hour, the'TI foi that package would be' 2.7. From Table 2-4 it would appear that'no package'with a TIfgreate'r than 10 may be transported.

However, the regulations (see 49 CFR 173.393(j)) do provide for transport of packages with dose rates exceeding those in Table'2-4 in a transport vehicle (excefpt aircraft) that has been consigned as exclusive use, provided the following dose limits are not exceeded:

(I) l00'millirem per hour at 3 feet from the external surface of the package (closed transport vehicle only); .

(2) 200 millirem per hour atany point on.the external surface of the car or vehicle (closed transport vehicle only);

(3) lOmillirem per hour at-any point 2 meters (six feet) from the vertical planes projected by the outer lateral surface of the car or vehicle; or if the load is transported in an open transport vehicle, at any point 2 meters (six feet) from the vertical planes projected from the outer edges of the vehicle.

(4) 2 millirem per hour in any normally occupied position,ln the - .

carror vehicle, except, that this provision does not apply to private motor carriers. s no a to 2-12

When more than one package of radioactive material is loaded onto a transport vehicle, a a

total index for the shipment is obtained by.sunming the TIs for each individual package, TI for packages loaded onto a process requiring only the simple addition of numbers. The total single transport vehicle may not exceed 50 (see 49 CFR 174.700(b), 49 CFR 175.75(a)(3), and 49 CFR 177.842(a)). There-are two exceptions to this rule. One is for vehicles (other than by ship; aircraft) consigned for exclusive use (49 CFR 173.393(j)). The other is for transport the packages in single groups each having a in this case a total TI-of 200 is permitted with total TI not greater than 50, and each such group located at least 20 feet (6.1 meters) from any other- group (49 CFR 176.700). At least two cargo airlines are presently operating under special DOT permit to carry up to 200 TI, but all other aircraft are limited to 50 TI.

The regulations also provide tables of safe separation distances that must be maintained between stowed packages of radioactive material and persons or undeveloped film for various types of transport (see 49 CFR 174.700. "Special Handling Requirements for Radioactive Materi for als," for rail freight; 49 CFR 175.700, "Special Requirements for Radioactive Materials,"

for ships; and 49 CFR 177.842(b) for aircraft; 49 CFR 176.700, "General Stowage Requirements,"

truck and other common, contract, or private carriers by public highway). It will be noticed from Table 2-4 that these requirements apply only to Categories II- and III-Yellow packages.

Category I packages are not assigned a transport index.

All packages are expected to retain their shielding effectiveness during normal transport conditions. "The external dose rate,,or TI, measured by the shipper and written on,the package label must not increase during transport, e.g., as a result of faulty shielding. ,Afterbeing any subjected to the hypothetical accident conditions. listed in Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 71, increase the external dose reduction of shielding caused by damage to a Type B package must not (seeO10 rate-to more-than 1000 mrem per hour at 3 feet from the external surface of the package CFR 71.36(a)(1)). - .,

2.5 SPECIAL CONSIDERATION FOR FISSILE MATERIAL - - 'A '.

pre- .

The .third basic safety requirement for transporting radioactive materials is the CFR 71.4(e) as vention of nuclear criticality for fissile materials. -These are defined in 10 U-233, U-235, Pu-238, Pu-239, and Pu-241.

which

"-The criticality standards for fissile material packages are.found in 10 CFR-71.33, states, In effect. that a package used to;ship fissile material is to be so designed and con if water were to structed and'the contents so. limited that the package would be subcritical were to leak out. However, a leak into the package or if any liquid contents of the package though each package is sufficient number of certain types of packages of fissile material,.even subcritical, could conceivably be grouped in such a way, that the assambly becomes crittcal.

and depends on the The number of such packages that may be transported together is limited package design and contents.- - - .

nuclides that There are, however, some quantities, forms, or, concentrations of fissile are specified in 10 CFR cannot be made critical underany credibletransport conditions..,These 2-13

I-71.9, "Exemption for Fissile Material," and are exempted from the special requirements for.

fissile material shipments. They include, for example, packages containing natural thorium or natural uranium or less than 15-grams of fissile material.

The regulations prescribe three package classes called'Fissile Class I, II, and III for, shipments of fissile materials that do not qualify for exemption as' defined above. Fissile Class I packages'are considered safe from nuclear criticality by virtue of the package design and contents and may therefore be transported in unlimited numbers and in any arrangement so long as the total1radiation'TI limit is not exceeded' Each such packaging must be so designed that it is a net absorber of neutrons in both normal and accident environments. The specific standards for Fissile Class I packages are given in 10 CFR 71.38.

If a limited 'number of-packages would be subcritical in any arrangement and in'any foresee able transport circumstances, they are in Fissile Class II. For purposes of nuclear critical-ity safety control, a special fissile transport index is assigned to such packages as follows:

fissile TI = 50/N (2-1) where N is the number of similar packages that may be transported together as determined under, the limitations of 10 CFR 71.39(a). This transport index caninot be less than 0.1 nor more than' o

10. Thus, a shipment of N packages would not result in an aggregate fissile transport index greater than 50. The actual transport index assigned to any fissile material package is always the greater of the fissile 1I or the previously defined radiation TI (see 49 CFR 173.389(i)).

Aside from the limit on the number of packages per shipment,'Fissile Class II packages (like Fissile Class I) require no nuclear criticality safety control by the shipper.

Fissile Class III includes all packages of nonlimited fissile material that do not comply with the requirements of either Class I or Class II packages. Fissile Class III packages are those considered to be precluded from criticality under all foreseeable circumstances of trans port by reason of special precautions or special administrative'or-opeiatiohal controls imposed' on the transport of the consignment (Ref. 2-2). Special arrangements between the shipper and the carrier are required to provide 6uclear' criticality safety. The specific standards for such shipments are' given in 10 CFR 71.40. International shipments of Fissile Class III packages require multilateral competent authority approval (Ref. 2-2).

Because of plutonium's'toxicity, special additional requirements'are imposed on its ship ments. There is currently'a ban on shipments of plutonium by aircraft (Ref. 2-5). The require-,

ments of 10 CFR 71..42 apply to plutonium shipments after June 17, 1978, and stipulate that plutonium in excess of 20 curies per package must'be shipped.asa, solid and must be packaged in a separate inner container.' Exempted from this requirement is solid plutonium in the form of reactor fuel elements, ietal,*'and metal'alloy. .

DOT packaging requirements for the shipment of fissile materials are given in 49 CFR, o 173.396, "Fissile Radioactive Material." This section specifies certain existing approved packagings for fissile materials and-the authorized'contents for each. .Any other packaging design that is approved by NRC is accepted by DOT for fissile material shipments (see 49 CFR 2-14

usually given 173.396(b)(4) and 49 CFR 173.396(c)(3)). Since fissile material quantities are classifi in grams or kilograms, one cannot use Table 2-1 directly to determine which quantity limits in grams cation applies to a given amount of a particular fissile isotope. The quantity fissile materials are listed in for Type A and Type B packages of some of the more important specific activ Table 2-5. These were calculated from the data in Table 2-1 and the respective each isotope. It is apparent from ities, taking into account the transport group assigned to be classified as the table that a package containing, for example, only 2 grams of Pu-238 would 100 kg of a "large quantity," i.e., greater than the Type B limit, whereas a package containing of the amount of 3 percent enriched uranium would be classified as a Type A quantity, because radioactivity in each case.

2.6 PROCEDURES TO BE FOLLOWED BY THE RECEIVER radioisotopes and The standards discussed so far have been applicable to the shipper of occurs safely.

pertain primarily to packaging of the material in such a way that the transport and Opening Packages" The NRC standards of 10 CFR 20.205, "Procedures for Picking Up, Receiving, and opening (Appendix B to this document),"outline the-procedures for picking up, receiving, point the packages and apply to the licensee who is to receive the package. These standards out the responsibility of the receiver to:

notification

1. Make arrangements with the carrier to receive the package or to receive (in the latter case, the receiver is to of the arrival of the package at the carrier's terminal pick up the package expeditiously from the terminal).

caused by

2. Monitor the external surfaces of thel)-ackage for radioactive contamination on and at. 3 feet possible leakageof the radioactive contents and monitor'the radiation'levels performed no later than three from the external package surfaces. This monitoring iust be or in any case, hours after receipt of the package if received during'normal working hours, within eighteen hours.

the appro

3. Notify, by telephone and telegraph, both the final delivering carrier and priate NRC Inspection and Enforcement Regional Office if the monitoring reveals:

per 100 square

a. Removable radioactive contamination in excess of 0.01 microcuries centimeters of package surface; "

200 millirems per

b. Radiation levels on'the external package'surface in excess of hour; or .

of 10

c. Radiation levels at 3 feet from an external 'package surface in excess millirems per hour.

in which licensed

4. Establish and maintain procedures for safely opening packages giving due consideration material is received, and ensure that those procedures are followed, from the requirements to special instructions for the type of package being opened. Exemptions 20.205(b) for special-for monitoring external surfaces for contamination are provided in 10 CFR 2-15

TABLE 2-5

-- '4 TYPE A AND TYPE B QUANTITY LIMITS IN GRAMS FOR CERTAIN FISSILE MATERIALS Transport Maximum Content (grams)*

14 I Specific Activity

..4, ZI

(Ci/gmJ]6] Group Type A Type B

. Element -

U-235 2.1 x 10 " 1.4 x 106 9.5 x 107 4;

U-238 (or

'.4 depleted uranium) ' 3.3 x 10 9.1 x10 6 _1 6.1 x 108

, III Uranium (average enrich-, 8 ment- 3% U-235) , 3.86 x 10.. ' 7.8 x 106 5.2 x 10 III 4 Uranium (natural

".711%U7235) 3.45x 10- 7 8.7 x 106 5.8 x 108.

NI 44 III U-233 9.5 x 10-3 5.3 2100 II Pu-238 17.4 5.7 x 10-5 1.1 fl 4-;

.4 I

Pu-239 6.1 ' x j0f 2 1.6 x 10-2 ý26

-I 4..

I 4,

.23 4.3 x 10-3 86 Pu-240 - ,'

I 6

.4 Pu-241 (+-.daughters) 2 112 8.9 x 10- 0.18 4, t

I

4. Pu-242 3.9 x 10-, .0.26 5200 Am-241 (+ Np-237) 3.24 3.1 x 10-4 6.2 444 '4

- "I

4.4 Am-243 (+ daughters) . .19 : I 5.3 x 10-3 106

'4- 4 Cf-252 . . 536 1.9 x 0 .038 4'. ,.

Greater quantities must be shipped in packages approved for large quantities.

-4

in other than form materials and gases, Type A packages containing only radioactive material of less than 30 days and a liquid form, packages containing only radionuclides with half-lives quantities,"

total quantity of no more than 100 millicuries, all packages containing only limited of radioactive material consisting solely and packages containing no more than 10 millicuries of tritium, C-14, S-35, or 1-125.

2.7 LABELING OF.PACKAGES must be Each package containing more~than limited quantities of radioactive material 49 CFR 172.436, labeled on two opposite sides with one of three warning labels as described in "Radioactive White - I Label"; 172.438, "Radioactive Yellow - II Labels"; and 172.440; "Radio "Radio active Yellow - III Label." The labeling requirements are given in 49 CFR'172.403, active Material."

All three labelotypes contain the distinctive trefoil symbol and either one, two, or three on a Category I vertical stripes. The one-striped label has a white background and is'placed is marked with White package. A label with a bright yellow upper half and a white lower half radiation level outside the either two or three vertical stripes and indicates a 'significant and the three-stripe package. The two-stripe label is placed on a Category II_- Yellow package, radioactive White-- I'label~may notb'be label is placed on a Category III - Yeilow package. The used for Fissile Class II packages (49 CFR 172.403(b)(1)). Each Fissile Class III package, other types of each package containing a "large quantity" of radioactive material, and certain packages must bear a Radioactive - Yellow III label (49CFR 172.403(d)) The label must show index' (except for the isotope contained in the package, the number of curies, and the transport pounds) must the White - I label). In addition, each package weighing more than 50 kg (110 Type'A or have its gross weight marked on the outside of the package (49 CFR 172.310(a)(1)).

or' "Type B," respectively.

Type B packaging must be plainly marked with the words "Type A" Packages destined for export shipment must also be marked "USA" (49 CFR 172.310(a)(3)).

REQUIREMENTS PERTAINING TO THE CARRIER - VEHICLE PLACARDING AND-STOWAGE

-J 2.8 DOT imposes certain regulations on the carrier for radioactive materials-transport-i.These and packages for proper include vehicle placarding, examination of shipper certification papers transport marking and labeling, and proper loading and stowage of thepackages 'aboard the side of rail vehicle. Appropriate placards must be displayed on the front and rear and on each Radioactive - Yellow - III label. Theregu-.

or highway vehicles carrying packages bearing the Requirements."

lations regarding placarding are given in 49 CFR 172.504, "General Placarding responsibility of In addition to placarding his vehicle as required, the'carrier has the the shipper to be ensuring that the articles offered for transport hive-been certified by condition for transpor properly classified, described, packaged, marked,'labeled, and in proper tation.

the transport' group or groups For normal-form materials, the shipping papers must include and a desciiptionlof of the radionuclides, the'names of the radi onuclldes in. the material; the activity of the material-their physical and.chemical form. For all radioactive material, 2-17

I-in curies and the ,typeof radioactive label applied must also be listed. In addition, for fissile materials, the fissile class must be given with an additional warning statement as described in 49 CFR 172.203(d).

For shipments by aircraft, the operator of the aircraft (e.g., an airline official) must inform the pilot-in-command of the name, classification, and location of the radioactive mater ial on the aircraft per 49 CFR 175.33, "Notification of Pilot-In-Command." In addition,' for passenger-carrying aircraft there must be a clear and visible statement accompanying the ship ment, signed or stamped by the shipper or his agent, stating that the shipment contains radio active materials intended for use in, or incident to, research, medical diagnosis, or medical' treatment (49 CFR 172.204(c)(4)).

The carrier is also required to make sure that the maximum allowable TI is not exceeded and that the packages are not transported or stored in groups having a total TI greater than

50. He must also ensure that such groups of yellow-labeled packages are separated by the required distances from areas continually occupied by persons, from film, and from shipments of animals. Further, he, must ensure that a Fissile Class III shipment is not transported on'the same vehicle with other fissile material and is segregated by at least 20 feet (6.1 meters) from other radioactive material packages in storage. The'pertinent regulations are found in 49 CFR 174.700(d), 175.7f0, 176.700(d), and 177.842(f).

There are special requirements for stowage of packages of radioactive material bearing Radioactive - Yellow -II or Yellow - III labels aboard vehicles. For a vehicle loaded with the maximum allowable radioactive package load of 50 TI, a minimum distance'of 2.1 meters must be maintained between the package and a space continuously occupied by people. In practice, radioactive packages are usually placed as far to the rear of the aft cargo hold as possible in passenger aircraft.

2.9 REPORTING OF INCIDENTS AND SUSPECTED CONTAMINATION If death, injury,,fire, breakage, spillage, or suspected radioactive contamination occurs as a direct result of hazardous materials transportation, the'regulations (49 CFR 171.15; "Immediate Notice of Certain Hazardous Materials Incidents") require immediate notification to DOT and the shipper. The, carrier _must submit dithin 15 days of the date of discovery of' such an occurrence a "detailed hazardous materials incident report(49 CFR 171.16, "Oetaled Haz ardous Materials Incident Reports"). Thevehicles,,buildings, areas, or equipment in which a spillage of radioactive materials has occurred may not be used again until the radiation'dose rate at any accessible surface is less than 0.5 arem/hour and there is no significant removable surface contaminatioý. The carrier can obtain technical assistance in radiation monitoring following an incident or accident by calilfng one of the ERDA or NRC Regional Offices for radio:-' ..

logical assistance.

The level above, which removable radioactive contamination is considered "significant" depends on the contaminating nuclide and is specified in 49 CFR'173.397(a)Y Thfs sectto~nalso prescribes a method for' assessing the surface contamination of a'package. For radioactive material packages consigned for shipment on exclusive-use vehicles (49 CFR 173.389(o)), the' 2-18

transported "significant" levels of surface contamination are 10 times as great as for packages on non-exclusive-use vehicles (49 CFR 173.397(b)). Eiclusive-use transport ýehicles must be' each use and may not be returned surveyed with appropriate radiation detection instruments after is 0.5 mrem/hour or less and to service until the radiation dose rate at any accessible surface (49 CFR 173.397(c)).

there Is no significant removable radioactive surface co6tamination MATERIAL 2.10 REQUIREMENTS FOR SAFEGUARDING OF CERTAIN SPECIAL NUCLEAR (SNM) require-physical Certain strategic quantities and types of'special nuclear materiaitransit because of their protection against theft and sabotage both at fixed 'sites and during standards for physical protection of potential for use in a nuclear explosive device. The NRC 73.36, which make up a subchapter materials whili in transit are found in 10 CFR 73.30 - 10 CFR in Transit." They apply to any entitled,Il"Physical Protectio n of Special Nuclear Material imports; exports, transports,-'-,^,.

person licensed pursuant to the regulations in 10 CFR 70 who takes delivery of a single shipment delivers to a carrier for transport in a single shipment, or to a carrier, any one of the fol free-on board (f.o.b.) at the point where it is delivered lowing:

in the U-235 isotope to 20

1. 5000 grams or more of U-235 contained in uranium enriched percent of more,

2. 2000 grams or more of U-233,

3. 2000 grams or more of plutonium, or 5000 grams'or more computed by

4. Any combination of these materials in the amount of the formula:

grams = (grams contained U-235)

+ 2.5 (grams U-233 + grams plutonium).

exceeding:

The standards also apply to air shipments of SNM in quantities or U-233 or

1. _20 grams or 20 curies (whichever is less) of plutonium or more in the U-235

2. 350 grams of U-235 (contained in uranium enriched to'20 percent isotope).

often referred to as ,"strategic Quantities and types of SW that require safeguarding-are exempt-from these 'requirements for ship special Inuclear material," or "SSNI." A licens~eýis Quantities and Kinds of -Special Nuclear' ments of (see 10" CFR 73.6, "Exemptions for Certain" Material"):

1. "", Urnr ,n. h- to l ta n

1. U,ranIum enriched to less than 2_0 per"cent in the U-235 isotope.- ' --

2-19

2. SNM that-ls not readily separable from other radioactive material and that has a total external-radiation dose rate in excess of 100 rems per hour at a distance of 3 feet from any accessible surface without intervening shielding'(e.g., irradiated fuel), and

3. SNM in a quantity-not exceeding 350 grams of U-235, U-233, plutonium, or a combination thereof, possessed in any analytical research, quality control, metallurgical, or electronic laboratory.

The general requirements for physical protection of SSNM while in transit are found in 10 CFR 73.30, "General Requirements" (Appendix B to this document), and are concerned with the following:

1. The necessity for the shipper to make prior arrangements with the carrier for physical protection of the SSNM, including exchange of hand-to-hand receipts at origin, destination1 and transfer points.

2. The minimizing of transit time and avoidance of areas of natural disaster or civil disorder (does not apply to the air shipments described earlier).

3. The required use of tamper-indicating type seals and locking of containers for speci fied contents. No container weighing 500 pounds or less can be shipped in open trucks, railroad flat cars, or box cars and ships.

4. The use and qualification of guards.

5. The outlining of procedures to be followed by thelicensee.

6. The provision for approval of special procedures not found in the standards.

Specific standards for safeguarding shipments of SSNM by road are given in 10 CFR 73.31, "Shipment by Road." The basic requirements of this paragraph are as follows:

1. No scheduled intermediate stops are allowed.

2. Vehicles used to transport SSNM are to be equipped with radlotelephones, and contact with the licensee or agent is to be made, in most cases, every two hours.

3. Two people are to accompany the shipment in the vehicle containing the shipment. In addition, either an armed escort consisting of at least two guards in a separate vehicle shall accompany the shipment (in this case only one driver is required in the vehicle containiný the SS11 for shipments -lasting less than one hour) or a specially designed truck or trailer that reduces the vulnerability to diversion shall be used.

4. The vehicles are to be marked on top with identifying letters, to permit identifi cation in daylight and clear weather at 1000 feet above ground level, and also on the sides and rear of the vehicle.

2-20

"Ship Standards for safeguarding shipments of SSNM by air are discussed in 10 CFR 73.32, ment by'Air":

20

.* 'Shipments bypassenger aircraft* of plutonium or U-233 inquantities exceeding curies or 20 grams (whichever is less) or 350 grams of U-235 contained in uranium enriched to-.

20 percent or more in the U-235 isotope must be specifically approved by the NRC.

2. Transfers are te be minimized.

3. -Export ;shipmentsare to be escorted by an unarmed authorized individual from the last terminal inthe United States until the shipment is unloaded at a foreign terminal.

ship The regulations of 10 CFR 73.33, "Shipment by Rail," provide that, for safeguarding uniformed and ments by rail,- an-escort by two guards is required (guards are, by definition, car, or in an escort car armed - see 10 CFR -73.2(c)).- The guards ride either in the shipment contact with the from which they can keep the shipment car under observation. Radiotelephone licensee or his agent is to be made at-specific:intervals.

"Ship The regulations for safeguarding shipments of SSNM by sea, given in 10 CFR 73.34, ment-by Sea," provide that: .... " - - ," .

no scheduled

1. ,'Shipments shall be made on vessels making minimum ports of call andwith transfers to other ships. -..

sealed.

2. j The shipment is to be placed in a secure compartment that is locked and the last

3. Export shipments shall be escorted by an unarmed authorized individual from port in the United States until.the shipment is unloaded at a:foreign port.

regarding

4. Ship-to-shore contact is to be made every 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months , and the information agentwho arranges for position and -status of the shipment is to be.sent-to the~licensee or.his the protection of the shipment.,,-, ~ Ic"~ 'I~* "

The necessary-transfers of-,SSNM during a ,shipuent must be monitored by a ,guard. Thesii',

Nuclear Material":

monitoring procedures are outlined in 10 CFR 73.35, "Transfer of Special the guard is

1. At a scheduled intermediate stop where-the'SSNM is not to be unloaded, visual surveillance of to observe the opening of the cargo compartment, maintaining continuous the licensee or his agent it until the vehicle departs. Then the guard must immediately notify of the latest status.

under contin

2. At points where SSNM transfers occur, the guard is to keep the shipment for an incoming vehicle, uous visual surveillance, observe the opening of the cargo compartment N

Note that 49 CFR 175 prohibits these shipments unless the materials are intended for medical shipments by air in uncer or research use, and Public Law 94-79 prohibits NRC approval of of any licensed plutonium other than that contained in specified medical tified packages devices.

2-21

K_

and ensure that the shipment is complete by checking locks and/or seals. Continuous visual surveillance is also to be maintained when the shipment is in the terminal or in storage.

Immediately after a vehicle carrying'SSNM has departed, the guard must notify the licensee or his agent of the latest'status. " "

3. The guard is to report immediately to the carrier and the licensee who arranged for the protection of the SSNM any deviations or attempted interference:

Finally, 10 CFR 73.36, "Miscellaneous Requirements," contains miscellaneous safeguarding requirements for licensees who"'sfip,-riceive, export, or import SSNM. The basic features of these requirements are as follows:

1. If a licensee agrees to take delivery of'an f.o.b. shipment of SSNM, the licensee, rather than the shipper, arranges for the protection of the shipment while it is in transit.

2. A licensee who imports SSNtM must ensure that the-shipment is not diverted in transit between the first point of arrival in the United States and delivery to the licensee.

3. The licensee who delivers SSNI.to a carrier for transport must, at the time of depar-ture of the shipment, notify the consignee of the methods of transportation, the names of the carriers, and the estimated arrival'time. The licensee must also arrange to be notified by the consignee immediately upon arrival of the shipment.

4. The licensee who' e'ports SSNM must comply with this regulation for transport to the first point outside the United States at which the shipment is removed from the vehicle.

5. A licensee who receives a shipment'of SSNM is to notify the shipper immedlately upon arrival of the shipment at its destination.

6. If 'a shipment of SSNMW is lost ore'unaicounted-for after the' estimated arrival time, the licensee who arranged for safeguarding the shipment shall immediately conduct a trace investigation and file a report with the NRC as specified in 10 CFR 73.71, "Reports of Unac counted For Shipments, Suspected Theft, Unlawful Diversion,'or Industrial Sabotage." .

The application of the above requirements and additional measures required as license

'conditions (10 CFR 70.32(b)) are discussed'in Chapter 7. *' '-.... . 2'

I. ~i' 2-22

REFERENCES Radionuclides, 2-1. International Atomic Energy Agency, A Basic Toxicity Classification of Technical Report Series No. 15, IAEA, Vienna, 1963.

of Radio 2-2. A. Fairbairn, The Development of the IAEA Regulations for the Safe Transport active Materials, Atomic Energy Review, Vol. 11, No. 4, IAEA, Vienna, 1973.

2-3. Docket No. HM-ll, Federal Register, Vol. 39, No. 252, December 31, 1974.

of the Inter 2-4. International Commission on Radiological Protection, "Recommendations 9, Pergammon Press, national Commission on Radiological Protection," ICRP Publication Oxford, 1966.

2-5. Public Law 94-79 (S.1716).

2-23

CHAPTER 3 RADIOLOGICAL EFFECTS 3.1 RADIATION Radiation is emitted as a result of radioactive nuclides undergoing spontaneous decay.

During the decay process, these nuclides emit characteristic particles'or electromagnetic-radia tion and are thereby transformed into either completely different nuclei or more stable forms of, the same nuclei. The nuclide that'results from this emission may alsobe radioactive, depending on the relative stability achieved by the nucleus via decay (Ref. 1).. From a radiological health viewpoint, three of the most important types of radiation are charged particles, neutrons, and electromagnetic radiation.

3.1.1 CHARGED PARTICLES "Charged'particles such as beta and alpha particles undergo strong Coulomb interactions with matter. These 'interactions rapidly diminish the energy of the charged particles and therefore limit their travel toshort distances.' An alpha particle with 5 million electron volts (HeV) of energy, for example, will travel about 3.1 cm in dry air and 0.004 cm in tissue (Refs. 3-2 and 3-3).

3.1.2 NEUTRONS Radiation dose from neutrons is a strong function of particle energy. Fast neutrons inter act with matter primarily through scattering-collisions with nuclei. About one-half the neutrons with energies near 1 MeV are absorbed after passage through 9.25 cm of water (Ref. 3-3).

"Thermal" or low-energy neutrons have a higher probability of absorption by matter. ,They are captured by some nuclei in a process that is often accompanied by subsequent radiation or fission.

3.1.3 ELECTROMAGNETIC RADIATION X-rays and gamma rays lose energy as a result of the photoelectric effect, Compton scatter ing, and pair production. Since these processes are less probable than the Coulomb'interactions characteristic of charged particles, the range of electromagnetic radiation is much greater than that of alpha or beta particles of comparable energy. One-MeV gamma radiation will travel about 7 cm in water before half of the initial incident photons are absorbed (Ref. 3-3):

3.2 DOSE - -,.

Radiation exposure may be measured In terms of its ionizing effect or in terms of the energy absorbed per unit mass of exposed material. Historically, radiation exposure for x- and gamma radiation was measured in units of roentgens (the amount of radiation required to produce one electrostatic unit (esu) of charge from either part of an ion pair in 1 cm of dry air). It 3-1

A-can be shown that 1 roentgen is equivalent to energy deposition of 88 ergs in 1 gram of dry air (Ref. 3-4). A modern and more useful method for quantifying radiation interaction is in terms of the energy absorbed per unit mass. One radiation absorbed dose (rad) unit equals 100 ergs per gram of absorbing material.

Since biological effects of radiation have been found to depend on both the energy depos ited and the spatial distribution of the deposition, it was found convenient to define the relative biological effectiveness (RBE) as RBE = Dose of 220-250 keV x-rays for a given effect Dose of the radiation in question for the same effect where a particular biological effect is considered (Ref. 3-5). In an attempt to devise a unit that would provide a better criterion of biological injury when applied to different radiations, a biological dose unit, the Rdentgen Equivalent Man (rem), is defined by Dose equivalent in rem = RBE x absorbed dose in rad (3-2)

Since RBE will depend on effect studied, dose, dose rate, physiological condition, and other factors, the quality factor (QF) is defined to be the upper limitjfor the most important effect due to the radiation in question. The biological effect of 1 rem of radiation will be equiva lent for all types and energies of radiations; radiation doses in rem are thus additive, inde pendent of radiation nature. Table 3-1 lists QFs for various types of radiation.

TABLE 3-1 QUALITY FACTORS FOR VARIOUS TYPES OF RADIATION (Refs. 3-6, 3-7, and 3-8)

Radiation Range of Quality Factor Typical Value x-ray, y-ray 1.0 - 1 Beta particles, '1.0 - 1.7 1 electrons Fast neutrons 5.0 - 11.0 10 Slow (thermal) 2.0 - 5.0 3 neutrons Alpha particles 1.0 - 20.0 10 Protons 1.0 - 10.0 10 Heavy ions, - 20.0 20 fission fragments . - ,.-

Radiation from sources external to the body is usually only harmful to humans when in the form of neutrons, x-rays, or gamma rays, since alpha and beta particles are typically stopped by the skin.* However, any source of radiation incorporated into the body is potentially hazardous.

The large QF assigned to alpha particles, for example, indicates that they may be especially Extremely energetic.beta'radiation can penetrate the outer layers of skin and damage the more sensitive inner layers. -

3-2

hazardous internally where they can deposit a large quantity of energy in a small amount of potentially more sensitive internal body tissue.

rhe radiosensitivities of different life forms differ considerably. In general, higher cases life forms are more sensitive to radiation than lower forms, although in some specific for a range of life forms.

this is not true (Ref. 3-5). Table 3-2 shows the dose response Throughout this report, the radiological impact to man will be the only one quantitatively evaluated. This perspective is taken because of the generally higher sensitivity of man to to radiation and because the societal impacts of doses to human beings are generally considered be more significant than the impact due to irradiation of lower life forms.

3.3 BACKGROUND

SOURCES OF EXPOSURE'"

Natural background radiation, originating primarily from cosmic rays and terrestrial gamma emitters, constitutes the most significant source of radiation exposure to the general popula and differences in tion. The dose from background sources will vairj;ith altitude, latitude, materials, etc. The variation in cosmic the radioactive material content of the soil; building the charged radiation with altitude, for example, is shown in Figure 3-1. At low altitudes, However, particle component (both solar and galactic) is essentially constant with latitude.

as a factor of depending on the altitude of the recipient, the neutron component varies as much will vary 3 from 41ON to 90ON (Ref. 3-9). Consequently, the individual dose from these sources will receive about considerably with location. For example, a person in Louisiana or Texas one-half the annual dose received by a person in Colorado or Wyoming (Ref. 3-10).

of naturally Both internal and external exposure to all persons results from the presence and even the human body.

occurring.radloactlve material in the soil, -air, water, vegetation, on the type The doses received by various organs from these sources can differ widely depending whole-body equiv of soil, house construction material, diet, etc.- An -average annual individual rays and internal alent dose* of 102 mrem is received from natural background exposure (cosmic Since the U.S. population was about 220 x 106 and external terrestrial sources) (Ref.'3-1O).,

person-rem.

persons in 1975, the total annual natural background population dose is 22.4 x 106 of radiation Radiation exposure to the public also occurs in medical and dental applications and dental sources. A large component of this dose results from diagnostic use of medical dose yresults -from the use of x-rays (15.8 person-rem).., A smaller, but increasing, population radiopharmaceuticals (0.2 person-rem).

China, and France is Fallout from atmospheric weapon testing by the U.S., U.S.S.R., U.K.,

3-10), contributing 9 x estimated to result in an average annual individual dose of 4 mrem (Ref.

105 person-rem in 1975.

is expected to Nuclear power, including fuel reprocessing and power reactor operation, result in an average annual dose of approximately 0.4 mrem to individuals in the general popula dose of 9 x 104 person tion in the year 2000 (Ref. 3-11), corresponding to an annual population rem.

Protec "Whole-body dose is defined in paragraph 20.101(b)(3) of 10 CFR Part 20, "Standards for organs, head tion Against Radiation," as dose to the whole body, gonads, active blood-forming and trunk, or lens of the eye.

"3

- I -________

TABLE 3-2 APPROXIMATE RADIOSENSITIVITY OF VARIOUS LIFE FORMS TO EXTERNAL RADIATION (Ref. 3-5)* -

Life Form Biological Effects Necessary Dose Plant Life Growth Impairments, 2,000 - 70,600 R Arthropods Death 1,000 - 100,000 R Insect Pupae and Larvae Death 200 - 2,000 R Fish, Amphibia, Reptiles Death 1,000 - 2,000 R Mammals (general)', :* Death (LD 50/30)* 300 - 800 R Hamsters 'Death (LD 50/30)* " 800 R Mouse Death (LD 50/30)* 600 R-,

Man Death (LD 50/30)* 300 - 600 R

Lethal dose to 50 percent'of the'exposed populaton 'within 30 days.-

4. * -' .4 3-4

f

YKu IU~b 102

= *"'NEUTRONS "cc 10 L:J C,, S

PIONSý,

10-1 k 550 0 5 10 15 20'- "1'25' 30'" .

I- ALTITUDE, KM ... ,.

FIGURE 3-1. VARIATION OF GALACTICRADIATION DOSE RATES WITH ALTITUDE

. AT GEOMAGNETIC LATITUDE (X) OF 55° (Ref. 3-9).

Galactic radiation is primarily energetic alpha particles, protons, and some heavy nuclei derived from sources other than the sun. Solar radiation consists mainly of protons and heavier nuclei emitted from solar flares and also associated with sunspots (Ref. 3-9).

3-5

The occupational dose received by Federal radiation workers, naval nuclear propulsion pro gram personnel, power reactor employees, nuclear fuel cycle service personnel, etc., accounts for an accumulated annual dose of 2 x 105 person-rem, for an average per capita dose of 0.8 mrem (Ref. 3-10).

Additional exposure results from color television sets, commercial air travel, and various consumer products using radium or other radioactive materials. The estimated annual individual 5

dose from these causes is approximately 2 mrem for an accumulated dose of 4 x 10 person-rem.

Background radiation doses and the integrated population doses are summarized in Table 3-3.

3.4 HAZARDS FROM RADIATION The effects of radiation upon the body are a manifestation-of the localized deposition of electromagnetic or kinetic energy in the atoms along the path traveled by the radiation. The ionizations and excitations caused by this deposition can directly orlindirectly alter both the chemical composition and the chemical equilibrium within the cells along the path (Ref. 3-5).

The effects of the radiation may be undetectable, or they may manifest themselves as acute physiological changes, carcinogenesis, or genetic effects, depending on the amount and type of incident radiation, the type of cells irradiated, and the time span over which irradiation occurs. Each of these effects will be discussed briefly below.

3.4.1 ACUTE PHYSIOLOGICAL CHANGES Acute physiological changes are normally associated with relatively large absorbed doses received over a short period of time. Data on these effects in man are derived largely from Japanese atomic bomb casualties, some radiation therapy patients, and a few recipients of high acute doses from Industrial accidents In the early daysofý theiýuclear weapon development pro grams. Table 3-4 summarizes acute whole-body radiation effects in man.

If the acute irradiation is localized'in aspecific region of the body, the effects can vary widely because of variations in cell sensitivity to radiation. The reproductive organs are among the more sensitive. Radiation doses to males beginning above 10 rads and extending to 600 rads produce a decrease In, or absence of, sperm beginning 6 to 7 weeks after exposure and continuing for a "few months to -several" years',after whIch'time there is full recovery. The extent of sperm count decrease and the rate of recovery are related to the magnitude of the dose (Ref. 3-13). On the other hand, organs such as kidneys, lungs, stomach, bladder, and rectum may be able to withstand acute doses of several thousand rads before substantial damage occurs (Ref. 3-7). "" , , *, - . .

3.4.2 CARCINOGENESIS ;v. .* ...

Fatal cancers account for approximately 20 percent of all deaths in the U.S. (Ref. 3-14).

These cancers are divided into three broad grapps: carcinomas, sarcomas, and leukemias or lymphomas. Within these groups, there are 100 ol so distincp varieties of disease based on the 3-6

TABLE 3-3 ESTIMATES OF ANNUAL WHOLE-BODY DOSES IN THE UNITED STATES (Refs. 3-10. 3-11, a6d 3-12)

Inte grated Annual Popu lation Dose" Average Annual Dose* (106 person-rem)

Source (mrem) 44 9.7 Cosmic rays Terrestrial Radiation 8.8 External 40 4.0 Internal .18 0.9 Fallout 4

.09 Nuclear Power 0. 4***ý Medical/Dental 15.8 Diagnostic x-rays 721 0.2 Radi opharmaceuti cal s 1 0.2 Occupational 0.8 0.4 Miscellaneous 2 40 Total ,

the population, doses con-The numbers shown are average values only. For given segments-of siderably greater than these may be experienced.

Based on U.S. population of 220 x 106.

Estimate for the year 2000.

lBased on the abdominal dose.

3-7

TABLE 3-4 DOSE-EFFECT RELATIONSHIPS-IN MAN FOR ACUTE WHOLE-BODY GAIMA IRRADIATION (Refs. 3-7 and 3-13)

Dose (rads) Nature of Effect 5-25 Ninimuti detectable'dose by chromosome analysis or other specialized tests.

50-75 Minimum acute dose readily detectable in a specific individual.75-125 Minimum acute dose likely to produce vomiting in about 10 percent of people so exposed.

150-200 Acute dose likely to produce transient disability and obvious blood changes in a majority of people exposed.

"340 Median lethal dose for single short exposure with no medical treatment (Ref. 3-13).

"-510 Median lethal dose for single short exposure with supportive medical treat ment (barrier nursing, antibiotics, transfusions) (Ref. 3-13).

"-1050 Median lethal dose for single short exposure with heroic medical treatment (bone marrow transplants, etc.) (Ref. 3-13).

3-8

losses in the United States original site of the malignancy. The specific fatality and man-year due to the principal types of cancer are shown in Table 3-5.

acknowledge that a statis There are many theories of carcinogenesis, but most researchers factors and cancer induction.

tical correlation can be established between certain environmental to lung cancer and that of Examples of these correlations include the correlation of smoking correlation between exposure to radiation dose to leukemia among atomic bomb survivors. The for animal exposures and is radiation and cancer induction has been qualitatively established physiological mechanisms involved widely accepted for human exposures (Ref. 3-15), although the exposed persons such as are not well understood. Statistical analysis, of 1arbe'numbers'of radium dial painters (Ref. 3-11)

Japanese atomic bomb survivors, uranium miners, fluorspar miners, person-rem of population dose.

permits rough predictions of latent cancer fatalities per million of ages within the general population These values, modified to account for the distribution assessment (discussed in Section 3.7 (Ref. 3-13), are used in the health-effects model for this of this chapter)..

3.4.3 GENETIC EFFECTS The genetic material (DNA) is organized into linear sequences (chromosomes) of large numbers of protein groupings i(genes). Changing the chemical"nature or location of one or-more of the protein molecules within a gene will change the genetic information carried by the chromosome and, hence, the genetic information used to "construct" cells in any offspring. Changes that

called gene mutation '1n extreme result from such modifications of the genetic coding are composition of entire chromosomes, cases where there are-gross-changes in the number or overall the mutations are called chromosomal aberrations (Ref. 3-13).,

and every individual appears Whatever their origin, mutations are frequently'detrimental, to reduce his overall fitness to to carry a "load" of defective genes which collectively itends equilibrium between mutation. rates and some degree (Ref. 3-7).; During the evolutionary past. an favorable genes has been established natural selection against detrimental genes~and in favor of the laboratory work that has shown for each-species (Ref. 3-7). Concern has arisen because.of (fruit flies) and various radiation to be mutagenic in lower life forms such as Drosophila relationships (Refs. 3-3, species of mice. These data have been extrapolated to dose-effect and possibly inaccurate procedure.

3-7, and 3-11) in man, although this extrapolation is a tenuous by radiation in human lympho There is positive evidence of induction of chromosomal aberrations of Japanese atomic bomb survivors cytes. However, several detailed investigations of children 3-17).

have not shown significant increase in mutation incidence (Ref.

3.5 RADIATION STANDARDS to various sources of radiation, As a result of early injuries and deaths from exposure 1920's to establish standards for radiation international efforts were organized during the early on Radiation Protection protection. In 1928, the International Committee (now Commission)

Committee on X-ray and Radium Protection, (ICRP) was created. In the United States, the Advisory and Measurements (NCRP), was organ later to become the National Council on Radiation Protection entered the field of radiation protection ized in 1929. More recently the Federal Government 3-9

TABLE 3-5 EFFECTS OF CANCERS IN THE UNITED STATES (Refs. 3-14 and 3-16)

Annual Man-years of Type of Cancer Annual Deaths (C) working life lost' '4(%)-&

lung 65,000 19 287,000 16 large intestine - 46,000 .14 141,000 8 breast,-' 30,000 9': , -,":,. 208,000 12.-

pancreas "18,000 5 "' unknown Sprostate 17,000 5 unknown stomach, 16,000 unknown.

leukemia 14,000 4 . .. - 1 76,000 "10 brain,, .. 6,000 2 117,000 7 iymphoma -' 11,000 3 .114,000

,- . 7.7, other cancers 113,000 34" 1` 70f,000 TO.TAL - 336,000z " 100 " " 1,74'4.-.n 0 -n- 100 "

- - ;-* - 'I

- a'-

3-10

through the Federal Radiation Council (FRC), whose functions were transferred to the Environmen tal Protect.ion Agency (EPA) in 1970. The dose limits proposed by NCRP, recommended as guidance for Federal agencies by FRC, and adopted for that purpose by the President of the United States on May 13. 1960, are tabulated in Table 3-6. It can be noted from this table that the recom mended population dose limitation, for example, is 0.17 rem average whole-body dose per person per year. This value represents exposure from all sources except natural background radiation for and medical procedures. Ta,addition, the EPA in the Federal Register has proposed standards exposure during normal dranium fuel cycle operations (see 40 FR 23420).

A maximum permissible concentration (MPC) in-air or water may often be stated for a given a person radionuclide. This is the maximum concentration in air or drinking water to which might be chronically exposed internally without exceeding the recommended dose limitations to a as specified critical organ. It should be noted that the levels in Table 3-6 -were-suggested upper limits, with the understanding that radiation exposure is to be kept as low as is reason ably achievable.--The recommended limiting levels (given in 10 CFR Part 20 and 40 FR 23420) are substantially below the level where harmful effects have been observed in humans.

3.6 COST-BENEFIT to radia There is a certain amountof statistical risk involved with any level of exposure one must compare the benefits gained tion. In line with other activities and'needs of society, people from the use of radioactive substances with the possible risks entailed. For example, a developing continue to use medical x-raysý'and radiopharmaceuticals that may help -discover (Ref. 3-18).

tumor in spite of the potential for other cell damage produced by the radiation dose; although Similarly, few.people are'likely to-'change their location to reduce background year. In short, this background can differ between certain states by as muchas 100 orem per of radioactive benefits outweighing'the pr'ospective costs rare usually expected fr6m certain uses Table 3-7, the risk of fatal cancer substances, just as from many other hazardous materials. In commonly accepted or life-span shortening from radiation is compared to estimates of other risks in our society.

3.7 HEALTH-EFFECTS MODEL - .

detailed model devel The health-effects model used in this assessment is based on the more was not used.

oped in Appendix VI to WASH-1400 (Ref. 13), although the complete methodology accident analysis The simplifications discussed below were used to make the more detailed reactor applicable to the transportation situation.

radiation sources Potential dosage sources were first subdivided into external penetrating and Internal radiation sources (principally from normal transport as discussed in Chapter 4) 5).

(principally from inhalation following accidents as discussed in Chapter and External penetrating radiation presents a whole-body exposure problem from photons on the neutrons with each organ receiving similar dosages. Internal dose effects are dependent order to specify this biological pathway taken by the specific radionuclide' in the body. In or Insoluble, pathway, the chemical nature of the material, in particular whether It is soluble 3-11

-1 TABLE 3-6 NCRP DOSE-LIMITING RECOMMENDATiONS (Ref. 3-7)

Combined Whole-Body Occupational Exposure Prospective annual limit 5 rem in any one year (3/quarter)

Retrospective annual limit 10-15 rem in any one year Long-term accumulation to age N years (N-18) x 5 rem Skin 15 rem in any one year Forearms' 30 rem in any oneyear (10/quarter)

Other organs, tissues,-and 15-rem'in.any one year organsystems,, (5/quar ter)

Pregnant women (with'res; pect. to fetus) 0.5 rem in gestation period Dose Limits foi the Public or Occasionally Exposed Individuals 0.5 rem in any one year Populatio'n Dose Limits' Genetic 0.17 rem average/year

-~ 'I Somatic 0.17 rem average/year Emergency Dose Limits - Life Saving individual (older than 45 yrs., if:possible) '.100 rem ,

Hands and forearms- 200 rem, additional (300 rem, total) -. - 2C2.

Emergency Dose Limits - Less "Urgent -'-" -;

IIendividuals ' - 25 rem ~2'~~ '

Hands and forearms 100orem, total '" t- 4.

-- 9 tr ~ ~ -- :~-

3-12

TABLE 3-7 COST IN DAYS OF LIFE ASSOCIATED WITH VARIOUS ACTIVITIES (Ref. 3-19)

Activity Cost in Days of Life Living in city (rather than in 1800 country)

Remaining unmarried 1800

. 3000 Smoking 1 pack of cigarettes-per day Being 4.5 kg overweight 500 Using automobiles 240 170 mrem/year of radiation dose 10 Transportation of radioactive 0.030 material* .

exposed individual (see Calculation based on an average of 0.5 mrem per year to an average Chapter 4).

the mechanism by which the material must be specified. Additionally, for insoluble materials, specified. Ingestion is considered a enters the body (i.e., ingestion or inhalation) must be the diet (Ref. 3-13). An examination pathway only for long-term low-level activity present in this pathway because the types and of the materials in the transportation analysis eliminates food-chain buildup. Inhalation amounts of materials involved in accidents preclude significant mechanism. Solubility or insolubility is therefore left as the only significant internal dose 3-13. Dosimetric parameters for each is determined from chemical forms suggested in Reference A.

of the standard shipments evaluated are discussed in Appendix during accidents involving various In order to compare annual risk resulting from exposure penetrating radiation resulting from normal materials with annual risk from exposure to external basis for comparison must be established. For transportation of radioactive materials, a common of additional latent cancer fatalities the purpose of this assessment, the expected number individuals was chosen.- Values for LCFs (LCFs) occurring during the lifetime of exposed organs are tabulate'd in Table 3-8, which reflecting the consequences of exposure to various from Table 3-8, the LCF-coefficient of 121.6 assumes a linear dose-effect relationship. .- Also whole-Iody'exposures; is used in the model.

deaths per million person-rem (less thyroid), for effect due to low dose rates, as Neither of these values-reflects the possible mitigation-of 3-13.

reflected in the calculations performed in Reference due to large acute doses must be In addition to LCFs. the question of early fatalities for early fatalities in this analysis are the addressed. The two organs of particular interest curve used is shown in Figure 3-2, curve B) bone marrow (the fatality probability versus dose dose curve is shown in Figure 3-3). The only and the lungs (the fatality probability versus occur (within the constraints of this model) would incidences of early bone marrow fatalities sources. Isotopes capable of causing from large dosages from external penetrating radiation material providing a sufficient dose to the early lung fatalities would include any inhaled (lethal dose to 50 percent of exposed people lungs such as plutonium dioxide. The LD 50/365 3-13

I-TABLE 3-8 106 EXPECTED LATENT CANCER FATALITIES PER PERSON-REM DOSE TO THE POPULATION (Ref. 3-13)

Expected Deaths**

6 Organ Exposed per 10 Person-Rem Blood Forming Organs 28.4

-(leukemia)

Lung 22.2 Stomach' 10.2 Alimentary Canal 3.4 Pancreas- 3.4 Breast 25.6 Bone 6.9 All Others 21.6 Whole Body 121.6 Thyroid*** 13.4

Adjusted for.age distribution within the population.

- BEIR-coefficients (Ref. 3-13) for a 75-year lifetime of potential cancer development are used.

For assumed average individual doses of greater than 1500 rem.

-S C * -

3-14

99.97 99.9 99.8

CD cr

.J

'II 5 A.

'U

.5

.2 05

.01 tO 200,:400 600; 800-O 10 1200,1400,ý- in>- .. t g:

-I- 'JJ~ht-KP4JJ~~ 2J.

-- FIGURE 3-2; ESTIMATED DOSE-RESPONSE CURVES FOR MORTALITY WITHIN 60 . - t-',- I, DAYS FROM WHOLE-BODY EXPOSURE TO EXTERNAL PENETRATING - - i--: 'r RADIATION: WITH MINIMAL TREATMENT (CURVE A). SUPPORTIVE

,- ".TREATMENT .(CURVE B), 'AND-HEROIC-TREATMENT (CURVE C)s:;,:,

CURVE'B REPRESENTS'THE MOST LIKELY LEVEL OF 'TREATMENT-AVAILABLE FOR MOST ACCIDENT VICTIMS (Ref. 3-13); IT IS THEREFORE USED IN THIS ASSESSMENT TO ESTIMATE EARLY FATALITIES FROM WHOLE-BODY EXPOSURE TO EXTERNAL PENETRATING RADIATION.

- - - .- - --. V. I

-. - : - : *v 3r'z 3-15

I-Y*TRIUM-* A z

0.01--

"o B IL C 0

rTERION IUM-91 0

i r?.

0.10 to'-4, olop W4 LUNG DOSE (rem)

A - Yttrium-90 and -91 were'the isotopesised""i obtain this curve. It isequally valid for other short-half-life beta- or gamma-emitting isotopes that deliver approximately the same dose rate. This curve is used for all short-half-life materials potentially encountered In transportation accidents (Source: Ref. 3-13).

B - This curve is based on data from-Sr-90/Y-90 inhalation by beagles and is used for long-half I fe, low-linear-energy-transfer radiation (Source: _:Ref. 3-20):"

C - This curve is based on data from Pu-239.inhalation by beaglesýand is used for long-half life, high-linear-energy-transfer radiation (Sourco: Ref. 3-20);.

FIGURE 3-3. DOSE-RESPONSE CURVES FOR MORTALITY DUE TO ACUTE PULMONARY EFFECTS FROM RADIATION.

3-16

within 365 days) for long-lived alpha emitters is the basis for the curve identified as line C plotted on Figure 3-3 (Ref. 3-20). This aspect of the radioactive material shipment hazard is addressed in Chapter 5 of this assessment.

The number of genetic effects is based on the radiation dose received by the gonads. If the integrated gonadal dose is known, estimates can bemade of the number of various types of genetic effects that might be expected to occur in all subsequent generations as a result of that dose. Values for the four types of genetic effectsconsidered are shown on Table 3-9 (Ref. 3-13).

For the most part, the radioactive materials transported are relatively short half-life species. However, there are a few exceptions such as Pu-239 (discussed in Appendix C), Cs-137, and Co-60. Because these isotopes have the potential for i long residence time in the body, two doses must be considered. The early dose is based on the rem/curie value for a 60-day exposure for bone marrow or a 1-year period for lung. This early dose is used to compute early fatal ities by using probabilities from Figures 3-2 and 3-3. The long-lived dose is based on the rem/curie vaiue for a 50-year period. This long-term dose is used to predict LCFs for long half-life species.

TABLE 3-9 GENETIC EFFECTS COEFFICIENTS PER 106 PERSON-REM GONADAL DOSE (Ref. 3-13)

Expected Genetic Effects Genetic Effect Per 106 Person-Rem Single-gene disorders 42 Multifactorial disorders 84*

Congenital disorders Spontaneous abortions 42 Total Genetic Effects. ., 174.4_ . - - -.

Upper range of 8.4-84. " - .- -

3-17

L_

j ,

REFERENCES 3-1. I. Kaplan, Nuclear Physics; (2nd edition), Addison Wesley Publishing Co., 1963.

3-2. Friedlander, Kennedy, and Miller, Nuclear and Radiochemistry, New York, London, Sydney:

John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1966.

3-3. Shapiro, Radiation Protection, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1972.

3-4. C. B. Braestrup and H. 0. Wyckoff, Radiation Protection, Thomas Books, 1958.

3-5. J. F. Fabrikant, Radiobiology, Chicago, IL: Year BookMedical Publishers, Inc., 1972.

3-6. A. R. Foster and R. L. Wright, Jr., Basic Nuclear Engineering, Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1969.

3-7. National Committee on Radiation Protection and Measurements (NCRP), "Basic Radiation Pro tection Criteria," Report No.- 34, 1971.

3-8. U. S. Department of Health, Educa,'.n, and Welfare, Public Health Service, "Radiological Health Handbook," 1970.

3-9. A. C. Upton et al., "Radiobiological Aspects of the Supersonic Transport," Health Physics Journal, Vol. 12, 1966.

3-10. M. Etsenbud, Environmental Radioactivity, (2nd edition), New York and London: Academic Press, 1973.

3-11. Advisory Committee on the Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiation (BEIR), National Academy of Science, National Research Council, "The Effects on Populations of Exposure to Low DC, November 1972.

Levels of Ionizing Radiation," Washington, 3-12. D. J. Beninson, A. Bouville, B. J. Obrien, J. 0. Sniks, "Dosimetric Implications of the Exposure to the Natural Sources of Irradiation," CEA-CONF-3113, International Symposium on Areas of High Natural Radioactivity, Pocos de Caldas, Brazil, June 1975.

3-13. U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Reactor Safety Study," WASH-1400, October 1975.

3-14. J. Cairns, "The Cancer Problem," Scientific Ausrican, Vol. 233, No. 5, November 1975,

p. 64.

3-18

of 3-15. W. V. Maynford and R. H. Clark, "Carcinogenesis and Radiation Risk," British Journal RadioloMy, Supplement 12, 1975.

National 3-16. U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Public Health Service, "Third Cancer Survey: Incidence Data," March 1975.

Pergammon 3-17. ICRP Publication 18, "The RBE for High LET Radiation with Respect to Mutagenesis,"

Press, May 1972.

3-18. P. C..Johnson, "Benefits and Risks in Nuclear Medicine," American Journal of Public Health, Vol. 62, No. 10, October 1972, p. 1568.

3-19. B. L. Cohen, Nuclear Science and Society, New York: Anchor Press, 1974, p. 67.

of 3-20. M. Goldman, "An Estimate of Early Mortality and Morbidity Following Acute Inhalation Plutonium," University of California (Davis), October 1976. Available in NRC Public Document Room for inspection and copying for a fee.

3-19

CHAPTER 4 TRANSPORT IMPACTS UNDER NORMAL CONDITIONS

4.1 INTRODUCTION

of events that can have Normal transport of a radioactive material involves a wide range environmental consequences. To make the source of these consequences clear, the sequence of First, for most'shipments, the events in a radioactive material shipment must be considered.

the radiation,exposure levels are material is placed in a package meeting regulatory standards, a shipping bill is prepared, noted, the package is labeled with the appropriate information, begins. -Once the package begins and the package is put aside until the transportation process of this assessment.

moving toward its destination, it becomes a part of the subject may take one of several As shown schematically in Figure 4-1, the transportation process take it directly to its ultimate paths. The package might be loaded onto a vehicle that will of transport, e.g., a truck or destination. However, most packages undergo a secondary mode it is assigned to a primary light duty vehicle, which takes the package to a terminal where to a terminal near its destina vehicle along with other parcels. The primary vehicle'takes it takes it to its ultimate tion where it is again loaded ontola secondary-mode vehicle that destination.

to a freight forwarder and In some other instances packages are picked up by or delivered This shipment may consist of a are consolidated with other packages into a single shipment.

shippers.-- When the shipment large number 6f packages obtained from a number of different packages that are delivered to the arrives at its destination, It is separated'into Individual consignees.

to the package, or an acci When transport occurs without unusual delay, loss of or damage transport. Radiological impacts dent involving the transporting vehicle, it is called "normal" inSections 4.2, 4.3,* and 4.4 of this occurring during this phase of transport are considered is not timely, the chapter. Cases do occur, although infrequently, in which-the shipment without being involved in a vehicular package is damaged, or the contents are lost or destroyed Section 4.6.

accident. These abnormal occurrences are considered in 4.2 RADIOLOGICAL IMPACTS OTHER THAN THOSE DIRECTLY ON MAN on man-and hisenvironment from The principal emphasis of this study,is the direct'impact the transport of radioactive material. However, there are impacts, on flora ýand fauna and on that also must be-considered. As con inanimate objects, as well as indirect- impacts on man be very small in comparison to the direct cluded in Chapter 3, these effects are judged to Indirect radiological impacts on man radiological impact to man in the normal transport case.

impacts, since no credible mechanism are negligible by comparison to the direct radiological 4-1

1/4

4

.~S

.S -

P P = PRIMARY S = SECONDARY

,",r FIGURE 4-1. POSSIBLE TRANSPORT PATHS

- S 4 44 I - 4.

through the food chain and by activation exists for an indirect radiological effect, except in the normal case by package con mechanisms. However, the food chain avenue is foreclosed low and of such type that activaticn' tainment, and radiation outside packages is sufficiently to casually exposed life fores are of structures surrounding man is negligible. Exposures no significant impact. In addition, equal to or less than those to man and therefore present ship part, designed to minimize dosage to animals packaging and transport regulations are, in Chapter 2).

ped in the same vehicle as radioactive material packages (see undeveloped photographic film. The The principal radiological impact on objects isto and film are designed to minimize regulations for spacing between radioactive material packages this problem (see Chapter 2)..

4.3 DIRECT RADIOLOGICAL IMPACT ON MAN is direct radiation exposure to The principal environmental impact during normal transport The impact is quantified in terms nearby persons,from the radioactive material in the package.

the annual latent cancer fatalities of annual population dose, in person-rem and in terms of from normal transport result from expected from this population dose. The radiological effects Shielding from buildings, -terrain, or radiation that escapes from the unbreached package.

maximum distance over which the.average vehicles is not considered in this report. However, the D.

population dose is computed is limited as discussed in Appendix the package...Thus people who Radiation dose rates decrease rapidly with distance from baggage handlers) are° e-xIposeId handle the package directly (such as loaders, 'dock workers,"and for very short periods of time.

to'the highest dose rates, although these exposures are usually this chapter. - - "

modes is addressed in Section--4.4 of The dose to handlers in all transport actually handle i't) or who are -..

Those who work in the vicinity of the package (but do not to lower dose rates than handlers transported with it (e.g., aircraft passengers),are subjected persons Iiving along a travelroute but generally 'for longer periods of time., Bystanders'and but the small doses delivered 'to smo'any' generally are subjected to even lower dose rates, group population doses.

people make the total population dose comparable to other tcase, the most For the purposes of computing the direct radiological, impact in ,the normal index ,

.radioactive material is the transport important characteristic of a'package containing In mrem per hour at a distance of, one (TI), defined in Chapter 2 'as the radiation dose rate of the packaging are '7 meter from the package surface, The' adlonuclide .and the;characteristics However; these factors may -'

of little importance In evaluaiting the"1pact In the' noimal' case.'

mode and may limit the total govern whether'the material can be- shipped by a given'transport number of packages on a given veh~cle, " I transport.makes use of the standard, The evaluation of the radiological lqppct of normal tables In that appendix list the package shipments model developed in Appendix A. Various modes, 'and average distances for type, average TI, per package, primary and secondary transport 4-3

each standard shipment. The methodology for the normal transport annual population dose calcu lation is presented in detail in*Appendix 0. This appendix shows thefactors considered in each calculation and the specific relationships used to compute the population dose.

Different transport modes have different characteristics such as mean velocity, location of bystanders, and carriage of passengers, all of which'affect population dose. For that reason, each primary mode is considered separately when assessing environmental impact. As previously mentioned, a secondary transport mode is frequently used to transport the package from the shipper to the primary mode terminal and from the end point terminal to the receiver.

The radiological impacts associated with secondary mode transport are consideredýexplicitly in.

Section 4.3.2.2. For each primary and secondary mode analyzed, both the accumulated annual person-rem and the maximum individual dose received by~persons as a result' of transport by that mode are evaluated. These results are summarized in the tables at the end of the chapter.

4.3.1 TRANSPORT BY AIR The radiological impacts'of normal transport of radioactive materials by aircraft are the direct radiation doses to passengers, attendants, crew, cargo handlers, and persons in the -,

vicinity of the aircraft while it is stopped. Doses to persons on the ground below the flight path are considered negligible because of the large 'separation' distances and high velocities.

The discussion Iof the environmental impact of transport of radioactive material by air is divided into three sections according to the principal -transport mode: commercial air pas senger service, commercial air cargo service, and other air modes (including air taxi and corporate aircraft, helicopter, and lighter-than-air craft).

4.3.1.1 Transport by Passenger Aircraft 4.3.1.1.1 Passenger Dose The materials shipped by passenger aircraft' are included in Appendix A. 'Other shipment.-,

parameters used in the calculation of p assIenger dose are shown'in Table'4-1. The annual popula tion dose received by passengers aboard aircraft carrying radioactive material is' computed as (Annual follows:' ,

Doe/ YerCryigRt.J)C - )',.

Total Passenger verage Average Average Number pulation = (Aircraft YearCarin FlightsRMper Dose Rate \,(,.

(vFlight uration ofper ,< . /0.4-1)

Passengers Flight The average dose rate is given by the average TI.per flight (TI per packa ge x nýmbe'r of packages pqr flight) times the TI-dose rate conversion factor K (f passengers, ,

mrem/hour/T!, Ref. 4-3).. The average flight duration is the average distance per flight'divided by the mean speed. This calculation is performed for each standard shipment. The sum' of the doses computed for each standardshipment results in a total annual population dose to passen gers of 2330 person-rem., . ... , .

The average annual dose received by an indi0vidual airline passenger depends on the number:

of flights taken, the fraction of those flights carrying radioactive materi'al (radioactive"" '"

4-4

"TABLE 4-1

'SHIPMENT PARAMETERS FOR CALCULATION OF POPULATION AND INDIVIDUAL DOSE FOR THE PASSENGER AIR SHIPMENT MODE' Transport Parameters:

682 (Ref. 4-1)

ý-Mean Speed (km/hr) 78 (Ref. 4-2)

Passengers/Flight 4

Cabin Attendants/Flight 3

'Crew/Flight

= 0.030 (Ref. 4-3)

KD/TI' (mrem/hr/TI) (passengers),

= "0.028 (Ref. 4-3)

KD/T, (mrem/hr/TI) (cabin attendants)

= 2 Average Flight Duration (hours)

"Average Distance-from 'Cockpit = 15.2 to Radiation Source (W)

Stop Time (hr)

Population Density at Stops ** =720 (people/km)2 )

= 2.68'x 106 (Ref. 4-2)

Passenger Flights per Year Passenger Flights per Year that Carry Radioactive Material = 8.95 x 104 (RTF = 1/30)

.Total TI shipped/year = 4.33 x 05s.- ,

= 4.8 Aveýage'TI per radioactive materiai (RAM)Wflight

.(4.33 x 1O0.TI/8g95 X 104 RAM flights/year) 3,.

- 3¶. *,

I-' -

3- -

¶3 '.

4-5

I traffic factor - RTF), the number of TI on the flight, and the duration of those flights.

According to the Civil Aeronautics Board there were about 210 million revenue passengers en planed on scheduled domestic and international flights between March 1975 and March 1976.

Using an average RTF of 1/30, the total number of passengers enplaned on flights carrying radioactive material should have been about 7 million. Each passenger makes, on the average, about 5 flights per year (Refs. 4-3, 4-4), but it is unlikely that any individual would fly on more than one radioactive material.flight per year. Distributing the,2330 person-rem among 7 million exposed passengers results in an annual average individual dose of 0.34 mrem. The cosmic radiation background dose rate to which these same passengers are exposed is 0.23 mrem/

per hour at an altitude of 9 km.

Assuming that 75 percent of the flight time is spent at 9 km, for 5 flights per year and an average of 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months per flight, the annual average cosmic radiation background dose per individual was 1.7 mrem (Refs. 4-5, 4-6). Multiplying this average individual dose by 7 x 106 passengers results in an annual population dose of 1.2 x 10 person-rem to these passengers from cosmic radiation. Thus the average individual dose from radioactive materials on board is considerably less' thanithe cosmic-ray background dose received by the same-indivlduals. Pas sengers who receive a greater radiation dose from the cargo because they travel more than the average also receive a proportionally higher cosmic radiation dose.

It has been pointed out, in another study (Ref. 4-4) that, a select group of individuals flying 500 hours0.00579 days 0.139 hours 8.267196e-4 weeks 1.9025e-4 months per year between airports with RTF's of 1/4 and 1/10' (e.g., Knoxville, Tennessee, and St. Louis, Missouri) would each receive, on the average, 108 mrem per year, assuming an average dose rate at seat level of 1.3 mrem/per hour (fully loaded conditions).

These same individuals would receive 86 mrem per year from cosmic radiation (500 hours0.00579 days 0.139 hours 8.267196e-4 weeks 1.9025e-4 months per year x 0.23 mrem per hour x 0.75).

4.3.1.1.2 Dose to Cabin Attendants The dose to cabin attendants was calculated in the same manner as the dose to passengers.

The average number of attendants per flight was estimated to be four, and the dose conversion factor used was 0.028 orem per hour per TI (Ref.,4-3). The.latter factor is an average over the cabin length and acknowledges the fact that the attendant moves throughout the cabin during the flight. The total population dose to attendants in 1975- was calculated to be 112 person-rem. Assuming that this dose was delivered to 20,000 attendants [one-half of the total attendant population (Ref. 4-4)], the average dose received by each would have been about 6 urer.

Experiments in Oklahoma City apd Boston indicate that the maximum dose rate to an attend ant in the tourist section of an aircraft carrying the maximum allowable load of radioactive material is between 0.6 and 0.8 urem per hour (Refs. 4-3, 4-4), while the dose to an attendant in the first class section is essentially zero (under current practice, radioactive packages are usually carried in the aft cargo hold). If 1000 hours0.0116 days 0.278 hours 0.00165 weeks 3.805e-4 months per year of flight time is assumed with an RTF of 1/10 (corresponding to an attendant who works only out of airports serving major radiopharmaceutical centers) and the average load Is assumed to be 4.8 TI, the tourist class attendant may receive up to 13 ores per year (1000 hours0.0116 days 0.278 hours 0.00165 weeks 3.805e-4 months per year x 1/10 x 0.028 mrem per hour 4-6

per year x 0.23 per TI x 4.8 TI). This compares with a dose of 173 mrem per year (1000 hours0.0116 days 0.278 hours 0.00165 weeks 3.805e-4 months flying time is mrem per hour x 0.75) from cosmic radiation assuming that three quarters of the attendants spent at 9 km altitude. -Multiplying this average individual dose by the 20,000 results in an annual population dose to these attendants of 3500 person-rem.

4.3.1.1.3 Dose to Crew materials Crew members on passenger aircraft are usually located away from radioactive results in a packages. The common practice of storing packages in the rear baggage'holds are pointed out byý cockpit dose rate that is very small. The positive'effects of this practice In most Barker, et aL (Ref. 4-3) based on measurements of rýdiation exposure to flight crews.

were stowedin the cases radiation was undetectable in the cockpit when radioactive materials aft baggage compartment some 15 meters away.

as the doses.to The annual population dose to crew members is computed i'nthe'same way the dose rate by passengers and attendants just discussed except that, instead of determining the an empirical TI-Dose rate conversion factor, the dose rate is computed analyticaily-using factor'K'is proportional dose-rate formula given in Appendix D, Equation (D-1). The dose-rate source-to-cockpit to-the TI, as discussed in Section D.1 of Appendix D."Using an average three crew members per flight, an estimate' distance of 15 meters together with the assumption of by summing the contributions of all standard shipments.

of 16 person-rem to the crew is obtained to an annual average Distributed over approximately 30,000 flight crew members, th*is amounts individual dose of 0.53 mrem.

known to'be In a survey at Boston's Logan Airport* (Refs. 4-3, 4-4), only 2 of 42 flights cockpit area and in both carrying radioactive material had detectable radiation levels in the in'Chicago"found none of the 100" cases the level was~only 0.1 mrem per hour.'A similar-survey flights surveyed had detectable radiation levels in the cockpit.l Assuming an RTF'of/IO, the per year would be 2.5 mrem, maximum annual dose received by a ight crew member flying 1000 hiours 173 mrem per year...

for an average load of 4.8 TI. These same crew members'would receive about hours per year are spent at from cosmic radiation, assuming that three-quarters of tJeir 1000 radiation of 5200 person-rem.

an altitude of 9 kin, for a total annual population dose from cosmic 4.3.1.1.4 Dose to BystandersDuring Stops both wthin and outside the During aircraft stops, the population-surrounding the aircraft cargo carried by the aircraft.

terminal building is exposed to radiation from any radioactive receIvea d6rin'g shipment"stops'is .

A general expression for the integrated population dose to occur In areas with an~average, derived in Section D.2 of Appendix . All stops are assumed 2

population density of about 720 per km .A -total stop time of fho'urs'assumed for 'each- '

stops, summing over all stand-,'

shipment. ,The total annual population dose to bystanders during ard shipments, is 11 person-rem.

4-7

I________________

The maximum annual dose to an individual during aircraft stops is likely to be received by a member of the ground crew who is refueling, loading, or unloading the plane. If this indi vidual spends 10 minutes per flight 4 times an hour at a distance of 3 meters from an average cargo, his annual dose is estimated' to be 85 mrem, using the dose rate formula given in Appendix D, Equation (D-i*, and assuming the RTF = 1/10, the'average TI = 4.8 (Type A packages),

a 40-hour work week, and 50 wbrk weeks per year.

4.3.1.1.5 Summary The radiation doses resulting from passenger aircraft transport of radioactive materials in 1975 (exclusive of secondary-mode contributions and doses received by' freight handlers) are sumarized in Table 4-2. The total annual population dose of 2470 person-rem resulting from" radioactive material on board passenger aircraft is considerably less than that received'by the same individuals from cosmic radiation.

4.3.1.2 Transport by All-Cargo Aircraft There were 31,400 all-cargo aircraft departures in 1975 (Ref. 4-7). Because'of the rela-'

tively small number of all-cargof lights and because of the limited number of airports served' by all-cargo aircraft, most of the radioactive materials transported by air go by passenger aircraft.- . .

Theprincipal. radiological, impact, from normal transport of radioactive materials by all-cargo aircraft is the dose to the crew and to bystanders. Radioactive materials in cargo*

aircraft are usually stowed as far from the crew compartment as possible. 'A 6-meter distance' between crew and radioactive cargo was assumed for this assessment.

At the time of this report, two cargo carriers were operating under a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA),waiver, that permitted, carriage of up to 200 TI per aircraft-on specific routes and for a specific-time period. .This increase" in the allo'able TI has the potential fo-r" increasing the radiation exposure to individual members 'of the'crew, but precautions are re quired by the FAA to minimize these exposures.

4.3.1.2.1 Dose to Crew i Bodeused to compute the doses.

Table 4-3 lists the shipment parameters for the air cargo The crew dose was, computed Cin the same way as the dose to passenger aircraft crew using Equation (0-1) in Appendix D. An average:of three crew members per flight wias assumed. 'The annual dose obtained by, summing over all shipments by all-cargo aircraft is 4.1 person-rem..The total crew population exposed to ,this population dose is estimated to be approximately 356 by" applyingthe ratio of the cargo to passenger air flights to the total- number of passenger air-,

craft crew. As a result, the average annual individual dose is estimated to 'be 12 mrer.' Thei'.

be similar to that forcrews on passengerI -'

average annual individual cosmic ray dose would I I "

aircraft (173 orem), for an annual population dose of 60 person-rem.

4-8

TABLE 4-2 ANNUAL DOSES FROM TRANSPORT OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL (RAM)

IN PASSENGER AIRCRAFT AND CORRESPONDING COSMIC RADIATION DOSES - 1975 IN PASSENGER Total Annual Populationm Dose Annual Individual Dose Exposed or RAM Q(person- rem) (mrem)Rad~aioa Population VARAM Cosmic ona Subgroup Persons S smic Radiation Passengers 7 x 106 2330 1.2 x 104 0.34 (avg) 1.7 (avg) 108 (max) 86 (max)

Attendants 2 x 104 112 3500 6 (avg) 173 13 (max)

Crew 3 x 104 16 , 5200 0.53 (avg) 173 2.5 (max) 4*

LO 2 4 4c (720/km ) 11 hot evaluated 85 (max)b Ground Crew (including bystanders)

TOTALS 2470 2.1 x 104 aDose is in addition to an average annual individual dose of 102 mrem received by persons on the ground from natural background exposure.

bApplies only to the most exposed member of ground'crew.

cSee Table 3-3.

I TABLE 4-3 SHIPMENT PARAMETERS FOR CALCULATION OF POPULA11qN DOSE FOR THE AIR CARGO SHIPMENT MODE Transport Parameters:

Mean speed (km/hr) 682 Crew per flight 3 Average distance from cockpit to radiation source (m) 6 Stop time (hr) 1 Population density at stops (people/km 2 ) 720 Estimated total all-cargo flights per year 31,400 (Ref. 4-7)

All-cargo flights per year carrying radioactive material (RTF = .042 (Ref. 4-8) 1,320 Flight duration (hr) 2*

Total TI shipped/yr = 1.61 x 104 Average TI per RAM flight = 12 4-10

The maximum annual dose likely to be received by an individual crew member was estimated by assuming 1000 hours0.0116 days 0.278 hours 0.00165 weeks 3.805e-4 months total flight time, with one-eighth of the time spent on flights carrying radioactive material. If each of those flights carried the average (12 TI) amount of radio active material at a separation distance of 6 meters, the annual individual dose received, computed by using the dose-rate formula in Appendix D, Equation (D-1), would be 61 mrem.

Measurements conducted on typical flights of the two carriers licensed for up to 200 TI per flight indicated that the crew received an average of,0.41 mrem per TI carried with an average load of 44.7 TI and an average annual dose of 364 mrem (Ref. 4-9). Crew exposure for these flights are monitored carefully according to restrictions in the FAA waiver which requires, among other things, that a health physicist supervise the handling and stowage of radioactive material to ensure that radiation exposures are as low as reasonably achievable.

4.3.1.2.2 Dose to Bystanders During Stops Bystanders are exposed to radioactive material packages during the time required to unload or add cargo to the freighter aircraft. Because freight operations usually occur in areas away from the main terminals the population density may be lower than that for the passenger air 2 1 case; nevertheless, the same population density (720 persons per km ) was assumed. Using the same computational technique, the annual dose to bystanders was estimated to be 0.4 person-rem.

The maximum dose delivered to a ground crew member is estimated using the same values as for passenger aircraft, except that the average RTF is 1/24 and-the average TI'is 12. This gives a maximum anticipated annual individual dose of 106 mrem.

4.3.1.2.3 Summary The annual population doses resulting from all-cargo aircraft transport of radioactive about 5 material in 1975 are summarized in Table 4-4. The total annual population dose is person-rem.

4.3.1.3 Transport by Other Air Modes 4.3.1.3.1 Transport by Other Fixed-Wing Modes The assessment of radiological impact from transportof radioactive materials by other for fixed-wing modes such as corporate aircraft was performed in a way similar to that all-cargo aircraft. An informal survey suggests that some radioactlve materials are trans impacts ported by this mode, particularly in the'oil-well-logging i.ndustry. The radiological are determined in essentially the same way as in the all-cargu mode except that the aircraft as are usually physically smaller than the typical cargo aircraft and therefore do not permit much spacing between the crew and radioactive packages.

The total TI transported by other fixed-wing modes is estimated to Oe no more than one The dose percent of that transported by all-cargo aircraft, i.e., 160 TI per year maximum.

(D-1) in Appendix 0, rates experienced by the two crew members are estimated using Equation 4-11

TABLE 4-4 ANNUAL DOSES FROM TRANSPORT OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL IN CARGO AIRCRAFT AND CORRESPONDING COSMIC RADIATION DOSES - 1975 Annual Population Dose Annual Individual Dose (person-rem) (mrero)

Population Total Exposed RAM Cosmic Radiation Subgroup Persons RAM Cosmic Radiation 350 12 173 Crew 4.1 61 61 (avg)

(max)

N Bystanders/2 "not evaluated 106 (max)

Ground Crew 720/km2 0.4 aee Table 3-3.

assuming a separation distance of 3 meters. The estimated total annual population dose from this mode is 0.04 person-rem, assuming an average flight time of 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months . This dose is neglig ible by comparison to the values calculated for transport by passenger and all-cargo aircraft.

4.3.1.3.2 Transport by Helicopters Helicopters are not widely used for transporting radioactive material. They are used to transfer well-logging sources to off-shore drilling-rigs. The actual extent of such transfers is not known, but a thousand 'such transfers'per year-is estimated. For'a two-man crew, a 1-hour flight time, a separation distance of-3 meters,-and a load of 2 TI, the possible dose is about 0.5 person-rem. This result is obtained using Equation (D-1) in Appendix D for the dose rate with d = 3 meters and taking Ko typical~of Type-A packages. Apopulation exposure of 0.5 person-rem is a negligible fraction of the total population dose for air transport.

4.3.1.3.3 Transport by Lighter-Than-Air Vehicles There is no known current use of lighter-than-air vehicles (LTAV) in radioactive material transport. But contemplated use for special nuclear material shipmints 'with a flight crew of three and a separation distance of 15 meters would result inca 'population dose of 0.04 person-rem, assuming 1000 such shipments per year of plutonium in Type-B packages, and an average of 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months per flight. The average dose rate was determined using Equation (D-i) in Appendix D, with d = 15 meters.

4.3.1.3.4 Bystander Doses from Other Air Modes The total annual TI transported by air modes other than passenger and cargo aircraft considered in thepreceeding calculations is 3140 TI peryear. A total of 16,000 TI per year was transported by all-cargo aircraft. Since the doses received by persons while stopped is proportional to the total TI, the doses while stopped for all air modes other than passenger and all-cargo aircraft should be that for all-cargo aircraft times 3140 TI per 16,000 TI or 0.08 person-rem.

Individual doses to ground crew (including bystanders) were computed assuming that a single Individual will service a maximum of one-third of the flights per year at a distance of 1.5 meters for a helicopter or corporate aircraft. The exposure time was estimated to be 10 minutes per flight for the individual. The results are presented in Table 4-5.

4.3.1.3.5 Summary The integrated and individual doses estimated for shipments by other air modes are summa rized in Table 4-5. Because Tlight altitudes for these air modes are generally lower than for commercial air modes, the cosmic ray dose rate is substantially lower (approximately 0.01 mrem per hour at 3 km). Based on the numbers of crewmen listed, the cosmic ray dose rate is esti mated to be 0.05 person-rem. This was computed by summing the contributions of each "other-air" mode, assuming 0.75 of the flight time is spent at an altitude of 3 km using the appropriate flight time, numbers of crewmen, and flights per year.

4-13

TABLE 4-5 DOSE RESULTING FROM RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL SHIPMENT BY HELICOPTERS AND CORPORATE AIRCRAFT - 1975 "Population Annual Population Dose Annual Individual Mode Subgroup Dose (mrem)* (person-rem)

Helicopter Flight crew 5 5 Bystanders/

Ground crew 60 see all-modes dose Corporate Flight crew 4 0.04 Aircraft Bystanders/ see all-modes Ground crew 0.6 dose All Modes Bystanders/ o1o 0.08 Shown Above Ground crew TOTAL 0.62 Flight crew doses are computed assuming 20 one-hour flights per yiar by the same individual.

2 TI per flight is assumed for helicopter and 1.6 TI per'flight is-assumed for corporate aircraft. I I. - .. o., !, .

4*e... - -

'1 - 4' I-.. I

.5. - - .4 I- z' if

1-.s

- . * .. r 4,

V' .;rS.rP 4 -

4-14

4.3.1.4 Storage Associated with the Air Transport Mode The radioactive material package may be considered to be in storage between the time it Is offered for shipment and the time it is placed aboard an aircraft and again after removal from the aircraft but before transfer to a secondary-mode vehicle for delivery to its final desti nation. Storage areas are typically on or near the airport grounds and are part of the airline freight handling facilities. Terminals visited during the course of this~study had a specific the location set aside for radioactive material packages, but the area was not isolated from 2 2 general work area. If a storage area occupies approximately 1I,000 m (120,000 ft ) and has 10 2

employees per shift, the average population density is approximately 900 persons per km . In the case of aircraft transport, this dose is charged to the secondary mode vehicles and hence is dibcussed in Section 4.3.2.2.

4.3.2 SURFACE TRANSPORT BY MOTOR VEHICLE An estimated 1.2 million radioactive material shipments are transported each year by is also truck. In addition, most land and air shipments involve a secondary ground link that a

by truck or light duty vehicle. While a number of truck shipments areradiopharmaceuticals, ship substantial traction of those radioactive materials requiring massive shielding are also shipments are rela ped by truck because of the capability to carry heavy cargo. These latter sources, tively few in number and are associated with large fuel-cycle shipments, irradiator and other large-quantity sources.

4.3.2.1 Transport in Trucks the The principal radio-logical impacts from truck transport of radioactive materials are to the passenger aircraft direct radiation dose to handlers, crew, and bystanders. In contrast route case, there are'no passengers exposed to radiation; however, persons along the transport are for a 'relatively short are exposed during passage of the vehicle. In most cases, exposures during a trip of duration, but the number of persons who can be exposed may become very large rest, _repair, and considerable distance. Additional doses result .from stops, for meals, crew is not limited as in the refueling. Because access to the area aroundthei'-vehicle-during stops used to evaluate case of air shipment, the potential for exposurpis higher. The parameters the normal dose resulting from truck transport are summarized in Table 4-6.

4.3.2.1.1 Dose to Truck Crew similar to that The calculation of the annual :population dose received by truck crew is computed using Equation for the dose to;aircraft crew. The average dose -rate inrýthe cab is dose rate exceeds (D-1) in Appendix D with d = 3 meters and.with K =_Kox TI. 'Ifthe computed dose to 2 mrem per 2.0 mrem per hour, it is assumed that shielding is introduced to limit the practical limit for all hour as required by the regulations for exclusive-use vehicles and as a assumed to be in the cab shipments. Two crew members per vehicle are assumed. The crew is to the crew is appro only during periods of actual travel. Thus, the duration of exposure ximately the same as the distance traveled divided by the average speed while moving. The about 2580 total annual crew dose summed over all standard shipments is computed to be person-rem.

4-15

TABLE 4-6 SHIPMENT PARAMETERS FOR CALCULATION OF POPULATION'

- ~ ' "-DOSE FOR THE TRUCK TRANSPORT MODE High-Population Medium-Population Low-Population,

.Transport Parameters Areas Areas' Areas

',Average Speed (km/hr). 2 40 88

- Fraction of Travel, Distance 0.05 0.05 0.9

., Population Density (persons/km2) 3,861 719 6 of Stops (hr) " 5 2 SDuration 3

- . Traffic Distribution" 00.08

.. Fraction in Rush Hour

. -

Fraction in Non-Rush Hour. 0.92 1 1 "TruckTraffic Distribution 0 Fraction on City Streets' 0.05 0 on 4 Lane *, 0.10 0 0

- Fraction Fraction on Freeway 0.85 1 1 One-Way Traffic Count per Hour' 470 (normal traffic)*, :,- 2,800 780 "Total TI shipped.- 3.8 x 106 (3,.36 x 106 in exclusive-use trucks)

Based upon a recent traffic survey in Albuquerque, New Mexico.

The maximum individual dose is likely to be received by a crew member transporting irra of an exclusive-use diated fuel. Although the maximum allowable radiation dose rate in the cab hour, experience indicates that dose rates truck carrying radioactive material is 2 mrem per cask and are usually less than 0.2 mrem per hour (Ref. 4-10) because of the distance from the are at most shielding by intervening material. Dose rates at 2 meters from an irradiated 'fuel cask 25 10 mrem per hour, (about 33 mrem per hour at 1 meter) but are more likely to b4 about member spends mrem/hour at I meterfrom the vehicle surface (Ref. 4-10). Assuming that i crew of 1 meter from the cask, 20 hours2.314815e-4 days 0.00556 hours 3.306878e-5 weeks 7.61e-6 months per trip in the cab and a total of one hour at a distance hour x his maximum possible dose per trip is 73 mrem (2 mrem per hour i 20 hours2.314815e-4 days 0.00556 hours 3.306878e-5 weeks 7.61e-6 months + 33 mrem per annual dose would be 2.2 rem.

I hour).. If the same crew member made,30 such trips a year, his In practice, however, a 0.2-mrem-per-hour radiation level in the cab-and a 25-mtrero-per-hour for a level at 1 meter are more likely, and the accumulated dose is about '29 mrem per trip maximum annual-individual dose of about 870 mrem.

4.3.2.1.1 Dose to Population Surrounding the Moving Vehicle 4

The population dose received while the vehicleI is in motion is composed of two principal the trans components: that resulting from the exposure of persons in other vehicles occupying port link (on-link) and that received by persons along the transport link (off-link).

The off-link population dose calculation is 'disiussed in detail in 'Section 0.1 of Appendix D. Equation (D-1) in Appendix D was used to compute this dose' for' each 0standard shipment involving truck transport, and the results were summed to obtain'thei-total annuai The off-link-dose. The transport parameters used in .the calculation are listed in Table 4-6.

resulting total annual off-link population dose is 348 person-rem.

The on-link population dose calculation is 'discussed in Appendix D, Section D.5 and Is composed of two components:

1. The dose to'persons traveling in'the direction opposite to the 'shipment and '

2. The dose to persons traveling in the same direction as the shipment. ' " '

direc The "opposite direction" dose is obtained using Equation (D-17) of Appendix D;'the "same tion" dose, Equation (D-22). Both calculations are made for each standard shipment using the transport parameters listed in Table 4-6, and the result* are s _uoed all standard shipments.-'

over The resulting total annual on-link population dose is about 172 person-rem.

The maximum-dose tosan individual haring the transport link with the vehicle would'lrob ably be,received by a person in a vehicqe following the-shipment from its point of 6rigin't('

distance of 30 its destination. If a truck driver followed an irradiated fuel shipment at a 94 mrem per meters during a 20-hour trip once per week, 50 weeks p'er"year,'he would receive year (Equation (0-1), Appendix 0, with d = '30 meters)' 4.* ver'it- is hghly'ulikely t.ha.t A mo6re reason this particular set of circumstances would occur for'the same driver each week.-

at 30 meters behind

able assumption might be that a specific driver's annual accumulated time 4-17

-1 irradiated fuel shipments might be equivalent to one 20-hour trip. Under these circumstances, that driver would receive an annual dose of 1.9 mrem.

The maximum dose received by a person living along a transport route would probably be' received by an individual living adjacent to a highway where radioactive material was frequently" shipped. Using Equation_(D-2). in Appendix D, the annual dose received by a person living 30 meters from a roadway on which standard irradiated fuel shipments (K 1000 mrem-ft 2 per hour) pass 250 times per year at an average speed of 48 km per hour is 0. 009 mrem.

Neither the off-link nor the on-link calculations explicitly take into account the effects of shielding outside the packaging that might act to absorb radiation and therefore mitigate the population dose. This is likely to be most effective in cities where buildings are con structed from relatively good radiation absorbers such as concrete and steel and in hilly terrain where topographic features may provide shielding.

4.3.2.1.3 Dose to Population While Vehicle is Stopped The computation of the population dose that occurs as a result of' shipment stops is dis cussed in Section D.2 of Appendix D. Equation (D-10) in Appendix D was used to compute this dose for each standard shipment using the stop duration and population density values listed in Table 4-6. three The assumptions he 4-6 regarding the lengthierfstops shown in Table opulai6nregardweengalength of in each of the three population zones wereimade' fromthe observation that fuel stops and rest areas are more often located in suburban areas or in areas that have population densities higher than the rural average. When the results are summed over all standard shipments involving truck trans port, a total annual dose of 1000 person-rem is obtained. Again, the effects of shielding by buildings and terrain would probably reduce this value.

Although vehicles carrying large amounts of radioactive material are placarded, bystanders may get close enough to receive a small dose from a shipment. If a bystander spends 3 minutes in an area 1 meter from an irradiated fuel cask, he would receive a dose of 1.3 mrem, assuming a 25 mrem per hour radiation lever at that distance (Ref. 4-10). Unless the same person "inves tigated" several such shipments per year, this is expected to be the maximum annual dose received by an individual while the shipment is stopped..

4.3.2.1.4 Dose Resulting from Intransit Storage At the beginning and end of the transport cycle and at intermediate terminals, radioactive material packages m~y be stored_ temporarily while awaiting atruck that is proceeding to the final destination. The potential therefore exists for irradiation of truck terminal employees and surrounding population during these ,periods of temporary storage. The calculation is identical to that for storage involved with air transport, and the same average population density (900 persons per klin2 ) 'in the warehouse Is "assumed. fhe "resulting annual population' dose for an average intransit storage time of 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months per shipment is computed to'be 261" person-rem.

4-18

I 4.3.2.2 Truck, Light Truck, and Delivery Vehicles All radioactive materials that are This transport mode includes all secondary transport.

by truck, rail, ship, or barge are taken shipped by air and almost all that are transported the receiving terminal to the receiver by from the shipper to the shipping terminal and from are usually located in or near cities; thus trucks, vans, or automobiles. Freight terminals the speeds are relatively low.

the population densities are relatively high, and the truck mode with the material and Using the same calculation procedure as used for estimates of population dose to the transport parameters shown in Table 4-7, the following indicated groups are predicted:

1. Annual dose to crew (1 person per shipment) = 53'person-rem. -

person-rem.

2. Annual dose to surrounding population (on-link) = 216 "dos--to surrounding p opulation (off-link) = 51 person-remn.

person-rem.

4. Annual dose to surrounding pQpulation (stopped) = 79

= 310 person-rem.

5. Annual dose to surrounding population (intransit storage) person-rem.

The annual total population dose from secondary modes is 709 the maximum TI carried by-van noted in Assuming that a van driver carries a shipment with days per the standard shipments (3.8 TI "mixed" - Type B) once perworking day.(250 working mrem per year of 40 km per hour, he would receive 352 year) over a distance of 40 km at a speed other cieirdose calculations,and a separation (using the same computational procedure as in of State health agenciesin-cooperation with distance of 2 meters). Recent studies by a number might'bervalid. A more likely NRC and DOT revealed few instances where these assumptions makes a single radiopharmaceutical pickup and scenario would be a courier-service driver who a total of 3.8 TI (2 Mo-99 generators), the delivery per week (50 weeks per year). Assuming driver would receive 70 mrem per year-'(1/5_x352)7-Y '*'-""

investigating a van loaded with radioactive The likelihood of the same person following or remote. Hence, the maximum annual on-link material in a city on a regular basis is considered The annual maximum off-link dose is assumed to and bystanders doses are considered negligible.

be the same as that for truck, namely 0.009 trem.

4.3.2.3 Summary of Truck Transport transportation of r#dioactive material The annual doses resulting from truck and van in Table 4-8; the total is 5070 person-rem.

(exclusive of freight handler dose) are summarized 4-19

TABLE 4-7 SHIPMENT PARAMETERS FOR CALCULATION OF POPULATION DOSE FOR THE DELIVERY VEHICLE TRANSPORT MODE High-Population Medium-Population Areas Areas Transport Parameters Average Speed (km/hr) 24 40 Distribution of Travel Distance 0.4 0.6 2 3,861 719 Population Density (persons/km )

Stop Duration (hr)' 0.5 0 Traffic Distribution Fraction in Non-Rush Hour Tt" .. 0.92 0.92 Fraction in Rush Hour .0.08 0.08 Roadway Distribution 0.65 0.

Fractionon:City Streets . 0.65 0.65' Fraction on 2-Lane 0.05, 0.05 Fraction on 4-Lane 0.05 0.05 Fraction on Freeway .., 0.25 0.25 Total TI Shipped - 1.18 x 10 6 A-20

TABLE 4,8 DOSES RESULTING FROM TRUCK AND VAN TRANSPORT OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS - 1975 (EXCLUSIVE-OF FREIGHTIHANDLERS)*

Maximum ' - -

Annual Individual Population Annual Population Dose Dose (mrem)

Mode Subgroup - (person-rem) I 2580 870 Truck Crew On-link 172 0.( D09 348 ., -

.- . Off-link-1000 While stopped Storage 261 .500*

53 " 70 Van Crew 216 negl igible On-link 51 0.1 009 Off-link

_791 .. ,;,. negl igible While stopped.

310 ' -500*

S-'- Storage TOTAL 5070 ectton 4.4. --. ' i. - -

See discussion of freight handlers in Si

.2- -V.

2 '2

- - ~'71

*' - .. .L'

'2,,. '2 it .'..3 2( 2.' ..

. - S -n

+/-..*. 1 * . . I' 'd-... . *2

i' 2 .

..- 22.. 222. . 2 $.

C. .

4"& .. i S '

th.*, .. 22' 22 . 2 *j **

1 .--.- 2..--..:.

4-21

-1 4.3.3 RAIL TRANSPORT The methods used for calculating the impact of transport by rail are similar to those used for truck transport because of similarities in route structure and service areas. The major differences between truck and train are in the speed of transport (train is generally slower) and the proximity of population exposed on the rail link: Although the speed of a freight train while moving through the countryside is reasonably fast, the need to enter sidings occa sionally to allow faster trains to pass and to pick up and drop off cars reduces the mean speed considerably. This results in a longer time for exposure of the public to radiation. Where passenger trains pass or are passed, a population dose is incurred in a manner analogous to that received by other vehicles using the highway in the truck mode. Shipment, parameters used to compute population dose for rail transport are shown In Table 4-9.

4.3.3.1 Transport by Freight Trains Because of the length of time required for a shipment and special capability for handling massive loads, the principal radioactive materials shipped by rail are those with long half-lives or those that require special shielding. An example of a shipment of this sort would be a large irradiated fuel cask. The only material shipped by passenger train is a negligible amount of "limited" postal shipments.

4.3.3.1.1 Exposure of Train Crew An average freight train is composed of approximately 70 cars. As a result, the proximity of the train crew to a cir carrying radioactive material is difficult to quantify except on a statistical basis. While the train is in motion, the brakeman or conductor in the caboose may he as close as 3 meters or as far as a few thousand meters from a radioactive shipment. If the latter condition occurs, a great deal of Intervening cargo acts to shield the crew car. Similar arguments can be made for the engine crew so long as there is only one shipment per train. If there is only a single cargo car making up the train, the engine crew and caboose crew experi ence similar dose rates.

The dose received by the crew is calculated in a manner similar to that for trucks. The dose-rate formula (Equation (D-1), Appendix 1) is used with d = 152 meters, and the average exposure time is given by the average shipment distance divided by the average speed. A total of five crew members is assumed. The computation is performed for each standard shipment involving rail transport, and the results are summed to obtain an annual population dose to crew members of 0.9 person-rem.

The maximum annual individual dose to a member of a train crew is estimated for 50 irra diated fuel shipments per year, an average separation distance of 152 meters, and an average crew time of 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months . This combination gives a maximum annual dose of 1.2 mrem.

4.3.3.1.2 Exposure of On-link and Off-link Population Those persons exposed on the transport link are passengers on trains or freight train crews who pass or who are passed by a train carrying radioactive materials. This calculation 4-22

TABLE 4-9 MODE SHIPMENT PARAMETERS FOR CALCULATION OF POPULATION DOSE FOR THE RAIL

.4 Low-Population

'High-Population Medium-Population Areas Areas Areas Transport Parameters 40 64 , ,

Average Speed (km/hr) 4 24

- Distribution of Travel 0.05 0.9 0.05 Distance.

Population Density 719 6 3,861 (people/km 0 24 0

Stop Duration (hr)

T, U - Passenger Trains 5; 4'5 (trains/day),I, .5

.5 Number of Crew (engineer, fireman, $

.4' conductor, and 2

"-. brakemen) , ,' 152 152. 15215 Average Separation Distance Between

Crewand Radioactive.

(n) - - :4 Material' Total TI shipped - 1.8 x 10 to correspond to the regulatory

A TI of 111 is assignedj.tO spent fuel shipments limit of 10:mrem/hr. at a distance of, 6 feet from the surface of the vehicle.

44 4 4444 4 4

-1 is similar to that for truck transport, assuming one freight train per hour and a 10-foot mimimum separation between passing trains. Because of the very small number of passenger trains and the small number of freight train crew members, the on-link annual dose is only 0.012 person-rem. The maximum annual individual on-link dose is negligible owing to the small number of passing trains.

Using the data given in Table 4-9, and summing over the population zones, an annual value of 23 person-rem to the surrounding off-link population is obtained. The maximum off-link dose is similar to that received by a railway station employee who works at a railway'station near a spent fuel reprocessing site. If 17 trains per year carrying irradiated fuel pass that station at an average distance of 30 meters and an average speed of 8 km per hour, and if that same station employee is working when each of them pass, he will receive 0.017 mrem according to 2

Equation (0-2) in Appendix D, with K = 1000 mrem-ft per hour.

4.3.3.1.3 Exposure to Population During Stops As indicated earlier, freight trains frequently stop at rail sidings in order to let other trains pass or to pick up additional cars. In addition, crew change and fuel stops occur at 4-to-6-hour intervals throughout the trip. If it is assumed that the train is stopped a total of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months per trip and those stops occur predominately in low population density zones, a total annual population dose while stopped of 0.9 person-rem is computed using the general expression for population dose during shipment stops derived in Section 0.2 of Appendix D for each standard shipment and summing the results.

An example of the maximum dose to an individual while the train is stopped is that received by a railroad employee who serviced the train while-it was stopped. If it is postulated that the employee works'at a station near an irradiated fuel reprocessing center that handles 100 iercent of the annual rail shipments and that this employee spends an average of 15 minutes at an average distance of 15 meters from each shipment, his annual dose would be 1.65 mrem. This value was obtained using the dose-rate formula in Appendix 0, Equation (0-1) with d = 15 meters 2

and assuming 17 shipments per year and a K of 1000 Iremr-ft per hour.

4.3.3.2 Storage Associated with Rail Transport Very little storage is likely to be associated with rail transport of radioactive materials.

A spent fuel shipmentthat occupies a single car might spend 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months in rail yards waiting to be Included in a'train to take it toward its destination. In such a location, the average exposable population density is estimated to be 25 people per l*2,'corresponding to 20 employees, in a railyard 1.6 kilometers long and 0.5 kilometer wide. Again,fusing the formula for dose while stopped, given in Section 0.2 of Appendix 0, an annual population dose of 0.7 person-rem is obtained.

An example of the maximum individual dose during rail shipment storage is that delivered to a railroad employee assigned to service or check the railcars carrying irradiated fuel in the yard prior to final coupling to the parent train. If such a person checks 17 such trains per year at an average distance of 8 meters, and if such a check takes 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months , he would receive 4-24

an annual dose of 25 mrem. This number was obtained by using Equation (D-1) of Appendix D for 2

the dose rate and assuming a K value of 1000 mrem-ft per hour for each shipment, as in the standard shipment model.

4.3.3.3 Summary in The annual doses resulting from rail transport of radioactive material are summarized Table 4-10; the total is 26 person-rem (exclusive of freight handler dosage).

4.3.4 TRANSPORT BY WATER Historically, water transport modes have been used for shipments of material that are massive or bulky or that do not require exceptionally fast travel. Shipments of irradiated number of fuel and fresh fuel would therefore qualify for water transport. A considerable to have export shipments of enriched uranium and long-half-life isotopes by ship were reported occurred in 1975 (see Appendix A).

4.3.4.1 Transport by Barge It is anticipated that barge may be a feasible method for transporting fresh fuel'to No such ship reactors and irradiated fuel to reprocessors located on appropriate waterways.

occurred in ments were reported'in the 1975 shipper survey. However, at least one shipment exposed at each early 1976. With relatively few people exposed during movement and a few fuel terminal, population exposure is expected to be negligible. The transport of irradiated by barge is considered as an alternative in Chapter 6 of this report.

4.3.4.2 Transport by Ship only two transport For the overseas export-import trade in radioactive materials, there are packages (less than a few modes available: air and ship. Generally, relatively light-weight 1975 survey revealed a tonnes) of short-half-life materials are transported by aircraft. The uranium, fresh reactor fuel, and total of 3747 TI transported by ship, principally enriched to be 8.1 Kr-85. The total annual population dose from these shipments was calculated computational techniques person-rem using the transport parameters in Table 4-11 and the same 4-12.

as used for other transport modes. The-esults are summarized in Table assigned watch station An example of the maximum dose is that received by a crewman whose stowed. If that person stands includes the cargo area in which an enriched uranium shipment is spends 5 minutes per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months of watch every day and makes normal hourly rounds, he probably vessel carries a single hour at an average distance of 3 meters from the shipment. If his would be 3.7 mrem. Individual shipment per year and the trip lasts 10 days, his annual dose because the actual numbers of exposures of the other population subgroups were not evaluated people and their yearly exposures were not known.

4-25

I -______

TABLE 4-10 DOSES FROM RAIL TRANSPORT OF RADIOACTIVF MATERIAL - 1975

- 1975 Annual Maximum Population Dose, Annual Individual Population Subgroup (person-rem) Dose (mrem)

Crew 0.9 1.2 Surrounding population On-link 0.012 not evaluated Off-link 23 0.017 Bystanders/Railway Workers 0.9 1.65 Storage 0.7 25 TOTAL 26 C.

.4'-

4-26

TABLE 4-11 SHIPMENT PARAMETERS FOR CALCULATION OF POPULATION DOSE FOR WATERBORNE TRANSPORT MODES Ship Barge Number of Crewmen 10 5 Mean Velocity (kr'L' 14 5 Distance from Source to Crew Wm) 61 46 Fraction of Travel High population zones 0.001 0.01 Medium population zones 0.009 0.09 Low population zones 0.99 0.90 Total Stop Time (hr)

(Medium population zone) 10 10 Total TI Shipped 3747 4-27

I-TABLE 4-12 DOSE RESULTING FROM SHIP TRANSPORT OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL - 1975 Annual -Maximum Population Population Dose Annual Individual Subgroup (person-rem) Dose (mrem)

Crew 5.7 3.7 Bystanders/stevedores during stops 1.1 not evaluated Persons in port area (off-link) 0.9 not evaluated Persons in vicinity of storage area 0.4 not evaluated TOTAL 8.1 4-28

4.4 EXPOSURE OF HANDLERS Handlers of radioactive material packages are generally exposed to the highest dose rates of any population group; however, because they handle the packages for relatively short times, relatively small doses are received. Handling, as defined in this report, occurs whenever a package is transferred from one mode to another, irrespective of the number of people and .

physical movements that take place. A recent study (Ref. 4-11) indicated that the average population dose received by handlers at airports was 2.5 x 10"4 person-rem per TI for small packages. This population dose conversion factorwas used for each handling considered in this report. Thus the dose computed for handlers js likely to be conservative because the number of people involved in airport handling is likely to be the largest andthe time spent-in handling the most prolonged throughout the shipping industry. . .

In this document, the handler dose iscomputed by multiplying this average dose conversion factor by the average TI per-package, the number of packagesper shipment, the number of ship-.

ments per year, and an estimated number of handlings per package. This calculation is repeated for each standard shipment, and the total handler dose is obtained by summing all standard shipments.' The total annual handler dose was calculated tobe 1740 person-rem.

, -'* I _ " . , -"

Irradiated fuel casks and irradiator sources, because of their large sizes, are not handled-in the same ways as smaller packages. Two handlers are assumed to spend 15 minutes at both the shipping end and the receiving end attaching and detaching rigging equipment for loading and unloading the cask in an average radiation field of 200 mrem per hour-(1 meter from thecask)

(Ref.,4-10). This results in a population dose.of O.lperson- 1rem(2 persons x 200.mrem per, hour x 1/4 hour) at each end,,for a total of 0.2 person-rem per shipment., Multiplication by, the number of-shipments per year gives theannual population dose in person-rem. A total of.54 person-rem to handlers may result from the handling oflarge casks. -Much of this exposure is not expected to be within the transport industry but rather to employees of the shippers and consignees.

Individual doses to handlers have been evaluated for those employed in airport terminals (Ref. 4-11).,-Results of those studies -indicate-that.no workers would receive annual doses in excess of 500 mrem and most workers who participatedin the survey would have .received annual doses smaller than 100 mrem as a result of handling radioactive material shipments. It is expected that the individual doses to airport handlers are the largest of any similar group.

4.5 NONRADIOLOGICAL" IMPACTS ON THE ENVIRONMENT _ - - " . - -"-

The two principal nonradiological impacts that may arise from.the normal transport of radioactive material are area denial and resource use.

4.5.1 ,AREA DENIAL-.

There:is'notsignificant area denialbresulting from normal .transport of radioactive material termi packages., Most-packages are shipped along with other freight,and are stored in the same nals as other freight awaiting shipment. Although radioactive material packages are usually 4-29

I-isolated in designated areas of freight terminals, it is doubtful that significantly smaller total floor areas would be required if there were no transport of radioactive materials.

Exclusive-use shipments require no storage, since they proceed directly from shipper to consignee.

4.5.2 RESOURCE USE The primary resourceuses associated with radioactive material transport include the com mitment of shielding material for construction of packages anrId the use of energy to move the transport vehicles. The shipment of radioactive material requires shielding of individual packages to reduce exposuire to people 'and photographic materials during transport. Construc tion of these packages requires commitment of natural resources in a manner that may or may not; permit recycling and reuse. The principal materials used for shielding are lead and depleted uranium. quantities committed at any one time to use as shielding in transportation packaging; are only a small percentage of-the total amounts of these materials used for all other purposes.

Reuse of lead shielding material by return of used packages to the shipper is accomplished, (according to an intervew' with a major radiopharmaceutical shipper) about 50 percent of the time. In the remaining cases, the disposition of the material is unknown, but it is assumed that a significant recycling effort takes place. This assumption is based largely on the fact that the radioactive mterfal packages are received by people who are licensed to possess radioactive materials and who appreciate the value of reusing the shielding material either directly or by recasting'it Into a'usable form.' In addition,' Industrial- and commercial users 'o, often have an active salvage operation for metals of all kinds. Thus,.one might well expect no more than 20 percent loss in lead shielding material per year.' A significant fraction of this material is sent to refuse disposal areas. The environmental impacts of this loss are the energy and resources necessary to replace the unreturned material and the presence of lead in an uncontrolled environment. "

Depleted uranium is typically used as shielding in large casks such as those used to ship "irradiated'fuel orliarge Irradiator sources.- Since these casksare quite costly, the uranium.

resources involved are carefully controlled and'fully recycled.-I Depleted uranium used to construct shields Is obtained from enrichment tailings and, at present, has few alternative uses.

Other materials such as wood, steel, fiberboard, and plastic are also used in the con struction of packaging used to transport radioactive materlals. 'Sinceradioactive materials, constitute only a very small percentage of the total amount of goods transported in similar packages, the use of these-resources for their transport is considered negligible.

The second area of resource use is in the operation of the transportation Industry itself.

The transport of material requires the comitment of personnel, money, and resources. Since 6 transported radioactive material packages account for only 2 x 10 of the 500 x 109 packages annually, and asince; for the -HmOtpairt they ire transported'incidentally to other freight,,

virtually no savings in resources would be realized if they were'removed from the transport -.

process.

4-30

routinely along with Certain radioactive material shipments, however, cannot be handled shielding, certain ship other freight. Because of excessive bulk, radioactivity, or massive locations. Examples of-.

ments'are'handled as theexclusive cargo for transport between two civilian reactors and large these kinds of shipments-are irradiated fuel from military and vehicles irradiator sources. Natural and enriched uranium'are'usually carried on exclusive-use resource use and environ because of their bulk rather than their radioactive properties. The with and charged to the transpor mental impact committed to such shipments can be identified as fuel use, noise, pollution, tation of radioactive materials. Such environmental impact items A considerable and accidental injuries and deaths can be associated with such-activities..

about 7,500 such ship amount of-material is transported by exclusive-use vehicles, but only radiopharmaceuticals ments ý-consisting of nuclear fuel, waste, large quantity source, and some total number of shipments are made per Pear. 'These shipments are a negligible,fractlon of the these nonradiological of all materials and therefore account for only a small fraction of transportation'Impacts:--: - -

4.6 ABNORMAL TRANSPORT'OCCURRENCES infrequently and that "In 'each mode of-transport there is a class of incidents that occur

-incidents are con cause-additional radiation'exposure and radioactivecontamination. These not involve accidents that sidered here as a component of normal transportation because they do dropping of packages by cause damage to the shipping vehicle. Included are such events as skewering of packages material handlers, packages being run over and crushed by a vehicle, and Other occurrences relate to by a forklift, any of which may compromise package integrity.

properly, labeling packaging procedures and include failure to pack the ;radioactive materials or, too small), failure to close seals packages with an incorrect TI rating (either too large Package loss is properly; use of defective fittings, or-failure to provideadequate shielding.,-

in excess radiation yet another in the class of abnormal occurrences, any of;which may result exposure to handlers or to the general public. , .. -

- The'DOT received 144 hazardous material incident.(HMI) reports .involving radioactive in only36 -,

materials during the 5-year period 1971-1975 (Ref. 4-12). Releases were indicated indicating of these reports. About half of these releases occurred in,Z1975 (20 incidents),

leading to a that fewer than one out of every 100,000 packages were involved in incidents for about half the total release. Air carriers (including air freight forwarders) accounted and the remainder number of reports submitted. Highway carriers accounted for about 45 percent, by highway carriers.

were filed by rail carriers., Over 60 percent of:the releases were noted packages of radiopharmaceuticals.

Most-of the air shipment incidents involved Type A or limited Appendix F.includes 98 of these incidents in alist of hazardous material incident reports obtained -from.DOT. -

handling, Five of the twelve reported releases-in the air mode involved packages dropped in anct crushed by a vehicle.

typically-falling off a cargo handling cart and then being run over from damage by other freight, 4ewternal puncture, loose Other releases forJthe air mode resulted fittings-or closures, or other improper packaging. .. - . . - , .

4-31

-1 The' reported highway incidents, included Type A radiopharmaceutical packages, drummed low-specific-activity wastes,"large casks; and radiography- sources.. Twelve of the reported incidents (only one of which involved a release of radioactivity) were caused by vehicular accidents and are therefore the subject of Chapter 5. Defective or improper packaging was responsible for over half the incidents that involved a release.

A principal impact produced by a damaged package is radiation exposure of inaividuals handling the package and others who are near the. package for- a period- of time, especially..,

before the damage is detected. Other impacts are associated with the resulting radioactive contamination, including the doses received by cleanup crews and the cleanup costs. For most Packages (e.g.. radiopharmaceuticals or small industrial sources), this is a small effect.

As an example of the radiation levels to which persons might be exposed, a 30-curie Ir-192 source with complete loss of shielding resulting from a packaging error could produce a dose rate of as much as 25 rem per hour at 1 meter from the center of the package., A single incident in which shielding was lost on one side of such a package is known to have occurred. Although the exposed individuals exhibited no detectable acute health effects (indicating a dose of less than 25-50 rem), it is clear that the potential exists for large individual doses under these.

circumstances.

Most radioactive materials' are shipped in Type A packages, which are designed to withstand only normal conditions of-transportation. The quantities of, material released in package-dam aging Incidents are expected t6 be on the order of 10-3 of the package content. With this release fraction for Type'A quantities of a radionuclide and' assuming that 10-3 of the material, released is inhaled, ingested, or absorbed, an average individual dose rate about 0.5 rem per--.

year is expected. (This dose rate'and release, fraction are derived from the basis of the IAEA Type A quantity specification for each material.) Since most handling accidents are likely to occur in terminal areas, fewer than 10 people are likely to be exposed and the population exposure received per incident is u'nl1kelyito be greater than 5 person-rem.. For the current 20 incidents involving a'release per year, the expected annual population dose rate is expected to be less than 100'person-rem from this source. -.

4.6.1 IMPROPER LABELING OF PACKAGES Estimates of the annual 'radiological impacts resulting from abnormal occurrences'are difficult at best, Isince incidents involving release or partial loss of shielding are so di--,

verse, and the numbers of persons exposed are usually not know. ' Some of the shipments reported.

in the 1975 Survey (Ref. 4-13, described in Chapter 1) may have included packages with incor-i rectly assigned transport indexes. If the total reported TI were too low, the annual normal dose is higher than that calculated Jn this'chaptei.' On the other'hand;'if-the total -reported TI were too high,the annual dose would be lower than anticipated.'L However, assigning.aTI1 higher than that' warrakted'by the radiation level could cause shipments to'be -unnecessarily:-,

delayed because of restrictions on the maximum TI allowed on a transport vehicle.! Improper;r, !

labeling of packages usually occurs for one of the following reasons: (a) premature release of the package for shipment or (b) an error in measuring the radiation level at 3 feet from the package surface to determine the TI.

4-32

Premature .release of a package for shipment is'a particular problem with short-half-life materials because the decay that occurs between labeling and actual commencement of shipping is factored into the labeling process. If the time lag is underestimated consistently, an extra hazard may be incurred by the public and the industry. "

Measurements of package TIs in 1973 showed a significant number had more TIs than stated on the label (Ref. 4-14). To combat this problem and that resulting from improper shieldin"g FAA has proposed that every package offered to the airlines be monitored before it is accepted for shipment. This procedure might catch shipping errors before the consequences could affect a large number of people.

4.6.2 IMPACT RESULTING FROM LOSS OF CONTROL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL PACKAGES-The principal impact resulting from loss of control of a package'is irradiation of people in-the vicinityof. the package who are unaware of its presence or contents. Loss of control might-result when a package is separated from its radioactive labels' i'fit is 'dripped during transport.. Either scenario is potentially more serious if shielding or'package 'Integrity is lost, especially if a long-half-life nuclide is Involved.

A typical population dose may be computed by using Equation (D-9) of Appendix D, 'where' allowance is made for the change of the TI with time due to radioactive decay:

D(T) = 7-19-93I(x,d)P(T)o -t) e (4-2) where I(x,d) 27, f e-r B(r)dr .

t-t '" = half-life of isotope - ,,* -- , .s-. ' .. -,

"(TI) intit'ial c e ' L- ' . " . ...... .. --.

PD = population density

'T - tir during which package is'lost!-'-*

K - TI to dose rate constant conversion factor 2

ASuburban population density'of '719 persons per km (6.68 x'1O"- persons per ft ) and is a 1.0-TI Type-A "package _oi'I-131'with' 'h~aif-life of 8 days, the populationidose received about "7-x i0 3person-rern, assuming the 'pickagl'Is-lost indefinitely.- -The population dose associated with a lost package in an area of higher populationdensity would be proportionall higher, but is unlikely to reach a significant level.

incidents The average time to recover a lost package is -approximately 14 days (based on reported 'during :1976).-- A high dose 'rate'makefs'-a -package -easier-,to -locate 'using radiation for,.an survey equipment. Using the 14-day value' iiithe above*calculation,ýthe population-dose 1-131 package loss is of the order of 0.005 person-rem. Records indicate an average'of55" 4-33

I-losses per year over the last 9 years. Assuming all lost packages to be like the 1-131 package just considered, an average annual population dose of 0.025 person-rem might be expected.

4.7 SHIPMENT BY FREIGHT FORWARDERS The previously mentioned State surveillance studies (Ref. 4-15) examined four freight out." The forwarder locations where, consolidation of radiopharmaceutical packages is carried average annual population exposure associated with these operations was found to be 4 person-rem the per location. It is estimated that there are no more than 10 such locations throughout country, resulting in a maximum annual population exposure of 40 person-rem.

4.8 EXPORT AND IMPORT SHIPMENTS

,Export risks are considered to occur from the time the material leaves the shipper until it enters the country of its destination. This includes the secondary mode link from the into shipper to the U.S. port of departure and the primary mode link to the first port of entry the destination country, but not the secondary mode link to the ultimate destination within the foreign country. Import risks are considered to occur from the time the shipment first arrives in the U.S. until it reaches its ultimate U.S. destination. Thus, import'risks are associated' primarily with the secondary mode transport of the material from the U.S. port of entry to its destination.

4.8.1 EXPORT SHIPMENTS The export normal risks were evaluated in ways completely analogous to the total normal risk evaluation using the export standard shipments model discussed in Appendix A, Section A.6.1. Secondary mode mileages were half of their counterparts in the total risk calculation, since the secondary mode link on the receiving end was not considered and the number of han dlings were adjusted accordingly. The results are given in Tables'4-13 and 4-14 by transport mode and material, respectively. The total annual normal population dose resulting from export shipments is 61 person-rem, or 0.6 percent of the total 1975 normal risk.

The maximum individual dose due to export shipments is unlikely to be greater than that delivered to an airline passenger who happens to fly on a number of passenger aircraft flights carrying radioactive materials. The data indicated about 600 TIwere'exported by passenger aircraft. If these,600 TIwere transported on 50 flights each carrying 12 TI and if an,.-Ind"i vidual happened to fly on ooe-fourth ofall flights with radioactive 'aterials and experience the average 0.36 urea per hour dose rate (0.030 mrem per hour TI x 12 TI) for an average of 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months per flight, his total dose would be 36 urem. .- - .

4.8.2 IMPORT SHIPMENTS I -, , ? 1 - i , . I , - I - I the Since imports reported in the 1975 Survey accounted for only an estimated 40 TI and to the total normal dose total-TI transported annually is 4.5 x 106, the contribution of these is considered negligible. *,- .

4-34

I I . 4' -I ,

TABLE 4-13 ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT'OF NORMAL EXPORT SHIPMENTS (BY MODE)

-, SIumATTON W. nrOUP POPULATION EXPSURF TO RIOIATION IN PFP.SON RF" ASA 4ODES UNDVR NORMAL C0407TIONS WEUTOF TRANSPORT Of WBPvflUIR&OTOACTtVE "ATERIALS 81 VIRIOUS IRANSI'OWY 444 *44 44

,1 4 4. Rpouot4oiN POPULATION 44 4. OVTNG I TIMM~t4S ,)Fl LINK STORAGE TO TALS, PASSENGERS CRVMNfN HANOLFRS "NOat eir SR!!MFNVN 44 4444 t444 i -4" v,

6. S3SE7 - h.vqMe-ui4 6.1qTE-aI 0 44ISt2F-U a,

a. .633EM0 WAS T. AIR 1.002E#Qt S.320E'Cft a.444 63AIE0cfee 0.' - I.211-S1 44 GO AIR I./' *44

?.ISIE-02 .723E-01 34

,alef-12 .I.863E*01 TRUCKC 1:.,

4.4 I..ffl6*0S 9.274E-01 SI*7SqE*Dg 2.283E'SI SEC. "4our$ 0. 7.055E#OO a. ~Ssal.sa ,col-v RAIL to. a. .4 OTHEW I.'-# 7.665f#flfl 1 44~* 4 4 wt L 4 44 4',44 ,I 4

14

.osac.a 3.A6VI900 ;;srelfua 6.469ce#S TOTALS 1.0ilrtW 2.IISE'flt 4414*444 f4444 4 4 4

44 4,4' i¶ , .4 ý 4 444* 44 I I I,,

44 *4? 4 f444 44444 4 44 4' 44 4 ,44 444444 4.44444 44 44 4 4'4 f44,44 44444 ¶ 4 .4 44 *4' It 4)44444 4444 4444444444444444444444 4 44,441 444 7 -

4 4

)4 44 4 4 --

TABLE 4-14 ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT OF NORMAL EXPORT SHIPMENTS (BY ISOTOPE)

SUMMATION OF GQ'OIIP POPULATION EXPOSURE TO RADIATION IN PrOSflN RFhq AS A RESULT Of TRANSPnRT OF VARIOUS RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS UNOFR "flRIIAL CONDITIONS GROUPS SURRV3UNnING POPULATION W'411P MOVING ISOTOPE SHIPMENT PASSENGERS CRENNFN ATTENDANTS I4ANOLFRS qFF LINKI ON LINKC STOPS STORRGF TOT ALS 9147'1-A 6.743E-Ot 2.1I3r-o1 3.227E-62 1. 672E-0 1 6.2?7E-03 t.133F-02 2.090F-0 2 2.1!15F-0l? 1.15'.E.00 1.099E-02 4.994E-03 4i.20DE-03 1.28SF-D0e 5.4.IIIE-UU. 3.015E-04. 4.444F.8-94U 2.213E-02 AU198 0. 4.8S'SE-93 9.008F-03 2.1.90F-U' too51E-03 5.4.1E -04 1961.8F-02 C 057 3.592E-02 3e27.E-fl3 I.676E-U 3 1. 500UE-02 2.386E-8'. 1.9071?03 9.0 18 E-U'.4 I. 330E-03 5 .FIU5E-02 C061I-x 0. 12.751E-03 3. 00 GE-U 3 G.301-05 3.5017I-fU. 1.804Fv-04 2.66 1E-04. 6.661F-03 C050-8 I* t.272E-o1 1. 95 GE-U 3.331.7-0S -2.44.6E-03 U..6E0 6.195F-03 1. 64.0E-01 C-14 2.7ZSE000 Z.52'.E-o1 404U61.E-01 6.234.E-03 3.'.75E-02 2. 684F.-02 3.959F-OZ 3.663E*00 tR192-k ,1.500 F-U2 4..ISE-Uh., 1.757F-U'! 9.0 lAF-Ul 1.130V-al 3.1144F-02 IR192-9 ?.2OtaE-6 I 7.29SE-31l 3.079F-02 1.585F-02 2.334F!-02 4. 183E-0 1 "NF*I4C% U. 1.202E-01

0. 1.6?'.E-01 4..632E-03 1*955E-UP 1. 006ET02 1.'.85E-02 3.35SE-Il Ti131-A 9.62.E-U~ .U'eE-0t, 4,.606F-0 2 1.733E-U'! 7.5157-631 E*9?6E-03 1.022E-OZ 1. 1607 #0 WITEO-A s5*711E-03 '..2?2E-04 2.73#sF-1'. 2. IGGE-03 3.1137-05 ,1.314E7-04. 1.762E-U04 1.462F-04 8.9A3E-03 "wn99-A 4.124.E#00 6.959E-01 t.97'.e-ot 1.U7U.E*00 2.191E-02 19.2'.9E-U2 8. IZ5E-02 1.146F-01 6.1.017100 s.5?Uf-o1u 7.176E-U2.., 4.*078F-02 8. 10GE-U 2 1.8547-01l T7.WUE-0.3 5.811.7-03 8. 57A8r-al 1.loflM#08 P32-W 1.0042E-01 G.AW6-13 4..98 6E-03 fl.&816E-OZý 3*IZ3E-I'. 1.31AF-03' 10086F.-03 1.602E-03 1.381.F-01 KE 133-A U..A06F-03 1.176E-021. 1.71.3E-U'., 7.3S7E-Il. 7. 713F-U0. 1.117F-01 1.2377-01 04726-A Go 1*702E-02 To 2.4WIUE-gz 1.4413E-03 2.128F-01 4.6*06E-02 1.,2S2E-01,, 8.369F-02 5*992E-13 5*06ZE-02 5.2977-03 5.374.F-03 6.25 67-03 8.7217-03 2.91.3E-Ot "PU238-9 1.69ZE-02 1.?i6E-U02 9. OSSE-016 .l.512E!-Q2 4..371E-04' 1.64.5F-03' 1.3 16E-03 1.86 87-23 5. 756E-02 fie 2.673E-02 9.1117-03 8.8627-0'q 7.639E-03 1.0307-02 1.3607-01 tPS-E-LG go 7.'162E#00 I& 7.42C0E.U6 6.5757-01 z.2qlEtaa 1.998E*UU Z.S5867.00 2.232E*01 2.78SE-01 t.Lt3E**Ot 1,333E-02 3.Z5IE*UU t.1.IlE000 1.353E*00 1.198E.00 1.628E.00 2. 526E*Ot VOZ-RX a., l.33'3E*G0 Qs. 1.07IEU00 3.53BE-92 1.4.93'E-01 7.688E-02 1.131.7-01 2. 78E0S 0 TDOTALS ,1.882E*81 2.169E#81 '..79'.E-o1 1. 423E+31I 2.177E*UI f#.vURoE.U 3*467E.0 .03o0 4.603c*oo 6.670 6.069E+lt

4.9

SUMMARY

OF ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS FOR NORMAL TRANSPORT In this summary only the radiological impacts from normal transport of radioactive materials are discussed in detail, since they are the predominant ones. Other impacts, e.g., area denial and resource use, are secondary. Because radioactive materials are carried most often on Vehicles whose prime purpose is-to carry passengers or other freight, these secondary impacts would occur regardless of the presence of the" radioactive material package. The impacts pre dicted for 1985 are based on the scaled-up standard shipments model presented in Appendix A.

The radiological impact in terms of annual population doses is given in Table 4-15 for various population subgroups-and modes of shipment. Table 4-16 shows similar information clas sified by isotope shipment rather than by mode of shipment. Tables 4-17 and 4-18 show the projected values for 1985. Table 4-19 summarizes the maximum individual annual dose values.

From the data contained in these five tables, the following observations can be made:

1. Shipments of waste material account for 15 percent of the 1975 dose and 24 percent of the 1985 dose. These shipments are numerous and have large TI values. Shipment of isotopes for medical use accounts for approximately 52 percent of the total 1975 dose and 38 percent of the 1985 dose. While each such shipment emits radiation at,relatively low intensity, the number of such shipments is very large. Shipments of isotopes for industrial use account for 24 percent of the 1975 dose and 22 percent of the 1985 dose. Nuclear fuel -cycle shipments account for 9 percent of.the 1975 dose and 15 percent of the 1985 dose. Limited shipments contribute 0.6 percent of the 1975 dose and 0.7 percent of the 1985 dose.

2. The highway transport modes (truck and delivery van)' contribute 69 percent of the total 1975 dose. Passenger air transport accounts for 30 percent of the total'1975 dose.

3. On the basis of person-rem per TI carried; the passenger air mode causes the largest radiological effect for the material carried. Values for each mode are shown below:

Mode Person-rem perWTI carried Passenger air 0.0067 Ship 0.00265 Secondary modes - 0.00198 All-cargo air , . . 0.00128 Truck " I 0.00116 Rail 0.00065 When the mean person-rem per TI for secondary transport modes is added o that for each primary transport mode, the ranking is as follows: - - -. -

- - 1' - -

4-37

TABLE 4-15 ANNUAL NORMAL POPULATION DOSES (PERSON-REM) FOR 1975 SHIPMENTS BY POPULATION GROUP AND TRANSPORT MODE

-Population Group "Surrounding Population Transport % of Mode Passengers Crew Attendant as Handlers Off-Link On-Link Stops Storage Totals Total Passenger b %

Aircraft 2330.0 16.000 111 I 433.00 0 0, 10.800, 0 2902.00 30 I

Cargo Aircraft 0 4.090 0 16.10 0 0 0.413 0 20.60

.. Truck 0 2580.000 0 51.60 347.000 172.000 999.000% 261.000 4406.00 45 Rail 0 0.893 0 92.50 22.500 0.012 0.879 0.666 117.00 1 Other 0, 5.710 0 1.87 0.878 0 1.080 0.392 9.93 Secondary 24 Modes 0 534.000 0 1143.00 51.200 216.000 79.200 310.000 2333.00 2330.0 31404000 112 1740.00 422.000 388.000 1090.000 572.000 9790.0Q TOTALS

% OF TOTAL 24 32 1 18 4 4 11 6

TABLE 4-16 3T ANNUAL NORMAL POPULATION DOSES (PERSON-REM) FOR 1975 SHIPMENTS BY POPULATION GROUP AND MATERIAL Surrounding Population TotalsI . Total

%of' Attendants Handlers Off-Link On-Link stops Storage material Passengers crew 10.500 14.600 18.400 0.905 79.000 4.380 262.000 3.0 Am-241 A 18.90o 1,15.000 0.047 0.046 0.059 1.950 0.020 0.240 0.032 B .413 1.loo1 Am-241 2.440 3.140 66.700 1.0 16.600 0.938 2.180 15.500 25.200 0.740 Au-198 0.109 0.079 0.107 5.300 0.134 0.805 0.046 C-1 4 2.790 1.2 30 14.300 0.150 0.279 0.231 0.305 4.590 0.311 1.960 Co-57 6.500 2.0 7.280 10.400 13.100 197.000 T, 110.000 0.358 43 :900 3.720, Co-60 LSA 7.490 19.000 26.100 32.500 645.000 7.0 122.000 13.000 0 433.000 0'*

Co-60 A 0.864 1.04 16.400 3.290: 0.265 0.131 B 0 10.900 Co-60 0.004 0.001 0.120 0' 0.003 0.001 LQ1 0, 0.110 Co-60 0.038 0.076 0.020 1.640 0 0.800, 0.075 Co-60 L02 0. 0.627-1 355.000 4.0 5.300 16.300 27.100 33.800 138.000 0.165 130.000 Cs-137 A 0.054 0.067 1.010

3: 346a 0.222 0.02 0.039 0..6o0 0 Cs-137 B 0 1.22 20.800 0.312 0.781 0.955ý 0.161 6.030 31.360' 7.940 Ga-67 0.026 0.035 0.906

"-0.253 0;010 0.032 0.321 0.213 0.015-H-3 LSA 0.016 0.115 0.006 0.015 0.012 0.663 -

0.314 0.169 0.015 H-3 A

TABLE 4-16 (continued)

Sof Passengers Crew Attendants Handlers Off-Link On-Link Stops Storage Totals Total Material 1-131 A 1000.000 504.000 48.000 426.00 20.500 54.600 43.000 57.900 2160.000 22.0 0.041 0.090 0.088 0.114 2.420 1-131 B 0.848 1.140 0.o041 0.554 0.638 .. 1.350 1.140 1.500 53.800 Ir-192 A 20.500 '18.400 0.981 9.370 8.500 15.300 14.000 18.100 584.000 6.0 Ir-192 'B 170.000 265.000 8.140 85.000 6.440 0.816 1.170 1.090 1.400 46.600 Kr-85 A 10.100 25.100 0.483 0.060 0.007 .011 0.011 0.014 0.424 Kr-85 B 0.092 0.224 0.004 0.878 1.660 1.690 2.170 63.300 1.0 Limited 17.800 26.600 0.853 11.600 0 0 3.470 1.710 16.100 4.210 47.900 MF+MC LSA 0 22.500 03 8.940 4.410 32.200 8.440 72.700 1.0 MF+MC A 0 18.600 0 0 0 0.026 0.013 0.106 0.028 1.250 MF+MC B 0 1.080 0 0 0 0.008 0.004 0.011 0.003 0.351 MF+MC LO 0 0.326 6.970 0.626 1.170 1.670 2.090 32.800 Mixed LSA 1.250 19.000 0.060 17.600 0.956 2.300 3.540 4.440 55.700 1.0 Mixed A 1.680 25.000 0.080 0.576 0.050 0.096 0.147 0.183 2.550 Mixed B 0 1.500 0 25.100 53.800 47.600 62.600 2210.000 23.0 A 873.000 715.000 41.800 393.000 Mo-99 3.810 5.800 4.500 5.920 329.000 3.0 144.000 127.000 6.890 31.100 Mo-99 B 4.510 0.250 0.599 0.491 0.654 24.600 P-32 10.900 6.630 0.522 0.013 0.0007 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.056 Po-210 A 0.019 0.018 0.0009

TABLE 4-16 (continued)

% of Storage Totals Total Material Passengers Crew Attendants Handlers Off-Link On-Link Stops 0.171 0.150 0.008 0.058 0.005 0.010 0.008 0.011 0.421 Po-210 LO 0.007 0.020 0.024 0.07, 0.505 0.080 0.179 0.004 0.158 Pu-238 A 0.063 0.066 0.084 2.480 0.589 1.250 0.028 0.357 0.038 Pu-238 B 1.170 1.530 1.910 40.500 0.915 27.900 0.044 6.190 0.825 Pu-239 B 0.0008 0.0002 0.0003 0.008 0 0.003 0 0.003 0.0002 Pu-239 LO 3.790 5.820 7.260 105.000 0 58.700 0 27.300 1.97 1.0 Ra-226 A 0.204 0.314 0.396 3.800 1.330 0.005 1.380 0.065 Ra-226 B 0.104 t Spent fuel 0.175 0.427 0.068 0 6.800 0.222 0.089 7.780 rail 0 Spent fuel 0 1.880 4.820 1.260 93.800 1.0 truck 0 31.300 50.800 3.8 11.200 14.000 138.000 1.0 0.165 57.700 2.160 7.050 Tc-99 3.440 42.200 1.310 1.810 2.540 30.400 0

17.200 0 1.030 UF6-nat 6.500 0 0.135 0.218 0.107 3.870 3.140 0 0.147 0.118 UF6-enr 0 0 2.830 3.250 5.210 2.570 36.300 19.500 2.970 U02-enr 0 0 0.443 0.465 0.689 0.341 15.000 12.500 0.395 U02-Rx 67'.100 485.000 5.0 0

113.000 0 172.000 47.000 "38.900 '47.800 U308 "0.422 0.439 0.553 18.400 12.700 0.088 1.960 0.356 U-Pu 1.840 1.700 12.600 3.290 38.400 0 0- - , 3.450 Waste LSA 0 17.400

TABLE 4-16 (continued)

% of Handlers Off-Link On-Link Stops Storage Totals Total Haterials Passengers Crew Attendants 254.000 125.000 746.000 195.000 1460.000 15.0 Waste A 0 139.000 0 0 0 0 0.357 0.176 1 .580 0.413 3.090 Waste B 0 0.565 5.460 0.421 0.789 0.743 0.964 32.500 Xe-133 10.8 12.800 0.516 2330,000 3140.000 112.000 1740.000 422.000 388.000 1090.000 572.000 9790.000 TOTAL 1 18 4 4 11 6 PERCENT 24 32

'47 ° nel ()

.r

"- rT

""I. * ,J r a

3' ' Iii r; '4 '$*

43 I I I,.' ,I, 4 -! -

-I I'

y

TABLE 4-17 ANNUAL NORMAL POPULATION DOSES (PEASON-REM) FOR 1985 SHIPMENTS BY POPULATION GROUP AND TRANSPORT MODE Population Group surrounding Population % of or~

Transp Passengers Crew Attendants Handlers Off-Link On-Link Stop Storage Totals Total Mode Passen ger 4010 27.30 192 702.00 17.30 4948.0 19 Aircr aft '

Cargo 3.96 0 188.0 '1 4.)

v Aircr aft 0 37.80 0 '146.00 0 0 1340.00 662.000 3870.00 1010.00 13840.0 54 Truck 0 6649.00 0 308.00 97.40 0.052 3.85- 2.92 607.0 2 Rail 0 "3.86 ' 0 499.00 3.86 0 4.37 1.59 47. 0 Other "0 29.60 0 7.60 Secondlary19.0 840 5720 0 :1220.00 0 2820.00 132.00 557.000 195.00 814.00 5732.0 233 Modes TO0 192 4480.00 1580.00 1220.000 4090.00 1830.00 25400.0 rALS 4010 7970.00

)F 18 6 5 16 TOJrAL IoQ

TABLE 4-18 ANNUAL NORMAL POPULATION DOSES (PERSON-REM) FOR 1985

HTPMENTS BY POPULATION GROUP AND MATERIAL SH PM NS . .

BY.. .. .. . . .

Surrounding Population

% of Handlers Off-Link On-Link Stops Storage - Totals Total Material '-Passengers Crew Attendants 0 205.000 12.300 31.200 37.900 47.800 648.000 3.0 Am-241 A 0 313.000 0.625 0.908 0.149 0.119 0.152 4.110 Am-241 'B 0 2.980 0 0.938 2.180 2.44 3.14 66.700 Au-198 15.500 25.200 0.740 16.600 2.090 0.119 .283 0.205 0.278 13.800 C-14, ' 7.260 3.200 0.348 0.336 .500 0.517 0.366 33,900 41 Co-57 16.900 11.300 0.808 3.160 9.990 20.200 27.100 34.000 497.000 2.0 Co-60 LSA 0 292.000 0 114.000 33.700 49.400 67.700 84.400 1680.000 7.0 Co-60 A 0 1130.000 0 317.000 4.550 0.691 .341 2.180 2.720 42.700 Co-60 B 0 28.300 0 0.007 .003 0.011 0.003 0.311 Co-60 L1; 0 .286 0 0 2.000 0.131 .094 0.190 0.050 4.090 Co-60 CQ 2 0 1.570 0 338.000 15.700 43.800 70.300 87.900 918.000 4.0 Cs-137 A 0 363.000 0 0.576 0.063 .102 0.140 0.175 2.610 Cs-137 B 0 1.570 0 15.700 0.438 1.850 0.942 1.390 51.700 Ga-67 24.800 5.490 1.180 0.659 0.027 .083 0.068 0.091 2.360 H-3 LSA 0.836 .555 0.04 0.017 .040 0.031 0.042 1.720

.440 0.039 0.299 H-3 A 0.817

TABLE 4-18 (continued)

% of Crew ,,Atttendants Handlers Off-Link. On-Link Stops Storage Totals Total Mat.* ial Passengers i 20.500 ": 54.600 43.000' 57.900 2160.000 9.0 f I-1000.000 504.000 48.000 426."000' 1-131 A 0.041' 0.090 0.088, , 0.114 2.920 0.848 1.140 0.041 0.553 ,"

1-131 B 54.000O* 2.010 5.010 2.950 3.890 92.200 Ir-192 A 0 24.400",'

0 25.200, 53.(000 36.400 47.100 1130.000 Ir-192 B 745:100'" 0 221.000 4.0 0

3.050 2.830 3.630 121.000 1.0 kr-85 A 16.700' 2.120, 26.200 65.2'00 1.260" 0.018, 0.029 0.029 0.038 1.100 Kr-85 A 6.582 0.011 ' 0.156

o.2iA6 2.290 4.320 4.390 5.670 165.000 2.220 30.200 1.0 Limited 46.300 14.400 7.100 66.700 17.400 199.000 93.100 0 0 1.0

.b. MF+MCt-LSA 0 37.000 18.300 134.000 34.900 301.000 1.0

," MF+C A 0 77.100 0 0 0.109 0.054 0.440': 0.115 5.170 0 4.460' 0 0 MF+MC B 0.033 0.016 0.046

0.012 . 1.460 0 1.366 0 0' MF*MC LQ 1.630l 3.050 4.350 5.450 85.600 3.25o 49.566 0.i56 18.2006 Mixed LSA 2.480,, 5.970 9.210, 11.500 145.000 65.1*0 0.M09 45.800': 1.0 Mixed' 4.370

.130 0.249 0.382 0.476 6.6301 3.890 0 1.5001, Mixed B 65.300 140.000 124.000 163.000 5750.000 4o-99 A 109.oo000 1020.000 23.0 2270.000 1860.000 11.700 15.400, 856.000 3.0 80.800 9.910 15.100 374.000 331.600 17.900 Mo-99 B 0.648 1.550 1.270 1.700, 63.700 28.300 17.2 00 1.350 11.700' P-32 0.004 ".008 0.005 0.009 0.127 0 0.059 O' 0.043 Po-210 A

TABLE 4-18 (continued)

% of Handlers Off-Link On-Link Stops Storage Totals Total Material Passengers Crew Attendants 0 0.443 0 0.152 0.017 0.039 0.021 0.029 0.700 Po-210 LO 0.411 0.019 0.052 0.063 0.081 S1.310 Pu-238 A 0.209 0.466 0.010 0.112 0.213 0.171 0.219 5.090 Pu-238 B 0 "3.450 0' 0.926

.0.833 1.210 1.530 1.910 39.700 Pu-239 B 0 28.000 0 6.190 0.003 0.0002 0.0008 0.0002 0.0003 0.007 Pu-239 LQ 0 0 0.003 Pu-recycle 0 0.333 0 0.006 0 7.030 6.650 0 0.041 1.970 3.790 5.820 7.260 105.000 Ra-226 A 58.700 0 27.300 0.229 0.314 0.396 3.800 I

B 1.410 0 1.380 0.071

,b o*

Ra-226 00 Spent fuel 8.530 3.440 16.400 298.000 1.0

rail,: 0 2.600 0 261.000 6.690 Spent fuel 22.900 7.600 565.000 2.0 truck 188.000 0" ,306.000 11.300 29.000 5.610 18.300 29.000 36.400 358.000 1.0 Tc-99 8.950 110.000 0.426 150.000

"- 34.500 1.360 3.530 2.310 3.200 224.000 1.0 144.000 "6.900 27.800 TI-201 161.000 198.000 278.000 2010.000 8.0 467.000 0 710'.000 195.000 U308 U 4.240 5.410 7.480 10.500 126.000 UF6-nat 0 S71:o000 "0 26.900 0 "0.609 0.489 .560 0.904 0.444 16.000 UF6-enr 0 13.000 0' 11.700 13.400 21.500 10.600 150.000 1.0

0" 80.700 0 12.300 U02-enr .2.860 1.410 61.300 0 1.640 1.840 1.930 U02-Rx 51.600

TABLE 4-18 (continued)

% of Total Attendants Handlers Off-Link On-Link Stops Storage Totals Material Passengers Crew 76.300 1.750 1.820 2.300 52.800 0.364 8.130 1.480 U-PU 7.610 7.040 52.000 13.600 159.000 1.0 71.900 0 0 14.300 Waste LSA 0 3080.000 805.000 6010.000 24.0 0 0 1050.000 516.000 Waste A 0 574.000 0.726 6.510 1.700 12.700 2.330 0 0 1.470 Waste B 0 2.050 1.930 2.510 84.500 28.000 33.400 1.340 14.200 1.090 Xe-133

.4b, 4480.000 1580.000 1220.000 4090.000 1830.000 25400.000 TOTALS 4010.000 7970.000 192.000

% OF 7 1 18 6 5 16 TOTAL 16 31 4

TABLE 4-19

SUMMARY

OF MAXIMUM ANNUAL INDIVIDUAL DOSES FROM RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL TRANSPORT Population 1975 Max. (Avg.) Probable Subgroup Dose (mrem)

Airline Passengers 108 ( 0.34)

Cabin Attendants 13 ( 2.9)

Passenger Aircraft Flight Crew 2.5 ( 0.53)

All-Cargo Aircraft Flight Crew 61 (12)

Air Crew (other air modes) 5 Truck Crew 870 Van Crew 70 Train Crew 1.2 Ship Crew 3.7 Freight Handlers 500 Bystanders (pass. air) 85 Bystanders (cargo air) 106 Bystanders (other air modes) 60 Bystanders (truck) 1.3 Bystanders (rail) 1.65 Off-link (truck/van) 0.009 Off-link (rail) 0.017 On-link (truck/van) 1.9 Storage (rail) 25 4-48

Person-rem per TI carried S..... (includina secondary link)

Mode I J m

Nonexclusive trucks 0.00889 Passenger air 0.00814 Ship 0.00524 All-cargo air 0.0035 Rail 0. 00183 Exclusive-use trucks (no secondary link) 0.00058

4. The estimated total annual population dose is 9,790 person-rem 'in 1975 and 25,400 person-rem in 1985. This dose has the same general characteristics as other chronic exposures to radiation such' as natural background: The predicted result of public exposure to this radiation is' approximately '1.19 -latent cancer'fatalities and 1.7 gehetic effects-in 1975 and 3.08 latent cancer'fatalities and 4.4 genetic defects in 1985. While thWe value of -9,790 person-rem may seem large, it is small when compared with the 4 x 107person-rem received by the total U.S. population in the form of natural background radiation (see Chapter 3). The total population it risk for-radioactive ýaiterlal transport ii estimated to be about 20 x 106 people (1975), based on estimates of n'umbers of aircraft'passengers, persons in air terminals, and persons living within 0.5 mile of truck and van routes. -Thus, the average"annual individual dose is approximately 0.5 mrem, which is a factor of 300 below the average individual dose from bac'kg~round id;riation. 'These resuits a e~shown in'Table'4-'20. '

5. Exports and imports of radioactive materials make only a very small contribution to the overall normal'risk.-- - '

S" . . .. TABLEt 20 .'.0 RESULTS - NORMAL TRANSPORT OF: ..

RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS

, - : :, .. .: *:- * *,*.; *;: *.' ' ,. "197_.55 ' -*,,- ,, 198_5 Total Annual Population Dose 9,790 -25,400 (Person-rem)

, .* - ,-;1.2. -3.1 ,

Expected-AnnualLCFs' Expected Annual Genetic Effects .t . -,; ,1.7- .; . , ,.' 4.4

.'1975 Average= 99790" m .- **I_

r=,-0. " -. x > :

Individual Dose *\T' , ., ,.*&Ž. -' , ..2 Annual Normal Dose Attributable -to.. ,- ~ ..

Export and Import 61 Person-Rem Shipments in 1975 - . . "':

4-4 r

,4-49

- I -______

REFERENCES 4-1. Aircraft Operating Cost and Performance Report, Civil Aeronautics Board, 1975.

4-2. "Air Carrier Traffic Statistics", Civil Aeronautics 'Board, U.S. Department of Trans portation, March 1976.

4-3. R. F. Barker, D. R. Hopkins, A. N. Tse, IAEA-§M-184/15, "Radiation Dose to Population (Crew and Passengers) Resulting from the Transportation of Radioactive Material by Pas senger Aircraft in the United States of America," Population Dose Evaluation and Standards for Man and His Environment, IAEA, Vienqa, 1974.

4-4. "Assessment of the Environmental Impact of the FAA Proposed Rulemaking Affecting the Conditions of Transport of Radioactive Materials on Aircraft," Sponsored by the Federal Aviation Administration, May 7, 1975.

4-5. A. C. Upton, et al. "Radiobiological Aspects of thdSupersonic Transport," Health Phsics, Vol. 12, p. 209.

4-6. D. J. Beninson, A. Bonville, UNSCEAR. 1975. Dosimetric Implications of the Exposure to the Natural Sources of Irradiation.

4-7. 'Airport Activity Statistics of Certificated Route Carriers", Civil Aeronautics Board, U.S. Department of Transportation, June 1975.

4-8. "Survey to Determinethe Percent of Passenger Aircraft Departures Carrying Hazardous Materials," Federal Aviation Administration, Flight Standards Service Informal Survey, June 20, 1974. J 4-9. Letter from R. P. Skully (Federal Aviation Administration) to H. H. Brown (Nuclear Regu-latory Commission) dated April 7, 1975 with enclosures. Available in NRC Public Document Room for inspection and copying for a fee.

4-10. Environmental Survey of Transportation of Radioactive Material to and from Nuclear Power Plants, WASH-1238, USAEC, December 1972.

4-11. J. Shapiro, "Exposure of Airport Workers to Radiation from Shipments of Radioactive Materials," NUREG-0154, USNRC, January 1977. ".

4-12. A. W. Grella, "A Review of Five Years Accident Experience in the U.S.A. Involving Nuclear Transportation"; IACA-SR-10/5. Presented at Seminar on the Design, Construction, and Teating of Packaging for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Materials, Vienna, Austria, August 1976.

4-50

4-13. J. L. Simmons, et al., Survey of Radioactive Material Shipments in the United States BNWL-1972, Battelle-Pacific Northwest Laboratories, Richland, Washington, April 1976.

4-14. J. Shapiro, "Determination of Exposure Rates to Occupants of Passenger Aircraft Used to Transport Radioactive Materials," Prepared for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission by the Harvard School of Public Health, Boston, MA, June 20, 1973.

4-15. "Survey of the Transportation of Radioactive Materials in the State of New Jersey," New Jersey State Department of Environmental Protection, Division of Environmental Quality, Bureau of Radiation Protection, June 1974.

4-51

CHAPTER 5 IMPACTS OF TRANSPORTATION ACCIDENTS

5.1 INTRODUCTION

Two factors are considered in evaluating the impact of accidents that involve vehicles carrying radioactive shipments: probability and consequence. The probability that an acci dent releasing'-radioactive material will occur can be described in terms of the expected number of accidents (of given severity) per-year for each transport mode,-together with the package response to~those accidents and the dispersal that is expected. The consequence of an accident is expressed in terms of the potential effects of the release of a specified quantity of dispersible radioactive material to the envihonment or the exposure resulting from damaged package shielding. -*

The prouC oprobability and consequence is called the "annual radiological risk" and is-expressed in terms of the expected radiological consequences per year. This risk can be quantified for each shipment type. Summing the risks over all shipments gives the total annual risk resulting from all shipments. Since this method does not distinguish high probability-low consequence risks from low-probability/large-consequence -risks, sh'ipments with potentially severe consequences are, in addition, considered separately from the risk calculations.

The actual method by which risk is calculated is outlinedIn Appendix G and detailed in Refer ence 5-1. Figure 5-1 outlines the informational flow used in the calculation of impacts due to transportation accidents. It also-shows theý additional impacts that add to the annual risk discussed above. -, .

.This chapter.is divided into eight additional1:sections. Section" 5.2, which follows this introduction,'ificludes discussions--of accidelnt rates for various rtansport modes and severnties and of package release fractions. S6Eti&" 5.3 discusse-ithe dispersion/exposure model and the inhere~nt ;assumptions used in the meteorological calculation. The results of the risk calcula tions 'using the 1975 standard shipments and their 1985 proJections (see Appendix A),are pre sented in Section 5.4. Section 5.5 discusses the potential effects and cleanup costs of the radioactive..contamination from a transportation accident. In Section 5.6 the "worst-caseu

shipment scenarios are considered, i.e., those that have the potential for very severe conse quences but have a"very low occurrence probability.' Section 5.7'discusses the impact due-to eixport/im'port, shipments>* Section 5.8 discusses the nonradiological impacts of transportation" accidents, and Section 5.9 summarlzes the results of the acr Ident risk~and consequence calcu lations. A sensitivity analysis for the risk computation is performed in Appendix I.

52 DETfAILED ANALYSIS" .. -

iDirect-radiological im~acts on man are considered to be the mo-st'Important component of

'the'environmental impact. Direct impact to man may result from tnsportaton by any mode-or 5-1l

VI N

standard "*

I Shipments,.' I "

SModel :' x~ected Num-ber R'J i* i i *ot Accidents r , " : , ' -- per; Population Each Year in Zone S' ident '0 AcJerity Sevesslfication eClae **Accidentý'ad 9

'" " , for each ModsRt

!-

and Severity

-*o ~Category ,

,dent .

rity Da ta S(by mode) ..

"FIGURE 5-1. 'FLOW DIAGRAN FOR ACCIDENT ANALYSIS"

See n-7I, otes on following page.

FIGURE 5-1 (continued)

Notes:

a. Shipment mode.

,b. Type of ,packaging.

.c. -Type of radionuclide; chemical and physical form.

d.' Amount of dispersible material released or amount-of unshielded, material.

e. Dosimetric data for radionuclide.

f. Overall accident rate for each mode.

g. Accident rate 'for each mode-severity~combination.

h Amount of di spersible material iinhaled or external exposure'

-from unshielded material.. ....

i. Number of shipments per year; average distance per shipment. '

j. Fractions of accidents expected in each population zone.

"k. Population densities. - . - . , - 4 .

1. -Biological effects of exposure.'

m. Average number of accidents per year of each severity.

n. Summation over all severities.

o. Summation over all scenarios.

.44.44~.2 4 1:~~

-~t ' * .. . 44 7..

5-3

I submode. The probability that a transport vehicle of a particular mode will be involved in an accident of a specific severity depends on the accident rate per vehicle-kilometer, the number of shipments per year by that mode, and the distance traveled by each shipment transported by that mode. The "consequences" of an accident involving a specific mode depend on the quantity and type of radioactive material carried, the fraction of the material that is released in the accident, the population density in the area where the release occurs, the local meteorology at the time of the accident, and the biological effect of the material Ln the environment.

5.2.1 ACCIDENT RATES In order to compute the probability of an accident, it is first necessary to know the accident rate for the mode under consideration. The accident rates used in this assessment are specified per vehicle-kilometer and are summarized in Table 5-1, which also lists the sources for the information.

5.2.2 ACCIDENT ENVIRONMENTAL SEVERITY CLASSIFICATION The amount of radioactive material released to the environment in an accident depends upon the severity of the accident and the package capabilities. .gery_,severe accidents might be expected to release a considerable amount of the radioactive material carried, while minor accidents are unlikely to cause, any release. Thus, in addition to the overall accident rate for each mode, the distributions of accidents according to severity must be determined. In this section, the aicident severity classification scheme used in this assessment is discds sed, and the distributions of accidents according to severity are determined for air,. truck, rail, and waterborne transport modes. In addition, estimates of the relative occurrences of accidents of each severity, in each population zone, and for each transport mode are discussed.

5.2.2.1 Aircraft Accidents The classification scheme devised for aircraft accidents follows that of Clarke, et al.

(Ref. 5-2) and is illustrated in Figure 5-2. The ordinate is the speed of impact onto an unyielding surface, and the abscissa is the duration of a 1300OK fire. The results of Clarke et al. indicate that impact speed and fire duration are the most significant parameters with which to categorize aircraft accidents and that crush, puncture, and immersion are lower-order effects (Ref. 5-3). Unyielding surface rather than real surface impacts were chosen in order to make use of the data of Clarke et al. and to facilitate comparison with the regulatory standards. A derating model is introduced into the analysis later to account for the prob ability of impact on real surfaces rather than on unyielding targets.

The first two scale divisions for impact speed were chosen to correspond to standards for Type A and Type B packagings, respectively. Thus, Category I accidents (with no fire), equiv alent to a drop from 4 feet (1.2 n) or less onto an unyielding surface, should not produce a loss of containment or shielding in a Type A package. A 30 foot (9.1 m) equivalent drop was chosen as the division between Category II and Category III impact accidents, corresponding to the Type B container test specification. The remaining Impact category divisions were 5-4

TABLE 5-1 0

ACCIDENT RATES Accident -Rate" Mode (per vehicle-kilometer) Reference Aircraft 1.44 x 10-8 5-2 Truck, Delivery van 1.06 x 10-6 5-2, 5-5 '

ICV .46 x 10-6 5-5, 57 Train .93 x 10- 5-2, 5-7, Helicopter .63 x 106 5-9-.

6 15-I0 Ship, Barge 6.06;x 10- !

- Also -see -K.-A -. Soloman, Estite.of,Athe-.Probability that an Aircraft Will Impact the PVNGS," NUS-1416, June 1975.

Rail accidents aregiven as railcar accidents per railcar kilometer.

3.- 7 7 7; 5-5

I 6

600 VII 0 304 VIII VI VII 224 i i V VI VII I192

.fLU U I.

-u n IV V VI VII uJ fin Isis4.

Lx III IV V VI U

0D c/

II - III IV 17.6 IV 0 E III 0.5 1 1.5 2 1300°Kelvin Fire Duration !ours)

FIGURE 5-2. ACCIDENT SEVERITY CATEGORY CLASSIFICATION SCHEME - AIRCRAFT 5-6

chosen more or less arbitrarily from the aircraft accident data compiled by Clarke et al.

(Ref. 5-3) in such a way that

1. 95% of the accidents involving impact are severity Category VII or.less,

2. 85% of the accidents involving impact are severity Category VI or less,

3. 80% of the accidents involving impact are severity Category V or less.

4. 70% of the accidents involving impact are severity Category IV or less, and

5. 60% of the accidents involving impact are severity Category III or less.

The fire duration category divisions were chosen in such a way that, with the exception of certain Category IV accidents, increasing the fire duration'by' 30 minutes is equivalent to in creasing the impact to the next higher level. Impacts at less than 48 kilometers per hour would not be sufficient to in accident of severity Category V or greater regardless of how long the fire burned. The fire temperature was chosen as 1300°K'to facilitate comparison with previous data (Ref. 5-2) and to correspond roughly to the temperature of a jet fuel fire.

Note that Category I accidents can involve a fire of as much as 15 minutes' duration. A Type A package invoived in a Category I accident in which a fire occurs'would not be required by the regulations to survive the accident without loss of shielding or containment.

The fractions of aircraft accidents expected-in each of the :eight aircraft accident severity categories are given in'Table 5-2. The numbers under the column heading "Unyielding Surface" were taken from the accident severity data of Clarke et al. (Ref. 5-3) and were adapted to the accident severity classification scheme used in this study.

The fractional occurrences listed unaer the heading "Real Surfaces" account for the fact that most aircraft accidents involve impact onto surfaces that yield or deform to provide at least some cushioning effect and result in impact-forces that are lessjsevere than would occur on an unyielding surface. The'e fractional occurrences are obtained by derating those for un yielding surfaces,' based upon occurrence statistics for surfaces of varying hardness. The details and rationale for this procedure are discussed in Appendix H. The derating of acci dent severnties was made beginning with Category VIII and working back as far as Category III.

No real surface derating is expected for Categories I and II, since these low-severity acci dents are expected to occur while the aircraft is on the ground at the airport.

A subclassification within each severity category was made to estimate the fraction of those accidents that occur in a given population density zone. Three zones were used in this assessment: low, medium, and high, characterized by average population densities of 6, 719, and 3861 persons/km 2, respectively (the derivation of these values is discussed in Appendix E). Since accident reports do not generally include the population density of the surrounding areas, the data to determine the accident occurrence fractions in various population zones do 5-7

TABLE 5-2 FRACTIONAL OCCURRENCES FOR AIRCRAFT ACCIDENTS BYACCIDENT SEVERITY CATEGORY AND POPULATION DENSITY ZONE I

Fractional Occurrences f, Fractional Occurrences 'According Accident' .to Population Density Zones Severity Unyielding Real High Low Medium Category Surface 'Surface

.9 .05 I 5.447 .05

.05 II .16 .447 .05 .9 III .0434 .1 .8 .1 U' '.09 IV .0107 .1 .8 .1

.05

.0279 .3 .6 .1 V .03

.0194 .3 .6 .1 VI .03

.0046 .98 .01 .01 VII -. 04

.03 .0003 .98 .01 .01 VIII TOTAL- 1.00 1.00 Overall Acident Rate - 1.44 x 10-8 accidents/kilometer for commnercial aircraft (K. A. Solomnan, "Estimate of the Probability that an Aircraft Will Impact the PVNGS," NUS-1416, June 1975.)

not exist. Thus, estimates were based on the following assumptions relating severity to accident locations:

1. Accidents of severities I and II are assumed to occur at airports. Since most airports are in suburban (or medium) population density zones, 90% of all class I and II accidents were estimated to occur in medium density zones, with 5% each in low- and high-den sity zones.

2. Accident Categories III-VI were expected to be mainly takeoff and landing accidents and thus were expected to occur near airports.

3. The fractional occurrence of accidents in 1-ow-population-density zones was assumed to increase somewhat with accident severity, since a greater percentage of Categories V and VI accidents occur at higher speeds, which implies greater distaý6nce from the airport.

4. Accidents of severity Categories VII'or VIII are mainly in-flight accidents and are expected to occur at random along the flight path: They are very strongly weighted toward the rural, or low density, areas since about- 9ilof the land area of the United States is consid ered rural (Ref. 5-4). The remainder Is estimated to be' split between medium population density (1.9% of the total land area) and high population' density (0.1% of the total land area).

The accident rate'for U.S. certified route carriers used in this assessment isl.44 x 10"8 per kilometer. This accident rate represents an average over.all aircraft types forthe years

.1967-1972, but within those years the range was 1.13 x 108 to 2.0 x 16-8 per kilomreter. The accident rate' for eah -severity leveliwsobt ained by multiplyihg the overall accident rate by the fractional occurrence for real surfaces for that severity class. For each scenario in the standard shipments model, three risks are computed, assuming the shipments occur entirely in a low-, medium-, or high-population density zone. The actual risk is obtained by forming the sum of these three ris;k*lues-,wihtda by the' fractional -adident occurrence in each population density zone for that scenario. This same computational technique is used for all transport modes.

5.2.2.2 Truck Accidents .. .

The severity classification scheme for truck accidents is shown in Figure 5-3. In this case the ordinate is crush force rather than impact. Foley etta1. (Ref. 5-5) have shown that, in the case of accidenhtsinvolVingbiiotor carrieis,"the-dominant'factors 'in the determination of accident severity are crush force, fire duration, and puncture. The crush force may result from either an inertial load (e.g., container crushed upon impact by other containers in load) or static load (e.g., container crushed beneath vehicle)., .

The fractional occurrences of truck accidents in each of the eight severity categories are listed in Table 53.' Sitnce the dominiait 'ffect:is A crush rather than "impact, no real surface derating is involved. The fractional Occurrences were taken from the data of Foley et al. (Ref. 5-5). Note that the values for Categories VII and VIII are much lower than for 9

-1 S2220 0_ &.1,U CD, S. IV V VI . VII 89

". III' ~ IV V ~ VIf

-22 SII III IV~

6.7 "0.5 115 12 13000 Kelvin Pire Duration (Hours)

S:c* FIGURE 5-3. ACCIDENT SEVERITY CATEGORY CLASSIFICATION SCHEME - MOTOR TRUCKS 5-10

.5 TABLE 5-3 FRACTIONAL OCCURRENCES FOR TRUCK ACCIDENTS BY ACCIDENT

. .' SEVERITY CATEGORY AND POPULATION DENSITY ZONE

'Accident " Frac~tional Occurrences According

,Severity Fractional.f- , to Population

-Low Density Zones Medium High 77 "ACategory Occurrences I 7 .55 .1 1 .8 II S ., .. .36 .1 .1 .8

.07 .3 .4 .3 U'

IV . " ; . .016 ' - '.3 .4 . .3

-ae

. V ' ,, .0028 .5 .3 ,, .2

.1 .7 .2 '".1

7.7 VII 8.5 xi0 8

.8 .1 *

"Vi VI "ll 1.5 x 10 .9 .05 .05 SOverall Accident Rate"(Ref1 5-5) 1 "06 'X 1f0,acctdenti/ktlometer 7 (0.46.x 10"6

'7!.

':7

-1 aircraft accidents. The overall accident rate for motor carriers transporting hazardous materials used for this assessment is 1.06 x I0"6 accidents/kilometer.

The estimated fractions of truck accidents in each severity category occurring in each population density zone are also shown in Table 5-3. The very low severity accidents are expected to occur mainly in urban areas. The table reflects a gradual shift of accidents to rural areas with Increasing severity as average velocity increases.

Current plans are to require shipment of plutonium in 1985 by Integrated Container Vehi cles (ICV) (Ref. 5-6). These are trucks with large vault-like cylinders designed to withstand accident forces and attempted penetration by thieves or saboteurs. Using ERDA nuclear weapons shipment data, the accident rate (which includes the effects of a reduced speed limit, freeway travel, no weekend driving, etc.) is expected to be 0.46 x 10-6 accidents/kilometer (Ref. 5-7).

The fraction of accidents within each severity category and the fraction of accidents in each population zone are expected to be the same for ICVs as for other trucks.

5.2.2.3 Delivery-Van Accidents The accident severity classification scheme for delivery vans is the same as that for trucks, as shown In Figure 5-3. Fractional occurrences by severity and the overall accident rate are shown in Table 5-4 and were taken to be the same as for trucks. The fractional occurrences in the three population zones, however, are different. In the standard shipments model, delivery vans are used only as a secondary transport mode. There is practically no rural travel since most of the radioactive materials transport in delivery vans is to and from airports, truck terminals, and railroad depots. There are expected to be more low-severity accidents in high-population-density zones and more severe accidents on freeways in medium population density zones as a result of the higher freeway speeds.

5.2.2.4 Train Accidents Figure 5-4 illustrates the accident severity classification scheme used for train acci dents. The ordinate in this case is impact velocity, taking into account the effects of puncture. In their analysis of train accidents, Larson et al. (Ref. 5-8) considered crush to be an important factor. However, they were concerned with containers shipped in carload lots and with the crush forces resulting from interaction with other cargo in the rail car. Since the principal rail shipment considered is spent fuel, which is not shipped on the same car as other cargo, crush as a severity criterion is not of prime importance.

Table 5-5 lists the fractional occurrences for train accidents by severity class and by population density zone. The f 1-values were taken from the data of Larson et al. (Ref. 5-8).

As with truck accidents, no real-surface derating of the fractional occurrences is required, since the predominant mode of damage in severe accidents is puncture. The overall accident rate is 0.93 x 10-6 railcar accidents/railcar-kilometer, assuming an average train length of 70 cars and an average of 10 cars involved in each accident (Refs. 5-7 and 5-8). As in the case of motor trucks, the more severe accidents are assumed to occur in lower-population density zones where velocities are higher.

5-12

TABLE 5-4 FRACTIONAL OCCURRENCES FOR DELIVERY VAN ACCIDENTS BY ACCIDENT SEVERITY CATEGORY AND POPULATION DENSITY ZONE Accident Fractional Occurrences According Severity Fractional to Population Density Zones Category Occurrences'f Low Medium High AA ...A LA I .55 .01 .39 6 .60

'A.

i-A .36 1 .01 .39 .60 IIIIV ' .01 .39 .60,

.07 A'

A.A.A I IV 016 .01 I .50 .49

-l y

.0028 .01 .50 .48 WA

'--A '.*,.

. 0011 .O01 .50 .49 vrt AS VII 8.5 x 101 .01 .60 .39 1.5-x 10"* .01 .60 * .39 viii go

Ovirall Acci dent Rate - 1.06 x 10"6 Iaccidents/ki'lo'r iter 11 . ., . 4

-1 160 Vill-130 64

" 40

, = III IV V VI I

- 24 8.0 IV S.2III IV 01 0.5 1 1.5 -2 (1300OKELVIN) FIRE DURATION HOURS; FIGURE 5-4. ACCIDENI SEVERITY CATEGORY CLASSIFICATION SCHEME - TRAIN 5-14 _

"* .: ,TABLE 545 "7 *,FRACTIONAL OCCURRENCES FOR TRAIN ACCIDENTS BY ACCIDENT SEVERITY CATEGORY AND POPULATION DENSITY ZONE Accident . . Fractional Occurrences According severiity," Fiactional to Population Density Zones

,-

Category a r S...

,, 'Occurrences 7* Low Med1ium H

,,--7' 1, -. 1 0. .1 .

7, - .3

" .. .. .4

,, * : *T, "*' "*' .0018 . .

in

.. : . .3 .1.3klO":

' - ViX " ; - 6.0 x 18. .

-4 .05 "16.0 xV10 8 7cdent

Overal Rate4-0.93 xO"6 -aiicar acctdents'ratlcaý-ktloreter.

7 7- 4

- I 5.2.2.5 Helicopter Accidents Helicopter accidents are classified in a manner similar to aircraft accidents (Figure 5-2).

The overall accident rate is 0.63 x 10-6 accidents/kilometer (Ref. 5-9), and the fractional occurrences, shown in Table 5-6, are taken to be the same as for aircraft impacting on real surfaces. However, the fractional occurrences in the three population density zones are different since helicopters are used principally as a secondary transport mode to and from airports.

Accidents represented by the first two severity categories occur while the helicopter is on the ground either at the airport or at a pickup or delivery point, all of which would be located primarily in medium- and low-population density zones. It is 'anticipated that helicop ter flights, particularly those carrying extremely hazardous material, would be routed to avoid flying over high-population-density zones whenever possible. Thus, the takeoff and landing accidents (severity Categories III-VI), as well as the in-flight accidents (Categories VII-VIII), are expected to be concentrated in the medium- and low-population-density zones.

Category VII and VIII accidents involving helicopters are considered to be midair collisions and would be expected to occur mainly in the immediate vicinity of an airport; thus most of these accidents should occur in medium-population-density zones.

5.2.2.6 Ship And Barge Accidents (Ref. 5-10) a total of 6.67 x lOll Records for calendar year 1973 for domestic waterborne traffic show ton-miles. Precise data are~not available to indicate what fraction of those ton-miles was barge traffic; however, a reasonable estimate seems to be 1.73 x l0ol tori;-miles of barge traffic. According to the Coast Guard's annual statistics of casualties, there were an esti mated 1395 barge accidents in 1973, of which about 60% involved cargo barges.

The available data cannot be analyzed'in the same way as the data for rail or truck transport. On the basis of discussions with the U.S. Coast Guard, it is estimated that the average net cargo weight of a typical barge is about 1200 tons. The total number of barge miles would then be about 1.44 x 108. This yields an accident rate of about 6.0 accidents per million barge kilometers.

Very little data are available on the severity of accidents involving barges. Since barges travel only a few miles per hour, the velocity of impacts in accidents is small.

However, because of the large mass of the vehicle and cargo, large forces could be encountered by packages, for instance, spent fuel casks aboard barges. A forward barge could impact on a bridge pier and suffer crushing forces as other barges are pushed into it. A coastal or river ship could knife into a barge. Fires could result in either case. An extreme accident, i.e.,

an extreme impact plus a long fire, is considered to be of such low probability that it is not considered a design-basis accident. The likelihood of a long fire in barge accidents is small because of the availability of water at all times. Also, since casks could be kept cool by sprays or submergence in water, there is compensation for loss of mechanical cooling.

5-16

I

".' ', 4i' "7'.

. TABLE 5-6 .

RACTIONAL OCCURRENCES FOR HELICOPTER ACCIDENTS BY ACC

IDENT SEVERITY CATEGORY AND POPULATION DENSITY ZONE Accident Fractional 2 Fractional Occurrences According Occurrences, - to Population Density Zones 2 SeVerity Low , , Medium High Category (Real Surfaces) . '

.447 .35, .60 .05, 447 '" .35 .60 .05 a 7.

"* I I

.45 .10

.0434 .45, V,

".0j,7' .45 - . .45 .10

" .45. ' .45 -, .10

.0279' Oea

,den Ac 4 .0194 01947 , ;45. .45 .10

. L

- ( .* , .1 .. .

"44'"

vr] Acidn

._0046 ,* .19

. .80 .01 4 -,. - ' .01

.0003 - .19 .80

.'- '.4 4*

4'.000 7:,: 19 .

4,, '4 Rate 0.63x 1iO-6 accidents/kilometer

. ;,.,4,

}

-1 The likelihood of cargo damage occurring in barge accidents is much less than in the case of rail accidents. The accident severity breakdown for ship and barge is shown in Table 5-7.

If a cask were accidentally dropped into water during barge transport, it is unlikely that it would be adversely affected unless the water was very deep. Most fuel is loaded into casks under water, so immersion would have no immediate effects. The water would remove the heat, so overheating would not occur. Each cask is required by NRC regulations (10 CFR

§ 71.32(b)) to be designed to withstand an external pressure equal to the water pressure at a depth of 15 m (50 ft), and most designs will withstand external pressure at much greater depths. If a cask seal were to fail due to excessive pressure in deep water, only the small amount of radioactivity in the cask coolant and gases from perforated elements in the cask cavity would be likely to be released. Even if the cask shielding were ruptured as a result of excessive pressure, the direct radiation would be shielded by the water. About 10 m of water, which is the depth of most storage Oools, would be ample shielding for radiation, even from fully exposed fuel elements.

In a recent study (Ref. 5-11) it was concluded that the pressure seals on a spent fuel cask that is dropped into the ocean might begin to fail at a depth of 200 meters, a typical depth at the edge of the continental shelf, and release contaminated coolant. The fuel elements, which contain most of the radioactive material, provide excellent containment. In an operating reactor, the fuel elements are under tater at' elevated temperatures and at-pressures on the order of 1000 to 2000 psi. Thus exposure to water pressures at depths of 600 to 1200 m should have no substantial -effect on the fuel elements themselves. The study concluded that they would not fail until they reached a depth of approximately 3000 meters. Once they failed, the fuel pins would release fission products into the ocean, but these would be dispersed into such a large volume of the ocean that the concentrations would be very small. Certain nuclides such as cesium and plutonium could be reconcentrated through the food chain to fish and inver tebrates that could be eaten by man; but, as pointed out in the study, the possibilities of a single person consuming large quantities of seafood, all of which was harvested from the immediate vicinity ')f the release, is very remote, especially' since most seafood is harvested in areas over the continental shelves.

In virtually all cases, except those in which the cask was submerged to extreme depths, recovery would be possible with normal salvage equipment. If the cask and elements could not be recovered, corrosion could open limited numbers of weld areas within about 2000 years (Ref. 5-11), with possible localized failures occurring sooner. However, by that time most of the radioactivity would have decayed. Subsequent release would-be gradual, and the total amount of radioactivity released at any one time and over the total period would be relatively small. Considering the extremely low probability of occurrence, the major reduction in radio activity due to radioactive decay, and the dilution that would be available, there would be little environmental impact from single events of this kind.

Should a shipment be accidentally dropped during transfer to a barge, the main effect will likely be limited to that of rather severe damage to the barge. It is possible that a fuel cask could penetrate the barge decks and fall into the relatively shallow water of the breakwater basin. As previously discussed, there would be at most only minor radiological 5-18

TABLE 5-7

-- .* -, "* FRACTIONAL OCCURRENCES FOR SHIP AND BARGE ACCIDENTS BY SEVERITY CATEGORY'AND POPULATION DENSITY ZONE S-' - Accident Fractional 'Fractional Occurrences According ty .'Fractional Severity *' Occurrences to population density zone Mccident'Sever Low Medium High t- Category** Occurrences Category (this assessment) 7 I .897 0 .5 5, inor-2 -

.0794,, II .0798 0 .5 .5 ninor moderati-2 .001449 .

.,,* moderate-3. .00113; 1 III .00113.

013 .9

~o r' .. .0...

IV - .0186 0 .9 moderate-4'-, .0186'- 0 "severe-2 .0000052 V .0000052 .1 .9

.000072 VI .000072, .1 .9 "seere-3 '

.000195- 1 .9 0 severe-4 ,, .000195', VII

.000013 .1 .9 0

, xtra.severe-'l, - .00013 VIII

"*Overall 3cident rate - 0.06,0 accldents/kilometer' '.

,Iroý Oef.'5- .

- I -______

consequences, since the cask (or drums) could be recovered easily and rather quickly. The environmental impact resulting from damage to the barge (including its sinking) would also be minor, since salvage could readily be started. The most significant effect would be the economic loss from recovery operations.

Waterborne traffic spends a very small fraction of its travel in high-population-density regions. The highest traffic density will probably occur in the port- areas and, as a result, be associated with lower speed. Categories VI, VII, and VIII accidents probably require relatively large forces, a long-term fire, or an explosion, which are more likely to occur in open water. Categories III through V are more likely to be the result of a lower speed colli sion in a dock area, either with another vessel or a pier. The population density of dock areas of most cities was considered to be representative of a medium-population zone. Hence, Class III-V accidents are assumed to occur in a medium-population zone. Categories I and II accidents are not likely to involve another vessel, since they are very minor in nature.

Hence, they are considered to occur either in open waters or while securely moored. These assumptions are reflected in Table 5-7.

5.2.3 RELEASE FRACTIONS In order to assess the risk of a transportation accident, one must be able to predict the package response to an accident of given severity. In particular, one needs to know the fraction of the total package contents that would be released for an accident of given severity.

The actual releases for a given package type would not necessarily bethe same'for a number of accidents of the same severity class. In some cases there may be no release, while in others there may be, for example, a 10% release. Indeed, in a given accident involving a number of radioactive material packages. transported together, some of the packages may release part of their contents while others have no release at all. The approach taken in this.assessment is to derive a point estimate for the average release fraction for each severity' category and package type and assume a1_1 such packages, including each package in a multipackage shipment, respond to such an accident In the same way without regard to the type or form of the contents.

The paucity of data on package responses to severe accidents makes it difficult to predict even the average release fraction, much less a distribution. Since the packaging standards do not require tests to failure there has been, until recently, little information relating the response of packages to accident environments.

Recently, a series of severe impact tests was carried out at Sandia Laboratories using several types of containers commonly used to ship plutonium (Refs. 5-12 and 5-13). All con tainer types survived tests with no structural damage to the Inner container after Impacts onto unyielding targets occurred at speeds up to those typical of a Category V impact accident.

Several containers exhibited some minor structural damages and cracking in Category VI Impacts, but no verified release occurred. Tests of containersVtyplcal of those in commerce resulted in failure of a nonspecification cast iron plug and allowed material-loss and also compromised the overall integrity of the inner containers., In one test a-container lost 6%of its contents (magnesium oxide powder) in a Category VII impact; others survived Category VIII Impacts with no loss of contents. Although none of the containers in this test series was subjected to 5-20

0 fire, others of the same type survived less severe impacts followed by a 1300 K environment lasting for a half-hour with no release. Using this test information or assuming that pack the agings begin to fail at severities just above those that they are required to survive, responses of packages are estimated by the methods detailed below. The release fraction estimates for all packagings evaluated are shown in Table 5-8.

Two specific release fraction models are considered. Model I specifies total release of package contents for all dccident severities exceeding that specified by Federal regulations.

test This somewhat unrealistic model assumes that zero release occurs up to the regulatory level and that the packaging fails catastrophically in all environments that exceed that level. Clearly, packagings do not behave in this fashion, but this approach does present a simplistic evaluation of present regulations. Model II Is considered to be a more realistic model, although it too has inherent conservatism as is discussed later. Models I and II are used for the 1975 and 1985 risk assessment, and Model II is used for consideration of transpor tation alternatives in Chapter 6.

5.2.3.1 Release Fractions For Plutonium Shipping Containers for Two sets of release fractions for Type B plutonium shipping containers are listed earlier (Refs. 5-12 Model II; both are derived from the container impact test data described (13) and 5-13). Those release fractions listed under the heading 1975 Pu show a small release that small amounts of material in a Category VI accident. This accounts for the possibility Category might be forced through the cracks observed in the inner container. The 5% release in a measurable amount of material escaped.

VII reflects the results of the one test in which release The Category VIII release fraction' of 10% is an estimate of the upper limit to the fraction based upon analysis of all test data.

1985, The 1985 Pu release fractions acknowledge that in the interim period from 1975-to to produce packages that will have package development programs currently underway are likely higher integrity. As a result only a 1% release is expected in Category VII and 10% in Cate containers currently gory VIII. Even lower release fractions are likely to be justifiable for test data and assurance under development, but no lower values were shown without complete that older containers will be out of use.

as the principal The Integrated Container-Vehicle (ICV) .s currently being discussed change the release frac transport vehicle for plutonium shipments in 1985 and is expected to vault-like containers tions associated with plutonium shipments appreciably. The massive for these containers are will be highly accident resistant. The release fractions assumed also shown in Table 5-8. . -

5.2.3.2. Other Type B Containers designed to Federal regulations require that Type 8 packagings be able to withstand tests test data on safety simulate certain accident conditions (Ref. 5-14). In the absence of begin to fail just margins for Type B packages, the assumption is made that most containers not in the catastrophic beyond the accident conditions at which they were tested, although 5-21

TABLE 5-8 RELEASE FRACTIONS Model I LSA Cask Cask Severity (Release)

Category Drums -Type A Type B (Exposure)

I 10 10 0 0' 0 II 1.0 1.0 0 0 0 III 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 N

m IV 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0

'C V "1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 VI i.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 Vii 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 VIII "1.0 1.0 1.0 j

I 4*) .

47 5 4 j

-t

fABLE 5-8 (continued)',

RELEASE FRACTIONS Model 'II 33 Type 1975B 1985 Severity, .LSA Cask Cask (release) ICV Pu 'Pu Pu (exposure)

Category Drum Type SNo 0 0 0 0 10 0 0 0.

01 0 0 .0 0

.3 ,

.. II ".01" .01 30 0

CA 0 0

.01 0 .01 IV 0

IV .1 0 0 1 .0 .. 1 .0 0'O 0 1.0

- 1.0 0 0 *'0 0

VI 1 .*0 1.0 3.18x10-7 1.0

'1.0 .01 0 0

S.o" 1.0 3.18x10-5 1.0 VII "1.0 .56 .01 0

,VIII 3.12x10-3 1.0 S . '

1.0 1.0 .1 .

1.00 4

33 ,3

'4 3 VII 37 3 33 4 3

-1 manner assumed with Model I. Above the threshold test at which release occurs, the release fractions are assumed to increase with increasing accident severity as assumed for plutonium containers. Note that catastrophic failure (i.e., complete release) is assumed for accident severity categories above IV. This is a conservative assumption in the absence of tests to failure.

5.2.3.3. Type A And Low Specific Activity Containers The same rationale used for Type B containers is used for Type A containers. A small re lease is assumed for Category II with progressively greater releases with increasing severity in the same way as for Type B containers. An independent test carried out at Sandia Laborato ries on a single Type A (Mo-99 generator) container under Category IV impact conditions re sulted in extensive packaging damage but zero release. Thus, the release fractions assumed for this type of packaging are believed to be conservative.

5.2.3.4 Casks Large casks are used for shipments of large irradiator or teletherapy sources, irradiated fuel, and high-level fuel.cycle waste. In analyzing release fractions, therefore, two types of releases must be considered:ý direct release of contents to the environment and exposure of the surrounding environment to neutron or gamma radiation through a breach in shielding.

These two problems must be addressed separately.

Spent fuel can be thought of as a combination of two components: gaseous and volatile materials in the coolant, plenums, and void spaces in fuel rods and non-volatile fission pro ducts and activated material held in the matrix of the fuel pellets. Since packagings for large-quantity shipments such as spent fuel must meet Type B standards, the Type B packaging release fractions discussed previously are used to evaluate-the release of available gaseous and volatile materials (Ref. 5-14). Drop tests using spent fuel shipping containers were conducted at Sandia Laboratories (Ref. 5-15). There were no releases at impact velocities up to 394 kilometers per hour onto hard soil.

The effect of loss of shielding is modeled =by assuming that a circumferential crack is produced in the cask by the accident forces (see Figure 5-5). Using probabilities and descrip tions of breaches suggested in Reference 5-16, a Category VI accident was considered the minimum accident with forces sufficient to cause a crack through the entire cask. This was modeled as a circumferential crack 0.1 cm wide around the entiie cask. In a Category VII accident this crack is assumed to be 1 cm in width; in a Category VIII accident, it is assumed to be 10 cm in width..:

The "release fraction" for the loss of shielding case is not really a release fraction at all, but is the product of the fraction (W/L) of the source length that is exposing the sur rounding population and the fraction [1 - 2/n tan-i(TNW)] of the surrounding area that lies within the sector being exposed (see Figure 5-5). The computation of the integrated popu lation dose is then carried out assuming a fictitious point source whose strength is the total 5-24

SECTOR IN WHICH PEOPLE ARE' EXPOSED

,, (EQUAL SECTOR ON OPPOSITE SIDE)

SHIELDING PROVIDED BY CASK

/

i ll_ý I mI I I 4 - I I

-IRRADIATED

- 4 4, FUEL CENTERLINE OF CASK " - - - - - - - N- N - N --

.; r. ,- ,

iw C-'"

- - . - W = WIDTH OF CRACK

""T -TIICKNESS -OF 'CASKSHIELDING FRACI ION OF SURROUNDING 7" POP ~ULATION EXPOSED I- TAN -WI

4 4" 4." z-. ,4'..j' T 7 , .. I'.b ,*

t .C7 74 . 4 -44 FIGURE 5-5.' RELEASE FRACTION MODEL FOR EXPOSURE-TYPE-'- -- ' ,

4,44 44 SOURCES'SHIPPED IN CASKS, ,

Z-- , -4 , , , ' --.- -.,

'"I 5-25 "

number of curies contained multiplied by the "release fraction," with the Integration extending over the entire area. The values in Table 5-8 were determined for a cask length, L, of 2.54 meters and a shielding thickness, T, of 0.4 meter.

5.2.4 SHIPMENT PARAMETERS The shipment parameters that contribute to the accident impact calculation include the number of curies per package, the number of packages per shipment, the physical/chemical form of the material, the dosimetric aspects of the material, the number of shipments per year by each mode, and the distance traveled by each shipment. These data are presented in Appendix A.

5.3 DISPERSION/EXPOSURE MODEL Once a release has occurred, the released material is assumed to drift downwind and disperse according'to a Gaussian diffusion model and can produce such environmental effects as internal and external radiation doses, contamination, or buildup in the food chain. If the accident involves a material in special form, only external radiation exposure is assumed to occur. *. .. . . . . . .

Environmental iaacts resuelt both from a-release-to the atmosphere'and from external radiation exposure from a large source whose shielding has been damaged in an accident...

Atmospheric transport and diffusion can disperse released material over large areas, but the degree of dispersion is determinedby-atmospheric turbulence, which is a function of the season of the year, time of day, amount of cloud cover, surface characteristics, and other meteoro logical parameters. The deposition of radionuclides--assoitedi thi-thft-passage of a cloud of released material can have a very complex lenviro'nmatal impact. Some possible ways in which the dispersed material can produce a dose to man are summarized in Figure 5-6. Direct external or internal dose to man is the principal effect from gamma emitters. Material that emits alpha or beta radiation produces the largest radiological consequence when aerosolized and inhaled by man. Figure 5-6 shows that'deposited'radionuclides can also be taken into the food chain. They can be transferred from-soil. to- vegetation to animals and eventually to man.

However, radiation doses to man through the food-chain pathway are usually more significant (relative to doses through Inhalation, for example) if there exists a continuous source of release to the environment.

5.3.1 ATMOSPHERIC DISPERSION MODEL .....

The dispersion model is based on Gaussian diffusion, a technique widely used in analysis of atmospheric transport and diffusion. Accidents that involve a release of dispersible material are assumed to produce a cloud of aerosolized debris instantaneously at the accident site. The initial distributionrof aerosol mass, with heightis assumed. to be a line source extending from the ground to a height of' 10 meters.'-, The*iitial concentration increases with height in a manner consistent with data obtained in experimental detonations of simulated weapons (Ref. 5-17). The use of such an initial distribution is justified for accidents in which fires or residual energy provide an aerosol cloud to be released from the accident site.

Since the dose from a 10-meter-high line source is indistinguishable from that of a point 5-26

Fa I,

(4

1' (A

1%

"-,J

' '* ' ,' °. *;GROUND

GST I, 3

-l ",FISH OR;, ANIMAL DO SEAFOOD, FLESH

.... PR6ODUCTS 2'

-.4

" FIGURE 5-6. POSSIBLE.ROUTES'TO MAN FROM RADIONUCLIDE RELEASE I.

- I source at downwind distances greater than about 100 meters, the initial distribution with height is unimportant. Doses calculated using this model are conservative, since most poten tial accidents involve energy releases that may carry aerosolized materials to heights greater than 10 meters. The degree of conservatism increases as the height of release increases and is especially conservative for elevated sources such as a release that might result from midair aircraft collisons.

Transport and diffusion of the aerosol cloud (composed 6f particles so small that gravita tional settling is minimal) occur symmetrically about the mean wind velocity vector. This process is described using climatological distributions of horizontaland vertical components of turbulence intensities and wind speed. The aerosolized material is allowed to diffuse horizontally without constraint and vertically to an altitude of 1400 meters (Ref. 5-18).

A year or more of meteorological data recorded at sites near-,White Sands, New Mexico, and Aiken, South Carolina,-is used-in the model. These data are used to generate values for the lateral and vertical dimensions of the aerosol cloud, which are expressed in terms of the measured lateral and vertical turbulence intensities (Ref. 5-19). These values are calculated for various downwind locations to provide'estimates of the dilution that has occurred as a function of the downwinddistance and the amount of aerosolized material involved. The results obtained for each of the meteorological data sets are examined to, determine the area within which a given dilution factor is not exceeded (this is an area in which a given concentration is exceeded). A curve of area exceeded in only 5% of all meterol1gical- conditions versus dilution factor not exceeded within the area is shown in Figure 5-7. This area is taken as a credible upper limit in which a given dilution factor will not be exceeded.

In order to make a full analysis of actual inhalation hazard, the phenomena of deposition and resuspension must be considered' As the cloud of aerosolized material is transported by the wind, material is scavenged from the cloud by dry deposition processes and deposited on the ground. Wet deposition, i.e., deposition by rain and snowfall, is not considered in this model; the neglect of wet deposition will mean that this calculation overestimates the population dose in areas where precipitation can interact with the aerosol cloud. Dry deposition occurs con tinuously, and its effect- is-stimated by depleting-the-total quantity of material that would contribute to inhalation dose by the amount of material deposited between the source release point and a point of interest. The amount of material deposited at any point is calculated using a deposition velocity, Vd (m/sec), which, when multiplied by the time-integrated concen tration (Ci-sec/m ), yields the amount deposited, 0 (Ci/m2). A value of 0.01 m/sec is used for Vd based on a previous analysis (Ref. 5-20) and for consistency with the resuspension model used in this document. Dry deposition removes material from the cloud and reduces the downwind concentration, as shown in the lower curve on Figure 5-7.

Resuspension occurs when deposited particle material on a surface is made airborne as a result of mechanical forces (walking, vehicle traffic, plowing, etc.) and wind stress on the deposition surface (as in sandstorms or blowing snow). The resuspended material becomes available for inhalation by people in the contaminated area and can cause an additional com ponent of body burden and radiation dose accumulating with time. Methods used to calculate 5-28

I 4S 6 I i I I 7

V)

Lii NO DEPOSITION 8

10-Lii u

'10-10 CD A DEPOSITION INCLUDED-10-11

.-12 10J L, ,'

, "A I

A

'~

L A

-104A..A .105 r,' 10

.10 A.1' ,A.08 AAAA1 ]

-~~~~AE -(mX- . .. >

FIUR 5-7 'A DONWN DIUTO F ACTOR FIGURE57. DOWNIND ITIONOFACTOR

'A.

A r.frAAAA

A AAAAAA A A A **A

.AA A., . A A'A A.At-AAAAAAtAAAA**A A A' AAA .A.A'A..' A AAAA AA AAA-AA' AAAA LA AAA', A'A A. A

A' *A,A .'ASA ' A A-A' AIAAAAAAA 'A A....

5-29_

- I resuspension involve an empirical "resuspension factor," K/m, which is the ratio of the ahi concentration at a point to the surface concentration just below that point in the contami nated area. An initial value of 10"5/m decreasing exponentially with a 50-day half-life to a constant value of 10"9/m is used in this study to evaluate the dose contributed by resus pension (Ref. 5-20). Because of radioactive decay, short-half-life materials such as Tc-99m provide little resuspension dose, whereas long-half-life nuclides such as Pu-239 increase the initial dose by a factor of up to 1.6 over the dose received during actual cloud passage.

Two effects can be calculated once the actual downwind concentration and deposition pat terns are known. The first and most important effect is the fnhalation dose received by persons in the downwind area. The calculation of this dose is discussed in Appendix G,, and the results are presented later in this chapter. The'second effect,,which can be determined from the deposition pattern, is the level of surface contamination.- Contamination on surfaces has two principal effects: the material can be resuspended and.inhaled (as previously discus is sed), and affected land or crops can be quarantined or condemned if the contamination level sufficient. The latter effect is discussed in Section 5.5:

5.3.2 EXTERNAL EXPOSURE MODEL If the postulated accident results in shielding damage to a package containing a nondis or an persible material, e.g., one of the special-form shipments such as CQ-60 or Ir-192, gamma or neutron radiation irradiated fuel cask, direct external exposure results from the at emitted by the material. This assessment assumes that after an accident the source remains introduction of temporary shielding the accident site for 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months with no evacuation and no The area in which people are exposed is assumed to extend for a distance of 0.8 kilometer G.

radially from the location of the source. This calculation is discussed in Appendix 5.3.3 DOSE CALCULATION each is Two doses are computed in the consequence calculation, ind the computation of in Reference 5-1. 'The first discussed in Appendix G. A more detailed discussion is available special calculation is of the annual integrated population dose (in person-rems) for either materials. This computation is shown form exposure materials, or atmospherically dispersed delivered to schematically in Figure 5-8. The results can be expres-d eithier as person-reins using conversion particular organs or'as annual 'additional 'expected latent cancer fatalities factors from Chapter 3.

give a The second calculation is annual early fatality probability. If an isotope can or excessive pulmon sufficient dose to cause an early fatality, either from external exposure as shown in Figure 5-9.

ary exposure, the annual probability of this occurrence is computed 5.4 APPLICATION OF THE MODEL TO 1975 AND 1985 STANDARD SHIPMENTS shipment scenar The annual population dose calculations were carried out for the standard results are presented ios discussed in Appendix A using the methods discussed previously. The 5-30

rMaterial a Combine over Severitiei. Modes.' Zones.

Nuclides Combine over all 7 organs

-:-'nput. Information : s,-'FIGURE 5-8. FLOW LATENTCHART FOR CANCER FATALITY CALCULATION 1"it.

5-31

I-(4)

(5)

(7)

(13)

(10)'

(14) 5-32

in Table 5-9 for both 1975 and 1985 standard shipments. The annual probability of more than a given number of early fatalities is plotted on Figure 5-10 for 1975 and 1985. Note that a total of 5.37 x lO"3 latent cancer fatalities were expected to result in 1975 from all radio active material shipments, with the principal contributor being the 144-curie Po-210 shipment scenario with 24% of the 1975 LCFs.* The mixed fission product/corrosion product shipments taken together are of similar importance to Po-210, and the shipments of uranium-plutonium mixtures are third, representing 10.7% of the total LCFs in 1975.

The picture in 1985 is similar, except that the plutonium shipments become much less important. This results from the expected improvement in packaging -release fractions in plutonium containers.

The data plotted in Figure 5-10 indicate an annual probability of one or more early fatalities (within 1 year of an accident) of approximately 3.5 x 10", while the probability of 10 or more is 2.5 x 10-6. This implies that an accident serious enough to kill one person from acute radiological effects would occur only once in 2000 years at 1975 shipping levels.

Results using Model'ILrelease-fractions >for 1975 and '1985 data are presented in Table 5-10 and Figure 5-11. The results shown in Table 5-10 show clearly the impact of the Model I release fractions, which imply that the containment capability of the 'containersis no better than the regulations require. The most important shipments in this analysis'are those with the large quantities of very hazardous materials. The expected LCFs in this case 'are 9.8 per year in 1975, more thanlO00 times that forModel II. The data plotted in FigureS5-11 for the probability of early fatalities-using Model 1Irelease fractIons are also ver different from the Model II results. They indicate a probability of less than 0.1 -of having one or more early fatalities per year for 1975 using this unrealistic, but legally possible, release fraction model.

5.5 CONSEQUENCES OF CONTAMINATION FROM ACCIDENTS "

In additlon to direct -radiological Jmpacts to man, can accideýnt involving radioactive material may result ine- vir6riental contamination leading'to loss of crops or contamination of buildings and necessitating evacuation of residents. Analysis of-these impacts has been addressed in some detail for the case of a reactor accident in Reference 5-20, and a similar methodology has been adopted for this report.

The potential contamination consequences of..a transportation accident Involving radio active materials are, in general, several orders of magnitude.smaller than those for a reactor accident. The potential for Ingestion of radioactive iaterialsis reduced considerably by the "There are many factors that can modlfy~the.risks-identlfied In-Table 5-9. One of these factors is the accident resistanceof the package-used to ship particular-radionuclides. Not included in this analytical model, and thus not reflected-in the results, is the fact that all large quantity shipments of polonium were made in the same accident-resistant packages used to ship plutonium. If considered, this would result in much smaller releases in many of the accident severity categories, and in a smaller total risk attributed to polonium.

5-33 -" -"

S'TABLE 5-9

'A,,, ACCIDENT RISK ANALYSIS RESULTS - EXPECTED LATENT CANCER FATALITIES

'2" S1975 AND 1985 - MODEL II RELEASE FRACTIONS 1/4

.1

-Expected Latent Percent

Expected Latent Percent Cancer Fatalities .of Total Cancer Fa talitiei of Total Risk, 1985 Pisk' Standard Shii ?ment 1975 00131 24.4 .003 73 22.4 i-PO-210 (144 :1) -

17.7 MF+MC (LSA) .000709 4* 13.2 .002 94 U-*

-Pu Mix,, *".000514 10.7 .000 22 1.3

.001 98 11.9 "MF+MC (A) -:.000478 ' 8.9 9.6 Waste (A) *.000388 7.2 .001 60 U* .(natural 8.2

.000328 6.1 .001 35 wp "Wahte (B) ), t ',

.000182 3.4 .000 752 4.5 Co-60 (40,004O'cL) 2.4 .000 336' 2.0

.00013 0.0

'Pu-239 (B) .000129 2.4 .000 0122

.00011i 2.1 .000 286 %1.7 "Mixed (A) 2.0 UO T.0000817 5 .000 338

-,'.0000800 1-.5 .000 334 2.0 MX+AC (392 'c jL "2 -Mo-99 (A) S , ;.0000708 1.3 . .000 184, 1.1 UFP (enrichedd) "- .0000594 1.1 .000 246 1.5, Ligited , ...

, 0000579 1.1 - .000 151 0.9

'Mo-99 (B) ý,:.0000573 1.1 .000 149 0.9

".0000478 0.9. .000 126', 0.8

Co-60 (LSA)

I-131 (A) , p.0000384 0.7 .000 0384 0.2

".0000383 .000 0997 0.6

"-Mixed (B) 0.7 2.5 Spent fuel-' '.0000356 0.7 .000 422 "All'others, -. 000482 9.0 .001 36 8.2 "TOTAL 00*o531,' 7016 r6 2." F'2

'4...

10- 3 10-4_

1985 K 10-5 -

"Li 1975 I- 0-6 Al 10-8

_J

- 5 0 -10 15 NUMBER OF EARLY FATALITIES (N)

FIGURE 5-10. CUMULATIVE ANNUAL EARLY FATALITY PROBABILITY - 1975, 1985 - MODEL II 5-35

TABLE 5-10 ACCIDENT RISK ANALYSIS RESULTS -1975, 1985 - MODEL I RELEASE FRACTIONS Expected Expected

- Standard Latent Cancer Percent of Latent Cancer Percent of

"-:Sh ipment Fatalities -1975 Total Risk Fatalities - 1985 Total Fisk U-Pu Mixture 32.8 86.6 7.9 80.21 Pu-239 (1169 ci) 1.78 18.0 1.78 4.7 vs C"

Recycle 4.8 plutonium 1.83 Spent fuel 0.021 0.2 0.8 2.1 (rail) 0.047 0.5 0.29 0.8 Spent fuel (truck)

All others 0.11 1.1 0.038 0.1 9.86 100 37.9 100 I I

aa- LC-S a aaa; ,,> aat'aa a,'

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fact that contaminated areas are smaller and could be cordoned off. Contaminated crops, milk, and possibly even animals might have to be condemned and destroyed.

A detailed analysis of decontamination costs for four land-use situations for contami nation by both a long-lived and a short-lived isotope is presented in this Section. A cleanup level of 0.65 pCi/a2 was used, based on the Palomares, Spain, nuclear weapons incident (Ref.

5-21). The assumptions and results are shown in Table 5-11. Values associated with Table 5-11 were extracted from Reference 5-20.

The analysis of decontamination costs involves many'assumptions and, of necessity, repre sents only order-of-magnitude accuracy. More accurate analysis requires very specific infor mation about land use near the accident site,-the nature of the accident, the weather at the time of the accident, etc. However, the cost of decontamination may be approximated as being directly proportional to the area contaminated and the population density. Figure 5-12 shows the area contaminated versus curies released using the atmospheric dispersion model discussed in Section 5.3. Figures 5-13 and 5-14 were plotted using the 600-curie release as a benchmark.

These figures show the ipproximate decontamination costs resulting from an accident involving a given size shipment of long- and short-half-life material.

5.6 SEVERE ACCIDENTS INWVERY HIGH POPULATION DENSITY URBAN AREAS If an accident involving certain large-quantity shipments or certain shipments of highly toxic or highly radioactive materials were to occur in an urban area of very high population density (i.e.,>lO 401km2)' such as New York City or Chicago, the consequences could be more serious than any considered in the risk analysis. Although such an accident is very unlikely, its potentially severe consequences merit separate attention. For the purposes of this anal ysis, the average urbani'density of New York City (as determined in the' 1970 census) is used:

15,444 people/km2 . The`dispersion calculation and the values for percent of released material aerosolized and the percent respirable are the same as those used for the analysis described in Section 5.3.,, Tables 5-12, 5-13, and 5-14 list the results of the calculations for certain shipments of Co-60, Po-210, Pu-239, spent fuel, and recycle plutonium 'for a Category VIII accident. Table 5-12 lists the integrated population doses and corresponding LCFs expected to result from these accidents. The probabilities associated with these accidents are estimated by assuming that urban areas of extremely high population density comprise 1%of the total urban area in the country.

Table 5-13 shows the number of persons receiving doses greater thaA' a given value for each accident considered. The reason for choosing 5, 15, 50, 340, 510, 3,000, 10,000, 20,000 and 70,000 reins as dose values 'is thit these correspond to0certain benchmark values:

15 rems to lungs - NCRP-recommended limit for annual routine exposure of radiation workers (Ref. 5-22) 3000 rems to lungs - threshold for pulmonary morbidity from short-lived gamma and beta emitters (Ref. 5-20) 5-38.,

TABLE 5-11 ESTIMATED DECONTAMINATION COST FOR 600 CURIE RELEASE OF VARIOUS MATERIALS [a)

Long-Lived Contaminant Short-Lived Contaminant [b)

Estimated Decont. Estimated Decont. Technique Cost ($)

Technique Cost Population Zone Land Use (1) DF<20 (1) cordon Rural undeveloped/ off for 2 uninhabited bury by deep 5 60 days [e] $29,000 (6 person/km ) plowing (c) 7.8x0S (2) DF > 20 scrape and bury [d), 3.04x10 5 Total = Total

"$i.08xlO6 $29,000 11 (1) DF < 20 (1) cordon farmlan d/ . 105 off for dairyla nd bury by deep 5 $29,000 Y,

¶fl plowing k ý 7.8x 0 60 days (2) 270 (2) DF > 20 scrape and evacuees 3.04xi0 5 for 60 days 3.65x10 4 bury S....

. P *

(3) decon.,., (3) purchase homes/barns & dispose of 5 crops, forage, 5 a.,,DF<20 [f] 6.22x10 '

4 milk [k] 9.77x10

b. DF>20[(gi 7.42xi0 1' (4)'270 evacuees (h] 3.65xi0 4 f . 1'1 (5) purchase I' \' &'dispose of crops, forage, 6 and milk '[i] 1.15x10 [j]

"Total' Total 6 6 1.04x10

.. $2.97xl0 See notes at end of table.

TABLE 5-11 (continued)

Long-Lived Contaminant Short-Lived Contaminant (b)

Estimated Decont. Estimated Decont. Cost M$}

Technique Cost ($) Technique Population Zone Land Use (1) cordon 98.5% single (1) Decon "

Suburban homes off all family (719 persons/km2 dwell ings a.'DF'< 20(11 56.lxI06 residential 12.lxlO0 areas with

b. DF >20(m] DF a20 It) 7.2x10 4 0.8% public areas (2) 3.24x10 4 evacuees 4.4x10 (schools, (2) Decon.

homes DF>20 12. 3x10 6 etc.) (3), Decon.'

0.4% com public areas (3) cordon

a. DF <20(n] 1.83xi0 55 off all mercial &

b. DFz20[o) 1.0xlO parks NuJ 2.84x10 5 industrial areas (4) Decon. (4) Decon. 5 commercial & public areas 2.84xl1 0.3% parks, U'

cemeteries, industrial etc. areas 9.15x0:4 (5) Decon.

commercial

a. DF< 20[p] 9.77x10 4 & industrial, 5

b. 'DP-& 20[q] areas 1.89xi0 (5) Decon.

parks by (6) 2035 evacuees replacing for 60 days.

lawn (r) 30,320 (6) indiv. evacuees for and corporate 10 days 5.74xi0 6 income loss[s] 7.33x10 6 (7) income loss 9.64xi0 6 Total -

Total 2

$8 xi 06 $28.5x10 6

K': >,i TABLE t-11 (c6ntlnued)

Long-Lived Cont'aminant ýShort-Lived Contaminant Decont. Estimated Lad~Decont. Estimated Techi,!Lie Cost_($)

'Popula~tion zone ______ (vi 'Technique, Cst' 1)cordon Urbanit ,;:y, apartment'I~ off resid;.

(36 eisonP areas with, (3ý1 n (6,story' buildings-1.7xl06 MtH2 'It) 7.2x10 4 k),,, apts)' [cc)2 6 1"DFc20 [x]

b. DFz20[yl' 1.061106 (2),cordon

"ýj.,,fam.; residiccl, 2).Decofl'., off all piriks and vacant 20%"publid si1 efan~ areas - 3.2xl106 (3) Decon.

" ~ r4.'l;'~ 1lfdeoneca .6-:()Dcn 11 resid. with 6

-I 'j i"' a. DF<20 4.110 DF z 20 3.Sxl0 10nee. b. DFz20[m 2.i5xl06

"(4) Dec'on.

commercial U' Cocmmecia & industrial b- f 1 % pajý z. &ubindu'rald areas 9.5X106 f -. ",I ;...: -a.iDF<20 44 6xl 6 (5) 10,900

~ ~ o vacant b. DFt21' 491 f" land (4) Decon 6 60 daysi l.63x10 for6 10 days , 30.81106

'r area vacant s (6) Decon.

public,

f ý,abury)0 4.83x10 areas 7.lx106 (7)'income loss 51.8x1106 6

loars',, 3 'i21 0 ,

f" r$94 .6 x1 Total

$106110 6 [aa,vJ I ,

. $98.6xlO6

, 1, 1

Notes for Table 5-11 2

2.82 x 106 m 4.5 x 10 m (1.11 x 104 acres) require deiontaminatiog; 7 2 a.

(698 acres) require a DF Ž 20. 400 cpm/m (.65 pci/m ).

b. 1-131 is used as an exampTe/tj/ 2 - 8 days/i x t 1 / 2 60 days.

c. $75 per acre. ' I

d. $435 per acre - includes costs of reburial.

e. $5 per hour per guard/4 guards per ehift (based on conversations with private security agencies) This could be reduced if National Guard or active duty military were esed. '

f. $4915 per building/2 buildings per 4-person family (home and barn).

g. $8725 per building/2 buildings per'4-person family (home and barn).

h. $13.5 per day per evacuee; 10 day evacuation required.

i. $104 per acre (based on 48-state average - less Alaska and Hawaii).

j. If orchards are involved, the cost could be considerably higher (up to

$5000 per acre) to account for the loss of crops in subsequent years.

k. The entire year's crops are purchased/60-days of milk products are purchased/the average dairy yield per acre is $16 per year.

1. 5 house& per acre/$1095 per house,(includes street cleanup).

m. 5 houses per acre/$3510 per house ,(icludes street cleanup).

n. $2200 per acre.

cUn

o. $18,000 per acre. .

p. $2200 per acre.

q. $35,000 per Icre.

r. $0.13 per ft to replace lawns/0.61lacres of parks per 100 persons.

s. $1100 per capita per~quarter - individual/$940 per capita per quarter corporate/10 days of lostvincome..

t. 10 guards on patrol'pershift.

u. 1 guard per 5 acre park per shift .. ..

v. If total evacuation for*6O days with,no decontamination were us§d, the

$1.4 x 10 for urban.

ppproximate cost would-be,$261 x 10 for'suburban and acceptable.

However, this approach would probably not be socially

w. Based on approximate, values for an average U.S. city (New York City Planning Commission, "Plan for New York City - Volume 1 (initial issue)," 1969)-streets are included with appropriate categories. I

x. $15 per occupant for 6-story 'apartment building / all residents assumed to

y. $140,per occupant for-6-story apartment building Y live in multi-story buildings

z. 20 guards, on patrol per'shift.

aa. Clearly, the method used to deal with a spill of this sort would be the least expensive method - probably outright cleanup rather than long-term evacuation.

bb. Single family units.

cc. The single family units are assumed to have 4 persons per unit, 5 units per acre. The remaining people are assumed to live in multi-story buildings.

-J 1.4 E

t3 9d 2.4 0

U

.2

,i0L Curies Released FIGURE 5-12. AREA CONTAMINATED TO A LEVEL 1,,F 0.65 uCt/m2 FOR A GIVEN RELEASE

.*j 4*

5 I-LL_

CD,

-LJ 170 100. i 3 io i 1 o-i" CURIES RELEASED FIGURE 5-13. DECONTAMINATION COSTS FOR RELEASES OF LONG-LIVED ISOTOPES 5-44

1 04 c/)

-. J L__

_1_

C I,

C-)

ICJ RURAL (UNDEVELOPED)

'FARMLAND! DAIRYLAflD

,: 7 2+ 1 "ll 06l 103 104 105 10 .- 0 l -"

+÷ . '-- CURIES RELEASEDC i FIGURE 5-14. DECONTAMINATION COSTS FOR RELEASES OF SHORT-LIVED ISOTOPES 5-45 .

TABLE 5-12 "I NTEGRATED POPULATION DOSE AND EXPECTED LATENT CANCERS FROM CERTAIN CLASS VIII ACCIDE IN HIGH-nENSITY URBAN AREAS IN HIGH-DENSITY URBAN AREAS Population Doe 1975 1985 Commitment"

'4 Standard Shipment. (person-rem) Organ LCF Probability Probability

-4 _*

0

"* \28 whole body 1.02x10-10 2.55x10" 10 a

Co-60 (315,000 ci)W

'A 10 10 4,, Po-210'.(144 Ci) ,/ 5.27x10 6 lunq / 117 2.57x10- 8.2x10-Plutonium 3.15x10 6 / lung/

7 1 U' (1.23,x 1o6 Ci) 1.llxlO bone 147 1.06xl1-1 1.06xlO-II

-4 Spent fuel 14CIo/ "whole body/ .1 -9 (rail cask) 2.85x 1O4 "- lung 1 1.8x10-10 6.91xl0 Spent fuel " 23iS/ whole body/

9 8 (truck cask) . 441 lung 0 2.99x10- 1.8x10-106 Recycle plutonium* 1.59x lung/

(6.19 x 106 :ci) 5.6x 1O6 bone 74* 0.0 2.24x10-10

1985 only.

0

TABLE 5-13 NUMBER OF PEOPLE RECEIVING DOSES GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO VARIOUS SPECIFIED ACUTE DOSES (IN REMS) OF INTEREST IN CERTAIN

- CLASS VIII ACCIDENTS IN HIGH-DENSITY URBAN AREAS Time Period Shipment Organ for Dose 5 15 50 340 510 3000 10,000 20,000 70,000 Co-60 (315,000 Ci)., Whole Body 1 hr 75 - 12 0 0 Po-210 (144 Ci) Lung 1 yr - 3.423lO3 - - - $59 2 -

U' Plutoniu?

(1.23x10 Ci) Lung - 2337 - - - 0 -0 Spent Fuel Whole Body 1 hr 61 - 8 0 0 - - -

(truck cask). Lung 1 yr 0 -0 0-Spent Fuel , Whole Body 1 hr 440 - 40 7 0 -

(rail cask)' Lung 1 yr' 48 - - - 0 0 Recycle Pu (6.19x10 6 Ci) Lung l yr - 2475 -0 0

TABLE 5-14 EARLY FATALITIES AND DECONTAMINATION COSTS CLASS VIII ACCIDENTS - EXTREME DENSITY URBAN AREAS Total Percent' Percent Early Decontamination Isotope Curies Released Aerosolized Fatalities Cost*

Co-60 315,000 0 0 0 NA Po-210 144 100 100 1 $300 x 106 Plutonium 1.2 x 106 10 5 0 $800 x 106 C'

Recycle Pu 6.2 x 106 10 5 0 $1200 x 106 (1985 only)

Spent fuel 9.1 x 106 100** 100* $400 x 106 Spent fuel 1.4 x 106 100** 100 0 1200 x 106 Adjusted for Increased evacuation and income loss costs resulting from higher population density.

Of available gaseous and volatile fission products only.

10,000 rems to lungs - threshold for pulmonary morbidity from long lived alpha emitters when received as an acute dose (Refs. 5-20 and 5-23) 20,000 rems to lungs* - produces early fatality from pulmonary morbidity resulting from short-lived beta-gamma emitters when received as an acute dose (Ref. 5-23) 70,000 rims to lungs* - produces early fatality from pulmonary morbidity resulting from long-lived'alpha emitters when received as an acute dos. (Ref. 5-23) 5 rems to whole body - NCRP-recommended limit for annual whole-body radiation for radiation workers (Ref. 5-22) 50 rems to whole body - threshold for noticeable' physiological effects from acute exposure to whole-body radiation (Ref. 5-22) 340 reins to whole body** - produces early fatality from bone marrow destruction from acute exposure with minimal medical treatment (Ref. 5-20) 510 rems to whole body** - produces early fatality from bone marrow destruc tion from acute exposure with supportive medical treatment (Ref. 5-20) 5.7 EXPORT AND IMPORT SHIPMENTS..

The annual radiological 'risk- calculation for accidents involving' 'import and export shipments was donef in the same way 'as for the 1975 and 1985 tsatindard'tshipments models. A separate standard shipments model was devised for 1975 export shipments only and is.discussed in Appendix A. - - -.

is 1.57 x 10.5 The total annual radiological risk computed for export'shipments in 1975 LCF per year, or 0.3% of -the total accident risk. Tablel5-15,'shows a breakdown of the annual accident risk by material and majorItransport modes.' Over half of the risk results from enriched uranium shipments because this is the' dominant exported material. Since most exported enriched uranium shipments are transported by ship, these dominate the risk; shipments by aircraft and truck are of lesser importance. It is not anticipated that export shipments would contribute a significantly greater percentage of the annual risk in 1985 than they did in 1975. A detailed analysis of the environmental effects of U.S.

nuclear power export activities isgiven in Reference 5-24.

LD 50/360 value (lethal dose within 360 days for 50% of a population so exposed).

LD 50/30 value (lethal dose within 30 days for 50% of a population so exposed).

5-49

TABLE 5-15 ANNUAL EXPECTED LATENT CANCER FATALITIES RESULTING FROM ACCIDENTS INVOLVING EXPORT SHIPMENTS OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS 1975 EXPORT SHIPMENTS MODEL

-,)

"Major Percent of Transport Annual Expected Total Export "A

-' (Material Mode(s) Latent Cancer Fatalities Shipment Risk SEnr iched UO2 Ship 5.5 x 10 35.1%

Enriched UP6 Ship 4.4,x,10 28.1%

MF,+MC - Type Cargo Air 3.3 x 10

-6 21.1%

I us 4,

U' Co-60 A',

0

.TypeB Truck Al 1.41x 10-6 8.91 Enr iched UP 6 Cargo Air

.Truck 7.5 x 10-7 4.6%

A Mo-99 Pass Air,

- A* -Types AB -Cargo Air 1.4 x 107 0.91 "All Other Ship, Truck Exports Pass. Air, Cargo Air 1.9 x 10-7 1.3%

5 TOTAL 1.57x 10- 100t

,o

According to the 1975_Survey (see Appendix A), virtually all of the curies imported in.

1975 were contained in four Type B Co-60 shipments, each containing only one package with an average of 1.8 x 105 curies per package. The average distance per shipment was 670 kmn,and the shipments were all transported by truck. One of the scenarios considered in the 1975 5

standard- shipments model, Co-60-LQ2, involved four Co-60 shipments by truck, 3.2 x 1O curies per shipment and 3200 km per shipment. Jhese four shipments result in an annual risk of 1.2 x 1010 LCF per year. The risk for the four import shipments can be determined from this figure, reduced in proportion to the curies transported and the shipment distance. The result is 1.4 x 10-11 LCF per year.

5.8 NONRADIOLOGICAL RISKS IN TRANSPORTATION ACCIDENTS Most radioactive materials are shipped incidental to other freight shipments, i.e., the shipment would take place whether or not the radioactive material were on board. For these shipments the only impacts chargeable to the radioactive material are the nomalpopulation dose discussed in Chapter 4 and the radiological accident risk discussed earlier in this chapter.

However, for exclusive-use shipments, i.e., those that require the exclusive use of the transport vehicle, there are certain nonradiological risks that-must also be considered, e.g.,

the risk that the driver of a exclusive-use vehicle will be injured or killed in an accident, not from radiological causes, but from the accident itself. In addition to fatalities, nonra diological-injuries and property damage must be considered as part of the environmental impact of radioactive materials transport along with the radiological effects.

It has been estimated (Ref. 5-25) that transport of cold fuel to nuclear power plants and shipments of- irradiated fuel and solid wastes from the plants by exclusive-use vehicles could result in 0.03 injuries and 0.003 fatalities per reactor year if all fuel and solid :waste transport were by truck and irradiated fuel transport were by rail or barge. For the approx imately 60 power reactors in operation in 1975, this translates into 2 injuries and 0.2 fatal ities per year. - .

Probably the greatest use of exclusive-use trucks for other than fuel cycle materials is in the 'transport of radiopharmaceuticals, primarily No-99/Tc-99m generators.. If it is esti mated that 10% of the generators that were transported by truck in the 1975 standard shipments model are transported by exclusive-use trucks, In.average aggregate quantities of 80 TI per shipment, about 130 such shipments per year would be expected. For an average shipment dis:

tance of 960 kilometers, the total distance traveled would be 1.25 x 10 kilometers per year.

Utilizing the accident statistics anciinjury and fatality data that were used to estimate the nonradiological -impact for shipments to and from power plants -(Ref. 5-25), the transport of Mo-99/Tc-99m generators by exclusive-use trucks would produce about 0.07 injuries and about 0.004 fatalities per year. .

Finally, certain all-cargo airlines make.routine flights exclusively for shipment of radioactive materials, primarily Mo-99/Tc-99m generators. It is estimated that these flights cover 320,000 kilometers per year. Using the commercial aircraft accident rates of 5-51

R_

1.44 x 10-8 accidents per kilometer, these flights would be expected to result in about 0.005 accidents per year.' Assuming that a crew of two would be killed in each accident, aa average of 0.01 fatalities per year would be expected.

Thus, the estimated nonradiological impacts resulting from transport in vehicles used exclusively for radioactive material shipments is 2.05 injuries and 0.213 fatalities per year.

The major contribution is made by transport of cold and spent fuel to and from nuclear power plants.

5.9

SUMMARY

OF RESULTS The results of the calculations of the risk resulting from potential transportation accidents involving radioactive materials shipments may be summarized as follows:

1. The accident'risk for the 1975 level of shipping activity, as determined from the 1975 shipping survey, is very small: roughly 0.005 additional LCF per year, or one addi tional LCF every 200 years, plus an equal number of genetic effects. This number of LCFs is' onl.y 0.3% of those resulting from normal transport population exposures.

2. Over 70% of the accident risk is attributable to shipments of Po-210, plutonium, waste, mixed fission and corrosion prQducts, and UF6 (Table 5-9).

3. The projected accident 'risk in 1985 is 0.0166 LCF per year, or about 3.5 times the 1975 risk, but is still -very small in comparison to the LCFs resulting from normal transport. Even though the 1985 calculation takes into account a modest amount of plutonium recycle, the risk from plutonium (U-Pu mix) is 1.3% of the total risk.

4. Using Model 1I release fractions, the annual probability of one or more early fatal-,

ities from radiological causes in a tran'sportation accident is about 5 x 10- in 1975 and 10-3 in 1985.

about

5. Costs of decontamination following a transportation accident involving a 600-curie release can be as much as 100 x 106 dollars in an urban population zone.

6. In spite of their low annual-risk, specific accidents occurring in very-high-density urban populatjonSzones can produce' as manyais'llearly fatality,- 150 LCFs, and large decontami nation costs. Although- such accidents are possible,'their probability of occurrence is very-,..

smal l.

7. The contribution to the annVal accident risk from export rnd import shipments is:.

less than 0.01 times the domestfc transport risk and is likely to remain so in 1985.

8. The principal nonradfological impacts are those injuries and fatalities resulting from accidents involving vehicles used exclusively for the transport of radioactive materials.

The number of expected annual nonradiological fatalities is almost'50 times greater than the 5-52

expected number of additional LCFs resulting from radiological causes but is less than one fatality every five years.

The annual individual probability of an early (radiological) fatality resulting from a transportation accident involving a radioactive materials shipment is presented in Table 5-16 together with annual individual probabilities of an early fatality from other types of acci dents. The numbers listed in the table are based on the assumptions that all accidents occur randomlj'throughout-the ,opulation' and that'the number of persons at risk for-early fatalities resultingfrom radiological 'auses following a-transportation accident is 75.x 106 (estimating that approximately one-third of the population lives along major transport routes). The table shows, for example, that an individual is 105 times as likely to be killed as a result of being struck by lightning as he is to die from radiological ýauses within'one year following a transportation accident involving a shipment of radioactive materials.ý The table shows that there are many commonly accepted accident risks that are very much greater than the accident risk of transporting radioactive materials.

TABLE 5-16

,--INDIVIDUAL RISK OF EARLY FATALITY BY VARIOUS CAUSES (Ref. 5-20)

Accident Type Number per Year Individual Risk per Year Motor-'Vehicle 5.5 x 104 , 1 in 4,000 Falls-' . ,- , 1.8 x 104 ",. 1 tin-10;000

,Fires'# i - - 7.5 3 103 t ,-. ',l-,In 25,000 ,

Drowning 6.2 x 103 1 oin-30,000, 3

Air Travel 1.8 x 10 1 in 100,000 Falfling Objects . -1 .3'x 10 3 " . .: 1 'in 160,000,,

Electrocution:': ... -' 1;1 -x 103o f,- U.'--.in 160,000 z' Lightning 160 1 in 2,000,000* *':

Tornadoes 91 1 in 2,500,000 Hurricanes- - r ",,93` 3 fle 'l in.2,;500o 000o.oo 100 Nuclear: Re~actors ".- '3'tx - Z c10-r ,l ,in'5,00000,O00-,O Transportation of

_Radioactive Material - hn, 7 (f r om R a d i oa c t i ve - * -1 i 0: . " , O- :

causes)","' -- ' 3.5"x 10-4** ' ,rt11 in,'200;000,000O00**

- Statistical estimate for 1975.

- - Usinga population at- risk of 751million* people. r t*-: -

5 REFERENCES 5-1. J. M. Taylor and'S: L. Daniel,*."Radtan - A Computer Code to Analyze Transportation of Radioactive Material,", SAND 76-0243. Sandia Laboratories, Albuquerque, N.M., April 1977.

5-2. R. K. Clarke, J.-T. Foley, W. F. Hartaan, and D. W. :Larson, "Severities of Transportation Accidents, Volume I -: Summary," SAND 74-0001. Sandia Laboratories, Albuquerque, N.M.,

July 1975. ",

5-3. R. K. Clarke, J. T. Foley, W. F. Hartman, and D. W. Larson, "Quantitative Characterization of the Environment Experienced by Cargo in Aircraft Accidents," Proceedings of the 4th International Symposium on Packaging and Transportation of Radioactive Materials, Miami Beach, Fla., September 22-27, 1974.

5-4. U.S. Dept. of Commerce,-'Statistical Albstracts "_t ' nited States 1974, 95th Edition, Social and Economic Statistics Administration, U.S. Bureau of the Census.

5-5. J. T. Foley, W., F.,Hartman, D. W. Larson, and R. K. Clarke, "Quantitative Characteriza tion of the Environment.Experienced by Cargo in MotorCarrier Accidents," Proceedings of the 4th International Symposium on Packaging and Transportation of Radioactive Materials, Miami Beach, Fla.,, September 22-27, 1974.

5-6. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comfission, "Final Generic Environmental Statement on the: Use of Recycle Plutonium in Mixed Oxide Fuel in Light Water Cooled Reactors," NUREG-O002, August 1976.,' c .,,i : . ,

5-7. J. 0. Harrison and C.[E. Olson, "Estimation of Accident Likelihood in AEC Weapon-Trans-,

portation," SAND 74-0174, Sandia Laboratorieo. Albuquerque, N.M., April,1975.

5-8. D. W. Larson, R. K. Clarke, J. T. Foley, and V. F. Hartman, "Seiverities of Transportation Accidents, ,VolumeaIV .-_ Train," SLA-74-OOi,-USandia Laboratories, Albuquerque, N.M.,

September 1975.

5-9. J. T. Foley, Sandia Laboratories, Albuquerque, N.M.,,',Accfdent Rates for Various Modes-of Transport," Memorandum to R. E.-: Luna, rAugust 7, 1975. Ava.ilable* in NRC Public Document Room for inspection and copying for a fee.

5-10. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "The Final Environmental Statement Related to Manu facture of Floating Nuclear Power Plants by Off Shore Power Systems," NUREG-0056, September 1976.

5-54

5-11. S. W. Heaberlin, D. A. Baker, C. E. Beyer, S.'Mandel, and P. L. Peterson, "Evaluation of the Consequences of LWR Spent Fuel and PlutoniumShipping Packages Lost at Sea,". Paper No. IAEA-SR-10/14, IAEA Seminar on the Design, Construction, and Testing of Packaging for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Materials, Vienna, Austria, August 23-27, 1976.

5-12. L. L. Bonzon and M. McWhirter, "Special Tests of Plutonium Shipping Containers," Paper No. IAEA-SR-lO/22, IAEA Seminar on the Design, Construction, and Testing of Packaging for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Materials, Vienna, Austria, August 23-27, 1976.

5-13. L. L. Bonzon and J. T. Schamaun, "Container Damage Correlation with Impact Velocity and Target Hardness," Paper No. IAEA-SR-10/21, IAEA Seminar on the Design, Construction, and Testing of Packaging for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Materials, Vienna, Austria, August 23-27, 1976.

5-14. 10 CFR 71, Appendices A and B.

5-15. I. G. Waddoups, "Air Drop Test of Shielded Radioactive Material Containers," SAND 75-0276, Sandia Laboratories, Albuquerque, N.M., September 1975.

5-16. W. A. Brobst, "Transportation Accidents: How Probable?", Nuclear News, May 1973.

5-17. H. W. Church, R. E. Luna, and S. H. Hilly, "Operation Roller Coaster: Near Ground Level Air Sampler Measurements," SC-RR-69-788, Sandia Laboratories, Albuquerque, N.M., February 1970.

5-18. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, "Mixing Heights, Wind Speeds and Potential for Urban Air Pollution Throughout the Contiguous United States," Office of Air Programs, January 1972.

5-19. F. B. Smith and J. S. Hay, "The Expansion of Clusters of Particles in the Atmosphere,"

Quarterly Journal of the Royal Meteorological Society, Volume 87, pp.82-101, 1961.

1975.

5-20. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Reactor Safety Study," WASH-1400, October 1967.

5-21. F. Lewis, One of Our H Bombs isMissing, McGraw-Hill Book Company, New York, 5-22. U.S. Department of Commerce, "Maximum Permissible Body Burdens and Maximum Permissible Concentrations of Radionuclides in Air and in Water for Occupational Exposure," National Bureau of Standards Handbook 69, August 1963.

of 5-23. M. Goldman, "An Estimate of Early Mortality and Morbidity Following Acute Inhalation Plutonium," University of California (Davis), October 1976. Available in NRC Public Document Room for inspection and copying for a fee.

U.S.

5-24. U.S. Energy Research and Development Administration, "Final Environmental Statement, Nuclear Power Export Activities," EROA-1542, two volumes, April 1976.

5-55

I 5-25. U.S. Atomic' Energy- Commission, "Environmental Survey of, Transportation of Radioactive Materials to and from Nuclear Power Plants," WASH-1238., December 1972.

"- ' "e .' ) . . . . ._ . .2. . . .

-P * *s

-, - oI, P 5-56

CHAPTER 6 ALTERNATIVES

6.1 INTRODUCTION

The analysis of the impact of transportation of radioactive materials presented in Chapters 1 through 5 wasWbased on cur'rent "shipping practices as revealed'in the'1975-survey'and in the 1985 projections of those shipping practices. In this chapter, the environmental effects of various alternatives to shipping practice as projected for 1985 are evaluated.-' The 1985 stand ard shipments model was used rather than the 1975 model because it'was felt that by-the time any new regulation to implement a particular alternative went into effect,' the shipping activity would be more accurately described by the 1985 model. Thus, the impacts of various alternatives are evaluated by using the 1985 standard shipmentsi model'and are compared with'the '1985 base line,'1ie., the risk computed in the previous chapter f'fi985.

"."An altern'ative' that results'in a lower" annual 'population dose is 'desirable from a radio-'

logical point of view but should'be balanced against ,nonradiological impacts'alnd the-cost of implementation. Similarly, one alternative may be desirable from a safeguards viewpoint but undesirable from a radiological safety viewpoint.-"Ttus',"a quantitative comparison'of the radio logical impacts may be made in-terms of the number of excess' latent cancer fatalities tLCFs) produced, but the assessment of the total impact of a-'given alternative on the eiivironment often will include Qualitative consideration of other factors. .. '- .

Three radiological impacts relative to 1985ishlipping activiti'ire quantified for each alternative: (1) the annual normal population dose in terms of both person-rem per year and the annual LCF, '(2) the' a'nnual' expected number' oi L'CFs' due to'accidents, and (3) the annual proba bility of one or more early fatalities resulting from ac-cidents."' Comparison'ismade to the 1985 baseline case, the radiological impact of which is summarized in Table 6-1.

TABLE :-. - ;". .. - .

RADIOLOGICAL IMPACTS FOR THE BASELINE CASE

" - 1985 STANDARDSHIPMENTS WITH MODEL II',RELEASE FRACTIONS, -;,,

SAnnual' "*" 251360 pers'on-rem normal population dos'e"" P (3.07 LCF)

Annual expected numberof LCFs' - "0.017 LCF ' '""* " .'

due to accidents Annual probability of ' mor-e' °r' 9o. X 10 ' .

, *early'fatalitles due to radio-, 4-.-q logical exposure from accidents r I fi. *~",:,

Certain alternatives considered in the draft version were eliminated as a result of comments from authoritative sources concerning their impracticality. These inclu e-shifting'all material carried by all-cargo aircraft to passenger aircraft, flights only under VFR (visual flight rules), daytime-only flights, and specific aircraftfmodelrequirements. "

6-1

-1 Where appropriate, the cost of implementing an alternative is estimated, and this cost is compared to the benefit resulting from the alternative. Benefits are expressed in terms of the estimated reduction In annual population dose or LCFs resulting from implementation of the alternative. To compare benefits to incremental costs, it is necessary to assign a monetary value to an LCF. For the purposes of this assessment, the official NRC estimate of $1000 per of 121 LCF per 106 person-rem (Ref. 6-1) is used along with the whole-body dose-effect value person-rem (Ref. 6-2). resulting in a value of $8.22 x 106 for each LCF.

The alternatives discussed in this chapter may be classified by three general types:

1. Transport mode shifts

2. Operational constraints

3. Packaging or material constraints Transport mode shifts involve additional or alternative regulations that would eliminate the use of certain transport modes for either all radioactive material shipments or for certain of the potentially more hazardous materials, e.g., polonium or plutonium. In evaluating the effects of these mode shifts, the assumption is made that the material involved would continue to be transported in the same total annual quantities but by a different mode.

The alternatives of the second type are those that would require specific operational constraints on transport to *limit accident rates or consequences, e.g., restricting route, lowering speed limits for surface modes, no weekend driving, monitoring airport packages, and lowering alowable radiation levels in aircrtft. ...., . -,

-Ihe alternatives of the third type are those that would:. -,

1. Restrict, theform of the material ,shipped to reduce its dispersibility and/or respira bility in the case of an accident severe enough to breach the packaging. .

2. Reduce the quantity of material shipped on a given transport vehicle to reduce the amount that could be dispersed in a severe accident. "

-1 ý, " . ., 11 1 * -ý

3. Introduce new packaging. standardsto" require] the use ofextradurable packaging for shipments involving Type B and large quantities of the potentially more hazardous isotopes.

4. Lower the package quantity limits or package transport index (TI) limits.

Each of these general alternative types is discussed, in detail in Sections 6.2 through 6.4 of this chapter. Risk estimates are made and compared to the risks due to~current shipments.

The results are summarized in Section 6.5.

6.2 -TRANSPORT MODE SHIFTb , .,.' ,,-so- . -r.". - , , . -.

In this section, In .... the effects ff ciot expected from shifting various classes of. radioactive s..,..**........................ .... material from one transport mode to another are assessed. Various combinations that have been suggested as likely to yield a decrease in radiological impact are considered.

6-2

6.2.1 ALL AIR TRANSPORT BY TRUCK This section considers the effects of transporting by truck all materials considered for transportation by either passenger aircraft or all-cargo aircraft in the 1985-stahdard shipments model. No change is assumed for the average distance per shipment for each scenario. However, because transport by truck is considerably slower, this'alternative might necessitate'shipping a greater number of curies and TIs per package for the short half-life-materials-to compensate for the additional radioactive decay.

'It is estimated that the minimum time required from shipment to use'is approximately 20 hours2.314815e-4 days 0.00556 hours 3.306878e-5 weeks 7.61e-6 months (essentially 1 day)-for shipments by aircraft'witbin the-continental United States.--In a similar time period, destinations within about 1290 kilometers could be served by truck with no additional radioactive material required to compensate for'the loss resulting from radioactive decay. However, for longer distances, shipments must'contain more-radioactivity at the timelof shipment. The amount required can be estimated using the following relationship:

A 2.693 20)

A exp 9 ,where > 2.2,0) a t and At = Initial activity for, truck shipment ....

Aa = initial activity for air shipment . .

x = destination distance from shipper .

u -= mean transport speed for trucks

t1/2'=. nuclide half-life (in-hours) .- .

The only isotopes listed in the standard shipments model that have half-lives sufficiently short to require addltionalbradioactivlty when-transported by.truck are Tc-99m, Au-198, Ga-167, and Mo-99. Of these isotopes, only Mo-99 is transported an average distance greater than 1290 kilometers. Equation (6-1) suggests that about 10 percent more radioactivity would be required for 14o-99 shipments transported by truck instead of by air. This small change in amount carried will have a negligible effect on the radiological impact but might result in some significant increase in expense for the radiopharmaceutical supplier. .. , . ..

6.2.1.1 -Radiological Impacts The radiological impacts computed with this alternative are: -... ,. 4 Annual normal populition doee 26,290 person-rem Annual LCFs from accidents . 0.021 LCF '. - '. . .

4 9.28 x10" Annual probability of one or more early fatalities -'" "

case Comparison' of the',radiological impact'of this 'alternative with that-of -the baseline The, (Table 6-1) indicates an increase of 930 person-rem per year'In the normal populationdose.

additional dose received by crewmen is the largest contributor to the overall increase. The 6-3 ,

I annual accident LCF is increased as a result of the higher accident rate for trucks as compared to aircraft. The annual early fatality probability is also increased slightly.

6.2.1.2 Nonradiological Impacts and Cost-Benefit Balance The shift of all radioactive materials from an air mode to truck mode implies an increase in the number of truck-shipments. from 2.34 x 106 to 4.14 x 106 shipments per year in 1985 or a factor of approximately 2. In order to estimate the freight cost savings resulting from shifting all air shipments to truck, an average package mass of 22.7 kilograms and an average distance of 1600 kilometers are assumed. , The freight rates for such a package were obtained from local (Albuquerq~e, New Mexico) airfreight and truck offices and were found to be $0.70 per kilogram for airfreight shipments under 45.4 kilograms and $0.26 per, kilogram for truck shipments under 45.4 kilograms. Thus, the transport of a 22.7-kilogram package for 1600 kilometers costs,$10.11 more by airfreight-than by truck. The shift of 1.8 x 106 packages per year'from air transport to truck transport would therefore result in an estimated annual saving of about $18 x 106.

An additional saving would be realized for the cargo aircraft shipments that are shifted to truck because of the decreased secondary mode distance-'(160 kilometers per shipment for cargo aircraft versus 80 kilometers per shipment for truck). The shift of cargo aircraft shipments to truck involves about 1.4 x 105 packages. With each package traveling, on the average, 80 fewer 6

kilometers by secondary surface mode, about 5.6 x 10 fewer kilometers by secondary mode trans port would be required, assuming an average of two packages per shipment. Assuming that delivery vehicles get 12.8 kilometers per liter, that gasoline costs $0.14 per liter, that driver salaries and other costs amount to $5 per hour, and that the average speed is 48 kilometers per hour, the 6

additional saving for the decreased secondary mode travel would be $0.8 x 10 . The radiological cost would be'the additional annual population dose of 930 person-rems- At $1000 per person-rem,.

this amounts to $0.93 x 106 per year. Based on these assumptions, this alternative appears to 6

be cost effective with a net saving of $17.9 x 10 ,"'

6.2.2 ALL PASSENGER AIR TRANSPORT BY ALL-CARGO AIRCRAFT "

This section considers the effect of transporting by, all-cargo aircraft all materials transported by passenger aircraft in the 1985 baseline calculation. All other baseline shipments are left unchanged. This shift necessarily involves an increase in secondary surface mode.

transportation because all-cargo aircraft serve fewer airports than passenger aircraft. This assessment assumes a 160-kilometer average secondary mode distance per shipment for cargo air craft and 80-kilometer for passenger aircraft.

The mode shift described in this'alternative may not be readily achievable without shifting some shipments entirely to the truck mode, but, for the purposes of this comparison, that possi bility will not be considered. Rather, it is assumed that the required coverage can be achieved by the package airfreight lines that have begun to serve many parts of the United. States. It should be noted that a shift to package airfreight would involve transport in smaller aircraft and therefore would result in greater exposure to crew members. However, because of the lack of quantitative information, this was not taken into account in the calculation.,

6-4

No significant increase in package curie content has been postulated in this alternative to account for increased time between shipment and use. While it is expected that shipments will be slightly slower, the effect is not expected to be significant because the ground transport link is limited to 160 kilometers.

6.2.2.1 Radiological Impacts The radiological impacts computed with this alternative are cs follows:

Annual normal population dose 21,830 person-rem' (2.64 LCF)

Annual-LCFs from accidents - 0.017 LCF .

Annual probability of one or -9.12 x 10-4 more-early fatalities - ... ... . -.

The decrease of 3,530 person-rem in annual normal population dose from the baseline case (Table 6-1) results from the elimination of the-dose-to'airllne passengers-and attendants,*

although this decrease is,partially offset by an increased dose to the surrounding population resulting from the increased iec6ndary mode travel. "

6.2.2.2 Nonradiological Impacts and Cost-Benefit Balance If the secondary (ground) link-is not considered, no-significant additional'nonrad-ological" toa fromciiee impacts result this aiternative other than thev the posiilt possibility ofiyn inceae 'csts required of the increased euTe acst to serve outlying cities :by package airlines. Some scheduling difficulties are 4likely 'as a result of fewer flights of all-cargo aircraft as compared to those of passenger aircraft.

However, the additional secondary-mode distance requlred'by this alternative is signi- '

ficant. The shift of all passenger aircraft shipments to cargo aircraft involves about'1.7 W 106 packages. Using the cost parameters introduced in Section 6.2.1, the increased secondary mode distance will cost $9.2 x 10 The 30530 person-reim decreasei'h normal population dose is"'

equivalent to only $3.5 k 10 6 savings at $1000 per person-rem. Thus, from a cost-effectiveness viewpo'int, the -alternative of shifting all passenger aircraft shipments to cargo' aircraft-does not appear desirable. "" ' - .

2 623ALL ALL-CARGO AIR SHIPMENTS BY TRUCK -. : **

In this alternative, all-cargo air' shipments' in the 1985 baseline are 'transferred to the' truck mode. The actual distance in the truck mode is estimated to be approximately the same as the-airline distance. As in the first alternative, which considered the shift of both cargo aircraft and passenger aircraft shi'ment*to' the"truck mode, 'this alternative would require'that Mo-99 shipments contain about 10 percent more rad"oactivitj than in the-baseline case to*miua'eiz' for the Mo-99 that decays during the extra travel time required by'-the truck mode An 80-kilo--:

meter average secondary van link -was assumed for the additional truck shipments resulting from this alternative.

? V" .. ~~ ',2... c¶-

X-6.2.3.1 Radiological Impacts The radiological impacts computed with this alternative are as follows:

Annual normal population dose 26,160 person-rem (3.16 LCF)

Annual LCFs from accidents 0.020 LCF Annual probability of one or 9.28 x 10 more early fatalities Just as in the alternative shifting all air shipments to truck, this alternative results in an increase in annual normal population dose and an increase in LCFs overe the baseline case (Table 6-1). However, the increase is'not as great as in the, previous alternative since fewer shipments are involved. The increase in normal dose is principally due to higher crew dose.

6.2.3.2 Nonradiological Impacts and Cost-Benefit Balance In the discussion of the alternative shifting all air shipments to the truck mode, it was estimated that for an average size package (22.7 kg) traveling an average distance (1600 km) the truck mode rate would be lower by $10.11 per package. This shift of 1.4 x 105 packages from 6

all-cargo aircraft to truck would be expected to result-in an'-annual saving'of about $1.4 x 10 based on this rate difference., Since the secondary mode distance for trucks is 80 kilometers per shipment while 160 kilometers per shipment are estimated for all-cargo air shipments, an additional saving of $7.7 x 106owould be realized from the decreased secondary mode travel-'

(using the same secondary mode assumptions, as in Section 6.w.1). The c ott uld be an additional 800 person-rem population dose from normal transport and an additional 0.003 LCF from accidents, which is a dollar. equivalent of $815,000 per year. Thus, this alternative, as well as the one in which all air shipments are shifted to truck, appears to be-cost effective.

6.2.4 HIGH-HAZARD DISPERSIBLE MATERIAL BY TRUCK OR BY RAIL Certain dispersible materials in.the standard shipments model are more hazardous than" others. This section considers the effect of requiring certain of the more hazardous of the 1985 standard shipments to be transported by truck or rail. The shipments considered are those dispersible materials with both a curie-per-package value 'greater. than 100 and a, rem-per-curie (inhaled) value greater than 106 The materials that meet these criteria are HF + MC (large quantity), Po-210,(large.quantity), Pu-239B, Pu-239B (large quantity), U-Pu mixture, and recycle Shipments byaircraft could be shifted to either truck or rail without additional physical constraints.. The packages used are typically the size of 206-liter (55-gallon) drums or"smaller and weigh a few hundred kilograms or less. The materials' half-lives are sufficiently long that loss by radioactive, decay during transport is not important. Because of tne value of plutonium as weapon material, a mode shift for plutonium (or any other special nuclear material) shipments in strategic quantities requires careful consideration of the security required for protection against theft or sabotage. Because that aspect of the problem is discussed in Chapter 7, con sideration in this section will be confined to the radiological and other nonradiological aspects of the environmental impact. 6-6

in Truck shipments of MF + MC, Po-210, and Pu-239 (1169 curies) are assumed to be made exclusive-use trucks. Truck shipments of Pu-239 (1.2 x'10* uries') U-Pu mixture are assumed to take place in Integrated Containew Vehicles (ICV, see Section 5.2.3). For rail shipments of on Pu-239 (1.2 x 106 curies) and U-Pu mixture, the ICV trailer is assumed to ride "piggyback" the rail car.

6.2.4.1 Radiological Impacts If the dispersible materials considered above are transported by rail only, the following results are obtained:

Annual normal population dose Z5,260 person-rem (3.06 LCF)

Annual LCFs from accidents 0.019 LCF 9.08 x 10-4 Annual probability of one or more early fatalities If these materials are shipped by truck only, the radiological impacts are:

Annual normal population dose 25,400 person-rem 1 1 (3.07 LCF)

Annual LCFs from accidents 0.019 LCF 9.25"x 10x4

"-Annual probability of one or

-. more early fatalities on cost Since the costs of ICVs cannot be evaluated at this time, a definitive statement from this alternative effectiveness cannot be made. However,, the radiological changes, resulting do not appear to be significant.

6.2.5 ALL SPENT FUEL BY TRUCK than rail casks.

Truck casks for transportlng irradiated fuel carry fewer fuel elements Considering Thus, if all spent.fuel were transported by truck, more shipments would be required.

fuel elements that truck.casks transport only a single element while rail casks transport seven might be required in a single cask, as much as a sevenfold increase in the number of shipments under this alternative (Ref. 6-3).

6.2.5.1 Radiological Impacts as follows:

The radiological impacts computed with this alternative are summarized "Annual normal population dose 26,250 person-rem (3.18 LCF) .

Annual LCFs from accidents O.017LCF Annual probability of one or - 9.12, 10 more early fatalities 6-7

-1 The 890 person-rem increase'In normal dose ($9 x 105 equivalent) over the baseline case (Table 6-1) results from the increase inthe number of truck shipments.

6.2.5.2 Nonradiological Impacts and Cost-Benefit Balance The estimated costs for shipment of irradiated fuel by rail and by truck are listed in Table 6-2. It is evident from the table that the cost for transporting seven single-element casks by legal-weight truck is about the same as for transporting one 7-element cask by a unit train. It is assumed in this assessment that about 6.5 times as much spent fuel is carried in a rail cask as in a truck cask (Ref. 6-3).

TABLE 6-2 ECONOMICS OF RAIL-TRUCK MODE SHIFT FOR SPENT FUEL Mode Cost per Shipments Legal-weight truck $10,000 Non-unit train** 45,000 Unit train** 73,000 1200-1300 MWe reactor, 1600-kilometer shipment, 68 truck or 11 rail shipments per year.

A unit train is one devoted exclusively to the carriage of a particular cargo, spent fuel in this case.

An additional consideration is the procurement cost of a truck cask versus that of a rail cask. Costs of three representative casks are shown on Table 6-3.

TABLE 6-3 COSTS OF REPRESENTATIVE SHIPPING CASKS Cask Model Use Purchase Cost - Lease Cost Transnuclealre truck $1 x 10 $1600/day +

TN-9 ,maintenance contract General Electric rail $4 x 106 $1 x 106 /year IF 300 (4-5 year minimum)

National Lead rail $2 x 10 6 $2400/day NL 1024 Assuming a 3-day truck trip (plus 3 days return) and an 8-day rail trip (plus 8 days return)

(Ref. 6-3) and 10 maintenance days per year, each truck cask can be'used 59 times per year'and each rail cask can be used 22 times per year. Using the 1985, baseline shipment information, 26 truck casks and 30 rail casks would be required at a purchase cost of $116 x 10 6 (assuming half the rail casks are purchased from each supplier) or an annual lease-cost of $43 x 106 If all irradiated fuel were shipped by truck, 98 truck casks would be required at a purchase cost of

$98 x 106 or an annual lease cost of $57 x 10 6 . a ,: -

Using these data and assumptions, the alternative of changing from the combination truck plus non-unit train shipments of irradiated fuel described inthe 1985 standard shipments model 6-8

to all truck shipments would cost an additional $14 x 106 in cask leasing charges, and the 5,768 total shipments would cost an additional $13 x 106 for shipping. When these cosstsi are combined with the equivalent of $9 x 106 additional radiological .costs, the alternative of 6

shipping all irradiated fuei by truck is not cost effective to the extent of $28 x 10 per year.

6.2.6 ALL SPENT FUEL BY RAIL As discussed above, rail casks have up to seven times the capacity of truck casks for irradiated fuel. The annual number of shipments would therefore be reduced if rail were the only mode used to ship irradiated fuel.

6.2.6.1 Radiological Impacts The radiological impacts computed with this alternative are summarized as follows:'

Annual normal population dose 24,900 perso'n-rem (3.01 LCF)

Annual LCFs from accidents 0.017 LCF Annual probability of one or. 9.12 x 1044 .

more early fatalities '.,

The reduction of 460 person-rem-per year in normal population dose as compared to the baseline case (Table 6-1) has a dollar equivalent of $460,000 per year.

6.2.6.2 Nonradiological Impacts and Cost-Benefit Balance Using the'data and assumptions in Section 6.2.5, the alternative-of -changing from-the com-,.

bination truck plus non-unit train shipments of irradiated fuel described in the,1985 standard shipments model to all non-unit train shipments is found to be cost effective. The 887 annual rail shipments would save $6 x 106 in cask.leasing charges,;_5,x 106 -inshipping charges, and $5 x 106 in equivalent radiological costs. This alternative would therefore be cost effective by about$11xlO6 peryear- - . e" :" -.

6.2.7 ALL FEASIBLE IRRADIATED FUELBY BARGE u' -........ "-. - - - . - - -

It'has been suggested that a viable means of -transporting irradiated fuel from nuclear-.

power 'plants to reprocetsing'sites would be =to'use:barges, on'thenavigable waterways in and,.

around the'United States.' Aýpreliminary review was made of the feasibility of-this alternative by."examining the location of reactor 'sites ,as'projected to 1985 (Refs..6-4, and 6-:5);and their proximity to navigable'waterways (Refs.'6-6 and-6-7)i This analysis revealed that approximately 74' percent of the projected-1985 nuclear'generatlng capacity will-be sited within 80 kilometers_

ofinavigablewaterways (including the ocean),'and 88 percent will-be sited within 240-kilometers of -'navigable' waterways. The' only -currently -projected reprocessing site (Barnwell;- South,-!

Carolina)'is approximately 48 kilometers -romnavigable water.ý -,

If it is assumed that the only barge shipments would be those in which the .total :secondary, link distance is less than 240 kilometers and if shipments through the Panama Canal are ex cluded, approximately 48 percent of the 1985 projected total 1We (71 percent of the sites) could 6-9"'

I be serviced by barge. Under these assumptions, the average distance by barge would be about 3500 kilometers, drnd the average distance by secondary'mode (truck) would be about 130 kilo meters. This would amount to 212 barge shipments per year, each barge carrying two rail casks.

6.2.7.1 Radiological Impacts If it is assumed that the remainder of the plants are serviced by rail (460 shipments per year), the radiological Impactsire as follows:

Annual normal population dose 25,040 person-re.

(3.03 LCF)

Annual LCFs from accidents 0.017 LCF Annual probability of one or 9.12 x 10-4 more early fatalities If the remainder are serviced by truck (3,000 shipments per year) instead of rail, the results are:

Annual normal population dose 25,700 person-rem (3.11 LCF)"

Annual LCFs from accidents' 0.017 LCF Annual probability of one or 9.23 x"1O-4 more early fatalities The first case results in a decrease of 320 person-rem per year ($320,000 equivalent) as com paredto the baseline case (Table'6-1); the second case results in an increase of 340 person-rem per year'($340,000 equivalent).- ., ..... ,

6.2.7.2 Nonradiological Impacts and Cost-Benefit Balance These radiological impacts must be considered in light of the cost necessary to accomplish,,

this mode shift. The cost of a barge/tug combination is estimated by the American Waterways Operations, Inc., of Washington, D.C., at 0.0027 to 0.0041 dollars per tonne-kilometer (0.004 0.006 dollars per ton-mile). If the average irradiated fuel load is 1360 metric tons (1270 metric tons for the two loaded rail-casks (Ref. 6-3) and 91' metric-tons. for auxilieries. lncluding generators,, emergency equipment,, etc). the water portion of an, average trip will cost between

$13,000 and $20,000.' The-secondary link will add an additional $1625 (at $6.25 perkilometer.

for^truck and'assuming two truck loads per barge-load).. Thus,,the 212 barge-shipments projected for °1985 ,would cost approximately $3.8 x 106.;` The additional rail or- truck service to-the "

remaining 29 percent of the sites would cost between $47 x 10 per year,(remainder, by truck) and

$16 X 10 per year (remainder by train) for a total annual cost of between $19 million,and $51,.

million.' The annual cost-ofthe 19854baseline truck/rail mix is $46.4 x 10 6 , using the truck/

rail costs from Table 6-2 (trucks and non-unit trains). , Thus,- the barge alternative can provide a net saving of up to $27 million if the remainder is serviced by rail. These figures include only transport costs. -' .: -- - -.. . .

6-10

The barge alternative requires 46 rail casks and 51 truck casks (if the remainder goes by truck) or 67 rail casks (if the remainder goes by rail). In both cases, a 19-day one-way barge shipment (3520 kilometers at 8 kilometers per hour) plus a 10-day annual maintenance period is assumed. This results in a range of $67 x 106 to $76 x 106 for annual lease costs.-,The 1985 baseline lease cost is $43 x 106.

Thus, the overall nr-..radiological effect could be a saving of as much as $3 x 106 if the remainder is serviced by rail.

In addition'to transport costs, various one-time site-specific costs may be required to give a site -the capability to handle bat:e -traffic. These 'costs would include dredging (at as estimated by"

$1-$13 per cubic'meter (Ref. 6-8)), pier construction (at $100,000 to $500,000, Williams'Crane and Rigging of Washington,-D.'C.-), etc. These costs should not alter the apparent cost iffectiveness of this alternative. '

The fact that transportation costs are 'so much" lower for barges than for other-modes makes this alternative certainly worth additional investigation. Barge transportation of irradiated fuel may be a viable alternative, at least for some specific reactor sites,ý'if not-as a nation wide scheme.

6.3 OPERATIONAL CONSTRAINTS ON TRANSPORT " .

"In this section, the effects'of various alternatives ýesigned tb reduce risk by the use of constraints 'on transport operations Iare considered.- No transport mode'shifts are involved,'nor' are there any restrictio'ns on packaging. Restrictions considered in this !section would apply to carriers.

6.3.1 RESTRICT RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL TRANSPORT TO AVOID HIGH-POPULATION ZONES

'In this alternative, using airports'in suburban-population zones ratherý thin major metropol of such a change itan airports and ground link routing around cities 'is considered.' An example International would be using Ontario Airport in Ontario, California, in place of Los Angeles Airport. This 'alternative is modeled by changing' the "fraction of travel in high-population are zones for trucks, aircraft, and the'associated van links. Travel fractions for trucks fractions for' changed from .05 urban/.05 suburban to .01 urban/.09 suburban; the corresponding to .2/.8. If aircraft aircraft are changed from .02/.10 to 0/.12 and, for vans, from .4/.6 routes are chosen to avoid high-population-'density zones,'the radiological riskrsulting from vicinity of aircraft accidents would be reduced since most airplane accidents occur in the ground acci airports during takeoff or landing (RWf%6-9) and'since the consequences'of air or However, most destination points'are in' dents are more severe if they occur near urban centers.

By appropriate or near cities, so that deliveries would still have to be made in urban areas.

beltways or outlying-roads and avoid the controls, delivery vehicles could be routed to use are central city as much as possible. For these reasons, the average secondary mode distances assumed to increaie to a minimum of 160 kilometers:per shipment. ' "

occurrence

'If shipments through high-population zones-are restricted,-the probabilities of of accidents with potentially large consequences, as discussed in Chapter 5, would be reduced.

6-11

6.3.1.1 Radiological Impacts The radiological risks computed for this alternative are as follows:

Annual normal population dose 23,850 person-rem (2.89 LCF)

Annual LCFs from accidents 0.018 LCF Annual probability of one'or 9.49 x 10-4 more early fatalities The increases in accident LCFs and early fatality probability over the baseline case (Table 6-1) are due to the substantially increased secondary mode. distance, with its associated higher acci dent rate. The decrease in normal dose is due to the,reduced exposure to on- and off-link popu lations resulting from travel in lower-population-density zones. This effect is partially offset by a slight increase in the secondary mode crew dose that results from higher secondary distances.

6.3.1.2 Nonradiological Impacts and Cost-Benefit Balance Some additional considerations relating to this alternative are:

1. The choice of available air carriers could be restricted since not all major carriers, particularly cargo air carriers, provide comprehensive service to smaller airports.

2. An examination of the 1985 standard shipments model, with an additional 80 kilometers per shipment added to most scenarios, reveals an additional 320 x 10 6 kilometers in secondary mode travel. Using the same.assumptions used in Section 6.2.1 for estimating secondary mode costs except for allowing for a higher average speed (72 kilometers per hour), the cost of the additional secondary mode travel resulting from .this alternative is computed to be about

$33 x 106 per year. -j , ..- ,

3. - It should:be noted that some major, urban airports are already located in lower-popu lation-density zonesý(e.g., Dulles International Airport).,_,,. ,

This alternative is clearly not cost effective since thereJs a saving of $1.5 x i0 6 asso ciated withthe decreased radiological impact 'but a cost of $33 x 106 associated with the addi-'

tional secondary mode-distance. * ....

6.3.2 ROUTE TRUCKS ON TURNPIKES OR INTERSTATE HIGHWAYS

-- The effect of this alternative is to reduce the truck accident rate by about 10 percent' (Ref. 6-10). ., , . ,.-,

6.3.2.1 Radiological Impacts,,, , ,, ,,, .- . .. . ..

Z ~~ W:Zi; ~ ~ tr, ~ ~ F -

The lower accident rate causes a significant reduction in the annual accident LCFs and,,

early fatality probability. The normal population dose is reduced from the baseline case (Table 6-1) because of, less exposure to surrounding population. The radiological impacts compu ted for this alternative are as follows: .,

6-12

I Annual normal population dose 24,290 person-rem (2.94 LCF)

Annual LCFs from accidents 0.015 LCF Annual probability of one or 8.22 x 10-4 more early fatalities 6.3.2.2 Nonradiological Impacts and Cost-Benefit Balance Turnpike routing is used by most long-haul carriers because limited-access highways usually provide the most direct routes and minimum-driving -time:'- However,_the truck must .stll.pick up merchandise, make deliveries, and refuel in populated areas. Thus, the nonradiological impacts of this 'alternative' are con-sidered negligible.' Because-of the'net reduction in normal dose

.(equivalent to $11: x 106 per year), this alterndative is considered cost effective.

6.3.3 RESTRICT TRUCK DRIVING TO GOOD WEATHER ... -

Thee effect of this alternative would be a reduction In the truck accident rate by 10 per--

cent (Ret. 6-10). "

6.3.3.1 Radiological "Impacts The radiological impacts of this accident reduction below the baseline case (Table 6-1) are as follows: %2' . -. ... .

"Annual normal population dose.. . . .25,360 person-rem

"(3.07 LCF) "

Annual LCFs from accidents 0.015 LCF Annual probability of one or 8.21 x 10-4 more early fatalities 6.3.3.2 Nonradiological Impacts and Cost-Benefit Balance* " .

Restricting trucks to good-weather 'driving has the potential problem that a truck could be forced to stop for several days to~wait for clear weather. Increased warehouse storage, sched ule delays, and loss of additional radioactive material by decay would result. The costs asso ciated with these nonradiological impacts would appear to outweigh-ieth "red*cktion in accident risk.

6.3.4 -RESTRICT TRUCKS CARRYING RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS TO A MAXIMUM SPEED OF 72 KM/HR (45 MPH) -

Restricting trucks to a lower speed limit (for instance,- 16, kilometers per hour below posted limits) reduces the highway accident rates by about 5 percent (Ref. 6-10).

6.3.4.1 Radiological Impacts

'The computied radiolo~gial lipacts; a~e "as -ol libs: '~.--.-'Z.

- -- "': Annual normal, population dose - _ 26,770 person-rem

"(3:24 LCF)"' '

6-13 "-;

Annual LCFs from accidents 0.016" LCF Annual probability of one or 8 67 x 10-4 more early fatalities The accident risk is reduced only slightly from the 1985 baseline -case (Table 6-1). However, since truck shipments take longer, the dose received by people living along the highway and by people sharing the highway with such trucks is increased.

6.3.4.2 Nonradiological Impacts and Cost-Benefit Balance A nonradiological impact of this alternative would be the additional travel time required. *.

In the 1985 standard shipments model, the.2.7.x 109 annual truck kilometers traveled at 72 kilometers per hour rather than 89 kilometers per hour would require an additional 7.2 x,10 hours1.157407e-4 days 0.00278 hours 1.653439e-5 weeks 3.805e-6 months per year. Assuming each shipment requires two drivers at $5 per hour, $72 x 106 in addi-+

tional salaries would be required annually. The costs might be partially offset by a small decrease in operating expenses resulting from improved fuel consumption and reduced maintenance.

Since all trucks would not be affected, law enforcement officials would be hampered in their, ability to enforce the reduced speed limit. The increase in normal population dose of 1410 person-rem corresponds to an additional cost of $1.4 x 106 per year. This alternative does not appear to be cost effective.

6.3.5 RESTRICT TRUCKS FROM TRAVELING ON WEEKENDS Prohibiting intercity' truclktravel 6n weekends provides a-significant reduction of 53 percent in truck accident rates (Ref. 6-11).

6.3.5.1 Radiological Impacts The resulting radiological impacts are as follows:

Annual normal population dose 25,360 person-rem j..,.'+ i i,- -, * *- (3.07 LCF) , ,

"-.*+Annual

- +~ ,: ,

LCFs from accidents-,

~, .. ýI ý" -'ý+,ý , #"

i -,;+

'V

- 0.0074 LCF

.. . . 0- 4 + -* -. * : . ,o Annual probability of one or 4.62 x 10 more early fatal ities' J. ,~':~. ~

Although the normal dose is unchanged from the baseline case (Table 6-1), the accident LCFs and the early fatality probability are substantially reduced.,, In the-analysis of this alternative, it is assumed that secondary mode transport is not restricted to weekdays so that the air and rail shipping modes continue to be served. . , *+° - ",* ' ,.

6.3.5.2 Nonradiological Impacts and Cost-Benefit Balance Prohibition of weekend truck travel might prove to be a burden to radiopharmaceutical shippers and users since a large number of short half-life isotopes areshipped on Saturday evening to arrive for use on Monday morning. If these shipments had to be made on'Friday instead of Saturday evening, an incriase inthe' amount of material shipped would be required in some 6-14 -

cases to 'allow for additional radioactivity decay. The package TI values would be increased and more shielding required. In order to circumvent this problem, a restructuring of,radiopharma ceutical use by physicians might be possible.

The-monetary equivalent of this reduction in accident LCFs would be $75,000 per-year. This relatively small benefit would probablybe offset by thecost of-equipment "dead time" on week ends and holidays. Since this type of restriction would prevent shipment roughly 30 percent of the time, exclusive-use vehicles, special-loading equipment, etc., would,be idle. In addition, if a shipment were only halfway to its destination when the weekend arrived, temporary, storage would be required and thereby add to the population dose. Thus,, this alternative is not con sidered cost effective.

6.3.6 RESTRICT IRRADIATED FUEL SHIPMENTS TO SPECIAL TRAINS ONLY "The Association of American Railroads has .recommended that shipments, of irradiated (or.

spent) fuel be made in special t-iný the significant characteristics of which are as follows:

1. No treinht other than the spent fuel casks is carried.

2. 'Special trains'travel at speeds not faster than 56 kilometers per hour (35 mph).

3.. When aspecial train 'transporting -an irradiated fuel cask passes or is passed by another train, one of the trains is to remain stationary while the other train passes at a speed not faster than 56 kilometers per hour.

At present,' irradiated fuel shipments by rail,-are handled by ordinary freight trains -in, which other freightraccompanies the irradiated fuel. For ERDA irradiated fuel ,shipments, the railcar carrying the irradiated fuel caskjisusually~placed at the rear of the train just in front of the caboose;.- - ~.. .

Items requiring excess clearance or having excess weight are currently transported by it special tiains. -,To date, we know of only one.accident involving special train service, and caused no damage' to-the lading and no injuries. -There havebeen no railcar accidents involving 6.2)..

irradiated fuel shipments by regular-,train out of,a total of-nearly 2000 shipments (Ref.

for-irra Thus, -,an, assessment of .the advantages of special trains as opposed to regular, trains are diated fuel shipments on the basis of past accident -experience is not possible since there insufficient accident data to use for the comparison.- . r . * . ,

- In a special ERDA study (Ref. 6-]2 on the safety of special trains, the conclusion, based on regular freight train accident data, indicated that the maximum ,reduction in the freight A

train accident rate .resulting -from a 56-kilometerper-hour speed limitation is 19 percent.

to railroad equip "train accident" was defined as -one ýthat resulted .in more than $750,damage ment;" truck,,-or roadbed. A .50-percent -reduction Jn the, number, of serious accidents_(those.

4 _

resulting'in more than $75,000 damage) was determined to be the maximum reduction possible.

-. However,-the direct application of accident rate data -for ordinary freight trains to special draft version trains overlooks some very important, points mentioned in certain comments on the 6-15

I -______

of this documint.' Some of these points, which should be considered in evaluating the advantages of special trains,'are the following:

1. With special trains, less damage is likely if an accident does occur. Irradiated fuel casks are designed to withstand a 9.1lmeter drop onto an unyielding surface; real impacts occur ring in accidents involving special trains would be less severe since the: speeds are less than 56 kilometers per hour-and real, rather than unyielding, surfaces are involved. Crush forces would also be expected to be less than for regular trains since only a few railcars are involved and no other freight is carried. No prolonged fires would be'expected since no flammable freight is transported along with the shipment.

2. A serious derailment would be less likely because of the shorter train length. Not only aie there fewer cars to become derailed but' the entire train may, be kept under constant surveillance from both the caboose and the engine. Should one of the cars become derailed, the train crew can promptly note the occurrence'and take immediate action to stop the train, proba bly before the car overturns or other-serious' damage occurs. The train can also be stopped much more quickly because of the shorter length.

3. Fewer switching mishaps would be expected because there is much less switching. No switching of the irradiated fuel car would be required and the train could proceed to its desti nation without intermediate switching because no other freight is carried. The reduction in the amount of switching required would'also decrease the doses received by brakemen and others who carry out the switching operations.

4. Cleanup operations, should major derailment occur, might be easier if the accident involved a special train.' Special'railroad cranes of largecapacity would be required to rerall a heavy car carrylng a spent fuel cask., The crane itself would usually have to be transported-,

to the accident site by rail, and cleanup time would probably be less',than that for a major derailment of a regular freight train. For a regular train, more debris would probably. have to be removed in order to reach the spent fuel car.

5. The actual iransit-time of the spent fuel cask is likely to be quite a bit less than it w6uld'be in'regular train service.*' In an example cited in one of the comments to the draft version of this document, an actual-special train shipment of .three- casks containing nuclear.

cores from Proviso, I11inoio,"to Council Bluffs, Iowa','took less than 16 hours1.851852e-4 days 0.00444 hours 2.645503e-5 weeks 6.088e-6 months . Inca detailed.

accounting of the same shipment made by regulartrain service,.the commenter estimated that the, shipment would have taken more than 70 hours8.101852e-4 days 0.0194 hours 1.157407e-4 weeks 2.6635e-5 months , most of which time is spent In holding or, switch, yards (Ref. 6-13)

Nevertheless," the actual "reductlon in both normal and accident.risks in 1975,,had all rail.

shipments of spent 'fuel been ha'ndled by spkialtrainlservice;,is negligible because theship-;,

ments of spent7 fuel by'rail in 1975 contributed only 0.08,percent of the normal risk and 0.1' percent of the accident risk.' Thus- 'even if both risks were reduced'to zero, there were so few, irradiated fuel shipments by rail in 1975 that the rMsk'reduction would have been insignificant..

In 1985,- however, 652 shipments of irradiated' fuel by.rail-are expected.- Assume that, under special'train service, the accident risk could be reduced to zero. The accident risk from-.

6-16

4 spent fuel shipments by regular train in the 1985 baseline is 2.5 x 10- LCFs per year. Thus, under the assumption of no accidents with special trains, the total accident risk would be reduced by 2.5 x 10-4 LCFs per year. Now consider the cost effectiveness of this alternative by comparing the additional cost for special train service to savings in cleanup costs following an accident with regular train service and to the radiological benefits.

An irradiated fuel cask for rail shipments is estimated to carry 3.2 MT of irradiated fuel (Ref. 6-3) and to contain the following amounts of releasable radioactivity, as discussed in Appendix A: 11,000-Ci Kr-85, 0.14-Ci 1-131, and 1280 Ci of other fission products. Using the release fraction model and accident probabilities discussed in Chapter 5, it is estimated that accidents of severity greater than or equal to category V would result in 100 percent release of these quantities and that the probability of such a rail 'ccident with regular train service is about 1.86 x L0 per kilometer. For the 1985 level of irradiated fuel shipping activity by rail (652 shipments per year at 750 miles per shipment), ;the annual probability of an irradiated fuel accident of sufficient severity to release 100 percent of the releasable contents would be such that one accident might be expected about every 700 years. A category IV irradiated fuel railcar accident might be expected once every 76 years but with a release of only 10 percent of the releasable contehts. A category III accident might be expected once every 7.6 years with a release of only I percent of the releasable contents. The decontamination costs for cleanup of the fission products only for these accidents are determined from'Figure 5-13 and listed in Table 6-4.

It is estimated (Ref. 6-14) that each accident involving'a 'release, regardless of its severity, results in a loss of the use of mainline track during cleanup for 5 days. At an estimated cost of $2000 per hour, this amounts to $240,000*per- occurrence.L Amortizing this figure over the average occurrence perlods in Table 6-4lforleach accident category and summing all accident categories involving a release result in an-average-annual cost of $35,000 per year.

Thus, assuming that Zall rail shipments of irradiated fuel in 1985 were made by special train and that special train service did, An fact,.,reduce to zero the probability of an accident of sufficient severity to release radioactivity or cause partial loss;of shielding, the annual savings would be the sum of the amortized annual decontamination costl,,the annual cost for loss of mainline track, and the accident ,LCF dollar equlvalent' ($2000-per year) for a total of

$6.6 x 105 per year. 'Assume, in addition, that the use of special trains also reduced to zero the normal dose (0.036 LCF per year) resulting from irradiated fuel rail shipments in 1985 because of reduced handling and storage time. An additional saving of 0.036 LCF per year, or equivalently, $300,000 per year would result. The total savings would be about $1 x 106 per year.

The extra cost to transport spent fuel b*" special rtrain rather than regular train is com puted by using the cost estimates made in the ERDA study (Ref. 6-12): $15.60 per kilogram of spent fuel by regular train and $24.80 per kilogram of spent fuel by special trains. These figures are for a 1740:kilometer shipment and assume two casks per shipment in the case of special trains for optimum cost effectiveness. The cost for shipping a cask carrying 3.2 metric tons of irradiated fuel is $49,920 by regular train and $79,360 by special train. The annual additional cost for the 652 rail casks to be transported by special train in 1985 is

($79,360 - $49,920) x 652 = $19.2 x 106 6-17

4 .4

,, 4

=t 4.4 4-.

4--

0

'2 44

-4 TABLE 6-4 ý I

-Ta - 4

- a

'2 ESTIMATED, FREQUENCIES OF-OCCURRENCE AND DECONTAMINATION COSTS

-I 4.

4.- FOR'RAILCAR'ACCIDENTS' INVOLVING IRRADIATED FUEL SHIPMENTS BY' UJ 44 REGULAR TRAIN SERVICE IN 1985*,

'4 C. Fission

- , - Average

4. Accident Frequency of Product Average Release Decontaminatic on Decontamination Severity Occurrence Cost per year ($)

A-.

(1 accident per) (curies) Cost ($10e)**

Category 0 0

,1.7.years "; 0-"

Co

.4 4')

12.8. 1.1 $1.45 x 105

. -6years 44 4-'

128 20 $2.63 x 105 IV - 76 years .

-4 $2.14 x 105

.4 "j7006O years. ,1280 150 C.

4' 44 V TVIOTIILII

$6.22 x 105

'TOTAL

-.4

a . -'

.1 652 shipments per year at 1200 kilometers per shipment.

Assuming all accidents occur in suburban zone.

(4 44 A '4.

,o r* '-4

that When this cost is compared to the annual savings calculated under the assumption population dose, it special train service completely eliminates the accident risk and normal cost is about 19 does not appear to be a cost-effective alternative. The annual additional times the annual savings.

is made under The calculation for annual decontamination costs' with regular train service of Figure 5-13 the assumption that all accidents would occur in suburban areas. An examination the same.ý If all reveals that the decontamination costs for urban areas'would be approximately reduced and accidents occurred'in rural areas, the decontamination costs would be substantially make-the use of special trains still less 'cost effective. Furthermore, "since special trains shipments probably would not completely eliminate the normal dose and accident risk of spent-fuel is probably even by rail,' the 19:1 cost-benefit ratio is probably a minimum; the actual ratio greater.

MAXIMUM 6.3.7 ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY RECOMMENOATIONS'OF'O.5 MREM PER HOUR RADIATION AT SEAT LEVEL IN PASSENGER AIRCRAFT on a The analysis of maximum radiation dose to'passengers performed in Chapter 4 wasbased passenger maximum average dose rate of 1.3 mrem per hour in the rear third of a fully loaded that the maximum radiation aircraft. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency has e'cormmended 6-15) in dose at seat level in the passenger compartment be limited to 0.5 mrem per hour (Ref.

for achieving.thisWgoal were order! to minimize individual radiation'dose- -Three approaches and (3) suggested: (1) additional shielding of package's,'-(2) placement options on aircraft, indi modified shipping procedures. While any of the three approaches would reduce the maximum TI.transported vidual dose, only additional shielding that resulted in a reduction in the total Spacing of annually would be effective also in reducing the annual normal population dose.

the totalTI trans packages or reducing the TI'allowed on passenger aircraft would not reduce ported and would therefore result in no change in the normal population dose.

receive In Chapter 4, it was estimated that an Individual'who flies 500 hours0.00579 days 0.139 hours 8.267196e-4 weeks 1.9025e-4 months per year could othe'radiation level were limited, 108 mremper 'year fromthe radioactive material on board. .If to 0.5 mrem per hour,' his annualldose would be'reduced by the factor 1.3/0.5 = 2.6 to-a dose of, 42 mrem per year.

6.3.8 AIRPORT PACKAGE MONITORING i.e., those occur-The 'effects of abnormal transport occurrences within~normal transport, that were not rences that resulted in release of radioactive-material.or excessive exposure but Adminis-ý the result of a vehicular'accident, -'ere discussed in Chapter.4., he Federal Aviation material packages tration has proposed that airline personnel bezrequired~to monitor.radi3active presented to-them for shipment before they are'loaded ontothe aircraft. It is suggested that, and crew resulting this procedure might'eliminate unnecessary exposure of passengers, attendants, from damaged, defective,-or improperly packaged materials.' . '

12 releases re Airport package monitoring would probably have prevented only one of the in incidents involving ported to the Department of Transportation during the period 1971-1975 source was improperly aircraft shipments of radioactive materials. In this one incident, a 6-19

L_

positioned in its container, and the shipper's monitoring system failed to detect the error.

Most of the other incidents involved packages damaged by handling operations during transit.

Most aircraft incidents involve Type A packages and, if such a package were to completely lose its shielding, the radiation level at 3 meters from the package would be less than 1 rem per hour since this is one basis upon which Type A limits are determined (see Chapter 2).

Assuming that such a package were inadvertently placed on an aircraft carrying 60 passengers for a 2-hour flight, the total population dose would be 120 person-rem if the average dose rate in the cabin were 1 rem per hour. Assuming such incidents occurred only once every 5 years, as te limited experience would indicate, the average -additional population dose would be about 25 person-rem per year or.less.than 0.1 percent of the total annual dose in 1985. At $1000 per person-rem, the dollar equivalent would be $25,000 per-year. 'If the monitoring of the estimatedý 1.7 x 106 packages in 1985 were to be handled by freight handlers in addition to their other work, if each monitoring required approximately 30 seconds, and if freight handlers were paid $3 per hour, the additional cost would be $42,000. The monitoring procedure itself would add about 30 person-rem per year to the normal dose, assuming 30, seconds to monitor one package and an average radiation level of 2 mrem per hour experienced by the person monitoring the package.

Thus, this alternative does not appear to be cost effective.

6.4 RESTRICTIONS ON MATERIAL FORM, QUANTITY SHIPPED, OR PACKAGING The physical and chemical form of the radionuclides transported can strongly influence the amount of material released in an accident and, the pathway to eventual radiation exposure of man. Restricting the maximum quantities of radioactivity allowed on a.vehicle limits the amount of material available for releasein an accident and hence the magnitude of the consequences.

6.4.1 RESTRICTING THE PHYSICAL AND/OR CHEMICAL FORM OF SHIPPED MATERIAL As noted in Chapter 5, the release of dispersible alpha-emitting isotopes in an accident presents an inhalation hazard since lung deposition may occur for particles having aerodynamic diameters of less than 10 micrometers. Larger-diameter particleshave a much, smaller probabil ity of pulmonary dep6sition and;- consequently,.do not~constitute as severe a health hazard to man. The consequences of an accident are directly proportional to the respirable fraction of the material released.

A fabrication technique for production of fuel containing plutonium to be used in reactors involves precipitation of the'oxalate and calcination to. produce PuO2 powder. The effect of calcining temperature on particle' size distribution is shown in Figure 6-1. It should be pos sible to control the respirable fraction by controlling the calcining temperature. Another.

possible method of reducing the quantity of respirable material available for release in an accident is pelletizing the PuO2 powder prior to shipment. It might, be possible by either technique to reduce the respirable fraction of particles released in an accident to 1 percent of the total quantity shipped. These techniques might also be applied to other high-hazard mater-.

ials such as polonium.

6-20

A

'1 3-:

""3 .3

-V ., 3." ," 3 3 4 3 34

'I ;

33)

"-3

.00 90 80 31 -,

70 60 "3 " " 3 502 -- oo 40",' ; '. 12000(

T '- -

30 - - .....

ft 20, " '

107I' - ' "3-"

10. o05' ' : 9 10 60:

PARTICLE DIAMETER MICRONS FIGURE 6-1.- VARIATION IN PLUTONIUM DIOXIDE PARTICLE SIZE DISTRIBUTION FOR A RANGE "oOF,CALCINING TEMPERATURE BETWEEN 800C AND 1200"C (Ref. 6-16).

rll

I Assuming the respirable fractions for high-hazard dispersible materials (as defined in Section 6.2.4) are limited to 1 percent (as opposed to 20 percent in the baseline case), the annual radiological effects are as follows:

Annual normal population dose 25,360 person-rem (3.07 LCF)

Annual LCFs from accidents 0.012 LCF Annual probability of one or 8.88 x 10-4 more early fatalities The annual normal dose is unchanged from the baseline case (Table 6-1) by this alternative.

However, the accident LCF is reduced by 0.005 LCF per-year or, equivalently, $41,000 per year.

In addition, there is a substantial reduction in the worst-case accident consequence for the large shipments considered. Depending on process modification costs,- thisialternative may be cost effective.

6.4.2 RESTRICTING MATERIAL SHIPPED PER VEHICLE Assuming the same amount-of- material wvould be transported anyway, the reduction of the amount allowed on'any given vehicle would result in more shipments and therefore in the possi bility of more accidents involving-those shipments. Increased transportation costs and, for shipments of' strategic quantities.-of special nuclear material, increased security costs would result from this restriction without a corresponding reduction in the annual population dose or in the risk resulting from accidents. However, the consequence of any one accident, should it occur, would be reduced in proportion to the reduction of the amount of material on the vehicle.

From a risk viewpoint, the alternative does not appear cost effective.

6.4:3 REVISING PACKAGING STANDARDS, PACKAGE QUANTITY LIMITS, AND TI LIMITS The alternatives considered in this section are concerned with the reduction in the risk of transporting radioactive materials by three general methods: (1)revising the packaging stand ards to ensure survivability (no release of radioactivity) in all but the most extreme accident conditions, (2) lowering the quantity limits for radioactive materials packages and thereby limiting the amount of radioactive material available for release in any given accident, and (3) lowering the package TI limits.

6.4.3.1 Revising the Packaoing Standards-forType B Containers The results of the risk analysis for both the 1975 and 1985 standard shipments models showed that the annual expected number of LCFs resulting from accidents is much lower than that expected from doses received in normal transport. - However,, even though the probability of occurrence of a severe accident is very small, the consequence of such an accident could be large. For this reason, alternatives that reduce the amount of radioactive material dispersed in an accident are conslaered.

6-22 -

.,Since it is generally acknowledged that current packagings are better than the regulatory standards require, new packaging standards could be introduced that would, in effect, require that-all new packaging designs be at least as good as those currently in use. Such an action would not result in a decrease in risk due to accidents but would ensure that the risk would not increase as a result of the introduction of new packagings 'inferior to presentones.

To see the effect of packaging standards revisions, a different release fraction model 'is considered. It postulates that all Type B packagings are constructed to match the 1985 plutonium packaging criteria discussed in Chapter 5, i.e., only a 1-percent release would occur in a class VII accident and only a 10-percent release would occur in a class VIII accident; .

The annual radiological risks if this alternative were implementedare as follows:

-Annual normal population dose ' ' 25,360 person-rem (3.07 LCF)

Annual LCFs from accidents 0.010 LCF Annual probability of one or "1.05 x 10"8 more early fatalities Both the accident LCF figure and the annual early fatality probability are reduced significantly from the baseline case (Table 6-1).

The reduction in annual accident LCFs is equivalent to $58,000 per year: Recent tests of plutonium shipping containers (Refs. 6-17 and '6-18) indicate that presently used plutonium '

for in'this alter packagings may already have the required level of a6cident resistance called native. Further consideration of this' alternative would require an assessment of the level of accident resistance of the designs of all Type B packagings now in use.

6.4.3.2 Lowering the Package Quantity Limits A second possible method of risk reduction considered in this ýsection is lowering the package quantity limits. Such'action would reduce the amount 'f radioactive material per package available for release, and, if the Iame amount of sh.eld.ing were usedthe TIperpackage would alsobe reduced. However, unless a package TI reduction were required along with the quantity reduction, it-would probably be more cost effective to reduce the amo6unt of shielding in order to lighten and reduce the cost of transporting an individual package. -Consequently; the 'same total amount of material would continue to be'transported, but in a larger number of packages.

Thus, there would be an increase in the annual expected number of LCFs.- However, the risk of early fatalities might be reduced.

With the TI per package remaining the same but a larger number of packages transported, the number of 'TI transported annual ly would be increaaed, ýand 'the ioutine exposure due 'to normal transportwould be increased accordingly.- "Since normal transport accounts 'for over 90'percent' of the risk in the 1985 baseline, the total risk would be-subfstantially increased over the base line case (Table 6-1). .. " " . ' . .

If the action loweringthe quantity'limits were accompanied by a corresponding requirement' to reduce the package TI by the same proportion, the total TI transported annually would be 623

I-unchanged. In this case, there would be no change in either the accident or normal contribution to the risk, assuming, as before, that the total quantity of radioactive matferial transported annually remains the same. The net effect would be to transport the same quantity of radio active material per shipment and per vehicle, except in a larger number of packages. In' either case, shipping cost's would be higher, particularly in the case whýere the action is accompanied by a required reduction In TI because the total weight transported annuaily wo'uld be signifi cantly higher. Higher costs with no change in annual LCFs indicate an unfavorable cost-benefit ratio.

6.4.3.3 Lowering the Package TI Limits The final possible, risk-reduction method consideted in this section is lowering the package TI limits. Current standards allow up to 10 TI for packages'with a Radioactive Yellow III label. The reduction of-the package TI can be accomplished by either or both of the following methods

1. A reduction of the quantity of material per package.

2. An increase In the amount of shielding used per package.

The first method was discussed in the preceding paragraphs and was shown to produce, at best, no change in the total annual risk. The second method, an increase in the amount of shielding per package without reducing the quantity of material per package, could'result"in a reduction In the number of TI shipped annually and in a corresponding reduction in the routine risk In normal transport.- The effect of reduction In the maximum allowable package TI on the annual risk of normal transport would, depend on the amount of the reduction and on detailed information concerning current TI per package values. The current effective radlopharmaceutical industry limit is 3 TI per package (Ref. 6-19). Radlopharmaceuticals constitute a large portion of the radioactive material shipments and, as a result, make'a significant-contribution to the annual risk. A reduction in the 10-TI package limit by a factor of two or three is estimated to have very little, if any, effect on the overall risk since it appears that most package TIs for other than exclusive-use shipments are already at or below that level.

A pregious study (Ref. 6-19) has compared -the effects of package limits of 10, 5, and 1 TI with the effective present limit of 3 TI, for transporting radiopharmiaeuticali by passenger aircraft. The results showed that when the cost-benefit ratios are considered, the 5-TI limit is most cost effective, and a TI limit of 3 exceeds the point of cost effectiveness by a sub stantial margin. However, a TI limit of 1 was found to result in costs exceeding benefit' by a factor of four.

Therefore, just as currently used packagings are much better than the standards require, the effective TI package limits are lower than required by the regulations. The TI limits could be lowered to the cost-effective.level of 5, for example, without affecting current shipping action' and with no change in the overall risk. The result of such an practice significantly would be to ensure that the present voluntary package limits are maintained. Unlike introducing new standards for packaging durability, lowering the TI limits from 10 to 5 would not require

6 expensive container-qualification tests. A reduction of the TI limits to lesi than 3, however, may not be cost effective.

6.5

SUMMARY

OF COST-EFFECTIVE ALTERNATIVES A summary of the various alternatives considered in this chapter that appear to be cost effective is presented in Table 6-5. The alternative of shipping spent fuel by barge, where feasible, appears to be the most cost effective.

The analysis of alternatives performed in this chapter was done to determine which, if any, may be cost effective and therefore merit further study.- A considerable number of alternatives were considered but none in the depth required for an environmental impact statement prior to actual implementation of the specific alternative.

r I,.

1, Z7 t

- S S 6-25'-

TABLE 6-5 SUM4MARY OF COST-EFFECTIVE ALTERNATIVES Applicable Alternative Paragraph Annual Savings All air shipments by truck 6.2.1 $18 x 106 All all-cargo air 6.2.3 $8.3 x 106 shipments by truck All spent fuel by rail 6.2.6 $11 x 106 All feasible spent fuel 6.2.7 $3 x 106 by barge (remainder by rail) 6 Route trucks on 6.3.2 $1.1 x 10 turnpikes Restrict respirable 6.4.1 fraction of high hazard dispersible materials to.1.0%

Revise packaging 6.4.3.1 standards for Type B containers Lower package TI limits 6.4.3.3 MHay be cost effective depending on the cost of process modifications.

Hay be cost effective depending on development costs for new containers.

May be cost effective depending on level of reduction.

I REFERENCES 6-1. Section 2D of Appendix I, "Numerical Guides for Design Objectives and Limiting Conditions for Operation to Meet the Criterion 'As Low As Is Reasonably Achievable' for Radioactive Material in Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Reactor Effluents," to 10 'CFR Part 50, "Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities."

6-2. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission, "Reactor Safety Study," WASH-1400, October1975.

6-3. U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, "Environmental Survey of Transpoitation of Radioactive Material to and from Nuclear Power Plants," WASH-1238, December 1972.

6-4. "List of World Nuclear Power Plants," Nuclear News, December 31, 1975.

6-5. Atomic Industrial Forum, "Electricity from Nuclear Power in the United States," 1975.

6-6. Rand-McNally Road Atlas of the United States.

6-7. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Annual Report, "Waterborne Commerce of the United States."

6-8. "Handling and Using Dredged Material," Environmental Science and Technology, April 1976.

6-9. K. A. Solomon, "Estimate of the Probability That an Aircraft Will Impact the PVNGS," NUS Corporation, NUS14-16, June 1975.

6-10. U.S. Department of Transportation, "Summary of Accident Investigations, 1972," Bureau of Motor Carrier Safety, Federal Highway Administration, October 5, 1973.

6-11. J. 0. Harrison and C. E. Olson, "Estimation of Accident Likelihood in AEC Weapon Transpor tation," Sandia Laboratories, SAND74-0174, Albuquerque, NM, 1974.

6-12. W. V. Luscutoff and R. J. Hall, "A Safety and Economic Study of Special Trains," Battelle Pacific Northwest Laboratories, 1976.

6-13. ICC Docket 036325, "Radioactive Materials, Special Train Serv'ce Nationwidew statement by George R. Hansen.

of 6-14. Letter dated June 25, 1976, with enclosures, from H. J. Breithaupt, Jr., Association American Railroads, to S. J. Chilk, Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Available In NRC Public Document Room for Inspection and copying for a fee.

Radio 6-15. "Considerations for Control of Radiation Exposures to Personnel from Shipments of active Materials on Passenger Aircraft,m EPA Recommendation to FAA, December 1974.

6-27

I 6-16. Battelle Pacific Northwest Laboratories, "The Risk of Transporting Plutonium Oxide and Liquid Nitrate by Truck," BNWL 1846, Richland, WA, August 1975.

6-17. L. Bonzon and M. McWhirter, "Special Tests of Plutonium Shipping Containers,"

IAEA-SR-10/22, International Atomic Energy Agency-Seminar on Radioactive Materials Pack aging and Transportation, Vienna, Austria, August 1976.

6-18. L. Bonzon and J. Schamaum, "Container Damage Correlation with Impact Velocity and Target Hardness," IAEA-SR-10/21, International Atomic Energy Agency Seminar on Radioactive Materials Packaging and Transportation, Vienna, Austria, August 1976 6-19. BattellePacific Northwest Laboratories, "Assessment of the Environmental Impact of the FAA Proposed Rulemaking Affecting the Conditions of Trns'port of Radioactive Material on Aircraft," BNWL-B-421, Richland, WA, September 1975.

6-28

CHAPTER 7

- SECURITY AND SAFEGUARDS

7.1 INTRODUCTION

-The rapid 9rovth.of the nuclear power industry coupled with an increase in terrorist activ ities have increased concern over theft of nuclear materials, sabotage of nuclear facilities, and other associated acts of terrorism. The possibilitfe- of illegal acts and the nature and extent of.potential threats have been and are continuing to be examined by the NRCas part of the overall safeguards program described in Section 7.3. Countermeasures have been established to protect both fixed sites and nuclear material in transit.*

Two categories of material have been examined relative to the in-transit protection of the material against theft and sabotage: (1) special nuclear material (SNM) such as enriched ura nium and plutonium and (2)radioactive isotopes and wastes such as cobalt-60 and spent fuel.

7.2 RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS - POTENTIAL FOR MISUSE 7.2.1 LOW ENRICHED URANIUM Low enriched-uranium, the fuel used in light-water-cooled power reactors, cannot be used directly to fabricate a nuclear explosive. Furthermore,,the radioactivity of this material is so~low that dispersal by manual means or acts of sabotage would not produce a significant radio-.

logical'hazard.

Requirements for physical protection of shipments of low enriched uranium intransit are not specified in NRC regulations.

7.2.2 IRRADIATED (SPENT) FUEL , .

Irradiated fuel removed from light-water-cooled power reactors contains low enriched ura nium, -fission products, and plutonium and other transurantcs. It is highly radioactive and requires heavy shielding for ,safe handling. Massive, durable containers (casks) weighing 25 to

-O0tons are ;used ,for,transport of the spent fuel assemblies (both by road and rail). The contained plutonium is not readily separable from the other radioactive materials.

In March of 1974, specific requirements for the protection of significant quantities of strategic special nuclear material (SSNM) in transit in 10 CFR Part 73'became effective. 'In May of 1976.

licensees were directed to provide additional protection for road shipments through the use of a separate escort vehicle and improved communications. In February pf 1977, in order to formal ize security measures currently being employed, license conditionfi were" issued requiring the 'use' of an armored transporter plus an escort vehicle and a minimum of five armed guardsjfor the pro-.

tection of road shipments.

7

-- 4 + .

2' ,r 7 _': , *' ,

++--'2'..e, **.'* 't- . 2.. '-- '" 2 - " ',

".+ . -+ f "+

7-I1 -k

I The design features that enable the shipping container to withstand severe transportation accidents (e.g., multiplicity of heavy steel shells, thick dense shields, and neutron-absorbing jackets) also enable the containers to withstand attack by small arms fire and explosives. A massive rupture of the- containers by mechanical means or high explosives that would result in the radioactive contents being ejected or removed is considered to be essentially impossible.

Although unlikely, the possibility exists that the container could be breached to the extent that the gaseous inventory and a small portion of the solids would be "lispersed into the'atios-ý ":

phere. For a release from a truck cask containing three PWR elements, the effects in a popula tion density of 2060 people per square mile a're calculated to be'about 1 early deatti and about 220 latent cancer fatalities (Ref. 7-1).*

Spent fuel in transit i'sconsidered to be neithei an attractive nor a practical tirget for theft or sabotage and is specifically exempt from the physical p otection requirements of 10 CFR Part 73.

7.2.3 LOW-LEVEL WASTES Soft waste material generated at nuclear reactors and associated fuel cycle'facilities, e.g.,

contaminated paper and clothing, are compacted and placed (typically) in 55-gallon drums for shipment. Each drum may contain 500 pounds of compacted material with up-to one curie'of acti vation and fission products.

The low specific activity and low radiation levels allow the contaminated trash Xo be shipped withoutishielding. -Because the radioactive contamination 'isbound on the:compacted materi'al, it is unlikely to be released in the event the drums are broken open by accident or criminal acts. Even if an entire truckload of 50 drums were to be'consumed by fire, the amount of radionuclides that would become widely dispersed would be quite small. It has been estimated*

that as much as 99 percent of the 50-curie inventory would remain in the ashes, and only 1 percent or 0.5 curie (primarily ce*ium-137) would become airborne (Ref.: 7-2)>

Liquid fuel cycle and reactor wastes such as contaminated resins and sludges are dewatered, consolidated by mixing with concrete (or other solidifying agents), and placed (typic'ally) in" 55-gallon drums.

The majority of these drums contain less than 20 curies and are shipped'as' Type A packages."'

A smali percentage contain up to' 100 curies (average' of' 20 curies) and are shi'pped'as Type B packages. The ceme'nted, solidified form of the waste materials contributes significantly to*.the' retention of the radioactive inventry In case of container failure.-'

"" a5dn of cemented ast were broken open by acts

,If-each container. of a,50-drum Type A L*h~pen of. cee of sabotage, the total activity released to the' atmosphere would be quite small.i (Reference 7-2.'

indicates tof gaseous and'v-olatile'fission'p'iduits 'would:

become airborne..)-' -~~-~

For different population densities the effects would vary proportionately. However, no credit is given in the calculations to evacuation of downwind areas that could reduce these conse quences by a factor of 10.

7-2

It would be extremely difficult to breach the Type B package to the extent of breaking open 1

the inner container and exposing the solidified wastes. 'In the unlikely event this were to occur, approximately 0.2 curie of 'fission produ'cts (primarily cesium-134 and -137) 'would be released to the atmosphere for each 55-gallon drum ruptured (Ref. 7-2). For a 42-drum load, which would probably be the limit for a Type B truck shipment, the total activity released would be 8.4 curies. Because of the form'of the material, it is'unlikely that the presence of an open fire would significantl increase the activity that would become airborne.

The breach of the Type B package and the exposure o f t.he cemented wastes would contaminate the transport vehicle and nearby ground and produce a radiation field. However, the hazard would be limited to the vicinity of the vehicle.

Because of the .form of the materials and the relatively low levels 'of radioactivity, low level wastes are Considered unlikely targets for "sabotage. Even if subjected to-criminal acts, no major hazard would result.

7.2.4 HIGH-LEVEL WASTES High-level wastes (HLW) generated from the reprocessing of-spent reactor fuel,' even though" cooled for ,many years before' shipment, have many of the same fiss ion products found in the spent' fuel but little' plutonium. These wastes aie intended to be sol idified (e.g., in the form of a dense glass) for shipment and storage. They are highly Iradioactive' ana will require heavy shielding for safe handling. .

HLW shipping casks would be similar in design to a spent fuel shipping cask-and would have many of the same features (steel liners, lead or depleted uranium gamma shielding, a cooling system, neutroný shields, and sacrificial impact limiters). The resis'tance to sabotage would be essentially the same as for a' spent fuel cask; if either were breached by criminal acts, thee consequences are estimated to be of the same order of magnitude. ' ". .

High-level waste shipments are considered to be neither an attractive nor a practical target for theft or sabotage. '(There are currently no HLW-shipments and few if any are antici';

pated by 1985.1) -:

7.2.5 NON-FISSILE RADIOISOTOPES (SMALL SOURCE) ' " "-"c Small-quantity shipments (less than 20 curies) have little potential for harm to the general public through misuse. Dispersal of the contents of a shipping container following a theft or from an "t by sabotage would result in'a relatively minor localized 'contamination. (The 'radiation unshielded 20-curie 'source of cobalt-60 -would be -only 'abbut 25 R/hr at 1 meter.' On the other hand, the radiation6 would be extemeiy'hazardous to a terrorist'who 'directlyhandled the source without intervening shielding.)IV ' " I.....' ' - -::' '

7.2.6 NON-FISSILE RADIOISOTOPES (LARGE SOURCE) ' , , : ' ,'& °-:.- , '

Large-quantity shipments (10 to 1O6 curies) may have a limited potential for endangering the public health and safety through misuse.

7-3 '1,

Containers used forthe shipment of these amounts of material must meet DOT and NRC regula tory requirements forType B or large-quantity packages. These packages are designed to prevent the loss or dispersai of the contents, to retain shielding efficiency, and io provide for heat dissipation under both normal transport conditions and specific accident damage test conditions.

The size, weight (which varies from hundreds of pounds to forty tons for a 500,000-Ci Co-60 source), and construction of these containers make theft a difficult endeavor and dispersal of the contents an Impractical event. In addition, the high level of radiation associated with the isotopes prevents handling without-mass shielding. If a shipping container were diverted, it would be almost impossible to use the contents to cause any significant harm other than through explosive breaching and subsequent dispersal of the contents.

If sufficient amounts of explosives are used, the possibility exists that the radioisotopes could be dispersed to the atmosphere (for gases or volatiles) or locally dispersed on the ground (for solids). Tables 5-12, 5-13, and 5-14 show the consequences of worst-case -accidents for several large-quantity shipments of Po-210 and Co-60. It is believed that these results are representative of the possible effects of worst-case credible criminal acts during transport.

Although terrorists might perceive large-quantity shipments of non-fissile radioisotopes to, be attractive weapons, the protection afforded by the shipping container and the high level of radioactivity of the contents make theft and dispersal difficult and deliberate manipulation.

very difficult. The consequences associated with worst-case acts of sabotage would not consti tute a significant radiological hazard.

7.2.7 URANIUM HIGHLY ENRICHED IN U-235 Highly enriched uranium (uranium enriched to 20 percent or more in the U-235 isotope) could be used to fabricate a nuclear explosive,and therefore has significant potential for misuse.

Depending on their form, these materials could be used directly (e.g., U metal) or after proces sing (e.g., KTGR fuel).

Because of its low radioactivity, sabotage of.U-235 would not, in general, constitute a threat to the general public. Conceivably, it might be possible to bring about criticality by, actions involving both removal of neutron absorbers and rearrangement of the uranium materials.

It certainly would be a dangerous task and probably would irradiate the perpetrator. If success ful, the hazard, although dangerous, would be restricted to the general vicinity of the nuclear materials.-

NRC-regulations require that higbly enriched uranium.in quantities of,5 kilograms or more.

be protected against theft and sabotage in accordance with the physical security requirements of.

10 CFR Part 73. Additional requirements have been established for-fixed site andtransport,,.

protection by license conditions. (These include requirements for the use of an armoredtrans- ,.

port vehicle that has a cargo compartment with barriers or containers that deter or delay pene tration, a separate escort vehicle, and a minimum of five armed guards for. road_ shipments.)-,

Physical security requirements are not specified for quantities smaller than this amount.

7-4

a 7.2.8 PLUTONIUM AND URANIUM-233 Reactor grade plutonium and U-233* (like U-235) could be used to fabricate a crude nuclear explosive. Depending on their form, the plutonium orU-233 could be used directly-(e.g., Pu or U metal) or after processing (e.g., Pu nitrate). In addition, because.of their radioactivity, plutonium and U-233 are potentially hazardous, particularly when in the form of respirable aerosols. Therefore, for significant quantities of these materials, the potential exists for misuse both as illicit explosives and as dispersal weapons.

Plutonium and U-233 in quantities of 2 kilograms or more are protected against theft and sabotage in accordance with the physical security requirements of 10 CFR Part 73. Additional protection has beenrequired at both fixed sites and in transit by.specific license conditions as in the case of highly enriched uranium discussed earlier.

7.3 SAFEGUARDS OBJECTIVES AND PROGRAM Safeguards are-defined as those measures employed to deter, prevent, or respond to (1) the unauthorized possession or use of significant quantities of nuclear materials through theft of, diversion and (2) the sabotage of nuclear materials and facilities. The NRC safeguards program has the general objective of providing a level of protection against such acts that will.ensure against significant increase in the overall risk of death, injury, and property damage to the public from other causes beyond the control of the individual. To be acceptable, safeguards must take realistic account of the risks, involved and of burdens on the public in terms of impacts on civil liberties, institutions, the economy, and the environment.

The followingfunctional elements are utilized by the NRC~toensure effective protection of the radiological health and safety of the public and protection ofthe environment:,

1. Consideration of the nature and dimensions of the postulated threat in the development of regulatory requirements - ..

2 .. Imposition of safeguards requirements on the industry directed-toward countering1the postulated threat., ... .

3. Licensing activities, including review of safeguards procedures proposed by industry, as required by regulations.

4.. Inspection of safeguards implementation to ensure adequacy. .

5.- Enforcement of requirements through administrative, ci%,il, or criminal penalties.

6. Administrative and technical support for response and recovery.

"There-arecurrently no strategic quantities of privately owned U-233, and no shipments are expected in the next several years.

7-5

7. Confirmatory research related to the development and testing of methods, techniques, and equipment necessary to the effective implementation of safeguards.

8. Frequent program' review in the light of industrial/technical or social/political changes to ensure that any needed revisions are made to the elements above.

Current programs are directed at protecting against theft or diversion of certain types and "quantities of nuclear materials that could be used for nuclear explosives or contaminants and protecting against the sabotage of nuclear facilities and materials.

The Commission's regulations-in 10 CFR Part 70 require a license in order to own, acquire, deliver, receive, possess, use; transport, import, or export special nuclear materials. The NRC' publishes specific safeguards requirements for materials and plant protection in 10 CFR Parts 70 and 73 and carries out the following activities to ensure compliance:

1. Prelicensing evaluation of applicants' proposed nuclear activities, including safe guards procedures inthe case~of applicants for significant quantities- of special nuclear material;

2. Issuance of a license to authorize activities subject to specific safeguards require ments; and

3. Inspection and enforcement to' ensure that applicable safeguards requirements are met by implementation of approved plans.

The provisions in 10 CFR Part 73 include specific physical protection requirements that apply to licensees who ship5 kilograms of U-235 (contained in uranium'enriched to 20% or more),

2 kilograms of plutonium or U-233, or a weighted combination of these.

The NRC conducts inspections of a licensed plant and its related transportation links to ensure continued effective implementation of material control and physical protection require ments. Each licensee is required to afford the NRC'opportunity to inspect the'nuclear mate- %

rials, to perform or permit the NRC to perform necessary tests of materials and equipment, and to make available any records pertaining to possession, use, or transfer of nuclear material.

If items of noncompliance or deficiencies are found in the implementation of safeguards requirements by the licensee, the licensee is instructed to take prompt-corrective action and to' inform the NRC of the results. The NRC hag the authority to modify, suspend, or revoke licenses and to impose civil penalties'on licensees for noncompliance with' th items and conditions of the license.

Early in 1976, the NRC established an Information Assessment Team (IAT) fQr the purpose of.--

determining 'ina timely fashion' theý credibil ity, seriousness, and imediaay of hazards'asso-:- `

ciated with threats to nuclear facilities or transportation. This team is chArged with the 7-6

responsibility for receiving and reviewing all incoming threat notifications, performing multi source correlation, assessing the validity of sources and data, judging the degree of serious ness, and recommending options for alternative courses of action. In the event that a threat' escalates into an attempt to steal SNM or sabotage nuclear facilities or transportation, 'the IAT forms the nucleus of the NRC Incident Response Action Coordination Team (IRACT). This team is responsible for initiating, planning, and coordinating incident response actions.

7.4 PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM AND PLUTONIUM DURING TRANSIT 7.

4.1 INTRODUCTION

As noted in Section 7.2, the only radioactive materials that require physical protection against theft and sabotage during transit are-strategically significant quantities of uranium enriched to 20% or more in the U-235 isotope, U-233, and plutonium. The potential for misuse of shipments of other radioisotopes is-sufficiently low that no additional protection is presently' believed necessary.,

It is estimated that during calendar years 1977 and 1978 there will be less than 30'ship-'

ments per year of, strategic quantities of uranium and plutonium in the commercial sector. Most of these -will be transfers of UF66 "from Piketon, Ihio and Oak'Ridge Tennesseed to O'Hare air port for export overseas.

The following paragraphs contain a description'of current requirements bth'rgulations and specific license conditions) for physical protection during transit and an assessment of the:

adequacy of these requirements relative to a postulated threat consisting of an internal threat' of one employee occupying any position and an external threat of a determined 'violent assault by several well-armed, well-trained persons who might'possess inside knowledge or assistance.*

7.4.2 ROAD SHIPMENTS Shipments are 'required to be made in a vehicle that has an armored cab with a 'crew of three armed guards and a cargo compartment that is constructed to resist penetration and delay entry.

A separate vehicle with two additional armed guards must escort the transporter.

Communication requirements include radiotelephones in both vehicles for communication to*

the licensee, his agent, or the police; radios for'intervehicle communication,' and citizen band" radios in both vehicles for use in emergencies.

Shipme'nts are required to be made on primary rgads during daylight hours. '(If a'trip is to extend into the night, a second escort vehicle with two'additional'guards'is-required.) Trans fers from vehicle'to storage, from one vehicle to another, 'and from storage'to vehicle as well-as material In'storage must be monitored by'guards who 'are equipped with communications to'local police and who must keep the shipment under continuous*visual surveillance: ," '

On the basis'of Intelligence and'other relevant information 'availablei'to the NRC,-there are no known groups in this country having the combinationof motivation,-skill, and resources required to carry out an assault against a protected shipment or facility.

7-7;

Many other specific requirements, such as requirements 'for vehicle markings, scheduled in NRC regula calls, guard training, route selection, notification of shipment, are contained tions and license conditions.

The combination of five well-trained armed guards, armor protection, and penetration resistant cargo compartments is considered adequate to withstand an assault by a small group for a prolonged period of time. The requi.rements for multiple means of communication and the restriction of travel to daylight hours-on well-traveled roads-are designed to ensure that local police forces would be notified and would be able to respond in time to seal off and neutralize the threat. (As noted above a second escort vehicle is required if travel extends into the night.)

The protection system does not necessarily fail even if the attack is conducted by a large force that outnumbers the guards. The margin'of'safety might be less and casualties "s perha higher. However, the capabilities of the local and state police relative to 'communication networks, area isolation, response force numbers, armament, and transportation provide'protec-'

tion against threats larger than that postulated.

The penetration-resistant transport vehicle provides resistance to penetration and contain ment against acts of sabotage directed at dispersal of the plutonium.' It is estimated that, for a wide range of assaults, including road mines, gunfire, hand-carried explosives, and vehicle-to vehicle and other crash environments, this type of vehicle would prevent wide-scale dispersal of the plutonium cargo. There is, of course, a practical limit to the protection" against unlimited amounts.,of explosives. A trailer truckload of TNT (40,000ib) detonated next to the transporter would cause massive, damage to the vehicle and to the surrounding environment. The'consequence of such a blast might exceed the consequences of the plutonium contamination.

Transfers or material stored while awaiting transfer (24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months or less) are protected by armed guards. In addition, all U.S. airports and sea terminals used for transfer of SNM have security systems that provide control of access and a reserve of armed individuals that could respond to a security emergency.. , ...

Plutonium shipments in quantities less than 2 kilograms do not fall within the physical protection requirements of ,10CFRPart 73.-.The cutoff point wasestablished at this level in order- to provide;a substantial margin of safety below the quantity of plutonium generally accepted as being required to construct an improvised nuclear explosive.

While, this level is not, directly related to risks associated with dispersal weapons, it can be shown that the possible consequences. from dispersal of such quantities would be of the same order as-malevolent use of chemical explosives and small compared to a nuclear explosion. "(It has been estimated in Reference 773 that plutonium dispersed in a. city having a high population density could result in one fatality for each 15 grams dispersed.) L The protection afforded to, road shipment and storage in transit is considered-to be-as effective as that provided by ERDA (now DOE) during the transport of government-owned SNM., , .f 7-8

7.4.3' RAIL SHIPMENTS At present, no physical protection plans have been approved by the NRC for rail shipments, and no shipments of NRC-licensed SNM are being made using this mode of transport. In order for a security plan utilizing this mode to be approved, protection comparable to that currently afforded road shipments would have to be provided. Such features of the plan as guard strength and deployment, communications, armor, penetration resistance of the cargo compartment, and route selection would be assessed to ensure that the escort force could withstand an attack by a small group until police response was ensured. For plutonium shipments, the resistance to, ,,

penetration or sabotage of the cargo compartment would be evaluated to ensure a level equivalent to that for road shipments.

7.4.4 SHIPMENT BY INLAND WATERWAYS No physical protection plans have been approved by the NRCfor shipment by inland waterway, and no shipments of NRC licensed SNM are currently being made using this mode of transport. A security plan for shipment by inland waterway would be approved only if the protection-against assault and sabotage were equal to that presently applied to road shipments.

7.4.5 ,AIR SHIPMENTS Shipments of strategically significant quantities of SNM are required to be made in cargo-only aircraft. SNM being transferred to or from such aircraft (including periods while in storage) must be protected by guards equipped with a-capability for radio communications to either a local law enforcement agency or an air terminal guard force. Preplanned in-transit storage may not exceed 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months . Guard surveillance of the cargo compartment whenever the compartment containing SNM is open and observation of the aircraft until it departs are required.

The combination of assigned guards, communications to local police, and a reserve of armed airport security personnel stationed at the flight lines at major commercial airports provide significant protection against an assault or covert attempts by unauthorized personnel to board the plane., (The only air shipments currently being made or projected through,1978 are imports and exports at O'Hare airport. These flights are ,escorted by an unarmed employee or agent of the licensee. U.S. safeguards responsibilities-in the transportation of nuclear materials for export end when the shipment is unloaded at a foreign terminal. The NRC regional offices inspect every import and export shipment for&compliance ~ithrequire nts.) -The surveillance of the transfer onto the aircraftýplus the -normal -preflight check of-the cargo compartment by the flight crew make it*unllkely a.stowaway could board and ,occupy the aircraft undetected. An attempt at diversion of the aircraft~by a memberof the flight crewjonceairborne'is considered to be unlikely. ' 5--, .- -- '-

Transport of plutonium by air presents a unique problem. If both~the~aircraft were damaged and the shipping container were breached during flight, the altitude and velocity of the aircraft might' aid 'in the plutonium dispersal.. Similarly, ahighvelocity:crash of an aircraft might cause or contribute to the rupture of a shipping container and the scattering~of the contents.

7-9

However, no shipments of plutonium by air will be licensed by the NRC (except for individual medical applications) until the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has certified to the Joint Commit tee on Atomic Energy of the Congress, as required by law, that a safe container that will not rupture under crash and blast-testing equivalent to the crash and explosion of a high-flying aircraft has been developed and tested.

7.4.6 SEA SHIPMENTS Shipments of SNM by sea 'are conducted in accordance with physical protection provisions similar' to those applied to air shipments. Guards equipped with radio equipment capable of ,

communicating with local police or'a nearby commercial' guard force maintain surveillance over the SNM during transfer operations. Vessels are observed by these guards until they depart the.

harbor. Sea shipments are escorted by an unarmed employee or agent of the licensee. Ship-to shore contact is made at least every 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months to relay position information and status of the shipment. It is considered unlikely that a shipment, while at sea, 'could be successfully diverted or sabotaged to the'extent that a significant radiological hazard would result.

7.5 ALTERNATIVES The present in-transit physical security requirements provide protection, at a minimum, against theft or sabotage by a postulated threat consisting of an internal threat of one employee" occupying any position and an external threat of a determined violent assault by several well armed, wel1-tra6ned' persons who might possess inside knowledge or assistance. -This protection is the responsibility of'and'is supplied by the licensee or his agent'and consists of privately owned facilities and equipment-under the control of private guard forces.

Consideration has been given* to using such other means of protecting SNM in transit as a Federal guard force; the ERDA transport system, Department of Defense escorts. and systems.

designed to withstand a larger, more violent assault. These alternatives are discussed below.

7.5.1 FEDERAL GUARD FORCE' I '- ,

The need for and feasibility of an- NRC security agency to assume operating responsibility for security forces to protect: the nuclear industry was the subject of-a special review by the NRC in 1975-76 (Security Agency Study, 'Ref. 7-4). -The principal conclusion was:

. U*The study has found that creation of a Federal guard force for maintaining security in the nuclear industry would not result in a "higher degree of guard force effectiveness than can beachieved by the use, of~private guards, properly qualified,,trained and certified (by NRC). Analysis of the existing regulatory structure indicates that NRC'can fulfill its responsibilities to assure-adequate .,

physical protection of licensed facilities and materials through stringently enforced regulations."

7.5ý.2 THE ERDA (DOE) TRANSPORT SYSTEM ' ' .,

The Security Agency Study also'addressed the question of whether a Federal transport system was necessary for privately owned strategic special nuclear material. The study concluded: '*

7-10

fI

""With regard to shipping containers and transportation vehicles,

,the private sector can provide a level of security equivalent to that provided by the ERDA system which is responsible for trans port of government-owned special nuclear material., Equivalent security can be provided by the private sector using drivers, guards and operating techniques under stringent standards now

- being established by NRC. "Reliable'and effective communications can be provided by a system such as the ERDA communication system if commercial carriers are required to'use'it."

The'present level of transport protection provided by the licensed industry is considered to be comparable to that required by ERDA (now DOE). While the licensee (or transport company) does not always have the capability of communicating directly to a command and control center while in transit (as does the ERDA system), the use of radiotelephone,-intervehicle radio, and citizens band radio combined with restrictions that normally limit travel to daylight hours on primary highways is considered adequate to provide timely notification of local police of a security emergency.

7.5.3 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ESCORTS The Posse Comitatus Act prohibits the use of Armed Forces for civil law enforcement, which would include protection of private property, unless expressly authorized by the Constitution or by statutes. None of the present authorizations would permit-the-use of Armed Forces personnel except in emergencies caused by civil disorder, calamity, or disturbance or when State authority has broken down or there is armed insurrection. Even if this legal impediment did not exist, there is no need or justification for using military forces and equipment to protect against the postulated threat. The physical protection deemed necessary to defeat this threat can and is being provided by the private sector.

7.5.4 PROTECTION AGAINST A HIGHER THREAT, LEVEL TheNRC is continuousjy evaluating the nature and extent of potential -threats against nuclear materials and facilities. JThe -threat assessmentprogram. has developed the following information: - --

" The intelligence community has no evidence that there are groups in this country

-- having the motivation, skill, and resources toattack either a fuel facility or a fuel shipment.

" .There have been no assaults in this country against facilities or shipments with the specific intent to cause a radiological release or to steal nuclear material.

o To date, there is no evidence to indicate any loss bytheft or~diversion to unauthor ized use of significant quantities of special nuclear materials.

o An examination of over 1200 acts of violence characterized as terrorism occurring in the idecade 1965-1975 revealed that 97%were carried out by 6 or less people and 86% by 3 or less. . ,

7-il -

tU Since there is no identifiable threat, the decision as to- the level or protection to be applied (or the magnitude of'the postulated threat° against which defenses are to be established) demands the use of subjective judgment. .

Based on the above threat assessment, it-is believed that the requirements placed on the licensees by NRC provide a capability" to protect against the postulated threat and are in the public interest. For purposes of a planned review in a public rulemaking proceeding, NRC has under preparation proposed new regulations that have as their objective the achievement of safe guards that would counter hypothetical threats more severe tham those postulated in evaluating -

the adequacy of current safeguards for licensed operations, including transportation activities.

In addition, consideration is being'given to the protection of material during anomalous occur rences such as unscheduled emergency stops enroute.

7.5.5 RESTRICTING TRANSPORT TO A PARTICULAR MODE Regardless of the mode of transportation, adequate protection against-theft and acts of sabotage that would result in a significant radiological hazard can be provided. For example, while it might be argued that'air shipments (fixed wing or helicopter) made from secure terminal to secure terminal are better protected than are road-air-road or all-road shipments (the evi dence is not conclusive that this argument is correct), this is not sufficient justification to prohibit transport'bylthese latter two- methods when it can be shown that they have sufficient physical protection: "

7.6' CONCLUSIONS -

0 Existing physical security requirements are adequate to protect, at a minimum, against theft or sabotage of strategic special nuclear materials'(uranium enriched to 20% or more in the U-235 isotope, U-233, and plutonium) in transit by a postu lated threat coniisttng of an internal threat of one employee occupying any position and an external'threat of a'deteruined violent.assault by several well-armed, well-trained persons who might possess inside knowledge or assistance.

o The level of protection provided by these requirements reasonably ensures that transportation of'strategic special nuclear'material does not endanger the public health and safety or common defense and security. However, prudence dictates that safeguards policy be subject to close and continuing review. Thus, the NRC is conducting a public rulemakIng proceeding to consider upgraded interim requirements and longer-term upgrading actions** The'objective of-the rulemaking proceeding is to consider additional safeguards measures to counterý the hypothetical threats of internal conspiracies among licenseee'mployees and determined violent assaults that would be more severe -han th6oe:postulated in iv~aluatinig the adequacy of current safeguards.

o - The use of the ERDA (now' DOE)

Q ransport system is not,' at' this time, considered to be necessary for the protection of privately owned strategic special nuclear 7-12

material because the present level of transport protection provided by the licensed industry is considered to be comparable to that presently required by ERDA (DOE).

Similarly, the use of Department of Defense escorts is not presently needed to protect domestic shipments against the postuiated threat because the physical protection deemed necessary to defeat this threat can and is being provided by the

- *rivate sector. . ..

o Shipments of radioactive materials not now covered by NRC physical protection requirements, such as spent fuel and large source nonfissile radioisotopes, do not constitute -athreatto the public health andjsafety either because of their limited potential for misuse (due in part to the hazardousI radiation levels which preclude direct handling) or because of the protection afforded by'safety considerations, e.g., shipping containers.

7-13 ý

REFERENCES 7-1. C. Vernon Hodge, USNRC, and James E.' Campbell', Sandia Laboratories, Calculations of Radio logical Consequences from Sabotage of Shipping Casks for Spent Fuel and High Level Waste, September 8, 1976.

7-2. U.S. Atomic Energy Commssion. Environmental Survey of Transportation of Radioactive Materials to and from Nuclear Power Plants, WASH-1238, 1972; Supp. 1, NUREG-75/038, 1975; Supp. II, NUREG-0069, 1976.'

7-3. B. L. Cohen, The Hazards 'In Plutonium Dispersal, Institute for Energy Analysis, Oak Ridge, Tenn., March 1975.

7-4. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Security Agency Study: Report to the Congress on the Need for, and the Feasibility of, Establishing a Security Agency within the Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, NUREG-0015, 1976.

7-14

APPENDIX A STANDARD SHIPMENTS MODEL A.1 INTRODUCTION The transportation of radioactive materials involves such a diversity of isotopes, package types, quantities of material,' package radiation levelsý and transport modes that a detailed consideration-of every shipment-becomes impractical. In order to realistically assess the radio logical risk associated with the transportation of radioactive materials, it is necessary to select a finite 'number of shipment types that'domlnate the radiological risk.

The'standard shipments model used in the draft version of this document was based on a 1972 shipper survey (Ref.*A-1) extrapolated to 1975 and on interviews with a few major shippers. The results of a detailed 1975 shipper survey (Ref. A-2) were not available in time to be included in, the draft document. The standard shipments model used in this document is much more extensive than the previous one and-Is based on the 1975 survey data. 'The purpose of this appendix is to illustrate the-methods used to-derive the various standard shipments models. In the remainder of this appendix,"'the survey report" refers to the report of the'survey data listed as Refer ence A-2.

"In'the 1975 survey,,certain-shippers completed "detailed questionnaires" while others com-,

pleted"summar6questionaaires." The detailed questionnaires requested information'based on actual shipping records while the summary questionnaires requested information based on shipper estimates. Most major shippers, i.e., those known to ship large numbers of packages annually, and all special nuclear material licensees completed detailed questionnaires, although a few were missed and were sent' summary questionnaires.' Summary questionnaires sent to a cross section of licensees were intended to'represent the entire licensee population on asampltng basis. Thus, the sumnary questionnaire data base was divided into two'separate.groups: one-for minor shippers and the other for apparent major shippers. 'There exist;'-therefore, three data bases: one from the detailed questionnaires- one from the summary questionnaires completed by minor shippers, and one from'the summary questionnaires-completed by apparent major, shippers.- Each data base was extrapolated differently to include the entire'shipper population. -The set of standard shipments,,

on which this risk assessment is based was determined from these three data bases.

Each standard shipment is specified by the ,isotope or material-being shipped, the package type, the number of packages shipped per year, the-average number of, packages per shipment,ýthe average quantity of-material per'packagq, the-average transport index (TI) per package, the average'distance traveled per'shipment,'and the primary and secondary transport modes.

A-1 -

I A.2 COMPILATION OF STANDARD SHIPMENTS LIST The selection of standard shipments was made as follows. First, groups of isotopes and materials were selected from Reports X.H,* XIII.H,* and XIV.H* of Reference A-2. The isotopes selected accounted for 97.9% of the total packages, 99.1% of the total kilometers, 97% of the total TI, and over 99% of the total curies or grams, as determined from the detailed question naires. All uranium-plutonium mixtures were combined into a single gro.,o with an average reactor grade plutonium content of 25% by weight.

Having selected the isotopes and materials that accounted for the vast majority of packages, curies or grpms, TI, and kilometers in the detailed qupstionnaire data, it was necessary to determine the distribution of'shipments according to package type, and transport mode. for each material. For example, one needs to know how many, Type B packages of Co-60 were transported by truck. Such information was not directly obtainable from the survey report. Certain of the computer reports (I.D and If.D) gave, the breakdown for each isotope according to package type, but not by transport mode, while others (X.A-G and XI.A-G) listed the breakdown by transport mode but not by package type..

In order to obtain'a'breakdown by both package type and transport mode, two tabulations were made. First, the number of packages of each isotope was listed by package type, Independent of transport mode, using Reports.I.0 and II.D. Next, the number of packages of each isotope was tabulated according to primary transport mode, independent of package type, using Reports X.A-G and XI.A-G. Then, the two tabulations were combined to form a composite distribution of numbers of packages (extrapolated to account for the unsurveyed shipper population) as a function of both package type and prim.iry transport mode.- The results are shown in Table A-l. -The primary-uses:..,

of each isotope (M = medical, I = industrial, FC.= fuel cycle, W = waste) are also includedtin the table. .

Implicit in the tabulation of data in Table A-1 is the assumptjon that all:packages of a given isotope have the same transport mode split, regardless of package type. _This assumption was necessary in order to combine the package data and transport mode data. ,Thus,,Table.A-1 constitutes a first approximation to the breakdown,according to packagetype-and transport mode.

An exception was made for, Co-60 when it was noted that-there were: no reported aircraft shipments.,

of Co-60 greater than'20 curies.in-the detailed.questionnaire, data., Thus, Type B and large-.

quantity Co-60 shipments were assumed to be transported by truck. ,-yo Entries listed as "Blank 'Entry" in Reports 1.D and II.D or "unknown" in the transport mode breakdown of ReportsX and'XI were added to the categorycontaining the largest percentage of packages for that Isotope., Certain o6vious discrepancies (such as very_ massive shipments by aircraft) were adjusted prior to tabulating the 'results in Table A-i., Two large shipment types,-,

Co-60 LQ-2 and Pu-239 LQ, were not listed in the survey data, but shipment data were obtained. ,o from other sources.

The raw data for Reference A-2 are contained in a series of computer reports specified by a Roman numeral combined with an alphabetic character.

A-2

TABLE A-1 TOTAL PACKAGES EXTRAPOLATED FROM DETAILED QUESTIONNAIRE (NON-URANIUM)

Major Package " Air ' Passenger Material Use" Type Freight Aircraft Truck Mail Rail Sh 14p Total 7052.

Am-241 I A 2172 254 -- 4 1 0 0 155' B 48 6, 100, 0 2299 0 4059 Au-198 M A 192 1568 00 0 0 14444, Co-57 M A 1907. 7063 5474 0 0 56 LSA 7 28 21 0 0 0 0 1940 Co-60 I'M A 114 62 1763 0 0 0 0 329 B. 19 11, 299 0 4395 LSA 259 141 3995 0 0D 0 0 73 LQ1 4' 2 67 0 0 0 4 LQ2 0 0 4 0 0 4042 190 3771 0 0 Cs-137 I A 81 0 0' 25, B 1 1 23 0 4 .79 0 0 85 LSA 2 0 19617

r 0, C-14" M Am 6356 7415 4865 0 0, 19860 5720 12750 0 Ga-67 M A 1390 0 0 28970' 7996 11820 8227 956 0 H-3-,ý I A 13 0 ,406 B 112 166 115 0 20 14' 2 0 " 49 LSA 14 0 0 1081 22 432 0 0 Ir-192 I A 627 0 4861 2819 97 1944 0 0 B

iF'131 '+

0 0 326743 1-125 M A 30714' 209442 86587 0 83 568 235 0 0 886 B 0 68 18 0 0 LSA 6 44 0 66 1075 126 640 0 0 Kr-85 I A 243 0 15 241 B 54 28 143 0 0 1 22 LSA 5 3 .13 0 20154 0 0 MC+MF FC A 0 :0o 20154 0 0

0 0 4687 B 0 '0 4687 W

TABLE A-1 (continued)

Majoi Package Air Passenger

'4laterial Use Type Freight Aircraft Truck Mail Rail Ship Total MC+MF FC LQ 0 0 11 0 0 0 11 LSA 0 0 31191 0 0 0 31191 1Mo-99 H A 25460 56421 46058 0 0 0 127939 B 0 4369 869 1927 1573 0 8 0

Po-210 I A 72 -1 68 35 0 184 1 17 LQ 7 0 :6 3 0 P-32 M A 2014 5634 3558 0 0 0 11206 Ra-226 I A' 12 -,5 104 0 0 0 122 B 66 - 27 555 0 0 0 648 Tc-99m, M A 10090 "20649 203910 0 0 0 234649 Waste W A 0 0 12877 0 0 0 12877 B 0 0 1806 0 0 0 806 LSA 0 0 19736 0 0 0 19736 6844 6154 12538 0 0 0 25536 Xe-133 I A Mixed M A 930 14455 21842 269 0 0 24486 B 83 1 0 0 92

r LSA 211 "328 4963 61 0 0 5564 Pu-238 M A 12 75 139 0 0 0 226 B 15 93 174 0 0 0 282 LQ 0 3 5 0 0 0 8 LSA 2 12 22 0 0 0 36 Pu-239 FC A 2 1 63 0 0 0 66 B' 135 40 3804 0 0 0 3979 LQ 1 0 22 0 0 0 23 Pu PC, A 0 1 0 0 0 1 B S5 1 132 0 0 0 138 U-Pu FC A 4 0 17 0 0 0 21

B 62 9 303 0 0 0 374 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 LO 0 Spent fuel FC Cask 0 0 254 17 0 271 Limited quantity shipments in limited packagings are listed as "various" isotopes in Table A-3.

I - industrial; M '-medical, FC - fuel cycle; W - waste material.

Uranium shipment data are tabulated separately in Table A-2 because they were determined differently. It was recognized that most of the uranium transported is for use in the nuclear fuel cycle for the production of power in nuclear reactors. Two previous studies (Refs. A-3 and A-4) have addressed the environmental effects of transport of uranium and identified the shipment types listed in Table A-2. The amounts pef package, the numbers of packages per shipment, and the average distances per package shown in the table were taken from these two previous studies.

"The first two shipment types in Table A-2 involve, natural uranium. The total grams of natural uranium transported were determined from the survey data, from both the summary and detailed questionnaires. Natural uraniuu shipments were considered to be those listed in the survey data as "U-238." "U-235 Z," "U-235 A, B, and C," and ' tu."

A total of 9.1 x 10" grams of natural and depleted uranium was transported in 1 year- as determined from the survey data. Half of this was assumed to be shipment type 1 and half shipment type 2, since the two shipments are sequential and the total amount of uranium must be conserved. The total packages per year of each shipment type were determined by dividing the total grams transported by the amount per package. The number of packager of enriched uranium for each of the remaining three shipment types was determined in the _ w, from the total grams of enriched uranium transported (3.9 x 109 grams total).

All entries in the survey tables listed as "U-235.D-Y" or "U-235" were considered as enriched uranium.* The total amount of material in grams was determined by dividing-the amount shown (amount of U-235 only) in the tables by the fractional enrichment. -Thus,- the total amounts of enriched uranium are considerably greater than those determined from Report XIV.H, for example, since Report XIV.H shows only the amount of U-235 contained in the U-235/U-238 mixture.

The total number of packages of uranium determined in this way does not agree with the total number determined from the survey, but the total number of grams, of course, does agree. Since it is only the total amount of material shipped (not the tot~al packages) that determines the risk in the accident case, this simplified model is considered adequate in determining the accident risk.

The average TI per package assigned to each uranium shipment was computed by--first deter mining the total TI for both natural and enriched uranium from the survey data, distributing the natural uranium TI equally among packages of shipment types I and 2 (as defined'in Table A-2),

and distributing the enriched uranium TI equally amongipackages of:shlpment types 3, 4, and 5.

The result is an average TI of 2.6 each for types I and 2 and 1.4 each for types 3, 4, and 5.

Since the normal dose depends upon the total TI transported annually, it is unimportant how the TI are distributed among packages, as long as the total TI is accounted'for. The normal dose computed for the enriched uranium shipments is an overestimate, since the TI reported in the survey data was most likely fissile TI rather than radiation TI. In the section of Chapter 4 where maximum individual doses areconsidered, a'dose'rate value from Reference A-4 was used in place of the TI per package computed here.

The summary questionnaire data for numbers of packages were added to those from the detailed questionnaires. The resulting package totals are shown in Table A-3, listed by isotope, package The letters A-Y following the symbol U-235 in the survey data indicate the oercentage enrichment in the isotope U-235. A-5-,

TABLE A-2 URANI U SHIPMENTSSUSED It,THE STANDARD SHIPMENTS AMOUnt Total' Avg.

Ship. , , Form/ per Pkg Pkgs per pkgs. Distance, "ype Material From 4

-o'To - Package*:(grams) shipment per'yr- (km)

(4' 4 " -* -" ,, 44 8x O51 2x O

1 *:. U3 0 8 Mill m.il : UF6640Prod. LSAi - 1.2x1600 9 2 4 UF6 :UFP6 Prod. Enrich Pl. LSA Ixl0 2 4550 800

-3 U F(enr) Enrich P1. U0 P. , AF 2.2x10 6 5 591 1200 "444 ,44 UO2 UO " "- 4 4.0 4 UO (enr) Ud' PI Fuel'Fab., AF l.1x1O 40 11818 1200 S. - . u 4*p

44 -4

4"o

" , ) ""F5 uel Fab. Reactors -. SF , 8.3xl0 6 1566 1600 S44,.,-, .4

4 _

,* *LSA -'low specific'activityl "AF- Type A fissile; SF =special form.

." 44. 444- 4 4 4.I4 4 . . 4 4 44 4

TABLE A-3 COMPILATION OF TOTAL PACKAGES SHIPPED PER YEAR Material Package Type Mode* Packages per Year Various Iimited** AF 138508 PAC 172992 T 391008 Am-241 A AF 4201 PAC 491 T 20330 M 73 S 16 B AF 55 PAC 7 T 115 M 1 Au-198 A AF 201 PAC 1644 T 2411 Co-57 A AF 2146 PAC 7947 T 6183 LSA AF 8 PAC 31 T 24 Co-60 A AF 158 PAC 86 T 17447 B AF 37 PAC 21 T 1397 AF 6 PAC 3 T 92 LSA AF 359 PAC 195 T 5535 Cs-137 A AF 333 PAC 792 T 31023 v B AF 2 PAC 3 T 69 Cs-137 LSA AF 5 PAC 12 T 233 C-14 A AF 8691 PAC 10140 T 6655 AM 1341 Ga-167 A AF 1407 PAC 5789 12904 H-3 A AF 10510 PAC 15536 10984

,M 1256 B , -T AF 147 PAC 218 T 151 M 17 A-7

I_______________

a TABLE A-3 (continued)

Material Package Type Mode Packages per Year H-3 LSA AF 18 PAC 27 T 18 M 2 Ir-192 A AF 2788 PAC 97 T 1922 B AF 12751 PAC 440 T 13654 1-131+1-125 A AF 38133 PAC 260034 T 107817 B AF 103 PAC 220 T 292 LSA AF 8 PAC 54 T 22 Kr-85 A AF 1079 PAC 559 T 3446 S 291 B AF 241 PAC 125 T 634 S 65 LSA AF 22 PAC 12 T 58 S 6 MF+MC A T 21517 B T 5004 LO T 12 LSA T 33301 Mo-99 A AF 25838 PAC 57008 T 54929 m 109 B AF 882 PAC 1947 T 1876 M 4 Po-210 A AF 86 PAC 1 T 81 M 42 R 10 LQ AF 9 T 7 H 3 R 1 P-32 A AF 2164 PAC 6052 T 3823 Ra-226 A AF 58 PAC 24 T 25893 B AF 312 PAC 128 T 2620 A-8

k TABLE A-3 (continued) haterial Package Type Mode Package per Year Tc-99M A AF 10329 PAC 21138 T 208740 Waste A T 131120 B T -821 LSA T 20097 Xe-133 A AF 7058 PAC 6347 T 12930 Mixed A AF 930 PAC 1445 T 26773.

M 269 B AF 3 PAC 5 T 100 M 1 LSA -- AF 211 PAC 328 T 5970 M 61 Pu-238 A AF 272

- PAC 1724 T 3230 B AF 15

PAC 93 T 174 LSA AF 2 PAC 12

-T 22 .,

LQ PAC 3 T 5 Pu-239 A AF 2 ,

PAC 1 T - 63 B AF- 135 PAC 40 T 3804 LQ AF 1 T 22 Pu A' - T

- B -- AF~-

5..

PAC 1

"- T"- 132 "

U-Pu mix - A , ,- AF -,. . .. ..

T 17 B " AF 62,"

PAC -' 9 T 303 LQ T 1 Spent fuel Cask T-T . 254 R 17 U 0 (nat) LSA T 54000 3 8. . R - - -66000 UF ,(nat) A T 2048 6 R -- 2502 UF" (enr) B ..- T,,--.- 485 6 S 106 UO (enr) B T 9691 2 S 2127 UO (fuel) B T 1284 2 ;-'S " 282'

- AF - air freight; PAC = passenger aircraft; T truck; S ihip; R = rail; M mail.

All limited shipments have been grouped together.

A-9

a type, and transport mode. Data from apparent major shippers were obtained from Table 4.8 of Reference A-2. The air/land transport mode splits listed in Table 4.8 were used. Further subdi vision of packages between passenger and cargo for air transport and between truck and rail for land transport was made using the corresponding mode splits in the detailed questionnaire data.

The minor shipper summary questionnaire data were obtained from Summary Questionnaire Report I.D.

Since this report presented only package totals for each isotope, the package type split and transport mode split were taken to be the same as for the detailed questionnaire data.

A.3 SIMPLIFICATION OF STANDARD SHIPMENTS LIST All shipments in limited (exempt) packagings were grouped together in Table A-3, with the transport mode split preserved. In Table A-4, limited quantities shipped in other packagings were combined with other limited shipments, using the limited mode split. In order to minimize the number of scenarios (isotope - transport mode - package type combinations), scenarios with fewer than 1% of the total packages of that isotope and package type were combined in the trans port mode with the largest number of packages.

The total of all-packages (except limited) transported by airfreight in Table A-3 was 7.32 x l10 However, for the 12-month period ending in June 1975, CAB data (Ref. A-5) indicate a total of 31,000 all-cargo aircraft departures. If all airfreight packages were transported by all-cargo aircraft, there would be about 100 packages per flight, assuming an RTF of 1/24. This does not appear to be reasonable. Many respondents to the 1975 survey probably entered the symbol AF (freight-only aircraft) under the heading 'transport mode" for all airfreight shipments.

However, the CAB data indicate that only 12.4% of the total domestic airfreight tonnage goes by cargo-only aircraft, the majority being shipped by passenger aircraft. To account for this, 87.6% of the packagez of each isotope and package type transported by. airfreight in Table A-3 were transferred to the passenger aircraft category, with the exception of the large-quantity shipments.

The transfer of packages from cargo aircraft to passenger aircraft results in a total of 5.12 x l05 nonlimited packages by passenger aircraft. The total number of passenger aircraft departures in 1975 was about 4.5 x 106. Assuming only one package per flight, approximately 10%

of all passenger aircraft flights, on the average, carried radioactive material. Since many materials are shipped in multipackage consignments, these data appear to be compatible with the RTFs of 1/10-1/30 discussed in Chapter 4.

The actual split between all-cargo aircraft and passenger aircraft probably lies somewhere between these extremes, i.e., some of the respondents to the 1975 survey probably did interpret the symbol "AFU to mean all-cargo Ilights as was intended. However, since there is no way of determining how many responded correctly, the latter more conservative approach (transferring a large number of packages from all-cargo aircraft to passenger aircraft) was taken in this assessment.

The net result of these simplifications is shown in Table A-4. This table servas as the basis for the analysis in the body of the report.

A-10

I TABLE A-4 PACKAGE TOTALS FOR STANDARD SHIPMENTS - 1975 (PACKAGES PER YEAR)

Mat-rial Package Passenger

-,Materilal' Type Air Freight Aircraft Truck Rail Ship Various Limited 1.72E+4 2.95E+5 3.91E+5 Am-241 A 52 1 4170 2.04E+4 B 7 55 116 Au-198 - A 2:5 - 1820 2410 -

Co-57 A 26 .7 '9860 6180 Co-60 A 1.77E+4 B 5 53 1400 LQ1 101 LQ2 4 LSA 45 509 5540 C-14 A 1080 1.91E+4 6660 Cs-137- A 41 1080 3.10E+4 -

5 69 Ga-67 A 175 7030 1.29E+4 "1H-3 A 1300 '..'2.6E+4 1.1OE+4 B 18 -364 151, LSA 2 45 18 "Ir-192 A 346 "2540 1920

B 1590 1.17E+4 1.37E+4 1-131+1-125 A 4720 2.93E+5 1.08E+5 B "13 '310 292 Kr-85 A 136 1530 3500 ~2 9 B 30 336 634

-MF+MC'A 2.15E+4 _

5000 ...

LQ 12

'LSA 3.33E+4 -

Mo-99 A 3200 7.97E+4 5.49E+4 B 109 2720 1880 Po-ý210 A 16 113 81- 10 LQ 1~ 11 P-32 A 268 7940 3820 S Ra-226 A 2.60E+4 B 39 401 2620 -

-Tc-99m A 1280 3.01E+4 2.09E+5 Waste A 1.31E+5 B , 821 LSA 2-03E+4 .

Xe-133 A 875 1.22E+4 1.29E+4

-.-Mixed - A p2260 -,2.70E+4 -

B 8 101 LSA 26 513 5830 Pu-238 - A 34 - -: , 1980, 3250 B 2 109 179 ANON Pu-239 B 17 165 LO 1 - I -

U-Pu B 8 58 330 Spent Fuel(T) Cask - 254 -

Spent Fuel(R) :Cask,, *L" L - . .. . 17 U308 (Nat) LSA - , 5.40E+4 6.60E+4 Ul (Nat)- A - 2050 2500 Uý -(Enr) ' B - 485,,,,:, - 106 Uý (Enr) B *- . 9690 - 2130 UOj Fuel 'B "1280 " . 282's A-1I .

JI In addition to the number of packages per year for each isotope and transport mode combina tion, four other parameters are required to characterize each shipment: average distance per shipment, average number of packages per shipment, average number of curies per package, and average TI per package. These parameters were determined by averaging values given in Reports I.D and II.D in the 1975 survey for each isotope and package type. Values for uranium shipments were determined from Reference A-3 as discussed earlier. The results for all shipments are summarized in Table A-5. The TI value of 1.0 assigned for spent fuel shipments is an artifact, which, when combined with a K value of 1000, produces a dose-rate factor of 90 mrem-m2/hr (1000 mreu-ft 2 /hr),

as discussed in Appendix D0 The average distances per shipment were determined, for each isotope and package type by dividing the TI miles for each'entry in Reports I.D and II.D by the TI for that entry and then summing over all entries for that isotope and package type. Distances for uranium shipments were taken directly from References A-3 and A-4.

Certain shipments, such as large irradiator sources or truck shipments of irradiated fuel, are loaded directly onto the primary mode vehicle and transported directly to the receiver with no secondary link. However, most other shipments involve a secondary mode link such as a~van or courier vehicle to move the material from the shipper to the primary mode terminal (e.g., airport, freight dock) and to take the material from another primary mode terminal to the consignee at the end of the trip. For shipments by passenger aircraft,.truck, and rail, the secondary mode dis tance is assumed to be 40 kilometers at each end or 80 kilometers per shipment.- For shipments by all-cargo aircraft, which do not service all major airports, the assumed distance is 80 kilometers at each end for a total of 160.kilometers per shipment. .In the case of transport by ship, the distance from the port to theuser may be still larger; a value of 320 kilometers per shipment is assumed (not necessarily the case for barge shipments, as discussed in Chapter 6).

In the absence of data to the contrary, one package per shipment was assumed. Data do exist for some uranium fuel cycle and some waste shipments (Ref. A-3), and these data were incorporated into the model. These data a~rereflected in the numbers of packages per shipment for the materials listed in Table A-5.

A.4 DOSIMETRIC PARAMETERS FOR STANDARD SHIPMENTS The consequences of an -ccident involving a release of radioactive material depend on certain dosimetric parameters, including the rem-per-curie value, the particular organ or organs affected, the fraction aerosolized, and the resuspension factor. -Each of these is discussed below.

A.4.1 REM-PER-CURIE VALUES AND AFFECTED ORGANS "

For dispersible materials (gases, liquids, and volatile or dispersible solids), the rem-per curie value used in'this analysis is the dose in rem received by an individual per curie'of radioactive material inhaled'_1 The inhalation of a radionuclide primarily affects one'or more critical organs characteristicýof that nuclide. For example, inhaled plutonium may cause biolog ical damage to bone and lung tissue. Table A-6 lists the rem-per-curie values and critical A-12

a TABLE A-5 SHIPMENT PARAMETERS FOR STANDARD SHIPMENTS Package Curies per-'ýTI'per "Kilometers Packages Material Type Package Package per Shipment per Shipment Various '-Limited .003 "1600 [1] 1 Am-241- A 3.51 '2.1 633 1 B 107 0.9 2450 1*

Au-198 A .84 2.6 958 1*

Co-57 A .003 .08 2420 4.6 1480' 1 Co-60 A 7.9 1.5 1280 1 B 1760 L01 40000 5 .14 2010 1.0 [21 3200 1 LQ2 3.2xl1 4.8 898 1 LSA .16 1 C-14 A .02 .02 2140 Cs-137 A .67 2.7 346 1 B 1350 2.0 950 1 Ga-67 A .16 .2 700 1 H-3 A 8.6 .002 1770 -1 B 134 0 1600 [1] 1 LSA 1.7 2.6 800 1 Ir-192 A 64 1.3 1820

'B 157 2.1 2030 1 1-131 + A .01 .7 " 1430 o 1 1-125 B 9.7 0.6 1340 544 1 Mixed A .332 -. 4 B "146 - 3-8 850 980 1 LSA 1.3 .73 MF+MC A .48- :5.9 889 B .23 .07 794 -'1 SLSA 392 3.0 2330 1

- .59 :-*692 1.9 Mo-99 'A 1.2 " '1.9 -- 1690 94 4.4 -3230 -

1 B -

Po-210 A .007 .04 1210 50

-. LQ 144 :"..1.95 -2330 P-32 A .. .24 .25 1600 Xe-133 :A _- 7 .'6 _: L .14 :P'1850 1090 1 Waste A .33 f 22.4 [ 1 B 273 6.5 725 LSA .32 2.0 879

-839 1

'Ra-226 A ".002

.0.4 .07

.3 B 253 1 Kr-85 A 16 .8 2420,13500

".91 2010,'

13.3 ">02 :1,594-Pu-238 A 1 B 2630 .82 1930 t; 1 6 6 0 -- ' [1-* 1 Pu-239 B 1169 6 .98 Plutonium LQ 1.23x10 2.0 1600 Spent Fuel Cask 1.4x10 66 [41 1.0 121. 2530 [51 Cask 9.1c10 [41 1.0 121 '1210 (5)

- U (nat.

depl)

LSA .13 [61 ý" :2.6 -" 1600:, --- -' 40-U (nat dep1)

(UF6) LSA 3.5 [71 2.6 800 2 U (enr)

(UE ) A .85 1.4 1210,9660 181191 5 1 (enhr)

(U%) B .042 1.4 1210,9660 [9) 40 A-13

a TABLE A-5 (continued)

Package Curies per TI per Kilometer Packages Material TX2e Package Package per Shipment per Shipment UO (enr)

(uel rods) B .32 .5 1600,9660 [9] 6 U-Pu mix B 38,300 3.3 2750 1 Tc-99m A 1.03 .16 209 1 Tl-201[10J A 8.2 .37 2690 1 Recycle Pu [10] ICV 6.2x10 2.0 1600 Assumptions

[11 Certain isotopes with TI's of zero were assigned primary mode distances of 1600 kilometers.

(21 Large casks are assigned a TI of 1 to force a dose rate factor of 90 mrem-m2/hr,(1000 mrem-ft 2 /hr) - see Appendix D.

[31 Kr-85 Type A goes 2420 kilometers in domestic traffic and 13500 kilometers by ship overseas.

(41 The spent fuel curies are divided into releasable material (Kr-85, 1-131, and volatile fission products) and exposure-source materials. The curie breakdown is as follows:

- Curies 8 113 Volatile

,Kr*-85 I-131 1 Fission Products Exposable Truck cask -1,700 :022 - 200 1.4 x 10 6

Rail cask 10,900 -- .138 *,, 1280 9.1 x 10

[51 Spent fuel when-shipped by truck goes 2530 kilometers and when shipped by rail goes 1210 kilometers.

[61 Shipped in 40-package lots.

171 Shipped in 2-package lots.

[81 Shipped in 5-package lots.,..

(91 Overseas uranium shipments go 9660 kilometers by ship. Domestic ship ments go 1210 kilometers by truck. - .

[101 These shipments occur in 1985 only.

A-14 -

TABLE A-6 REM-PER-CURIE (INHALED) VALUES FOR STANDARD SHIPMENTS Physical Material Form Rem/Ci Inhaled Organ Time Period Ref.

liquid 1.1 x 1062 thyroid 60 d A-6 Limited I1] 1 hr A-7, A-8 AM-241 special form 3.1 x*10 WB liquid 1.4 x l.*0 LLI 168 hr/wk A-9 Au-198 A-9 Co-57 liquid 1.4 x'10 '. LLU 168 hr/wk Co;-60 dispersible A-6 solid I, 1.3 x 10 lung 50 y special form 1.34* WB 1 hr A-7, A-8 liquid 700 ' 4 o WBE' 168 hr/wk A-9 C-14 WB 50 y A-6 Cs-137 liquid, 3.7 x 10-1 special form 3.4 x 10

WB 1 hr A-7, A-8 special form 9.0 x 10 WB 1 hr A-7, A-8 Gi-67 A-10 H-3, 121_, liquid/gas 64 WE 70 d 4.0 x 10 6 WE 1 hr A-7, A-8 U" ir-192 "',,1' special form 1.1 x 106 thyroid 60 d A-6 1-131+1-125 liquid 1.1 x 10 thyroid 60 d A-6 Mixed [31 liquid MC+MF [41 dispersible A-6.

sol id 1.3 x 106 lung 50 y liquid 2.1 x 10 4 LLI 60 d A-6 Mo-9 9 A-9 Tl-201 liquid 2280 , LLI 168 hr/wk Po-210 dispersible 7.1 x 107 lung 168 hr/wk A-9 sol id '

7.1 x 104 bone 168 hr/wk A-9 P-32 liquid 476 WE 168 hr/wk A-9 Xe-133 gas aste [5) dispersible 50 y A-6, A-9 solid 3.7 x 10 -. WB.

special form 7.0 x 10 WB 1 hr A-7, A-8 Ra-226 [6j

TABLE A-6 (continued)

Physical Material Form Rem/Ci Inhaled Organ Time Period Ref.

Kr-85' gas 0.61 WB 50 y A-6 liquid 89 lung 2d Tc-99m Pu-238 dispersible A-6 sol id 1 2 x 108 lung 1; y A-6 3,1 x 108 lung 50 y A-6 7.6 x 108 bone 50 y A-7, A-8 Spent fuel special form 1-131 gaseous fission A-6 product' 1.1,x 106 thyroid 60 d Kr-85 gaseous fission A-6 0.61 WB 50 y product Mixed fission volatile' fission 50 y A-6

r prod.([7] product 3.7 x 10 4 WB 1.2 x 10-'* - WB 1 hr A-6, A-7, A-8

.Exposure [8) special form dispersible solib 7 A-l1 volatile solid 1.94 x 10 bone 50 y depl)' (9) 50 y A-11 4.73 'x 10" 3 lung 5.7 x 10 7* WB 1 hr A-7, A-8 speciil form A-11 dispersible soli 1.94 x 10 7 bone 50 y U (einr) (10] 50 y A-l1 4.74 x 10 " lung special form 5.2.x 10 6* WB 1 hr A-7; A-8 lung ly A-6, A-12 plutonium dispersible solik 3.99 x 10i7 till] 1.06 x 107 lung 50 y A-6, A-12

,,3.74 x 105 bone 50 y A-6, A-12 Q

2.9 x,,10 WB 1 hr A-7, A-8 special form P

Rem/hr/ci for nondispersible materials.

TABLE A-6 (continued)

Notes:

1. Modeled as 1-131.

2. Taken for individuals older than 10-15 years and for a body half-time of 10 days.

3. Modeled as 1-131 since most of this material is radiopharmaceutical byproduct material.

4. Modeled as Co-60 since that isotope is both a fission product and corrosion product.

5. Modeled as Cs-137.

6. The radiation comes from the decay of Bi-214.,- . - , .

7. Modeled as Cs-137. , ,- .

8. The gamma source for ,irradiated fuel was derived from isotopic mixture in Reference A-8, allowing for 150-day cooling. The ,principal contributors are-Zr-95 and Ru-106.

-, o ; , .*

9. 99.3 percent U-238/.007 percent U-235.

10. 3 percent enrichment assumed.

11. The calculation for rem-per-curie for recycle plutonium is detailed in Appendix C. ,.,

-~. .. Z .5 t

r. ' ' - T. -

A-17:".

organs for each material in the standard shipments list, including special form and other nondis persible materials. Critical organs were determined from rem-per-curie values from References A-6, A-l0, and A-il, and from the list of critical organs in the ICRP/NRCP tabulation of maximum permissible concentrations.

For materials whose rem-per-curie values are not specifically tabulated, values were computed based on the ICRP/NCRP maximum permissible concentrations in air for chronic exposure at 168 hours0.00194 days 0.0467 hours 2.777778e-4 weeks 6.3924e-5 months per week as follows:

106 x 0o K(BR)(PC (A-l) where Dn = statutory organ dose limit (15 rem/year for internal organs)

BR = breathing rate MPC a = maximum permissible concentration in air K = unit conversion factor For breathing rate of 20 liters per minute, this becomes:

Rem/curie -_1.427 x 10"- - (A-2)

(inhaled) MPC " - 1" 1" *"

a Nondispersible materials present only a direct radiation hazard in.the accident case (as well as the normal case); therefore, the dose received is a whole-body dose. The computational' method of determining whole-body doses from direct-external exposure sources-is discussed in Appendix G. For nondispersiblei aterials, the "gamaa-ray'doses delivered in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months at'a distance of 1 meter from a 1-curie source are listed in Table A-6. -

A.4.2 RESPIRABLE FRACTION The fraction of material that is respirable (able to be inhaled and deposited in the pulmon ary region of the lungs) was chosen conservatively to be 1.0 unless data were available to the contrary. A respirable fraction of unity is probably a reasonable choice for gases and liquids, but it is probably very conservative for most dispersible solids. Specific data (Refs. A-13 and A-14) were available for plutonium and for U3 0 8 and were used in the calculation. The respirable fractions used for each standard shipment are listed in Table A-7.

A.4.3 AEROSOLIZED FRACTION The aerosolized fraction of material released in an accident depends on the accident environ ment. A container may be crushed beneath a truck, in which case very little material is aerosol ized, or it may bounce into the air following the impact and disperse its entire contents. The aerosolized fraction estimated for each standard shipment is listed in Table A-7. For most packages, the aerosolized fraction was assumed to be 1.0. However, certain shipments, notably uranium, involve large quantities of material (105 to 106 grams per package). An assumption of A-18 "

I TABLE A-7 "ADDITIONAL DOSIMETRIC FACTORS

- V.r-Reespirable Aerosolized "Resuspens ion Mater ial I raction Fraction Dose Factor 1.0 S1.0

- 'Limited" -[1] '1.0 "Am-241 [21 0.0 0.0 -0.0o 1.0 1.03 Au-198.* 1.0 1.0 Co-57 1.0 1.0

).0,1.0 0.0,1.0 0.0,1.6 "Co-60 [21 1.0 C-14 1.0 1.0 0.0,1.0 0.0,1.0 0.0,1.62 -

Cs-137 0.0 Ga-67 [21 0.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 H-3 0.0 0.0 0.0 Ir-192 0.0 1.6 MF+MC 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.09 1-131 + 1-125 1.0 1.09 Mixed 1.0 1.0 1.0 Mo-99 1.0

. . --. 1.,0,. " 1.5

-- Po-210 1.0 "0.0 Ra-226 [2] 1.0 "1.0 (1 ;0 *1.1 .---..

P-32 -:

1.0 Xe-133 1.0 *.. 1.0 1.62 -

Waste 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 Kr-85 0.0, .0.0 ,

Pu-238 [2J 0.0 0.0,0.2 0.0,1.0--; -0.0,1.60 Pu [2,31 .05 1.6 Pu [41 0.2 1.09

-Spent fuel-l-131 ,1.0 , 1.0 Kr-85 1.0

-,1.0

-U308 -, FP .,-0.06 0.0,1.05 1.63

--. .01

.0.4 1-;63 1.0 1.0 S-'l.6 *. *

") 0.2 1.0 0.0 1.0 Tc-99m 0.0,1.63 UOý 0.0,0.2

2) r '. --

7- . . ' r - *-- t 111 "Limited'is modeled as'I-131.

J2] Special :form :materials are assigned value of.O.0. If-a material

- appears both in special and normal form, both sets of values are shown. .- " . , -: . .. . ..

[3] Small plutonium shipments.

. . [4]Large plutonium shipments.

4--- r,c A-19

unity aerosolized fraction for such shipments should be excessively conservative, since complete aerosolization of such large amounts of material would be quite difficult.

The mechanisms of aerosolization can be divided into four principal categories: wind resus pension of spilled contents, impact or fire-driven pressure rupture, fire entrainment of spilled contents, and explosion. By examination of potential accident environments, it was determined that the pressure-rupture accident is the only mechanism that occurs in i significant proportion of accidents and with a significant potential release. Even when it does occur, not all of the material ejected from the container would be aerosolized. The situation would be analogous to throwing a handful of sand into the air; most of it would fall back down, with only a small portion of it becoming aerosolized. Based on these considerations, it was estimated that, on the average, no more than,5X of the released material is aerosolized.

A 1% aerosolized fraction was selected for UF6. Since UF6 is a solid up to a temperature of 64 0 C, it was considered to remain essentially non-aerosolized except when involved in a~fire, in which case it was considered 100% aerosolized. Since UF6 is transported principally by truck or rail and since fires occur in only about 1% of all truck or rail accidents, an average aerosol ized fraction of 1% was considered appropriate.

A.4.4 RESUSPENSION FACTOR The resuspension dose factors take into account the doses received by individuals after the initial debris cloud passes. The dose results from radioactive particles deposited on the ground during the cloud passage which are resuspended and inhaled. A discussion of the methods used to estimate resuspension factors is provided in Chapter 5 and will not be repeated here. The resus pension factors for each shipment considered are listed in Table A-7.

A.5 1985 STANDARD SHIPMENTS The numbers'of radioactive material packages expected to be shipped in 1985 are listed in Table A-8. All industrial and most radiopharmaceutical (non-SNi, nonsource material) shipments and all Pu-238 packages were scaled upward by a factor of 2.6 from their 1975 values. This corresponds to an average increase of 10% per year during the 1-year period 1975 to 1985.

Pu-239 shipments were estimated to be unchanged from their 1975 values since these involve principally research reactors and weapon-production facilities. However, a new type of plutonium shipment, "recycle Pu," was added to account for the recycling of plutonium recovered from spent fuel and the fabricating of mixed oxide (MOX) fuel by 1980. For an estimated (Ref. A-12) 20,535 kg per year transported in 1985, 41 packages per year will be shipped n integrated container vehicles.(ICV) in 504-kg quantities.-This plutoniuui is considered'as "once-through"-plutonium, and the average number of curies per package is determined from the isotopic content discussed in Appendix C. . ' , !

Spent fuel shipments for 1985 are based on an estimated'total amount'of 2,849 tonnes per year (Ref. A-12). Each truck shipment is estimated to contain 0.5 tonne, and each rail shipment 3.2 tonnes (Ref. A-3). The transport mode split between truck and rail is taken to be the same A-20 -_

TABLE A-8 STANDARD SHIPMENTS - 1985 (PACKAGES PER YEAR)

Material Package Type AF 4.47x10 P A/C 5 Truck 6 Rail Ship 4

Limited Ex 7.67x10 1.02x104 Am-241 A' 1.22x10 - 5.30x10 4 B 161 - 302 J(-198 A 25 1820 4 2410 4 Co-57 A 694 2.56x104 1°61x10 4 Co-60 A - 4.60x10 B - 3800 LQ1 - 262

' LQ2 - 410 LSA 1440 4 4 144x10 4 C214 A 2810 4.97x104 1.73x10 4 Cs-137 A 2920 - 8.06x10 4 N B 13 - 179 4

Ga 67 A 455 5.18x10 4 H-3 A 3380 6.76*10 2.86x10 B 47 946 393 LSA 5 117 47 ir-192 A 7500 4 - 4990 4 B 3.45x10 4 - 3.56x105 1-131+1-125 A 4720 2.93x10 1.08xxlO B ,13 310, 292 Kr-85 A 354 3980 9100 772 B 78 874 1650 MF+MC A" - 8.9x10 4 B - 2.07xi0 LQ 500 LSA -

1.38x10 5 Sr

TABLE A-8 (continued)

Material Package Type AF Truck 5 Rail Sh iP Mo-99 A 83-0 2.07x10* I-4-i 0o B, 283 7070 4890 336 211, 260 Po-210 A LO 32 18 3 A 697 2.06xl04 9930"4 P-32 2'.6x10 4 Ra-226 A B 440 2620 5 4

A 3330 7. 3x10 5.43x104 Tc-99m 4.25x10O T1-201 A 7500 A 5.4x10 5 Waste 3300 4 B

LSA 8.4x10 4 4

A 2280 3.17x10 3.35x10 4 Xer133 7.02x101 N Mixed A 299 5880 B 21 263 4 LSA 68 1330 1.52x10 A ,88 5150 8450 Pu-238 465 B 288 B" 182 4030 Pu-239 LO 1 1530 5 652 5 Spent fuel Cask U 08 LSA 2.24x10 5 2.73x104 8440, 1.04x10 U*K.Nat. A 439 B 2010 4 Up .Enr. 4.01xlO 8820 UO Enr B 1170 5300 UO2 Fuel B 33 240 1370 U-?u Mix B

'ICV 41 Recycle Pu m

3 as that predicted by Blomeke et al. (Ref. A-15). The results are 1,530 truck shipments and 652 rail shipments.

Uranium fuel cycle shipments for 1985 were determined using an estimated 5,383 tonnes of enriched uranium produced in 1985 (Ref. A-12). When compared to the 1300,tonnes determined from the 1975 survey, an industry growth factor of 4.14 was determined. All uranium and uranium plutonium-mixture shipments were scaled upward by this factor from their 1975 values. Only the total numbers of packages were scaled; the average number of curies per package (or shipment),

the TI per package, and the distance per package were assumed to be the same as in 1975.

The projected package totals for certain of the 1985 standard shipments were not obtained in any of the above ways. An executive of a major U.S. radioisotope sujplier estimated that:

1. The use of 1-131, Ra-226, and Au-198 is not expected to expand by 10% per year'as suggested for other radioisotopes.

2. Several isotopes are not expected to be transported by passenger aircraft in the future.

The isotopes Am-241, Co-60, Ir-192, Po-210, Ra-226, Pu-238, and Pu-239 were transferred to air freight mode.

3. Ga-67 will be shipped by air instead of truck.

4. TI-201 is expected to be significant in 1985.

A.6 EXPORT-IMPORT MODEL The standard shipment list in Table A-4 was determined from information contained in the 1975 survey report. In-order'to determine the'impacts of'export'shipments explicitly,' a standard shipment list similar to that of Table A-4 was compiled from the detailed questionnaireosurvey data for exports only. Imports are discussed in Section A.6.2.

A.6.1 EXPORT STANDARD SHIPMENTS LIST A list of total packages by package type and trans'p'ort mode and corresponding package param eters for export shipments is shown in Table A-9. The data were obtained by sorting the export shipments data in the .1975 survey by isotope, package type, and transport mode and determining thi total number of~packages (extrapolated),;the average number -of curies or grams per package, the average TI per package, and the average distance traveled per.package.

Materials included in the standard shipments list used in the total impact calculation were included in the export standard shipments list. ,These materials accounted for more than 99% of the total packages, curies, and TI exported, as indicated in the 1975 survey data.

Exports account for about 5.x-106.curies, orabout 1% ,of the total number of curies trans ported in the United States. About 95% of thewnumber of curies exported are Co-60, Ir-192, A-23

Sv TABLE A-9 1975 STANDARD SHIPMENTS MODEL FOR EXPORT SHIPMENTS - TOTAL PACKAGES PER YEAR "BY PACKAGE TYPE, TRANSPORT MODE, AVERAGE CURIES/PACKAGE, AVERAGE TI/PACKAGE, AND AVERAGE MILES/PACKAGE Extrapolated Total Packages Air'freight Pass. A/C Ship " Truck Total "Package CL TI a K /Pk' Km/Pk a 4ae Km/Pkg Package material TypeL Package. Package Form _____g 53, SF 14 6440 18 4990 7 7 ' 11500. ,141 1450 '

Am-241- A 2.8 2.2 7.

13.1. *, 0.4 SF 6 8050 1 8050 Am-241 a 1 Au-198 A' 16.0 6.0 L 2090 20 3 644 17 1210 Co-57. A, '.086 0.5 L

4 6120 4 Co-60 A 7.3 0.5 SF 13 2450 13 2670 SF Co-60' B' -' -1.0 1 Co-60" LSA .0001 -0 L m1 11300 1770 3 3

s-137 A 2.0 S5.0 SF 96 0.27 3.1 L 32 9340 64 4030 172 C ' A 53 -12900 119 11900 1I-3A ~ A .06

0, 0,

L G

"1 1260 1 r H-3T A 50 10 Ir-192 A 66 1.0 NS 10 4830 64 126 2.3 NS "64 1240 4030 160 1-131 ' A S.09 .48 L 14 3010 146 1380 135 10400 11 11900 42 135O00 4 Kr-85 A 2.2 .28 G 70 36 MF A 9.6 3.1 G 36 3880 2430 217 70 5230 22 NO-99:1 A 2.64 3.3 L 125 6730 18

" 3.0 L 7 ,11700 11 7570 1830 B 76.7 66n0 1 12 2 38 B 359 0.84 SF 10 8050 1 16 lu- 4 96.

Pu-239 B 1.45

0.0 SF 12 - 8050 28 21 3380 P-32 A 0.13 0.43 "L'S 7 5430 3860 1260 10 Ra-226 A 0.004_ *1.6

10 1 28 0.28 ,G 3 9660 24 4380 Xe-133 A 5.4 .1 403 1290 " 14 0.016 0.1 L 13 1i Mixed' A L 10 8 7570 Lim. 6x10" 0 12600 41 Limited "L U-Pu , B 0.11 0 L, 41 4030 14000 7580 1.25x10 18 9140 29 10500 1.24x,1 18 869 UO& (enr) B 0.013 .26 DS 27 405 0.34 3.4 DS 117 9660 - 261 760 UF6 (enr) B 483 34 1.48xl0"* 3.5 SF 34 9820 93 U0 2 -Rx B 3 8050 - 81 9

.0044 .27 SF 16100 U-238 A p

Mo-99, and Pu-238. Over 80% of the approximately 15,000 packages exported are enriched U02, although these represent only a small number of the total curies.

Enriched UO2 and UF6 account for about 72% of the approximately 6,500 annual TI exported.

The total TI exported is about 0.1% of the total TI transported annually.

A.6.2 IMPORT MODEL An examination of the import shipments reported in the 1975 shipper survey indicated the following ,unextrapolated-totals:

19 packages 17.2 x 106 curies 40 TI (estimated)

Virtually all the curies were contained in the four special-form Co-60 packages averaging 1.83 x lO5 curies per package. Thus, the accident risk is evaluated in Chapter 5 for these four truck shipments only. The normal risk is discussed in Chapter 4 based on the total TI trans ported. Although the packages arrived in the U.S. by.passenger and cargo aircraft, mail, ship, and truck, the environmental impacts of these shipments (evaluated only from the time the ship ments enter the U.S. until they reach their U.S. destination) were made by assuming they traveled by truck from their port of entry to their destination.,°The reported imports included Type A packages of 1-125, Yb-169, Cf-252, and C-14, exempt packages of enriched U02 and natural uranium metal, one Type B package of Pu-239, one Type B (fissile) package of enriched U02 , and four Type B packages of Co-60.

A-25

REFERENCES A-1. Summary Tables for Radiopharmaceutical Manufacturer's Survey, based on a survey conducted by the USAEC during a period of 1 week between October and November 1973 among eight participating manufacturers. Compiled by the Office of Standards Development, USNRC, Washington, DC, 20555, March 1975.

A-2. Battelle Pacific Northwest Laboratories, "Survey of Radioactive Material Shipments in the United States," BNWL-1972, April 1976.

A-3. U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, "Environmental Survey of Transportation of Radioactive Materials to and from Nuclear Power Plants," WASH-1238, December 1972.

A-4. U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, "Environmental Survey of the Uranium Fuel Cycle," WASH-1248, April 1974.

A-5. Civil Aeronautics Board and Federal Aviation Administration of U.S. Department of Transpor tation, "Airport Activity Statistics of Certificated Route Carriers," June 1975.

A-6. U.S. Nuclear Regulaiory Commission, "Reactor Safety Study," WASH-1400, Appendix VI, Table VI-C-1, October 1975."

A-7. U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Public Health Service, "Radiological Health Handbook," January 1970.

A-8. L. M. Lederer, J. M. Hollander, and I. Perlman, Table of the Isotopes, New York, London, Sydney: John Wiley and Sons, 1967.

A-9. U.S. Department of Commerce, "Maximum Permissible Body Burdens and Maximum Permissible Concentrations of Radionuclides in Air and in Water for Occupational Exposure," National Bureau of Standards Handbook 69, June 1959.

A-10. R. L. Shoup, "Radiological Effects of Environmental Tritium," Nuclear Safety, Vol. 17, No. 2, March-April 1976.

A-li. U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, NLiquid Metal Fast Breeder Reactor Program," WASH-1535, Washington, DC, December 1914.

A-12. U.S. Nuc tear Regulatory Commission, "Final Generic Environmental Statement on the Use of Recycle Plutonium in Mixed Oxide Fuel in Light-Water-Cooled Reactors," (GESMO),

NUREG-0002, Augdst 1976.

A-26

A-13. H. W. Church, R. E. Luna, S. M. Milley, "Operation Roller Coaster: Near Ground Level Air Sampler Measurements," Sandia Laboratories, SC-RR-69-788, Albuquerque, NM, February 1970.

A-14. E. C. Hyatt, "Techniques for Measuring Radioactive Dusts," Radiological Health and Safety in Mining and Milling of Nuclear Materials, Vol. I, International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna, 1964.

A-15. J. 0. Blomeke, C. W. Kee, and R. Salmon, "Shipments in the Nuclear Fuel Cycle Projected to the Year 2000," Nuclear News, June 1975.

A-27

APPENDIX B EXCERPTS FROM FEDERPALREGULATIONS B.1 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGULATIONS B.1.1 10 CFR Part 71, Packaging of Radioactive Material for Transport and Transportation of Radioactive Material under Certain Conditions UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

,'TITLE ~ RULES and REGULATIONS

.TITE 10. CHAPTER 1. CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS-ENERGY .

[PACKAGING 7 OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL FOR PART TRANSPORT AND TRANSPORTATION'OF RADIOACTIVE

-71 ,' MATERIAL UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS 5.bpiIA~emr3 Prai~sa7142 Stecial requrmm$eo., for pltonica sh.p tions of other agencies having jurishic.

inmts lifter June 17. 1978 lion over means of transport The re S"e. quirements orthis part are in aJdition to.

Salbiprl D*Operaidtg Pro, lres 7.1t and not in substttution for. other re Esblifhiest ansd 4',ain.1 .f ro. quiremcnts I 71.1 ReqwcmeSt o license 71.51 7- cedwirs.

71 4 D efiasions 7 r.asp -EXE* M of PlToIKO

] pe. Inmatrial. .... 53 71 In ........

. Pehlisnary detrvrm."i os - * - 71.2 S-cope.

o EXEMPrIONS 71.54 wutmcidcierminatoon$

'ý'_ 71.35 'Opesiguaai~sci The regulastions in this part apply to, 71 a Specific Aeptiig 7,1 ... each person -authorized by. speceftc mowe tyhea AqAsa.-' "7162 Returds. " tee license issued by the Commission to 71.7 lana ofor Eiempima "-... '-'71.53A la~ee*n sdm -"+*

71l Em7e"at o. o ýaps lmariipi l Pycks ,od'pbyI a-.-

ngs.+`a 71A5Vinlonim*.

- 71.64 VIons . and + tests' * , ireeeive ,

e¢ possess u use or transfer ltcensed 719 EampfsamCAofrsl¢ fu mtr,a maier - -materials, ifhe delivers such materials to 71 10 L,,*eed exemption for s*.prmen of type Appendies Wa carrier for transport or transtports such qenimtAppradet A-4tormal ,.,s. or trarpol material outside the conripes of his plant App..dne11'Hypoilist¢allccdeuu coadulss. :- or other place of use.

GLJ-RALLICENsES ..

"Apeadas C-Trimsport growpi`4 of rwedsou¢Ieles 71 11 Geieuat Islceose o shipment of tlicesed Append.s D-Teats foc SWpcal loein hicsmed " 71.3 Relrcustrut for license. "

- material ' ' - " .

msaseuil - - -

71 12 Gescratllm hse ln*u*eti.)DOT peiesO-.

Ip .""

"l"as eomltaiers.in packagrsaIOped - . AUTHORITY. Tle Fprvisis of Pohern It7, No licensee subject to the regulattons

- irse by ano*herpriso. and.r psckage iused sadeFrsaes S3.63.81.161.. i183.6 Sas in this part shall (a) delaver *,ty licensed

'approedby a I*ioe-¢*asIIsl eoespe. 930.933.935.944.953.9S4.asamsoiled.42U.SC .. materialstoaCarrier fortransport or(b)

"easthoratllwy ,.. 201. 23. 2111. 1220. 2232. 22133. 1ust sWaer."'

iwair mied Fordbeppurposesof ec 223.41S8Sa. i transsport licensed material except as 71.13 Comm"Oeallsaes 71.14 Imerpreetaaos ,amaeded.42U.SC.2273.l 71a1-71.Samaed authorized in a general license or 71.1t Addrnsasl rewqsrtemeisstM iaersen.6l10.655&ta 950.s ameinded.42U.5.C. specific license ,issued by the Commit.

7116 Aseadmest of existnatliceass .2201a) Secs 202. 206. Pab. L. 93432. N Su alan, or as exemptped in this part.

.. 1244. 1246.42 USC. 5342.3$46 S U "" -S Or C~m*s al~applic-la. L * - r l*"lm *,r.++ , +, ** - .+J.. "'"

71.2t 1.l2Paedo sipen *

1.1

..... r e." "' , As used in this part:

(a) **Carrier7 means any person 71223 Packte4ailueiaa ...

7124 Proceduwrlcsmfrols .'(a) This part establishes require. engaged in the transportation of of ments for tansportation and for pre. I e In , asporn 71.25 Add hlrma "

. n.. m"eritsn* 'for and for e. puengeriori pfrorty.as Common. con-,

partton 'for shipment of hcens material and prescribes procedures and warder.co thp s terms are used il thefn.

Ir 3t General "n.aasafords all rcknifig r'"standards for apolbythe wadrautoecemsleesdarth n approval by rpaclear Nusging tcrstate Commerce Act, as amended. or 7132 Struciura1 usaiardid for a " 'Mop suta rory smtay ,.a.grl h .*a , " Regulatory Commission of paea-ging the U.S. Post Office; , . ,

71.33 Cruucatusy aaaidaeds Iar fisu -,atial sind shinping procedures for -fissile-" ,(b) .... rflection by, wat:"

lla¢kat- Materia

. . ( . .... 2 . .. .. means immediale contact by-water of, "7I..14-[nllallm 7,.35 sdawrosolenalles d at l* latklte.

fe-a pllum.36, ptolo plutonium-241) sld for quantities of..

m-239.',8nd , su'"fficient thicknessto reflecta maximum mber of neutrons-.,

forasimakd w 8.3 licensed materials in excess of type A (c)

.3 Saadards towbybh"i tel*aco,. -Containment vessel" means the lm.lor aamIle paesaie quantities, as defined in J 71.4(q). and receptacle on which principal reliance is 71.37 Evalahmasofan array Of paclar of ruaulte prescribes certain requirements govern- placed sOretain the radioactive m~terial during transpolrt;" +" "

71 39

""eism~aidsis Snecil a. a Fault, Cu I Ing such packaging and shipping.

73.39 Spcfc--ad ' oraFneCasl (b) The packagilng and trasnsort of -- (d) -Fissile classification" meant reclinr these materials are slu, subject to other Icdat.on ofa psckagtor shipment sr 71.40 Slsrepse standardsfurasCmdeCfaslllJ mtp- parns of this chapter and to the regula- rljic materials according to the con 7 anan trols needed to provide nuclear cri 71AI I a"whl saiismacwr ld andcient Nd'mrald3 ka - d. *t3 1 11-1 ý1_1_ I April 30.1975

I PART 71 i PACKAGING OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL FOR TRANSPORT-titality safety during transportation as lion per gram of contents does not ex transport, simulating the material to he follows: ceed: transported, as to weight and physical (1) ristile Class 1: packages which (i) 0op001 milhcurie orGroup I ra and chemical form;: - ,

may be transported in unhimited nsum dionucl ides; or (o) "Special form" means any of the bers and in any arrangement, and which (ii) 0.005 millhcuric of Group I Ca following physical forms of ltcensed require no nuclear criticality safety con dionuclides; or material of any transport group:

trols during transportation. l[or pur (iii)0.3 millicurie of Groups Ill or (I) The material is in solid form hav poses of nuclctr criticality safety con IV radionuclides. ing no dimension less than 0.5 trol. a transportation index is not millimeter or at least one dimension assigned to I-isstle Class I packages. NOTE Tho adiu hot is "a IdeId io. greater than five millimeters; does not However. the external radiation levels matermi$ of km. rbq*td...i* mei'ntri.

cer 'u ý:a'. a melk. sublime, or ignite in air at a tem ltudcs or hl Flume cricald rx,-*.

may require a transport index number. perature of 3,0W0 F.; will not shatter or (2) Fissile Class II: Packages which wasees L:np ais.ue.st pa~e. medcmdh. _-1. MW crumble if subjected to the percussion may be transported together in any ar ihqaWdplant Waei.ijudges.sodMaCL test described in Appendix D of this rangemeatf but in numbers which do not part; and is not dissolved or converted exceed an aggregate transport index of (5) Objects of nonradioactivea 'into dispersible form to the extent of

50. For purposes of nuclear criticality "material externally contaminated with u more than 0.005 percent by weight by safety control, individual packages may radioactive material, provided that the piimmersion for I week in water at 68 F.*

have a transport index or not less than radinactive material is not readily dis or in airat 86 F.; or persible and the surface contamination. - (2) The material is securely con-0.1 and not more than 10. However, the when averaged over an area of I square tained in a capsule having no dimension external radiation levels may require a higher tran.sport index number but not to meter. does not exceed 0.0001 millicuric less than 0.5 millimeter or at least one (220,000 disintegrations per minute) per dimension greater than five millimeters.

exceed 10 Such shipments require no nuclear criticality safety control by the square centimeter of Group I ra which-will retain its contents if subjected dionuchldes or 0.001 millicurie (2.200. to the tests prescribed in Appendix D of shipper during transportation.

(3) Fitstile Clas Ill: Shipments of 000 disintegrations per minute) per this part; and which is constructed of packages which do not meet the require square centimeter of other ra materials which do not melt. sublims, or dionuclides. ignite in air at 1.475* F.. and do not dis ments ofFissile Classes I or I1 and which are controlled in transportation by solve or convert into dispersible form to (h) -Maximum normal operating the extent of more than 0005 percent by special arrangements beteen the ship pressure" means the maximum gauge weighs by immersion for I week in water per and the carrier to provide nuclear pressure which is expected to develop in at 68" F. or in air at 86- F.

criticality safety. the coitainment vesscl under the normal (e) "Fissile materials" means conditions of transport specified in Ap (p) "Transport group" means any uranium-233, uranium-23S. pendix A of this part; - . -

9 one of seven groups into which ra plutonium-238, plutonium-23 , and (i) "Moderator" means a material dionuclides is normal form are plutonium-241: used to reduce, by scattering collisions classified, according to their toxicity and (0 "Large quantity" means a quan and without appreciable capture, the their relative potential hazard' in tity of radioactive material, the agSreg kinetic energy of neutrons;:_ . . transport, in Appendix C of this part.

ate radioactivity of which exceeds any (j) "Optimum interspersed by

. - (I) Anyradionuclidenotspecifically- ;

one of the following. ,. I ý drogenous moderation" means the oc listed in one of the groups in Appendix C "

(I) For transport groups as defined currence of hydrogenous material bet shall be assigned to one of the Groups in in paragraph (p) of this section:.. , ween containment vessels to such an ex accordance with the following table:

(i) Group I or HI radionuclides: 20 tent that the maximum nuclear reactivity curies; results; . . . - .

(ii) Group IlI or IV radionuclides: . 1.

S ftdkftl haltrtId.e (k) "Package" means packaging and "200 curies; its radioactive contents; tad.O. OSe N000 IO*daysta Over 106, (iii) Group V radionuclides- S.000 (I) "Packaging" means one or more wmido -. do.. IO6'e , Nmo curies; I , - - 1,' . . , . receptacles and wrappers and their con-,

(iv) Group VI or VII radionuclides: tens excluding issile material and other' r 50,000 curies; radioactive material. but including ab- a Atomic 'Group Ill Group It-. Group Ill.I and - " ' " "* * . ;.

sorbent material, spacing structurkas. ouneb 6 (2) For special fbrm. material, at thermal insulation, radiation shielding. modsi.e defined in paragraph (o) of this section: devices for cooling' and for. absorbing 5,000 curies. mechanical shock, external fittings, (g) "Low specific activity material" neutron moderators, nonfissile neutron (2) For mixtures 'of radioauclides means any of the following: absorbers, and other supplementary the following shall apply., ... .. 0 (I) Uranium or thorium ores and equipment; (s) If the identity and respective ac.-

physical-or chemical concentrates ol (m) "Primary coolant" means a gas, tivity of each radionuclide are known.:

thoseores: ' y liquid, or solid, or combinationi of them,. the permissible activity of, each, ra (2) Unirradiased natural or depleted in contact with the radioactive material dionuclidc shall be such that the sum, for uranium or unirradiated natural or. if the material is in special form, in all groups present, of the rasio between thorium: - " the total activity for each group to the contact with its capsule, and used, to (3) Tritium oxide in aqueous solu. remove decay heat; . - - - .,.. permissible activity for each group will, tions provided the concentration doet (n) "*Sample package" means a not he greater than unity.- -. - -

not exceed 5 I) millicuries per milililer package'*hich isf.bricated. packed. and (ii) If the groups of the radionuclides (4) Material in which the activity u closed to fairly represent the prop*o-pld, arc known but the amount in ac~h group essentially uniformly distributed and i6 package as it would be presented for, cannot be, reasonably determined, the ?

%hich the estimated average concentra,

,.iJ. ,

-,52,'. -t ,,. .,-.,.. -

April 30. ¶D75 - .- '- -' S -. '.1 .,.t' rr i - j't' - S *

- S Ii B-2

a PART 71. PACKAGING OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL FOM TRANSPORT' mixture shall 4,e auigned to the most packages, placarding of tl' transl..rta- (2) Thorium. or uranium containiqg restrictive group present. tion vehicle, monitoring requirements not more than 0.72 percent by weight of (iii) If the identity of all or some of and accident reportins. fissile matcrial; or ,

the radionuclid.s cannot be reasonably (b) When Department of Transpor. (3) Uranium compounds. r, :r than determined. each of those unidentified tation regulations are not applicable to metal (e.g.. UF. UFa. or uranium oxide radionuclides shall be considered as shipments of licensed material by rail. in bulk form, not pellettcd or fabricated belonging to the most restrictive group highway, or water because the shipment iMto shapes) or aqueoust solutions -(

which cannot be positively excluded, or the transportation of the shipment is uranium, mnwhich the total amount I(rv) Mixtures consisting of a singlc not in irerstateor foreign commerce.or uranium.233 and plutonium present

r. radioactive decay chain where the ra- to shipments of licenred material by air does not exceed 1.05 percent by .veight Sdionuclides are in the naturally occur- because the shipment is not transported of the uranium-23S conient, and the proportions shall be considered as Sring in civil aircraft, the licensee shall con- total fissile content does not exceed p consisting of a single radionuclide. The form to the standards and requirements 1.00$ pemrent by weight of the total :

group and activity slall be that of the of the Department of Transportation uranium content; or 2 first member prescnt in the chain, except specified in paragraph (a) of this section, (4) Homozenous hydrorpnnus solu.

that if a radionuclidt 'x" has is half-life " to the same extent as if the shipment or tion' or mixtures containing not more forgerthanthatofthttfirstmemberand tt:ansportation were in interstate or than:

an activity grcatcr thaa that of any other forei~n commerce or In civil aircraft. 2 (i) 500 grams of any fissile material.

member. includinS the first, at a'ny time Any requests for modifications. waivers. 9- provided the atomic ratio of hydrogen to during transportation, the transport or exemptions from thost requirements. -E fissile material is greater than 7.600, or group of the nuclide "x"and the activity and auy notifications referrLd to in thou ( is) 9 00 , -.grams' of of the mixture shall be the maximum ac- requirements shall be filed with or made. uranium-235: trovided. That the atomic, tivity of that nuclide '"x" during to, the Nuclear Reguletory Commission. ratio of hydrogen to fissile material is transportation. , , (c) Paragraph (a) of t m-llon shall greater than 5,200. and the content of to.. 6 n ot apply to the rursidon 'of. other fissile material is not more than I Pdts 2,10 o 36 Iem dieensed Term n defred H&=d m&tdal . or toto theedelivery Of percent by-weight of the total, material a carrier for uranium.235 content; or ge elusive, and 70 of this chapter hisve the transport.'where such transportation Is (dii) 500 grams of uranium.233 and W.sime meaning when used in this part.

A m wsubject to the regulations of the Depart- uranium-235 Provided.That the atomic'

[-

'(q) "Type A quantity" quantity" means a quantity of radloac-and "'type B meant or Transportation or the U.S Postal Service. '

ratio of hydrogen to'fissile material is greater than 5.200. and the content of plutonium Isnot more than I percent by live material the aggregate radioactivity E XEMPTION* weight of the total uraniuprc233 and of which does not exceed that specified .. . .. uranium.235 content; or in thefollowing ta.:material: i 71A6 'Spadfiexinptt"L.- -() Leslsthan 350 grams'of fissile PAovfded. That there Is not TSmq4n tro.- .. , Type A is-" more S grams than foot of fissile material in

,we I ?A~p) uet -,tity q,,stny cwks) (incur-) "..son onormay on grant its own initiative, such the Comm exemptions from the aany cubic c f wh the within the packae pakae

tI * "0*1"'

0 rVAlelureents Of the regulation$ to this r-1i 71.0 ETxemption of physiclas.n O0I

". zO'

'2 panulas it determines are authorized by low and will not endanger life or Proper-.

'u Physicians.

,- t finofed"hysc as de a ., of in §35.3(b) 11lll tv -o - 0- ty or the common defense and security. x this chapter, are exempt from the regula-,

Vi a, - ... 20 30-.* " l .. tions in this part to the extent that they VI @cra fo0.00 --

VII- IW *1 71.7 rExemption for no* htan transport licensed material for use in the Special-form 0.TypFAquaatltes.1 . " Lactice of medicine. r 71.5 Transportatioa of licensed A licensee Is exempt from all the re- 5 71.9 Ezemptiko for flasik material.

material " ,, ' .. o., ., ' qulrements of this part to the extent that . " '." . 1 "1. . I I.

L.he delivers to a carrier for transport: . A liensee is exempt from require (a) No licensee shall transport any r (a) Packales each of which contains ments in If 71.33.-71.33(b). .71.36(b).

licensed material outside of the confines sinlicensed material having a specific ac-. "7137.71.38. 71.39. and 71.40 to the cx of his plant or other place of use, or ti ity Inr 'excess ýo f 0.002 tent that be delivers to a carrier for deliver any licensed material to a carrier I- microcurielgram; or- " transport packages each of which con for transport, unless the licensee com- : ' - . tains one of the following:

piles with the applicable requirements of (b) Shipmenit subject to the regu-a (a) -ot more than 15 grams of fissile c the regulations apropriate to the mode of transport, of the Department of/tion 0

I, Transportation F iona of th Departm in 9C. prt 170I 39. .4 C_

in 49 CFR Parts " part 103 or46CFRpart 146ortheU.S.--

of spra 34 material; or J-...

(b), Thorium. or uranium containing nor more than 0 72 percent by weight of 270-189.14 CFR Part 103 and 46 Part Postletvicein39CFRtparts 14,and 1 fissile material: or 146,-and the U.S. Postal Service in 39 i of pacLages each of which contains to (c) Uranium compounds, other than.,

CFR Par*t 14 and ,sh Ns,ore mnsofar than atype A quantity ofradioac- metal (eg. o.. U F.U.or uranium oxide regulations relate to the packfagng of live material. as defined in I 71.4(q).

byproduct.,source., or special nuclear which may include one of the following:- * " ' - . .

material. marking and labeling of the ) op* l ,,, s e, N ........

packages. loading and storage of material;OO. " b* " " I, - I,1d- ,

- *lledipasedby 3U R110437. inheasb*yd*h. t(I a.duitwo W t&lIMM iEacpq ~fur.iam.232.1Aehemkih20 Fhaih tea l em dedd 35Fi 10437. - " -- ' ' Am "dW 35FR16347 "- "4 Jun, 20. 2975 "

B-3

a PART 71

PACKAGING OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL FOR TRANSPORT-'

in bulk form. not pelletted or fabricated Of 71.11 General Ulnse for shipment 20-25 -31t tI-tt W1I0 4 I into shapes) or aqueousI solutions of of Iiensed materiaL 1 IS1.1-i 15-17 13-2 2 uranium. in which the total amount or uranium-233 and plutonium present A general license is hereby issued, to INOTE. cc.cso*ai.. 0 Shtai mdeveal hr.-e does not exceed i.O percent by weight I-persons holding specific licenses issued xfll uld.Ffwowb*., r sf o fimsueMaterial. the tota ~amutoft uranium, of the uranium-235 content. and the

~ ~

§pursuant to this

~ hs ~ which inI .o the~

chapter to deliver eie i f ofts

,I shessdnd"smt si. shem roe 0otal cartI uimspe lades total fissile content does not exceed ,'licensed material to a carrier for Ia.ll o,-t cen-d tO.

1.00t percent by weight of the total ;transport. without complying with the -.

uranium conteni;tor . - -- I package standards of Subpart C of this - 71.12 G LI riase for shipmt (d) Homogeneous hydrogenousl Ipart, when either: ,

In DOT speeifies tion containers. In solutions or mixtures containing not l (a) The material is shipped as a packages appre ved for ate by more than:. ' '-

Fissile Class III shipment with the X16 another person, Id pokt:eS ap.

i.

,(I) 500 grams of any fissile material,: following limitations on its contents: R - proved by a foreIgs national con provided the atomic rati of hydrogen to., - " - L poest authority.

ftisle material is greater than 7.600; or ( nA general lice (2) 800 grams..- of-S (1) Nosinglepackagecontainsmore r Alse Is hereby issued, to uranium-23S: Proyidedl. That the atomic *than a type A quantity of radioactive "persons holding a g eneral or specific ratio of hydrogen to fissile material is -* material. as defined in I 71.4(q); and license issued pursuan I to this chapter. to c:

greater than 5.200. and the content of * -

u_ n

r. icran rial to a carrier for i s sport:

other fissile material is not more than I percent by weight of the total F -

1:2) The h

fissile l

material contents of U uranium.235 content; or -,. , I the shipment do not exceed: [ (a) In a specinca Rion container for (3) 501) grams of uranium-233 and- (i) 500 grams of uranium-23S; or fissile material as spetcifivd in 1 173.396 total of uraniumo233.

(ii)' 300 grams plutonium.239. (b) or (c) or foreia a I ype B quantity of the atomic That material iso. plutonium-238.

uranium.235:

ratio a) hydrogen Provided.

to fissole and raiatv

. I as specified in greater than 5.200. and the content of, plutonium-241; or I - I 173.394(b) or 117 3.395(b), or for a plutonium is not more than I percent by, (iii) 'Any- combination of ' large quantityofradi, oactive material as

%eight of the total uranium uranium-2333 uranium-235.- and. specified in 173.394 (c)or I 173.395(c) e uranium-235 content; or, a plutonium in such quantities that the sum of the regulations or the I Department of, (e) Less than 350 grams of. finle - of the ratios of the quantity of each of ._Transportation. 49 ClFIR part 173;or Smaterial- Pcovided, That there is not them to the quantity specified in subdivi. - r6r which a license.

more than 5 grams of ressle matere ian u . sions (i) and (ii) of this subparagraph. (b) In a package fa

a. does not exceed unity; or - certificate of compliaance or other ap any cubic foot within the package. -

proval has been issue td by the Commis (iv) 2500 grams of plutonium-238.

plutonium.239. and plutonium-241 cn. sion's Director of INuclear Material I 71.10 Limited exemption for ship- Safety and SafeguardIs or the Atomic meat of type B qnantities of, capsulated as plutonium.beryllium" Energy.- Commissi on. provided that:

neutron sources, with no one package ing a package pur raIoc Iemt , .- ' " , . . containing in excess of 400 grams of. (I) The person us icense provided by A person delivering a type B quantity- plutonium-238,. plutonium.239. and , uant to the general 11 of radioactive material, as defined m plutonium.241; or , .... . .. - this paragraph: he specific licet-se, f 71.4(q). toa carrier for transport in ac- -,(b) The material is shipped as Fissile, (i) Has a copyoft ance. or other ap-'

cordance with the provisions of a special Class 1i packages with the following', ertiaathorizingli se or the package permit, which has been issuedand by Isthe limitations on the contents of each provaJ authorizing u eferred to in the Department of Transportation wn* Lpckige-: and all documents r Do plicense, certificate, or other approval, as effect on June 30. 1973. is exempt from -,-**'1 -'i-"-' - A applicable; the requirements in this part with respect, (I) Nosinglepackage contains more * (ii) Comples wit h the terms and_-_

to such shipments. The exemption - than a type A quantity of radioactive ,. conditions of the license. certificate, or granted by this section shall terminate on u. material, as defined in f 71.4(q); and I other approval, as applicable. and the December 31. 1973. or on the date on X 4-; - .. ,- ; -. I .- - applicable rcquiremetnts ofthis part: and which the DOT special permit expires. 7 '1-- .. ... -a ap(pc bilPrior to first use of the package whichever is later, except as to activities (2),' No package contains fissile submits in writing I o the Director of described both in the special permit and material in- excess of the amounts Nuclear Material Saflety and Safeguards in an application for a license which the specified in the following table, and each or the ' Atomic Elm r Commission.

C person has. prior to the termination date package is labeled with the correspond-, his name and license number, the name of the exemption. filed with the Commis. ing transport index: and license or certifit care number of the - .

sion. If the person has filed such an ap- - 11 '. 1 person to whom the package approval plhcation, the exemption granted by this lasuwass quenayr ( fmale Materil - phas been issuedo and the package aden.

sectiom nhall continue until the appies- arpt in a packer tificatsone number specified ,-in the mion has been finally determined by the c .at"' package approval . I I "*. +.,

sl. ' "U

- iii U-lti Pins. sa h e u - (2) The package a pproval authorizes r." -. * " ' r .. (states) Is*f 01ms) as.*. mar. tad.. use of the package un der general license graph:

-.1 GI.Ntnih wltar an'de- ",o,'3/4 t s a" provided in this paraa apply to havy w . 27 23-25 320-4013, (c) Ins package which meets the per naIt apply to heavy hy"r*an (La- d l outalsu; 35 24 21-2i 240 -320 " - tinent requirements iiIT the 1967 regula..

or tritium). - I I -. , 2$ t0 21-24 It 31 160-240 6 c tions of the Iniernatio otal Atomic Energy

"*AJ&,ti Uair tURMT. ,... - , ,- a . -Agency and the use of which has been ap jAfefrdJ is Ft 16347. - it"druS,4aicl araFt1047. !proved in a (.-,',n anational competent April 30. 197S - . .,.,..*

B-4

I PART 71 PACKAGING OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL FOR TRANSPORT...

authority certificate which ,&S been J, used in the license. (I) Identification and maximum revalidate'd by 'the Department of * (b) The reference to 971.7(b) in radioactivityofrradioactivetconstituents.

Transport atiron. Pnrvided. That the per. hlicensesissucd pursuant to uhispart prior (2) Idcntification and maximum son using a package pursuant to th. 1o March 26, 1972.** is changed to quantities of fissile constituents; general Ilicense provided by 'this I 71.9(b). . (3) Chemical and physical form;,

,. paragraph:

(4) , Extent of rcflection, the amount (I) Sand cor'.ics with the ap-tis (c)The rcfercnee to 1 71.9(b) in and identityofnonl-fi~silr,ncutranabsor plicable cc rtificat, .the revalidation, and - licenses issued pursuant to this part prior bers in the fissile constitutents. and the u the docurn ents referenced in the certifi- m to June 30. 1973. is chngdir fissile con I cate trolAti ve to the use and maintenance t 3 .h . stituents; of the pac kaging. and the actions to be (5) - Maximum %eight; and F Sbt B-cen A lcatlom (6) , Maximum amount of decay heat (2)Y prio taken Corr to shipment, and S u b p a rt 7 1 .23 P ack ag e e a ti .

mp lies w ith th e app licab le re- 71.2.3 Packaerev.luatio...

--. -F. '

qullecllnts cal thils part. aind Ine Mepill-, § 71.21 Contents of application.- I ,0C ment of I ransportation regulations in 49 a - The applicant shall: ,

CFR part 173. 14 CFR part 103. and 46 An application for a specific license (a) ' Demonstrate that the package CFR part 146 an , satisfies the standards specified in Sub under this part may be submitied as application for a license or license part C;

[ 71.13 Conmnanicatlions.

amendment under this chapter and shall (b) For a Fissile Cbs3s 11 packac.

"All communications concerning the include, for each proposed packaging ascertain and specify the number of simi.

design and method of transport, the lar packages which may be transported r

,egulations in this part should he ad together in accordance with 1 71.39. and following information in addition to any, Sdressed to the Nuclear Regulatory Com-,

co mission. Washington. DC 20555. At. otherwise required* .. (c) For a Fissile Class Ill ishipment.

(a) A',package description as tC-' describe any proposed special conitrols

u. tention. Director of Nuclear Material and precautions to be exercised during SSafety and Safeguards, or may be quired by J 71.22; '

(b) A package evaluation astranspor loading, unloading, anti han dclivered in person at the Commission's - dling, and in the event of accident or officesat 1717 H Street NW.. by § 71.23.

(c) A description of proposed pro- delay. -

Washington. D.C. or at 7920 Norfolk by 1 71.24; Avenue, Bethesda. Maryland. cedural controls as required (d) in the case of fissile material, an .7 71.24 Procedural controls.

"F" 71.14 Interpretatlorn&. " identification of the proposed fissile class - -. The applicant shall describe the rcgu-o Except'as specifically authorized by S .&L lar and periodic inspection procedures the Commission in writing, no in S71.,22 Package desription. . L proposed to comply with '71.51(c).

serpretation of the rn-aning of the regulations in this part by an officer or employee of the Commission other than The application shall includcea description of the proposed package in F sufficient detail to identify the package V' The Commission may at any time re 71.25 Additional Information.

a written interpretation by the General Counsel will be recognized to be binding I accurately and to provide a sufficient ", quire further information in order to on the Commission. basis for evaluation of the packaging.

enable it to determine whether a license.

The description should include- , certificate of compliance, or other ap.

S*1 71.15 'Additional requlrement$. (a) With respect to the packaging- I proval should be granted, denied.

S(I) Gross weight. .. . - *modified. suspended. or revoked.

The Commission may by rule. reguls; tion. or order impose upon any licensee (2) Model number; .....

(3) Specific materials of construe-tion. weights, dimensions, and fabrica. I r Subpart C..Package Standards such requirements. in addition to those established in this part. as it deems tion methods of . -- I § 71.31 General standards for 'all (i) Receptacles, identifying the onet packaging.

necessary or appropriate to protect health or to minimize danger to life or ,which is considered to be the contain-."

property. ment atriael;

. pei .calye a (a)t'eiackaging sthall 'be ot such (H) Materials specifically used as' materials and conskructgon that there

"-I*j 7.16 ? Amendment of exisling nonfissile neutron absorbers or modera- will be no significant chemical. galvanic.

F lcenses. tors; (tii)

, . , ... . or other reaction among the packaging Internal and external structures - components. or between the packaging (a) Licenses issued pursuant to this supporting or protecting receptacles; g components and the package contents.

part and in effect on October 4. 1968. (iv) Valves. sampling ports. lifting ac (b) Packaging shall be equipped with which authorize Fissile Clats II packages devices, and tic-down devices; - ' , a positive closure which will prevent in

i. are hereby amended by increasing the (v) Structural and mechanical means ads ertent opening.

minimum number of units specified for for the transfer and dissipation of heat; (c) Lifting devices:

each Fissile Class II package by a factor and............ . - (I) If there is a system of lifting of 1.25. The new number, shall be -(4) -Identification and volumes of devices which is a structural part of the rounded up to the first decinmal. In addi any coolants and of receptacles contain- package. ihe system shall be capable of tion. the term "radiation units- is ing coolant. -. +-.., . . , supporting three times the weight of the changed to -transport index7 wherever (b) 'With respect to the contents of loaded package without gcner.tlng stres the package: . - < in any material of the packaging in ea.

. .. .... . cess ofits yield strength.

.la.*ssamed b.yI k 104)7. .-.I..faiedtOO. E4fbS.tS a6iW . , (2) If there is a system of lifting

-Amtkd 37 1k)M April 30. 1975 B-5

a PART 71 PACKAGING OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL FOR TRANSPORT-devices which is a structural part only of simple beam supported at its ends along ditions of transport as specified In the lid. the system shall be capable of any major axis. packaging shall be capa 171.35; and ,

supporting three times the weight of the ble of withttAnding a static load, normal (2) The effect on a package ofcondi-,

lid and any attachments without general-, to and uniformly distributed along its tions likely to occur in an accident shall ing stress in any material of the lid in ex length, equal to 5 times its fully loaded be assessed by subjecting a sample° cets of its yield strength. I weight, without generating stress in any package or seat, model, by test or other (3) If thcre is a structural part of the material of the packaging in excess of its assessment, to the hypothetical.accidcnt package which could be employed to lift' yield strength. conditions as specified in 1 71.36.

the package and which does not comply' (b) Ezternoalpressure. Packaging (b) Taking into account controls to with subparagraph (I) of this paragraph.. shall be adequate to assure that the con be exercised by the shipper, the Commis-.

the part shall be securely covered or'. tainment vessel will suffer no loss of con &ion may permit the shipment to be' locked during transport in such a man tents if subjected to an external pressure evaluated together with or without the, ner as to prevent its use for that purpose. of 25 pounds per square inch gauge. transporting vehicle, for the purpose of' (4) Each lifting device which is a one or more tests.

structural part of the package shall be so § 71.33 Criticality standards for (c) Normal conditions of transport designed that failure of the device under' rflssle material packages. and hypothetical accident conditions excesslh e load would not impair the con-',

different from those specified in 1 71.351 tainment or shielding properties of the, (a) 'A package used for the shipment and 171.36 may be approved by the package. of fissile material shall be so designed Commission if the controls proposed to' (d) Tie-down devices: and constructed and its contents so be exercised by the shipper are' (I) If there Is a system of tie-down limited that it would be subcritical if it is demonstrated to be adequate to assure devices which is a structural part of the, assumed that water leaks into the con.

the safety of the shipment.

package, the system shall be capable of tainment vessel, and: ,

-withstanding, without generating stress (1)' Water moderation of the con i 71.3S Standards for normal condl in any material or the package in excess tents occurs to the most reactive credible gloss of transport for a single Sof Its yield strength, a static' force ap extent consistent with the chemical and package.

i plied to the center of gravity of the' physical form of the contents; and I I package having a vertical component of (2) The containment vessel is fully F (a) A package used for the shipment.

two times the weight of the package with* reflected on all sides by water. ' '

,.of fissile material or more than a type A S(b) A package used for the shipment _quantity of radioactive material, as its contents, a horizontal component of fissile material shall be so designed defined in I 71.4(q). shall be so designed along the direction in which the vehicle ccand constructed and its contents so' travels of 10 times the weight of the and constructed and its contents so limited that it would be subcritical if it is Slimited that under the normal conditions package with its contents, and a horizon-tal component in the transverse direction I assumed thaf any contefits ofthi packiage. Lof-trisport speetfled in appendix A of of 5 times the weight of the package with auwhich are liquid during normal. Lthis part:

its contents. ' transport leak out of the containment' (I) There' will be no release- of (2) If there is a structural.part of the, vessel, and that the fissile material is radioactive material from the contain package which could be employed to tie then: ' ment vessel; the package down and which does not (I) In' the most reactive credible (2) The effectiveness of the packag-'

comply with subparagraph (I) of this configuration consistent with the chemi.

ing will not be substantially reduced; paragraph. thi part shall be securely cal and physical form of the material;' (3) There will be no mixture of gases covered or locked during transport in (2) Moderated by water outside of or vapors in the package which could.'

such a manner as to prevent its use for the containment vessel to the most reac through any credible increase of that purpose. tive credible extent; and pressure or an explosion, significantly (3) Each tie-down device which is a (3), Fully reflected on all sides by' reduce the effectiveness of the package; structural part of the package %hallbe so water. (4) ' Radioactive contamination of the designed that failure of the device under (c) The Commission may approve liquid or gaseous primary coolant will excessive load would not impair the eixceptions to the requirements of this not exceed 10-7 curies of activity of ability of the package to meet other re section where the containment vessel in Group I radionuclides per milliliter; quirements of this subpart. corporates special design features which SSxl0-6 curies of activity of Group II ra P would preclude leakage of liquids in 71.32 Structural standards for typa spite of any single packaging error and dionuclides per milliliter. 3110"- curies X of activity of Group Iii and Group IV B and large quatilty packaging.. appropriate measures are taken before' each shipment to verify the leak tightness Sradionuclides per milliliter; and (5) - There will be no loss of coolant.

Packaging used to ship a type 8 or a of each containment vessel. (b)-. A package used for the shipment Slarge quantity of radioactive material. as of fissile material shall be so designed w defined in 1 71.4 (q) and (f), shall be' 1 71.34 Evaluation of a single and constructed and its contents so I designed and constructed in accordance package. '

limited that under the normal conditions L with the structural standards of this sec of transport specified in Appendix A of tion.' (a) The effect of the transport en.. this part: I I'

. 'Standards different' from those vironment on the safety of any single package of radioactive material shall be S*(I) The package will be subcritical;

specified in this section may be approved (2) The geometric form of the evaluated as follows: package contents would not be substan fby She Commission" if the controls pro ' (1) The ability ofa package to withs.' tially pliered:

i- posed to be exercised by the shipper are land conditions likely to occur in normal (3) There will be no leakage Ofwater Idemonstrated to be adequate to assure transport shall be assessed by subjecting R the safety of the shipment. I ' I into the containment -vessel. This rc a sample package or scale moctel. by test quiremnen need not be met if. in thi I (a) Zonal resistsance. Regarded as a or other assessment. to the normal con.

Aperl 30, 1975 B-6

I PART 71

PACKAGING OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL FOR TRANSPORT-evaluation of undamaged paciages ments of this paragraph if it contains most reactive credible extent consistent under I 71.38(a). 1 71.39(aXI). or l~only low specific activity materials, as with the, damaged condition of the

71.40(a).'it -has been assumed that 'defined in 1 71.4(g). and is transported package and the chemical and physical moderation is present to such an extent iron a -motor vehicle, railroad car, form of the contents.

as to cause maximum reactivity consis-' 'aircraft. inland water craft, or hold or tent with the chemical and ph)sical form "'deck of a seagoing vessel assigned for the § 71.38 Specific standards for a Fissile Class I package.

or the material; and There will be no substantial reduction in the effectiveness of the EZsole use of the licensee.

(b) A package used for the shipment A Fissile Class I package shall be so designed and constructed and its con.

ii packaging, including" (i) Reduction by more thanS perceit of fissile material shall be so designed and constructed and Its'contents so limited that ifsubjected to the hypothcti tents so limited that. I (a) Any number of such undamaged In the total effective volume of the packaging on which nuclear safety is cal accident conditions spocificd In Ap packages would be subcritical in any ar assessed. - '* " pendix B of this part as the Free Drop, rangement, and with optimum Ain (ii) Reduction by more than S per.' Puncture. Thermal. and Water lmner icrspersed hydrogenous moderation cent in the effective spacing on which sion conditions, in the sequence listed in' unless there is a greater amount of in nuclear safety is assessed, between the Appendix i. the package would be terspersed moderation in the packaging.

center of the containment vessel and the subcritical. In determining whether this in which case that greater amount may be outer surface of the packaging; or standard is satisfied. it shall be assumed considered; and - ."

(iii) Occurrence of any aperture in that: I -

-- I _ (b) -Two hundred fifty such packages the outer surface of the packaging large (I) The fissile material is in the most would be subcritical in any arrangement.

enough to permit the entry of a 4-inch reactive credible configuration consis. if each package were subjected to the hy cube. - "" tent with the damaged condition of the pothetical accident conditions specified package and the chemical and physical in Appendix B of this part as the Free (c) A package used for the shipment form of the contents; ' - , Drop. Thermal. and Water Immersion of' more than a type A quantity of (2) Water moderation occurs to the conditions, in the sequence listed in Ap radioactive material as defined in most reactive credible extent consistent pendix B. with close reflection by uater J 71.4(q), shall be so designed and con- with the damaged condition of the on all sides of the array and with op structed and its contents so limited that package and the chemical and physical timuminterspersed hydrogenous under the normal conditions of transport form of the contents; and - moderation unless there,is a greater specified in appendix A of this part, the (3) There is reflection by water on amount of interspersed moderation in containment vessel would not be vented all sides and as close as is consistent with the packaging in which case that greater directly to the atmosphere. ' the damaged condition of the package. ii amount may be considered. The condi tion of the package shall be assumed to f 71.34 Standards for hypothetical 1 7137 Evalation of a array of be as described in § 71.37.

accident conditions for a single packages of fissie material.

pakage. - -, .. ' . . .. ' . § 71.39 Specific standards for a I - Flsle Class I1 package.

" .. . . ,, (a) The effect of the transport en (a) A package used for the shipment v. vironment on the nuclear safety of an ar of more than a'type 'A quantity of i ray of packages of fissile material shall (a) Ar Fissile Class 11 package shall radioactive material, as defined -in be evaluated by subjecting a sample be so designed and constructed and its I 71.4(q). shall be so designed and con- package or a scale model, by test or, contents so limited, and the number of usrucsed and its contents so limited that other assessment, to the hypothetical ac such packages which may be transported If subjected to the hypothetical accident cidcnt conditions speeified 'in 1 71.38.' together so limited, that.

conditions specified in appendix B of §71.39. or 171.40 for the proposed (I) Five times that number of such this part as the free drop. puncture. ther-. fissile class, and by assuming thai each undamaged packages would be subcriti mal. and water Immersion conditions in' package in the array is damaged to the cal in -any -arrangement If closely the sequence listed in appendix B, It will same extent as the sample package or reflected by water; and .

meet the following conditions: - . scale model. In this case of a Fissile (2) Twice that number of such

- (1) The reduction of shielding would Class III shipmentthe Comnitassion may. packages would be subcritical in any ar rangement if each package were sub not be sufficient to increase the external taking into account controls to be exer-' jected to the hypothetical accident con radiation dose rate to more than 1.000 cased by the shipper.permit the shipment ditions specified in Appendix B of this Smillorams per hour at 3 feet from the ex- to be evaluated as a whole rather than as mlurfams p p the .

ourfat3feetfrm individual packages, and either with or ,part as the Free Drop. Thermal. and te(2) Ns radioactive material would without the transporting vehicle, for the' Water Immersion conditions, in the se

'. .,acaent listed in Appendix B. with close be released from the package except for purpose of one or more-tests. ' reflection by water on all sides of the ar.

gases and contaminated coolant contain (b) In determining whether the &tan-'

i l

-Ing. otal radioactivity exceeding neither:

(i) 0.1 percent of the total radioac-

. tivity of the package contents, nor ' "

(iS) 0.01 curie of .Goup I fa dards of §§ 71.38(b), 71.39(a) (2). and 71A0(b)aresatisfied~hshallbenumed that:

(I) The fissile material is in the most ray and with optimum Interspersed hy drogenous moderation unless there is a greater amount of interspersed modera tion in the packaging, in which case that greater amount may be considered. The dionuclides. 0.5 curie of Group IiII ra- reactive credible configuration consis dionuclides, i0 uris or Group ra* tent with the damaged condition of the condition of the package shall be

-assumed to be as described in J 71.37.

dionuclides. 10 curies of Group IV ra- package. the chemical and physical form disouelides. and -?,50X) curies of inert of the contents.'and controls exercised (b) The tranopors index fir cacti ginss trrespective of transport group. over "ihe number, of 1Sct-ages to be Fissile Class II package is calculated by transported together; and . - ,- . ,dividing the number 50 by the number of A package need not satisfy the require. (2) Water moderation occurs to the April 30, 1975 - ,: ;-

B-7

PART 71

PACKAGING OF.RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL FOR TRANSPORT such Fissile Class It packages which may plaeced within outer packaging that meets - (b) Prior to the first ute of. any be transported together as deteriined the requirements or Subpart C for packaging for the shipment of licensed'

under the limitations of parnaraph (a) of packaging of material in" normal form. . materials, where the maximum normal

. this section. The calculated number shall The separate inner container shall not operating pressure will exceed S pounds Abc rounded up to the first decimal place. release plutonium when the entire per square inch gauge, the licensee shall package is subjected to the normal and test the contamnmcnt vessel to assure that "I71.40 Specific' stuadards for a accident test conditions specified in Ap. : it will not leak at an internal pressure 50, Fisalle Class Ill shipment. pendices A and B. Solid plutonium in the percent higher than the maximum nor.

following forms is exempt from the re- mal operating pressure.

A package for Fissile Class Ill ship. quirements of this paragraph: (e) Packaging shall be conspicuously ment shall be so designed and con. (I) Reactor fuel elements; and durably marked with its model num structed and its contents so limited, and ' (2) Metal or metal alloy; or ber. Priur to applyingthe model number.

thenumberofpackagesinaFtiutleClass (3)' Other plutonium bearing solids the licensee shall determine that the Ill shipment shall be so limited, that: that the Commission determines shuuld - packaging has been fabricated in accor (a) The undamaged shipment would' be exempt from the requirements of this dance with the design approved by the be subcritical with an identical shipment section. , - Commission.

in contact with it and with the two ship-, (c) Authority in licenses issued pur.

ments closely reflected on all sides bji suant to this part for delivery of 1 71.54 Roctine determinations.

water;and ' - . plutonium to a carrier for transport (b) The shipment would be suberiti- under conditions which do not meet the. Prior to each use of a package for ship.

cal if each package were subjected to the' limitations of paragraphs (a) and (b) of ment of licensed material the licensee hypothetical accident conditions' this section. shall expire on June 17. shall ascertain that the package with its, specified in Appendix B of this part as 1978. , contents satisfies the applicable require.

the Free Drop. Thermal. and Water Im. ". ments of Subpart Cof this part and ofthe mersion conditions. in the sequence ,SubpatD-Operating Proceures license, including determinations that:

listed in Appendix B. with close rcflec- e " ". ,, (a) The packaging has not been sig.

tionbywateronallsidesofthearrayand I 71.S1; Ealabllshmeat and vinolate. nificantly damaged; with the packages In the most reactive' I nuace of procedures. , F. (b) Any moderators and nonfissile.

arrangement and with the most reactive , , - neutron absorbers. if required, are pre-'

degree of interspersed hydrogenous The licensee shall establish and main., sent and are as authorized by the Com-,

moderation which would be credible lain: - , , ad ý I mission;:, I", - - . .

.considering the controls to be exercised _ (a) Operating procedures adequate (c) The closure of the package and.

I1 over the shipment. The condition of the r to assure that the determinations and any sealing gaskets are present and are' package shall be assumed to be as

controls required by this chapter arc &c- free from defects; described in 1 71.37. Hypothetical acci- I complhshed; - (d) Any valve through uhich prim.

dent conditions different from those , (b) Procedures for opening and clos-. ary coolant can flow is protected against specified, In this paragraph may be ap- 7 ing packages in which licensed material - tampering; proved by the Commissi"n if the con., is transported to provide safety and to (e) The internal gaugc pressure of tiols proposed to be exercised by the j assure that. prior to delivery to a carrier the package will not exceed, during the, shipper are demonstrated to be adequate lfor transport, each package is properly anticipated period of transport, the max-;

to assure the safy of the shipment. closed for transport; and . .o..c imum normal operating pressure'ary:.

1 71.41 Previously eonstrucltedi procedures adequate to assure that the. coolant will not exceed. during the anti packages for Irradiated solid procedures required by paragraphs (a), cipated period of traniport. the limits

-uclearfuaL-, '. Jl Land (b) of this section are followed.. specified in 1 71.35(a) (4).

an oter provisios otwithstandin I,.52 Assou,,ptio. as to maknou;" The provisions of this section shall not' Notwithstanding any other provisions bs bees,applicable for packages authorired in, of this Subpart. a package; the use of I propeftles. _ , - " the general licenses granted_ by '71 6.10 which has been authorized by the Coin-' sc ae h iesesalacran mission for the transport of irradiatedI When the 'isotopiesblundance. mass. suheasethe litentseote shallag areerais

23. 1961, and which has been completely degree of moderation, or other pertinent authorized in the general license:

constructed prior to January I. 1967'," property of. fissile material in any' 7- I Opening Instructions.'

shall be deemed to comply with the package is not known, the licensee shalll "package standards of this subpart for I package the fissile material as If the- M Prior to deliverof a package to, car that purpose.

-- unnown properties have such credible" A icr for transport, the licensee shall

£ g4 pca reu emnt or values as,,wll cause the maximum, nulerrectviy a-assure that'.. any_ special ... instruction

-71.42 Special requiremnsFor nuclear reactivity. needed to safely open the package are, pluonium shipmetsf sent to or have been made available in 1- 9"78. " - -- I 71.S3 Prenitnry ddtermlatians. _ irhl cons~ignc (a) Notwithstanding the eaemption (a), Prioe to the first use of any. ['j IA1 Reports.

i In 1 71.9. plutonium in excess of twenty Packaging for the shipment or lkensa.'d ' * ' -i' 6 (20) curies per package shall be shipped materials, the licensee shall ascertain The licensee shall report to the Direc..

as a solid. ihas there are no cracks. pinh°les un- gtor of Nuclear Material 'Safety and (b) Plutonium in txcss of twenty controlled voids or other dcfLcts which "Safeguardsl.. IU.l.-Naelar Regulato.ry could significantly reduce the eff'citve. - C I(20) cur ics per package shall he n'ss of the packaging. C withi i 30 days any instance Cin hich I packaged in a separate inner container April 30,1975 ,

B-8

A PART 71 . PACKAGING OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL FOR TRANSPORT."'

of 174. or any regulation or order APPLNDICT.S effective.ess of any authorized packag issued thereunder. A court order may be APFLNDIX A--NOPMAL CONDITIO4S OF obtained filr the payment of a civil "there ing du iin use .

is substantial reduction in the penalty imnpoted pursuant to sectionf 234 TIRANItORT p 71.Z Records.' of the Act for violation of scction 53, 57, Iack of ihe toIi..knl niinal coidijii,,.s of f.irlfrt I. k1 beatppied separaely io detceinuac it.

62.63.1.82, I01.103. 104. 107.or 109 or (a) The licensee shall maintain for a effectt,". a package of the Act, or section 206 of the Energy of 2 years after its generation a *Reorganizatiin Act of 1974. or any rule. Speriod I Ifr--D.rece suitelhi at on amwent tein peit.late,,f IS3" Int,11 air - ý I

record of each shipment of rissile regulation. or order issued thereunder. - 2 i.,ut-An ailise.i irmperaorwe i( "t4O r in Urematetia or of more than a type A quan or any term. condition, or lhmitation of oill a. and shade of radioactive material as defined in ority license issued thereunder, or for any

/3 ?ensaer--Atm..splhr.c Ieessore or o s i,nm s e

S standard atnmosphteric pWresur -

§j71.4(q),.in a single package, showing. Iviolation for which a license may be 4 I'l*tonao-Vlbralint normtlly Inculent io Lwhere applicable. revoked under section I16 or the Act. iramluerl ,- ..

3 . Wolew Si.lp-A aier spraysnfficienrl heavy l Any person who willfully violates any io keep Ike ntire espused surface of Ike ps.,gkes en.

(I) Identification of the packcaging l provision of the Act or any regulation or celpiihe buiol... ounmtlouola.y wet duhr*ng a plcillsi 30 by model number; i order issued thereunder may bcguilty of (2) Details of any sicnificant defects a crime and, upon conviction may be in the packaging, with the means punished by fine or imprisonment or 6 Irr" Da.--4Setxe 1-112mad 2 1i2 hours employed to repair the defects and pre after the conclusion of ihc wlr spraylie. a fr"e Lboth. as provided by law. drop ibhrusigh t1e dsimtae specri.ird bet"w .unito a lat vent their recurrence. u . la) hrontall esselintially ways lnr anere. sulking ithe (3) Volume and identification of sfarace in a p.ssouio fore Which onsimavinm tnilnge is coolant. 1 expected.

(4) Type and quantity of licensed FREE FALL DISTANCE material sn each package, and the total quantity in each shipment. Phiartne afeADs,~

(5) Foreach item ofirad. " . fpni,,daj - ,- (11) material.

10.00060 20",000, (I) Identification by model number; 20Oi2.0 30.000.- t1O... 2 (ii) Irradiation and decay history to Move shan11100 1 the extent appropriate to demonstrate lis that its nuclear and thermal charac. 7 (iatir Driip--A fiee drop naloeeKh enroll Of Ike package hinsaceessmif.. inthe cases1a e)llndoi-ieristics comply with license conditions; elt package cont, eachqartier of each ism. frowri a (iii)' Any abnormal or unusual condi hcilhi of I im foot to a nt essentlia*ly t),eldoig tion relevant to radiation safety. 1hotranotat surfacr 'Thisletsappliesaonlyto packath (6) Date of the shipment; whichare constr*cteldplimlrlly of wood or fiber.

board, and dIona exceed i10 poundstu nross weih.

(7) For Fissile Class Ill. any special and so aIt FPiae Clas 1t packagings t controls exercised; CI ntirirwii-tlmpaci of ibe hemisphreicai end i (3) Name and address of the 01*.llllvericat metglindJer *1.4intche inl dimerellLl transferee; and weighuag I1 pulads drupped front a l641hiil 40 (9) Address to which the shipment hli..hefsoi elheatptned surfae ofaelihpackagewhich is expected to be niosevulnerable so punct*re 71e was made; and . long Iais oftie cylinder hltalbe perpendictlar i. the (10) Results-of the determinations ILoiate aevface required by II 71.53 and 71.54.

(b) The licensee slall make available "I Cinnpmtltiw-sFor packaesi not enceediaig to the Commission for inspection, upon I t0 00 pstends In weighl.0 comapresslve 1load equal to Cothlr S iotes theweightiof Ite packale at 2 pounds reasonable notice, all records required per squareInch whltiplted bylhe masanlin hottzon by this part. list close steeti of shepackage. whichever is treaSit t ind shalt be applied dtilns a period of 24 mad bJutivin of The4 Ilkwrx widuiautly againstll the to 1 71.63 Ilspedieon sad tests. package in the Pomsia i. which 11e Packagewcntlt LromlMly be transpoueed (a) The licensee shall permit the t I Commission at all reasonable times to Inspect the licensed material, packaging.

and premises and facilities in which the licensed material or packaging are used.

produced, tested, stored or shipped.

(b) The licensee shall perform and permit the Commission to perform, such tests as the Commission deems necessary or appropriate for the administration of the regulations in this chapter.

71*

74 violatleis.

9Z An injunction or other court order g0Ismay be obtained prohibiting any viola.

T U lion of any provision of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. as amended, or Ti tle II of the Energy Reorganization'Act' April 30.1975 B-9 I

I~~~~~~~~~ I HII~i~

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'0~i11 z *6 M I.L .cO"1 o l GL cl fli;ti 5 a!1 m2at I TVa

44 4 4 4 44 4 4 4 44

- 4 4 I*4 a

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- 4 4 4

-. 4 a 8.

-. 44 - -, 4 * =4 r -

44 44 4

444

44 4 4 4.

9 4 4,4 4 4 - 4 4 4 U.

4 -

wE 4.

44 LU 11111 *,

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.iii~ihI~I:Ea 2 Ibeaud SC SL 0c

'-'I I' ac CL A2-2AH5 Un "U4 RR 2" I~~ 10, microns in equivalent aerodynamic diameter) are filtered out of the inspired air by the cilia in the.nasopharyngeal passages. They are captured in the mucoid lining of the passages, transported with the mucus drainage, and'eventually swallowed (pathway b on Figure C-1). Intermediate sized particles (1 to 10 microns in equivalent aerodynamic dia meter) are deposited principally in the pulmonary or nasopharyngeal region with a small fraction depositing in the tracheobronchial region (Refs. C-7 and C-B). Some of these particles also become entrained in the mucoid lining and are moved upward towards the pharynx by mucocillary action for eventual deposition into the.upper GI.tract (pathway d in Figure C-1). In addition, a small number of these particles are dissolved-in blood (pathway c on Figure C-I)., Small1 particles (<1 micron in equivalent aerodynamic diameter) are preferentially, deposited in the pulmonary region.. They come in direct contact with'the alveoli and are rapidly phagocytized*

and localized in the- reticuloendothellal cells of the alveoli (Ref. C-16).

Soluble plutonium readily diffuses from the reticuloendothelial cells of the alveoli into the blood and lymphatic systems and is translocated into skeletal and liver tissue with a clearance half-time of-I50-2O0 days (Ref. C-16). -,

I '2 -r- .ý r - - , z-Insoluble plutonium, notably PuO2 , has much longer lung clearance half-time (200-1000 days).

Clearance mechanisms include tracheobronchial mucocillary action (pathways f and k on Fig ure C-1), some dissolution (pathway e on Figure C-1), and lymphatic absorption (pathway g on

'Figure C-1). The overall pattern of the plutonium translocation (in beagles) is shown on Figure C-3. :The buildup in the thoracic lymph nodes appears to be an endpoint in that there is very little movement,of the plutonium from the thoracic lymph nodes to systemic blood (path-.

way hon Figure C-I)..- . - . - ...

Studies indicate that different isotopes of plutonium may exhibit different biological behavior. For, instance, Pu-238 appears to translocate faster than other plutonium isotopes, ..

Phagocytosis is'a process bywhich special cells, such as'white blood cells, rid the-body'of' bacteria and unwanted debris in the tissue., During phagocytosis, the foreign matter is actu-ally surrounded and ingested by the cell (Ref. C-19)... 7 C-6

FIGURE C-i. BIOLOGICAL PATHWAYS FOR INHALED MATERIAL (Refs.-C-3, C-7, C-19, C-20)

(a) Nasopharyngeal absorption in blood (b) and (d} Mucociliary translocation to .upper GI tract (c) Tracheobronchial absorption in blood .

(e) Alveolar diffusion'-', C

-(fSort-term and k)' long-term mucociliary translocation of

'phagocytized material to tracheobronchial region (g) Absorption into lymphatic system (h) Transfer to venous system (i) Gastrointestinal absorption in blood (J) Excretion from GI tract as feces or absorption from GI tract and excretion as urine C-7

I 20 I I I- 4 I

-% I Ii Z,. NASOPHARYNGEAL REGION. ,'

U%

5 2

LU I.TRACHEOBRONCHIAL REGION 4 "

"" 0.5 PULMONARY-REGION 0.2 %

0. 1 U \ I ,1 ,-, 1 t 1 5 10 20 30 50 7080 90.95-....-99

- PERCENT DEPOSITION FIGURE C-2.- DEPOSITION -MODEL (Ref. C-7).

The radioactive or mass fraction of an aerosol"that"is ..deposited' in the nasopharyngeal, tracheobronchial;'and pulmonary regions is given:in relation to the activity of mass median aerodynamic diameter. (AMAD) or (MIAD) of the aerosol distribution. The model is intended for use with aerosol distribu tions that have an AMAD 6r MMAD between 0.2 and 10 mlcrons with geometric-.

standard deviations of.less than 4.5. Provisional deposition estimates further extending the size range are givenm by the broken lines., For the unusual' dis tribution having an AMAD or MMAD greater than 20 microns, complete nasopharyn geal deposition can be assumed. Themodel does-not apply to aerosols with AMADs or MMADs below 0.1 micron.

C-B

100 cno C/CN Coi 10 0

U 0(D uj =

0i :i ": 2"",. 31' 2 : 3 :"

IP

3,%*-

'

U

6. 7 2

10 11 TIME AFTER EXPOSURE JYEARS)

"FIGURE C-3.2 TRANSLOCATION OF PULMONARY-DEPOSITED,,

- .,Pu-239 IN.BEAGLE DOGS (Ref. C-16).,

T. - C' pK

apparently due to particle disintegration or surface fragmentation caused by its higher spe cific activity.

C.5 BIOLOGICAL EFFECTS The effects of plutonium on tissue are largely a function of the high:energy, alpha and beta radiation emitted during radioactive decay. Because of the nature of alpha and beta particles, their energy deposition occurs in a relatively small amount of body tissue. When tissue of laboratory animals is exposed to a sufficient quantity of plutonium, the energy deposition results in early effects ranging over several degrees of illness including death.

In smaller doses, the radiation appears to act as a carcinogenic agent.

.0 It should be noted here that no evidence of cancer, other illness, or death that can be attributed unequivocably to accidental or intentional, plutonium exposure 'in human beings has occurred (Refs. C-4, C-11, C-12, C-13, C-14, C-15, C-16, C-17, and C-18). This record does not exclude the possibility of long-terim low-dose effects that may require more than 20-30 years to reveal themselves. Specific effects within organs of interest are discussed in detail below.

C.5.1 EFFECTS ON SKELETAL AND HEMATOPOIETIC SYSTEMS (Refs. C-3, C-4, C-16, C-19, and C-21)

If plutonium is translocated to skeletal sites, itis preferentially deposited on the bone surfaces. Depending on the rate of growth or remodeling'of the bone (and hence on the age of the exposed individual) the deposit may remain on the surface or be buried. Very large bone accumulations of plutonium result in suppressed osteogenesis and eventual tissue necrosis. At lower doses,-pathological bone fractures may occur. At low doses, theincidence of osteogenic sarcoma also shows a marked iicrease. All of these effects are on the skeletal tissue itself.

The effect on hematopoietic tissue'within the bone structure can result in depression of gran ular leukocytes at low doses and lymphophenia at higher doses. The'evidence from either exper imental or clinical studies that plutonium produces leukemia is, at present, scanty. However, theoretical consideration and clinical investigation of persons'injected with Th-232 indicate that leukemia should not be excluded as a risk from plutonium exposure.

C.5.2 EFFECT ON LIVER (Refs. C-16 and C-17)

Very low doses of plutonium to the liver appear to have no effect in laboratory animals.

As the dose increases, bile ductatumors and cirrhosis have been observed although bile duct tumors also occurred in control animals..-The correlation'of liver results from'animals to man remains somewhat unclear at this time.

C.5.3 EFFECT ON LYMPH NODES (Ref. C-16)

It has been concluded from the rodent and'dog'experiments..that.thi lymph nodes are not especially susceptible to the carcinogenic action of alpha radiation frm plutonium. However, the question of possible long-term plutonium-induced lymphosarcoma is not completely addressed by these results. Information obtained from long-term studies on occupationally exposed pluto nium workers should provide more definitive information on lymph-system effects.

C-10 -T-

C.5.4 EFFECTS ON LUNGS (Refs. C-16 and C-22)

The data on plutonium effects-in the-lungs are heavily based on beagle experiments. Large deposits (>0.5 pCl/g of lung) in the-pulmonary tissue of these animals have caused severe inflammation, edema,' hemorrhage, and death within a relatively short period of time (0 week).

At somewhat -lower-doses (0.05 - 0.1 pCi/g of lung) pulmonary fibrosis occurs, resulting in -

respiratory insufficiency and eventual death., At lower deposition levels (0.6 to 14 pCi total lung burden),-bronchiolo-alveolar carcinomas have developed. Although thepathogenesis is not well known, it appears that the bronchiolo-alveolar carcinogenesis may be related to the fibro tic repair of the localized radiation damage.

C.5.5 GENETIC EFFECTS (Ref. C-23)

It has been known for several years that doses of high linear energy transfer (LET) radia tion are more effective at producing somatic damage than low-LET radiation. However, the correlation of LET to mutation induction has not been well established. Based on recent mouse data, it appears that the RBE for genetic effects from low doses and dose rates of high LET radiation may be higher than anticipated. However, the ICRP feels that the quality factors in use are adequate. In view of the very small gonadal uptake of plutonium, the genetic risk is clearly less than the risk to lung or skeletal tissue.

C.5.6 MITIGATION OF PLUTONIUM CONTAMINATION (Ref. C-16)

Several techniques have been developed to mitigate the effects of plutonium exposure. The most common method of dealing with exposure to soluble plutonium compounds involves intravenous injection of DTPA (diethSlenetinaminepentacetlc acid). This acid forms stable plutonium com plexes and increases urinary excretion of the element, in some cases by orders of magnitude.

In cases involving insoluble pulmonary plutonium deposits, pulmonary lavage with physio logical saline has been used with some success. This is a relatively high-risk medical pro cedure, however, so the actual hazard of the deposited material must be carefully evaluated.

C.6 PLUTONIUM TOXICITY The toxicity -of plutonium has been the subject of considerable discussion. It has been alleged that plutonium is one of the most potent respiratory carcinogens known (Refs. C-24 and C-25). These assertions are based on two principal premises:

1. The so-called "hot particle" theory, which states that the dose received by an organ should be computed using the very small mass of irradiated tissue surrounding the deposited particle rather than the entire organ mass (Ref. C-24) and

2. The ciliary impairment that is alleged to be present in smokers (Ref. C-26).

Neither of these theories has gained widespread acceptance In the medical or health physics communities, and both have been strongly refuted by experts in the specific areas (Refs. C-18, C-27, C-28, C-29, C-30, C-31, and C-32)

a The more widely accepted feeling is that, although plutonium is certainly a potent carcin ogen, it is not "the most-toxic substance known to man." As an acute toxin, plutonium is much less potent than several of thesubstances, considered as "super toxins" shown in TableC-3 (Ref. C-33). As a carcinogen,'comparison'with chemical substances is more,tenuous due to a multitude of units and exposure periods, although attempts have been made (Refs. C-20 and C-34). Comparisons of long-term toxicity have been made,,, however, with, other radioactive materials (Ref. C-33) based in maximum permissible concentrations," and these results show plutonium to be the isotope of highest risk to bone from inhalation but of comparable or less risk than that of other isotopes in terms of ingestion hazard and hazaru to other organs.

I.,

-zJ. J-1,z

-S -'v: If.

-C-'-, 4 * *-* .-

SfC - ,** , ,

-' -'-V.- - r. t, -

C-12" * -

ACT TABLE C-3 .

ACUTE TOXICITY OF SOME SUBSTANCES (REF. C-33)

+ Quantity*

Substances Criterion* Species Route" (per kg body weight)

"""otulinus toxin A .9 7 x 10-- zg/kq (crystalline) LD5 0 Mouse Ipr Tetanus5toxin LDs 0 Mouse Ipr 1 x 10-4 pa/ka Diptheria toxin LD50 Mouse Ipr 0.3 pg/kq Nerve Gas, GB, -, 50% deaths pg/kq+

in 1-2 hr. Human INH 16 VX I"uman INH 8 Ag/kg+

L050 Cat IV 390 pg/kg S iCurare"

.Bufotoxin' LD5 0 Mouse Ipr 500 jg/kg' Strychnine LDs 0 Mouse Ipr 500 jig/kg LD Dog INH 500-800 pg/kq

.'Pu-239 -

PU 50/30 Rat IN" 2000 mg/kg,

AXter-Wacholz k (115) rPU-39'. D50 'assuming5/3 a 75 kg man and 17 liter/min breathinq rate.

ý*The items marked L are'actually the lowest figures found in the literature for classical LD5 Except for the confusion of terminology engendered, thev might 6e labelled "LDLo.

+Estimite.

.Ipr -percentaneous injection; INH inhalation; IV - intravenously.

I-,,

a REFERENCES C-1. W. N. Miner, "Plutonium," USAEC, 1960.

C-2. The Metal Plutonium, A.S. Coffinberry and W. N. Miner, eds., University of Chicago Press, 1961.

C-3. "The Metabolism of Compounds of Plutonium and Other Actinides,", ICRP Publication 19, May 1972.

C-4. Plutonium Handbook: A Guide-to the Technology (Volumes I and II), 0. J. Wick, ed.,

Gordon and Breach Science Publishers, 1967.

C-5. J. R. Roesser, "Nuclides and Isotopes," General Electric Company, 1966.

C-6. C. M. Lederer, J. M. Hollander, and I. Perlman, Table of the Isotopes, John Wiley and Sons, New York, 1967.

C-7. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Reactor Safety Study," (WASH-1400), Appendix VI, October 1975.

C-8. J. W. Healy, "Los Alamos Handbook of Radiation Monitoring," (LA-4400), Los Alamos Scien tific Laboratory, 1970.

C-9. Strom, Watson, "Calculated Doses from Inhaled Transuranium Radionuclides and Potential Risk Equivalents to Whole-Body Radiation," (BNWL-SA-5588), Battelle-Pacific Northwest Labs, Richland, Washington, 1975.

C-10. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Final Generic Environmental Statement on the Use of Recycled Plutonium in Mixed-Oxide Fuel in Light Water Reactors," (NUREG-0002),

August 1976.

C-11. Hemplemann, Richmond, and Voely, "A Twenty-Seven Year Study'of Selected Los Alamos Pluto nium Workers," (LA-5148-MS); Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, January,1973.

C-12. Rowland, Durbin, "Survival,: Causes of Death, and Estimated Tissue Doses in a Group of Human Beings Injected with Plutonium," Workshop on Biological Effects and Toxicity of Pu-239 and Ra-226, Sun Valley, Idaho, October 1975.

C-13. Norwood, Newton, Kirklln, Held, Breitenstein, "Health of Hanford Plutonium Workers,"

Health Effects of Plutonium and Radium, J. W. Press, Salt Lake City, Utah, 1976.

C-14

a C-14. Richmond, "Human Experience," (LA-UR-74-1300), Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, January

'1974.

C-15. Richmond, "The Current'Status of Information Obtained from Plutonium-Contaminated People,"

(LA-UR-74-1826), Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, July 1974.

C-16. Advances in Radiation Biology, J. T. Lett, H. Adley, and H. Zelle, eds., Academic Press, 1974.

C-17. W. J. Bair, "Biomedical Aspects of Plutonium,"- (BNWL-SA-5230), Battelle-Pacific Northwest.

Laboratory, Richland, Washington, December 1974.

C-18. "Alpha Emitting Particles in Lungs," NCRP Report 46. August 1975.

C-19. A. C. Guyton, M. D., Textbook of Medical Physiology, W. B. Saunders Co., 1966.

C-20. B. L. Cohen, "The Hazards in Plutonium Dispersal," (TID-26794), July 1975.

C-21. Vaughan, "Plutonium -- A Possible Leukaemlc Risk," The Health Effects of Plutonium and Radium, J. W. Press, Salt Lake City, 1976.

C-22. Dagle, Lund, and Park, "Pulmonary Lesions Induced by Inhaled Plutonium in Beagles,"

(BNWL-SA-5563), Battelle-Pacific Northwest Laboratory, Richland, Washington, 1975.

C-23. "The RBE for High-LET Radiations with Respect to Mutagenesis," ICRP Publication 18, May 1972.

C-24. Tamplin and Cochran, "Radiation Standards for Hot Particles," National Resources Defense Council, February 1974.

C-25. Gofman, "Estimated Production of Human Lung Cancers from Worldwide Fallout," (CNR-1975-2),

Committee for Nuclear Responsibility, July 1975.

C-26. Gofman, "The Cancer Hazard from Inhaled Plutonium," (CNR-1975-1), Committee for Nuclear Responsibility, May 1975.

C-27. Healy, Anderson, McInroy, Thomas, and Thomas, "A Brief Review of the Plutonium Lung Cancer Estimates by John W.Gofman," (LA-UR-75-1779), Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, October 1975.

C-28. Snipes, Brooks, Cuddihy, and McClellan, "Review of John Gofman's Papers on Lung Cancer Hazard from Plutonium," (LF-51/UC-48), Lovelace Foundation for Medical Education and Research, September 1975.

C-29. Grendon, "Some Plutonium Fallacies," presentation at 21st annual meeting of the Health Physics Society, July 1976.

C-15

U I

C-30. Richmond, "Current Status of the Plutonium Hot Particle Problem," Oak Ridge National Laboratory, (CONF-751105-17), 1975.

C-31. Richmond, "Review of John W. Gofman's Reports on Health Hazards from Inhaled Plutonium,"

(ORNL/TM-5257), Oak Ridge Nationil Laboratory, February 1976.

C-32. Dolphin, "Hot Particles," British National Radiological Protection Board, 1974.

C-33. Stannard, "Plutonium Toxicology and Other Toxicology," The Health Effect of Plutonium and Radium, J. W. Press, Salt Lake City, 1976.

C-34. "Nuclear Power and the Environment - Questions and Answers," American Nuclear Society, June 1976.

S.> ,

I -. -

A. I,',

I, - -

I I C-16

APPENDIX D POPULATION DOSE FORMULAS FOR NORMAL TRANSPORT The formulation for the assessment of population dose is based onan expression for dose rate as a function of distance from a point source of radiation. This point source approxi mation is acceptable for distances between the receptor and the source of more than two source characteristic lengths. At smaller distances, the point-source approximation overpredicts ex posure and, therefore, will provide a conservative estimate of dose. The dose rate formulation is given by:

Ke'Pd2 Bid) (D-1) d where D(d) = dose rate at a distance d (mrem/hr) d = distance from source (ft) 1 p = absorption coefficient for air (.00118 ft )

B(d) = Berger buildup factor in air, where in this case Bid) = .0006d + 1 (dimensionless) (Ref. D-l) 2 K = dose rate factor (mrem-ft /hr)

D.1 DOSE TO PERSONS SUQROUNDING THE TRANSPORT LINK WHILE THE SHIPMENT IS MOVING An expression for the total integrated dose absorbed by an individual at a distance x from the path of a radioactive shipment with dose rate factor K passing at velocity V has been derived (Ref. D-1) from Equation (0-1) and is given by 0(x) 2ýI(x) (D-2) where V = shipment speed (ft/hr) x = perpendicular distance of individual from shipment path (ft)

= "r Bit)dr I(x) x r(r"x2)*

By appropriate transformations, this integral -an De expressed in terms of modified Bessel 2

functions of the second kind of order zero,-which can be evaluated. For a K of 1 mrem-ft /hr and a V of 1 mile/hr, the absorbed dose as a functon of x is as shown in Figure D-7.

In order to obtain integrated population dose in sectors of length L and width d on both sides of the roadway (Figure D-2), Equation (D-2) is multiplied by the average population density and L and integrated over the width of the strip D-1

-1 100 1000 Perpendicular distance from individual -

to shipment path (it)

FIGURE D*-I. DOSE RECEIVED BY AN INDIVIDUAL AS A SHIPMENT PASSES D-2

L d

Shipment route %

0 - populated zone with uniform population density PD L - length of populated utrip d - maximum distance over which exposure is evaluated min - smullest distance between exposable population and shipment centerline. -

FIGURE D-2. DOSE TO PERSON LIVING ALONG THE TRANSPORT LINK D-3

I Dose = 2PD)(L)f D(x)dx (D-3) min where Dose = integratea population dose in strip (person-mrem) 2 PD = average population density (persorr/ft )

L = length of strip (ft) min = minimum distance from population to shipment centerline (ft) d = maximum distance over which exposure is evaluated (ft)

D(x)dx = incremental dose function from Equation (D-2) (mrem-ft).,

Equation D-3 predicts an infinite dose as min approaches 0; thus a limit on this value must be set. Values for min were selected based on actual roadway dimensions. A value of 2,600 feet was selected for d based on a previous assessment (Ref. D-l).

Consider a single trip made by a radioactive package with dose rate factor K. The trip is considered to involve three population density zones: rural, suburban, and urban. The total population dose resulting from the trip of length L (feet) is made up of the sum of the doses received in each of the three zones:

Dose = Doser + Doses +"Doseu where the subscripts r, s, and u refer to rural, suburban, and urban, respectively. The use of the integrated dose expression of Equation D-3 results in the following expression:

eFfrPr fsPDs + fuPDu (0-4) o KL - s U u I(

where fr = fraction of distance traveled in rural population density zone fs = fraction of distance traveled in suburban population density zone fu = fraction of distance traveled in urban population density zone PDr = population density (rural) (people/ft2z)

PDs = population density (suburban) (people/ft )2

?Du = population density (urban) (people/ft 2 )

Ir = p I (x)dx r

Is = AIx)dx minS lu = I(x)dx flnU D-4

minr = minimum distance from exposable population to shipment centerline (ft) (rural)

-min = minimum distance from exposable population to shipment centerline (ft) (suburbal )

r minu = minimum distance from exposable population to shipment centerline (ft) (urban)

Vr = -average speed in rural area (ft/hr)

Vs = average speed in suburban area (ft/hr)

Vu =average spied in urban area (ft/hr)

Long-haul shipments use freeways or four-lane' roads in most low and medium population density zones. However, in high density zones, use of' city str'eets is often unavoidable.

Since the minimum exposure distance (min) is smaller under these circumstances, the last term of Equation.1D-4) is modified as follows: . .

4K(f u)(PD u)(L)

Doseu = u Iu(f 0 + K'f (D-5) where fo = fraction of high density zone distance traveled on freeways or four-lane r6ads fl = fraction of high density zone distance traveled on city streets K' = constant that accounts for closer minimum distance on city streets. This constant K' is given by

/I(x)dx min, 1i ° ... JJdJ fI(x)dx.'-.J I~u i-j4 where min = is the minimum distance of the exposable population from the shipment center line for shipments-on city streets.

9 The upper integration limit d was taken to be'2,600-ft, an'd'the lower-limits minr = mns =

minu = 100 ft in all three population density zones. A value of 30 ft ,as$.selected for minu on city streets, resultingIin "avaiue of 1.636 'for K'.--With these limits, the-dimensionless integral Ir = = Iu was evaluated numerically and found to be equal to 2.9' "

When the expression for urban dose Du of Equation (0-5) is substituted'into Equation (0-4),

the, following expression results: " -- ?r,* *: . , : .

"[IrPDr +fsPDs + f P u

,Dose= 4KL(2.42) IVP" + D I- .636

. 2L 1 6)

-D- Z:

2 If the population densities (PD) are expressed as persons/mi and the velocities (V) are expressed in miles per hour (mph), the dose received permile traveled is: - - -

D-5 --

a 3.4x 10 0 (K)f Dose(peron- PD5 f PO ~ l 10+ s + U U(f * (D-7) rem/mile)L rsuJ The annual normal population dose for this shipment scenario is obtained by multiplying the above equation by the total number of package-miles per year for this type of shipment, or PPS x SPY x FMPS, where PPS = average number of packages per shipment SPY = number of shipments per year FIPS = average distance traveled (miles ) per shipment The dose raCe factor K may be expressed as K = K0 TI, where Ko is a transport index to dose rate conversion factor:

Ko = (3 + d)2 where 2d = typical package dimension in feet.

In this assessment:

Ko = 13.4 ft2 for i'typical Type A package Ko = 16.0 ft2 for a typical Type B package -I An Irradiated fuel cask, however, is treated simply as a source with a dose rate factor K = 1000 mren-ft 2/hr; no TI is assigned.

The final expression for the annual population dose for a given shipment scenario, and the one used in this assissment to evaluate the normal population dose to surrounding population while the shipment is moving, is the following:

(persoDYoe) i3.7"x

-' iO'IO(Ko)(TI)(PPS)(SPY)(FMPS) -8) year) J . . (D-8)

/frPDr+ fsPOs + fuu P Ul(f ,** 1.636f,"

whereKo 134 00ft2for a.Type A package and 16.0 ft2.fora*TypeB package o .

TI = average TI per-package, . w, t-uJ . , - .. ,.

PPS = average number of packages per shipment SPY = number of shipments per year', ...: - . -- ,'-;

FMPS = average distance (miles) per shipment -, S fr' s fu = fraction of distance traveled in rural, suburban, and urban areas, respectively 2

PO, PPDu = population density (person/mi ) inruralisuburbain and-urban areas, respectively Vre Vs Vu = average speed (mph) inrural, suburban, and urban areas, respectively fo = fraction of urban travel on freeways or four-lane roads' ., .

f = fraction of urban travel on city streets 0

D.2 DOSE TO POPULATION DURING SHIPMENT STOPS If the shipment stops for crew change, meals, refueling, etc., people in an annular area around the stop point are exposed. The population dose is again obtained by integrating a form of Equation (D-1) that includes an annular differential element, 27trdr:

d I-pr~

Dose: Ko(TI)(AT)(PDjf( 2nr) eB())dr (D-9) where Dose = integrated population dose per shipment (person-mrem)

AT = total stop time per shipment (hr)

Numerical evaluation of the integral for various values of x and d yields:

x(ft) d(ft) integral 5 400 26.104 5 1000 29.827 5 2600 31.613 2600 27.275 By accounting for the fraction of stops that occur in various population density zones and by making appropriate unit conversions, the integrated population dose in person-rem per year resulting from stops for a given shipment-type is given by:

Dose = Q1 Ko(TI)(PPS)(SPY) [ATr (PDr +& Ts(PDs) + ATuPD U (D-:0) where Tr = total stop time in 'rural population density zones (hours)

T = total stop time in suburban population density zones (hours)

Tu = total stop time in urb~an population density zones (hours)

Q, = 2.54 x 1O-9(rem-km2 /mrem_-ft) (for x = 10 feet and d = 2600 feet)

D.3 DOSE TO WAREHOUSE PERSONNEL WHILE PACKAGE IS IN STORAGE The dose to warehouse personnel is computed the same way as the dose received by persons while the shipment is stopped. The result is:

(Dose)stor = Q2 Ko(TI)(PPS)(SPY)(ATstor)(PDstor) (D-11) where Dosestor = integrated population exposure (person-rem/year) 7t = total storage time per shpmini (hors). .'

Tstor, ;

o o , t . :-" . , c,:-

PDstor = population density in warehouse area

. xlO(m 2 2 ( = nd d 0 x =5 feet and d =1,000 feet) x 0(rem-km /mrem-ft )(for Q2 2.77

'. , , ^, , - I .

D-7 ý

I 0.4 DOSE TO CREWMEN The annual dose to crewman is obtained directly from Equation (D-i) by using an average source-to-crew characteristic distance (d) for each transport mode:

(Dose) crew = Q3 (Ko)(TI)(PPS)(SPY)(Nc) e-ldd2B(d) ATship (D-12) d where Nc = number of crewman aboard d = average distance to crew compartment (ft)

Q3 = 10-3 (rem/mrem) I ATship = average time required for a shipment = _ + l FMPS FMPS = average distance (miles) per shipment The values of e'8d Bid) for the assumed values of d for the various modes are shown below:

d2

"': e-lid Bid)

, .:*. ~d2 . ..

Mode d(feet) d Van 7 2.03 x 10-2_

Truck 10 9.94 x 10 50 3.88 x 10=4 Pass. Aircraft..

3

20 , .o 2.47 x 10-Cargo Aircraft

- . 500 x 66.88 Rail 200 2.21 x 10-5 Ship Barge 150 4.06 x 10" 2

Because of regulatory limits for dose ratelin'the crew compartment;12 mrem/hr is used as an upper limit for dose rate in this assessment. If the TI carried would cause this limit to be exceeded, it is assumed that shielding would be introduced to reduce the dose rate to this level.

D.5 DOSE TO PERSONS IN VEHICLES SHARING THE TRANSPORT LINK WITH THE SHIPMENT Figure D-3 shows a truck carryingradloactive material-; Thetruck is traveling at a speed V along with other vehicles in the same lane. Occasionally vehicles traveling in the opposite direction pass the truck in the other lane. There are tiwo"separate doses to be computed:

opposite direction from the shipment and

1. The dose to persons traveling in the direction ie as the shipment.

2. The dose to persons traveling in the sa D-8 --

VT CLof opposite lane d, - VT

'a

+:C:)- t::: -

CL of shipment path

.max oI mtn - minimum following distance V traffic velocity

= lane separation distance max - maximum exposure distance FIGURE 0-3.- DOSE TO PERSONS IN VEHICLES SHARING THE TRANSPORTATION LINK WITH THE SHIPMENT

a 0.5.1 DOSE TO PERSONS TRAVELING IN THE OPPOSITE DIRECTION Assume that both the shipment and the oncoming traffic are moving at speed V(km/hr). The dose received by an individual in an oncoming vehicle may be computed by assuming that this vehicle is at rest and he is passed by the shipment at a speed of 2V. An expression for the integrated dose from a moving source was given in Equation (D-2).

Thus, the average integrated dose received by a person in an oncoming vehicle passing the truck at a distance x is:

0 = ( WI x) (0-13)

The average number N of oncoming vehicles per mile is N ' (D-14) where N' is the traffic count (average number of cars per hour traveling in one direction).

Let P be the average number of persons per vehicle. Thus the average number N of persons who travel in the opposite direction to the shipment and who are exposed per kilometer traveled by the truck is Navg a = cP VTF N'_P (0-15)

The average annual population dose to persons traveling in the opposite direction to the shipment is given by 0 x Navg x FMPS, where FlPS is the average distance per shipment. Multiplication of this number by SPY, the annual number of shipments of the type being considered, results in the annual population dose for the given shipment. scenario:

Dose =- *I(x) v- P(FMPS)(SPY)

TV T (0-16)

NO KI(x) P(FMPS)(SPY)

VT The traffic count N' and the average velocity V depend upon the population density zone and the time of day (i.e., rush hour or normal traffic). The value of the integral I(x) depends on the distance x of closest approach, which in turn depends on the type of road. The assumptions made for the various values for x and the corresponding values for I(x) are tabulated below:

Type of Road xft) I(x)(ft-l) 50 2.9 x 10-2 Freeway 4.8 x 10"2 Four-Lane 30 10 1.5 x 10"1 City Streets The following additional assumptions are made:

1. All rural and suburban truck travel is on freeways.

D-10

2. The traffic count doubles during the commuter rush periods (applicable in urban and suburban population zones).

3. The average speeds aecrease by a factor of 2 during commuter rush periods (applicable in urban and suburban population zones).

4. Urban travel may be on freeways, four-lane roads, or city streets. Suburban and rural travel is all on freeways.

5. Urban travel on freeways and four-lane roads during rush hour is at half the average suburban velocity.

6. Urban travel'on 'freeways during non-rush hours is at the average rural velocity.

Urban' travel on four-lane roads 'during non-rush hours is at the average suburban velncity. " I Under these assumptions the following expression is obtained for the annual-population dose in person-rem/year to persons traveling in a direction opposite to the shipment for a given ship ment type:,

ý(Dose)op = Q(K0 )(TI)(PPS)(SPY)(FMPS)(P)(F) (D-17) where F = fr ++ f2NsLf

/ 5 nX Tr (VvTs)/... / ..

+ fu In deriving this expression, the substitution K = K, x TI x PPS has been made, where TI =

TI/package, and PPS = number of packages/shipment. Other symbols in this equation are as follows:'

,v r I respectively fr fstfu= 'fractions of distance traveled in rural, suburba~i, and urban zones, frh fraction of distance traveled in rush hour traffic f fraction of distance traveled in normal traffic f fraction of travel on freeways or interstates f = fraction of travel on four-lane roads D- 1I

M f = fraction of travel on city streets VTr average velocity on freeways (miles/hour)

VTs =average velocity on freeways in suburban population density zones and on all four-lane roads (miles/hour)

VTu = average velocity on city streets (miles/hour)

IfWy = I (50 ft) = 2.9 x 0l 2 ft"1 2

141= I (30 ft) = 4.8 x 10 ft" Ics = I (10 ft) = 1.5 x 10-lft"I

=(10-3 rem~l I mile) m-*-}*-O-*}= 1.89 x 10 The annual dose is computed for each shipment scenario using Equation (D-17), and the results are summed over all the standard shipments to obtain the total annual dose to persons traveling in a direction opposite to that of the shipment.

D.5.2 DOSE TO PERSONS TRAVELING IN THE SAME DIRECTION AS THE SHIPMENT-.

On the average, vehicles carrying radioactive material move at the same speed as the rest of the traffic. Thus, vehicles traveling in the same direction as the shipment can be modeled as a static set of vehicles at fixed distances from the shipment.- The dosein mi11irem received by a person located at distance x from the radioactive material may be computed by multiplying the dose rate from Equation (0-2) by the duration AT of the exposure:

Dx aT (D-18)

Ux For a given scenario, the total annual exposure time is given by the quotient of total miles per year (miles per shipment x shipments.per year) and average velocity:

ATann =a(FMPS)(SPY):

nVT . (D-19)

It is assumed that people are distributed uniformly along the shipment path with a linear density given by l._

Linear Density (persons/mile) ~N'P" (D-20)

I .prosml) I VT The annual dose to persons traveling in the same direction as the shipment for a given scenario is determined by multiplying the expression for the dose given in Equation (0-18) by the linear density givenAin Equation (D-20),. using Equation (D-19),. for. ATann, and integrating over x from some minimum distance d out to a maximum distance "max":

max (Dose)s- e V NiPr. (FMPS)(SPY)* K /e_ B x) dx (D-21)

-~

The factor of 2 takes into account vehicles ahead of and behind the shipment.

D-12

As in the case of persons traveling in the opposite direction, N' and VT depend on the population density zone ana the time of day (rush hour or normal traffic). Also the distance d of closest approach depends on the type of road. The average values selected for d are 100 ft for freeways and interstates, 30 ft for four-lane roads, and 10 ft for city streets. Using the same traffic assumptions as made for the calculation-of the dose to persons traveling in the direction opposite to that of the shipment, the following expression is obtained for the annual dose (for a given shipment scenario) received by persons traveling in the same directions as the shipment:

(Dose)same dir. = Q'(K 0 )(TI)(PPS)(FMPS)(SPY)(P)F (D-22) where the traffic factor F is the same as that given in Equation (0-17), except that:

Ifwy = 1l (100 ft) = .008 14 = 11 (30 ft) = .031 Ics = 1, (10 ft) = .097 2600 ft and I1 (d) =

d The constant Q' is:

7 3

rem x 1 mile 3.79 x 10-Q' = 2 x 10- *rem 5280 ft The annual dose is computed for each shipment scenario using Equation (D-22), and the results are summed over all the standard shipments to obtain the total annual dose to persons traveling along the route in the same direction as the shipment.

D-13

REFERENCE D.I. U. S. Atomic Energy Agency, "Environmental Survey of Transportation of Radioactive Materials to and from Nuclear Power Plants," WASH-1238, December 1972.

D-14

APPENDIX E DEMOGRAPHIC MODEL',

E. I INTRODUCTION The analyses of both the normal and accident transport risks depend on the population density, i.e., the average number of people per unit area' Because population densities vary greatly, three' different population density zones corresponding roughly to urban, suburban, and rural areas were considered. The average population densities assigned to'each were determined from 1970 census data (Ref. E-l).

Accnrding to the '1970 census definition, urban population comprises all persons in places of 2;500 or more inhabitants, but not those living'in rural portions of extended cities. Urban areas contain 73.5 percent of the total population.

E.2 URBANIZED AREAS The Census Bureau has delineated so-called "urbanized areas" to provide a better separation of urban and rural populhtlon in the vicinities of the larger cities. An urbanized area consists of a central city with 50,000' or more inhabitants ani"surrounding'closely-settled territory.

Areas of large non-residential tracts devoted to such urban land uses as railroad yards, airports, factories, parks, golf courses, and cemeteries are excluded in computing the population density.

2 2 The average population'denslty in urbanized areas is 1,303/km (3,375/mi ); 31.5 percent of the total population live within the central cities of urbanized areas, and 26.8 percent live in the urban frinqe', for a total of 58.3 percent living inside urbanized areas.'

Urbanized areas such as Columbus,^ Ohio; Memphis. Tennessee; New'Haven, Connecticut; San Antonio, Texas; and Wilmington, Delaware,- hive population densities higher than-the. average, while Atlanta, Georgia; Dallas, Texas; Des Moines, Iowa; and Bridgeport, Connecticut, have population densities lower than the average.

The average urban 'housing -area 2consists' of'four to five housing -units per acre or'about 3,861 p~rsons/km2 (O,000 persons/ii )j If -this value' for urban population density is assumed and 54 percent of the urbanized area ojpulaton'livein' the central city, .18.2 percent of the urbanized area is occupied by'the central -ct.*- This assumptt6n forces an assumed density of 719 persons/km for the so-called urban fringe. These two densities were selected to represent 2

the urban and suburban population densities throughout the country.

E.3 OTHER URBAN AREAS About' 15.2 percent 'of the total-populationi live" in areas 'that are classified as urban, but, that are outside the urbanized areas in and ar-ound the larger cities.- The average ýpopulation 2 density zones.

density in these areas Is taken to be 719 persons/km , as in suburban population

E.4 RURAL AREAS Rural areas, which contain 98.5 percent of the land area (approximately 3.5 million square miles) and 26.5 percent of the total population (approximately 50 million people), have an 2

average population density of 6 persons/km . This figure was selected to represent rural areas.

E.5 EXTREME-DENSITY URBAN AREAS Certain cities have population densities far in excess of the average value for urbanized areas. An analysis of population- densities, of cities, each having a total population of more than 100,000 persons, indicated that there were: I 2

1. 98 cities with a population density less than 1,930/km (5,000/mi2);

2

2. 37 cities with a population density between 1,930 and 3,861/km2 (5,000 - 10,000/m12);

3. 10 cities with a population density between 3,861 and 5,792/km2 (10,000 - 15,000/mi 2 );

4. 7 cities with a population density between 5,792 and 7,722/km (15,000 - 20,000/mi );

2 2 (20,000 - 25,000/mi );

5. 0 cities with a population density between 7,722 and 9,653/km and 2

6. 1 city (New York City) with a population density greater than 9,653/km .

In each of these cases,,the population density was determined by dividing the total population in the city by the land area enclosed by the city limits. Two additional points were noted:

1. New York City is clearly in a class by itself..2 The most densely populated borough is persons/km (67,808/mi2)

Manhattan, with a population density 6f, 26,188

2. Cities with the larger population det..,ities are not always the cities with the larger total populations. For example, Los Angeles, California, with a total population of 2,816,000, 2

has a population density- of 2,345/km , while Paterson, New Jersey, with a total population or 2

145,000, has a population density of 6,657/km , almost three times as great as that of Los Angeles.

The risks associated with the transportation of radioactive material through areas of very high population density are currently being evaluated ina follow-on study. In tne current report, the consequences of a severe accident.within such an area are evaluated for certain worst-case isotopeg and are presented along with an estimate of the probability of occurrence.

rhe annual risk estimates for all radioactive material transport, however, are made using the' 2

average values of 3,861, 719, and 6 persons/km E.6

SUMMARY

AND CONCLUSIONS For the purposes of this assessment, the 1970 census data were reducedto a nationwide model that specified three population zones - urban, suburban, and rural. The fraction of total land area, fraction of total. population, and associated population densities for each of E-2

I I 2

the population zones are shown in Table E-1. A population density of 15,444 persons/km was used to represent an extremely dense urban area in the worst-case accident analysis in Chapter 5.

ý 1 15.1 11 -. , I-E-3

a TABLE E-1 TABULAR

SUMMARY

OF DEMOGRAPHIC MODEL Population Fraction Fraction Population Density Zone of Land Area of Population (persons/km2 )

A. Urbanized Area .0098 .583 1303

1. Central city .0018 .315 3861

2. Urban fringe .008 .268 719 B. Other Urban Areas .0053 .152 719 C. Rural Areas .985 .265 6 D. Demographic Model Used in This Assessment

1. Urban (A.1) .0018 .315 3861

2. Suburban (A.2+B) .013 .42 719

3. Rural (C) .985 .265 6

4. Extreme density urban - - 15444 E-4

I REFERENCE E-1. "Statistical Abstracts of the United States 1974" (95th Edition), U.S. Department of Commerce Social and Economic Statistics Division; U.S. Bureau of the Census.

E-5

APPENDIX F INCIDENTS REPORTED TO DOT INVOLVING RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL FROM 1971 THROUGH 1974 materials that This Appendix contains a list of the 98 incidents invoiving radioactive through 1974. The data, were'reported to the U.S." Department of Transportation (DOT) from 1971 Reports. A tabulated in Table ;-l, were obtained from the DOT Hazardous Materials Incident sample of the DOT reoort form is presented as Figure F-i.

(e.g.,

Columns 1 and 2 of Table F-1 describe the material involved for each incident the 5-digit code for R.A.M.N.O.S. - Radioactive Material '- Not Otherwise Specified) and give was shipped, as that material. Columns 3 and 4 describe the packaging in which the material nature of the packaging failure "obtained-from Item G on Figure F-1. Columns 5 and 6 list the 8 show the number of from the 15 possibilities listed on Item F of Figure F-1. Columns 7 and

_Column 9 shows the failed containers and.the total number, of containers in the shipment.-

the special permit

--special permit number obtained from Item G.30- on Figure F-1. - Column 9 shows riport'number: the number' obtained from Item G.30 on Figure F-]. Column 10 gives the incident (e.g., 4.$..'-refers to firrst digWt*is the last digit of the year in'which the incident occurred The remaining five 1974), and the second and third digits refer to the month of the incident.

digits codify the report within the month.

F-i -~

TABLE F-1 INCIDENTS REPORTED TO DOT INVOLVING RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS (SORTED BY REPORT NUMBERS)

COM4ODITY CODE CONT I CO0IT 2 FAILIJPF 1. FAILURE 2 4 FAIL 4 SHIP SP NO. REPORT NO.

RCDI'ACTIVE MATFRIA OS93i nRIJN MTL EXT PUNCT OTHER 0 2 SP6000 1020027A ZIPCONIU4 SCqAP(BOR 11150 oflnY-SlOE OTHER 1 1 010*014A U'iKN 11141.) TANK CAR 41044*40004 i '1 La19QIJ OUFS N41#940404# 0 10400134 UNKN 10007 OPUM MTL - "OTHER *MUIEUl#0I 1 . *441 l0qO8l1A RADIOACTIVE DISVICFS RADIOACTIVE DEVICES Oq9l0 LOPSE FVC 11003764 RADIOACTIVE DATERIA 05010 BOX WOOD FXT PUNCT' OTHEP 1 4' SP5248 1!10102A RADIOACTIVE MAfTRIA 08930 CONT LO *U0UI6IUI/ "1 410104110 0 21 1120!73A RADIOACTIVE MATARIA C4930 OTHER 2 2010124A Cq 30 RADIOACTIVE 4TATERI CYL MTL BOX WOOD LOOSE FVC 20101374 RADIOACTIVE MATERIA C14T PLS UU4##eeagaii 1 29 2010193A RADIOACTIVE MATERIA 18930 CONT LO BOX FBR DROPPED 2020138A FISSILE RADONACTIVE 08940 MUellla#MUMU, 0 203%1127A RADIOACTIVE S A TFRIV 05110 DRUM MTL EXT PUNCT, ueeeea~ei~aa 1 61" " 20401184 RADIOACTIVE MATSRIA 0a930 POX WOOD OTHER 41' 2040228A RADIOACTIVE MTATERI 08930 TUP! GLS TUBE FBR CROPPED 444090000# 2 2 2950044A O'QZO TANK TRK RA401ACTIVE TATERIA EXT PUNCT FREEZING 1 20701204 RAD1IACTIVE MATERIA LINR PLS DRUM MTL INT PRESS CRPR-RUST 1 2070311A I RADIOACTIVE WATEPIA CYL MTL ?A OTHER 0e4144641e 1 105 24T70390A RADIOACTIVE MATERIA 08933 BOX WOOD OTHER FRT 0#04404000 1 1 208onnlA RADIOACTIVE MATFPIA 08930 17' IPINER REC BOTTO4 1 2090377A 08933 RADIOACTIVE MTATERI CYL MTL LOOSE FVC' IU4100EI0VU 1 1 21O3BO9A OI"20 74 RADIOACTIVE MTATERI BOX MTL BOX WOOD EXT HEATc' IMONa NiE401 4 21003934 RADIOACTIVE TATERIA 05920 WELD MUU1I#0flU S7 21201 6A 17S 1 1 21 4

RADIOACTIVE MATFRIA 09930) DRU4 MTL OTHER FRT LOOSE FVC 0 101 2120264A RADIMACTIVE MATERIA 09930 Dqojm MTL OTHER FRT LOOSE FVC 4 10 30101164 RADIOACTIVE MrATEPI 08930 PAIL *4TL OEF FVC LOOSE FVC 22 2 30102624 qRADIO NqOAS I SAG PPR fXT PUNCT 1K 30300984 08930 CAN iTL BOX FBR PD oknPpCr 1 ReAeMe NoeoSo 303930 1 30712I4A 21C EXT-PUNCT BOTTOM 1 30702704 R*A.N. SMALL OUANTY 09940 ROTL GLS 21C 4 OTHER FRTV 30805"0A RoA.'4 LOW SPEC ACT DRUM MTL COQR-RUST' 21 31MO029A 08910 03920 CYL MTL 125 DROPPED BOTTOM I 1 3'00274A RoA.*I LPW SPEC ACT I?7 DPOPPED 1 53 311O05OA RADIOACTIVE DEVICES O0910 POX FOR OTHER LID 1 1 3110179A ReAeMs LOW SPEC ACT 08020 1?" EXT PUNCT 2 79 3120045A RA.e, LOW SPEC ACT 03920 nRUM NTL CORR-RUST BODY-SIDE 1 621 4020.81A RADIOACTIVE DEVICES J8910 8JX WOOD OTHER FRT OTHER I 1 L020263A ReA*N. N.O.Se 03910 CAN MTL 21C OTHFR t 1 4020IQ44 P.A*M. N.0eS. 04930 BLANK BOTTOM BODY-SIDE 1 I 40?00984 R*A*M* NoO*S* 1 R.AoM. P4.0.5.

TA DROPPED OTHER 1 4030170A 05930 WATER 6 03930 BOX FPq 0 4030232A R.Ao.I N.O.S. BLANK OTHER 1 40303094 0 0 08030 nRUN MTL EXT PUNCT OTHER 2 4030476A Ro.A.M. LOW SPEC ACT 08020 TANK PRT OTHER 0 13 4040129A R@AoM, N*O0S. 08930 CAN MTL OTHER I 1 1 4040132A R*A*Mo NO@S* 03930 CAN MTL OTHER 1 1 40401328 R*Aoeq N*O*Se 1 RoA*oq NO9S*

08930 55 OTHER 'EXT PUNCT 0 12 40404034 08930 t28 DROPPED 12 4040404A R*Ao~o NOoSO 0$930 ?A DROPPED 4050132A V .d

¶ . 5 44 - 4 oo t a c --

d w 4 0---oO 0 0< o4 0

4 00 00 C0 C4 n 0 0 0 0 0 -4.4 v.-1 4 .4 .4444q ý o C# 4.t. 0 044 . C0 0C 0C440 IL ~IIL IL

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I DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION F- Appi-od OMB He AS613 HAZARDOUS MATERIALS INCIDENT REPORT - ' ,

INSTRUCTIONSt Submit this report in duplicate to the Secreta*y. Hazardous Materials Regulations Board.

Transportatlon. Washington. D.C. 20590. (ATTN: Op. Dliv.. Department of If space provided for my item Is inadequatie. complete that item under Section H. "Remarks" key'ing to the entry number being completed. Copies of this form.

may be obtained from the Secretary. Hasardous Materials RegulsUons Board. Additional copies in in limited quantitell, this prescuibed format may be reprociced and used. if on die some size med kind of paper.

-t A4 INCIDENTI I. TYPE OF OPERATION EIGHT OTHER IE) AIR a HIGHWAY 30 RAIL '- WATER ,0FORWARDER 6E(Ideity

2. DATE AND TIME OF INciDENT 70"s~h - Day - Ter~) I*LOCATION OF INCIDENT

REPORTING CAIIRIERI COMPANY OR INDIVIDUAL StN~oo. City.

.M~m kor. anld Zip Code')

$1eaft ST DDR ESS (

' 4. FULLNAME S. TYPE OF VEHICLE OR FACIUTY C SHIPMENT INFORMATION

7. NAME AND ADDRESS OF SHIPPER (Or..n oddee) . . NAME AND ADDRESS OF CONSIGNEE (Deeiinml0- ad4-...)

9. SNIPPING PAPER IDENTIFICATION NO. I0. SHIPPING PAPERS ISSUED BY

- .CARRIER : O'SHIPPER ID OTHER ,,

(i denIIyjF DEATHS. INJURIES, LOSS AND DAMAGE DUE TO HAZARDOUS MATERIALS INVOLVED 13. ESTIMATED AMOUNT OF LOSS AND/OR NUME[R ERSONS INJURED Ii. NUMMER PIERSONS KILLED PROPERTY DAMAGE' INCLUDING COST IO DECONTAMINATION (Rme-d .i in

14. ESTIMATED TOTAL QUANTITY OF HAZARDOUS MATERIALS RELEASED E HAZARDOUS MATERIALS INVOLVED 9I. CLASSIFICATION.- . 1. SNIPPING-NAME I7.' TRADE NAME

,( S e e. 1 7 2 . 4) . " " - " ( Se e . 1 7 2 . 5)

. . .. . . . o - ' - , ' .- -. '.. S..

F NATURE OF PACKAGING FAILURE -* .-+ .. .

Ia. (Cf *Jr el 6l.140lo aec..)

IS) DROPPED IN HANDLING - 131 EXTERNAL,-PUNCTURE IM 13) DAMAGE BY OTHER FREIGHT 143 WATERt DAMAGE IN DAMAGE FROM OTHER LIQUID 16) FREEZING

17) EXTERNAL HEAT 4(0) INTERNAL PRESSUREN" (I) CORROSION OR RUST 10,DEFECTIVE FITTINGS.. u11 LOOSE FITTINGS. VALVES OR 112 FAILURE OF INNER VALVES, OR CLOSURES CLOSURES ., RECEIPTACLES (INl OTTOM FAIL.URE 141 SlODg UAILURILURE (IN WELD FAILURE I IN CHIME FAILURE I 17MOTHER CONDITIONS (ifEtilp) 19. $PACE FOR DOT USe ONLY tmi 9 1 T 511100. 1 (10-70)

FIGURE F-1. HAZARDOUS MATERIALS INCIDENT REPORT F-4 --'

I G PACKAGING INFORMATION .1!...o.. nc,.anl-- -r p. packagin I. M-nlvsd In '-a& o mIa"risl show peckaging informarion oopamtrtly for "ch. lt mom, &o. is n.dadd. ias. Section K -- pos .3k..

helow, kerino th. it nb-r.

ITEM II 52 *3 TYPE OP PACKAGING INCLUDING INNER 20 RECEPTACLES (St..I *r.., woodn boa.

cyitndar. ft.*

CAPACITY OR WEIGHT PER UNIT Si (SS ga.loJI. 45 1b... etc.)

NUMBER OF PACKAGES FROM WHICH 22 MATERIAL ESCAPED NUMBER Of PACKAGES OF SAME TYPE ZS IN SHIPMENT DOT SPECIFICATION NUMBERIS) ON 24 PACKAGES (2IP. IrE. AA. .4c.. or none)

SNOW ALL OTHER DOT PACKAGING V 2S MARKINGS (Pert 178) 21 NAME. SYMBOL. OR REGISTRATION HUM BER OP PACKAGING MANUFACTURER SHOW SERIAL NUMBER OF CYLINDERS.

57 CARGO TANKS. TANK CARS, PORTABLE TANKS ZS TYPE DOT LIABELISI APPLIED SEGISTRATION IP RECONDITIONED NO. OR SYMBOL R DATE OF LAST 558 TEST OP INSPEC.

REQUALIPIED, SHOW TION IF SHIPMENT IS UNDER DOT OR USCG 30 SPECIAL PERMIT. ENTER PERMIT NO.

.. . ... -_. - -*.- -.. L .* .. ,.a, ar... mA..... r.nb~lh.e auae, atnwanf S..

H REMARKS

Describe essential facts of incident including but not ..... a.e. ,-. .. .

action taken at the time discovered. and action taken to prevent future incidents. Include any recommendationswhen to improve submitted packSging, handling. or transportation of hazardous materials. Photographs and diagrams should be pecessary for clarification.

31. NAME OF PERSON PREPARING REPORT (TYPe -t print) 32. SIGNATURE

34. DATE REPORT PREPARED 3S. TELEPHONE NO. (Jnclude Area Code)

Reverse of Form DOT F S900.1 (10-70) CPO INToOa - oX 376 FIGURE F-1 (continued)

F-5

I APPENDIX G CALCULATION METHODOLOGY FOR ACCIDENT ANALYSIS The methodology used to compute annual, early fatalities and latent cancer fatalities resulting from accidents involving shipments of radioactive material is presented in detail in Reference G-I. The procedures are outlined in this Appendix.

G.I. COMPUTATION OF ANNUAL EARLY FATALITY PROBABILITY The technique for computing annual ea'rly fatality probability is illustrated in Figure G-1.

Initially, the average dose received by individuals within a given isodose area is computed for each radionuclide in each accident severity category:

(G-l)

Oi,j,k = (ni)(RFj,k)(AERi)(RESPi)(Ei)(RPCi)(DF) where average dose received in the area(rem) index over radionuclides index over the accident severity categories index over the package types .

n curies per shipment (Ci) -

RF release fraction ....... ..

AER =

--- -aerosolized fraction RESP fraction of aerosolized material of respirable dimensfon in reference mixture E= particle size distribution factor*

RPC = dose per curie inhaled (rem/Ct)

DF = ailution factor (This value includes the effects of a 0.01 m/sec deposition velocity.)

The appropriate-dose-response relationship '(see Chapter 3) is then used to determine the probability of early fatality for each exposed individual. This is shown as block 6 on Figure G-1. Once the individual probability per exposure has been computed, a combination of binomial and Poisson statistics is used to'compute the probability of a given number of early fatalities within a given isodose area:

-o _ _k (*ie )*, (G-2)

.- ~~~ Pj

()lkQ~~

RThis factor accounts for potential variation in particle size between the aerosol used for reference for the rem-per-curie value and the actual aerosol being shipped. In the analysis in Chapter 5, a respirability of 0.24 is used for rem-per-curie reference and a value of 0.11 was obtained from an industry survey. Hence;'E=O;46. ,

G-1,

a (4)

(5)

(7).

Splcific No. of (13)

Early Fatalities (1 ly Of a'*

trobill fpntrift. Of (12) 'rlyFatalities (14)

Severity Accidlent -

, (IS) -- Input Informatlon

.I (15)

FIGURE G-1.. FLOW CHART FOR EARLY FATALITY CALCULATION (17)

I ,

- o C.

(ii)

G-2

P(k) = probability of k early fatalities i = predicted number of people in specific isodose area P = individual probability of early fatality when exposed to a given dose 1

A = expected number of people in isodose area (product of area and average population density)

Using a Taylor expansion, Equatior (G-2) can be reduced to k (G-3)

P(k) =

which is in the form of aPoisson distribution with parameter APl1 where P(k) is the probability of k early fatalities assuming that an accident does,-occur., This value must now be combined with the annual probability of an accident of specific severity, in the specific population density zone involving a specific mode of transport:

P(k)iJ,k,1 =(P ik) (Iacc)iJ.,l) (G-4) where P(acc)i,j,k,l = annual probability of ith severity accident in jth population density zone involving kth radionuclide -being shipped by the lth mode combination ,

P(k)ik = P(k) from Equation (G-3)

The annual accident rate for accidents of a given severity is computed as follows:

'iijik,1 =-

[(A. 1op ( l, p fI;J;1;p

)((N 'MSkI,j ,I "')

- : ' (G-5)

+ [(1,s 1,*1, where [Pl~s)(rli.l,s)(6iJd~l.0) Pk~l)(FNP'k,l~s)]

hJ,k,l "accidentsper year of 4th severity in jth population density zone for kth

. radionuclide'transported by lth *mode combination.:-_

p ='contribution from primary mode - *-:- .

s = contribution from secondary mode "APM1, = overall accident rate for lth mode primar vehicle -.

ni,1 = fraction of lth mode combination accidents that are of severity I 8

i,j,l = fraction of ith severity accidentswith lth mode combination in Jth population SPY k,1h density zone m'o d c ombin ati o~n kl = shipments per year of kth radionuclide by Ith . de...m.a.

FMPSk,1 = distance per shipment for kth radionuclide by Ith'Mi6de combination P(acc) is obtained by using the Poisson distribution on yij,kl.from Equation (G-5).

The assumption is now made that fatality-producing transpothti on'a6c idents involving radioactive material- shipments are statistically independent'-on an'annual basis:" 'This -allows the use of~the Boolean identity It should be noted that the Poisson approximation for the probability of a given number of people in an isodose'area combined with the binomial dose-effect relationship over predicts fatality probability for small yvalues of X. L, G

U P(AUBUC) = 1 - P(A)PO)(t) (G-6) where P(M) = the Boolean complement of P(A),

to combine fatality probabilities over all severity categories, population density zones, mode combinations, and materials.

"Thus, the annual probability of a specific number of early fatalities from a given radio nuclide, shipped by a'given mode combination 'in a gTven population density zone, over all accident severity categories is given by:

8 Pjk,l = 1.0 - (1 - P1 ) (G-7) 1=1 where I = index over accident severity categories P1 = P(k)igj,kl computed in Equation (G-4) j = index over the population density zones k= index over the radionuclides 1 = index over the mode combinations for specific radionuclide This technique is used to combine results for the population density zones and mode combina tions for each atmo pherically dispersed radionuclide. that can produce a sufficient dose to cause an early fatality. -, ,

Some sourcesiof whole-body external penetrating radiation~also have the potential for,:,

be providing sufficient dose to cause early-fatalities. ,-The number ofthese. fatalities can computed using the following formula for the dose rate at a distance r from this type of source:

).

(G-8)

(5597.2)WnL(E){e Pr)(

S=

r-where DR(r) = dose rate at r (rem/hr) .

n=curtes of material (Ci) ,. ..

E = energy of photons (MeV) 1 P= energý attenuation' oefficient (0.00393 1(0.00118 ft )) "

.. ,,r distance,tosource.()a-) , .- ,.;: -

B(r) = Berger buildup factor (0.00018r+ 1) (dimensionless, r in meters) and'4.5MeV.

This result is most accurate for photon energies between approximately O.25iMeV Outside those ranges, the values for p, 8(r) and the numerical constant would need to be adjusted (Refs.-G-2" d G-3). The method of computing results for.this type of source is ver similar*

inFigure G-2. ,." .

to that useL or atmospherically dispersed sources and is illustrated G-4

I Radi of (1)

Interest MNaterial (3)

Annular Areas (2) Dose (7)

Characteristics; S Block (8) on Figure G-1,,* ,*

Odvdual S(5) ( pecific" of" d Probabilit -Curve 1Dose-Respoxnse (6)

Iq Blc(9) r , Input Data FIGURE G-2. EARLY FATALITY COPUTATION FLOW DIAGRAM FOR EERNA POENTRATING RADIATION SOURCES

- - ~.A.4rC.r %

I .x-6-5

- I The results of computation for all potentially fatal exposure sources and for all potentially fatal atmospherically dispersed sources can now be combined to give the annual probability of a specific number of early fatalities from transportation accidents involving all radionuclides shipped. This is given by:

n P=1.0 - n (1 - P1 ) (G-9) 1=1 where 1 = index over the radionuclides shipped n = number of radionuclides shipped that can produce a sufficient dose to cause early fatalities "P1= probability combined over'severities,'population density zones,' and mode combinations G.2 COMPUTATION OF LATENT CANCER FATALITIES DUE TO'AIRBORNE RELEASES FROM ACCIDENTS The method for computing annual latent cancer fatalities (LCF) froi accidents is illus troted in Figure G-3. Initially, the accident rate for each of the eight severity categories for each mode combination in each population zone is computed:

class h accidents =ý.)JIp I-)~Py ~ MS year -,j,k,1 ,p ],, , ,1 k,1, (G-1O)

](A ,),.sX,0 q k1s

+ [(Als(6ils)i 1,5)(~~ k MlSX" k~l,s)]

where i = index over t'.he accident severity categories j = index over the population zones k = index over the radionuclides shipped 1 = index over the transport mode combinations p = primary mode contribution s = secondary mode contribution X1 = total accidents per unit distance for lth transport mode combination 8

j,1 = fraction of class i accidents in jth population density zone for lth mode X1 = class h accident fraction for ith transport mode SPYk.1 = shipments per year for kth radionuclide by lth mode FMPSkl = distance per shipment for kth radionuclide by lth mode The number determined using Equatiofr, (GiO4). is: the- annual' accident- rate for a specific severity accident, occurring in a specific population density zone, involving a specific radio nuclide, shipped by a specific mode combination.

This must now be combined with the integrated organ dose resulting from a given atmospheric release of material. This dose is computed for a single exposure to the nth organ from the kth radionuclide involved in a category h accident in the jth population density zone.

(IF) (DF) (PDj XRDFI) (G-1

Jckn = (cik)(PPSk) (RFk) (AERk) (RESPk) (RpCn,)

G-6

'I Hilo of Specific 'II *Accident lRate Severity in . (peril.Ie)

M lSpecific= Pop. Zone-='

Seveity a Model Akccident '* " * ,

Rate.

Characteristics

,* l Amount of Material Released specific organ from lohec Specific Nuclidle In Dispersion specific Accident .. .model (EquatiJon 33)"

(*

Cofine ever Soverittes,

Equation 13, 1od"s,-Zones. Nuclides M ,

lExpected Annual . ,:..

Dose to Specific UF ContributionOra C From Each Organ i, Coefficients Equation 14 Combine Over All Organs FIGURE 'G-3. FLOW* CHART FOR

'* LATENT CANCER

- Input Information Epce Annual : "' " FATALITY CALCULATI'ON U.F due to Accidents ] ,' ""- ", -

G-7

I where Cik = curies per package for the kth radionuclide PPSk = packages.of the kth radionuclt de per shipment RFk,h = release fracton for an h severity accident involving a package used to ship the kth radionuclide AERk = percent of released amount of kth radionuclide that is aerosol ized RESPk = percent of aerosolized amount of kth radionuclide material that is of a respirable size RPCkn = rem per curie (inhaled) delivered to nth organ by kth radionuclide IF= integration factor over designated area OF = dilution factor PD = population density E = particle size distribution factor (see Equation (G-l))

RDFt = resuspension dose factor (This value includes a resuspension factor of 10°5 ."1 and isevaluated for each isotope.)

The IF ano DF values are obtained from appropriate meteorological data, and the E and RPC values are obtained from appropriate dosimetric data. -.

The total integrated organ dose per year to the nth organ from the ith severity class of accidents for the lth transport mode with the kth radionuclide in the Jth population density zone can now be specified by:

Dose/yriij~k ln = (¥', 1) (8ioj)(sPYk.1) (FNPSk,l) (#jln) (G-12) where i = index over accident severity categories J = index over population density zones k= index over radionuclides 1= index over transport mode combinations n = index over organs ........

(A,y, 8, are variables from Equation (G-10))

By summing the values determined in Equation (G-12) over all modes of transportation, all accident severity categories, all population density zones, and all transported radionuclides, the total annual dose to the nth organ for all clasises of accident is obtained.

r' s t uI Dose Dose/yr Ve-ars

-n L..

=1 j=l Ek1l 1=1 ijE~ ~ ,(

where r= number"of.accident severity categories s = number of population density zones t = number of transported radionuclides -.. ..

u = number of transport mode combinations .

n = index over organs ,...

G-8

Once the total annual organ doses are computed, they are converted to expected latent cancer fatalities using the LCF coefficients discussed in Chapter 3.

v LCF = K (Dose/year)n (G-14) n1l n,,

where LCF = expected latent cancer fatalities Kn = latent cancer fatality coefficient for nth organ --

n = index over organs v = number of organs G.3 COMPUTATION OF LATENT CANCER FATALITIES FROM EXTERNAL EXPOSURE SOURCE Certain transported radioactive materials are not readily dispersible by virtue of their packagings (e.g., special form packages) or their chemical or physical form (e.g., nonvolatile components of spent reactor fuel or radiography source capsules). These materials may, however, provide a significant point source of external penetrating radiation. The integrated dose from shipments of this type (based on a 1-hour exposure) is given by:

ID= C K n E T PD (I n e-pr B(r)d)r (G-15) where ID = integrated population exposure (person-rem) 2 2 C = units conversion constant (rem/arem x km /ft = 9.3 x 10-11)

K = 5597.2 (see Equation G-8) n = curies per package (Ci)

E = photon energy (MeV)

T = exposure time (assumed to be 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months ) 2 PD = population density (persons/kI )

x = minimum distance from source to populated zone (assumed to be 3 meters) d = maximum distance over which exposure is assumed to occur (assumed to be 780 meters)

The similarity between this and the "Dose while stopped" in Appendix D is intentional.

When the integral is evaluated for the given limits and the expression is simplified, the result Is:

ID = 1.4183 x 10-5 (n)(EXPD) (G-16)

Once the integrated dose is determined, the LCF coefficient of 121.6 per 106 person-rem is applied to predict the latent cancer fatalities. This value is then combined with the LCF foi dispersion calculations to give a total expected annual LCF.

G-9 -*-

- I REFERENCES G-i. J. M. Taylor and S. L. Daniel, "RADTRAN: A computer code to analyze transportation of radioactive material," SAND-76-0243, Sandia Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM, April 1977.

G-2. S. Glasstone and A. Sesonske, Nuclear Reactor Eng9neerlng,,Van Nostrand Reinhold Company, New York; 1967.

G-3. U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, "Environmental Survey of Transportation of Radioactive Materials to and from Nuclear Power Plants," WASH-1238, December 1972.

o .

.Jr-.

.-. J

'V .24, 1.

F S2

' " * *,, * . ÷, ° * - * * ; - * .-* o* q: l. , t . * *t * ' ** ',I- -f ,

G-10 "

°I APPENDIX H METHOD FOR DERATING ACCIDENT SEVERITY CATEGORIES 5ire based in an The accident severity categories for aircraft presented in Chapter energy available for equivalent drop height mpact onto an unyielding surface as a measure of as shown on Figuri'5-2.

container defo'rmation. This can be expressed in terms of impact velocity results in package The actual damage'°mechanism, however, is the abrupt deceieration that defomati on.

tests at Sandia Labora One "unyielding" surface that has been used in shipping container slab of rein tories (Ref. H-1) is a 10-centimeter-thick sheet of steel over a 4.5-meter-thick approaches this criterion forced concrete. However, a very small fraction of the earth's surface for being unyielding.

'* _ _'vedn, naayi -. a unyielding. .

To quantify the extent to which surfaces are unyielding, an analysis was to those'experienced onto an performed to relate the* impact Mvelocities on real elastic surfaces unyielding surface in terms of Poisson's ratio and Young's modulus of elasticity.'

an elastic half plane Consider an infinitely rigid sphere (E = m) being dropped onto in Reference H-2 as:

(E < a-). The maximum displacement of the half plane is given v 2~2/5 a n( _ ) (H-l) where a = displacement of half plane m = mass of sphere R = radius of sphere E = Young's modulus of half plane v = Poisson ratio for half plane v = impact velocity of sphere value of deceleration can If sinusodial behavior of the half plane is assumed, the maximum be derived:

2

[ 16] 2/5 (H-2) nmax 0.1157w V6 / 5 for a given value of If steel is used as an "unyielding" target, the equivalent velocity for both the unyielding target deceleration can be found by solving Equation (H-2) for velocity this is done, the following relation and the real target at the same value of deceleration. If ship is obtained:

H-1l-

a (H-3)

Vsteel ILVSJ.] 4 eldngs

] =[ -"-vs2- 1/3 Table H-1 shows a breakdown of,actual surface'occurrence probabilities in the United States (based on air carrier routes) together with surface properties. Values computed for V/Vs are shown for each surface type.,

The ratio of velocities shown in Table H-1 was used to evaluate the Joint probability of experiencing an accident of a given severity and having it occur on a surface of given hardness.'

The result is a "derating system" that shifts accidents that have velocities typical of a Class VIII accident, for example, to a lower severity class tyical of an impact velocity given by V =VobservedAV/Vs) (H-4)

For example, a hard rock impact (V/Vs = 2.21) has a probability of 0.05. Applying the 2.21 factor to a velocity typical of a Class VIII accident gives an effective velocity of 507 km/hr (1127/2.21), which is in the, Class VII accident severity category. As a result, 5% of the Class VIII accidents are reassigned to Class VII due to impacts on hard rocks. A similar procedure is used for all other surfaces. The procedure is shown explicitly in Table 11-2.

- .'~ .

H-2

TABLEH-1 "CALCULATED PROBABILITIES AND CHARACTERISTICS OF SURFACES UNDER FLIGHT PATHS BETWEEN MAJOR U.S. AIR HUBS (Ref. H-3)

Poisson 's surfaceYoung' Modulus-E (pascal) 'Ratio Syrface Tye Example______ 1 Probability E ____ ___

V/wy 0.5 4.48 Wter Witer, marsh 0.18 1.5 x 10 SOft SOil; Sand, cultivated 8 0.2 7.05 soil 0.28 6.9 x 10 Hard Soil Partially con- 9 0.3 3;.37 solidated clay 0.39' 5.52 x 10

'aF SoftRocki Tuff, alluvium 10 0.2" 2.53

sandstone 0.09 1.38x 101 0.2 2.21 Hard Rock, Granite, gneiss 0.05 2.07 x 10

-Unyielding' ,Abutments, .... "- 0.33 1'.0 steel 0.01 2.07,x 0I 3

A 1-percent unyielding surface has been added to the information in Reference to'add conservatism. - .

I Ow

TABLE H-2 DETAILED DERATING SCHEME

£ 11 111 IV V Impact Surface Contribution rtaction of accL idast Severity yrretio of &ccJ. Zsiqvalent impact rtotLon deleted Frgaction rsy due Of fraction to to rraction Added dents -Lthseverity As""n Cato"" dents with dimeia ta g1ves severity velocity onto an from category as a unyielding surface result of derails rng surface to Cato-unyield- cateqory added as a result of derating l8hon in given category (based t ;o (baed fii e 0t5 rrby source category hard soft hard soft upon real surfaces)

= hlot .. toupon alk [or ht) kilosetor/hE rock rock moll &oil water "uyielding surface) witZ 0.02, 404-1121 0.0291 0.0000. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0001 VII 0.04 306-004 0.0)39 0.0004 Vll - .0042 0.0015 .0027 0 0 0 0.0046 VIll - 0.01:1 0 0 0.0117 0 0004.014 VI 0.03 225-06 0.0217 0.0003 VII - 0.00 0.001 0 0 0 0 VIII

0.0014 0 0 0 0.000l 0 "5*

0 v 0. 129-22S 0.0291 0.0003 VII - 0.0192 0 0.0030 0.0150 0 0 0.0271 VI - 0.0 0 0 0 0 0 Vill - 0.0 0 0 0 0 0 VII - 0.0072 0 0 0 0 0.0070 IV 0.00 19-120 0.0405 0.000*i - 0.001S 0.0010 0 0 0 0 0 0V-0.01 0.0015 0 0 0 0 VIII - 0.0 0 0 0 0 0 vil - 0.0112 0 0 0 0.0112 0

.091 0.0000 VI - 0.0144 0 0.0027 0.0117 0 0 0.0434 II0 0.00 41-11 V - 0.0144 0 0.00217 0.0111 0 0 IV -0.0025 .0025 0 0 0 0 VIII 0.0 0 0 0 0 0 Vi- 0.0 0 0 0 0 0 VI 0.0130 0 0 0 0.0004 0.0004 0.8937 1, a00 N ctegorieS v - 0.01)0 0 0 0 0.0004 0.0054 1". II not dereted IV - 0.0410 0 , 0.0045 0.0115 0.014 0.00O III - 0.00, 1 0.0045 0.0001 0.0351 0.0212 0.0162

REFERENCES H-I. L. L. Bonzon, H. McWhirter, "Special Tests of Plutonium Shipping Containers," IAEA-SR-10/21, International Atomic Energy Seminar on Radioactive Material Packaging and Transportation, Vienna, Austria, August 1976.

H-2. S. P. Timoshenko, J. N. Goodien; Elasticity Theory, McGraw-Hill, 1970.

H-3. D. W. Larson, R. K. Clarke, J. T. Foley, and W. F. Hartman, "Severities of Transportation Accidents - Volume II - Aircraft (SLA74-O001)," Sandia Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM, September 1975.

H-5

I APPENDIX I SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS

1.1 INTRODUCTION

This appendix contains -an analysis of the-sensitivity of the risk assess'ment presented in this document to some of the 'parameters used in the calculation. It'should be noted from the outset that this is neither an error analysis nor a full parametric-study. The purpose of this analysis is simjly'to determine how s'ensitive the calculation is to so-me of the mo re important parameters.' Since values'chosen for many of these parameters were based on certain assumptions,"

the results' of -this parameter study should help'to indicate the sensitivity "of this assessment-to those assumptions. The parameters considered are divided into three categories: fundamental parameters, general parameters, and shipment parameters. The fundamental parameters are those included in both the normal and accident calculations or used throughout'o.ne o f these two calcu lations. The fundamental parameters include the population densities and the meteorological parameters. General parameters `arei those parameters 'included in part-of either of the two calculatio'ns. 'Examples are release'fract'ions for a specific package'type and average velocities.

Shipment'paramete-rs are those determined from thIe 1975 survey data.' 'They include the'average curies per package, distance per shipment, and TI per package. In the following sections, the' sensitivity of the calculation to each of these three parameter types is discussed.

1.2 SENSITIVITY OF ANALYSIS TO'FUNDAMENTAL PARAMETERS .--'-' ,

The"sensitivity of the assessment to fundamental parameters is measured by the change in the annual risk (either the normal or' accident "c'omponents),when'the value of the parameter-is changed by a fixed amount."-In the two following sections, 'the changes in annual risks (expres sed as apercent)-are presented for a'fixedý (10'percent) change' in one parameter with all other paramte rsheld constant . - - *-- - " *.

I.2.1' CHANGES IN POPULATJON'bENSITY "

"Using the parameiers An t1 975 BaselIne modeE` an incremental increase of 10 percent was made (independentW) in;°eeach -f tihe three- p'ooulattio-'n deinities.' ThW-esults are' shown' in' Table 1-1.

TABLE I-1

. , PERCENT

_ CHANGES IN NORMAL AND ACCIDENT RISKS FOR A 10 PERCENT INCREASE IN-POPULATION DENSITY ""- "n" Parameter. ~Change in Annual Risk Normal . Accident

. Urban Population Density.-; 0.7%, 8.5 Suburban Population Density :, - -'-O.4% .. o. 2.1% :

Rural Population Density 0 0 1-1

It is evident from the table that the accident risk component is much more sensitive to toe value chosen for the urban population density than is normal risk. Normal risk is relatively insensitive to population density changes. Changes in rural density are unimportant in all cases.

1.2.2 CHANGES IN THE METEOROLOGICAL PARAMETERS The atmospheric dispersion model used in the accident risk analysis is a Gaussian plume model using turbulent diffusion coefficients. An initial release height of 10 meters is as sumed, and cloud depletion by dry deposition is allowed. Rather than investigate the sensi tivity of the atmospheric dispersion model to these parameters, a 10 percent increase in the diffusion factors was assumed (see Figure 5-7). The result was a 9 percent change in the annual accident radiologicalrisk. The annual normal risk value is, of course, unaffected by this change....,.

1.3 SENSITIVITY OF THE ACCIDENT ANALYSIS TO GENERAL PARAMETERS In this section, the sensitivity of the calculation of the annual, radiological risk re sulting from potential transportation accidents is examined. Because of the different nature of the normal transport risk calculation, Its sensitivity to both general and shipment parameters is discussed in Section 1.5. - ,

The accident risk depends on, among other things, the product of the annual accident rate, the package release fraction, the fraction of all accidents estimated to occur in a given popu lation zone, and the population density of that zone. Each component of this product (and thus the product itself) is.a function of both the transport mode and the accident severity category.

Table 1-2 is a tabulation of these products by severity categoryfor, each population zone for type Apackages (or drums), transported- by the truck mode., The last column in Table 1-2 shuws the percent contribution of each product to the ,totale (sum of all the products). The table, shows that for transport of any given type A package by truck under all the assumptions inherent in the calculation, 84 percent of the accident risk is from accidents that occur in urban zones, and most of this results from class II, III, and IV accidents. Thus, an,error in estimating the urban population density or the fraction of distance traveled in urban areas has a much greater effect on the risk estimate. (for type A packages by truck) than corresponding errors for suburban and rural zones., Abbreviated tabulations were made for each transport mode, package type, and population zone calculation and are presented in Tables 1-3 to 1-7.

The values shown in-these tables are independent of the standard shipment model; they apply individually to each packagetransported:- By-th- same token,-a comparisonof the relative risks of two transported packages can be made directly from these tablesionly if they contain the same quantities'of-the same material and are transported the same distance. Different materials may still be compared by recalling that the risk is proportional to the quantity of material trans ported, to the distance traveled. and to material characteristics such as fraction aerosolized, fraction respirable, and the rem-per-curie value. n. , .- , ý-5.-,.

n"-;"-

1-2

a TABLE 1-2 PRODUCT OF ACCIDENT RATE, RELEASE-FRACTION. FRACTION OF ACCIDENTS IN GIVEN POPULATION ZONE.- AND POPULATION DENSITY FOR TYPE A PACKAGES BY TRUCK Severity Population Fraction Category Zone Product Of Total I R_ 0 0 II .23 4.5 x 10 .5

-R .4 III 1.3 2.6 x 10"

-R

-4 Total 3.1 6.0 x 10 Pural IV R -4 0.1%

V .89 1.7 x 10

R -5 VI .49 -9.6 x 10 VII -R

.043 8.5 x 10 -6

-6 VIII .0086 1.7 x 10 S 0 0 I

II S "28 -'5.4 x 10 .3 rS -2 III 214 4.2 x 10 Total

-2 Suburban IV S 489 9.6 x 10 16%

-2 V S 64 1.3 x 10

-3 VI S 17 3.3 x 10

-4 VII S .65 " 1.3 x 10

-5 VIII U ".057 1.1 x 10 I U 0 0 II 1180 2.3 x 10 -1 U

-1 III U 861 1.7 x 10

-1 Total IV U 1970 3.9 x 10 Urban 841

-2 V U 230 4.5 x 10

-3 VI U 45 8.8 x 10

-4 U 3.5 6.8 x 10 VII

-5 VIII U .31 6.0 x 10 1-3

a TABLE 1-3 PRINCIPAL CONTRIBUTORS TO ACCIDENT RISK FOR TRUCKS Package Accident Population Percent Type Severity Zone of Risk A, Drum IV Urban 38.5 II Urban 23.1 III Urban 16.9 IV Suburban 9.6 V Urban 4.5 III Suburba6 4.2 V Suburban 1.3 TOTAL 98.1 B, Cask-2 V Urban 32.1 IV Urban 27.5 III Urban 12.0 V Suburban 9.0 IV Suburban 6.8 VI Urban 6.3 III Suburban 3.0 VI Suburban 2.3 TOTAL 99.0 B-Pu VI Urban 51.8 VII Urban 20.0 VI Suburban 19.3 VII Suburban 3.7 VIII Urban 3.5 TOTAL 98.3 Cask-1 VIII Urban 72.8 (exposure) VIII Suburban 15.5 VII Urban 8.4 "VII Suburban 1.6 VI Urban 1.1 TOTAL 99.4 1-4

IABLE 1-4 PRINCIPAL CONTRIBUTORS TO ACCIDENT RISK FOR AIRCRAFT Package -.- Accident Population -Percent Type - Severity SZone of Risk A, Drum '2 V Suburban '21.0 V Urban 18.8 VI Suburban 14.6 "VI Urban 13.1 IV Suburban 10.8 "IV Urban 7.2 II Suburban 5.1 III Suburban 4.4 III Urban 2.9 II Urban 1.5 TOTAL 99.4 B, Cask-2 V Suburban 29.8 V Urban 26.6 VI Suburban 20.7 VI Urban 18.5 IV Suburban 1.5 IV 'Urban 1.0 TOTAL_ 98.1 B-Pu VI Suburban 48.6 VI. Urban 43.5 VII Urban 5.2 TOTAL' ' 97.3 Cask-1 VIII Urbin 59.3 (exposure) VIII Suburban 11.0 VII .Urban "~ 9.3 VIII Rural 9.0 VI Suburban 4.4 VI Urban 3.9 VII Suburban 1.7 VII Rural 1.4 TOTAL 100.0 I-S -

I TABLE I-5 PRINCIPAL CONTRIBUTORS TO ACCIDENT RISK FOR RAIl RISK FOR RAIL Package Accident Population Percent Severity Zone of Risk A, Drum

III, IV Urban 32.8 II Urban 14.6 III, IV Suburban 8.2 V Urban 2.2 TOTAL 98.8 B, Cask-2 III, IV Urban 29.4 V Urban 19.6 "III, IV Suburban 7.3 V Suburban 5.5 TOTAL 98.5 B-Pu VII Urban SO.0 VI Urban 21.7

- VII Suburban 9.3 VIII Urban 8.3 VI - Suburban 8.1 VIII Suburban 1.6 TOTAL 99.0 Cask-1 SV III: Urban 73.3 viii Suburban 13.7 VII Urban 9.0 VIII Rural " 2.1 VII Suburban

1.7 TOTAL

99.8 f.- * ....

E' 1-6

I TABLE 1-6 PRINCIPAL CONTRIBUTORS TO ACCIDENT RISK FOR WATERBORNE MODES AND VARIOUS PACKAGE TYPES Package' Accident Population Percent Type Severity Zone of Risk A IV Suburban 56.4 IV Urban 33.6 II Urban 7.2 II Suburban 1.3 TOTAL 98.5 B, Cask-2 IV Suburban 57.0 IV Urban 34.0 VII -Suburban 5.7 VI Suburban 2.2 TOTAL 98.9 BPu VII Vill Suburban 81.7 VIII Suburban 11.8 VI Suburban 6.4 TOTAL 99.9 87.5 Cask-1 VIII Suburban (exposure) VII Suburban 12.4 TOTAL 99.9 1-7

I TABLE 1-7 PRINCIPAL CONTRIBUTORS TO ACCIDENT RISK FOR SECONDARY MODES AND VARIOUS PACKAGE TYPES Package Accident Population Percent Type Severity Zone of Risk A, Drum IV Urban 41.7 III Urban 22.4 II Urban 11.5 IV Suburban 7.9 V Urban 7.3 VI Urban 2.9 III Suburban 2.7 II Suburban 1.4 TOTAL 97.8 B, Cask-2 V Urban 36.8 IV Urban 21.0 VI Urban 14.5 III Urban 11.3 V Suburban 7.0 IV Suburban 4.0 VI Suburban 2.7 TOTAL 97.3 B-Pu VI Urban 58.0 VII Urban 17.8 VI Suburan 11.0 VIII Urban 6.3 VII Suburban 5.1 VIII Suburban 1.8 TOTAL 100.0 Cask-1 VIII Urban 72.9 (exposure) VIII VII Suburban 20.9 Vill Urban 4.2 Suburban 1.2 TOTAL 99.2 I-8

PARAMETERS 1.4 SENSITIVITY OF THE ACCIDENT ANALYSIS TO THE SHIPMENT analysis to the particular set of In this section the sensitivity of the accident risk Then the various combinations of mode, standard shipments is considered in a general way.

make major contributions to the annual package type, accident severity, and population zone that risk are tabulated using the 1975 standard shipments model.

1-3, the accident risk calcu In addition to the four-factor product discussed in Section that are characteristic of the material lation also depends on the product of a number of factors comparing the ielative hazards of dif shipped and other shipment parameIters. For purposes of called the "hazard factor."

ferent shipments, it is useful to define a new parameter per curie inhaled)

Hazard Factor = (curies per package) x (packages per shipment) x (rem x (average distance per shipment) x (LCF coefficient for organ associated respir with rem per curie value) x (fraction aerosolized) x (fraction able) x (resuspension dose factor).

energy E is substituted for the rem per When comparing nondispersible materials, the gamma ray curie inhaled.

mode and 'package type com Table I-8 lists hazard factor sums for the various transport factors for that package type and trans binations. Each entry represents the sum of a11 hazard

'These sums, which contain the standard port mode using the 1975 standard shipments model.

contained in Tables I-3 through shipments information, are then combined with the information by package type, transport mode, 1-7 to obtain a ranking of the relative risk contributions thei'1975 standard shipments. The results population zone, and accident severity catego6ry for 1lists, in order of decreasing importance, are shown in Table I-9. The first part of the table the annual risk., Note the number of truck the combinations that are the major contributors to not necessarily mean that truck shipments mode shipments that are major contributors. This does truck'shipments of the standard are more hazardous. It simply reflects thet predominance'of contribtons t6 the annual accident risk shipments model'. The second table.lists thepercent The remaining three tables show the relative for each transport mode, summed over package types.

eight accident -severity categories, and each contributions of each package type, each of the made by type A packages is in part population zone to the accident risk. The major contribution type.

due to the relatively large number of packages'of this Ado not contribute the greatest It is interesting to note that the most severe accidents used'in this assessment. Over 80 amounts to the annual accident risk u:Wer the assumptions III, IV, and V. This results in part percent of the risk comes from accidents of severities VIII accidents and in part from the conser from the very low probability of category VII and packages.

vative set of release fractions for type A and B I-9 :

TABLE I-8 HAZARD FACTOR SUMS Package Type/Mode Truck Van (Pa' Pass. Air Cargo Air Rail 1 .1",09 )6 1.2 x 108 6.8 x 10 4.4 x 10 1.3 z 10i 9

B 4.9x1x10o? 2.0 x 10 8 5.7 x 10 5.1 x 10 8 5.0 x 108 BPu 4.3, x 1012 1.9 i1o lo0. 6.5 x 1011 9.8 x 1010 0

.Cask-i 1.6' X'10 '0 0 0 3.2 1o6

'Cank-2 1.1' x lO8 0 0 .2.4

107 1.21 x 108 6

Drum j 7.2'x 10 5 8.6 x 10 5.2 x 105 0 a

Package Typo/Mode? 1.0 x 10 Van (T)* Van (R)* Van (Ca)'

0 1.9 x 107 1.1 x 10 5.1I" 105 0

B. 1.0 , 10 0 1.4 x 108 1.7 x 107 3.5

107

'4

, BPu " 0, 1.4 x 1011 0 6.1 x 109

,Cask-I 0 0 0 2.1 x 105 0'

"ýCaak-2 0 0 1.6 x 10 6

0 0

- Drum 8.1, x 106 0 8.8 x 104 Pa - passenger air; T - truck; R - rail; Ca - cargo air.

M TABLE 1-9 OVERALL RISK CONTRIBUTION FROM ACCIDENTS FOR 1975 STANDARD SHIPMENTS -

Package -Accident -- Population . Percentage of. Total Type Severity Zone Accident Risk Mode "Truck -A, Drum "IV - Urban 14.5 BPu - :, .VI .Urban 11.2 Truck 8.7

. Truck A, Drum IX Urban V Urban 6.7 "Truck 9, Cask-2 Truck A, Drum III . .- Urban, 6.4. -.

IV Urban 5.7 Truck 8, Cask-2 4.3 Truck BPu VII Urban S ,Truck VI ,- - .Suburban 4.2

- BPu2' 3.6 Truck A, Drum IV Suburban "JIIl ": -Urban "2.5 Truck B, Cask-2 : 2.1 Sec. Modes BPu *.- . VI , Urban,--,:

Truck B, Cask-2 V Suburban 1.9 1 --

' 1.7 I.f Truck "A,Drum " V. -'~' '--Uban Truck A, Drum , III - . Suburban .

Rail A, Drum IV Urban 1.5

"-,Rail A, Drum III - -;Urban-' 1.54 :

Truck ., Cask-2 IV - - .-.-- Suburban - ,-' "1.3 Truck Modes

" B, Cask-2 VI Urban

.. .Sec. "B,Cask-2" V " Urban v ". -

" .. ... .. . .TOTAL .. 82.1 %

TOTALS " '*.-'-'- ':.-'*' '

5 Percentage of Percentage of Accident Risk Package Type Accident Risk Mode 79.3 A, Drum 45.0 Truck 28.0 2.7 B, Cask-2 Pass. Air 26.0 Cargo Air 0.2 BPu Rail 8.8 Ship 1.1 Sec. Modes 7.9 Accident Percentage of Population Percentage of Zone Accident Risk Severity Accident Risk 0 Urban 80.2 1 18.3 10.0 Suburban 2 1.5 3 15.0 Rural 4 31.0 5 14.0 6 23.0 7 6.0 8 1.0 1-11.-,

Although for most M1rlpment scenarios the largest fractions of accidents were expected to occur in rural and suburban population zonas, the urban zone contributes over 80 percent of the annual accident risk. The large population density of urban areas outweighs the relatively low fraction of accidents expected-to-occur in these areas.

1.5 SENSITIVITY OF THE NORMAL DOSE CALCULATION TO VARIOUS PARAMETERS.

The annual normal population dose resulting from any one of, the standard shipments Is proportional to the total TI transported per year and the total distance. A 10 percent error, for example, in the average TI per package, the total packages per year,; or the average distance per shipment would result in a 10 percent error In the annual normal dose.

Table 1-10 contains tabulations of the percent of contributions.to the annual normal risk by certain package types, populatiohn': subgroups, transport modes,. package type-population sub group combinations, and transport mode-population subgroup combinations.W The data for the table were obtained from the normal dose analysis using the 1975 standard shi*ment data. The dominant contribution of type A packages" to the normal dose, as in the accident case, results from the comparatively large number of such packages in thet standard shipments 'model. Type A packages make a larger contribution in the noimal case because of the large-fraction of the total TI that they represent. The truck mode is also the greatest contributor. to the normal risk, again due In part to the comparatively large number of truck shipments. It is interesting to note that 65 percent of the normal risk results from doses to passengers, crew, attendants, handlers, and warehouse personnel. These dose calculations are Independent of the population densities esti mated for each of the three population zones.

r n.. , ,

C, r V.r 1-12

I TABLE I-10 PRINCIPAL CONTRIBUTORS TO THE JIORKAL RISK Package Type Population Subgroup Mode Percert of Percent of Percent of Package Normal Risk Subgroup Normal Risk Mode Normal Risk A, Drum 88.0 Passengers 24 Truck 45.0 B. B-Pu, 11.0 Crew 32 Pass. Air 29.7 Cask 1.0 Attendants 1 Cargo Air 0.2 Handlers 18 Rail 1.0 Off-Link 4 Ship 0.1 On-Link 4 Sec. Modes 24.0 Stops 11 Storage 6 Package Type/Subgroup Package Type Subgroup Percentage A, Drum Crew 27 A, Drum Passengers 21 A, Drum Handlers 16 A, Drum Stops 11 A, Drum Storage 6 B, B-Pu Crew 5 A, Drum Off-Link 4 A, Drum On-Link 4 B, B-Pu Passengers 3.

B, B-Pu Handlers 1 Node 1/Subgroup Mode Subgroup Percentage Truck Crew 26 Pass. Air Passengers 24 Sec. Modes Handlers 12 Truck Stops 10 Sec. Modes Crew 5 Truck On-Link 2 Pass. Air Attendants 1 Pass. Air Handlers 4 Truck Off-Link 4 Truck Storage 3 Sec. Modes On-Link 2 1-13

a cc

'A IL 0i IL5

ML23164A046

Text

Enclosures:

SUMMARY

1.1 Purpose and Scope

1.2 BACKGROUND

2.1 INTRODUCTION

3.3 BACKGROUND

4.1 INTRODUCTION

SUMMARY

SUMMARY

5.1 INTRODUCTION

SUMMARY

6.1 INTRODUCTION

SUMMARY

7.1 INTRODUCTION

4.1 INTRODUCTION

SUMMARY

SUMMARY

1.1 INTRODUCTION

1.7 TOTAL

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