ML23156A569

PR-073 - 38FR03083 - Physical Protection of Special Nuclear Material

ML23156A569
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Issue date:	02/01/1973
From:	NRC/SECY
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38FR03083, PR-073
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ADAMS Template: SECY-067 DOCUMENT DATE: 02/01/1973 TITLE: PR-073 - 38FR03083 - PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL CASE

REFERENCE:

PR-073 38FR03083 KEYWORD: RULEMAKING COMMENTS Document Sensitivity: Non-sensitive - SUNSI Review Complete

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,.,""" "'r4!~~-i~i:tP Mr. L. Manning ~1untzing Director of Regulation x:> ~

United States Atomic Energy Commis si Washington, D. C. 20545

Dear !,

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.ntzing:

Our letter dated ?vfarch 30, 1973 to the Chief, Public Proceedings Staff, set out Kerr-McGee's concerns and objections to the proposed

.changes to 10 CFR 50, 70 and 73. '\Ve relied upon our years of experience in various phases of the nuclear industry in advising changes to avoid a profoundly inequitable impact on the industry. Despite the expressed concerns of the industry, the proposals were adopted without s ignificant change.

Since voicing our obj ections to the eventually adopted proposals, our p reparations for compliance have demonstrated costs that will exceed ou:r worst fears: particularly in the area of providing plant physical security under the new 10 CFR 73 requirements .

Ke rr -McGee is under a fixed price contract with Westinghouse Hanford for the production of fuel pins needed in the Fast Flux Test Facility (FFTF) program. This co ntract places an arbitrary and unreasonable limit on the amount of increased production costs due to chinges in governmental regulation which we can recover. As you know, Kerr-McGee has strongly protested the bequity and impropriety of the .AEC and Westing-house Hanfoi"d in forcing this limitation on. us and believes Kerr - McGee is entitled to its removal. When the contract was entered into there was no way Kerr-1\/IcGee could have foreseen the spectacular increases in safeguards costs now m:i.ndated by Part 73 . Securing the appropriately trabed armed guard force , modifying the plant facilities , purchasing and installing required alarm systems and monitoring equipment~ and contra.ct-ing for transportation escort services is expected to total in excess of

$333, 0 00 for the remainder of base order production under the FFTF cont-r act.

Mr. L. Marm. ing.untz ing 2. March 6, 1974 J

The physical security costs are only a part of the unforeseeable costs which the AEC has caused under its new regulations iss u ed since our FFTF contract was made. It is now estimated that increases in license fees and the increased cost of complying with the new material control and accounting procedures when taken with the increase d physical security co sts, will total over $1,100,000 in added regulatory costs under the FFTF contract for the base order quantity alone. We estimate that this will exceed the maximum reimbursement now allowable on the base order q uantity of our FFTF contract by $600, 000 unless relief is obtained from the contract limitation.

In view of the actual cost data now available, we must renew our protest of the concepts and sp~dfic requirements of the new regulations, particularly as to 10 CFR 73 . There is no historic basis for such a di sproportionate emphasis on security as opposed to the practical e conomic and safety factors involved. The regulations ignore the plight of those in industry under contracts which do not provide a means whereby the regulatory impact may be absorbed by the party initiating sweeping changes, i.e . , the United *states Government. Such an inequitable result c ould not have been in the contemplation of the parties at the time the FFTF contract was executed. This must have an adverse impact on the ability <:>f Kerr-McGee and others similarly situated to perform which ,

in turn, creates problems for AEC programs .

In view of the above, we ask that the Commission promptly review its re gulations keeping in mind that certain amendments are necessary to provide equity for those so severely affected by the new regulations.

Although the new Part 73 is to become effective March 7, 1974, it is believed that actual cost data will provide a basis for examining the re gulations and modifying them to reflect a more accurate assessment of thei r impact.

Sincerely yours, KERR-McGEE NUCLEAR CORPORATION P. S. Dunn

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Vice President cc: Dixie Lee Ray ~

Chairman, USAEC Thomas A Nemzek DiI'.'Cctor, Division of Reactor ~esearch & Developmept, US..t\E_C R. Cuteri, Co nt ract Administrator Mr. Al Squir e , Presid e nt Westinghouse Hanford Company Westingho u se Hanford C orp.pany

161 East 42nd Street, New York, N. Y. 10017 Babcock & Wilcox Telephone: (212) 687-6700 May 3, 1973 Mr. Paul C. Bender Secretary of the Commission U. S. Atomic Energy Commission Washington, D. C. 20545

Reference:

Letter from Martin Victor to Paul Bender dated March 30, 1973

Dear Mr. Bender:

As stated in my letter of March 30, 1973, we have further reviewed the proposed amendments to the Atomic Energy Commission regulations governing the form and frequency of physical inventories and the physical protection of special nuclear mate-rial. The subsequent review resulted in the attached supplement to our previous comments which is presented herewith for your consideration. In presenting these additional comments, we have attempted to supply alternative wording that accomplishes the ends sought by the Commission through more flexible and less costly means.

We hope that this supplement will be of value to you in refining the language of the new regulations.

Sincerely,

'MV~

Martin Victor Vice President and Secretary

ATTAC *O LETI'ER OF MAY 3, 1973- B &

• AEC SUPPLEMENTARY COMMENTS ON 10 CFR PART 70 AND '(3 10 CFR Part 70 SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL Requirements for Physical Security Proposed Regulation (Introduction, Para. 4)

If the Commission adopts the pro:posed amendments, licensees will be given a period of 6o days after publication of the effective rules in the FEDERAL REGISTER to submit required physical security plans.

The remaining physical protection requirements would be made effective 120 days after publication in the FEDERAL REGISTER.

Proposed Change If the Commission adopts the proposed amendments, licensees will be given a period of 60 days after publication of the effective rules in the FEDERAL REGISTER to submit required physical security plans. The remaining physical protection requirements would be made effective 120 days after physical security plans a.re submitted to the Commission.*

Comment The wording change would assure the licensee of sufficient time to comply with the regulations and submitted plans.

• Changed passages have been underlined for clarity.

Proposed Regulation (70.25, Para. c)

(c) Access requirements. (1) The licensee shall control all points of personnel access and all points of vehicle access into a protected area including shipping or receiving areas, and into each vital area.

Identification of personnel and vehicles shall be made and access author-ization checked at such points. All individuals, packages, and vehicles shall be searched for devices such as firearms, explosives, incendiary devices, or other items which could be used for industrial sabotage be-fore entry into the protected area is permitted. All emergency exits in each protected area and each vital area shall be a~armed.

Proposed Change The licensee shall control all points of personnel access and all points of vehicle access into a protected area including shipping or receiving areas, and into each vital area. Identi-fication of personnel and,vehicles shall be made and access authorization checked at such points. All noneroployees, pack-I

\j ages, and vehicles shall be searched for devices such as fire-arms, explosives, incendiary devices, or other items which could be used for industrial sabotage. Random checks shall be performed on employees as they enter the protected area.

Comment The most probable source of the prohibited devices is nonemployees.

The random check of employees would subject any employee violation

Lo <letectlon, if he nt tempted, to transport prohibl tcd items past the guards, yet it would not require the guard force to check everyone entering and leaving an area. In a production facility checking each employee would be impractical.

Proposed Regulation (70.25, Para. c(2))

(3) Access to vital areas shall be limited to individuals who are authorized access to vital equipment and who require such access to per-form their duties. Access authorization for such individuals shall be provided by the issuance of specially coded numbered badges indicating vital areas to which access is authorized. Unoccupied vital areas shall be protected by an active intrusion alarm system.

Proposed Change Access to vital areas shall be limited to individuals who are authorized access to vital equipment and who require such ac-cess to perform their duties. Access authorization for such individuals shall be provided by the issuance of specially coded numbered badges indicating vital areas to which access is authorized, Unoccupied vital areas shall be protected by an intrusion alarm system on an active status.

Comment The reason for the word change is a technical point. "Active intrusion alarm" has been interpreted to mean x-ray,

arc between two pointn that are located within 10 miles of es.ch other. In such case, one driver plus one escort with continuous radio communication will suffice. Escorts shall maintain continuous vigilance for the presence of conditions or situations which might threaten the security of the cargo, take such action as circumstances might require to avoid interference with continuous safe passage of the vehicle, provide assistance. to, or summon aid for crew of cargo vehicles in case of emergency, check seals and locks at each stop where time permits, a.nd observe vehicles a.nd adjacent 1

areas during stops or layovers. Continuous communication capa-bility shall be provided between the cargo vehicle and the escort vehicle. The licensee may use his own employees as armed escorts or he may use an agent.

Comment Some facilities may have operations split between two locations within a short clistance from each other. In this situation, the probability of a diversion without quick detection is much lower than over a long haul; therefore, a commensurately reduced armed force appears to be reasonable.

Proposed Regulation (73.31, Para. a(l) (ii))

Within 60 days after (the effective date of this amendment), licen-sees using either method sh{l.11 submit a plan for the selection, qualification, and training of armed escorts, or the specification and design of a specially designed truck or trailer, as appropriate.

Proposed Change Within 60 days after (the effective date of this amendment),

licensees shall submit a plan for the selection, qualifica-tion and training of armed escorts who will be deputized by the Federal Government as federal officers, or for the spe-cifications of trucks or trailers designed as set forth by OOT and AEC specifications.

Comment Private industry cannot assume authority to arm personnel who will cross political boundaries and it is impractical to expect industry to obtain gun permits from all the political sub-divisions in which the armed personnel would be required to function. Therefore, the practical solution is to have these persons deputized by the only political entity with jurisdiction over all subdivisions, the U. S. Government.

Also, the DOT and AEC must set specifications across the board for the specially designed truck since licensees are not normally involved in trucking activities' and lack the expertise required to establish the specification.

10 CFR Part 73 PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL Requirements for Materials Protection Proposed Regulation (73.3, Para. g)

(g) "Material access area" means any location which contains spe-cial nuclear material, within a vault, or a building, the roof, walls and floor of which each constitute a physical barrier, and which, in turn, is located within a protected area.

Proposed Change "Material access area" means any location which contains special nuclear material within a vault, a building, the roof, walls and floor of which constitute a physical bar-rier or other designated area with appropriate barriers approved by the Cotmnission, and which, in turn, is located within a protected area.

Comment Some components may be designated as "in storage" and are too large for an individual to move. These components may be stored within a heavy fenced area inside a building.

Proposed Regulation (73.32, Para. a)

(a) Access requirements. (1) Special nuclear material shall be stored or processed only in a material access area. No activities other than those which require access to special nuclear material or

equipment employed in the process, use, or storage of special nuclear material, shall be permitted within a material access area.

Proposed Change Special nuc'iear material shall b,e stored or processed only in a material access area. No activities other than those which are related to special nuclear material or equipment employed in the process, use, or storage of special nuclear material shall be permitted within a material access area.

Connnent Support activities, which are related to processing of spe-cial nuclear materials but may not require direct access to special nuclear material, must often be performed in mate-rial access areas in order to be efficient and practical.

Proposed Regulation (73.32, Para. a(2))

(2) Special nuclear material not in process shall be stored in a vault equipped with an intrusion alarm or in a vault-type room and each such vault or vault-type room shall be controlled as a separate mate-rial access area.

Proposed Change Special nuclear material not in process as defined in 10 CFR Part 70 shall be stored in a vault equipped with an intrusion

alarm or in a vault-type room and each such vault or vault-type room shall be controlled as a separate material access area.

Comment The words should be inserted in this paragraph to be consis-tent with Part 70. '

Proposed Regulation (73.32, Para. a(3))

(3) Enriched uranium in the form of small pieces, cuttings, chips, solutions or in other forms which result from a manufacturing process, which are kept for ultimate disposal, contained in 30-gallon or larger containers, may be stored within a locked and separately fenced area which is within a larger protected area provided that the storage area is no closer than 50 feet to the perimeter of the protected area. The storage area shall be protected by a guard or watchman who shall patrol at intervals not exceeding 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />, or by intrusions alarms.

Proposed Change Enriched uranium in the form of small pieces, cuttings, chips, solutions or in other forms which result from a manufacturing process, or lcrw concentrations of enriched uranium kept for recovery purposes, which are kept for ultimate disposal, contained in 30-gallon or larger con-tainers, may be stored within a locked and separately

fenced area which is within a larger protected area provided that the storage area is no closer than s2. feet to the perimeter of the protected area. The stor*age area shall be protected by a gua:rd or watchman who shall patrol at intervals not exceeding 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />, or by intrusions alarms.

Comment 30-gallon or larger drums containing SNM: which will be held for a short period of time awaiting recovery may be stored in a fenced area outside a building but within the perimeter of the protected area.

Prowsed Regulation (73,32, Para. a(6) )

(6) Packages and personnel entering a protected area shall be searched for devices such as firearms, explosives, incendiary devices, or counterfeit substitute items which could be used for theft or diversion of special nuclear material.

Proposed Change Packages and personnel entering a protected area shall be controlled to preclude devices such as firearms, explosives, incendiary devices, or counterfeit substitute items which could be used for theft or diversion of special nuclear material fram. entering the area.

Comment This would allow more avenues to control entrance of pro-hibited items to protected areas. As the words are pre-sently stated, it could be construed to mean a police type search at all times.

10 CFR Part 70 SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL Revised Material Control and Accounting Requirements for Special Nuclear Material Proposed Regulation (70.51, Para. a(l0))

(10) "Tamper-safing" means the use of d_evices on containers or vaults, in a manner that insures a clear indication of any violation of the integrity of previously made measurements of special nuclear mate-rial within the container or vault.

Proposed Change "Tamper-safing" means the use of devices on containers, vaults, or other designated areas in a manner that insures a clear in-dication that a violation of the integrity of previously made measurements of special nuclear material within the container, vault, or area. Containers may include elements in which SNM is encapsulated in metal, metallurgically bonded so as to pre-elude removal of the SNM without obvious destruction of the external surface.

Proposed Regulation (70.51, Para. E(3)(i), (ii), (iii))

(i) One calendar month for plutonium (except plutonium in that area of an irradiated-fuel reprocessing plant having shielding equiva-lent to 3 feet or more of concrete);

(ii) Two calendar months for uranium 233 and for uranium enriched 20 percent or more in the isotope uranium 235 (except such uranium in that area of an irradiated-fuel reprocessing plant having shielding equivalent to 3 feet or more of concrete); and (iii) Six calendar months for uranium enriched less than 20 per-cent in the isotope uranium 235 and for plutonium and high-enriched uranium that area of an irradiated-fuel reprocessing plant having shielding equivalent to 3 feet or more of concrete; Proposed Change (i) One calendar month for plutonium (except plutonium in that area of an irradiated-fuel reprocessing plant having shielding equivalent to 3 feet or more of concrete);

(ii) Two calendar months for uranium 233 and for uranium enriched 20'percent or more in the isotope uranium 235 (ex-cept such uranium in* that area of an irradiated-fuel repro-cessing plant having shielding equivalent to 3 feet or more of concrete); and

(iii) Six calendar months for uranium enriched less than 20 percent in the isotope uranium 235 and for plutonium and high-enriched uranium that area of an irradiated-fuel reprocessing plant having shielding equivalent to 3 feet or more of concrete.

Scheduling of physical inventories in accordance with inter-vals set forth in E(3)(i) through (iii) above shall be speci-fied by the licensee and shall be determined with sufficient time to allow orderly completion.

Comment The added language clarifies the responsibility for estab-lishing the inventory schedules.

Proposed Regulation (70.51, Para. E(4)(i))

(i) Calculate, for the material balance interval terminated by that inventory, the material unaccounted for (MUF) and its associated limit of error for each element and fissile isotope contained in mate-rial in process; Proposed Change Calculate, for the material balance interval terminated by that inventory, the material unaccounted for (MUF) and its associated limit of error for each fissile isotope contained in material in process;

Comment Maintaining a limit of error around the MUF for the fissile isotope will protect and safeguard the SNM. Such calcula-tions for the element add to the workload and serve no ap-parent purpose.

Proposed Regulation (70.51, Para. E(5))

(5) Establish and maintain a system of control and accountability such that the limits of error for any material unaccounted for (MUF) as-certained as a result of the material balances made pursuant to paragraph (e)(3) of this section do not exceed 200 grams for plutonium or uranium 233, 300 grams of uranium 235 contained in high-enriched uranium, or 2,000 grams of uranium 235 contained in low-enriched uranium, or the following, whichever is greater:

Proposed Change Establish and maintain a system of control and accountability such that the limits of error for any material unaccounted for (MUF) shall be established by utilizing a 95% confidence around the measurement system. The measurement accuracy of the equipment will be maintained within a reasonable degree established by the current state of the art.

Comment Use of an absolute maximum value as the limit of error seems unreasonable because such a limit fails to consider produc-tion operations which account for very large inventories of SNM. A more reasonable approach is to utilize the latest equipment and techniques available and statistically derive the limit of error according to the accuracy of the equip-ment and techniques.

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Dear Dr . Lapp :

Thank you for your letter of March 28 commenting on the proposed amendments to the regulations dealing with physical protection of s pec ial nuclear material. We also believe that adoption of t hese proposed amendments will strengthen the safeguarding of spec ial nuclear material .

Regulatory has ,,*orked closely with the General Manager's staff i u formulating the propo sed rule changes. and we have attempted t o achieve similarity and overall equivalence of the physical protection measures required of both licensees and AEC contractors cons i stent with the nature of the materials in their possession .

Your concern about protection of material from a possible "inside job" is cer~ainly not without cause. However, we feel that the pr oposed regulations which require (1) surveillance of individuals wit h in special nuclear material areas, ( 2) a check for concealed special nuclear material upon exit from such an ar ea, and (3) the protection, by an intrusion alarm, of all unoccupied areas con-t aining special nuclear rr~terial, including vaults, satisfactorily protect special nuclear material from the "inside job." The Corr:mission is giving consideration to clarification of lts author-ity to conduct a progrm for the approval of persons having access to or control over significant quantities of Epecial nuclear material.

Again, I thank you for your cor:nucnts.

Sincerely, DOCKETED U&£C Lester Rogers Director of Regulatory Standards cone . Chan ges made by J. Becker .

DR. RALPH - LAPP 7 2 15 PARK TER RACE DR.

I ALEXANDR I A, VA. 22307 ENER GY/NUCLEAR CONSULTANT CO DE 70 3/768,26 1 I

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.1 28 March 19 73 Dr . Lester Rogers Director of Regulatory Standards

• . :ti U . S . Atomic Energy Commission

-~ Washington, D. C. 20545 l

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Dear Dr . Rogers:

Thank you for your letter of March 8th requesting comments on proposed regulations for dealing with protection of special nuclear material.

I have reviewed the proposals and I believe that their adoption and effective implementation will considerably strengthen the procedures for safeguarding nuclear material. It seems to me that these proposals tend to require commercial practices in protection of such material ---/

come more in line with the procedures that are cur rently in effect for AEC custody of nuclear material .

It is sometimes difficult to visualize how proposals trans -

late into practice and get converted into hardware . My reading of the proposals leads me to conclude that much tighter security safeguards will be in effect for trans-portation of nuclear materials. However , it is not entire l y

...* clear that maximum protection will be afforded at fuel reprocessing centers. I am rticularly concerned about the possibility of an "inside j ob 11 involving personnel at the site who might either through active cooperation or by passing on useful information aid outsiders in penetrating security barriers and acquiring plutonium from the wnrehousc. It would seem ta me desirable to re- >

quire Q clearance for all persons having access to the warehouse and to consider an electronic security control X of the birdcages in s~oragc~ imitating to some degree military procedures for weapon security .

_f thank you for the opportunity to comment on this matter .

rel/lA

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f DOCKETED U8lEC Mrs. Ann W. Savolainen APR3 01973..,

Standards Coordinator Offlct of the Sea-eb!J American National Standards Publlt l'fcffldlngl BraDCb Insti tute, Inc.

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Dear Ann:

Thank you for sending us the copy of the Atomic Industrial Forum (Alf) letter commenting on our proposed amendments for control and protection

• of special nuclear material. We received this letter from Dr. Osborn and have discussed his eomments with him and other members of the AIF safeguards Committee.

Sincerely, LES'tEn HOli.EI~S Lester Rogers Director of Regulatory Standards DISTRIBUTION:

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-"Jo P.O.BOX 4048 POCATELLO, IDAHO - 83201 April 4, 1973 DOCKETED U$AEC Secretary APR 91973 U. S. Atomic Energy Commission Office of the seer Publlc Proceedings Washington, DC 20545 Branch Attn: Chief, Public Proceedings Staff

Dear Sir:

Relative to your announcement that you are considering amendments to your regulations in 10 CFR Part 73, "Physical Protection of Special Nuclear Material."

We are inquiring as to the exact definition of "special nuclear material." A question has arisen as to whether such a descriptive designation would cover all nuclear material. Perhaps if this matter has not been clarified, it should be.

Chester J. Sams Sr. VP - Traffic & Marketing CJS:J

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973 \ISt\EC PR 61973 I, I,' \C,'I 'I (lfncc ol !lte fllC(OOUl P;ibi1r. rr~cc~~lngs Secretary of the Commission iln,r.;h

u. S. Atomic Energy Commission Washington, D. C. 20545 Attn: Chief, Public Proceedings Gentlemen:

Proposed Rule Changes, 2/1/73, FEDERAL REGISTER, pages 3073-3083, Dealing with Safeguarding of Special Nuclear Materials and Physical Protection of Facilities.

Battelle recognizes the rationale and supports the need for practical and effective safeguards on special nuclear materials.

We suggest that there is a need to examine carefully the impact of the proposed rule changes on research and development activi-ties currently in progress in various facilities throughout the United States.

We are fortunate to have been in a position to participate in and to observe the evolution of the nuclear field from its in-ception, including studies of safeguards and protection. We be-lieve the concentration of effort and controls on production facilities is logical and feasible, but the adoption of the same controls for nonproduction facilities, especially research facil-ities, will result in research and development costs disproportion-ate to the safeguards benefits achieved.

For production facilities, which can be expected to be compactly designed and where operations are repetitive, conforming to the regulations will require a single reorganization of procedures and physical protection equipment. Costs can be amortized in the price of the product over an extended time period. Battelle's problems result from the nature of our research and development work. Numerous small jobs (few man months each) may be in pro-gress at several locations. At other times, the laboratories (other than some specialized plutonium facilities) are used for nonrelated work. In addition, these laboratories are distributed in many buildings. This situation further increases the total cost of compliance.

Secretary of the Commission Page 2 April 4, 1973 In effect, adoption of these changes will add a new major cost for the R&D safeguarding that frequently may exceed the total R&D cost. This will require a complete reevaluation of each program's net worth and may terminate, or substantially stagnate, research and development work involving special nuclear materials.

The cost for handling nonroutine small quantities of special nuclear materials {<10 Kg) would be prohibitive.

We suggest a very careful evaluation be made to see if safeguard-ing requirements for nonroutine R&D activities can be controlled to a level that would allow these activities to be continued with-out the high cost penalties of the proposed safeguarding require-ments. We hope a practical and reasonable safeguard policy can be developed so that adequate safeguards are applied, but keeping costs to the nonroutine, relatively small quantity special nuclear material (<10 Kg) user low enough so that he will not be forced out of business; and, hence, we all lose his contributions to the nuclear industry advancement.

Very truly yours, W. D. Richmond Assistant Laboratory Director WDR/ss

R. A. Lamley Vice President General Offices : 212 West Michigan Avenue, Jackson, Michigan 49201

• Area Code 517 788-1270 April 3, 1973 Secretary of the Commission United States Atomic Energy Commission Washington DC 20545

Dear Sir:

Attention : Chief, Public Proceedings Staff Consumers Power Company has reviewed the proposed amendments to 10CFR50, 10CFR70 and 10CFR73 filed in the Federal Register January 31, 1973 concerning physical protection of special nuclear material and related matters. T"nis review was conducted both on an "in-company" basis and in conjunction with the Atomic Industrial Forum's Committee on Nuclear Materials Safeguards. Consumers Power Company fully endorses the comments submitted by Mr. K. R. Osborne on the behalf of this committee.

With respect to the requirements on transportation of special nuclear material (10CFR73) we believe that the Federal Government should require carriers of non-exempt quantities of special nuclear material to be licensed.

It is extremely difficult for a shipper to provide sufficient control over a carrier's employees to insure that all physical security regulations are fully complied with at all times.

Yours very truly, BAL/db

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..j APR 4 *. I U&iiEC Mr. Robert Houston .

., I Directorate of Licensing U.S. Atomic Energy Commission Washington, D.C. 20545

Dear Mr. Houston:

The purpose of this letter is to protest the application of the proposed changes in parts 50, 70 and 73 of the Code of Federal Regulations to University Reactors. Application of these changes to a typical university training reactor installation would impose undue hardship in administration and would increase costs to the point that it would be necessary to close out nuclear engineering education and training. Our University, as several others, simply does not have the resources to support both the initial capital investment and the annual expense necessary to meet the proposed regulations. We are an educational institution with a 10-KW training reactor, not a production facility or a 1,000 MWe nuclear power station where the provisions of the proposed regu-lations are appropriate.

For example, Part 70.25 appears to require that we maintain at least five guards and watchmen to protect the fuel elements in the reactor ana in a presently locked and secured storage pit. It appears that it would be neces-sary to build a separate wall completely around the building which houses the reactor, but which also houses several staff members, graduate students, and a technician, as well as laboratories. To have every student who may have a class or laboratory within the building sign in and out of the building, be badged, and accompanied by another guard is completely impracticable. Our senior operators, operators, and technician have control over the vital area within which the reactor and fuel storage pit are located. Admission to this locked area is by personal recognition on the part of these staff personnel, and we are of the opinion that security is in no way compromised by this system. The Uranium 235 which we possess is in discrete fuel elements which are part of fuel assemblies contained in the reactor or in the locked storage pit. It is virtually an impossibility for unauthorized personnel to even approach a fuel element much less to smuggle one out of the vital areas. In our opinion the regulation of an exclusionary wall around the building and the hiring of a number of guards would not improve the security.

Mr. Robert Houston 31 March 1973 I

Pl emw do not/ i ntcrprct this as meaning that we arc in any way trying lo redun* Sl'.c11rit t or to compromise the security situation. We are simply calUng attcntior! to Lhc fact that the application of the proposed regula-tions would put university reactors used for training purposes out of business because of the intolerable expense.

Yours very truly, G~M~

Distinguished Professor of Engineering Head of Department GM:st

346 Wmchouso Roml OAK RIDGE, TENNESSEE 3/HJO NCO Ph. 61!'> - 48:l-3473 F FD Ph, 615-482-4027 April 2, 1973 DOCKETED UeAEC 51973 OfflOII tf flit SeGl'IIIIJ Mr. Paul C. Bender Mllc~III Secretary of the Commission lracll

u. s. Atomic Energy Commission Washington 25, D. C. 20545 Attention: Chief, Public Proceedings Staff

Subject:

Comments on Proposed Amendments to 10 CFR 70 and 10 CFR 73 as Published in the Federal Register, Vol. 38, No. 21, Thursday, February 1, 1973.

Gentlemen:

u. s. Nuclear, Inc., SNM-1315, offers the following comments on the subject proposals.

A. General Comments

1. It is not clear why the Commission proposes to amend both part 70 and part 73 to include requirements for physical security (protection) of Special Nuclear Material. It appears from the wording of paragraph 70.25 and 73.1 that both regulations apply to the same type of licensee; i.e., one who possesses more than 5000 grams of uranium-235.

2. The terms as defined in both paragraph 70.4 and 73.3 are confusing in that they appear to apply to the same thing. "Vital Area" in sub-section (v) of paragraph 70.4 and "Material Access Area" in sub-section (g) of paragraph 73.3.

3. The wording of both paragraph 70.25 and 73.32 are vague in that no clear distinction is made as to which SNM "storage only" sites each paragraph specifically applies (e.g., power plants, fuel element production facilities).

4. The proposed requirements in paragraph 73.31 for physical protection of SNM in transit would seem to preclude use of commercial transportation as existing tariffs do not cover the services which would be required under the proposed amendments.

B. Specific Comments/Recommended Alternatives

1. Paragraph 70.25 (a) (1) - For small facilities (<30 employees), in lieu of a separate guard force, specially selected employees will constitute the security force.

Mr. Paul C. Bender /\pr I 1 :~, I <l7 .l

2. Paragraph 70.25 (c) (1) - Personal searching of individuals prior to entering the protected area may be legally unenforceable.

The costs of mechanical devices to accomplish the search are prohibitive for small facilities: (<30 employees).

3. Paragraph 70.25 (c) (2) - A 'picture badge identification system should not be necessary for small facilities (<30 employees).

4. Paragraph 70.25 (e) (3) - An independent one-way link with local law enforcement agencies, other than telephone, may serve in lieu of two-way voice communication areas where such broadcast communication is difficult because of the terrain. Such one-way links may be devices similar to the hold-up buttons installed in banks.

5. Paragraph 70.51 (f) (3) (ii) (B) - Remeasurement of the fissile isotope of a randomly taken inventory sample should not be required for facilities with small monthly through-puts, which do not operate with mixed enrichments; e.g., 93-93.5\ w/o 235 u.

6. Paragraph 73.32 (a) (4) - Picture badge identification systems should not be necessary for small facilities (<30 employees), since employees will be well known to the staff and non-employees are separately badged.

7. Paragraph 73.32 (a) (6) - A search of packages entering an access protected area, along with knowledge of the individuals entering, should provide a sufficient precautionary measure against diversion.

The legality of requiring searches of visitors' persons is not clear. The costs of purchasing devices which would provide a high degree of detection capability are prohibitively expensive for small facilities.

8. Paragraph 73.32 (c) - All unoccupied material access areas should be locked to access from outside the building containing the area, but should contain interior doors which, while alarmed, still allow ready access.

In closing, it is hoped that the Commission will consider the impact of these far reaching proposed amendments on both small and large fuel fabicators and will require their implementation on a sliding scale which is based both on facility size and through-put.

Yours very truly,

(/I \ / 'h y_,/4,1., r7')

i M. s. Markowicz Manager Quality Assurance and Safeguards MSM:npe

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I t, -73 Allied-Gu~ Nuclear Services March 30, 1973 il~m Secretary of the Commission U.S. Atomic Energy Commission PR 31973 Washington, D. c. 20545  ::,r:

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~:a;.~;1 Attention: Chief, Public Proceedings Staff

Dear Sir:

Reference is made to proposed amendments to 10 CFR parts 50, 70, and 73 dealing with the physical protection and material control requirements for nuclear facilities, published in the Federal Register, Volume 38, No. 21, on February 1, 1973.

The following general comments are offered for your considera-tion:

The frequencies of proposed physical inventories [Section 70.51(3)] if administered in a manner requiring a plant clean-out for each inventory, would impose a heavy cost burden (espec ially in terms of lost production time) on plants such as the Barnwell Nuclear Fuel Plant . Preliminary estimates indicate that lost revenue due to such inventories, at the frequencies suggested in proposed amendments, would range from

$5 million to $10 million per year plus an additional $50 thousand to $100 thousand per year in additional operating expenses.

The physical security requirements would also be costly. Pre- .

liminary estimates of such costs ar.e between one-half and one million dollars in additional fixed capital costs and $200 thousand to $400 thousand per year in additional operating expenses for both the plant and transportation.

A new term is being introduced into Parts 50 and 70, i.e.,

"industrial sabotage". Until now the concern of an operator of a production or utilization facility was the public health and safety. The common defense and security, on the other hand, was the responsibility of the Federal .Government. The line between the two was fair ly clear . Introc acing the term "indus-:

trial sabotage ", appears to creat e a hybr between the two mentioned terms causing a considerable overlap between the areas of private versus public concern. As someone said, if an armed band were to hold up a nucl*ear plant, how would those protecting

_. ~.... ~- ,. ........

Secretary of the Commission Page 2 March 30, 1973 such plant know whether they were the public enemy or industrial saboteurs. Hence, the end res ult of introduction of the term "industrial sabotage" could be to pass on to private industry functions that normally would be performed by the Federal Government and asking private industry to assume the costs thereof. Therefore, we s ugge st that before putting the proposed amendments into effect, this problem be thoroughly reviewed.

Proposed Section 50.SSd(c), Section 70.25(c), and Section 73.32(a) (6) all would require search of individuals, packages, and vehicles before entry into protected areas. Since there are no adequate devices for detecting non-metallic items, this would necessitate a personal search of each individual. Each state has its own laws on search and seizure and there appears to be cons ide rable question as to the legality of a private company searching individuals whether they are its employees or not. Then, of course, the further step is, if during such search one finds some devic,es such as firearms, explosives, incendiary devices, does one have a legal right to seize same?

Hence, it appears that the matter of search (and possibly seizure) would require considerable legal research before such a provis ion could be put into effect.

Specific comments are as follows:

(10 CFR Part 50] Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities - Requirements for Physical Security

l. 55d(b) (3) - The minimum size of the isolation zone should be specified.

2. 55d(b) (4) - The minimum level of illumination should be specified .

3. 55d(c) (1) - We know of no detection device that can be used for searching for non-metallic explosives, incen-diary devices, etc. Equipment similar to that being used by the airlines could be utilized for searching for radio-active materials or firearms, but not for incendiary de-vices, plastic explosives, etc. Physical search is the only sure way to detect non-metallic items . This would involve expansion of rhange room facilities. It would also increase the ir to ~ ck production employees for access into the protected or ital areas . We suggest tha proper selection of employees and spot searches (if legal) would negate the need for searching every individual entering such areas.

'* *... .,.. i , ~ ; -- * - ... ..d:.., 1:e-- t. a Secretary of the Commission Page 3 March 30, 1973

4. 55d(c) (6) - Individuals not employed by the licensee, who, to perform their duties require frequent and extended access to a protected or vital area, should not be required to obtain daily validation of their access authorization .

Since the precautions taken at the initial validation ensure that such an individual does require frequent and extended access, such daily validation appears unnecessary .

The use of coded badges and controlled access to protected or vital areas would be an adequate control of this cate-gory of nonemployee . Daily validation would impose a severe administrative burden in cases where a large number

• .:>f contractor employees requires daily access to a pro-tected area.

(10 CFR Part 70] Special Nuclear Material - Requirements for Physical Security

1. 70.25(b)(3), 70.2S(b)(4)," 70.2S(c)(l), and 70.25(c)(6) -

Above comments 1 through 4 pertaining to Part 50 also apply to Part 70.

2. 70.25(e) {4) - It appears that a minimum time period should be specified during which communications s hould remain operable from independent power in the event of loss of primary power .

(10 CFR Part 70] Special Nuclear Material - Revised Material Control and Accounting Procedures for Special Nuclear Material

1. 70.Sl(e) (3) (i} - It appears that one calendar month is too frequent for physical inventories of plutonium in light of the very elaborate physical security measures

• being proposed. This frequency imposes an unnecessary cost burden, especially in terms of lost production time ,

on plutonium conversion facilities. Proposed material con-trol requirements are ineffectual for assuring that the physical protection measures have prevented the diversion or theft of plutonium. Hence, we suggest that semiannual physical inventories should be sufficient . More frequent physical inventories of p lutonium should not be required since the plutonium itself has signi fi cant radiation dose characteristics which make it extremely difficult and hazardous to divert or s teal.

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Secretary of the Commission Page 4 March 30, 1973 j'

2. 70.51(e) (3) (iii) - Likewise, it appears that six calendar months is too frequent for physical inventory of uranium enriched to less than 20% U-235, since this type of uranium is exempted from the physical security requirements.

Based on the principles of a graded safeguards system the exclusion of uranium enriched to less than 20% U-235 from the physical security requirements is quite a~propriate.

However, semiannual physical inventories for this kind of uranium are not needed to protect the common defense and security or the public health and safety. The implication in the proposed physical protection measures is that uranium enriched to less than 20% U-235 presents no real risk to the public in terms of protecting the common defense and security. Therefore, such stringent material control requirements, i.e., semiannual inventories and LE(MUF) =

0.5-0.7%, for uranium below 20% U-235 do not appear to be justified.

3. 70.5l(e) (5) - We suggest that the LE(MUF) for U-235 in a reprocessing or conversion plant should be equal to or greater than 1.0%. There does not appear to be justifica-tion for tighter control of the LE(MUF) for U-235 than for plutonium. In fact, at the low enrichments of U-2 35 to be processed in commercial reprocessing and conversion plants for light water reactor fuel (which has essentially no strategic value) it is hard to justify a regulatory LE(MUF).

Similarly, future LE (.NUF ) control s s hould not be e stab lished until the technology and need for achieving tighter controls have been demonstrated.

(10 CFR.Part 73] Physical Protection of Special Nuclear Material Security Measures

1.

• 73. 31(a) - Line 3 should read, ."section, each owner-licensee, or its agent, who transports or *** " and 10 CFR 73.31(b),

line 1, should read "Each owner-licensee, or its agent, who takes deli very *** ".

It appears that this change is desirable to differentiate between various licensees in the fuel cycle. Normally, the utility is the owner-licensee (who retains title to the fuel throughout the fuel cycle) and the various processors in the fuel cycle (performing a service for such utilities) would also be licensee , but would ac as agents for such owner-licensee.

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Secretary of the Commission Page 5 March 30, 1.973

2. 73.3l(a) (1), Lines 4 Query, should not the words 11

• • • which provides a system for the physical protection of valuable material in transit and requires an exchange of hand-to-hand receipts at origin and destination, *** " be transposed to the end of the sentence and change the words "provides" and "requi res " to "provide" and "require", which would make the transposed phrase applicable to both carrier and a Commission licen ee .

It would probably be more accurate to reword the penulti-mate sentence of this paragraph to read "no intermediate stops to transfer special nuc lear material or other cargo shall be made between the facility from which it is shipped and the facility of the receiver.", since it is possible that the shipper may not be the licensee of the faci lity at the origin of shipment as the present words "between the facility of the shipper" imply.

3. 73. 3l(a) (1) (i) - This S1.=ction requires that an armed escort accompany a shipment of special nuclear material. Again, there appears to be a question as to the legality of armed escorts crossing state borders. We suggest that this should be thoroughly reviewed before this provision is put into effect.

It appears that the words at the end of the second sentence

" **. and observe vehicles and adjacent areas during stops or layovers *** " might better be inserted in line 5 after the word "vigilance" and made to read " *** vigilance, includ-

_ing observation of vehicles and adjacent areas during transit, stops, and layovers for the presence of condi-tions *** ".

4. 73.31(a) (1) (ii) - In view of the considerable increase in costs which armed escorts would entail, it would appear prudent to support the "specially designed truck" approach to the transportation of special nuclear material. How-ever, some of the explosive-type immobilization concepts that have been advanced for special trucks could be a threat to safe transportation in case of malfunction rather than an improvement in the security of the cargo.

5. 73.31(a) (2) (iii), Lines 6 It appears that this should read " *** to a vehicle, from one vehicle or aircraft to another vehicle or ai craft, or from a vehicle to s torage ".

Secretary of the Commission Page 6 March 30, l973 In the second sentence of this paragraph, lines l3~l4, it is not clear what the words " *.

• while the shipment i s in storage." mean. Do they mean* storage at a ground facility or possibly at an airport or on the vehicle itself?

. 6. 73.3l{a) (4) - It appears that the first sentence of this paragraph could be better stated by breaking same down into two sentences as fo~lows:

i Transit time shall be minimized by selecting the mos t direct route. Also, shippers should use their best efforts to avoid areas of natural disaster or civil disturbances .

7. 73.3l(a) (6), Line 5 - The requirement of " l , 000 ft ." is vague and it appears that a closer definition of the size o f the lettering or nur.lbering should be provided and there probably should be some indication whether visibility from the air means by the "naked eye" or by the "aided eye ".

8. 73.3l(a} (7) - Again, it appears that the words "Finger-print type seals" need clarification .

9. 73.3l(d) - It appears that , to be consistent with Para-graph (a) above , the first line of this paragraph should read " *** Each owner-licensee or its agent who delivers to a *** " . Also , in ord8r to be consistent with Paragraph (b )

above , the word "he" in the second and third sentences of this paragraph should be changed to " *** the person taking s uch delivery shall *** ", and "Such person taking delivery shall also * * . ", respectively.

We trust that the above will be helpful in formulating a new physical protection and material control requirements po li cy.

Sincere l y

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Nuclear Materials and Equipment Corporation a subsidiary of Babcock & Wilcox----*- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

609 North Warren Avenue, Apollo, Pa. 15613 Telephone: (412) 842-01 11 March 30 , 1973

\

Mr. Paul c. Bender Secretary to the Camri.ssion U. s . Atcrnic Energy Ccmnission Washington, D. c. 20545

Dear Mr. Bender :

On February 1, 1973 the Atani.c Energy Conmission issued new pro:p'.)sed regulations for changes in 10 CFR Part 50, Part 70 , and Part 73 for the physical security and accmmtability of special nuclear materials (SNM}

• Licensees and other interested persons were requested to res:p'.)nd with ccmnents and suggestions on the proposed regulations. Nuclear Materials and Equiµnent Corporation (NUMEC), a subsidiary of the Babcock & Wilcox Canpany, respectfully sul:mits the following ccmnents and suggestions on the pro:EX)sed regulations .

NUMEx:: is a major processor of special nuclear materials for the Governrrent and private industry. NUMEC operates two sites for the manufacture of products containing nuclear rna.terials : (a) 10'.N-enriched and high-enriched uranium are processed at the caripany ' s Apollo , Pennsylvania site under AEX: license SNM-145, and (b) plutonium is processed at the canpany 's Parks Township, Pennsylvania site under license SNM-414 . Currently ,

NUMEC is processing low-enriched uranium for carrnercial contracts at a rate of about 30 rretric tons per rronth; high-enriched uranium for Government contracts at a rate of between 300 and 400 kilograms per nonth; and plutonium for Government and conmarcial contracts at a rate of between 10 and 15 kilograms per nonth.. Because of its long history of handling the above three categories of special nuclear material , NUMOC believes it is qualified to ccmnent on the llll)act of the proposed regulations on our business and on the nuclear fuel industry in general.

NUMEC believes that the selection of a 30-day period for physical inventory of plutonium operations and a 60-day period for physical inventory of high-enriched uranium operations appears to be an arbitrary

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Mr . Bender March 30, 1973 decision . We believe that the tendency toward concentrating on zrore frequent physical inventories provides only limiteq assurance that SNM is not lost or deviated. We believe that to serve the industry better nore emphasis must be placed on developing innovative inventory practices that minimize physical inventories and allow the licensee to close his books routinely in an acceptable manner without costly shutda-ms for p~'.lysical inventory .

Therefore , we suggest two changes to the proposed regulations . First, that the regulations be broadened to provide the licensee the flexibility of reducing the number of physical inventories required by the proposed regulation if the licensee can demonstrate that alternative approaches have been inplemented and tested which provide the Corrmission with acceptable evidence that SNM is being controlled in a manner equivalent to the assurance gained from zronthly or 60-day inventories; and second , that the proposed regulations be broadened to provide the licensee the flexibility of scheduling physical inventories on a rotating basis which precludes the necessity for a total shutdown of operations at any specified time .

We hope the above contrlel1ts and suggestions will assist the Ccmnission in nodifying the proposed regulations for special nuclear material . We believe the above changes will give industry an incentive to develop new approaches to material management which will meet the projected needs of the nuclear industry in an econanical manner .

Ve:r:y truly yours ,

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Manager , Quallty and Materials Management ECM/lkp

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'estingh!mse Electric Corporation Power Systems Water Reactor Divisions Box355 Pittsb1.rgh Pennsylvania 15230 March 30, 1973 U. S. Atomic Energy Commission Office of the Secretary of the Commission Washington, D. C. 20545 \

Attention: Mr. Frank w. Karas, Chief Public Proceedings Staff Gentlemen:

Subject:

Proposed Rule Making - Title 10, CFR Parts SO, 70 and 73 By notice published in the Federal Register of February 1, 1973, and by letter notification, dated February 2, 1973, from Mr. R. G. Page, the USEAC has advised all interested persons tha t it is contempla ting significant changes to its regulations in 10 CFR Parts 50 , 70, and 73 regarding its requirements for safeguarding special nuclear materials.

The Westinghouse Electric Corporation wishes to offer the following comments on the proposed regulations.

General Comments

1. Westinghouse has no current interest in the regulations in Part 50 dealing with reprocessing plant licensing.

Furthermore, the proposed sections closely parall e l sections proposed in Part 70. We , therefore , will restrict our comments to the proposed Part 70 changes, with the understanding that.they should also be considered as appropriate when the Commission finalizes the changes to Part 50.

2. Although we realize that these changes may, in fact, reflect the tenor of the times, we consider them a move backward to the types of security practiced during the Manhattan District era.

i General Comments (continued)

On the other hand, in the face of this approach, it does seem rather inconsistent to insert such detailed and specific requirements into such public documents.

It would appear that the Commission has again furnished potential hijackers, malcontents and various and sundry militants with the details of the conditions under which SNM is transported throughout the nation. Ideally these details should be between the Commission and their major licensees and, therefore, should not be a 11 public 11 matter.

3. We wish to reiterate our basic objection to 'incorporating regulations in Part 73 that impose obligations on the licensee with respect to placing restrictions on carriers' activities that the licensee cannot legally require of a common carrier. The true effect of proposed 10CFR73.31 is to exclude the vast majority of commercial motor carriers from participation in the movement of SNM subject to Part 73. Westinghouse maintains that i t would be preferable, and much less devious, to delete from the regulations the exemption granted to carriers and then to license any interested carriers directly.

4. The Commission requested cost impact data from affected licensees. Depending on the options chosen, Westinghouse estimates that the initial expenditures required to implement these proposed controls would range from about

$300,000 to $700,000, with the most probable figure hovering around $500,000. The corresponding approximate annual expenses would run from $300,000 down to about

$250,000, with the most probable figure being the $300,000 amount. These figures must be considered in relation to their effect on the activities of a single operating cfivision, and the gross income required to generate a net income of such magnitude. As another measure of the cost effect of these proposed regulations, the costs of a protected shipment between our Cheswick, Pa., and Columbia, S.C., facilities would be increased by a factor of approximately 500%.

5. The Commission's heavy dependence on armed guards and "fortified" positions really does not correspond to the latest tactical thinking. In general, dependence on guns and LLEA is passe 1

• Westinghouse suggests that the Commission instead depend on a nationwide network of highly mobile strike and recovery forces provided by the Federal Government, e.g., U.S. military personnel or federal marshals. ~0ch forces, utilizing helicopters, etc., could "scramble" from pre-determined bases to any threat point whether it involved a hijack attempt on the open road or an assault on a licensed facility. In addition, we suggest* that the Commission explore with the Joint Committee the adequacy of existing penalties provided by law for the forceful seizure of SNM.

I I

I General Comments (continJed)

I I

6. Similarly, the techniqµe of issuing personnel clearances, using searches, the buddy system or other form of monitor-ing of individuals is contrary to our democratic ways.

In the end, the decent! law-abiding citizen who really doesn't require close .surveillance will be inconvenienced, the law breaker will find a way to circumvent it.

i 7o Westinghouse suggests that those portions of proposed Part 73 that deal withlon-site physical security might better be i-ncluded as specific provisions related to processing SNM under proposed Section 70.25. This would reduce ambiguity and P?Ssible confusion.

Specific Comments Paragraph 7O.4{v). Reviselto read:

" *** which contains vital equipment. A vital area shall be enclosed within ... :roof, and floor of which each constitutes a physicalibarrier as defined in Paragraph 73.3(f) of this chapter."

f We see no sound reason:to require that the structure enclosing a vital areajbe made of a solid material.

I Paragraph 7O.4(w). In the\first sentence, insert the word "credibly" between "could" and "endanger." Delete the second sentence. '

As written, approximately 75% of all the equipment in a plant would be classified as vital, plus many operating personnel. Westinghouse feels that the maximum credible accident analysis should determine the extent to which equipment must be cons dered vital. The "double contingency 11 concept should be basic to the concept of credibility.

Paragraph 7O.22(b). Revise to read:

"I 11

• • • fiye effective kilograms ., *. 11 The Commission has committed itself to a program of "graded" safeguards. The adoption of the "effective kilogram" is a laudable step in this direction. In this instance, the Commission has produced no valid justification for reducing the 5000 gram breakpoint that it is currently using as a basis for applying FMC requirements and we request that it not b0 so reduced.

I

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Specific Coim:nents {continued)

Paragraph 70.22(g). Revise to read:

" *** by the licensee more than 5 effective kilograms of SNM, other than a license *** ".

/

See coim:nent on suggested 70.22(b), above. Many licensees I have established the scope of their operations and their I

I t license possession limits on the existing 5000 gram limit.

I Westinghouse simply cannot see any genuineladvantage to l

I reducing that number that would offset thelextensive burden imposed on these relatively small licenses.

Section 70.25. Revise to read:

11

• * ., or use 5 effective kilograms of SNM, other than See comments on suggested 70.22(b) and 70.22(g).

Paragraph 70.25(c) (7). Revise to read:

"Personal vehicles shall not routinely be permitted II The regulation should provide for those occasions when a personal vehicle being used for business purposes must be permitted within the protected area.

Paragraph 70.25{c) (8). Revise to read:

" *** whenever it can reasonably be concluded that they have been compromised .** 11 Basing a requirement for change on a "possibility" is not acceptable, since the Commission appears to rule out nothing as impossible.

Paragraph 70.25(d) (1). Revise in two places to read:

"All security-related alarms .*. "

It may be desirable to have process alarms, gamma monitors, etc. annunciate at a central location, but we see no need for that location to be both, or even one, of the continuously manned stations.

Paragraph 70.25(f} (2). Revise to read:

" *** 7 days, or such other interval as may be specified in Part II of the security plan require.j in Paragraph 70.22(g).

The seven-day requirement for a functional check seems rather arbitrary. This is particularly true of devices involving the rupture of a wire or foil, which might be as reliably checked by a visual inspection.

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Specific Comments (continued).

Paragraph 70.32(c). Revise to read:

n

" *** exceeding five effective kilograms See comments to suggested change to Paragraph 70.22(b).

Paragraph 70.5l(c). Revise to read:

II

" *** exceeding five effective kilograms See comments to suggested change to Paragraph 70.22(b).

Paragraph 70.Sl(e). Revise to read:

"*** exceeding five effective kilograms "

See comments to suggested change to Paragraph 70.22(b)

Paragraph 70.Sl(e} (1). Revise to include all of i, ii, iii, and iv under i. Renumber v, vi, vii, viii and ix to suit.

This change will clearly indicate the applicability of ii, iii, and iv to tamper-safed material.

Paragraph 70.Sl(e) (2). :Revise to read:

"(2} Within 120 days ... 11 Also add a sentence at the end to read: "A thorough physical inventory, including a safeguards audit, within the 60 days prior to the effective date of this paragraph shall fulfill the requirement for a physical inventory."

The 120-day period is compatible with the provisions of Paragraph 70.Sl(g). The provision for an inventory just completed is obvious.

Paragraph 70. 51 (e) (3} (i) & (ii). Revise to read:

"Three calendar months for *** "

Consider the elaborate physical security requirements imposed by Paragraph 70.25 and 73.32 that are intended to minimize and control personnel physical contact with SNM.

A monthly inventory would mean almost constant shuffling of SNM, cleaning up afterwards, or getting ready for the next physical inventory. This would seem to be opposed to the Commission's intent.

Paragraph 70.Sl(e) (4) ( 1 i}, (iv) & (v).

After the word "record" in each subparagraph insert the phrase "for a period of one year".

There should be some date after which the records can be discarded as not beina rpm,; ..,.,.,.r1 "'"'** 1 ""- ~-*-

I

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Specific Comments {continued)

Paragraph 70.Sl(e) (5). Revise to read:

" *** low enriched uranium." Delete entire remainder of paragraph.

The _proposed comparison to additions to or removals from material in process has no real validity.

Paragraph 70.Sl(e) (6) provides for a licensee or applicant to negotiate with the Commission for a specific LE(MUF).

Paragraph 7,0. 51 {h). Revise to read:

" *** within 240 days II To properly analyze, budget, design, procure, and implement an overall system, including secure storage, would require at least one year to complete. Each licensee's situation should be treated separately with respect to the compliance ti~e required, based on a

• realistic implementation schedule for existing licensees.

Paragraph 70.53(b) (~).

I Delete in its entirety.

This is to conform with the suggested deletion in Paragraph 70.Sl(e) (5).

Paragraph 73.l(a). Revise to read:

" *** by the licensee, of more than five effective kilograms of SNM.

See comments to suggested change to Paragraph 70.22(b).

Paragraph 73.3(n). Revise to read:

" *** is within unobstructed sight of the vehicle, which must be locked if the cab is unoccupied."

A ten-foot distance from the access door seems unreasonably short, since a man getting out the the cab would be further away than that during an interval of time until he reached the rear of a standard truck or trailer. We would like to point out tha*t, under the conditions in the proposed regulations, naual nccupancy" may be a misnomer,.and "multiple occupancy" involving at least three drivers may be required to meet DOT and Teamster Union requirements.on duty periods, etc.

Specific Comments (continued)

I Paragraph 73.30(b).

11 Revise to read:

exceeding twenty grams or twenty curies, whichever I

is less, of plutonium or uranium-233 or 350 grams of J uranium-235 (contained in uranium enriched to twenty percent or more in the U-235 isotope) but less than five effective kilograms .** 11 See comments to suggested chunge to Paragraph 70.22(b).

Paragraph 73.31(a) (1). Revise to read:\

"When highway transportation *** " and 11 No scheduled intermediate stops *** 11 Use of a "truck" as such is not always mandatory when moving SNM on roads. The term "hi~*hway transportation" is preferred.

This regulation does not provide for the distinct possibility of equipment breakdown that would require material transfer.

Paragraph 73. 31 (a} (1) (i).

Delete Revision to eliminate the requirement that the escort be armed would apparently not coincide with the Commission's intent. On the other hand, Westinghouse is opposed to the concept of using armed personnel as a deterrent. It normally only means that the "attacker" will escalate his forces to the extent necessary to give him some assurance of success. Please refer to our General Comment No. 5 for our position on the proper approach to dealing with hijackers.

If the Commission persists in considering the requirement for using armed escortsp major 'federal legislation appears to be necessary to permit the interstate transportation and use of weapons; to provide detailed federal guidelines on what constitutes "adequate force"; etc. Further, we suggest that the regulations consider the effect of using a "convoyu technique. Would each vehicle serve as "escort" for the other, could a single separate armed escort provide coverage for more than one carge vehicle, etc.?

I I

Specific Comments (continued)

Paragraph 73.3l(a) (1) (ii).

The design and procurement of a suitable truck or trailer would be unique. In particular, [since we suggested the deletion of subparagraph (i)] the necAssity for reliability would become paramount. A rough estimate of the cost of a "Brinks" type truck runs between $150,000 and $200,000 so the provision of a stand-by unit would be prohibitively expensive. The procurement lead time quite probably would be in excess of one year for even the first unit. The protective armor necessary on such a vehicle would drastically increase the vehicle weight and severely encroach on its cargo capacity.

Paragraph 73.31(a) (2). Revise to read:

"When both "highway and air II Again, the term highway transportation is preferred.

Paragraph 73.3l(a) (2) (iii). Revise to read:

" .** shall be within fifty feet of the vehicle which is not obscured from sight by intervening screens."

Ten feet seems unreasonable and the monitor probably would be in the way of the operators. For an aircraft, he might have to be on a ladder to meet the 10-foot requirement since the aircraft access door may*be greater than 10 feet in the air.

Paragraph 73.31(a) (3).

D~lete requirement for armed escort. See our comments to 73.3l(a) (1) (i).

(

Also, a two hour contact req~irement seems unreasonable for typical freight shipments especially when there are no stops, or where stops are at freight sidings where access to phones is not available as in many rural areas. For the limited number of shipments made this way, we question the advisability of notifying the local law enforcement authority. We are reluctant to believe that all levels of law enforcement agencies would react effectively on short notice.

Specific Comments {continued)

Paragraph 73.3l(a) (4).

This requirement cannot be imposed by a licensee on a common carrier. Selection of routes and timing of delivery may be recommended buticannot be imposed or enforced. Even if it could be done, ultra-detailed plans are almost certain to miscarry sooner or later. We suggest this be deleted in its entirety.

Paragraph 73.3l(a) (5).

This requirement is not practical.

I Dependence on radio-telephone to provide a two hour communications link is :impossible. It requires equipment capable of transmitting on any of three separate "bands" to assure nationwide coverage. Even so, many rural areas or "dead spots" do not:perrnit contact with central telephone communication center. In addition, in many urban areas where telephone service is available, the glut of calls imposes long delays before a mobile call can be placed. Even stopping:at roadside telephone booths could not assure two-hour communications as booths are not always available. We suggest:'that the Conunission delay this requirement for a fixed check-in interval until a more reliable communication 1 network is available.

Paragraph 73o3l(a) ( 6) *  !

Revise to specify the mi:nimwn size and the type of marking perferred. Identification of the vehicle from the air in clear weather at l,OOO*feet above the ground appears needlessly vague. In addition, this requirement raises other questions such as (1) must the escort vehicle also be marked, (2) what cc.ling system is to be used, (3) must the markings be lwninous or illuminated for night identification, (4) is the air observer limited to normal naked eye viewing, etc~?

I Paragraph 73.31(a) (7).

I Please designate specifically what is meant by "finger-print type sealso" Possibly this requirement should be included under Part 71 of the Commission's Regulations that describe the requirements for packages and/or packagings.

• I

/" /

~ I j

II Specific Comments (continued)

Paragraph 73.31(d), (e), (f) and (g).

The Commission's insistence upon using such terms as

' "immediately" or "at the estimated time" is not practicable.

Long range shipments, particularly imports and exports, simply cannot be scheduled with the degree of accuracy apparently visualized by members of the Commission's staff.

Some latitude should be granted to the licensee in such matters.

Paragraph 7 3. 32 (a) (1). \

Delete second sentence in its entirety.

As proposed, this requirement would impose a drastic restriction on the use of existing facilities. If the licensee is willing to comply with the requirements involved in operating within a material access area for operations that do not involve SNM, this should be his prerogative.

Paragraph 73.4l(c).

In various specific comments, we have made suggestions for rule changes that would n~duce the exaggerated demands for detail that are reflected* in this paragraph. Such changes should be examined to determine the extent of the changes to be made in Paragraph 73.4(c). It should be noted that the effective accumulation of the minute detail presently required by the proposed regulation, within a large corporation, is not feasible.

Thank you for this opportunity t9 participate in the Commission's rule making process. If you have any questions, please write me at the above address, or telephone me on (412) 373-4652.

Very truly yours, Karl R. Schendel License Administrator KRS: jh

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GEORGE B, PARKS EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT March 3 0 , 1973 Secretary of the Commission Un~ted States Atomic Energy Commission Washington, o.c. 20545 Attention: Chief, Pub li c Proceedings Staff

Dear Sir:

We appreciate the opportunity to comment on the proposed changes to 10 CFR SO , 7 0 and 73 , pertaining to physical security requirements and material control and accounting procedures for nuclear material .

Kerr-McGee has participated in several steps of the nuclear fuel cycle industry since it initially opened a uranium mine and mill in the Ambrosia Lake area of New Me xi co in 1953. Most recently ,

we have commenced operation s at a uranium hexafluoride conversion facility near Gore, Oklahoma and a p lutonium mix ed oxide fuel pro-duction plant near Cimarron, Oklahoma . These operations give us a firm background of operating experience on which to base our com-ments on the proposed regulations .

Kerr-McGee is convinced these proposed regulations are un-realistic and unnecessarily stringent. As we have previously ex-plained in detail to representatives of the Commission , the pro-posed materials control and accounting requirements are in fact technically impossible to achieve in the wet process system of our existing' Cimarron p lutonium facility . From this two general con-clusions must be drawn .

First , i t is not feasible to'attempt t o promulgate regula-tions detailing strict and specific procedures in this area which a re designed to apply uniformly to all facilities . Any set o f regu-lations adopted, in order to be workable , must provide for consider-ation of the design and processes of the particular facility and for the adoption of appropriate safeguarding and accounting pro-cedures designed to accomplish the desired objective in a manner compatible with the operation of such facility . There must also be recognition of the possibility of and permission for some trade-off between materi a l s cont 1 and accou n ting requiremen and p hysical security , so that or ex run- e an additional ph sical se curity measure might be taken in order to I l iminate a burdensome measurement point .

liliflr+ntrns~ . ......:.. ... ~ . - tHb t>ht* ,._ _ _ _ _. . , N * - - - - -

Secretary of the Commission March 30, 1973 Page #2 Additionally, it is clear the severity of the proposed procedures greatly exceeds any reasonable relationship to the public need in-tended to be served. We are unaware-, and we believe the industry as a whole is unaware, of occurrences of industrial sabotage or diversion of nuclear material which would tend to justify the im-

• position of requirements as strict as those proposed. The Commission has not demonstrated the need for such requirements, or offered any justification or explanation for them. Certainly the public inte~est will not be served by adoption of burdensome requirements di sproportionate to the end sought .

With reference to particular provisions of the proposed reg-ulations we have the following comments:

1. The Commission ' s announcement states that the require-ments of the proposed revisions to 10 CFR Part 70 "are based on the estimated technology capability " of the industry. Our exper-ience at the wet chemical process Cimarron Facility makes it clear such a forecast of the capabilities of the industry is not based on a realistic appraisal of present technology .

According to the announcement, the proposed standards "antici-pate greater utilization of commercially available equipment , im-proved measurement quality assurance programs , additional measure -

ment points and improved physical inventory measurements " than pre-sently employed . Much of the equipment required for compliance with these standards is not commercially available. For example, no equipment currently exists to measure plutonium held up in wet chemistry processing equipment. To the best of our knowledge , no research is being done on the development of such equipment by the AEC or private industry . Plutonium analysis has been refined as far as possible with the cur ~nt analytical methods, which may still be considered some\vhat inexact; however we are not aware of any development work now being done on new analytical methods to im-prove quality measurement assurance programs for plutonium anal-ysis.

• We submit that it is completely inequitable for the Commis-sion, through imposition of regulatory requirements beyond the cur-rent state of the art, to impose upon individual companies in the industry the considerable burden of the research and development required to develop "improved physical inventory methods". We point out that the Commission itself has large past and continuing SNM processing activities .

2. Additional measurement points proposed in the P t 70 revisions would require a much large r area for a processins plant of the Cimarron Facility type , and would provide additional point

? . ,*.l.+/-":S:ir.,r I

Secretary of the Commission March 30, 197 3 1 Page #3 I

I where material could be physically diverted in the process of mea-surement . Such expansion of plant area would of itself increase security problems by increasing personnel required for plant oper-ation and physical area requiring surveillance, while at the same time increasing the cost of the facility by an estimated 50%. Thus the addition of measurement points would not, in Gur opinion , pro-vide a significant contribution to safeguarding procedures . This again illustrates that consideration should be given to permitting the utilization of additional physical security procedures as an alternative to the installation of additional measurement points or the implementation of more stringent accounting procedures .

3. Six months would be allowed for the implementation of all the proposed Part 70 requirements by a licensee, with up to an additional six months permitted if the cost of implementation is over $500,000. No other consideration is given to the fact that for licensees currently operating SNM facilities such stringent regulations may be impossible to meet without complete rebuilding of facilities . We have estimated that implementation of the pro-posed procedures at our Cimarron Facility would take approximately 24 months, and require a capital expenditure of $2.5 million, with an additional expenditure of $200,000 per year required for oper-a ting expense. The comparatively young nuclear industry cannot absorb this type of cost and delay . In any event some reasonable allowances must be included in the regulations for existing facil -

ities built to comply with requirements existing at the time, so that such plants may continue to operate and the investment therein not be lost.

4. Subpart (e) (5) of Part 70.51 would establish Limits of Error for any material unaccounted for on the basis of a fixed num-ber of grams or a percent of the additions or removals from material in process. It is apparent to anyone who has had experience in SNM processing that such constraints are established for a labor-a tory type of operation dealing with no greater than a kilogram throughput or for a high production plant dominated by throughput .

Neither of these approaches recognizes the quality and economic requirements of a nuclear fuel plant .

Our nuclear fuel plant operating experience has convinced us that in order to operate economically a fuel plant must in some manner insure a maximum of once-through production meeting the qual -

i ty requirements of customer, industry , and regulation . To obtain the desired quality one tin through and u avoid rejections and expensive rework, adequate lending, test ng, and quality control procedures must be employed . This requires that a significant in-ventory of materials be maintained in relation to output to per-mit thorough in process testing and inspection. The result is an

Secretary of the Commission March 30, 1973 Page #4 inventory dominated situation, which does not lend itself to the procedures proposed in this subpart.

The material control pl:an, analytical quality control plan,

.and inventory procedures should be considered individually for each installation rather than such ,an arbitrary establishment of uni-form regulation at the present stage of development of the nuclear industry. We submit that the proposed regulations would establish a pattern of design for nuclear fuel manufacturing facilities that would not achieve the low cost, quality manufacture and the uni-formity of product desired by the Commission and industry.

s. The requirements for security precautions in shipment proposed in Part 73 are far out of proportion to any existing or anticipated need for such precautions . The requirement for an armed escort vehicle seems particularly inappropriate. These procedures would place upon the shipper the burden of insuring the security and integrity of the United States transportation system. In no other industry is such an inequitable distribution of responsibil-ity placed upon the shipper purchasing transportation services.

If the reason for such stringent regulations is correctly stated, i.e. "in the interest of the common defense and security", then the more appropriate establishment to bear this responsibility is the United States Government, which under our Constitution is charged with this responsibility.

In summary, we do not believe there exists any need for adop-tion of regulations of such severity and suggest the proposed regu-lations be reviewed in the light of these and other industry com-ments so as to provide a more realistic assessment of the balance between physical security an~ accountability, the current market for SNM*processing, the diff rences between the various existing plants, and the degree of severity actually needed to be imposed in these regulations. The proposed stringent uniform requirements would be unworkable in our opinion,. and their overall impact on the nuclear community would be incalculable. Undoubtedly, many existing facilities would be forced to shut down or seek special relief, an undesirable choice of alternatives. We believe that the interests of the industry, the public and the country would be adversely affected. We strongly urge the Commission to recon-sider its intention to adopt the proposed regulations.

Very truly yours, tg513~z--

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DOCKETED (ISIAEG P .O . Box81608 APR 3 1973 March 30, 1973 San D iego, California 92138 Tel : (714)453- 1000 Offfr,~ of the Seorat.uy Mlle rroc,ed/ngs Branc Secretary of the Commission U. S. Atomic Energy Commission Washington, D. C. 20545 Attention: Chief, Public Proceedings Staff

Subject:

Proposed Requirements for Physical Protection During Transportation--10 CFR 73

Dear Sir:

The opinions stated in this letter are in response to the invitation extended by the Commission on page 3080 of the Federal Register for Febru-ary 1, 1973 about the proposals to amend 10CFR73 with respect to security measures for material in transit.

In our view, the contemplated amendments suffer from use of a faulty standard to determine their applicability and from a lack of articula-tion concerning the hazards ultimately intended to be controlled. After ela-borating upon those principles, we will have some subsidiary comments con-cerning detailed language.

The two fundamental prob l e ms we perceive are closely entwined.

It is our belief that if the full range of credible hazards to be guarded against is marshalled, considered and balanced, a different standard for attachment of a version of the proposed new regulations is compelled.

The contemplated regulations were proposed in the interest of the common defense and security, through strengthening the already existing re-quirements for physical protection of SNM while in transit. It was also ex-plained that the amendments are inspired by an intention of reducing the risk of theft of SNM. We are confident the "common defense and security phrase was not and should not be used solely in the DOD sense to the exclusion of a concern for the possible effects of improper use of stolen material in the do-mestic aggressions of criminal enterprises. The unarticulated issue is, there-fore, "What kind of improper employment of SNM purloined from the transpor -

tation process should we be concerned about? 11 The answer may reveal that A DIVISION OF GULF OIL CORPORATION

Secretary of the Commission - 2 March 30, 1973 simply applying security measures typical of those used with AEC weapons grade materials will be a dis service to the public interest by generating an unwarranted confidence without reducing the most credible risks.

It is Gulf's thesis that the evils which are most appropriate causes for concern are not properly evaluated in terms of two kilograms of plutonium or U-233 or of 5 kilograms of >20% U-235 in uranium. Such standards seem-ingly were suggested under the influence of a presupposition that use of stolen materials for explosive devices is the significant hazard. We submit that it is not, and that even if it were, the 20% enrichment standard for U-235 would be inappropriate.

If criminal elements really wish to have a nuclear explosive de-vice for employment or £or mere threat, they would be better advised to steal it from the government than to take material from most licensees I shipments, due to the difficulty they would experience in making an explosively effective device from the kinds of material licensees ordinarily transport. We do not in-tend to suggest, of course, that no licensee shipment ever involves materials that have a capability for such use. Certainly, on occasions there are such shipments, but they can be defined much more precisely than by mere refer-ence to a quantity of plutonium or U-233 or to a quantity of moderately enriched uranium without reference to chemical and physical form. Reflection upon the fact that some materials are hardly usable for any kind of weapon purpose other than the psychological one and that others lend themselves to threats of wide scale poison application makes it apparent that there are wide variations and distinctions one could, and from a regulatory point of view should, make among such diverse shipments as those of large quantities of highly enriched UF 6*

equal quantities of U-235 contained in high or low enrichment materials inti-mately bonded with diluents, or various forms of plutonium. and U-233. In all of the variations, use of licensee material for its potential explosive qualities is the least likely recourse of criminal elements. The bomb threat is dramatic, but is hardly the practical one.

When consideration is given to the more practical applications of stolen material, it becomes apparent that the traditional 20% enrichment_ stan-dard £or regulatory distinctions is invalid. Its use has become merely habitual.

There was never a precise reason for its choice and today it is too arbitrary to be continued and extended. The effects of its continued employment are unfor-tunate from the points of view of both real public safety and the economic health and development of the private nuclear industry. Continued use of the 20% en-richment standard in security regulations not only leads to a false sense of se-curity about the significance of precautionary measures, their efficacy, and their

Secretary of the Comm.is sion - 3 March 30, 1973 relevance to the protection of the public interest, but also tends to align AEC, without adequate cause, with one segment of the private industry to the com-petitive disadvantage of another.

Use of the 20% enrichment criterion is fallacious when addressing undefined hazards. A typical case in point is afforded by any large scale fuel fabricator shipping and handling a UF 6 feed of from 2 to 5% enrichment, which will contain from 20 to 40 times the quantity of flourine per unit of U-235 that a uranium-thorium fuel cycle fabricator will process. The proposed regula-tions, due to their use of the outmoded standard and perhaps concentration upon the relatively incredible explosive risk, afford no protection whatever against that highly hazardous characteristic, Clearly, a better system of gra-dations with respect to the form, quantity and type of materials to be secured in the light of their accessibility, usability and foreseeable modes of use, is necessary. We propose development of a variation on the IAEA recommenda-tions, but going beyond IAEA 1 s simple two-group system and requiring appro-priately graded levels of security adjusted to the degree of accessibility and to the nature of the ultimate hazards. It should recognize the fact that foreign enrichment capabilities can develop within the foreseeable future, so that do-mestically and from the industrial point of view cost considerations are not only applicable but reasonable. On the latter score, to appraise the attractive-ness of material for explosive use, a formula can be developed to measure ac-cessibility (i.e. attractiveness) in terms of the ratio of the cost per fissile unit to purify licensee material to the cost per fissile unit to enrich U to the same level. In light of the well-known probability that new processes will reduce en-richment costs, and that in any event enrichment costs may not really be a significant deterrent to a determined criminal enterprise, it is apparent that something more than the simple enrichment criterion is necessary if we are to have a defensible trigger level for security regulations of the kind proposed.

In the attached comments, we advance a suggestion about rephras-ing 73. l to ad~pt it more closely to attractiveness, 11 The suggested language has not been thoroughly polished, but it or its later versions should be applied to 10CFR73.. l(b), 73.13(a), 73. 30, and 73. 31.

We have not addressed enrichment itself as a criterion. IAEA uses an enrichment-squared criterion, but it really reflects explosive weapons use and the way that enrichment costs vary to achieve explosive weapons grade ma-terial. It neglects the non-explosive usage. If the AEC chooses to use enrich-ment as 'its criterion for generalized hazards to the public, it should therefore assume far less weighting than the IAEA formula. Among other reasons, the

Secretary of the Commission - 4 March 30, 1973 ingestion hazard of uranium is due to the U-238 and U-234 rather than the U-235. The hazard from natural uranium lies in its chemical toxicity as a heavy metal rather than due to any particular isotope. At an enrichment of about 5 percent, the radiological ingestion hazard becomes the predomi-nant factor with the U-234 isotope as the major contributor. The U-234 follows the U-235 in the enrichment process, As enrichment increases, the radiotoxicity becomes almost totally that of the U-234. The sounder measure of the overall hazard then, for generalized purposes is really the total quantity of U-234 (or, i£ preferred, the tt0tal quantity of U-234 and U-235) present, with only slight dependence upon the degree of enrichment, The fission product hazard from a non-explosive criticality sit-uation also varies slowly, in that the minimum critical mass £or U-235 (see Figure 21 of TID 7028) increases slowly as a function of enrichment. The minimum critical U-235 mass at 5% enrichment is only 2. 2 times that at 93%, and at 2% it has increased only to 4, so even if the non-criticality hazards are omitted from the balance a simple enrichment criterion dis-torts the risk- precaution equation.

In brief, Gulf believes that the underlying theme of the proposed rules £or Part 73 fails to take account of the true hazards associated with stolen or diverted material and falls short of a reasoned evaluation of at-tractiveness. If physical security requirements are to be increased by reg-ulation (a matter as to which we take no position and concerning which the announcement states conclusions but presents no evidence of need) they should be adjusted to the practical hazards and not to those of presumed ex-plosive weapons alone. We will have more to say, below, about use of en-richment as one among several criteria at various stages of fuel fabrication.

It is recognized that highly enriched materials in simple physical and chemical forms such as metal, oxides, and fluorides are very deserving of protection. When the same highly enriched materials are processed £or use as fuel in a reactor, additional materials are frequently added and the en-riched material becomes intimately mixed with and held by these materials.

When this occurs, the enriched material can only be separated from the re-taining matrix by the use of extensive processing, and is no more attractive for nefarious applications than are low enriched oxides. The HTGR fuel cycle is a prime example of this. The uranimn is made into a ceramic kernel, given various coatings, embedded in a rod, then sealed in a graphite block. The typi-cal rod is about one weight percent U-235. The costs of separating the U-235 from the accompanying materials, including thorium, and repurifying to the original feed material state amount to a significant fraction of the cost of the

Secretary of the Commission - 5 March 3 0, 19 7 3 original material. Such fuel matrices must be considered to be in the same class as fuels with a low degree of enrichment. It is urged that the proposed regulations be revised or supplemented to ease the restrictions imposed upon those par-ts of a facility that are involved only with dilute materials. The categories formerly set forth in the AEC Manual appendix, Section 2401-071, on physical standards for the security of strategically important materials are a good starting point.

Turning to the question of the use of escort vehicles carrying armed guards, there is reason to d0ubt the degree of security provided.

Any criminal group which systematically sets about to hi-jack a truck or rail car carrying strategic materials would be certain to know if the federal regulations required the vehicle to be escorted, The escort vehicle would simply and logically be eliminated as the first act. That is one reason why Gulf, like many companies today, does not utilize armed guards as a matter of corporate policy. There are numerous others.

1 Another reason for reluctance, re levant when private armed guards are proposed to be required by rule of a federal agency, is the incon-gruity of entrusting protection against international incidents on the one hand to the Defense Department because such matters are the latter 1 s normal res-ponsibility as a matter of governmental principle, while on the other hand im-posing upon private persons the police functions that a~eaequapy the normal responsibilities of other government agencies. The propriety of assuming that the traditional means and the governmental agencies established for con-trol of criminal activities are inadequate has not been supported by evidence so far as Gulf is aware. It seems to have been only an intuitive conclusion inherent in the propased regulations.

For whatever reason, if AEC adopts the new rules as proposed and insists that licensees who would be subject to them must have armed guards, it will be pressing private enterprise into the crime suppression business, re-quiring private armed guards to be employed for 11 neutralizingtt the threats those same guards determine to exist in what they believe are exigencies, and placing their employers in a most precarious legal position. The licensees effected will be exposed to substantial legal risks, very possibly on absolute liability principles, in the event their guards make mistakes.

Generally, of course, people avoid endangering their own lives or those of others in the defense of property, However, it can happen, and human mistakes can occur, In many states employers will be unable to secure peace officer status for their guards so, although required by the contempl,ated regula-

Secretary of the Commission - 6 March 30, 1973 tions to be engaged in crime suppression by potentially violent means, they will be without the benefit of the usual official privileges. Conscious of its own exposure in a similar matter, twenty years ago AEC obtained statutory powers to authorize its employees and those of its contractors to carry arms in the discharge of official duties. Unless AEC is prepared to do the same thing for its licensees, and in any event until evidence has been adduced to support a conclusion that private armed guards are necessary as a general proposition to supplement regular police agencies, impositions of the risk and the duty upon licensees seems unfair.

There is a more important consideration than the risk to be borne by licensees. It is that entirely innocent persons may be injured as a result of a situation created in response to the proposed regulations. That hazard taken together with the correlative risks to be borne by the licensees and the AEC staff's doubts about the desirability of escort vehicles as recently ex-pressed in the survey of the environmental effects of transportation may make the proposition of mandating a quasi official special armed force a major fed-eral activity having a potential for significant impact upon the human environ-ment. As a minimum, a 11 Hanly type preliminary determinatio-n of environ-mental.effect possibiltt,ies, made upon an adequate record, seem.s, to be called fo:r;:, Hanlyv. Mitchell, 460F.2d640, 4ERCll52 (ZdCir.1972); Hanlyv.

Kleindienst F. Zd _ _, 4 ERC 1785 (2d Cir. Dec. 5, 1972).

Gulf recognizes that the proposed and existing regulations do not state what kind of weapons a guard or escort must have. They merely indicate -

he must be "armed. 11 U that were all, the difficulties would not be so great be-cause a licensee could make its own selection adjusted to the circumstances in which it operates. However, a licensee will apparently not be left free to do that, but will have to satisfy the staff. Our concern in this matter is increased by an address to an Atomic Industrial ForUill meeting at Key Largo, Florida on February 20, 1973 in the course of which a representative of the Directorate of Licensing said members of a licensee's "protection force must be trained to use firearms. " Neither as adopted nor contemplated do the regulations say that, and the address is therefore a good example of the way the proposed regulations could be employed in a manner inconsistent with traditional principles concern-ing staff discretion.

The AEC invited comment upon the added costs that industry might expect due to the proposed regulations regarding physical protection during transport of special nuclear materials. Gulf offers the following estimates based upon current studies involving a 1000 mile trip with new, cold reactor fuel:

Secretary of the Commission - 7 March 30, 1973 Second driver, and 20% increase in transit time due to communications, equivalent to $0. 32 /mile $ 320 Communications (16 calls) 20 Escort Vehicle and two guards: 960

1. Four days 1 pay with overtime ($5/hr): _ $560 2, Vehicle cost for 2,000 miles ($P, 10/mile): 200

3. Per diem for guards ($20/day): 160

4. One night in motel before return trip: 40 Total added cost per trip $1, 300 Original cost per trip Approx. 1, 000

$2,300 Cost is increased by t 130%

An estimate of the annual cost increase for a ll60 MW(e) HTGR reactor is approximately $31, 200, For detailed points concerning language of the proposed regula-tions as drafted, we advance miscellaneous remarks in tabular form as an attachment hereto.

Sincerely, amesP~

Attorney JPH:clg Attachments

10CFR 7 3 SECTION COMMENT Page 1

1. Section 73.lCe) o! 10 CFR Part 73 1s amended to read a.s !ollows: It is recognized that SNM which is in such a form as to be readily available

§ 73. l 1'111 po~c :md ijr.Opc. with simple processes for surreptitious use as an explosive nuclear weapon,

<a) 'I11ls rmrt prescribes requirements such as concentrated oxides, fluorides, or metal, must be afforded a high for the physical protection o! special degree of protection. It must also be recognized that much of the material nuclear mo.tenal by any person who is licensed pursuant to the regulations 1n used in the nuclear industry is contained in matrices of other materials Part 70 of thla chapter and who imPort.s, which in turn make the separation and recovery of SNM very difficult.

a exports, transPorts, delivers to carrier Accordingly, we propose inserting after"(- - - in the U-235 isotope" the

for transport 1n a single shipment, takes delivery of a single shipment free on words "and, if distributed in a matrix, the matrix is composed of over 20 board at the point where it 1s delivered weight percent uranium-235). 11 Related changes are sugge_sted_below.

to a carrier, or possesses at any site or contiguous sites subject to control by the licensee, of (1) more than 5,000 gm.ms o! urnnium*235 (contained In unmirnn enriched to 20 percent or more While this section does use the 10CFR70 licensing qualification, m tile lf~ isotope), or 2,000 grnnis of it does not provide the 10CFR50 exclusion that all similar trigger urnmum-233 or plutonium, or (2) a com-blnatwn of such materiai.s of more than sections in the proposed regulations carry and it is suggested that 5,000 grams, or (3) a combination o! appropriate phrasing be added.

such materials o! less* than 5,000 grams 1! the plutonium or uro.nium-233 content 1s greater than 2,000 grams, This section is not a part of the proposal being commented upon here, how-ever, we believe that the following rephrasing should be made "(contained

73. i'(b) in uranium enriched to 20 percent or more in the U-235 isotope and, if d_istributed in a matrix, the matrix is over 20 weight percent U-235)."

2. A new pa.mgraph (n) 1s added to Dual occupancy of tractors may become a thing of the past in the near

oir~!, ~!

8 10 CFR Part 73 to re!;d M future as motor common carriers turn for reasons of economy to abolishing

§ 73.3 Definilion,. sleeper cabs with dual driver shifts in favor of the system of "pony

• * * *

• express" shifts with only one driver in the vehicle until his relief by

<n) Dui-1 occupancy pratection" another at a division point en route. Truck cabs may eventually, and as mcans a signature security service plus cont.inuous attendance P.Ud surveillance , a general rule, have seat _arrangements for one person only. That should of the shipment thrnugh the 1.188 of two be anticipated, if not presently ~eflected, in the regulations.

dnvers or one dnvcr o.nd an authorized lndlvidui.l. A vehicle is attended when at least one or U1e drivers or the authorized individual 1B in the cab o! the transport vehicle, awake, and not in a. sleeper berth or 1s within 10 feet of an access door lea.ding to the speclaJ nuclear materla.l.

10CFR 73 SECTION COMMENT Page 2 73.13(a) This section is not a part of the proposal being commented upon here, however, for completeness, we believe that the following rephrasing should be made "Uraniu.m-235 contained in uranium enriched to less than 20 percent in the U-235 isotope, or uranium-235 distributed in a matrix such that recovery therefrom is difficult and such that the matrix is composed of 20 percent or less by weight of U-235."

This section is not a part of the proposal being commented upon here, 73.30(a) however, we believe tpat the following rephrasing should be made"( con-tained in uranium enriched to 20 percent or more in the U-235 isotope and, if distributed in a matrix, the matrix is over 20 weight percent U-235)." .

3. Paragraph (b) of 73.30 1s amended -

to reo,d as follows: It is suggested that this section be rephrased to read"- - - -(contained or in uranium enriched to 20 percent or more in the U-235 isotope and~

. ~.

§ 73.30 special Trnn~1*orlalion DU*

clc-nr mnlcrinl by airernCt, if distributed in a matrix, the matrix is composed of over 20 weight

. percent U-235) - - -

• II (b) Shipments by o.lr o! special nu-clear material in quantities exceedlng

( 1) 20 grnrns or 20 curies, whichever is lc.."3, of p!utomum or uranlum-233, but not exceeding 2,000 grams of plutoulum or uranrnm-233 or (3) 350 gra.ms but not excecdmg 5,000 grams of urn.nlwn-235 (coninlncd in uranium ennched to 20 percent or more In the U-235 Isotope) are not subJect to the requirements of this part other than this section.

4. Section 73.31 is a.mended to read as follows: Proposed 73.3l(a)(l) will require licensees by some means to ship

§ 73,31 Physical p1olcc1ion of Ppednl their covered materials on a limited "no intermediate stops" basis.

11m:knr 111nlerinl in lran,it.

(a) Except as speclfied in subpara-It may force "sole use of vehicle" arrangements, which are very graph (a) (8) and paragraph (b) of tb.L'> expensive.

sect.ion, each licensee who transports or who dehve1s to a earner for transvort special nuclear material, shall make arrani;:cment.s to assure that such spe-crnJ. nuclear nmt.erlal will be

• protected in transit as follows:

(1) When truck transportation only is used, special nuclear material shall be trn.mported under the estu.bllshed pro-cedure.<; of a. ca.n-ier which prov1des a system for the physical protection of val-uo ble material in transit and requires e.n exchange ot hand-to-hand receipts at origin and destination, or by a Commls-

10CFR 7 3 SECTION COMMENT Page 3 s!on licensee authorized to transport spec!o.l nuclenr mnicr!al. No intermedi-ate stops to transfer specinl nuclear ma-te11al or other cargo shall be made be-tween the facility of the sllipper and the facility of the receiver. The shipment shall be protecl;ed by dual occupancy protection as defined 1n § 73.3 (n). The shipment shall be further protected by one of the followmg methods:

• m An armed escort consisting of at leust two armed guards shall accompany It was concluded by the AEC in their December 1972 staff report on the sl1ipment in a sepo.rat.e moLor ve- transportation of radioactive materials that "the escort vehicle has hicle. Escorts shall maintain contmuous

• vlg11:tnce for the presence of cortd1tlons a probability of being involved in an accident at least equal to that or s1tuatwns which might threaten the of the shipment vehicle." It is believed that accidents to escort security of the cargo, take such act10n as circumsLanccs might require to avoid in- vehicles and injury to guards and other persons and property may terference with continuous safe passage well be more harmful than any protection of SNM the armed guard of tho vehicle, provide assistance to, or summon aid for crew of cargo vehicles in escorts could provide.

cnse of emergency, check seals and locks at each stop where time permits, and ob- Unless AEC can arrange to overcome them, there will be great diffi-serve vehicles and adjacent areas during stops or layovers. Continuous communi- culties in some states about private armed guards in private vehicles cation capability shall be provided be- on the public highways. There is no reason to restrict business to tween the cargo vehicle and the escort vehicle. The licensee ma.y use his own use of their own employees or agents. Contract services should be employees as armed escorts or he may allowed. In some circumstances, unless precluded by the last clause use an agent. of the text as drafted, the requirement may force licensees to use the services of the relatively few nation-wide connnercial guard services, who are already being heavily burdened by the new FAA requirement for airport surveillance. Escort vehicles and armed guards may only flag a shipment's value and call it to the attention of the unscrupulous. We have no evidence one way or the other but presume that AEC will satisfy itself that the choice eventually made is at least as likely to be correct as incorrect.

Requirements for completely locking vehicles will pose special prob-lems when trucks are stopped by state highway officials or ICC inspectors, as commonly happens. Such incidents can occur at any time during shipment. What is to be done about breaking seals for such inspections and about subsequently relocking and resealing?

10CFR 7 3 SECTION COMMENT Page 4 (il) The sh1pment shall be made in a.

specrnlly designed truck or trailer wluch As written, it gives the licensee no clue as to whether a "specially reduces the vulnera.billty to diversion. designed truck or trailer" is something like an armored car, or as Design features o! the truck or trailer shall permit 1mmohlllza.tion o! the van we have heard but find it difficult to credit, that AEC has in mind and provide barriers or deterrents to something like explosives for emergency detonation in axles or hubs physical penetration.

Within 60 days after (tho eficctl.ve for instant immobilization. As in the case of other passages of date of this amendment), licensees using the February 1 proposals, this one gives neither the licensee, the either method shall submit a plan for the applicant, nor the AEC staff any intelligible standard to apply.

selection, qualification, and tralnmg o!

armed escorts, or the specification and design of a specially designed truck or trailer, o.s approprio.te.

(2) When both truck and air transpor-tat10n ar.c u,ed: (1) special nuclear ma-terial shall be transported between a li-censee facility and the airport as speci-fied in paragraph (1) of this section.

The licensee shall assure that transfers during the air segments of a shipment are mlniffilzed.

(Ii) Special nuclear material shall be transported under the established pro-cedures of a carrier which provides a system for the physical protection of val-uable material in transit and require an exchange of hand-to-hand receipts at origin and destination and at all points en route where there ls a transfer o!

cm.tody.

(1!1) Special nuclear nrn.lerlo.l shall be monitored by an individual or Individuals designated by the licensee or hi3 agent, or as specified by conkact-of carriage, dur-ing each scheduled trnn.sfer from stor-age Lo a vehicle, from one vehicle to an-other, or from a vellicle to r,torage. The momtor shrul keep the shipment under con.;tant surveillance from the time it is released from the locked compartment of the truck or aircraft until it is loaded on to another aircraft or truck and that comparLment is locked, and while the shipment 1s in storage. "Const.a.nt. sur-velllnnce" means that the monitor shall be w1thm 10 feet of the access door to the shipment. The individual who mon-itors shall be required to nollfy the ear-ner ru1d the licensee who mMle the ar-rangements for protection of spccl[l.l nu-clear matcnal immediately of a.ny devia-tion from, or attempted interference with, schedule or routing.

10CFR 73 SECTION COMMENT Page 5 (3) When ra.U transportai10n 1s used, the shipment shall be escorted by two Escort of a SNM railroad car shipment would require three guards armed individuels, in the shipmen\. car or an escort car or the trninr who shall (for 24-hour duty) and a caboose to house them. In case of derail-keep ihe shipment cars under observa- ment or severe accident, the caboose and guards in all probability t1011 and shall detrnin at siops when practicable and time permits to guard would be included with resulting injuries or death. Guards on a the shipment cars and check cn.r 9r con- freight train are worthless; i.e., the SNM-carrying car cannot be tamer locks and sen.ls. Radio-telephone diverted since it cannot leave the tracks; such shipments are too com1mimcai1011 shR.11 be maintamed with a licensee or his agent every 2 holU"s large and heavy or secured in special cars so that they cannot be or less, and at scheduled stops in the stolen, and it is virtually impossible to sabotage the car while event that radio-telephone coverage was not available in the last 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> be[ore it is moving. The only vulnerable time for a railroad car shipment the stop. In the event no call 1s received of SNM is at interchange points which are already guarded by the in accordance with these rcqultCJnents,

• the llcensee or his agent wall lmmedl- railroad companies.

aicly notify an appropriate law enforce-ment authority and the approprlate Atom.le Energy Commission regulatory A operations reg1011al office listed m ap-W1_*p:..e_n_d_l_x_A.

{4) Transit times shall be minimized by selecting tho most direct route whicl1 avoids areas or naLural disaster or civil disorders. Shipments shall be preplanned to assure that deliveries occur at a ilme when the receiver at the final dellvery

point is present to accept recelDt of shipment.

(5) All motor vehicles used to tw.ns-port special nuclear material and escort The requirement of continuous or scheduled radio or telephone call-ins vehicles shall be equipped with a. radio-- is of questionable value. A break in scheduled communications may telephone which can communlcato wiU1 a licensee or his agent.. The licensee or initiate corrective action following an accident, diversion or sabotage, agent with whom commmuco.~ions shall but it is of no value in preventing any of these incidents. If com-be monitored for d1fierent, scgmenLs of the slupment shall be predesignated be- munication during transport is made a matter of regulation, then the fore a. shipment is mo.de. Rad10-oole- AEC should make it a part of the National Inter-Agency Radiological phone calls to such licensee or aqent shall be macle at lea.st every 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> lo Assistance Program since this is the means for obtaining help in case of relay pos1Lion and projected route. Tele- an accident.

phone calls slmll be made every 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> when ra.cl.10-tclepbone coverage is not available. In the event, no call ls received In accordn.ncc with theso requlr~ents, the licensee or his agent shall rmmedi-a.tely notify an appropriate law enforce-ment auLhont,y and the approprrn,Lo Atomic Energy Commission regulatory operations regional office listed 1n ap-pendix A.

10CFR 7 3 SECTION COMMENT Page 6 (6l Motor vehicles shall be marked on top with identifying letters or nwube1-s The use of sp'ecial markings on shipment vehicles is questionable*

which will pe1111!t identifico.t!on of tho They may only flag a shipment's value and call it to the attention vehicle from the arr in clear weather at 1,000 feet abovo ground level, and of the unscrupulous. We have no evidence one way or the other but marked on the sides and rear with tho presume that AEC will obtain data and satisfy itself that the choice same letters or numbers to permit identiflcation from the* ground. eventually made is at least as likely to be correct as incorrect.

(7) When surface tro.nsportat1on is Requirements for completely locking vehicles will pose special used, special nuclell.r ma.tonal shall he cI1.rned m closed vehicles or cont.ainers problems when trucks are stopped by state highway officials or ICC that are locked. Fingerprint tYPf' seals inspectors, as commonly happens. Such incidents can occur at any shall also be used on containers.

time during shipment. What is to be done about breaking seals for such inspections and about subsequently relocking and resealing?

The meaning of "Fingerprint type seals II should be clarified.

-'-----------JI.---*._ .. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - : - ~ - - - a (8) A licensee or appllcant for n. li-cense m11.y apply to the Comnusswn for approvn.l of proposed procedures !or transport of speciru nuclear materrnl in

a. manner not otherwrne auLhorlzcd by the regulntions o! tbIS chapter. Such application shall include a description nncl qun.ntlt,y o! tho special nuclear ma-tcrlru involvc<l, tho orialn and destina-tion, the cn.rr1ern to be used, the expected timo in tmn<,it, tho number o! transfer points, tho communicaUon to be used, the vehicle vlsuru identiilca.tion, and the cargo security and BUrVeillance measures to be u:,ed. -

(b) Ea.ch Ileen.see who takes delivery o! special nuclear material free-on-board This inserts regulations into an area that should rightfully be

(!.o.b.) the point where it 1s delivered to handled by contract negotiation. As a minimum, a phrase should be a carrier for transport shall make tho nrrn,ngemcnts to ~re tbat such special added such as "unless a written agreement exists assigning the n,1clear ma.t-Orlal will be protected 1n responsibility for making such arrangements to another licensee trnnsit ns prescribed in pa.rngruph (a) o! or to the party who delivers the shipment to the carrier."

ilus sccL1on, rnther than the person who delivers such shipment to the carrier for transport,

' 10CFR 7 3 SECTION COMMENT Page 7 (c) Eo.ch llccnscc who imports special nuclear mnte1ial shall make arrnnge-mcnw to 1v*,.*mrc !Jrnt &neh material ,will To avoid an unintended limitation of choice, "or his contractor" be prowcted in transit n.s follows: should follow 11 agent."

(1) J;n lndivlduo.1 designated by the Hccnsce or his agent, or as specified by -- *-* --*- - . --..-....,._ -

a contrnct of carrlngo, shall confinn the confx1.incr count at the first place in the -

United Stn.tcs where the shlpmcnt is du;- -

charged from the arriving carrier.

(2) Tho shipment shall be protected arLer an ivnl in the Umted States as pro- ' -

vidod m paragraphs (a), (d), and (g) o!

this section.

(d) Ea.ch licensee who delivers to a.

carrier for trnnsport special nuclear me.- These sections should provide for revision of the estimated time tcrlal shnll immediately notify the con-slgnee by telephone, telegraph, or tele- of arrival in the event of known delays encountered during shipment.

type, or the tlmo o! departure of the shipment, and shall notify or confirm - - -- ,

with the consignee the method of trans-porto.tion, including the names o! car-rlers, nnd the estlnmtcd time of arrival of the shipment at its dc.stinatlon. In the case oi a shlnment free-on-board  ;

Cf.o.b.) the point where it is delivered to u carrier for transport, he shall, be-fore the sl11pment is delivered to the canier, obtain assurance from the ll-censee or other person who is to take delivery of ille shipment at the f.o.b.

Jm!nt thnt the physical protection ar-rnngemcnts, required by po.mgraph (a) or this section for licensed shipments or .

required by AEC Manual chapters 2401 -

or 2405 for AEC license-exempt ship-ments, have been made. He shall also I mnke arrangements with the consignee to be noUfled immediately by telephone, telegraph, or teletype, of the arrival o!

the shlnment at H-s destination.

(e) In addition to complying w1th the requirements specified in paragraphs (a), Cd), and (g) of Uus section, each licensee who exports special nuclear ma*

tcnal shall make arrangements with the con.s!gncc to be notified immediately by telephone, telegraph, or teletype, of the nrnval or the slunmcnt at its de.'ltlna.-

t1on or of n.ny such shipment that is lost .

or 1;naccountccl for after the estimated time of arrival at its destination.

(0 Each Uccnsee who receives a ship-mcnt of spccml nuclear maLerial shall 1mmedlatrly notify tne person who de-llvc1*ed the material to a. carrier for tram,port of the arnvo.l of the shipment at its dcstJnation. In the even~ such a shipment foils to arrive at its destination at the estimated time, tbe consignee, 1!

. 10CFR 73 SECTION COMMENT Page 8 a licensee, or in the ca.se of an export shipment, the licensee who exported the slupment, shall Immediately notify by telephone, telegraph, or teletype, the DI-rector of the appropnate Atomic Energy ,*

Comm!ss1on Regulatory Operations Re-glona.l Office llllted 1n appendix A, and the licensee or other person who de- ,

livered the material to a carrier for -

transport.

(g) Each licensee who makes arrange-ments for physical protection of a ship-

' - \

ment of special nuclear material 8.5 re- I quired by this section shall immediately conduct a trace investigation of any ship-menL that is lost or unaccounted for after the estimated arrival time and me a re-port with the Commisslon

• as specified 1n § 73.42. I! the licensee who conducts*

the trace 1nveat1gatton 1s not the con-s!gnee, he shall also immediately report '

the results of his 1nvestigat1on by tele- ' '-

phon<:, telegraph, or teletype to the con-slgnee.

5. Paragraph (c) of § 73.41 is a.mended to read as follows:

§ 73.41 Records.

Ea.ch licensee shall keep the following records:

(c) Shipments of special nuclear mate-rial subject to tho requirements of thil!

part, including names o! carriers, major roads to be used, flight numbers 1n the I case of air 1,h!pments, dates and expected times o! deparLure and amval of ship-ments, names and addresses of the monl-tor and one alternate monitor at each transfer point, vcrlficatlon of communi-caLion equipment on boo.rd the transfer vehicle, names of individuals who are to '

communicate with tho transport vehicle, -

container sea.I descriptions and ldentlfi-cation; and ar.y other 1nforma.t1on to confirm the means utilized to comply with § 73.31. Such information shall be recorded prior to shipment.

. roa,~: .,~vt!:Gm

~W... R_

• ~~ R_ 7{)

___***:-~---

(38 FR 3D11J) 161 East 42nd Street, New York, N.Y. 10017 Babcock & Wilcox Telephone: (212) 687-6700 March 30, 1973 Mr . Paul C. Bender Secretary of the Commission United States Atomic Energy Commission Washington, D. C. 20545

Dear Mr . Bender :

This letter is the response of The Babcock & Wil cox Company to the Invitation in the Federal Register, Volume 38 ,

No . 21, February 1, 1973, to submit comments related to the regulations proposed by the Atomic Energy Commission governing the requirements for physical security at facilities licensed to possess or use special nuclear materials (10 CFR Part 70),

proposed regulations governing the physica l security of special nuclear material while in transit (10 CFR Part 73) and to proposed material control and accounting requirements for special nuclear material (10 CFR Part 70) .

B&W ' s Naval Nuclear Fuel Division, Commercial Nuclear Fuel Plant and Lynchburg Research Center, all located in Lynch -

burg, Virginia, would be affected by these regulations, as would the Nuclear Materials and Equipment Corporation, a sub-s idiary of B&W located in Apollo, Pennsylvania.

. Although we have determined that we can comply with the proposed regulations, we seriously question whether the threat of industrial sabotage and diversion of special nuclear material is sufficiently real to justify the great expense and disruption that would be caused by thes e r egulations .

For example , all employees working in vital areas*

have been investigated for the purpose of obtaining AEC or DOD clearance. To subject these individuals to a personal search each time they entered a protected ar ea ( as would be required by 1 0 CFR 7.0.25 (c) (1)) seems needlessly wasteful and would have a s eriously demoralizing effe*ct on them.

The Babcock & Wilcox Company / Established 1867

Babcock & Wilcox

- Page 2 -

Mr. Paul C. Bender March 30, 1973 The proposed regulations referred to above would also require the licensee; to search all vehicles before entry into a protected area forl devices such as firearms, explosives, incendiary devices, or o~her items which could be used for industrial sabotage. A thorough examination of each of the many vehicles *which *our operations require enter protected areas each day would nece'ssitate virtually stripping them to their components and rendering them inoperable. Surely those who contemplate industrial , sabotage would have the resource-

£ulness and imagination *to secrete such devices in a manner that no lesser search would detect; and to require such a search in the normal cour:se of business goes beyond the bounds of reason.

Representatives of the B&W organizational units affected by the proposed lregulations had the opportunity, during the recent Workshop on Protection of Special Nuclear Material and Facilities s,ponsored by the Atomic Industrial Forum, to obtain from the AEC staff members present who pre-pared the proposed regul~tions and who will be enforcing them, interpretations and clarifications of many of the regulations which would otherwise have been the subject of comment in this letter. I have attached letters from the four B&W units affected which comment i~ detail on the proposed regulations.

I would, however, like t9 comment further on two points.

It would seem ':hat the imposition of more stringent security regulations wou~d obviate the need for stricter control and accounting requirements which are designed to

.detect a loss of special,nuclear material following a breach in security. The proposed regulations which increase the frequency of required inventories of special nuclear material will require us to cease.operations for as long as one week every two months. Not only is the cost of performing the inventory great, but the productive capacity of our facilities would be substantially reduced.

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Babcock & Wilcox I

- Page 3 -

Mr. Paul Co Bender March 30, 1973 I also want to mention the problems associated with the armed guards that would ~e required by the proposed additions to 10 CFR Part 73 ~o accompany highway shipments of special nuclear material. Unless they were to be deputized as federal agents it appears' to us that these guards would not be allowed to carry their arms into other than their home states or, in some instances*, even out of their home counties.

For the above reasons and those set forth in the attachments to this letter and the fact that there have been no instances of industrial sabotage or diversion of special nuclear material under the present requirements for physical.

security and accountability; we recommend that the AEC give consideration to reducing the stringency of the proposed regu-lations.

I We are currently preparing procedures as an alter-native to those which wouldlbe required by the proposed regu-lations and which we feel would accomplish the ends sought by the Commission in a manner more reasonable and less costly to the affected business concerns. We would welcome the oppor-tunity to discuss these with the Commission staffo I

If you have any questions concerning these comments please contact Mro ,Thomas 1. Phillips, Corporate Security Administrator, The Babcock & Wilcox Company, 20 South Van Burean Avenue, Barberton, Ohio 44203, Telephone ~$~.:..-021..:-2130, Extension 18600 J, Jl.lf:J- 753 Very truly yours,

\

THE BABCOCK & WILCOX CG'lPANY Ln~

Martin Victor i~?JJif

Vice President and Secretary AGK:maw

161 East 42nd Street, New York, N.Y. 10017 Babcock & Wilcox Telephone: (212) 687-67()0 March 30, 1973 Comments of the Commercial Nuclear Fuel Plant, Lynchburg, Virginia,: to the Proposed Amendments to 10 CFR Part 70 Pertaining to Material Control and Accounting Requirements (e)(l)(i) - Considering,the definition of "Material in Process" in section (a)(7), section (e)(l)(i) will require that a large percentage of fuel pellets processed at Commercial Nuclear Fuel Plant will need to be "tamper safed." The use of seals and/or other tamper-indicating devices will be unwieldy at best on this quantity of'material; it will also prove to be expensive when considering cost of seals and of theit application. We think the best and least expensive method of compliance will be to provide locks on the storage bins them-selves; or possibly, to erect a gate of some type to limit access to the fuel (although this may not qualify as "tamper-safing." Of course, if the vault doors are ever rein-stalled and' put into use again, this may also qualify as "tamper-safing.")

'I (e)(3)(iii) - We presently inventory twice a year - once during the Price-Waterhouse audit, and once during the AEC audit. However, two points should be clarified. regarding an inventory every six (6) months:

- Scheduling of inventories must be at the dis-cretion of the licensee (e~in our case, to coincide with plant shutdown), and

- Due to increased materials inventories, sufficient time must be allotted in advance of each inventory to assure completion.

This could involve multiple shifts over a weekend, or work over holidays.

I Babcock & Wilcox

- Page 2 -

I Connnents of the Commercial Nuclear Fuel Plant, etc.

(e)(S) - This paragr~ph attempts to provide standards for permissible inventory accuracy limits.

Although wejapplaud the intent, we find the standards rather confusing. The footnote under the chart on page 3079 defines the limit of error ofjMUF on any material balance as "a percentage of additions to or removals from materials in process, whichever is greater."

We are not sure if this refers to additions to or removals'from the Material Balance Area (MBA) under consideration, or to those of the whole plant. In addition; we are confused by the usage of, the term "material in process." The definition in section (a)(7) does not seem applicable hereo I_

Section (f) of Paragraph 70.51 elaborates on further physical inventory requirements. It is a new section, and in some cases provides needed clarification. However, there are some ambiguous portions of the paragraph.

J (f)(l)(l) - We request further clarification of the term "measured value." This can be interpreted in two ways -

I I

each item in inventory must be directly measured to det~rmine elemental and fissile content. 1

)

- each ite~'s inventory value must be based on data acquired from actual measurements, and must be traceable to these measurements e.g.

standardized materials may be sampled, and the sample values applied to the population, if appropriate controls on such applications are establishedo

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i Babcock & Wilcox

- Page 3 -

Cormnents of the Commercial Nuclear Fuel Plant, etc.

We obviously feel that the second interpre-tation as the only reasonable alternative.

We do not pr~sently measure enrichment directly fori fissile and elemental content; we refer back to previous Commission refer-ences to the'. desirability of using statis-tical sampling methods for SNM control.

(f)(2)(iii) - The term 11 r~verificationrr is not clear, and should reference somehow the intended classificatfons in (f)(3).

I (f)(3)(i) - This could ~e literally interpreted to mean that sampling result application, as des-cribed in comments to (f)(l)(i), is not sufficient, ;and that each unit not previously directly measured at CNFP must be remeasured for elemental and fissile content. At present, of course, we do not measure each unit for elemental and isotope content; we sample to verify the accuracy of vendor stated quanti-ties. Such. large scale remeasurement at in-ventory ti~2 is not feasible. The key words in our casL*, then, seem to be, "not previously measured by' the licensee."

l (f)(3)(iii) - Even if (f)(3)(i)*were interpreted reasonably, a 11 demonstr_ationtt as required in this para-graph would. require fairly extensive and ex-pensive sampling and chemical analyses. The AEC now provides such sampling services during their audit; may these AEC samplings be used for satisfaction of this requirement?

161 East 42nd Street, New York, N.Y 10017 Babcock & Wilcox Telephone: (212) 687-6700 March 30, 1973 Comments of the Nav 1 Nuclear Fuel Division, Lynchburg, Virginiaj to the Proposed Amendments to 10 CFR Part 70 and 10 CFR Part 73 I

10 CFR Part 70 - Special Nuclear Material Requirements for Physical Security 70.25 Para. A. Physicll Security Organization Under hhis paragraph, a guide needs to be issued!on use and handling of firearms and how the AEC intends to authorize arm-ing of. the guards. The cost impact could range ~rom $35,000 to a $100,000 increase due to' additional guards, depending on the interpretation of definitions and re-

• I quirements.

I Para. 2. Under access requirements would require upgrading of the existing badge system to control access to vital areas at an approx-imate _cost of $5,000 to $10,000, depending upon :* nterpretation.

I Para. 8. Would require an additional full-time administratiye personnel to fulfill record keepin*g and changing of locks, keys and combinations and related equipment. An additional cost would range from $5,000 to

$15,000.

10 CFR Part 70 - Proposed Material Control and Accounting Requirements for Special Nuclear Material

1. The proposed regulations would become effective 6 months after publication of the rules. Under 70.51, the re-quirement is to tak_e an inventory within 90 days after

\

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Babcock & Wilcox

-rge 2 -

Corrnnents of the Naval Nuclear Fuel Division, etc.

I effective date of the Paragraph (E) utilizing procedures that are required td be written within 120 days after effective date. Thts sequence is not clear. The inven-tory should follow after the procedures become effective.

2. Under 70.51, 3-ii -'The requirement calls for an inven-tory every two months for enriched uranium above 20%.

This requirement is'.going beyond the intent of the reg-ulations to prevent sabotage and diversion of SNM. To physically identify approximately 50,000 items every two months that are large enough to be seen easily, and .

under the proposed $ecurity regulations appears to be very redundant and unnecessary. Also, the requirement is to measure the material in these components. The latter stage of the 1 components at Naval Nuclear Fuel Division are too large and there is no practical way of analyzing them for SNMo However, we have determined that a 100% inventory can be accomplished at Naval Nuclear Fuel Division utilizing a large number of people with the resulting cost in excess of $750,000 per year plus an initial outlay of approximately $25,000 - $50,000, depending on interpretation of the regulations. We can, however, propose alternative methods to accomplish the same goals. The t. *pe of material and the facility is unique and does not lend itself readily to frequent inventories. Either the regulations incorporate a broader latitude for accomplishing the end result or room for exception be built. in .

3. Under 70.51, 4-iii '- We fail to see the need for doing a limit of error around both the element and fissile isotope. If we control the fissile isotope, then the element would be controlled automatically. Use of gamma counting equipment could satisfy some measurements and would be accomplished within minutes, whereas isotopic and element analysis may take up to 30 days. This would reduce the amount of work and result in much quicker answers which is what safeguarding is .all about.

Babcock & Wilcox

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Comments of the Naval Juclear Fuel Division, etc.

4. Under 70.51 j e limit of error stated as .5% of additions or remova1s could be reasonable or entirely too small, depending on the definition of material in process. We believe material in process should be further clarified.

5. 70.51 This paragraph requires that accountability safeguarding of SNM'.be submitted for AEC approval prior to changes. This would be acceptable if downgrading were being considered, but if upgrading of the system I

was being considered, the submittal should be for in*

formation only. )

6. 70.51 iv - Clarification is necessary as to what suffices for verification of correctness of inventory i

records.

II 10 CFR Part 73 - Physical Protection of Special Nuclear Materials*

Requirements for Material Protection I

I 73.3 Para. G. Depending upon the final definition of what are ma erial access areas at Naval Nuclear Fuel D{vision, the cost could range from

$10,000 to $100,000. In this cost would be includdd intrusion alarms, possible closing of doo~s and the possibility of additional personnel to do* nothing but monitoring in entering and exiting the areas. An additional cost of $125,000 for an Alpha 3000 Central Control Alarm would have to be incurred for compliance.

73.32 Para. B. Exit Requirements To check individuals' packages and vehicles for SNM may have to include electron~~ dete t-ing equipment. The additional cost could range ~rom Oto $15,000.

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Babcock & Wilcox

-rge 4 -

Comments of the Naval Nuclear Fuel Division, etc.

Security Measures 73.31 Para. i. A guide is needed to state what actions and whJt I circumstances might be employed to avoid I interference of the safe passage of a vehicle and also the legal liability.

A defiriition is also necessary to deter-mine wlat is a significant armed attack.

The co~t of either armed escort or a speciaily designed vehicle has not been-determtned at the present time since we need further clarification of the truck design, and we have not determined whether additifnal personnel will be necessary for escort;service or whether existing per-sonnellcan be used.

I Para.ii. Guidan~e should be given as to the minimum requirements of a specially designed truck for Sfil1 transport.

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• The total cost impact could be further refined with additional time. . The 120-day implemE *1tation period may not be sufficient to incorporate all of the above security requirements.

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161 East 42nd Street, New York, N.Y. 10017 Babcock & Wilcox Telephone. (212) 687-6700 March 30, 1973 I

Connnents of the Lynchburg Research Center, Research and Development Division, Lynchburg, Virginia, to the Proposed Amendments to 10 CFR Part 70 Dealing with Requirements for I

Physical Security at Facilities at which Licensed Activities are Conducted

1. Statement: Licensees will be given a period of 60 days after publication of the effective rules in the Federal.Register to submit required security plans. The remaining physical pro-.

I tection req~irements would be made effective 120 days after publication in the Federal Register. ,

Comment:

I Due to the lengthy approval time required by the Atomic Energy Commission, the statement should be amended to require the remaining physical protection requirements to be made effective 120 days after approval of the physical security plan by the AEC.

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• Statement: 70.25(c) (1): * . . All individuals, packages and vehicl, s shall be searched for devices such as firearms, explosives, incendiary devices, or other items which could be used for industrial sabotage before entry into the protected area is permitte*d.

Comment: All U. S. citizens employed at the Lynchburg Research Center are investigated to determine desirability for an Atomic Energy Commission "LX. 11 clearance. We feel that it is not necessary to check Lynchburg Research Center employees. At most, periodic spot checking of employees is considered acceptable.

Babcock & Wilcox

-rage. 2 -

Comments of the Lynch'burg Research Center, etc.

3. Statement:

I 70.25(c) (3P,: Access to vital areas shall be limited to individuals who are authorized access to v~tal equipment and who require such access to p~rform their duties * .

• Comment: Because of hhe definitions of vital equipment and vital areas as used by the AEC, we are designating, three complete buildings as vital areas. We desire to allow access to each of the three buildings by all employees. In effect, we could authorize all employees access to each building and still maintain protection for all special nuctear material.

4. Statement: 70.25(c) (8): Keys, locks, combinations, and related equipment shall be controlled to mini-mize the possibility of compromise and promptly changed whenever there is a reasonable possibil-ity that they have been compromised and on termination.of employment of any employee having access to keys, locks, combinations, and related equipment.

Comment: Changing thJ keys, locks, and combinations each time an employee is terminated to areas in which he has access would be expensive and wasteful.

Should the proposed amendments become regulation, a different means or access to vital areas i.e.,

magnetic coded identification cards may be de-sirable at the Lynchburg Research Center.

The Lynchburg Research Center will, if our present license remains in effect and if the proposed amendments are approved as written, be severely effected financially. A preliminary estimate for the total cost of changes as proposed to 10 CFR Part 70 for

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Babcock & Wilcox

- Page 3 -

Comments of the Lynchburg'Research Center, etc.

the Lynchburg Research Center is $200,000. Additionally, it is estimated that annual cost kill increase from the present

$7,500 to approximately $50 1,000. The initial cost of $200,000 would include the following\

1. Relocation of access roads and parking lots

2. Relocation and additional fencing

3. Relocation and additional lighting

4. Full time guard coverage (the increase in the annual recurring cost $7,500 to $50,000 is to support a full time, twenty-four hour, guard force)

5. Special locking system for the protection of vital areas

6. Personnel detection systems for detection of conce?led special nuclear mat~rial

7. Close circuit TV camera system for protection of vital areas I

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GRASSLANDS ROAD ARNOLD R. FRITSCH ELMSFORD, NEW YORK 101523 PRESIDENT 914-1592-9000

.arch 29, 1973 Secretary of the Commission United States Atomic Energy Commission DOG I{ ET ED Washington, D. C. 20545 W.\fG

Subject:

FR Documents 73-1976, 73-1977, 73-1978, 73-1979 APR 21973~

Attention: Chief, Public Proceedings Staff

Dear Sir:

As one of the principal suppliers of special nuclear material in the fuel cycle industry, we want to register our strong concern and provide our

\ comments regarding the proposed amendments published in the Federal Reg-ister on February 1, 197 3, applying to various aspects of nuclear material safeguards. We appreciate your concern in this area, but believe that your attempt to combine requirements relating to the common defense and security, public health and safety, and industrial sabotage is improper. The following sets forth our general concern regarding the propos.ed AEC action. Additional detailed comments on specific items in each proposed amendment are attached to this letter.

Goals and Objectives of AEC Safeguards Program While we recognize the need for protection of special nuclear material, we have* difficulty in understanding the goals and objectives of the AEC pro-gram. We accept the need to accurately account for materials and provide a rea_sonable degree of physical protection and barriers against vandalism and the occasional intruder. However, we find it difficult to accept the need for excessive physical security measures against an unnamed and ill-defined threat which can never be met with certainty, since there is always the ques_-

tion of the manpower and resources imagined to be behind the threat.

The proposed amendments proliferate the specification type of require-ments rather than developing performance standards which can be applied

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Secretary of the Commission "United States Atomic Energy Commission March 29, 1973 Page Two I

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I appropriately in the wide variety of situations that exist thrC?ughout the indus-I try. We recommend that each of the regulations be re-exam~ned with the intent of proposing performance standards by which specifically stated goals and ob-jectives could be achieved. Further, there should be a distinction in standards between new and existing plants and recognition of applicability of standards in back-fitting situations.

History of Diversion of Special Nuclear Material We are unaware that there has been either an overt or covert diversion or attempt at diversion of special nuclear material from domestic fixed sites or in transit. This would indicate that the present system has worked with a degree of success, despite the shortcomings that some would ascribe to it. The anti-cipated quantities of special nuclear material in the possession of licensees and carriers in the near future does not, of itself, increase the probability of diversion. Further, there is no evidence that any criminal marketplace exists for special nuclear material.

International Safeguards Criteria The international consensus, as expressed by the International Atomic Energy Agency, is one of reasonably prompt detection of diversion of special nuclear m?terials, not preventing diversion as evidenced in the proposed amend-ments. IAEA safeguards experts from all over the world have accepted the prem-ise that assured prevention is difficult at best, and that detection, followed by prompt action by law enforcement authorities to recover material, is the proper and reasonable approach. Gulf United fully supports this consensus. Further, excessive protection of domestic material without a corresponding requirement in other nations and for prompt international action would seem to undermine the United States' position.

Responsibility for Common Defense and Security Perhaps the most basic concern raised by the proposed amendments is that of placing the burden of the common defense and security upon the industry in addition to its more proper burden of public health and safety. We feel that the place for this concern of armed intrusion is on Federal shoulders. The impact of the proposed AEC action is clearly intended to apply to the use of special nu-clear material in weapons, a responsibility of the Federal government. The

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Secretary of the Commission United States Atomic Energy Commission March 29, 197 3 Page Three thrust of the amendments therefore does not seem to be consistent with the intent to exclude acts by enemies of the United States.

Recommendation Reliance upon physical protection measures will result in an all or nothing system. The culprit or intruder is either caught or he is not. In the end, the only real defense is materials accountability. It is our recommendation that the AEC adhere closely to the IAEA system of safeguards and materials accountability which would alert the local, State and Federal authorities to the loss so as to enable them to apprehend diverters of nuclear material in the event an act of di-version has taken place. These accountability measures should not be diluted by needless effort directed toward extreme physical security measures.

The proposed AEC amendments should be withdrawn for more consideration and thorough review on the basis of the foregoing comments and until such a re-view is completed, the Commission should not bypass this regulatory procedure by imposing license conditions similar to these on an ad-hoc basis. As a begin-ning, we suggest that specific goals and objectives be established for each cate-gory of concern -- common defense and security, public health and safety, and industrial sabotage. Gulf United would be pleased to participate in developing appropriate and reasonable requirements, working either directly with the Com-mission o:r through industry or industry/Commission groups.

Sincerely yours,

/cl Attachments

FR Doc. 73-1976 I

SPECIAL NUpLE.AR MATERIAL REQUIREMENTS FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY I

• 70.22(9) and 70.25 The listing of special nuclear materfal covered by this regulation includes plutc-nium-238 by omission of speci~ic plutonium isotopes. Since non-fissile plutonium-238 has a specific radioactivity some 300 times greater than that of fissile plutonium-239 and has similar exemption quantities in this part, we must conclude that the proposed requirement for physical protection of these materials are not based on public health and safety but on the common defense and security.

Even more dramatic comparisons can be made among the other nuclides -- all serving to demonstrate that the quantities are based upon weapons-making criteria only.

70.25(a) and 70.25(h) i As in our comments on FR Doc. 73-1978, the equipping (arming?) of guards and instructions for the use of firearms is a matter which we believe requires further review. r 7 0

• 2 5 (b) ( 1) I The location (or relocation to comply with this requirement) of vital equipment within a vital area is a feat that may be extremely difficult to achieve. A fa-cility with large numbers of roof-mounted, unit air cleaners is a case in point.

70. 25 (c) (1) and (d) (2)

The searching of all individuals, packages and vehicles for firearms, explosives, incendiary. devices, or other items ?efore entry into a protected area in most exist-ing facilities is beyond our comprehension. The problems of inspecting a fully-loaded truck and all the packages therein during delivery of a single package to the facility could be multiplied several times during a normal workday. Search-ing of individuals may violate certain constitl!-tional rights and, at the very lea st, dissuade legitimate and desired visitors from entering. Furthermore, we know of no impersonal devices or instruments that could be used in lieu of searching individuals.

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70.25(c) (7)

When personal vehicles are used on official business, they should be permitted within a protected area in the same way that other vehicles are permitted.

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/FR Doc. 73-1976 1 Special Nuclear Material

/ Requirements for Physical Security (Continued)

/ 70. 25 (d) (1)

Annunciation of alarms in at least one other continuously-manned station not necessarily on site can be unreliable if not impossible in many areas, particu-larly where the station is off site (the 1 ocation of choice for most licensees).

Our experience with leased lines, for example, for this purpose has not been favorable. Alternatives such as additional on site stations C{r other means of signal transmission are extremely expensive. \

70. 25 (e) (1)

While a licensee can establish liaison with local 13w enforcement authorities for assistance when needed, the uniformity of action by the two parties will vary widely throughout the industry. We suggest that the best way to obtain uniformity and reliability is through resources of the Federal Government.

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70.25(e) (3)

Acceptance of two-way voice communication links by local law enforcement authorities is not enthusiastic and in some instances, completely impossible.

70.25(e) (4)

I There is no way to guarantee that communications equipment owned and operated by local law enforcement authorities and over which licensees have little or no control will remain operable from independent power sources in the event of loss of primary power.

70. 25 (f) (3)

Testing of communications to local law enforcement authorities except on infre-quent occasions, is generally unacceptable to the authorities.

/cl 3/29/73.

I FR Doc. 73-1979 PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL REQUIREMENTS FOR MATERIALS PROTECTION 73.32(a) (1)

The proposed prohibition against activities other than those which require access to special nuclear material in a material access area is a violation of the rights of an individual or company to conduct whatever business it considers to be appropriate in such an area. This requirement should be omitted.

73.32(a) (6}

See FR Doc. 73-1976; 70.25(c) (1).

73.32(b}

We are .unaware of any technique to check individuals, packages and vehicles for concealed uranium by impersonal means and the degree of searching required to check individuals personally for concealed uranium far exceeds the protection against search accorded to citizens. The Commission's Division of Nuclear Ma-terials Safeguards also acknowledges the unavailability of suitable detection de-vices. Equipment has been developed for detection of plutonium but we are not convinced of its efficacy, particularly when the plutonium is in the form of mixed oxides.

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/cl 3/29/73.

FR Do . 73-1977 1

SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL REVISED MATERIAL CONTROL AND ACCOUNTING REQUIREMENTS FOR SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL i

We cgree that it is technically possible to comply with most of the features of the proposed amendment if cost, hme I

and other factors are not considered.

Furthermore, incorporation of speci~l design features in new plants would facilitate meeting the requirements without undue difficulty. However, in existing plants, and in particular existing plutonium plants, meeting the re-quirements would necessitate shutting the plant down completely for process and system revisions. If extensive revisions were not made, the plant would be in a state of frequent inventory with little production possible. We are un-able to estimate the cost of such pn}cess and system revisions at this time,*

but the time required to plan, design and execute the revisions would be far in excess of the time prescribed, even with the extension period. To ease the burden on existing facilities, we believe that consideration should be given to exemption for "terminal £abilities, i.e., those which have a 11 definite, limited lifetime. We would suggest a series of cut-off dates by which progressively restrictive porti1ons of the regulations might become effective or require plant shutdown.:'

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/cl 3/29/73.

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FR Doc. 73-1978 PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF SPECIAI. NUCLEAR MATERIAL SECURITY MEASURES I

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I In the letter, we have stated our firm belief that responsibility for physical I

I protection of special nuclear material in the interest of the 9ommon defense I and security lies with the Federal Government. If the Goverhment were to assume that responsibility as proposed, the following comments should be considered.

7 3. 1 (a)

This part states that it prescribes requirements for one who ... exports *.*

special nuclear material. Does this imply that the AEC could ban a shipment if the foreign consignee does not have physical protection requirements similar to those in the U o S.? If so, that could be in direct opposition to existing national policy.

73.3l(a)

These various requirements are general:ly not a responsibility of the shipper or licensee but of the carrier. Suitable arrangements probably could be made be-tween the parties but the proper place for control is in the DOT or ICC regula-tions or through AEC licensing of carriers o 7 3

• 31 (a) (i) (i)

The arming of guards for shipment escort purposes, particularly if the guards are employees of the licensee and the shipment crosses state lines may be illegal. Also, the use of weapons by the guards may create serious personal and licen::;,ee liabilities o Unless the guards were Federal marshals (or equi-valent), we believe this requirement needs considerable review by legal staff.

7 3. 3'1 (a) (i) (ii)

We are aware of only one type of specially designed vehicle that would satisfy this requirement. However, it is not available in sufficient numbers or time and has a cost of approximately $150,000 each. We consider such a cost to be prohibitive to the industry.

73.3l(a) (3) and (5)

Radio-telephone communication is not uniform throughout the United States, it being relatively effective in the east, moderate in the west and poor in the northwest.

In addition, crowded channels in large cities make radio-telephone use almost im-possible.

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609 N. Warren Ave, Apollo, Pennsylvania 15613 Telephone : (412) 842-01 11

& Wn~cox 1 83 March 29 , 1973 9  ::::

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.Mr . Paul C. Bender Secretary to the Cannission f=

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l){l::'l ot \113 S1>PJarJ U. S. Atanic Energy Cannission uc frot~iln.,"I

.,~l.ttl Washington , D . C. 20545

Dear Mr. Bender :

On February 1, 1973 the Atanic Energy Cannission issued proposed regulations for changes in 10 CFR Part 50, Part 70, and Part 73 for the physical security of special nuclear materials (SNM.)

• Licensees and other interested persons were requested to respond with carments and suggestions on the proposed .new regulations. Nuclear Materials and F.quipnent Corporation (NUMEC) , a subsidiary of the Babcock & Wilcox Crnpany, respectfully sul::mits its ccmrents and suggestions on the proposed regulations .

NUMEC is a major processor of special nuclear materials for the Governrrent and private industry . NUMEC operates two sites for the manufacturing of products containing nuclear materials: (a) low-enriched and high-enriched uranium are processed at the ~any 's Apollo, Pennsylvania site under AEC license SNM-145 , and (b) plutonium is processed at the a:xnpany's Parks Township , Pennsylvania site under license SNM-414 . Currently, NUMEC is processing low-enriched uranium for ccmnercial contracts at a rate of about 30 metric tons per rronth; high-enriched uranium for Governrrent contracts at a rate Jf between 300 and 400 kilograms per

rronth;' and plutonium for Goven .*ment and carmercial contracts at a rate of between 10 and 15 kilograms per :rronth. Because of its long history of handling the above three categories of special nuclear material ,

NUMEC believes it is qualified to ccmrent on the impact of the new proposed regulations on our business and on the nuclear fuel industry in general . *

• Before carmenting on the specific provisions of the new regulation , we would like to make clear NUMEC's position and philosophy toward the physical protection of special nuclear materials. The managemmt of NUMEC is thoroughly aware of its responsibility to the public for the protection of special nuclear materials fr~ diversion for clandestine

Mr. Bender March 29, 1973 purposes, as well as for the pr~tection of its facilities fran events of industrial sabotage. Since the acquisition of NUMEC by Babcock & Wilcox in November 1971, major human and financial resources riave been cannitted to i.rrproving the security of NUMEC's Uranium and Plutonium Facilities.

For example, as a part of its license amendment for processing plutonium fuel for the Colmission' s Fast Flux Test Reactor Program, NUMEC in the Spring of 1972 cxmnitted to a major upgradlllg program at its Plutonium Facility to i.rrprove physical protection of special nuclear materials.

Highlights of that upgrading program included the erection and relocation of property fencing, installation of illuminating devices, installation of additional intrusion alann systems, installation of an advanced central control station for ironitoring both security and operational functions, and significant additional administrative changes for tightening security at tl-ie facility. Recently, we have camnitted to upgrading our Apollo Facility to i.rrprove physical security, and to the adoption of the irore advanced security techniques employed at our Plutonium Facility to our new high-enriched uranium facility nCM nearing operation at the Parks Township site. We cite these i.rrprovements as an exarrple of NUMEC's ccmnitrrent to providlllg effective security rreasures carm:msurate with the nature and hazards of the material being processed.

In many instances, our physical security provisions go beyond the requirements of our license. They have added significantly to the extremely high overhead cost associated with processing: special nuclear materials.

Based on the above background, we are pleased to sul::mi t the following ccmrents and suggestions on the new proposed regulations. Where possible, our ccmnents are directed to the specific paragraphs of the new proposed regulations:

1. 10 CFR Part 73, Requirerrents for Physical Security of Special Nuclear Material (a} The introduction to tnis section states that the proposed regulations are being i.rrplemented in the interests of the camon defense and security and the public health and safety.

We believe that there .is considerable disagreement within the general public and the nuclear :µ,dustry as to the validity of the potential threat fran diversion of SNM or industrial sabotage of nuclear facilities. We at NUMEC believe that the real threat to the safeguarding and protection of special nuclear materials is fran individuals, or small groups, intent on one or irore of the following purposes:

(1) Acquisition of small quantities of special nuclear material for the sole purpose of threatening local, State, or Federal authorities for financial gain .

Mr. Bender March 29, 1973 (2) Access to nuclear facilities for the purpose of ccnmitting acts of industrial sabotage to discredit the nuclear industry or to call public attention to a specific purpose of the intruder organizaticn.

We find very little substance in scenarios that depict massive anred attack by para-military forces intent on acquiring special nuclear material for weapons purposes. Accordingly, we support the Carmission's position in not requiring industry to develop physical protection measures that contend with this type of potential attack.

However, it would appear that if the Ccmnission is anxious to inspire industrywide acquiescence to its new physical protection requirements, then it is essential that industry be apprised of the potential threat to which it is to defend itself. Briefings should be held for industry, on a classified basis if necessary, to explain the potential threats that have forced the Ccmnission to propose new and stricter regulations. In addition, standards and guidelines should be prepared as a framework upon which the security plans for operating facilities should be based.

(b) Paragraph 70. 25, Physical S~curity Requirements Paragraph C(l) requires that the licensee search all individuals, packages, and vehicles for devices such as firearms, explosives, incendiary devices, or other items which could be used for industrial sabotage. We believe it is inappropriate and probably impossible to guarantee that incendiary devices or explosives are not entering facilities without employing extraordinary constraints on the ingress and egress of personnel and vehicles. For example ,

we believe that it is virtually impossible to search a delivery

• vehicle thoroughly enough to insure that it does not contain devices such as those indicated above without subjecting the driver and the vehicle to a thorough and complete search which we believe will far exceed the practical limit to which carrnercial carriers will agree. As an alternative to searching the driver and his vehicle, we suggest that the vehicle be restricted fran access to any part of the protected facility other than the dock, and that the driver be excluded fran access to the facility other than the shipping and receiving area.

We believe that better guidelines and definitions of incendiary devices are necessary. For example, would a book of matches be considered an incendiary device?

Mr. Bender March 29, 1973 In addition, to our knowledge there are no practical techniques for monitoring for possession of explosive devices which are not of a rretallic nature.

(cl Paragraph C(3) tends to limit access to vital areas to persons who have authorized access to vital equi~t and who are required to have such access to perform their duties; control is indicated to be by a coded numbered badge system for each vital area . We suggest that the regulation be revised to indicate that control shall be by "specially coded numbered badges indicating vital areas to which access is authorized, or other suitable technique reccmrended by the licensee and approved by the Ccmnission" .

(d) Paragraph C(6) establishes criteria for the access to protected areas by non-employees who have a need for frequent access to these areas. We suggest that the provisions of this section be broadened to treat non-employees on essentially the sarre basis as errq:>loyees if the non-errployee is a resident inspector, or an .

errq:>loyee of a different division or subsidiary of the parent carpany, or is otherwise specifically- approved to have access to vital areas . We would see no objection to establishing reasonable criteria for documenting the approved duration for access to vital areas by the above personnel .

(e) Paragraph (3) requires one two-way voice cannunication link, such as radio, to be established between the facility and local law enforcerrent authorities . Depending on local conditions , it is not always possible for the licensee to cc:mnunicate directly with law enforcem:mt agencies . As an alternate , the wording of this paragraph should be changed to indicate that where direct carmunication is not possible (by local regulation) the camrunications link rna.y be through a s ~parate control point which has direct

• ccmm.mications with lav enforcement authorities .

(f) Paragraph G(3) requires that a log be maintained for all entries by individuals into noi:rnally t111occupied vital areas . We suggest that this paragraph be amended to allow for the exclusion of guard personnel fran the log , provided that their entry into the access area is docurrented in Guard Tour Records .

2. 10 CFR Part 73, Physical Protection of Special Nuclear Material, Aircraft Ship.rent of Nuclear Material (a) NUMEC, at its own discretion, had discontinued the practice of shipping highly-enriched uranium product by passenger-carrying aircraft prior to the February 1, 1973 announcerrent of the new

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Mr. Bender March 29, 1973 I

I proposed regulations by the Camri.ssion. In certain instances ,

plutonium in special containers has been shipped by passenger-carrying aircraft, but shiprnent has been under escort by a courier of the Ccmnission's pr.ine contractor.

3. 10 CFR Part 73, Physical Protection of Special Nuclear Materials, Security Measures (a) 73.31(1) (i} requires that an escort consisting d£ at least two arrned guards shall accanpany each shipnent in a separate rrotor vehicle. This requirement will essentially double the cost of a nonna.l shipment of fuel by the NUMEC Corporation. In addition, we understand that there are significant problems in rroving material in inter-state transport using arrned personnel who are not Federal errployees.

• We find that the provision requiring separate carrier and escort vehicles, with two guards in the escort vehicle, will irrpose significant cost impact on local shipments where the manufacturer operates rrore than one facility within a short distance fran another. As an alternative to the use of two armed guards for short shipments, we propose that the condition in Section 73.31(1} (i) alx>ve be relaxed to pennit the use of a single anned guard for local shipments, provided that the escort vehicle is in continuous cannunication with a manned control station, and it is possible for response through this conmunications network to reach the shipment within a tirre span equivalent to that expected for nonna.l response to an errergency at the manufacturer's plant.

(b) Paragraph 73.31(5) provides for radio telephone comnunication between the escort vehicle and the licensee. We anticipate sore problems with the proposed system since it is our understanding

• that radio carmunication is frequently difficult in the vicinity of large cities. In the event this is atterrpted without success urrler such conditions, it could set into notion prematurely the response procedures required by the paragraph.

We hope the above ccmnents and suggestions will assist the Ccmnission in evaluating the proposed physical security regulations for special nuclear material. It is essential that industry and the Carmission reach agreement on reasonable and practical regulations in the area that do not irrpose unnecessary restrictions on our already highly-regulated industry .

Very truly yours,

~~

E. C. MJncrief Manager, Quality and Materials Managernent ECM/lkp

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DOCHHD Secretary of the Commission U. S. Atomic Energy Commission GH~e, 1 , S~*~f~

Washington, D. C. 20545 ~:;c Fr: ... }~Hngs Bran~h tJ7/.)

Attention : Chief, Public Proceedings Staff "u7T:::f Ref. COMMENTS ON PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO 10 CFR PARTS 50, 70 &73 (38 FR 3073-83, February l, 1973)

Gentlemen:

The General Electric Company's Nuclear Energy Division has reviewed the above-referenced proposed regulations dealing with physical security and )

special nuclear material control and accounting requirements . .

General Electric agrees that regulations providing requirements and pro- I cedures for the protection of nuclear facilities against industrial sabo-tage are desirable. It also concurs that regulations regarding physical security during transportation should be strengthened and that some modi-fications in special nucl ear material controls would be useful. The goal of all of these proposed regulations is, of course , similar, that is, to provide reasonable assurance that special nuclear materials are not diverted to nonregulated uses and to prevent nuclear incidents of any sort resulting from the deliberate acts of persons, either within or without a facility.

General Electric believes that workable regulations designed to accomplish the above goals can be developed. However, it does not believe that the proposed regulations in their present form are workable. Particular prob-lems with the proposed regulations, which'are discussed in more detail bel ow, are the requirement of specific detailed procedures and equipment for all facilities without proper allowance for the physical characteris-tics and type of existing facilities, the failure to differentiate suffic-iently between the types and forms of special nuclear material being util-ized in various facilities and the use of the same protective standards, procedures and equipment for nonnucl ear and nuclear hazards.

The difficulty of identifying the threat to be guarded against greatly complicates the task of developing regu lations and of evaluating the necessity for and effica of rticular proposals. It is our op inion that a great deal more i terc nicati on between the staff , indust ry and possibly concerned members of the public is necessary to development of 1

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GENERAL . , ELECTRIC

GENERAL$ ELECTRIC Secretary of the Commission 3/29/73 I

truly adequate regulations. More qiscussion, evaluation and definition of the threat or range of threats against which the regulations are designed to pro-tect is desirable. Additionally, much more investigation of the efficacy of various procedures against these threats* is necessary before final judgments can be reached as to which procedures and equipment should be utilized.

There has to be more room for flexi*bility 1n the implementation of any pro-posals due to the diversity and complexity of the various components of the ind1)stry. In particular, much more flexibility must be permitted in develop-ing programs for existing facilities. The necessity or desirability of apply-ing the same procedures and requirements to areas containing only low enriched uranium as are applied to areas containing plutonium and of applying the same procedures and requirements to the*various forms of plutonium must be fully explored. Licensees should be permitted to develop alternate plans which maintain the level of protection deemed necessary but minimize the disloca-tion and cost impact at their facilities.

I General Electric does not purport to have the answers to all of the considera-tions that it thinks should be included in developing regulations in these.

areas. However, it does believe t~at it has useful inputs and that in con-junction with inputs from the AEC, 1 the industry and the public, workable regulations can be developed.

l Further consultation of AEC Staff ~ith licensees regarding detailed applica-tion of these proposed regulations to specific facilities and the various alternatives that might be available to provide similar levels of protection might well aid the staff in developing less Procrustean, but equally safe, regulations. l r

General Electric believes that until further consideration is given to these concerns and until appropriate pro~ision is made for existing facilities, thes~ regulations should not become effective.

Because of time limitations, the imitations of the formal comment method and the fact that General Electric does not presently have definitive answers to the concerns it has raised, the following comments primarily reflect General Electric's concern with the proposed regulations rather than any specific proposal for replacement*regulat1ons.

A. Physical Security

1. The regulations should not require licensees to assume responsibility for the performance of functions beyond their technical ability or legal right. While the licensee can, for example, request the tele-phone company to maintain its transmission lines [50.55d(f)(l) and 70.25(f)(l)], and request the police to provide a back-up power source

[50.55d(e)(4) and 70.25(e)(4)] for its communication center, it cannot compel them to do so. A good-faith effort on the part of the *1 icensee to arrange for such services should be the regulatory rcquiren2nt rather than a specific requirement,that he 11 assure 11 actions of persons and equipment out ide of his control.

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GENERAL@ELECTRIC I

' Secretary of the Commission 3/29/73 I

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2. The attempt being made by these proposed regulations to apply ta all equipment, systems, devices or material whose failure could endanger the public health and safety is overly broad. Certainly the regula-I tions must be designed to protect the public health and safety from the radiological hazard associated with the activities regulated by the Commission. However, to regulate nonradiological portions of the activities, as, for example, in proposed 70.25(b), by the same standards and the same regulations which apply to the radiological activities is not practical. \

We doubt very much that standards applicable to radioactive materials could apply under any realistic analysis to the diverse nonradiologi-cal activities involved at a site. Examples of nonradioactive activi-ties involving systems which could be classed as vital equipment under the definition of proposed 10 CFR 50.2(z) and 10 CFR 70.4(w) are sew-age lines within a plant and to the local sewer system, natural gas lines that serve the site buildings' heating system, electric lines to the plant and oil being stored on site for heating purposes or lubrication of transportation vehicles. Numerous other activities and materials on site could be included under the definition pro-posed, and many of these activities and materials are governed by other specific Federal, State and local regulations which may be in conflict with these proposals. It is not reasonable to require that each of these numerous activities and materials be enclosed with walls and fences and protected by isolation areas and alarms.

3. Because of the diverse nature of the activities to be affected by these regulations and the fact that so many of the facilities in which such activities are conducted presently have physical features that cannot readily (and in some cases perhaps cannot at all) be modified to conform with the 50.55d(b) and (c) and 70.25(b) and (c) barrier requirements proposed, it does not appear that promulgation pf regulations as specific and rigid as these is either a recommended or desirable course of action.

An example of the problem is the appar~nt design of these proposed regulations with a large single-purpose production facility in mind.

There are other types of facilities that cannot as readily be adapted to the proposed regulations. One of these is the Vallecitos Nuclear Center, which is an integrated site with reactors, megacurie hot-cell facilities, radioactive materials laboratories and plutonium research and development laboratory facilities. These seven separate facilities are located in an inner 94-acre area with individual buildings containing facilities licensed under 10 CFR 50, 10 CFR 70, and an agreement State (California) byproduct material license.

Because of the basic research and develonment nature of the site, considerable interaction is necessary be~ween these diverse facilities.

In view of the above, it is very difficult to determine the 3

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GENERAL fJffe ELECTRIC II Secretary of the Commission 3/29/73 I

I impact of the proposed regulations. In addition to the obvious financial impact of backfitting a 94-acre, seven-facilities' site I' not designed with these proposed provisions in mind, one must also consider: {l) the possibility that the site cannot in any reason-able way be physically brought into comp,liance with these standards, (2) that even if physical compliance is possible, there may be a significant mandatory time lag just through construction scheduling,

.and (3) the possibility that the loss of mobility 9nd flexibility of site personnel would render reasonable operation i,ossible.

A preferable alternative would be to differentiate within these pro-posed regulations between: (1) large single-purpose production facilities and multi-purpose research and development complexes such as Vallecitos, and (2) between new facilities which may be designed according to a new 10 CFR 50, 10 CFR 70, and/or 10 CFR 73 and existing facilities with inherent large-scale backfitting problems. The regulations should provide for exemptions which would allow existing facilities and multi-purpose facilities to develop, subject to AEC Staff review and approval, programs which would fulfill the intent of the regulations, but at the same time reflect the unique problems of the existing facility or associated with the multi-purpose nature of the facility. In establishing appropriate requirements, varied priorities and related time scales for implementation should be established on the basis of the strategic value of the quantity of material at the site.

4. We disagree with the philosophy of using armed guards to accompany the transport of special nuclear material with the apparent direc-tion to utilize their weapons [see proposed 73.3l(a)(l)(i)]. The use of weapons on the public highways should be confined to official law enforcement personnel and other highly trained individuals. The use of armed guards may well represent a greater hazard to the public than does the cargo they are to protect, and the carriage of weapons across state borders may not be lawful in all cases.

5. Items 50.34(c) and 50.54(p) require filing physical security plans for facilities at two different stages of development. However, they could result in hardship to facilities for which an applica-tion has been filed, review by the AEC and ACRS has been completed and construction is essentially complete. To require the applicant for such a facility to amend his license to revise his physical secur-ity plan and have such plan reviewed prior to being permitted to operate would cause unwarranted delay.

6. Implementation of items 50.55d(c)(l) and 70.25(c)(l) in regard to searching for devices vmuld be very difficult and expensive, particu-larly at shipping and receiving areas. lruckload deliveries consist-ing of large quantities of boxes would have to be searched and 4

GENERAL :f/t: ELECTRIC Secretary of the Commission 3/29/73 presumably, so would bulk deliveries in tank trucks and arrival of garbage trucks. This requirement would also include search of spent-fuel shipments as they arrive at the fuel reprocessing facility.

Identification and search of personnel at both the entrance to the protected area and the entrance to the vital area, which of course is within the protected area, seems to be unwarranted duplication of effort.

7. It is recommended that the final eighteen words of §§55d(c)(8) and 70.25(c)(8) be stricken. Each termination of employment would then have to be judged within the framework of the remainder of the provision and not treated as an absolute reason for changing all locks, etc.

As an extreme example, it might be pointed out that termination of employment may result from the death of the employee.

8. It is not apparent why two separate continuously-manned alarm sta-tions are required [50.55d(d)(l) and 70.25(d)(l)]. This appears to be needless redundancy. Additionally, the requirement that records of alarms be kept both at the on-site central alarm station and at al1 other communication locations of each alarm appears unnecessarily complex and duplicative [50.55d(g)(5) and 70.25(g)(5)].

9. Fairly similar provisions are being proposed for incorporation in both Part 70 (38 FR 3075-78) and Part 73 (38 FR 3082-83), both of which apply to activities under the same licenses. In addition, Part 73 is being considered at two separate locations (38 FR 3080-82 and 3082-83). It would appear that this method could lead to conflict between the terms of the regulations and in many respects, result in needless duplication. For an extreme example, Section 73.l(a) is amended differently at 38 FR 3081 and 38 FR 3082. It would appear that Part 73 is the appropriate location to treat these subjects, and it is therefore recommended that they be combined to

~he extent feasible and incorporated in 10 CFR Part 73.

10. Sections 70.22(9), 70.35 and 70.32(e) would establish quantities of special nuclear materials above which a physical security plan for the possessing site would be subject to AEC review and approval.

The proposed language for combinations of more than one SNM type is not clear. If we interpret the proposal correctly, the review would apply, for example, at a possession schedule of 2,001 grams of plutonium, but a review would not be required at an aggregate of almost three kilograms more consisting of 2,000 grams of plutonium, 2,000 grams U-233 and 1,000 grams of U-235 in higher enrichment U.

Both for simplicity and consistency with the limitations of current regulations for passenger aircraft carriage of special nuclear material, the uniform value of 5,000 grams should be retained for all three materials either alone or in any combination.

11. Provision of specially designed vehicles as required by proposed

§73.3l(a)(l)(ii) could be complex and expensive. It may well not 5

GENERAL~ "-::: __ ELECTRIC

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Secretary of the Commission 3/29/73

, be possible to produce spkcifications for such a vehicle within the 60-day period provided. j

12. Numerous terms are used that r~quire further definition before the impact of the proposed regulations can be fully evaluated, e.g.,

11 11 authorization ... validated daily 11 [§§55a(c)(6)(iii) and 70.25(c)(6)],

at the beginning and end!of each interval during which it is used for security 11 [§§55.55d(f)(2)!and §70.25(f)(2)], 11 signature security service 11 §73.3(n), 11 self-checking 11 and "tanper indicatin~ 11 [§§50.55d(d)(l) and 70.25(d)(l)J and "fingerprint type seals [§73.31(a)(7)].

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B. Material Control and Accounting II I. The LE-MUF for strategically unimportant low-enriched uranium should be placed in proper perspective by revising the mass units in proposed subparagraph 70.51(e)(5) to be stated in terms of effective grams or

~ defined in a malner similar to that in proposea paragraph

2. In the introduction to proposed changes to accounting requirements (38 FR 3077), the Commission states it considers the proposals to be achievable with the use of present material control and account-ing technology. It does not indicate that accomplishment has been demonstrated either in government nuclear installations or in private licensed facilities. We are unaware of any situation in which this technology and methodology has been successfully utilized as a com-plete system in a large-scale nuclear installation. We are, there-fore, greatly concerned whether the goals of the regulation are realistically achievable with present technology and methodology or within the time scale set forth in these regulations. Even if the technology and methodology were demonstrated and available, we question whether sufficient consideration has been given to the cost factors involved. D sign and installation of such systems, particularly in existing racilities, could be extremely costly, requiring extensive dislocation of operations and plant. The Commission's invitation for submission of information on the cost impact of the proposals on licensees' existing operations indicates recognition of this problem. However, we are not able to make any definitive estimates in the amount of time available to us.

3. More stringent inventory frequencies [70.5l(e)(3)(i), (ii), and (iii)]

are proposed and would carry substantial cost burdens. The ratio of downtime for inventory to effective operating time would increase.

The increase in frequency of inventory of low enrichment uranium does not appear to be justified in light of that materials rela- 1

. tively small potential for mischief and the very high cost accompany-ing the increased frequency.

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I I Secretary of the Commission 3/29/73 I

I I 4. As proposed in 70.51 (e)(2), a special inventory would be required

' for low enriched uranium within 90 days after adoption of the amendment, whether or not a recent inventory had been completed. This appears to be particularly onerous in any case where such an inventory has been performed within the three months prior to the effective date of the amendment.

5. Based on experience, General Electric cannot acceP,t the limits proposed by 70.5l(e)(5) as being achievable in a factory environ-ment using existing material control and accounting technology. It has observed that the analytical measuring capability for Pu/Pu+ U is in the order of 0.5% relative, exclusive of sampling errors.

Thus, the uncertainty of any addition or removal to inventory can 11 11 11 II be no better than the measuring capability and, of course, there are other errors. Based on these observations, we believe experience will prove the proposed limits will be unworkable in the factory environment.

6. Item 70.5l(f)(3)(ii) specifies that in-process plutonium inventory not protected by tamper-safing shall be verified either by 100% measuring or by remeasuring a sample of sufficient size to provide the specified level of protection. For factory operations, 100% remeasuring of inventory items is highl¥ impracticable. Three alternative sampling plans are proposed as (B)(l)~ (2) and (3). The latter two appear technically defective.

Item (B)(2) specifies the requirements for attribute sampling plans in which the Reject Quality Level (RQL) or unacceptable percent defec-tive is 5% with an associated s error of 0.05. Since the limit of error is usually considered to represent the bounds within which 95% of the items will lie, it follows that 5% of the items can be expected to lie outside this bound by chance alone. The latter quan-tity is known as the Acceptable Quality Level (AQL) and therefore is

• equal to 5%. An Operating Characteristic Curve (OC curve) in which AQL = RQL would require 100% sampling, assuming perfect measurements and no sampling error~--a condition which is clearly untenable. We conclude there is no acceptable attribute sampling plan which meets the proposed requirements.

Item (8)(3) specifies the reguirements for a variable sampling plan with the same protection as (B)(2) above. Assume that the measure-ment of an item in inventory isµ. Then the limit of error on this value would beµ+/- 2 cr, where cr is a measure 6f the uncertainty on the measurement of the item. In order to reject the item, if the true value is at µ1 = µ + 2 cr (at the limit of error) with as error of 0.05, then, since the standard deviation is still cr, the critical value must be placed at µ 1 - 1.64 cr = µ t 0.36 a. (See Figure l).

This results in an a error of 0.73. This implies that 73% of all acceptable material would be incorrectly rejected by such a sampling plan. This is an intolerable situation and it is concluded no 7

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GENERAL@HECTRIC Secretary of the Commission 3/29/73 variable sampling plaD exists that satisfies the requirements. Since the standard deviation -for the measured variable would apply to both acceptable and reject material, the condition is not improved by changing the measuring capability.

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µ-.36a 1-11-1.646' µ1

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E. Vanhoomissen, Manager Special Fuel Programs M/C 169, Ext. 6166 es 8

- 0 UN ITIED NUCLEAR CORPORATION 1735 EYE STREET, N. w.

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20006 (202) 659-2345 March 29, 1973 Secretary of the Commission

u. S. Atomic Energy Commission \ OCKETED ila\EO Washington, D. C. 20545 21973 Attention: Chief, Public Proceedings Staff

Subject:

FR DOC. 73-1976-79

Dear Sir:

United Nuclear respectfully submits the following comments for consideration on proposed amendments to AEC Regulations published in the Federal Register on February 1, 1973.

As a general proposition, the goal of the AEC to reduce the risk of theft of special nuclear material and to provide for the more accurate accounting for such material is endorsed. We do, however, have certain reservations concerning the methods of accomplishing this goal.

One principal objection to the proposed physical security regu-lations is the emphasis placed on the use of armed personnel at plant site and during transit and the seeming reliance on such personnel to protect against threats to the common defense and security -- a task normally con-sidered to be the responsibility of Federal and local law enforcement authorities and the military. Responsibility for the intrinsic value of special nuclear material and the protection of employees and neighbors is properly placed on industry and industry has fulfilled its obligations in this respect. To the extent that the proposed regulations, in essence, require an armed confrontation between a' licensee 's security force and potential divertors, with the possible use of deadly force, the proposed regulations should be amended. The surest and most proper method of pro-tection against successful diversion, whether in the area of physical security or materials accounting, is prompt detection and reporting, followed by prompt action of law enforcement authorities to recover di-verted material. Armed guards are not necessary for such detection and reporting.

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fjJJ rMrn1f ED ff~ BJ C Lm!t!AR CORPORATION Secretary U. S. Atomic Energy Commission Page 2 A second principal objection is the proposed requirements for rigorous search of individual employees, the stated purpose of which is to detect devices such as firearms, explosives, incendiary devices, or other items which could be used for industrial sabotage. Perhaps such procedures would make industrial sabotage by such employee a little more difficult, but no search, however thorough, can prevent an act of indus-trial sabotage of a serious nature. The cornerstone of any security program is the individual who has been granted an access authorization predicated on an examination of his background, including his suitability to handle classified information, his loyalty and his integrity, prior to having access to sensitive material. To insist upon employee search could well cause a serious morale problem because it would be recognized for what it is -- a futile, ineffective attempt to prevent an act which can be accomplished by a determined saboteur despite such search.

If the above objections are indeed valid and no significant improvement in physical security results from the implementation of these proposed regulations, then the very real costs associated with compliance therewith are not justifiable. 'While cost alone is not determinative of the desirability of adopting preventive measures, if such measures do not accomplish the purposes for which they are intended, then there occurs an intolerable economic waste.

In the event these proposed regulations are made effective, an equitable adjustment to AEC fixed price contracts should be granted by the appropriate Contracting Officer to reimburse the contractor for the sub-stantial unanticipated costs that will necessarily be incurred as a result of complying with such regulations.

Additional connnents on specific items are attached hereto and reflect our view that the proposed regulations be withdrawn until answers to the very serious questions raised are formulated.

We appreciate this opportunity to present our views for your consideration.

Sincerely,

FR DOC. 73-1976 I

SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL REQUIREMENTS F 'R PHYSICAL SECURITY 10 CFR 70. 22 (g)

Uranium bearing materiat containing less than 20% U-235 by weight should be exempt from the fequirements of Part 70. Substantial time and effort would be necessar to purify such material, thus permitting 1

location and recovery of lost or stolen material*before unlawful use.

Material of this nature is similat to uranium enriched to less than 20%

U-235 in its hazardous characteriJtics.

Guidelines should be make available for use in preparing a physical security plan but should1be flexible enough to permit the tailoring of a plan to a specified operation. This would eliminate the application of non-essential me~sires to an operation simply because they are required by specification type regulations.

10 CFR 70.25(a) and (h)

Section 70.25(a) requires licensees to train and equip guards/

watchmen to protect special nuclear material against theft or diversion, and to protect against industrial: sabotage. Section 70.25(h) sets forth certain general response requirements imposed upon guards/watchmen in the event of a threat to the sensitive areas of a facility. These proposed regulations do not set standards :against which a licensee may measure the adequacy of training nor do they '*indicate the nature of the equipment to be utilized by the security force. A proliferation of armed personnel authorized to use deadly force in carrying out their duties is not de-sirable, particularly if such personnel are not professionals of very high quality and are not properly trained by experts in the field.

j 10 CFR 70.25(b)(2)

\

A physical barrier at the perimeter of the protected area serves little useful function. All controls are administered on the protected and vital areas and the addition'*of a third barrier adds little to security.

Isolation can be adequately prov'lded by a cleared area surrounding the protected area.

10 CFR 70.25(c)(l)

Common access points for both vital and protected areas should be permitted. Special limitations for access to vital areas serve little purpose except in extremely large facilities.

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I FR Doc. 73-1976 Page 2 f

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I The search requirements contained in this Section, if interpreted literally, appear to be unreasonable, impossible to comply with and do not accomplish the purpose for which they are intended. One bent on committing industrial sabotage, whether truck drivers, employees or authorized visitors, I

I I could do so with ingredients normally available within the area or which he I

carries on hia person (matches, cigarette lighter, etc.). Employment of security cleared personnel and continuous escort of non-employees not exempted I under 70.25(c)(6) is all that can reasonably be required to prevent industrial I sabotage.

10 CFR 70.25(c)(7) \

Personal vehicles on official business should be permitted within a protected area.

10 CFR 70.25(d)

Detection specialists indicate that no instrument exists which will detect all incendiary or explosive devices.

10 CFR 70.25(e)

Establishing and maintaining communications with local law en-forcement authorities depends prirnar;i..ly on the voluntary cooperation of such authorities, thus complete compliance with the requirements of this Section may not be possible.

Implementation of Regulations If the proposed regulations as set forth in FR Doc. 73-1976 are adopted, a period of one year after publication in the Federal Register should be permitted for final implementation.

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FR DOC. 73-1977 SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL REVISED MATERLI\L CONTROL AND ACCOUNTING REQUIREMENTS FOR SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL 10 CFR 70.Sl(e)(l)

Tamper-safing of waste containers destined for disposal should not be required. This type of material does not justify tamper-safe accounting.

10 CFR 70.51(e)(3)

Physical inventories by their nature cannot be primary material controls. Continuous accounting for material is required by controlled transfer and material balance systems; therefore, the frequent physical inventory does not justify the loss of plant and operations time and other c~ts. Inventories for high enriched uranium should be required no more fie~ently than every six months as an overcheck of the primary material concrDl sys terns.

Less stringent requirements and frequency of verification should be applied to materials of unique configurations and/or size because of the difficulties connected with possible theft of such items.

10 CFR 70.Sl(e)(S)

Limits of. error on MUF for high enriched uranium cannot be main-tained within the specified limits for low grade or scrap rraterials.

Measurement instrumentation with sufficient accuracy is not available.

The AEC safeguards instrumentation program data verifies the inability of the measurement technology. The current instrumentation is capable of no better than a 5% limit of error on any material balance.

. . I e FR Dal. 73-1978 l .

PHYSICAL PROTECTION Of SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL SECURI Y MEASURES 10 CFR 73.l(a)

Uranium bearing materia I containing less than 20% U-235 by weight should be exempted from this prop9sed regulation. Such material requires significant time and effort for ptlrification, thus permitting location and recovery of the material before unlawful use.

10 CFR 73.3l(a)(l)(i) and (ii)

The proposal for armed escorts to accompany a shipment of special nuclear material requires licenaeJs to protect against actions which threaten the common defense and security. jThis requirement would be better served by the use of armed Federal officers, particularly if use of deadly force is contemplated. It is also ques~ionable whether private armed personnel l

would be permitted unrestricted passage across state lines or local jurts~

dictional boundaries.

It would appear that early detection and reporting of theft is

~et~;:i;~!i~ goal and armed persinel are not necessary to the attainment Consideration should be ~iven to exempting from the requirements for both dual occupancy and a two ;man chase vehicle, relatively short haul shipments; e.g., within a 60 mile ,radius.

A minimum of 180 days should be allowed for submitting required plans and/or designs.

10 CFR 73.3l(a)(3) and (Sl

• Radio-telephone cornmunic'.ations are not effective in certain urban areas and in many areas west of the Mississippi River. Alternative reporting methods which do not increase dwell time in transit should be considered;

' ' l e.g., a four hour call-in time, thus eliminating frequent stops during which vehicles are more vulnerable to hijacking.

I 10 CFR 73.3l(a)(7)

Presently, fingerprint type seals are not practical. It would, appear that a tamper proof seal wo~ld suffice

• r FR DOC. 73-1979 PHYSICAL PRarECTION OF SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL REQUIREMENTS FOR MATERIALS PROTECTION 10 CFR 73.l(a)

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/ Uranium bearing materials containing less than 20% U-235 by weight should be exempted from this proposed regulation. Significant

! time and effort would be necessary to purify this material to make it suitable for weapon fabrication, thus permitting time for ~etection I and recovery of lost or stolen material before such unlawfil use.

10 CFR 73.32(a)(l)

Limitation of activity in material access areas is unnecessary.

Personnel control provides sufficient protection and no additional pro-tection is provided by limitirg activities.

10 CFR 73.32(a)(3)

Current regulations permit storage of enriched uranium scrap in fenced areas surrounded by a second fence no closer than twenty-five feet from the perimeter of the inner fence. The increase to fifty feet of spacing between fences affords no additional protection.

10 CFR 73.32(a)(6)

See FR Doc. 73-1976; 70.25(c)(l).

10 CFR 73.32(a)(7)

Surveillance of individuals within material access areas on a continuous basis is not feasible, Random observation provides a sufficient deterrent.

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475 PARK AVENUE SOUTH* NEW YORK, N. Y. 10016 * (212) 725-8300 March 29, D11CKETED OOAEO MAR301973 ~ 2 The Secretary U. S. Atomic Energy Commission Washington, D. C. 20545 Der.ir Sir:

The proposed amendments to the Atomic Energy Commission's regula-tions governing the quality and frequency of physical inventories and the physical protection of special nuclear materials and facilities, as published in the Federal Register on February 1, 1973, have been reviewed by members of the Atomic Industrial Forum's Committee on Nuclear Material Safeguards. We are concerned, (1) that a number of the amendments are inconsistent or unclear and among other things, (2) that they may by inference impose policing duties on licensees beyond what they can reason-ably be expected to fulfill (3) that they appear to conflict with federal and sta te regulations, (4) that they impose severe shut-down penalties on facilities and (5) that they exceed the practical measurement capabili-ties available from today's technology.

This letter highlights com~ents from many companies whose in terests and activities are widely varied, but whose reactions to the proposed amendments are remarkably similar.

We welcome the action by the Commission to define controls on certain types pf special nuclear mater a ls such as uranium-233, plutonium and uranium-235 enriched to 20% or more. We note that the proposed amendments do not address nuclear power reactors in view of the imminent publication of American Nuclear Society Standard 3.3, "Industrial Security for Nuclear Power Plants. 11 Related thereto, our Power Generation Subcommittee endorses ANS-3.3.

Specifically, the proposed amendments related to requirements for physical security of facilities and protection of special nuclear materials are unclear between industrial sabotage attempts, which the I lcensees would be required to protect against and attempts by an enemy of the United States which the government supposedly would be responsible for preventing. Also, they require the licensee to maintain a guard force, armed and prepared to use deadly force to counter a t hreat of undesignated proportions where local law enforcement assistance is small or slow in responding. Furt her to thie point, they specifically place a jud gemen t responsibility on a gua d to decide whether he should take personal action to neutralize the threat. A

The Secretary (2) March 29, 1973 regulation which could turn a facility into an armed camp, assigning judgement responsibility to private guards to use deadly vs. prudent force to protect that facility is unprecedented and unreasonable, in our judgement. If, in fact, action of this type covered in the proposed amendments is essential we must conclude that only a government guard force will suffice.

The amended regulations ~;1ould require that all individuals will be searched for firearms, explosives, etc. before entry into a protected area. The word 11 search 11 is unde fined. If a search means a body search such as that conducted by law en forcement officers, the legal ramifica-tions of searching employees or visitors are diffi c ult to resolve. Moni-toring equipment which could be used to satisfy the search req4irements is not commercially available.

We agree that transportation is the most vulnerable link in the nuclear fuel cycle and we agree with the Commission that physical protection exercised during the transpor ta tion of s pecial nuclear materials must be as effective as protection of s uch materials in process or in storage.

The requirement in the amended regulations that carriers of special nuclear materials should communicate by telephone on at least two-hour intervals where radiotelephone communication is not available dictates that in certain geog raphic areas a tran s po r ter would have to stop and park every two hours. This increases the vulnerability of the transport-ing vehicle to unauthorized d i version. A five-hour call in period would reduce the risk of hijacking and still provide reasonable assurance of the protection of the cargo. In addition it would offer the benefit of reducing the int ran sit dwell t ime .

Under the provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act and Federal Aviation Act, surface and air common carriers are granted operating certificates to provide transportation between specified geographical locations. In many i~stances shipments of special nucl ea r material moving by truck only, will pass out of the operating territory of the originating carrier and will have to be 11 interlined 11 with other highway carriers. This will con-flict with the objectives stated in the. proposed amendments of reducing intransit dwell time and utilizing direct routes in some instances.

We call to the Commission 1 s attention the fact that the use of armed .

escort vehicles could present a problem. Unless escort guards are military or federal officers, the carrying of firearms across states borders con-flicts with federal and state regulations. The carrying of sidearms is prohibited and rifles and shotguns can only be carried in vehicles when the weapons are unloaded.

The carriers a re the one whi ch will be called upon to implement most of the trans po rtation re uirements set forth in the propos e d regulations.

The Secretary March 29, 1973 If they are saddled with a system that requires inordinate capital inves-ments and disrupts their normal operating routine, then they will either refuse to handle these types of shipments or apply commensurate charges for their services. Regulations of transportation of special nuclear material via the licensee who has little control over the material in transit appears to be inadequate. Government licensing of the carrier would appear to resolve this difficulty, and we believe that such licensing action should be taken.

By our interpretation of the proposed amendments, monthly verifica-tion of inventory in a fuel fabrication facility with existing technology could require a shut-down once each calendar month for inventory and re-measurement of items not tamper-safed. For a large plant this could mean a c~s1ation of operations for five working days. A shut-down penalty of 20% of the total production capability will have a major economic impact unsupported by benefits which in terms of prior experience can only be described as speculative.

The proposed amendments to the regulations lists the following limits of error on MUF:

Jan. 1 and Unt i 1 Dec. 31 thereafter 1975 1976 Plutonium or Uranium 233 in a chemical reprocessing plant 1.0% 0.6%

Uranium 235 in a reprocessing plant 0. 7% 0.6%

Plutonium, Uranium 233, or high enriched uranium - all other 0.5% 0.3%

Low-enr*iched uranium - all othe 0.5% 0.5%

We believe that these limits impose a precision of measurement in an operating plant which may not be achievable with instrumentation com-mercially available. Also, this requirement is based on some develop-ment which is to be accomplished during th~ interim period between now and 1976. We recommend that the Commission consider the usual practice of first demonstrating the practical feasibility of new methods during the interim period before including them in a regulatory document.

With regard to inventories at fuel reprocessing facilities, inter-pretation of the proposed amendments related to exceeding limits of error for any material balance should not be translated into a requirement for a monthly physical inventory.

The Secretary (Ii) March 29, 1973 Further, they could be interpreted to require a very costly semi-annual shut-down and flush-out type of inventory for large fuel reprocessing plant s. It i s our opinion that the shut-down penalty of such an inventory is currently unsupportable.

Lastly, we recommend that limits of error of MUF on materials of very low strategic significance, such as low enriched uranium, be deleted.

We feel that such large quantities would have to be diverted that detection by physical requirements would be assured.

In summary we recognize that in drafting the proposed amendments the Commission has addressed the very difficult task of preparing detailed requirements for physical protection and inventory taking. We recommend that they not be promulgated as written because we believe it is imperative that the Commission review them to eliminate inconsistencies and to determine whether the amended regulations are applicable and enforceable . This is necessary to provide guidance and clarification to licensees who ultimately must be responsive to the regulat ions finally adopted.

We would be pleased to meet with the Commission to discuss the proposed amendments and the problems related thereto .

Sincerely, Kenneth R. Osborn Committee Chairman KRO/tc

EDLOW INTERNATIONAL COMPANY SUITE 404-5 1100 17TH. STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. U.S.A. 20036 March 27, 1973 CKETED

'EC The Secretary of the Commission *1AR,] 9197 U.S. Atomic Energy Commission Washington, D.C. 20545 Attention: Chief, Public Proceedings Staff RE: Proposed Amendments to 10 CFR Part 73 FR February l, Physical Protection of Special Nuclear Material Gentlemen, Please accept the following comments and suggestions for consideration in connection with the referenced proposed amendments.

We, at Edlow International Company, applaud the Commis-sion for taking action to strengthen the requirements for physical protection of special nuclear materials during the transportation cycle. We have prodded and pushed and urged for the past two years that action be taken by both government and industry to establish an effective system of physical security.

That the Commission used those items identified in the Department of Transportation studies as the basis for the proposed regulations is to be commended.

We note that the requirements of the proposed regulations--

safe vehicles, a:aned guards, two way radi.o-telephone communications, monitors, etc.-*can only assure that a theft or diversion cannot take place short of a ~ignificant anned attack. We read this to mean that these complex and expensive requirements can only handle insignificant armed attacks. This comes as no surprise to us, for we are on record as stating that .QQ system can be devised, short of a massive military convoy, which can prevent a carefully planned theft with sufficient "muscle" to back it up.

Does the Commission finally agree with us? Is this huge exercise which is proposed directed at insignificant theft or TELEPHONE: AREA CODE 202-833 -8237 / TELEX WUI 64387

I' Chief, Public Proceedings Staff March 23, 1973 Page two diversion attempts? Is it worth all this effort? We at Edlow International think not.

We are appalled that the Commission's objectives of pro-viding for the common defense and security of the United States as stated in paragraph one, are made a responsibility of the pri-vate nuclear industry. It is possible that the Commission may wish to put forward a new and novel concept, but we question whether there are any precedents on which to rely in publishing this astounding idea. The Commission has not seen fit to advise the private sector of such precedents, nor its basis for adopting such a philosophy.

We are under the impression that it is the function of the Department of Defense, to provide for the defense and secu-rity, of the u.s. We were unaware that any of the branches of our governrnent--executive, legislative, or judicial--were prepared to delegate this responsibility. We believe that many members of Congress will be surprised to learn of this highly unusual stance.

If the Commission concludes that the security require-ments as proposed should be implemented, even though the Commis-sion agrees that they are of little value in the face of a significant armed attack, we submit that the security functions should be performed by the armed forces, in the name of the common defense and security.

Let us now address ourselves to the feasibility of the requirements.

(a) We agree that the use of monitors is feasible and realistic. Two years ago we responded to previous rule-making that monitoring of shipments at interchange points was realistic and relatively inexpensive. We have not changed our mind.

(b) Material can be shipped in point-to-point movement, with no cargo transfers enroute. This may require ex-clusive use of equipment, which method is not uncommon in the normal common carrier industry. Under some con-ditions, cargo cruld be moved using the concept of last on-first off. To sum up, this poses no problem.

(c) The use of radio telephones in the transport vehicle and/or the "chase car" is feasible. Such equipment is available, and some t~ansport vehicles are already equipped with radio telephones. Let us point out that

Chief, Eublic Proceedings Staff March 27, 19/ 3 Page three there are many areas in the United States (in the far west and in certain mountain terrains) where radio tele-phone service is inoperable. These factors may require that the vehicle periodically stop to make normal tele-phone calls. This certainly does make the vehicle more vulnerable, as well as increase the dwell time in the transportation phase. This, obviously is in conflict with a basic principle established by the DOT study.

(d) The use of a "secure" vehicle is feasible. We define this to mean the equivalent of an armored car or armored trailer, which vehicle can be immobilized. "Secure" vehicles are available for hire.

(e) Armed guards are available. Private industry can hire civilian armed guards. They are readily available as a matter of normal business practice. Whether the use of such civilian armed guards is feasible is an entirely different question. We are unaware of any Federal type gun license which would permit a civilian guard to carry a gun across state lines.

We now address ourselves to the cost impact of the pro-posed criteria.

(a) We estimate the cost of monitors to be about $50.00 per eight hour shift.

(b) The cost of exclusive use vehicle for point-to-point movement is about ten times the normal freight cost for a relatively small shipment of SNM.

(c) The use of radio telephone in the transport vehicle and/or the "chase" car does call for additional costs,

• which would include installation and maintenance costs, cost of training personnel for the use of the equipment, and use and lease charges for the equipment. At this point in time we have no way of determining a good cost estimate.

Let us simply say that the costs would be considerable.

(d) We have determined that armored vehicles are avail-able at a cost of $1.50 per live and ferry mile.

(e) We have determined that armed guards are available at a cost of $3.00 per hour each, plus living expenses such as hotels and meals while away from home base.

It is our conclusion that the cost of transportation will increase by at least 1000'4 using these criteria, assuming small shipments of SNM.

,,1*

Chief, Public Proceedings Staff March 27, 1973 Page four The use of civilian armed guards, acting as employees or agents of private business enterprise, to provide for on the road protection for nuclear material transports worries us. A number of questions immediately arise, and, in the absence of authoritative

~nsw~rs, we would be most reluctant to open ourselves, or our em-plyees or agents, to what may apparently be serious liabilities.

For example, the fact that a man is armed means that he is supposed to use his weapon. If he is not supposed to use his wea-pon, then there is no point in handing him a gun. When does a civi-lian armed guard draw his weapon and fire? What is his position in court if he seriously injures or kills a suspect? What are the lia-bilities of his employer in the event of lawsuits for injury or loss of life? Does he use his gun only in self defense, or does he use his gun to protect the cargo? We particularly call the attention of the Commission to these questions, and stress the importance of a statement by the Commission as to the legal basis on which industry may rely in the event implementation of the use of civilian armed guards is, in fact, required by the Commission.

Experts in the transport industry agree that pilferage is no problem at all, insofar as special nuclear material is concerned.

SNM cannot be readily fenced. It is illogical to compare the pilferage of SNM with pilferage of watches, jewelry, records, etc.

Those items can readily be fenced, and are attractive to the pil*

fering criminal. The use of armed guards to prevent pilferage of SNM is ridiculous, Apparently then, the use of ariaed guards is proposed only to protect against an overt highjacking attempt. If the Commission can concede, as we read the preface to the proposeQ regulations, that

&I1Ded guards can only prevent diversion by insignificant armed attacks, the questi.on is then open as to the value of the use of "gun stingers" as a realistic system.

Our reading of publication in the Federal Register represents, in part, an admission by the Commission that absolute protection is impossible, Granted that this is true, early detec-tion of a diversion is the most desirable goal to be attained, so that early recovery is made easier.

Commission staff knows of at least two systems which will provide constant communication with vehicles and/or packages, which systems are now available and economically feasible. The communi-cation with the vehicle and/or package can be made at intervals as frequently as five seconds. Hardware now exists to implement such systems.

Chief, Public Proceedings Staff March 27, 1973 Page five Accordingly, we, at Edlow International Company, call upon the Commission to implement at tpe earliest possible date a system of constant communication to replace the use of anned guards It is our most basic conviction that early detection and recovery is far more in the interest of the common defense and security than more people with more guns to escort more and more shipments, which system is effective only in the presence of an insignificant armed attack.

Thank you for tne ) opportunity of presenting our views, and I remain Very _truly yours, EDLOW INf.i NATIONAL COMPANY

\.*~ 4 <'5(/2 Cf O'vV

' \

Ja~ Edlow Vice President JE/bt

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DOCKET NUM13ER PRODOSFD RULt p R _'13

- (38FR -.asat,1 197' MAR 20 PM 7 A ' ~of(3 USAEC - H S- GTWN CO MB ENGWI D COMBUSTION ENGRG WINDSOR CO N 710 - 447 -1 870 3 73 o. 1 MR . PA UL BENDER SECRETARY ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION WASHINGTON , D. C.

RE 20545 TH~ PROPOSED RULE MAKING PUBLISHED IN THE FEDERAL REGISTER ,

l VOLU ME 38 , NO . 2 1, THURSDAY , FEBRUARY 1 , 19 73, PERTAINING TO AMENDMENTS TO 10-CFR- 73 , " PHYSICAL PROTDCTION OF SPECIAL UCLEAR MA TER I A L , S EC UR I TY MEAS UR ES .....

IF IMPLEMENTED , THE PROPOSED CHANGES WOULD I MPOSE SEVERE HARDSHIPS ON SHIPPERS , CARRIERS , AND RECEIVERS OF SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL .

IT IS THEREFORE ESPECTFULLY RE UESTED THAT A STAY OF EXECUTIO OF' THE PROPOSED AMENDMENTS BE GRANTED TO PERMIT FURTHER STUDY AND RECOMMENDATIONS BY THE ATOMIC INDUSTRIAL FORUM 's TRANSPORTATION SUBCOMMITTEE.

COMBUSTION ENGINEERING , INC .

l O00 PR OSP EC T HI LL RD.

WINDSOR , CONNECTICUT 06095 A. GIRARD STORY MA NA GER - PLANNING A ND SER VIC ES TRANSPORTATION AND DISTRIBUTION - 665 - 19 EMBER - ATOMIC INDUSTRIAL FORU TRANSPORTATION SUBCOMMITTEE l

JMO END

TRISTAN ASSOCIATES POLYCLINIC HOSPITAL P'll.('CTIClt LIMITED TO IIADIOLOGY HARRISBURG, l"A . 171015 717 . 238-7821 I 717 . 782-4885 CORPORATION OP'P'ICI:

THEODORE A . TRISTAN, M.D.

RICHARD R. BROCK, M.D. 13 March 1973 3153 N. 28TH STREET RICHARD M. FENCEL, M.D . CAMP HILL, PA. 17011 MILTON A . FRIEDLANDER, M . D. 717

• 761-211158 LEONARD C. GRIFF, M.D.

P'INANCIAL OP'P'ICt:

JOHN C. MORTON, M . D.

RICHARD J. PAWELSKI , M.D . KUTZ BUILDING, SUITE 15-D 1104 FERNWOOD AVENUE RAY W . HORNER. R.T .* FA S R T CAMP HILL, PA . 17011 Secretary of the Commission DOCKETED United States Atomic Energy Commission ti EC Washington, D.C., 20545 Attention: Chief Public Proceedings Staff

Dear Sir:

I have recently ha d an opportunity to go over the proposed changes in Atomic Energy Regulations relating to transfer of radioactive material from the suppliers to the customers.

In this case, I as a physician am a customer, and it is difficult to make much sense out of what these require*

ments are. It is clear that the AEC is concerned about the safety of the transfer of materials and, apparently, they may or may not, in fact, be having trouble with the shipment of fissionable materials to people who are not aut horized to re-ceive them. If this is, in fact, the case I would suspect that it is an extremely small part of the problem and could be much less expensively managed by bird-dogging any particu~

lar suspected inci dent, or if a requirement is necessary, hav*

ing the manufacturers determine that their shipment is going to a reputable instit ut ion.

Creating a whole new system ver ifying that the trans*

feree is authorized to receive the materials, seems somewhat ridiculous since the transferring agent as listed in 30.41 is actually requiring the transferee to provide the ma terial, whereas the transferer should be able to get that i nformation from the Atomic Energy Commission directl y and it would be a great deal cheaper to do it this way rather than to constantly annoy physicians who are busy enough, and forcing them to dig through their files for mater t al, or fill out forms, which are unnecessary, since the information a~ to whether a physician is licensed to receive the material could be easily determined by checking with the Atomic Energy Commission.

.., Page two Secretary of tne Commission United States Atomic Energy Commission 13 March 1973 We are against bureaucracy, but tt ts coming to a bad state when not only the bureaucracy, but the people who are paying for it, have to behave ltke a bureaucracy.

It seems to us that the tmposition of still another regulation, which is really the ltcenstng agency's responsi~

bility, has to now be transferred to the individual who is al-ready done a vast amount of paper work in order to comply with regulations which many times are totally unrelated to the ne-cessities of modern medical practice.

Very stncerely yours, r/ltfAtf~

Theodore A.

Tristan, M.D.

Director Division of Radiology Polycltntc Hospital TAT jr

ASSOCIATE UNION SECURITY SERVICES, INC ,

SUITE 2011, F"OREBT HILLS PLAZA PITTSSURDH, PA, 15221 412*271*1200 DOCKETED tls.\8 Office of the Secretary U. s. Atomic Energy Commission Washington , D. c. 20545 Attention: Chief , Public Proceedings Staff Gentlemen :

I respectfully request that the comments included in the attached paper, which was presented at the recent Atomic Industrial Forun vJorkshop on Protection of Special nuclear Naterials and F'acili ties, be considered by the Corr.:rcission with respect to proposed rules:

1. USAEC Rules and Regulations, Proposed Amendment to 10CFR73, "Physic al Protection of Special Nuclear l~aterial, 11 Requirer.:ents for l-'iaterials Protection, published February 1 , 1973.

2. USAEC Rules and Regulations , Proposed Amend~ent to 10C:F'R50, Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities -- Requirements for Physical Security ,

published February 1 , 1973 .

3. USAEC Rules and Regulations, Proposed Arnendnient to 10CFR70, Special Nuclear l~aterial, Requirements for Physical Security, published February 1, 1973 .

t-:y particular comments are summarized on Page 13 of the attachrrent (I tems 1, 2 and 3). I believe each con*.rr:ent is sufficiently clear when consioered in light of the complete text of the paper with one possible exception, namely: the access of _!!gscr eened inciviouals to protected or vital areas without an escort . The proposed rules perreit this (i.c. 7 proposed 70.25 (c) (6)), whereas draft 4 of ANS 3 . 3, entitled ,

11 In6ustrial Security for Nuclear Power Plants," does not. As a matter of logj_c, good plant protection, and consistency (of

£.r;,C r*~ ui t ' B position should prevail .

AMr11owi-edged C'c.~---- ....,;. --~ :....

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Ue S. Atomic Energy Commission Harch 15, 1973 I understand from a committee member who helped draft ANS 3o},

• --.._that it was the intent of the committee that an "authorized" individual, whether an err.ployee or nonemployee, shall be screened (per Paragraph 4.3) before he is permitted access to a protected or vital area without an escort.

Ky principal motive and objective in providing these corur.ents are, hopefully, to be of assistance in the ultimate adoption of rules which are consistent on the funoamental aspects of protection (against sabotage), whether they be for a fuel fabricator, a reprocessor, or a nuclear power plant operator. Several changes need to be made in the prop0sed rules to achieve this goalo Respectfully submitted -

Attachment

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• \ ~

IlEMARKS DY LAWill~NCE D. (D/1.VE) LOW

• ATOMIC INDUS'rRIAL FORUM WORKSHOP ON PROTECTION OF SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL AND FACII,ITIES KEY . LARGO, FLORIDA FEBRUARY 18-21, 1973 PLft.NNING A PROTECTION PROGRAM I APPRECIATE THE OPPORTUNITY TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS WORKSHOP ON PRO'I'ECTION OF NUCLEAR MATERIAlS AND FACILITIES. MY PURPOSE THIS AFTERNOON IS 'ID IDENTIFY AND DI::,CUSS SOME OF THE MORE IMPORTANT ASPECTS OF PHYSICAL PROTECTION WHICH MANAGEMEN'!

SHOUID CONSIDER IN PLANNING (AND OPERATING) A NUCLEAR FACILITY WHETHER IT BE A FUEL FABRICATION PLANT ll A POWER REACTOR, OR A REPROCESSIOO PLANT o I HOPE I CAN STIMULATE SOME THOUGHT AND DISCUSSION WHICH MAY HELP ALL OF US.

IN ALL AREAS OF INDUSTRY AND BUSINESS, MANAGEMENT HAS AS ONE OF ITS MANY RESPONSIBILITIES THE PROTECTION OF I'IS EMPLOYEES AND THE COMPANY'S ASSETS -- MONEY, MATERIAL, E(.lUIPNENT, OR fACILITIES. THE EXTENT AND KIND OF PROTECTION NEEDED, ARE RELATED TO VARYI.00- FACTORS SUCH AS PLANT INVESWENT, CRITICAL NEED OF EQUIPMENT i

AND FACILITIES FOR CONTINUED OPERATIONSll PROFIT MAKING, PUBLIC NEED AND NECE'.SSITY, AND VULNERABILI1'Y TO ARSON AND VANDALISM. IN ADDITION TO THE USUAL CONSIDERATIONS, THERE ARE TWO' FACTORS WHICH ARE UNIQUE TO THE NUCLEAR INDUSTRY: (1) POTENTIA.L VULNERABILITY TO SABOTAGE WHICH COULD POSE A SIGNIFICA.NT THREAT TO TBE PUBLIC HEALTH AND SM"E'l'Y; AND (2} THE POTENTIAL THEFT OR DIVERSION Of CERTAIN QUANTITIES OF SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL WHICH COULD POSE A THREAT TO THE COMMON DEFENSE AND SECURITY OF THE NATION.

THERE ARE SEV3RAL BASIC DOCUMENTS WHICH ARE PERTINENT TO OUR DISClBSION TODAYo NOW, I DON'T WANT TO SOUND LIKE A REFERENCE LiffiARIAN, BUT IT SEEMS WORTI-rwHILE FOR ME TO LIST THESE DOCUMENTS AT THE OU.TSET. THEY ARE AS FOLLOWSi

• Consultant, Indust.r:i nl Sccuri ty C*.~* ]ucleat' Facili tics 9 Former Director, Division of Compliance (Rer,ulatory Operations)$ Headquarters; and former Director, Division of Security, Savannah River Operations Office, Aikeny S .. c., Uo s. Atom..i..c Energy Commissiono Hrc Lem's address is Box 44JI Damascus, Maryland 20750ia

1. THE STANiARD FORMfl.T AND CONTENT Or' SJ\..FETY \NALYSIS REPOR1S FOR NUCLEAR POWER PI..I\NTS, j SAEC (REVISION 1, DATED OC'IDBER 1972)., ,

2o THE DRAfil')* PROPOSED STANDARD ANS-3 .. 3, INDUSTRIAL S ECURI'rY FCil NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS, PREPAllED BY SUBCOMMITTEE ANS-.3 Oif THE AMERICAN NUCLEAR SOCIETY (DRAFT NOo 4, IOVEMBER 6, 1972)0 30 SAFE'IY GUIDE 17 - PROTECTION AGAINST INDUSTRIAL SABOTAGE, U3AEC OCTOBER 27, 1971.

4.

I

'£HE 33 fRAFT CRITERIA ON INDUSTRIAL SECVRITY (UStiliC -- INFO~AL 1972) o 5c. USAEC RµLES AND REGULATIONS, 10CFR73, "PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF SPECIAL NUCLEAR

MATERIALS," ISSUED NOVEMBER 28, 1970 ..

6,, USAEC JLES AND REGULATIONS, PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO 10CFR73, "PIIYSICJ\.L PROTECTION I

OF SPEC[AL NUCLEAR MATERIAL,tt REQUIREMlmTS FOR MATERIAIS PROTECTION, PUBLISHED FEBRUARY 1, 19730 1

7* USAEC RU LES AND REGllLATIONS, PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO 10CFR50, LJC ENSING OF PRO.iJUC'.TIION AND UTILIZATION FACILITIES -- REi,,lUIREMENT3 FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY, PUBLISHED FEBRUARY 1, 1973.

I 8,. USAEC RULES AND REGULATIONS, PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO 10CFR70, SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERI4L, REl.,!UIREMENTS FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY, PUBLISHED FESRUAHY 1, 1973; AND I

9. RECOMM~NDATIONS FOR THE PHYSICAL PEOTECTION OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL, PUBLISHED BY THE INERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, AND DATED JUNE 19720 I . i IN PLANNING A PHYSICAL PROTECTION PROGRAM FRO}! THE STANDPOINT OF POTENTIAL SABOTAGE, bmFT OR DIVERSION -- AND ESSENTIALLY I AM GOING TO LIMIT THE REST OF I

MY REMARKS ' TO THESE PARTICULAR CONSIDERATIONS - THE AUTHORS OF THESE, REFERENCE DOCUMENTS !JlPPEAR TO AGIIBE ON THE NBED FOR CERTAlN 13:\SIC INGREDIENTS, NAXELY:

. I lo SECTJR]TY AREAS 2., PHYSitjAL BARRIERS J., ACCESS CONTROLS 4., A SECtjRITY FORCE 5., SURVEILLANCE

6. LCCAL)L~1 ENFORCEMENT LIAISON

, 7., Olt"'F-SITE COMMUNICATIONS

./

THE/ APPEARS, HOWEVER, 'ro BE A DIVERGENCE OF OPINION AMONG THE AUTHORITIES ON SOM& OF THESE INGREDIENTS AS TO THE SCOPE AND EXTENT OF THE *PROTECTION NEEDED.

I THIS IS P,IBTICUJ..!'.RLY TRUE IN A:'::*.:::. SUCH AS PERSONNEL INVESTIGATION OR SCREENING AND ARMrG OF PLANT PROTECTION PERSONNEL,, WE ARE NOT ALIIAYS CERTAIN AS TO WHAT THE R&.iiREMENTS ARE.,

I

,, *1 e I I WOULD LIKJ<

TO b:X!\MINE THC:S~ AREt'\J BRIEFLY AND O 0Cu:;s SCME OF THF-: COUHSES I .

OF ACTION CNE SHOUW CONSIDER OR TAKE IN THE PREPARATION OF A PROTECTION PLANo 1 .

LET'S 1'UltGET THE MISSION IMPOSSIBLE GIMMICKS AND CONSIDER PRACTICAL AND EFFECTIVE

_MEASURES , MINIMIZE THE RISK OF SABOTAGE, THEFT OR DIVF.llSION -- WE ALL YNOW WE CAN'T BE ljO PER CENT SECURE Alfi MORE THAN WE CAN BE 100 PER CENT SAFE,.

I SECURITY AREAS .

ONE Oj THE FIBST DECISIONS ONE MUST MAKE IN TIIE PREPARATION OF A SECURITY OR PROTECTION PLAN IS TO DECiiJE UPON THE DEPTH OF PJOTECTION WHICH IS NEED.KO -

HOW MANY AkEAS WITHIN AREAS ARE NEEDED? - WHAT GRADATIONS OF CONTROL ARE NEEDED?

I

- IN THE LIGHT OF WHAT WE ARE TO PROTECT AGAINST, HOW MANY CONCENTRIC RINGS OF PROTECTION,ARE REASONABLE AND NECESSARY? THE ANS-3~3 DRAFT HAS A GOOD STATEMENT I

OF THE POT~NTIAL THREATS WE MUST PLAN TO COPE WITH IN A NUCLEAR PO',vER PLANT.

-- I ~UOTE!, "(1) A SINGLE DISGRUNTLED EMPLOYEE WHO IS AUTHORIZED TO HA VE ACCESS

'IO THE PLJn ;ND WHO IS FAMILIAR WITH THE Dr;;TAII~ OF CONSTRUCTION AND OPERA'rION j

OF THE PL~NT; (2) A SINGLE FANATIC OR MENTALLY DERANGID INDIVIDUAL, EITHER AN I  !

AU'fHORIZED EMPWYEE OR AN OUTSIDER~ WHOSE KNOWLEDGE OF THE PLANT MAY RANGE I

FROM NONE TO INTIMATE FAMILIARITY; (3) A SMALL GROUP OF DISCORDANT INDIVIDUALS, SOME OF iOM MAY BE ARMED, NOT NORY.ALLY AUTHORIZED ACCESS TO THE PLANT, BUT

-WHO ARE INTEt!T ON PERPETRATING ACTS OF SABOTAGE AGAINST THE PLA."IT; AND (4) l SPONTANEOlrs AND UNDISCIPLINED ACTIONS OF A RELATIVELY LARGE GROUP OF PEOPLE INVOLV~ fN MOB ACTIVITIES ASSOCIATIID WITH ACTS OF CIVIL DISTURBANCE., 11 (END OF

~uoTE,J rlE

• ON ' ] J:"T Oh DIVERSION OF CERTAIN SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL, WE MUST CONSIDER THE THH.EAf OF A SINGLE EMPLOYEE TAKING MATERIAL OUT AS WELL AS AN OUTSIDE ORGANIZEDI ;'OHCE, OR A COMBINATION OF INSIDE AND OUTSIDE FCRCES' CLANDllSTINE OR i

OVERT. IN '!ANY CASE, HOWEVER, WH~TIIER IT BE SAlt>TAGE, THEFT, OR DIVERJION, AND I

AS IS STATED IN SEVERAL REFERE.'NCES, WE ARE NOT PLANNING TO GUARD AGAINST AN ARMYQ I

ESSEN~ALLY IT APPEARS THAT ALL OF OUR REFERENCE RE1..lUIREMENTS OR GUIDES ARE IN AGRJEMENT THAT WE SHOULD PLAN FOR MORE THAN ONE RING OF PROTECTION -

I DIJ.t'l<'ERENT 'J?ERMINOLOGY IS USED, BUT BASICALLY THEY ARE THERE~ THE ANS-3o3 DRAFT I

I IS FAIRLY iXPLICIT, I.EQ, 3 RINGS -- OUTERMOST IS THE "OWNER-CONTROLLED AREA",;

WITHIN THAT AREA IS THE "PROTECTED AREAn; AND 'l'HEN WITHIN THE PROTECTED AREA ARE .

I I i THE VITAL AREAS. IN THE AEC RULES FOR FUEL FABRICATION AND REPROCESSING PLAN1S, A 11 PROTECT~ AREA" IS PRESCRIBED 0 THIS IS COMPARABLE TO THE ANS "PROTECTED AREA",

I I

AND THE II VJ:ITAL AREA11 AND THE 11 MATERIAL ACCESS AREA" IN THE AEC RULES OR PROPOSED I

'I RULES ARE COMPARABLE TO THE ANS "VITAL AREA .. 11 I

i '

EVEN 'l'HOUGH THE RE*~UIREMENTS HAVE NOT YET BEEN FIRMLY ESTABLISHED IN THIS i

REGARD, I 111INK A LICENSEE SHOULD ESTABLISH A MP'.IMUM OF THREE CONCENTRIC RINGS OF PROTECTION fOR A NUCLEAR PLANT BASICALLY AS PROVIDE:D IN ANS-J.,J., AT THE OUTERMOS'f I

RING I WOUID HA VE A SYSTEM OF NOMINAL CONTROLS TO KEEP INNOCENT PERSONS SUCH AS

'I I

HIKERS AND HUNTERS OUT. FOR THIS I WOULD USE CONTROLS SUCH AS SIGNS, GENERAL I

SURVEILLANG~, AND, IN PARTICULAR CIRCUMSTANCES, ¥..AYBE THREE STRANDS OF BARBED I

WIREo SUCH:1 AN AREA IS IMPORTANT SHOULD ONE EXPERIENCE CONFRONTATIONS WI'l:tt CIVIL DISO,ER OR PROTEST GROUPS & YOU WANT TO KEEP THEM AT THE PERIMETER IF YOU CAN. THIS WAY THE PUBLIC IS KEPT AT A DISTANCE FROM THE Pl10TECTED AREA I

AND IF THE OCCASION I ARISES YOU HA VE ESTABLJS HED A GOOD BASIS !.<'OR REMOVAL OF I

l'HE PUBLIC '.L'O PROTECT THE PLANT. IN SOME CASES CONTROL OF SUCH AN OUTER AREA IS

, I AISO NEEDED !OR DESIRABLE FOR RADIATION CONTROL OR FOR OTH.B:R SAFETY OR LEGAL REASONS.

I I

I ALL SEl!M TO AGREE THAT INSIDE TIIB CONTROLLED AREA WE PLAN .I\ PROTECTED I,

AREA; AND INNERMOST THE VITAL OR JliATERIPJ, ACCES.3 !JtEA., THESE ARE REASONAT.lT,~

I *

• I "l -[

• AND NECE5SAH.Y ~

1

• ~/

• ADUITI0NAL MEASURES TO PR01'EC'l' HIGHLY ENHICllED MATi!:H.IAL OR PLU1~NIUM ~OR TO PROTECT PARTICULARLY SENSITIVB OR VULNERAHLJt~ AREAS MAY DE I

PRUDENT AND PRACTICABLE TO PROVIDE A FOURTH RING OF PROTECTIONo I PHYSICAL BARRIERS THE ~QUIREMENTS AND GUIDANCE FOR PHYSICAL BARRIERS, SUCH AS FENCES~

EXTERIOR WAIJS, AND LIOHTING, ARE FAIRLY STRAIGHT FORWARD. IN PLANNING YOUR CLEAR AREA OR ISOLATION ZONE, I SUGGEST THE AREA OU'J:SIDE THE BARRIER SHCULD BE

• I AT LEAST 40 FEET, AND WHERE THE BARRIER IS A FENCE, THE CLEAR AREA D!SIDE l

SHOULD BE,! AT LEAST 50 FEETo FOR LIGHTIN(.j THE STA.MDARD OF 1.,0 FOOT-CANDLE OF LIGHT AT THE SURFACE IS USUALLY ACCEPTABLEe II ACCESS CONTROLS I

i THE PRINCIPAL POINT I WANT TO STRESS WITH RE5PF..CT TO ACCESS CONTROIS IS I

I THE t-!EED FOR EARLY AND EFFECTIVE PLANNING PREFERABLY IN THE PLANT DESIGN STAGE, i I v-IBICH WIIJ;, NOT ONLY SAVE MONEY BUT WILL 'ENHANCE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE PROTECTION PROGRAM OYER THE LONG TERMo THE ANS DRAFI' HAS S0HE EXCELLENT ADVICE AND GUIDANCE ON THIS. 'PLANT DESIGN AND LAYOUT SHOULD WHEN FEASIBLE ESTABLISH COMMON CONTROL

• 1 POIN'IB FO);i HEALTH PHYSICS AND MATERIALS AND PLANT PROTECTIONo COr-illINATION SECURI'IY I

I AND HEALTfl PHYSICS BADGES SH0UID BE DESIGNED AND USEDo TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE, SERVICE BUILDINGS, WAREIJOUSES AND OTHER AREAS TO BE SERVICED BY NON-PLANT PERSONNEL lI SHOULD BE LOCATED OU'J:SIDE PROTECTED AREAS o .EMPLOYEE AND VISITOR PARKING LOTS AND SERVI~E ROADS AISO SHOUID BE OUTSIDE. THE IWMBER, KIND AND LOCATION OF DOORS,

, GATES, AN~ OTHER ACCESS POINTS SHOULD B~ CAREFULLY PLANNED AND LAID OUT TO ENHANCE PROThlJTIO~, SAFETY, AND ECONOMY OF OPERATIONS, CONSISTANT AT ALL TIMES, OF COURSE,

. I WITH EMERGENCY PLAN NEIIDSo ELECTRONIC DEVICES AND OTHER CONTROLS FUR ACCESS POIN'IB

CAN I

ASSURE y~ DEVICES DON'T ALWAYS WORK.

ALWAYSI 13E IMPROVISED AFTER THE FACT I BUT EACH ADDS TO THE PRODLEMp AND I GOOD PLANNING FOR PLANT PROTECTION AT

'L11E UESIGN AND LAYOUT STAGE WILL MINIMIZE THE NEED FOR DEVICL'S AND EVEN GUARD I

I POSTS; IT ,REALLY PAYS OFF.

I SECURITY FORCE OUR RF;FERENCE DOCUMENTS ALL PROVIDE FOR A PL/I.NT SIW 1IRITY OR PtWMTION FOFCE. ~ETHBR SUCH A FORCE SHOULD CONSIST OF GUARDS OR iiATCHMEN IS UNSETTLED I I AND POSSIBLY A CONTROVERSIAL MATTER. ANS--3o3 ALSO PmVIDES "IN UNUSUAL CASES" FOR THE POSSIJLE RELIANCE ON AN' OFF-SITE SECURITY FORCE IF CERTAIN CONDITI0!-5 CAN I

I BE MET. ~ WILL COME BACK TO THESE POINTS LATERo WHAT I WANT TO COMMENT ON AT THIS POIW., IS THE SIZE OF THE PROTECTIVE FORCE. IN PREPARING A PLAN, THE B&ST

• rt:CHNIIJJE \rs TO FIRST MAKE AN INVEN'IDRY OF ALL OF THE ACCESS POINTS -- AND THE I

CONTROL, PATROL AND SURVEILLANCE FUNCTIONS WHICH m. VE TO BE PERFORMED TO CONTROL I

INGRFSS OR EGRESS OF PEOPLE, MATERIAIS, OR VEHICLES WHETHER IT BE FOR RADIATION I

CONTROL, JAFETY, FIRE, THEFT, SABOTAGE, DOPE, ALCOHOL, FIREARMS, OR CONTROL OF OTHER CONTRABAND. PLAJll"T OR MATERIAIS PROTECTION POSTS (GUARD OR WATCHY!EN PC6'IS)

SHOULD THEN BE ESTABLISHED WHERE THE PRINCIPAL FUNCTION IS TO MAKE ROUTINE CHECKS I

10 CONTROB ENTRY AND EXIT. TIIB PROFESSIONAL OR TECHNICAL Sl'AFF SHOULD NOT BE EXPECTED 'I;O PERFORM THESE ROUTINE DUTIES EXCEPT ON AN OCCASIONAL OR INFREQUENT I

I BASIS AS lQR A.CCESS TO VITAL EQUIPMENT, ETC 0

, I ,

SOME :POSTS ARE NEEDED FOR HEALTH PHYSICS REASONS. THEY SHOULD NORNALLY DE MANNED BY !HEALTH PHYSICS TECHNICIANS AND THE GONTROL THEY MAINTAIN CAN PROVIDE I

THE ~ONTRdL NEEDED FOR PLANT PROTECTION AS WELL., FOR EACH 24-HOUR, 7-DAY WEEK POST, AS ll'OU KNOW, YOU WILL NEED AOOUT 4o2 PERSONNEL PLUS ROVINJ PATROIS, BACK UP FOR LUNCHES AND BREA.KS, AND SUPERVISIONo THE.SE NUMBERS ADD UP, SO GOOD PLANNING PAY5 01.<'F. li WE WILL DISCUSS ~UALIFICATTON5 OF -,-r,;U!T f'!iOTECTION PERSOmiEL . LITTU LATER., r

SURVEILLANCE ALL SE~ TO AGREB THAT SOME l:<"ORM OF SURVEILLANCE IS NE:EDED TO OPERATE ANY SECURITY OR jPlIYSICAL ffiOTECTION AREA. IF YOU LOOK AT TIIE REFERENCE DOCUMENTS,

- i HO.JEVER, IT :rs DIFFICULT TO DETERMINE JUST WHAT IS REQUIRED OR ACCEPTABLE FOR SURVEIILANCE OF THE I 11 PRO'FiCTED AREA." SAFETY GUIDE 17 PROVIDES THAT SURVEILLANCE r

OF THE f'HYSJJCAL BARRIBR SHOUID BE MADE BY ROVING PATROIS, ClOSED CIRCUIT TELEVISION OR INTRUSIO~ ALARMS WITH GUARDS AT EACH POINT OF ACCESS; THE PROPOSED AMENDMENTS*

j TO PARTS SO, 70, and 73 REQUIRE INSPECTION OF TTJE PHYSICAL BARRIER PERIODICALLY I

BUT ARE SILENr ON HTIO DOES IT; AND DRAFT ANS-3.3 STATESTHAT aJRVEILLANCE SHALL BE j

PIDVIDED BY I PLANT SECURITY FORCE3 OR BY A COMBINATION OF OPERATING PERSONNEL AND i

PROT?.CTIVE IDEVICES OR PATROL DOGS. IN PREPARING YOUR PLAN, I WOULD URGE YOU 'IO I

PROVIDE FOR:SURVEILLANCE OF THE PHYSICAL BARRIER BY GUARDS (AT IRREGULAR BUT I

I FREQUENT INTERVALS PARTICULARLY ON OFF SHIFTS) o SOMS RELIABLE INTRUSION DEVICK i

'IO AUGMEN1I' THE GUARDS IS FINE, BUT I DON'T LIKE THE ID~ OF DEVICES, TV OR DOGS 1

AND RELIANck ON OPERATING PERSONNEL ONLY. OPERATING PERSONNEL MAY NOT ATJtJAYS BE AVAILABLEI WHEN THEY ARE NEEDED TO CHECK OUT A POSSIBLE. INTRUSION. THE PROTF.CTED A,R.EA SHOULD BE ORGANIZED ON A HIGHLY EFFICIENT AND EFFECTIVE BASIS,.

I THIS IS WHERE THE INTRUDER SHOULD BE DETECTED AND STOPPED" I

I I

LOCAL LAW ENFORCB11ENT LIAISON OF1',-SITE COMMUNICATIONS Jus'T O~E MINOR COMMENT IN THE AREAS OF LIAISON WITH LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT I

AND OFF-SITf COMMUNICATIONS o IN PREPARING YOUR PLAN YOU WILL FIND SOME VARIANCES IN THE REFERENCE DOCUMENTS ON REDUNDANCY OF OFF-SITE COMMUNICATIONS. I WOULD I

VOTE FOR A~ LEAST ONE LINK BY VOICE RADIO WITH BACp;.,.u> FJ1ERGENCY PO'tlERo I

NOW LET'S I

SWITCH 'IO A VERY IMPORTANT AND DIFFICULT PROBLEM AREA WHICH IS I

COi!EONL1 REFERRED TO ;.S PE!iSOlWEL .,_*. ,;:.';TJGATION OR PERSONNEL SCRECNING~ I I

1 I

AM CERTAIN WE CAN ALL AGREE IT rs AXIOMATIC THAT ANY SYSTEM TO PROTECT MATERIAL I .

OR A FACILliTY IS ONLY AS GOOD AS THE PEOPLE IN IT. PEOPLE ARE A Y.OST IMPORTANT INGREDIENT i1N A PRO'IBGTION SYSTEf-1, OUR REFERENCE DOCt!MEN'IS EITHER BEG OR AVOID THE ISSUE dR USE I

I UNDEFINED WORDS OR TERMS ON THIS MATTER SO IT IS SOMEWHAT UNCLEAR AS TO WHAT jSHOUI.D BE DONE., WE DON'T REALIX KNOW WHAT IS EXPEUTED OF US a W'tiAT I

IS ACCEPTA~LE TO LIGENSEE MANAGEMENT AND THE A&:1 I HAVE SOME THOUGHTS AND SUGGESTION3

• I DONJT HAVE ANY IDEA WHAT THE AEC STAFFERS THINK OR PLAN IN THIS A.REA. THE f

ANS-3.3 DRAFT HAS SOME GENERAL RE*.,?UIREMENTS FOR SCREENINq, INVESTIGATION AND MEDICAL ,Ex.1,INATION.S., THE AEG 33 CRITERIA INCWDE REQTilREMENTS FOR SCREENIOO AND INVESTIGATION.,

I AND THE AEC RULES AND PROPOSED AMENDMENTS ARE SILENT ON THE I

SUBJECT. IT WOULD BE MY GUESS THAT EVENTUALLY SOME SYSTEM WILL BE REQUIRED TO PFOVIDE REASONABLE ASSURANCE TI-IA T PERSONS WHO ARE Atil'HORIZED ACCESS TO THE PRO'l'ECTED, \VI;AL AND MATERIAL ACCESS AREAS, WITHOUT ESCOR'f, ARE SUITABLE AND I

RELIABLE. *THIS IS PROBABLY A GOOD TIME TO RAISE QUESTIONS OR TO MAKE ANY 1

SUGGESTION~ WE MAY HAVE ON THE SUBJEGTo PERSONNEL SCREENING, APPROVAL OR CLEARANCE I

PROGRAMS ARE VERY DIFFICULT AND COMPLEX TO OPERATE., THEY ARE FRAUGHr WITH POTENTIAL UNION PROBtlEMs, EMPLOYEE RELATIONS PROBLEMS AND PUBLIC RELATIONS PROBLEMS. FOR I

THESE REASONS THE REQUIREMENTS, CRITERIA, STANDARDS, AND ASSIGNMENTS OF RESPONSIBILITY

, I .

FOR THE FUNCTION SHOUID BE CLEARLY SPELLED OUT.. WHAT REALLY CONCERNS NE IN THIS I

I AREA IS THIS_.,. IF THE OBJECTIVE OF THE PROTECTION PROGRAM IS THE PROTECTION OF THE PUBLIC iHEALTH AND SAFETY ONLY, AND THE c°RITERIA FOR PERSON'NEL APPROVAL ARE i -

BASED ON C!µ.RA.CTER 9 MENTAL HEALTH AND SUITABILITY INFORMATION, SUCH DETERMINATIONS AND APPROvJrs SHOULD BE THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE LICENSEE _*_ IF, HOWEVER, THE 1 - - - -

1 PROGRAM OBJ'ECTIVE IS ALSO TO INCLUDE THE PROTECTION OF THE COMMON DEFENSE AND I

I .

SECURITY (AS STATED IN THE PROPOSED AEC AMENDMENTS) I SUBMIT THAT INDUSTRY WILL BE PLACED IiN AN UNTENABLE POSITION IF IT IS EXPECTED 1D MEET '£HE TWOFOLD OBJECTIVE.

I

._/ *_ ~ SAY THIS juECAUSE, f Tl!OSE w You WHO ARE OR HAVE nlN IN THE s~CURI TI!' llJJSIN!:SS KNOW., AND PS IS THE CASE IN THE AEG, THE CRITERIA FOR APPROVAL OR CL.EARANCE TO

})l,{O'fEC'l' THi COMMON DEFENSE AND S!~CURITY AIE BASED or~ CHARJ\CTER, ASSOCIATIONS I

AND LOYAL'I'Yi INFORMATION., THE BASIC IIHUHMATION NEEDED TO ASSESS ONE'S i

ASSOCIATIOt AND I.OYALT!: rs NOT AVAUADrn TO INDUSTRY BECAUSE IT rs CONTAINED IN GOVERNMENT FILES SO I DON'T SEE HOW THEY CAN DO THE JOB. THEREFORE, SHOUID IT

' I I

BE DIIDIDED THAT THE COI-1¥.0N DEFENSE AUD SECURITY IS TO BE PART OF THE PROGRAM I

OBJECTIVE, .I SEE NO ALTERNATIVE EXCEPT THAT THE GOVERNMENT ESTABLISH AN I

' I APPROVAL PROGRAM. NOW LET ME BE MORE SPECIFIC.

I I wourlD I SUGGEST AND PROPOSE THAT FOR ALL NUCLEAR FACILITIES UNDER DISCUSSION I

HERE TODAY ITHAT ALL EMPLOYEES (EXCEPT '!HOSE WHO HAVE WORKED FOR M COMPANY FOR FIVE YEARS OR MORE AND HAVE A GOOD RECORD OF RELIABILITY, STABILITY AND WORK I

PERFORMANC~) AND ALL CANDIDATES FOR BMPLOYMENT, BE SCREBNED BEFORE THEY ARE AUTHORIZED ACCESS TO TiflE PROTECTED AREA OR THE MORE INTERMOST AREAS ON AN UNESCORTED BASIS.

IN PARTICU:rkR, I PROPOSE THE E!-lPLOYER CONDUCT AN INQUIRY BY TELEPHONE OR LETTER I

TO ASCERTAIN WHETHER THE EMPLOYEE'S OR CANDIDATE'S RECORD DURING THE PREVIOUS 15 I

YEAHS (OR ~NTRANCE TO HIGH SCHOOL WHICHEVER IS LATER) DISCLOSES AUY ADVERSE CHARACTER

. , TRAI'IS OR O~HER BEHAVIOR WHICH MATERIALLY REFIECTS UPON HIS SUITABILITY TO WORK IN THE NUCLEAR FACILn' Y. THE INQUIRY SHOUID INCLUDE SUCH CHECKS AS CRIMINAL RECORDS, MI~ITARY SERVICE RECORDS, EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS, FORMER EMPLOYERS AND REFEIJ?ESo IN ESSENCE THIS IS WHAT THE ANS-3.3 DRAFT PROVIDES. I WOULD AI.SO I

SUGGEST 'THAT THE ANS-3.3 REQUIREMENT BE MET WITH RESPECT TO "EXAMINATION BY A LICENSED PHYSICIAN o" A COMPARABLE PROO RAM FOR SCREENING NON-EMPLOYEES IS ALSO I

I NEEDED BEJ!"'ORE THE'f ARE AUTHORIZED ACCESS WITHOUT AN ESCORT., THEN, AGAIN, AS I SAID EARLIE*' IF THE COMMON DEFENSE AND SECURITY IS A PRINCIPAL FAC'.IDR, THE AEC WILL HAVE T(p I ESTABLISH A PERSONNEL APPROVAL PROGRAM FOR ALL FACILITIES WHICH I

ARE RE~UIRED I

TO HAVE PHYSICAL PROTECTION OR INDUSTRIAL SECUHITY PROGRAMS TO GUARD A.GJ\INST SABOTAGE, THEFT OR DIVERSION., I UNDERSTAND LBGISLATIOr] *,ms DfiAF'TiID BY AEC A COUPLE OF YEARS AGO TO DO THIS OUT IT WAS LIMITED 'ID MATl:§iIAL FACILITIES

-- ', .. *ONLY AND 1wourn NOT COVER SABOTAGE CONSIDERATIONS AT A NUCLEAR REACTOR FACILITY.

I I WOULD F;NVISAGE SUCH A PROGRAM AS BEING COMPJ\.MBLE TO THE COMMISSION'S "L" CLEARANCE PROGRAM., THE APPTIOVA.IS WOULD PROBABLY BE BASED ON WHAT IS CALLED I

A NATIONAL AGENCY CHECK -- IT USUALLY INCLUDES FBI (FINGERPRINT II.ND FILE CHECK),

I MILITARY IINTELLIGENCE AO ENCY RECORDS, HOUSE COMMITTEE ON UNAMERICAN ACTIVITIES I -

INDICES AND THE CENTRAL INDEX OF THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION.., SHOULD ADVERSE i

INFOfillATJJON BE DISCLOSED, AN APPROPRIATE INVESTIGATION WOUIJJ BE MADE BY THE GOVERNMENT I TO RESOLVE THE MATTER., (I AM DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN "INQUIRY" AND 11 INVESTiqATION 9 11 AN INQUIRY MAY BE BASED ON TELEPHONE INFORMATION JI LETTERS, AND FORMS; ~ "INVESTIGATION" IS AN EXAMINATION IN DEPTH BY A TRAINED INVESTIGATOR WHO REVIlfB RECOROO HIMSELF AND INTERVI~ WITNESSES IN PERSON .. ) IN ANY CASE))

I I THINK ]NDUSTRY SHOUI.D REMAIN ALERT AND EXAMINE VERY CLOSELY ANY PROPOSED RULE, I

\

GUIDE OR fTANDArro oN PERSONNEL SCREENING, INVESTIGATION OR APPROVAL ro BE CERTAIN THAT THEY] CAN REALISTICALLY MEET THEIR RESPONSIBILITY AS ASSIGNED, REAL OR IMPLIED.

I THINK WIS SUBJECT WARRANTS FRANK DISCUSSION AND DEBATE., LET'S DEFINE 'ffiE ISSUES AflP PUT THEM ON THE TABLE. AS I HAVE *sAID, THIS' IS A DIFFICULT AND COMPLEX SUBJECT t IT HAS TO BE SE'CTLED. UNTIL POLICY AND STANDARDS, CRITERIA1 AND REQUIREM~NTS ARE ESTABLISHED, IT IS GOING TO BE VERY DIFFICULT IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE FOR ONE T~ PLAN AND OPERATE 'IHIS ASPECT OF A PROTECTION PROGPJ\Mo I WOULD URGE THE AEC Tb GIVE THIS .MATTER TOP PRIORITY FOR EARLY DECISION.

I I

GETITNG BACK TO GUARDS vs o WATCHMEN, I WANTED TO DWELL ON THIS A MOMENT BECAUSE OF THE QUESTION AS TO WHETHER PLA.NT PROT&:TION PERSONNEL SHOULD BE ARMED ..

I OUR REFERENCE DOCHMEN'IS VARY OM '1'1'W, POINT. IN 10CFR73 THE AEC DEFINF,S A GUARD I

i AS rr AN MATERIAIS AND PROPERTY

- q 11 AR.MID AND UNIFORMED INDIVIDUAL WHOSE PRIMARY DUTY IS THE PROTECTION OF A WATCHMAN IS DEFINED BY AEC IN THE SA;ME RULE AS II A

PERSON, NOT NECESSARILY UNIFORMID OR ARMl*ll, WHO PROVIDE3 PROTECTION FOR MATERIALS I

• AND PROPERTY IN THE COURSE OF PERFORMING OTHER DUTIESo" IN AEC SAFETY GUIDE 17 IT IS STA'l'ffi THAT GUARDS SHOUID BE USID A't' EACH POINT OF ACCESS IN THE PHYSICAL DARRIERo .I\R,MING THE SECIJRITY FORCE IS OP1'IONAL UNDBR ANS-.3.,J AS DRAF'ff!:D AND I

'£HE PROPCSiip AMENDMENTS TO 10CFR50 AND 70 STATE THE LICENSEE SHALL TRAIN AND E\.!UIP GUARDS AND WATCHMEN TO PROTECT AGAINST THEFT, DIVERSION OR SABOTAGE.,

THERE ARE GOOD ARGUMENTS ON BOTH SIDES OF THIS QUESTION. I SORT OF COME OUT ON MIDDLE onouko o NAMELY j I WOUID ARM THE GUARDS WHO MAN THE POSTS AND MAKE THE PATROIS OU 'ISIDE OF THE PLANT AND I VOTE FOR NO ARMS IN THE PLANT. I THINK THE OUTSIDE GUARD MAY CONCEIVABLE NEED A WEAPON TO PROTECT HIMSELF. I BELIEVE HE CAN BE MORE EFFECTIVE IF HE WEARS A SIDEARM EVEN IF IT ISN'T LOADED AT ALL TitfE-5

• HIS COLOR OF AUTHORITY SHOUID BE OBVIOUS TO THE POTENTIAL INTRUDER. GOOD PROCEDURES AND TRAINING MUST, OF COUTBE, BE PROVIIBD 'ID GOVERN. THE POSSESSION AND USE OF WEAPONS,.

AS I INDICATID E.ffiLIER, I WANTID TO SAY NORE ABOUT THE QUALIFICATIONS OF THE PLANT PROTECrr'ION FORCE. I AM TALKING ABOUT THOSE WHOSE PRINCIPAL FUNCTION IS GU ARD ING THE PLAN'r AND !-'.ATERIALS. I WOUID URGE MANAGEMENT ro s ET CLEA.R-CUT PERSONNEL QUALIFICATION STANDARDS TO ASSURE 1\ HIGH CALIBER FORCE WHETHER IT BE AN IN-HOUSE OR IXJNTRACT AGENCY PROTECTIVE FORCEo AS WE ALL KNOW PROTECTIVE 10RCE PERSONNEL IN NUCLEAR PLANTS MUST HA VE THE ABILITY 'IO UNDERSTAND RADIATION PROTECTION, EMERGENCY PROCEDURES, FIRE FIGHTING, AND THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THEIR 1:"UNC'fION IN TERMS OF PROTECTION OF THE PUBLIC HEAL'rH AND SAFETY AND CONMON DEFENSE AND s~cunrrY" THE PROTECTIVE FOOCE MUST HAVE THE RESPECT OF PLANT PERSONNEL FROM TOP TO BOT'IDM TO BE EFFECTIV~. ?J.ANAGEHEN'l' MUST BE ABLE TO RELY

ON THEIR JUDG~lENT, THEIR INl~ORMATION ANU TTE IR REPORTS. THE PROTECTIVE FO:tCE HAS TO BE INT EGRATED NITII TIIE OPERATHD FORCE 'ID FUNCTION EFFECTIVELY o 1

AND LET'S RECOGNIZE THAT MUCH OF OUR PUBLIC IMAGE (AN IMPORTANT ITEl1 THF..SE DAYS)

IS DASl1) ON *..ti-IA T 'lHE VIS I TOR OR THE PUBLIC OBSERVES AT THE PLAN 1' o THE GUARD I

AT THE FRONT GATE IS THE FIRST EMPLOYEE ONE S~ES OR MEETS o SICK, LAME AND LAZY PERSONNEL CAN'T DO THE PROTECTIVE JOB AT A NUCLEAR PLANT -- ONE RISKS GETTDO ALL KINDS OF IPERSONNEL UNLESS HANAGEMENT INSISTS OH HIGH STANDARDS. I CANiT I

S1RESS THIS TOO MUCH. IF CONTRACT AGE!~CY PERSONNEL IS USED I WOULD URGE I

MANAGEMZtH TO F.sTABLISH RIGID SPECIFICATIONS TO COVER PERSONNEL QUALIFICATIONS.

I WOULD SUGGEST QUANTITATIVE TESTING AND ~XAMINATION REQUIREMEJITS, HIGH PHYSICAL STANDARDS, AND BACKGROUND INVESTIGATIONS FOR SUITABILITY. GOOD PAY AND FRINGE BENEFITS ARE ALSO IMPORTANT ro MAINTAIN A STABLE AND RELIABLE roRCE.

AND TO MINIMIZE TURNOVER. I WOUID SUGGEST THAT LICENSEES GET COMPETITIVE BIDS I

ON ALL CON~CT AGENCY PROTECTIVE FORCES~ YOU MAY NOT TAKE THE LOW BIDDERsi BUT YOU WILL HAVE SOME CHOICES. A GOOD PROTECTIVE FORCE WILL COST I10NEY, BUT YOU I

'NANT AND NEED AN ALERT, EFFECTIVE, ABOVE AVERAGE PROTECTIVE Fffi CE.

THERE ARE SEVERAL OTHER IMPORTANT ASPEC'IS TO PLANNING AND OPERATING A I

PHYSICAL PROTECTION PROGRAM WHICH I HAVE NOT MENTIONED, SUCH AS ORGANIZATION; TRAINitiJ; 'IESTING AND MAINTENANCE OF EQUIPMENT; PREPARATION, APPROVAL AND REVISIONS OF' PROCEDURES; RECORDS; REPOR'IS TO THE AEC; AND QUALITY ASSURANCE OR MANAGID1ENT AUDIT. THESE :MATTERS ARE ALL IMPORTANT AND ARE COVERED IN THE I

ANS-Jo3 DRAFI'; SOME ARE ALSO COVERED IN OTHER REFERENCES IDENTIFIED EARLIEn 0 WITH YOUR INDUIOENCE I WOULD LIKE NOW TO SAY A FE'.-J WORDS AOOUT STANDARDS -

CHITER.IA - AND RE©IREMF.N'IS FOR PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS AND POWER REACTOJ;tS., THEY ARE PTIETTY HATID TO PIN DOViie } ;-1?\VE THE UTMOST AND

. ~ I

• 1... -

',*.?\., ~I SINCERE RESPECT FOR MY FORMER COLLEAGUES AND MY FRIENDS IN THE AEC, AND FOR THOSE IN INDUSTRY WHO HAVE WORKED AND WHO ARE WORKING HARD AND DILIGENTLY ON THIS MATTER, BUT IN SPITE OF ALL THIS DEDICATION AND EFFORT IT rs STILL VERY, VERY DIFFICULT TO MA.l(E RECOMMENDATIONS TO MANAGEMENT AND TO ASCERTAIN WHAT IS ACCEPTABI.E TO THE AEC AT THIS TIMEo WHEN ONE SITS DOWN A~JD STUDIES AND ANALIZES ALL OF THE REFERENCE DOCUMEN'IS AS I HA VE DONE, CERTAIN QUESTIONS COME 'IO HIND WHICH I WOULD LIKE 'IO POSE FOR YOUR CONSIDERATION, PARTICULARLY SINCE_MOST OF THESE REFERENCES ARE STILL IN THE DRAFT OR PROPOSAL STAGE:

1. WHY SHOULDN'T BASIC STANDARDS BE THE SAME FOR ALL NUCLEAR FACILITIES WITH RESPECT TO PROTECTION AGAINST SABOTAGE? I AM TALKING AflOUT SUCH FUNDAMENTAL MATTERS AS THE NUMBER A.ND KIND OF SEClRITY AREAS; PERSONNEL SCREENING AND PERSONNEL APPROVAL; PROTECTION_ DUTIES PERFORMED BY GUARDS /1.S OPPOSED TO WATCHMEN OR OPERATING PERSONNEL; UNESCORTED ACCESS TO PROTECTED, VITAL OR

\

MATERIAL ACCESS AREAS; BADGE AND PASS CONTROLS ~ID SPECIFICATIONS; MEDICAL EXAMINATIONS; SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCIES; RE.5PONSE TIMES, AND THE KINDS OF THREATS WE ARE PROTEC TIN} AGAINST g 2e SHOULDN 1 T THE AEC MAKE SABOTAGE VULNERABILITY STUDIES OF nWR' s, PwR 9 s., HTGR 1 s, FUEL FABRICATION PLANTS AND REPROCESSING PLANTS SO EVERYONE INVOLVED IN PLANNING A :PROTECTION PROGRAM WOULD KNOW THE VITAL AREAS, OR E(..!UIPMENT, OR MATERIAL WHICH NEED SPECIAL OR PARTICULAR PROTECTION?

3. AND SHOULDN'T WE HAVE A COMMON STANDARD OR CRITERIA FOR THE FREQUENCY, SCOPE AND EXTENT OF INTERNAL MANAGEMENT AUDITS 01 THE PHYSICAL PROTECTION PROGRAMS?

NOW LET ME HASTILY ADD 1 I Kr'"'u AT,l, OF 'TIIBSE THINGS HAVE BEEN THOUGHT AOOUT, 1-;UCH HAS BEEN DONE JiND wORn IS 1,u.-, .u; ?ROGHl!SS ON MAl\TY OR MOST 01" THEM 0 WHAT IS DIS'fUll.BING, HOwEVt!:R, IS 'l'HA T, J\S YOU AND I KNOW, SOME PLANS HA. VE TO IlE PREPARED AND SUBMI1'TED TO At<;C NOW. '1-IITHOUT CLEAR-CUT STANDARDS, CfU'rERIA AND HEQIJIREMENTS, INDUSTRY WILL CONTINUE TO BE SUBJOOT TO VARIOOS AEC STAF1'~ OPINIONS, JUDGMENTS AND AD HOC DECISIONS. AEC INSPECTIONS WILL BE MADE ArJAINST PLANS \YE SUBMIT AND THIS Yi.EAf-JS INTERPRETATIONS BY STILL ANOTHER SEDMENT OF THE STAFF o UNTIL WE GET STANDARDS, CJUTERIA AND RBQUIREMENTS~ I WOULD LIKE 'IO SUGGEST YOU CONSTIJER THE FOLLOWIMl IN THE PREPARATION OF YOUR PHYSICAL PROTECTION PLANS IRRESPECTIVE OF WHETHER YOU ARE PLANNING A PROGRAM FOR A FUEL FACILI'l1Y (FABRICATION OR REPROCESSING) OR A REACTOR:

lo USE THE ANS-3.3 DRAFT, 10CFR7J (AND THE PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO PARTS 5o, 70 AND 13) AS YOUR PLANNING DOCUMENTS"

2. IF YOUR COMPANY DOSS NOT HAVE A PRE-EMPLOYMENT SCREENING PROGRAM, ESTABLISH ONE FOR YOUR NUCLEAR WEL OR POWER FACILITY AS OUTLINED EARLIER AND IN ANS-3o3o I

3o IN YOUR PLAN, PROVIDE FOR SPECIFIC PERSONNEL RE*~UIREMEN'IS FOR A HIGH CALIBER GUARD FORCE. (I'D GO SO FAR AS TO SUGGEST YOU GIVE THEM A SPECIAL TITLE SUCH

/IS "PLANT PROTECTION OFFICERS" - IF YOU WAN1' TIIE21 TO BE GOOD, MAKE THEM FEEL IMPORTANT.,) I1D ARM THOSE ASSIGNIID OUTSIDE POS'.IS AND PATROIS 0

4. AND ESTABLISH AN OUTER "CONTROLLED" AREA.,

NOW, IN CONCLUSION;, I WANT 'l'O REITERA.TE ... PLAN EARLY.. SAVING MONEY IS A GREAT VIRTUE AND THE ENHANCEMENT OF YOUR PROTECTIVE CAPABILITY rs A REAL PLUS o EARLY PLANNING 1.-JILL DO IT. LET'S KEEP THE PRESSURE ON THE AEC J:t"OR STANDARDS, CRITERIA AND THE PUBLICATION OF THE REQUIREMENTS THAT HAVE TO BE MET. I DONiT LIKE ro SoVND

Lll\E A BROKEN m~corm l3UT UNTIL ALL OF us KNOW WHAT WE ARE PllOTECTING AND WHAT WE ARE PROTECTING /1.Gl\.INST (i.e., AS LONG AS THESE BASIC CONSIDERATIONS ARE ARRIVED AT ON AN AD HOG on SUBJECTIVE BASIS) IT IS GOING TO CONTINUE TO BE NOST DIFFICULT 1D PREPARE PLANS FOR TIIB PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF SPF.CIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL AND NUCLEAR PO-..-JER FACILITIES. DESPITE THE DIFFICULTIES, NUCLEAR PLANT SECURITY OR PROTECTION IS TI1PORTANT TO THE COMPANY j IF ONLY FOR ECONOMIC REA30NS. BUT BEYOND THATP BtCAUSE NUCLEAR MATERIAI.S ARE INVOIXTIDj PLANT SECURITY TAKES ON BROADER I

IMPLICATIONS INVOLVING THE PUBLIC WELL BEING 0 THUS, IT IS AN AREA THAT DESERVES THE ATTENTION OF TOP MANAGEMENT IN THE FORM OF CAREFUL PLANNING AND THOUGHTFUL ACTION. IN SHORT, IT DESERVES OUR BEST EFFDRT 0 THANK YOU FOR YOUR ATTENTION.

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RE PR POSED AME D 1£ S TO 10CFR 73 "P YSI AL PROT TIO F SPECIAL C E R .AT RI L" . RESPE TFULLY R-QUEST DUE DAE FOR COM ,E TS OR SUGGESTIO S BE EXTE DED TO MAY 3 , 1973 I ORDER OGIVE US ADDI IO A TI ME TO EVALU T T PROPOSED HAGES .

RAY F . FIS TRA SPORTATIO KERR MCGEE CORP M AGER - .,E RAL REGI DDGKE ; EO U&AEC MAR211973

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TKS E D tfi, OK A KERK COKLACY

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NUCLEAR AUDIT AND TESTING COMPANY

~1/4~T . (202) 6159-8866 SUITE 317, BARR BUILDING 910 - 17TH STREET, N. W . ~ D EU.tE _- TJ ?

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20006

( 3i Fl( Bo8 V Secretary of the Commission U.S. Atomic Energy Commission Washington, D. C. 20545 ATTENTION: Chief, Public Proceedings Staff Gentlemen :

We have reviewed the changes in the Atomic Energy Commission's regu-lations governing the protection of special nuclear materials by Commission licensees , as set forth in the announcement of Tuesday, January 30, 1973, and the regulations as published in the Federal Register for Thursday, February l, 1973. While we recognize the problems which have led to the .

formulation of these new regulations, we believe that a number of the pro-visions which have been incorporated are ill-advised, and serve little more function than a veneer, albeit one which will be quite costly for the industry to produce. We submit herewith our comments on these regulations for the Commission's consideration.

Our basic concern with these regulations, is that, in spite of the Commission's representation that they have been over a year in development, they do not appear to be sufficiently well analyzed to be free of internal i nconsistencies and apparently have not been evaluated against the probable meaningful effects which would be produced by following the regulations as set forth. In a number of cases, the cost of complying with these regula-tions seems far out of proportion to any substantial benefit which may result from their application. We also find that the justification set forth for putting certain of the regulations into effect without a comment period to be inadequate in the light of the statement by Chairman Schlesinger, as quoted in the Announcement R-36, that fu t ure increases in the number of shipments of plutoni um in the years aheqd make it imperative that these additional precautions be taken. If we correctly take this to be a state-ment of the basic justification for making the changes, then there would appear to be no emergency requiring immediate action. In the case of th e remainder of the changes, the provisions of a comment period of only 30 days appears similarly unjustified.

In short, we bel ieve that the undue haste in putting these regulations into effect and the inadeq uately-analyzed deta iled requirements represent an over-react ion by the Commission to certain events of recent history, the significance of which may have been greatly ex ngerated.

.* - *-r

--.. -Secretary of the Commission Page 2

- - -- It is, for example, totally incomprehensible that the Corrrnission should use as a justification for improved physical protection of special nuclear materials in transport the conclusion that there will be increased shipments of plutonium-238 in cardiac pacemakers and in neutron sources, particularly when the reference to this conclusion is made in such a way as to imply that the strategic significance of plutonium-238 is equivalent to that of reactor grade plutonium as an object for diversion. It is one thing to require, in the name of common defense and security, more stringent measures than are currently enforced for protection of strategic materials in transit as well as in the plant, but it is quite another thing to extend such requirements unnecessarily to a material whose only comparable characteristic is that it bears the same generic name as material which does have a high strategic significance. Though the regulations do partially exempt sealed sources from the full gamut of protection requirements imposed on plutonium, certain of the requirements which plutonium-238 must meet even when in a sealed source, are still more restrictive than the strategic importance of the material would require.

The attachment to this letter sets forth detailed co11111ents on both the content of Announcement R-36 and the revisions to Parts 50, 70, 73, and 150.

The comments in this letter and those in the attachment represent the com-bined views of Nuclear Audit and Testing Company, Inc. and E. R. Johnson Associates, Inc.

NUCLEAR AUDIT.AND TESTING COMPANY, INC.

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By-~--'--~--"--=;,...;;_

R. P. Wischow, President E. R. JOHNSON ASSOCIATES, INC.

B

DETAILED COMMENTS ON PHYSICAL PROTECTION REGULATIONS The following represents comments or questions regarding the new physical protection regulations, and are set down chronologically from the documents which have been provided by the Collillission and identified in the heading before each group of comments:

A. AEC PRESS RELEASE NO. R-36 (1) Inasmuch as the proposed 11 New Restrictions on Special Nuclear Materials would appear to be a "major federal action and 11 11 as such require the preparation of an environmental statement under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the question is raised as to whether an environmental impact has been con-sidered and whether the appropriate environmental statement has been prepared by the AEC. It might be noted that this should be considered a major federal action less on the basis of the possi-ble impact of the regulation on environmental considerations than on the cost factors which will be required to comply with the regulation by the nuclear industry. It would seem appropriate to require the preparation of a cost-benefit analysis for the action taking into account, as the cost elements, those added costs which will be entailed in complying with the requirements as set forth herein.

Another item of cost to be considered is the cost of enforcement of this regulation, in terms of the number of inspectors required in the Division of Regulatory Operations at the present and the projections for future requirements in order to insure that com-pliance with the regulation is maintained at the appropriate level.

(2) On page l, Paragraph 4 defines the cut-off point for shipments in passenger aircraft as 20 grams or 20 curies, whichever is less (presumably referring to the lesser mass). If indeed the motiva-tion for these regulations changes is corrmon defense and security, then it is not clear as to why material of increasing specific activity (which would be caused by higher percentages of plutonium-238 and plutonium-241) is discriminated against by this provision since this latter material would, in fact, be of somewhat lower strategic importance than would plutonium material with a lower specific activity.

2 (3} On page 2, in the first quoted paragraph, it is stated that "it is imperative that all possible precautions be taken to safeguard them 11 (underline added). If it is indeed intended that all possible precautions be taken to safeguard shipments of special nuclear materials; then the Commission should forth-with prohibit all shipments of such materials. We believe that the word "practicable" would be better terminology in this statement, and we hope that it more properly represents the intent of the Commission.

(4) The treatment of protection against industrial sabotage, referenced in the last paragraph on page 2, leads to several questions. The definition of industrial sabotage is 11 any deliberate act directed against a facility licensed pursuant to this part, or against any component of such facility, which could endanger the public health and safety, other than such acts by an enemy of the United States, whether a foreign government or other person 11 [10CFR50.2 (x)]. The specific requirements related to the protection which must be provided against industrial sabotage are presented in 10CFR50.55(d);

detailed comments on these provisions will be taken up at the appropriate point in the co111T1ents, but the question here con-cerns the intent of the observation in the statement of consi-derations for the 10CFR50 amendments: 11 Protection against attack and destructive acts including sabotage directed against a facility by an enemy of the United States whether a foreign government or other person is the responsibility of the Depart-ment of Defense 11

• Inasmuch as these amendments, which specify requirements for physical protection, go into substantial detail as to how the licensee shall meet the new obligations, it would appear appropriate to include some instruction to the licensee as to how he shall distinguish between acts of sabotage which come under the umbrella of 11 industrial sabotage 11 against which he must provide protection, and those which ~re perpetrated by an enemy of the United States for which the protection is the responsibility of the Department of Defense.

B. PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIALS IN TRANSIT (First Attachment to Announcement R-36)

(1) In the fourth paragraph on page 1, reference .is made to markings required on the top and sides of surface vehicles transporting special nuclear materials in quantities which come under the re-quirements of these new regulations. It is also required that there be capability for continuous communication by radio-telephone onboard the truck; it is further indicated in the reaulations that the communications. to be tran~mitted periodically~ relate to the routing and schedul.:- of ti1e trc:*k. These requirmen 1*s would appear to add up to a situation in 1*1rtich hijacking of a ~, uck is

• 3 made easier than it VtUuld be under the current regulatory requirements for transportation of special nuclear material.

While it is true that the requirement of an escort traveling in a separate vehicle would make possible a much earlier detection of hijacking, it does not appear sensible to establish by regulation a series of requirements which will conceivably make a proposed hijacking easier to plan and accomplish.

(2) In the fifth paragraph on page l, reference is made to pre-planning shipments to assure (underlining added) delivery when the receiver is available to accept the material. While we do not question the desirability of preplanning so that shipments arrive at the destination at a time when an authorized individual is on hand to accept this shipment, it seems characteristic of the glibness which marks other aspects of this most recent action by the Commission to assume that such action will assure delivery of the material at a specified time.

(3) In the first paragraph beginning on page 2, it is noted that

• * *

• the importers would be required to protect shipments from 11 the time of their arriva1 in this country 11

• If by 11 arrival in this countryn is meant the point of first landing of an aircraft carrying the shipment or ~he first docking of a surface vehicle, (as is implied in the regulatory statements on the matter) then guidance should be given licensees as to how they can arrange protection for material while it is still in the custody of the U.S. Customs authorities; if the Federal *Government is taking responsibility for protection of the material during such period, then it should be so stated.

C. REVISED INVENTORY RE UIREMENTS FOR SPECIAL NUCLEAL MATERIAL (Second Attachment to Announcement R-36 (1) In the second paragraph on page 1, the statement is made "Full assurance against undetected loss or diversion of material can be achieved only by a physical inventory' 11

• He question this statement on factual grounds: A physical inventory can detect loss or diversion of material onlb if such diversion exceeds the quantity represented by a reasona le MUF for the facility in question and even then it is not necessarily true that an ab-normal MUF represents a loss or a diversion. In short, while we do not question the desirability of a requirement on the frequency of physica1 inventories by a licensee holding signi-ficant quantities of special nuclear material, we believe the quoted statement is a gratuitous comment of little significance.

\ 4 (2) It would appear that the implication in paragraph 4, that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA} standards for safe-

. guarding special nuclear materials are equivalent to those promulgated in these regulations is false. If the reference to the fact that the IAEA has used the term 11 effective kilogram" is put in for the express purpose of creating this illusion, it should be removed; if not, it should be qualified to remove any impression that these regulations are based on IAEA standards.

In this same paragraph 4, a carelessness of approach is apparent in that the 5000 grams (underline added) does not apply to special nuclear material ~~but rather refers to 11 * * * * *

• special nuclear material in a quantity exceeding 5000 grams of contained uranium-235, uranium-233, or plutonium, or any combination thereof ..... 11

• Since the total quantity is a function of the enrichment (U-235),or the fissile isotope (U-233) or the total plutonium content, the discussion of these quantities should not be superficial but rather should be exact in every way.

D. PROTECTION AGAINST THEFT OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL AND. SABOTAGE (Attachment 3 to Announcement R-36 (1) In the first paragraph on page 1, it is stated that isotope production facilities are licensed under part 50 of the AEC regulations; neither 10CFR50.1 nor 10CFR50.2 contain words which,~ se, include isotope production facilities among the act1v1ffes covered by 10CFR Part 50. It is true that one proposed isotope production facility was handled as a Part 50 application, but this resulted from a special administrative action taken by the Commission under circumstances which were peculiar to that case. In any event, if the motivation for the physical protection amendments under discussion is to strengthen the protection of special nuclear material in the interests of national defense and security, there is no con-ceivable reason for including presumably non-special nuclear material isotope production facilities among those activities to which these amendments are applicable. If indeed the Conmiission now interprets the .words of 10CFR50 to include such facilities in its scope of applicability, such facilities should be specifically exempted from the requirements of these amendments.

(2) The last paragraph on page 1 describes the threshhold limits for applicability of the physical protection plans. We believe that it is inappropriate to impose the same level of protection on facilities covering the range from those handling only slightly in excess of 5 kg of contained uranium-235 or 2 kgs of contained plutonium to reprocessing plants handling hundreds of kilograms of plutonium. It would appear much more reasonable to recognize

5 different levels of strategic importance based on quantities of special nuclear.materials, such as is recommended by the IAEA. Recommendations for the Physical Protection 11 of Nuclear Materia in (June, 1972). The IAEA recommends two groups of special nuclear materials w~ich are subject to somewhat different levels of requirements for protection.

(3) Page 2 refers to an exemption which appears to have the possibility of subjecting licensees to two different sets of requirements for security procedures involving special nuclear material. If it has been determined that,there is no possibility for conflicting requirements here, it should be so stated; if this determination has not been made, then the licensee should be given an order of priority of the requirements where conflicts are found.

E. 10CFR73--AIRCRAFT SHIPMENT OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL 10CFR150--AIR TRANSPORTATION OF SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL

{l) The term 11 passenger aircraft 11 as used in this regulation is a vague and non-descriptive tenn. On the presumption that the Commission intended that this regulation should prohibit the shipment of p1utonium,uranium-233 and enriched uranium, in the quantities identified, on passenger-carrying, commercial transport aircraft, (which are the aircraft which have been the object of hijacking activities) it is suggested that these descriptions be modified to read as follows: 11 * * *

• no shipment

• • • . shall be made in transport aircraft while in commercial passenger-carrying service .... 11

• Alternatively, a definition of the term 11 passenger aircraft 11 might be included in the regulation; in such case we would recommend the following definition: 11 By passenger aircraft is meant a transport-type aircraft, while operating in commercial, passenger-carrying service under Part 121 of the Federal Aviation Regulations 11

• This comment applies to both above-cited amendments.

F. 10CFRSO--REQUIREMENTS FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY (1) Comments on the definition of industrial sabotage and the requirements which imply a fine determination of the sponsor of any attack against the facility were set forth in our discussion of the press release. Taken together, the defi-nition of industrial sabotage and the requirement for protection against industrial sabotage imply some requirement upon the licensee to make a differentiation between sabotage directed against the facility by a person acting in some capacity other than as an enemy of the United States, and an attack by one who is an cnE:my of the United States. The subtleties in*:-lved

6 in this differentiation are fascinating, and their implications in regard to actions to be taken by the licensee should be spelled out.

(2) Section 50.55(d) contains a number of requirements which will be difficult, if not impossjble, to carry out. For example:

(a)(3) requires that a licensee determine that an individual selected as a guard or 1;Jatchman shall have the ability to execute all (underlining added) duties required of him by the security procedures. A licensee can go only so far in assessing,~ priori, the competence of people he hires as guards; there are a number of practical con-straints on the procedures available to an employeer to select employees, not the least of which are some other Federal regulations.

(d)(2) requires the licensee to provide detection devices which are 11 capable of detecting the presence of firearms, exp1osives, and incendiary devices 11 Generally, the commercially-available devices capable of detecting concealed materials are either those which operate by detecting the radioact*ivity emitted by radioactive materials; the presence of

• -0dors or volatile components (use of mass spectrometric or chromatographic techniques); or those which detect metals or electrically conductive material. It may well be that there is no equipment available today or by the time these proposed regulations are to be enforced which would permit complete, literal and reliable compliance with this regulatory requirement.

G. 10CFR70--REQUIREMENTS FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY (1)- The comments regarding industrial sabotage also apply to this section.

(2) Subsection 70.25(h) should probably specify a maximum response time for actions taken upon receipt of an alarm.

H. 10CFR70--REVISED t~TERIAL CONTROL AND ACCOUNTING REQUIREMENTS FOR SPECIAL NUCLEAR ~~TERIAL (1} We believe that plutonium-238 should be specifically exempted from the requirements set forth in this section, unless there is referenced, documented evidence provided to d~~onstrate that plutonium-238 is fissionable and has a critical mass sufficiently low in respect to the total quantities of material which are likely to be handled, that it can r<.1*tionally be considered to be a strateg1c hazard.

• 7 (2) The reference to appl icab*i1 ity of the proposed amendment to large scale uranium-233 recycle fuel fabrication facilities is difficult to comprehend (Statement of Considerations, fourth paragraph) in view of the fact that nowhere in these amendments is uranium-233 exempted from the requirements which are now being imposed. If the statement The application of the pro-11 posed amendments to large scale uranium-233 recycle fuel fabrications has not been considered **.. implies that more 11 stringent requirements than those set forth in the amendments now promulgated would be imposed later upon such facilities, then we suggest that such considerations should be fully justified by the Commission before such additional restrictions are applied.

(3) The inventory requirements set forth in Paragraph 70.51 (e}(3)

(iii) appear to be much more reasonable than some recent safe-guards amendments to licenses. We assume, of course, that we have properly interpreted these three paragraphs as permitting two levels of physical inventory in a fuel reprocessing plant, with recognition of the impracticability of carrying out a monthly total physical inventory in the heavily-shielded pro-cessing section.

(4) Paragraph 70.51 (e)(5) establishes arbitrary limits on the magnitude of the limit of error of MUF on any material balance, 1

without regard to either the processes involved or the types of facilities being employed for the processing of special nuclear material. We question the basis upon which one can develop a single arbitrary limit for the value of the limit of error on MUF, and even more emphatically question the basis for the apparently arbitrary and unilateral assumption that on or before January 1, 1976, there will be some undefined change in the laws of nature which would permit an arbitrary reduction of these limits by regulatory action. We also question the reasonableness of disregarding effects of processes and pro-cessing equipment, which may vary from plant to plant in the case of the equipment and wi11 certainly vary from plant to plant in the case of the processes employed. We recommend that the Commission reconsider this and either (a) change the absolute limits in the table to a range based on practicable attainable values of MUF in different plants, or, (b) establish on an ad hoc basis for each facility (using clear and unambiguous -

criteria, which might well be set forth in these regulations) an allowable limit of error for that facility, and delete this table from the subject section.

... (5) In subparagraph 70.51 (f)(2), requirements are established for inventory procedun's on sealed sources which we believe are unreasonably comp*:,2~-- :er those persons whose use of special

8

\

nuclear material is only in the form of neutron sources.

We believe therefore, that sealed sources, and especially those containing only plutonium-238, should be either speci-fically exempted from the requirements of subparagraph 70.51 (f) or should be subject only to the requirements set forth in (2)(i) and (iv).

I. 10CFR73--SECURITY MEASURES (1) As a general corrnnent on this section, it occurs to us that the Commission may be attempting to place requirements on licensees which the licensees are not capable of meeting considering the present exemptions to the regulations per-taining to common and contract carriers. It appears that the Commission is attempting to regulate common and contract carriers indirectly by imposing requirements on shippers of material. We consider this to be undesirable in that it puts the shipper, and hence the nuclear industry, in the middle between the Commission and the carriers. Alternatively, it may result in forcing the licensees to become their own shippers.

We refer specifica11y to the following requirements:

(a) dual occupancy protection [71.3l(a)(l)],

(b) an a'rrned escort: in a separate motor vehicle accompany-ing a truck shipment [73.3l(a)(l)(i)],

(c) shipment in a specially-designed truck or trailer

[73.31 (a)(l )(ii)],

(d) specification of the manner in which material is transported between a licensee facility and the airport, in the case of material traveling by air, and assurance by the licensee (underlining added) that transfers during the air segments of the ship-ments are minimized [73.3l(a)(2)(i)].

We do not question the desirability of tightening up the re-quirements related to the transportation of specia1 nuclear material, as this area has probably been subject to the least-thorough safety and security requirements of any nuclear fuel cycle activity. We believe, however, that the preferable regulatory approach to dealing with this problem is to (a) remove the present exemption in 10CFR70.l2 pertaining to carriers and thereby impose these regulations directly on the carriers, and (b) license any carriers who wish to offer carriage of special nuclear material.

9 (2} As we commented on the press release, the provisions of paragraph 73.31 (a)(5) appear to be self-defeating, in that implementation of these regulations would appear to substan-tially aid in the location of a truck by a person who is intent on hijacking a spec\al nuclear material shipment.

(3) Paragraph 73.31 (a)(7) requires, in addition to all other precautions imposed on surface transportation of special nuclear material, that containers be sealed with finger-print-type seals. The term, fingerprint-type seal, should be defined as it is not a device which is well-known or in common use. Furthermore, we have serious reservations regarding the feasibility and practicability of routine use of such devices in small package shipping, and even more serious doubts that their use is necessary or justifiable in the light of all the other protective measures which are proposed. The fingerprint-type seal is unwieldy to use, generally requiring special photographic capability at both the shipping location and the receiving location, and special equipment at the latter location for opening and handling the seals. This type of sealing device is valuable where a package is to be in 11 dead storage 11 for an extended period of time, but we cannot see any need for its use in the shipping situation.

(4) Paragraph 73.31 (c)(l) requires that an importer perform certain actions 11 * * *

• at the first place in the United States where the shipment is discharged from the arriving carrier. 11 ;

as indicated in an earlier comment, a strict interpretation of this statement would presuppose that a licensee or his agent can have access to a shipment before it has cleared U.S. Customs. This ambiguity in the regulatory requirement should be clarified.

(5) The provision in paragraph 73.31 (d), which differentiates between requirements of AEC Manual Chapters 2401 and 2405 and the requirements of the present regulations appears to be in conflict with the statement made earlier to the effect that all requirements set forth in these regulations shall be in addition-to and not a substitute for, any other security re-quirements imposed by the AEC Manual chapters. This ambiguity should be clarified. *

(6) In paragraph 73.31 (f) it appears that some allowable leeway in timing should be stated in setting forth the requirement that 11 * * *

• a shipment fails to arrive at its destination at the estimated time, the consignee, .... or the licensee who exported the shipi11cnt, shall imn:2ci~:itely notify by telephone, telegraph or teletype Vi~ Dire,-tot' .J*:* the appropric1.te Arn *ic Energy Commi5sion Regulatory Operations Regional Office .... 11 ;

literal enforcement of this regu1ation (which cannot be pre-cluded by the experiences to date) could, and probably would,

• 10 lead to a situation of complete confusion.

We believe it to be appropriate that the Commission should impose more stringent regulations regarding the safeguarding of special nuclear material; in particular, the tightening of regulations governing the transport of special nuclear material appears to be overdue. What distresses us is that the actions taken to date, as evidenced by these regulations, show little evidence of having been thoroughly analyzed in respect to all of their implications not only for licensees but for the nationa 1 defense and security as well , and display 1ittl e regard for the cost impact of some of the added requirements vis-a-vis the tangible benefits which could be expected to ensue from their applicatione The Commission has explicitly recognized the possiblity that re-quirements applied to plants processing specia1 nuclear materials could result in costs exceeding $500,000; we note with interest that the only accommodation to this contingency is the opportunity to 11

• • • • be pennitted to make application with such substantiating evidence for an extension of time, not exceeding an additional 6 months, for compliance with the new requirements. 11 We also note that the Commission seems more solicitous re-garding the cost impact of the transportation regulations, even though the need for tightening of the regulations on safeguarding of special nuclear material in transit is more immediate than is the case regarding in-plant handling of these materials. 1 I

In the case of these added transporation regulations, we agree that there is cause for concern on the part of the Commission regarding the added costs of complying with these regulations, and question whether all of the added costs could be justified by a rational analysis of the real benefits to national defense and security which could be expected from the new requirements.

• As we have indicated elsewhere, we agree that some tightening of the regulations regarding safeguarding of special nuclear material is in order; we believe, however, that the Commission would have been well advised to have arrived at such added require~ents after a more careful consideration, in concert with the affected industry, of the cost, practicability, and tangible benefits of the regulations. Another as-pect which should- have been resolved before these proposed regulations were published is the interrelationship of these regulations with the regulations of other agencies. Among the latter considerations is the fact that the proposed regulations regarding transportation of special nuclear materia1, while directed to AEC licensees, in fact regulate activities carr-ied on by agents not subject to the Connnission 1 s regulations.

.,... ,-,ARCO Nuclear Company P. 0. Box 546 Leechburg, Pennsylvania 15656 March 2, 1973 oourn:i u,AEC MAR 91973 ~

Secretary of the Commission U. S. Atomic Energy Commission Washington, D. C, 20545 Attention: Chief, Public Proceedings Staff

Subject:

Revision of Part 73 of Atomic Energy Commission Regulations Relating to Commercial Passenger Aircraft Governing Protection of Special Nuclear Material The amendment to Part 73 of AEC Regulations, published in the Federal Register, February 1, 1973, prohibits licensees from effecting shipments in commercial passenger aircraft of plutonium in quantities exceeding either 20 grams or 20 curies whichever is less.

We suggest that such revision which includes Pu-238 is not consistent with the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42USCA!2134 which states " *** the Commission is directed to permit the widest amount of effective medical therapy possible with the amount of special nuclear material available for such purposes and Fo impos 7 tpe mini~um amount of regulation consistent with its obligations under this chapter to promote the common defense and to protect the health and safety of the public."

Since 1967, the Commission, consistent with this directive to permit the widest amount of medical therapy possible has sponsored the development of nuclear batteries utilizing Pu-238 and heart assist devices which would utilize Pu-238 as a power source . In addition to the programs sponsored by the U. S. Atomic Energy Commission, the National Heart & Lung Institute has also sponsored and does continue to sponsor the development of a totally implantable artificial heart which would utilize Pu-238 as a power source.

There has been made available for medical use through the Oak Ridge office, a medical grade Pu-238 which contains less than 3. ppm of Pu-236 which has been developed by the U. S. Atomic Energy Commission and which is ideal for such bio-medical devices. In addition to these two devices utilizing Commission developed fuels, we believe that the future will provide the medical community with additional bio-medical devices utilizing Pu-238 as a fuel that will provide useful medical therapy.

Any amendment to the current regulations which would impose limitations upon the shipment of Pu-238 to such quantities to the initial fuel encapsulator and then impose limitations which would prohibit the transportation of an artificial heart which utilizes approximately 100 grams of Pu-238 or approximately

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A Subsidiary of Atlantic Richfield Company

r Secretary of the Commission March 2, 1973 1500 curies, would in our opinion seriously effect the development and utilization of such needed medical devices. On the current propos ed basis a commercial airplane could not carry 3 persons who had a nuclear pacer implanted or 3 nuclear pacers being transported for implantation or any combination thereof. In the event of an emergency where a physician might require a selection of more than 2 pacemakers at the site of an implant operation, rapid supply of such pacemakers would be impossible.

We petition the Atomic Energy Commission for a change in rule of AEC regulations relating to commercial passenger aircraft to provide that Pu-238 contained in implanted medical devices or while in transportation to a licensed encapsulator be free to travel on commercial passenger airlines except as otherwise governed by previously adopted rules and regulations concerning transportation of hazardous materials.

We appreciate the opportunity to convey to you our serious concern of this proposed amendment.

Very truly yours, REW/be

CHA R L O T T ESV I L L E

• V I RGINIA -229 01 SCHOOL OF LAW March 1, 1973 Secretary of the Commission U.S. Atomic Energy Commission W shington, D. C. 20545 A tention: Chief, Public Proceedings Staff

Dear Sir :

Enclosed are my conr.ments and sugeestion~ to the Atomic Enet'gy Commission on proposed amendments published in the F deral Register on Febrtary 1, 1973, to: 1 CFR 70 concerning protection of ccr ain facilities a which 1*censed activities are con<l1cted (and cor espo <ling provisions of 10 CFR SO); 10 CFR 73 conccrnhg protection of sp_cial nuclear material at fixed s'tes; and 10 CFR 73 ~oncernjng protecti n of specia.'.. nuclear material in transit. I req ,est that hcse comments and s11ggestions be considered by the Com.ni sion p ior to action making he propo~ed amendments effec*ive.

Sincerely,

,; \ A l ('( 6- c),:

1aaon Wj_llrich Professor of Law MW:LH Enclosure~

OCfff:{fD US;1EC R 51973  ;,> s

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modes anrl during any period when movemPnt of SNM is stopped.

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2. §73.31(a)(l), (2), 'and ()) prescribe physical protection requirements for shipments o.f SNM by truck only, truck and air, and rail respectively. The regulations should cover all modes of transportation which can ,be reasonably expected to be used.

Therefore, requirements should be included for transportation of SNM by surface ship since §73.l states that the regulations apply to any licens*ee who imports or exports SNM.

3. §73.3l(a)(l) and (3) require that SNM be accompanied by an ar:,ned escort for truck and rail shipments. An alternative to this requirement is provided for truck transport if a specially designed truck is used. There is no requirement for either an armed escort or other special measures to protect SNM during transportstion on cargo aircraft: lior a.re intennediate stops of a cargo aircraft carrying SNM prohibited. The proposed regulations should be revised* to provide preferably for an armed escort to accompany air car~o shipments of' SNM. or alternatively for an armed guard to maintain constant surv~illance of SNM on board a cargo aircraft during any intermediate stop. Suc_h an armed escort would also be available to protect the SNM during inter-vehicle transfers. (See comments in paragraph 5 below.)

4. §73.3l(a)(2)(iii) requires monitoring of SNM during inter-vehicle transfers when both truck and air transportation are used. The regulations should include substantially equivalent monitoring requirements for all inter-vehicle transfers, espe-cially transfers between a ship and another transportation mode.

~ents h:l. Mason Willrich, Professor of Law, University of Virginia, to the Atomic Energy Conmission on proposed amendments published on February 1, 1971, 10 GFR LL 11 Physical Protection of Special Nuclear Material," which deal with special 'nuclear material (SNM) in transit.

1. As a policy matter, strate~ic quantities of SNM should receive equivalent protection in every trans.po.rtation mbde, and SNM should be no more vulnerable to theft while the material is in transit than when it i.M in use or in storage at a fi.xed site.

The AEC has apparently adopted such a policy. (See Edson G. Case, Deputy Directors Directorate of Licensin~. U. S. Atomic Energy Commission, uMaterials and Plant Protection: Regulatory Policy Overview," paper for Atomic Industrial Forum workshop on protec-tion of special nuclear materials and facilities, February 19, 1973). However~ the proposed regulations do not effectively

.implement a policy of equivalent protection of SNM throughout the nuclear fuel cycle.* Deficiencies in this re!?ard are noted in the specific comments which follow. At the outser, as a preliminary*

general comment, the proposed re~ulations are organized in a way that substantially complicates t~e development of a comprehensive and consistent regulatory scheme. lt is ,suggested that a more efficient,,.. end workable orp,anizat,ion

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would be to stat.e the general requirements for the protection of ShTM in transit and then to set forth any specific requirements or ~xceptions for a particular mode of tran~portation. General* requirements should also be stated for monitorinE!. durin~ transfers betwe~n transportation

This ccrmment should not be read as recorrnnending aholishin~ thE>

prohibition in §73.Jl(e)(l)' against \truck-to-truck transfers.

5. In addition to comment 4 above regarding protection of SNM during inter-vehicle transfers, §{).3l(a)(2)(iii), which deals-with such transfers when both truck and air transportation is used, has the followin~ d~ficiencies:

(a) The licensee or his a~ent has apparently unlimited discretion to designate an individual or individuals to monitor inter-vehicle transfers. As a mininrum this subsection should require that the 11 monitor be nn auth0rized individual" thereby invokinf?, the-df'fin-i.tion in ~7).3(b) which requires that ~he desiina.tion he mA<le in r,rritin~ in advanc~

l by the 1 i.censee. Th;~ requir~en t of a writ t;en designation by the licensee Df a person to monitor a transfer would prevent an on-the-scene haphazard designation by an a~ent of anyone who is handy at the transfer point (b) The requirement to monitor the transfer of SNM extends only t0 scheduled transfe~s. Since an un-scheduled transfer could he cRused as part of a plan to divert the SNM, especially a plan involving employees of the carrier, protection requirements should apply to all transfers not just those which are scheduled. The di. fficul ty hen~ could be solved by r4:quiri.n~ fl,n al:"IBed escort to accompany every shipment .,.

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,of strate~ic quant~ties of SNM and requiring the escort

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• to monitor all int.er-veh1c,le transfers.

,(c) The monitor _is required to maintain constant 11 surveillance while the shipment is in storage, 11 as well as when the SNM is bein~ transferred from one vehicle to anot~er. The use of the word storage in this contex,t i,s ampi~ous, because the regulations are not clear as to what security requirements, other than constant surveillance, ,are applicable during such stora~e. Presmnably storage does not mean the same in §73.3l(a)(2)(iii) as it does in §73.32(a)(l) which invokes the phvsical protection requirements of SNM

,I stored at licensed facilities.since sroraee facil~ties at transfer points are un~ikelv to have vaults or vault-type rooms. In order to implement a policy of equivalent protection of SNM throughout the nuclear fuel cycle, the re~ulations shbuld provide: (i) that the monitor during storap.e be an armed guard or guards; (ii) thar the stora~e f-aciltty meet specific requirements: and (iii) t ha r the time in s,torage at any transfer point shall not exceed a fixed period of, for example, 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, 11 (d) -The monitor is required to be within 10 feet of the access door to the shipment. 11 This language seems to- a*ssume there _is only one -acce-s.s door -to the compart-men.t where the S*NM is located. If it i*s practical, this assumption shoul'd be- set forth as a specific requirement, but. if it is not, the problem should be studied and thi:> 1 :p,-,~.,,..,.,,~ 1

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, I (e) The dutie~ of the rruck crew and armed escort during *a* truck-aircraft trans fer are .not specified.

' 1 The continued presence and responsibility of the armed escort until the shipmPnt is loaded into'the aircraft would subs.tantially increase the prot.ection afforded I

the SNM at little incremental cost. Similar benefits I

would be derived from requirin~ ~he ~~cort to be present when the aircraft is unloaded prior to transfer to a truck. This comment assumes, of course, that the aircraft-truck connection is immediate.

In view of the connnents in this paragraph 5 regarding truck-aircraft transfers and comment *4 above, *it is recolnmended tha. t the whole area of inter~vehicle transfers be reexamined to ensure

, that the risks associated with such transfers have been identified and evaluated. The regulations should then be promulgRted to cover all transfers with a general set of requirements. The re-examination should include considerAtion of various means to ensure that the vulnerahilitv of SNM to theft at an exposed transportation terminal, such as an airport or wharf, is no greater* than when the SNM is located at. a fixed site.

6.* The regulations should be revised to* clarify whether the physical security requirements applicable to SNM in transit

(§73.31) or *at a licensed facility (§73.32) ar~ controlling wheD SNM is transferred between a licensed facility and a vehicle at the origin or .des-tinat:i.0n of a shipment. In this connection, the l

interface bet~een the -material access area and the truck or other-

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6 shipping vehicle should be carefullv examined to determine the desirability of a requirement for 1dading docks at the barrier between the material access area and the protected area in order to eliminate intrusion of the shipping vehicle and vehicle crew into the material access area. (See further paragraph 3 of my comments on physical protection of SNM at fixed sites which*

considers §73.32(b)).

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7. §73.3l(a)(7) requires in. the case of surfacE1 11 transportation" that SNM shall be carried in closed vehicles or containers that are locked, 11 and that the containers must have fingerprint type seals. This language is ambi~uous. It is not clear whethe~ both the closed vehicles and the containers must be lo<.:ked or just the contain!?rs. If the licensee ships SNM in locked containers*, it would se~m that an open bed cruck may be I

used. The regulations should require shipment of SNM in a locked>

sealed container that is located in a closed, locked vehicle.

This requirement should be app]icc1ble to shipments by all modes of transportation, to the ex.tent thal it is practical. Where this fonn of protection is impractical, the regulations should require equivalent means of protection: In anv event, shipment of SNM should be made only in a c0ntainer that is locked and sealed. Moreover, in light of.the factors leading to theft th~t have been identified in the Department of Transportation studies, containers used in the shipment of SNM should be of a size and weight that they cannot be moved hy one man. Hence, the regula-tions should set forth uni form design requirements for containers*

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used to ship SNM, regard1ess\of transportation mode. Considera-tion should also be given to a n:iquiremPot that SNM must be locked and sealed in R speciRllv designed shippin~ container in a material access area at th0 licensed facility where the shipm0nt originates and that the contt.dner must not be opened until i l is within a material access area at the licensed facility which is the final destination.

8. The regulations should specify the phvsical prote.:'.tion requirements applicable to SNH shipments in car~o aircraft. In developing these requirements, the followinp:, P-lements should he considered and their practicality determined; armed escort~

locked and sealed containers in separate compartments; allowing or prohibiting commingling with other air cargo: and individuals l

I who may have access to SNH at inte:cmediate stops and monitoring*

requirements if weight must be shifted as other cargo is added or dische.rged.

9. §73.3l(a)(6) requires that rrucks "he marked on top with identifying letters or numhers which will permit identlfica-tion of the vehicle from the air in clear weather Rt 1,000 feet above ground level." It should be recqg.nizeo that these special markin~s could be quickly disguised by paint or a tarpaulin.

This subsectton also requires th::it the same letters or numbers he marked on the sides and rear of the truck to allow identification from the ground. Consid,2rRtion ~hould he given to whether mark-ings large enough to be visible from l ,000 feet in the air. if put on the sides and rear of the truck, '.Tlight be detrimental because they would attrRct unwanted att~ntion to the rruck and

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facilitate identification by potential thieves. It is assumed, of I

course, that whatever rnark1n~s an., used would be distinctive, hut would not expressly disclose the presence of an SNM-shipment.

10. SNM in transit must be e-ff*ectively protected against theft by an employee or employees. of the carrier; by an 1unrelated group of non-employ~es, and by a ~roup composed of ~mpl9yees and I

non-employees. Under §7'1.3l(a)(l) SNM may_li.le shipped by Lruck under either of two options: (i) dual occupancv protection plus an armed escort in an accompanying vehicle; or (ii) dual occupancy protection plus a specially designed truck which permits immobili-zation and provides barriers to penetration. (The definition in

§73.l(n) of*dual occupancy protection uses thP undefined term 11 s ignature security service." 1'1-ie meaning of this teti11 should be specified.) Option (i) provides inadequate protection against an armed theft attempt by an unrelated group since first the escort vehicle could be intercepted and then th~ truck hijacked. Option (i) does. however, provide suhstantial protection against an attempted theft by one or more members of the truck crew. On the other hand~ assuming the special rlesign featur_es can be operated quickly from within the cab, option (ii) may afford substantial protection against theft by an unrelated group, especially if combined* with an armed escort. In order to deal with the obvious threats to a truck shipment of SNM., therefore, the regulations should require dual occupancy and an armed escort and A specially desi~ned truck. These phvsical protection req~irements are already imposed on certain classified nuclear shipments, nnd hence':

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the same requirements would seem feasible for unclassified SNM s,hipments. In revising the ~roposf"d \rei~lations in this respect, the following alternate or additional forms of protection could be considered: requiring that the truck crew be armed; requiring an interlock system in the truck cab so it coµld not be moved until both crew members had inserted their key in orde,r to prevent one from driving away while the other is outside the cab during a rest ~top or for some other reason; and requiring the truck crew and escort(s) to have security clearances or at least to be screened by_some method to reduce the risk of employee diversion of _the shipmP.nt.

11. The'only requireQ?ent that a driver, ~scort\ or monitor of a SNt.f shipment immedia*tely re-port "any deviation from, or I

attempted interference with, sctiedule or routing 11 appears in I

§73.3l(a)(2)(iii), which applies only to the individual who monitors an SNM transfer between a truck and an aircraft. There should be a general requirement that the person or persons accompanying a SNM shipment immediately report any attempted or accomplished theft or unlawful diversion of SNM, or any circum-stances*indicating the probable existence of a threat situation.

The report should be made both to *the licensee or his agent and to the appropriate law enforcement authority. Reporting such an incident only to the licensee as is required in §73.3l(a)(2)(iii) could result in substantial delay before the authorities who

• might render assistance are noti,£ied.

The same comment applies .to any communication from a truck)'

escort vehicle, or rail car concernin~-any aimilai situation

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~e8uiring notification of a law enforcement authority. §71.1l(a) 1 (1) nnd (5) should be re~ised tn exprPssly require that the radio-telephone opera~o+ notify immediately the appropriate law enforcement authority. Moreover, the licensee or his agent should be required t;o man continuously a telephone or other instrument on whi~h communications are expected to be received while SNM is in transit. As a general matter, the communications technology required, radio-telephone or telephone, is unsophisti-cated compared with technology that is available. ln view of the critical nature of adequate communications, it is recommended that the cost-effe,ctiveness of a varietv o'f alternative systems be analyzed, and.that the requirements in this regard be tightened subsequently.

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12. §73.Jl(e) and (f) p,ive the,** consignee the option to use telephone, telegraph or teletype. to give notice that a shipment has not arrived by the estimated time of arrival. Since telephone communicatio~s are faster ~nd provide a quicker positive con-firmation that the message ha.s been received, these regulations should be revised.to indicate that telephone communications should oe used if possible~

13. The procedures to be followed by the AEC~ law enforce-ment authorities, and the responsible licensee to investigate any I

incident reported which may involve a loss of or attempt to divert SNM are not specified in the regulations. Presumably, these procedures are part of an unpublished recovery plan.

Recovery proc~dures. ~ontingency and coordination plans are a very impo~tant pa~t 9f a oystem of sBf~guards against unlawful diversion of SNM. Although P'-;lblication of these aspects: of a

.e 11 safeguards system would not be in the public 'interest, steps should he taken to provide the puhlic \lith some form of assurance that recovery plans are well designed and the resour~es are continuously availablP for their implementation.

14. §73.3l(c) provides special requirem~nts for SNM imports.

11 Paragraph (1) requires that a container count" he perf9rmed 11 where the shipment is discharged 11 from the arriving carrier. An aircraft or ship carrying SNH for import is likely to make

, intermediate stops to pick up or discharge cargo, outside and/or 11 11 within the U. S., before the stop W!'ere the* SNM is dischRrp.:;ed.

The "container count" should be made at rhe first stop within the U.S.> and ~nitorin~ of the SNM should be required during this A.nd any other *intermediate stops thereafter. Paragraph (2) requires the licensee lmportini SNM to follow the physical pro-11 tection requirements of §73.31 after arrival in the United States. 11 Care should be taken to specifv with-pr-ecision the point where the license-e 1 ,s 0bligations arise.

ls*. Other than requir:i nr, th<.> licensee to arrange for not ice to him in the event of safe arrival or failure to arrive

[§73.3l(e)Js the regulations do not purport to cover an export of SNM once the shiprnent leaves thP U. S. This seems to be the situation regardless of whether t~he shiµment is carried hy a U. S.

or foreign-flag ship or aircraft. The regulat-ions thus do not

- attempt to impose phvsical protec-tion rt='qt.irements on SNM ~xports when the materials are in transj t outs id~ the :jurisdic-tion of th~

U. S. or in use in -foreign countries. Ex.ports of SNM are requi re<l I ,

• by the Atomic Energy Act to be licensed and to take place only under the umbrella of a government-to-~overnment a£reemcnt for coopera-

12 material and safeguards to assure compliance. Moreover, the U.S.

is obligated under the Non-Proliferation Treaty and requires the application of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on all SNM exported from the u. S. to non~nuclear-weapon countries.

It is evident that the theft or unlawful diversion of SNM exported from the U.S., or of SNM generally in foreign countries) could lead to circumstances inimical to the common defense and security of the U. S. Therefore, it is recommended that the AEC and other interested agencies undertake urgently a broad study of the foreign policy and national security aspects of physical protection re$1uirements potentially applic*able to U. S. exports of SNM and that the AEC regulations applicable to physical pro-tection of SNt.Jf in transit and qther rele\rant regulations be I

appropriately amended in light,of the findings ~nd recommendations of the study.

16. The proposed regulations do not cover SNM shipments from a point outside U.S. to a destination outside the U.S.,

but which cross the U.S. en route. For example, material shipped from Canada to Latin Amr2rica or fr.om Japan to the Uniced Kingdom may, depending on the route chosen) transit.the United States. This gap in the regulations should be filled.

17. The proposed regulations penni.t licensees to delegate the fulfillment cf many important requirements to agents. The regulations should specify qualific.st:f.ons for agents and prohibit

,., licensees from contracting away, to agents who are entirely out- .

side the reach of the AEC, the responsibility for assuring adequate, protection of SNM shipments.

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18. §73.3l(a)(8) states that a licensee or applicant for a 11 license may apply for approval of proposed procedures for transport of fSNMJ in a manner not otherwise authorized 11 by these regulations. The regulation should provide that approval shall not be granted for any variance from the regulations except upon a determination by the AEC, sfter a review of the relevant circum-st~nces) that the SNM involved will not be more vulnerable to theft or loss as a result of transport in the manner specially proposed.

19. The proposed regulations are not consistent in the use

.,--!C'Qf terminology which leads to confusion . . For example §73.Jl(a)

(l)(i) uses the term "armed guards1r and §73.3l(a)(3) uses "armed individuals" to refer to the escorts\. accompanying* truck and rail 11 shipments respectively. The words truck 11 and "motor vehicle" ar~ used several timesy such as in §73.3l(a)(2)(iii) and §73.31

• , ,{a) (6), and appear to have identical meanings. However, "vehicle 1 11 as used for example in §73.3l(a)(2)(tii), appears to have a much broader meaning encompassing trucks. railcars, and aircraft. It is recommended that the regulations be revised to eliminate use of more than one word for the same function,especially 'Where there is likelihood of confusion with similar words. Mo:ceover, since "guard" ia a person defined in §73.3 to be armed~ use of the term "armed guard 11 in §73.3l(a)(l)(i) may be avoided, tf something different is meant, the differi?nce should be made explicit.

February 26, 1973 Comments hi: MRr,on Willrich, Professor of Lawt University of Virginia, the Atomic Energy Commission Q!!. propo9ed amendments Q!lblished on February 1, J.973~ .tQ.. 10 CFR 70 concerning protection of ~_rtain fac:tlities at which licensc:1 activities ~ conducted against industrial vabotage.

1. §70.25(a)(l) requires that the licensee train and equip' guards and watchmen to protect SNM against theft or diversion, and to protect against industrial sabotage. §70.25(a)(2) requires the licensee to estublish, maintain and follow written security procedures. However, the regulstions establish no guidelines as to the overall size of the security organization~

guard/watchman ratio, capabilities of equipment tolbe used, nature of tr&iningi and security clesrance for personnel of the I

security organization. §70.25(e)(l) requireR the licensee to take account of the probable size and response time of the local law enforcement authority assistance in developing his physical security plan. However 1 here again the regulations do not provide.either guidance to the licensee in evaluating local law enforcement assistance or a basis for the AEC staff to determine the ad~quacy of physical security plans submitted by licensees.

Hence, the proposed regulations lack standards in an area that

~as critical importance both to the nuclear industry a~d to the public. On the one hand, the AEC would have unguided discretion in determining the adequacy of an applicant's or a licensee's physical security orguniz.stion. On the other hand, interested citizens would have no assurance that the AEC' would not be

2 unduly lax in the requirements actually imposed on licensees regarding the physical security organ:tzetion.

• The problem is especially acute because the physical security plan sub~itted to the AEC by an applicant or a licensee would be withheld from the public record pursuant to 10 CFR 2.790(d), and hence would not be reviel-1able either by another applic~nt or licensee to I

ensure non-discriminatory treatment or by an i.n.terested private citizen to assure himself o-? the adequ&c}e of the plan. Accord-ingly, §70.2S(a)(l) *and (e)(l) should contain spei:ific criteria or standards. Moreover, these ,-ssues affect the public interest too broadly to be left to specification in a detailed gui.de to be issued later.

2. The "intervening space" which §70.25(b)(2) requires bct'{t1een the physical barrier around the perimeter of the protected area and physical ba~riers within the protected area is ambiguous.

While some variation should be permissible*. a minimum width should be specified. It should be wide enough for guards to patrol either on foot or in a vehicle.

3. §70.25(h) sets out in very general tenns how the guards and watchmen should respond "upon detection of abnormal presence or activity of persons or vehicles within an isolation zone, a p~otected area or a vital area or upon evidence of intr~sion into a protected area or a vical area." The regulation defers all the hard questions concerning the use of force to neutralize a threat, and in particular the use of deadly force to prevent completion of a theft i.11 progress. Some of these questions would be

\, e 3 answered by the licensee's written security procedures, others by the head of the security .force or the plant superintendent during l

an emergency, and still others (probably the hardest of all) would be largely within the discretion of the guards on the spot._

However, it is desirable to work out relatively uniform ground rules for all licensees to follow in their planning in this regard. In particular the range of credible threats the licensee's security organization must plan to deal with should be specified.

The use of deadly force to prevent the theft or diversion of a strategic quantity of SNM would appear justified as a last resort and necessary in view of the risk to che common defense and security and to the l)"Jblic health and yafety that would be likely to arise if an attempted theft of such material were successful. It seems likely that in many cases~ for various reasons~ the local law enforcement authorities should not be expected to deal in a timely manner with every situation where the use of deadly force may be nece6sary to neutralize a threat.*

In order to provide adequate protection in these cases, the security organization at the facility would need to be trained, equipped and instructed to use deadly force in potentially very hazardous circuma*tances. The quality of the manpower r-- 1uired in 1

the licensee 1 a security organization would be very high. There-fore, the proposed regulations, if implemented so as to provide effective and equivalent security at nuclear facilities througho~t the United States, would impose on individual licensees, which are privately owned enterprises, extraordinary police duties and

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responsibilities which are far beyond the normal role of industrial security in a civilian industry in peacetime and indeed beyond che expected role of local law enforcement authorities.

The amount of SNM in private industry is already vPry large) and it will rapidly increase for the foreseeable futurP, The number of facilities where strategic quantities of SNM are located will eventually bk q~ite large also. Therefore, it is suggested that the propos~d regulations be adopted as R stop-gap.

It is further suggested that, the AEC, in cooperation with representatives of appropriate law enforcement authorities at each level of government, the nuclear and transportation indus-tries and the general public ('.mose security is at stake),

un d erta k ea compreh ens i ve stu ri yo-f ti h,..,."'"secur1ty

• organ i zat i on required between 1975 and 2000 for the protection of SNM at fixed sites and in transit and of nuclear facilities in the United States. The study should seek to answer, among other qucstio~s: what threats to SNM and nuclear f~cilities will be credible: what security forces will be required to deal with the range f credible threats and t~e exter~t to which these forces already exist or need to be developed; end, in view of the range of credible threats to the security of the nation and safety of the public which could arise from successful theft of SNM~ as well as the range of credible thrC!ats of theft of material or acts of industrial sabotage "against "faciltties, what should be the respective responsibi.lities of private industry~ local, state'"

and federal Vm enforcement authorities and U. S. mi llrary forces.

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4. §70.32 prohibits a licensee froro making any change in its physical security plan which would decrease the effectiveness of physical security without the prior approval of the AEC. The effect of this requirement is to allow a licensee to determine the effect of a contemplated change in its physical security plan and, thereafter, to modify unilaterally a plan whiph formed part of the basis on which the license was granted. This grants too much discretion to the licensee in such an important aspect of a license as physical security conditions. At a minimum all changes in the physical security plani which the licensee considers would not decrease the effectiveness of physlcal.

security, should be submitted to the AEC for information without relieving the licensee of res.ponsibility for obtaining AEC approval of changes which may decrease the effectiveness of physical security.

5. The comments above also apply to corresponding provisions of the proposed amendments to 10 CFR SO.

.. ~............ .,,,.,,,,.... ,,.,,. .. -..........-..-,.,n.A,......~-.\.i..:.,

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l February 26, 1973 Comments !?_y Mason Willrich, Professor of Law, University of Virgini~, to the Atomic Ener~y Commission on ~ s e d amendments publishe on Februaryl , 1973, to 10 CFR 1..l, 11 Phy-;3j.cal Protection of Spec:f al Nuclear Material 'j '

which deal with special nuclear. material (SNM2 at fixed sites.

11

1. §73.32(a)(2) requires that SN}i not in processlf shall' be stored in a vault or vault-type room. The regulnt1ons do not define "in process." This requirement should be revised to specify how long and under what condicions SNM may remain out of storage. SNM that is packaP-ed and easily transportable should be required to be in storage at all times unless it is in transit or being readied for transit. For example, all plutonium nitrate in bottles at a fuel reprocessing facility should be required to be stored in a vault at \.the facility, pending its transfer to a permanent* storage facility. Tn1= same treatment should be required for high-enriched uranium or plutonium pending_

processing at a fuel fabrication facility.

11 2~ § 73. 32(a) ( 7) requirer; that surveil~ance shall be maintained of individuals within a material access area such that the activities of a single individual within such an aree will be .observed. 11 This requirement* for "surveillance" is different fro'ql §73.3l(a)(2)(iii) which requires "constant sur-veillance" of SNM during certain inter-vehicle transfers.

Therefore, l>y implication surveill-9'.nce" in § 73. 32(a) (7) means something less than continuous, which makes the requ:;..rement ambiguous. The surveillance requirement in §73.32(a)(7) is also

f '

• ambiguous because it does not specify how it is to be met. It is

/

recommended that these ambiguities be clarified if surveillance of individuals within a material access ~rea is to contribute significantly to SNM protPction.

3. §73.32(b) reauires that ~ach individual, package, and vehicle be "checked*" for concealed SNM before exiting from a I

material access area. The procedures and sensitivity of the check are not specified; nor is the person responsible for per-forming the check. Use of the word "checked 11 in '§73.32(b),

which covers exit from a material access ar.ea, may imply a less intensive and extensive inspection than is meant by use of the word 11 searched" in §73.32(.a.)(6), which covers eptry into 'a pro-tected area. Since exit inspection is a primary means to prevent SNM diversion by individuals who are authori.zed access to a material access area, the regulations should be strengthened and clarified in this regard.

Pre:s\.'!lllahly different procedures will be required for checking individuals fr.om those for checking packages and vehicles.

Moreover, different procedures should be used for checking packages and vehicles alleged not to contain SNM from those known to contain SNM. Doorway monitors and other devices that may be ust2d should be required to have a prescribed sensitivity, More-over, the authorized individual designated to contr.ol access to a material access area should also be required to control exit from the area.

• 3 Consideration should be given to prohibiting any vehicle that may go outside a protected area', especially a vehicle used to transport SNM out of the protected area, from entering a material access are& within the protected area. Such a limita-tion would be especially useful with respect to vehicles used to transport SNM between licensed facilities. If a vehicle for transportation o'f SNM off site were required to be loaded at a dock adjacent to the material access area and the SNM carefully monitored and accounted for as it was removed from the material access area and placed on the vehicle, the risk of unauthorized SNM being hidden on the vehlcl~ would be greatly reduced and the problem of trying to check for SNM hidden on the vehicle w0uld be avoided.

As a general criterion, c6nsideration should be given I

to requiring that the "best availabl~-methods and technology" be used in all exit inspections from a material access area, due to the importance of this ftmction.

4., Although the requirements need not be as stringent as those proposed in Part 73, consideration should be giv~n to requiring some physical protection of S~1M in quantities less than I

those specified in §73.l(a). Kilogram quantities of plutonium especially, if diverted, could be used intentionally or inadvertently in such a way as to create a substantial hazard to the public health and safety.

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~ H.Utf PR .. 7lJ 38 FR 80~5 E}$(0N NUCLEAR COMPANY, Inc.

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. ___ 2101 Horn Rapids Road, Richland, Washington 99352 s g ~ BJJ.tt: -7 3 Ff( ,?>0fi:

i 4 PHONE: (509} 946-9621 3J -

February 22, 1973 I

llO.CKETE.fl Secretary of the Connnission fl..~

U. S. Atomic Energy Commission Washington, D. C. 20545 MAR 21973lb,.

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ATTENTION: Chief, Public Proceedings Staff UZ-0 Gentlemen:

Exxon Nuclear Company, Inc. respectfully submits the following coilll!lents for consideration on proposed amendments to AEC Regula-tions, Parts 50, 70 and 73 covering the protection of and account-ability of special nuclear materials and protection of nuclear facilities. These comments are based on comprehensive review and study of the proposed changes and in part on prior plant experi-ence under special license conditions similar to those now being proposed.

1. Part 50 Paragraph 50.55, d, (c), (1): The requirement to search incoming vehicles for devices such as firearms, explosives, incendiary devices, or other items which could be used for industrial sabo-tage is not practical. A perfunctory search would be of little real value. An alternate approach would be to include the require-ments of 50.55, d, (c), (4), and (5) for truckdrivers; that is, require them to register as a visitor and be escorted while in the protected area. In addition, the drivers could be subject to search as required for individuals in this same section.

Paragraph 50.55, d, (d), (1): Experience has shown that there are very few detection aids which have been qualified to date as meeting the requirements of GSA Interim Specification W-A-00450A (GSA-FSS).

It would be helpful to make available to licensees identification of detection aids which have been so .qualified and provide information on where such devices can be sent for qualification.

2. Part 70 Paragraph 70.4, (t): In defining effective kilograms, insertion of the word "element" before "weight" each time it appears would clarify the definition. It would also clarify the definition to state whether the unit of enrichment to be squared is decimal or percent enrichment.

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AN AFFILIATE OF F.)kON CORPORATION

Secretary of the Commission Page 2 February 22, 1973 I

Paragraph 70.51, (a), (1): The definition of "additions to material in process" is used as the basis,for a criterion against which the size of LE-MUF is judged. Although this appears to be logical in most instances, there are circumstances in which it does not provide a valid basis. For example, if a large amount of scrap is removed- --

from storage during a scrap recovery campaign, the size of LE-MUF is increased, but it does not represent an addition to material in process as presently defined.

1

• This problem *can be circumvented, the need for defining "removals from materials in process" can be eliminated, and the unwiedly cri-terion for LE-MUF which relates it to the larger of additions to or removals from process can be avoided by making the following defini-tion of material processed.

"For a given material balance period, the material processed is the sum of the SNM for all items in beginning inventory and additions to inventory which are not identically a part of the ending inv~ntory or removals."

Thi~ definition more properly reflects *the amount of SNM exposed to process, and hence, subject to process loss, to MUF, and to addi-tional measurement uncertainty. At the beginning of a material balance period, SNM is normally present at all process stages of a multi-stage plant; the prl:>posed definition recognizes that even though this material may not have been added to the process during the material balance period, it does contribute to MUF and to LE-MUF during the period by virtue of its having been further processed, The adverb, "identically," in the definition provides the means by which the effect of unprocessed SNM is removed, An item is identi-cally a part of two MUF components if it is not exposed to process losses. For example, in a fuels fabrication plant, if an item is a fuel rod in beginning .inventory and a part of a fuel assembly in ending inventory (or as a removal), it is not a part of material processed, because it is not exposed to process losses during the bundle assembly operation.

Rather than material processed, another term might be more appropri-ate to describe this index. It is suggested that this term or a suitable alternate replace "the larger of additio11s to or removals from process," wherever: this expression occurs.

Paragraph 70.51, *(a), (5): It is pointed out that this definition of limit of error is different from that being proposed as an ANSI standard, where it is defined simply as twice the app~opriate stand-

, ard deviation. The proposed standard is in its early draft prepara-1 tion stages, however, and it may be premature to anticipate how limit of error will be defined in its final form, We prefer the 2cr- definition.

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Secretary of the Commission Page 3

' . -, February 22, 1973 Paragraph 70.51 2 (b): There is some confusion as to the* precise meaning of this requirement. For example, could the requirement that records be kept to show the acquisition of all SNM be met by the traceability afforded by quality control records, or must a separate record system.be established?

Paragraph 70.51. (e), (3) 2 (ii): This paragraph refers to an exc~ption where the plant area is enclosed with shielding equivalent to 3 feet or more.of concrete. There are two problems with this criterion. First, concrete comes in a range of densities so that "3 feet of concre-te" invites misunderstanding. Second, it is noted that the 3 feet of concrete criterion applies only to reprocessing plants. This implies that reliance is placed on gannna activity associated with the special nuclear material to prevent its diversion rath~r than the physical barrier presented by the concrete. This could lead to the practice of locating purified products behind 3 feet of concrete to circumvent the intent of the regulation.

This criterion should be rewritten and based directly on the radiation level of the I special nuclear material and its associated impurities.

Paragraph '70. 51, (e-) * ,(5 )-: Our current .. appraisal is that it may be difficult to meet the criteria f?r LE-MUF established for January 1, 1976, and thereafter. It is suggested that rather than fixing these values at the present time, the statement be made that the values in the first column of the table are in effect until December 31, 1975, at which time a reassessment will be made based on accumulated indus-try experience, the proven workability of new measurement technology, and other considerations. Licensees should be required to report to the AEC their LE-MUF experiences to assist in this evaluation.

Paragraph 70.51, (f), (3), (ii), (B), (1): The precise meaning of this statement is not clear. In our opinion, the nece6sary clarity can be achieved by combining statements (1) and (2) into one statement to relate to attributes sampling. (See next comment.)

Paragraph 70.51, (f), (3), (ii), (B), (2): There is no way that the stated assurance can be provided. AB written, the requirement_,is that at least 95% of the items be within the stated limits of error, and that when exactly 95% meet this criterion, there is a 5% chance of accepting the inventory as satisfactory. But, by the very definition of limit of error, if properly assessed, exactly 95% of the items will be -expected to be within the *stated limits o~ error, so that the chance of accepting as satisfactory an inventory of which is indeed satisfactory by its very definition is only 5%. This is obvi-ously unwo.rkable.

Secretary of the* Commission Page 4 February 22, 1973

\

The problem lies in the definition of a "defect*," It is not reasonable to define a defect as representing a discrepancy larger than the limit of error. Rather, a defect might be defined as a difference between the assigned value and the remeasured value which is larger thank times the measurement error standard deviation of this difference, The value fork should be at least three to produce a workable plan.

. .. . I I*t is suggested, in summary, that paragraphs (1) and (2) pe combined and rewr:tt*een */l's follows. /

• "If an at.tribute sampling plan is used, assurance shall be provided that no more than P percent of the items in the population are defects, where Pis 5 for plutonium., uranium-233, and high-enriched uranium, and is 10 for low-enriched uranium. If the category or population contains exactly P percent defects, the sampling plan shall assure that this is detected with probability (1 - B), where Bis 0,05 for plutonium, uranium-233, and high-enriched uranium, and is 0,10 for low-enriched uranium. An item is labeled a defect if the difference between its assigned element (isotope) weight and the re-measured weight exceeds four times the measurement standard deviation of this difference. 11 Paragraph 70.51, (f) 2 (3), (ii), (B), (3): We have difficulty in understanding precisely what this statement means, and would suggest that it be replaced by the following.

"If a variables sampling plan is used, sufficient sampling shall be*

performed to assure that the discrepancy between the assigned values and the remeasured values, totaled over that portion of the inventory which is subject to the variables measurements, has a measurement standard deviation which is less than Q percent of the total inventory

• in question. 11 In a fuel fabrication plant, reasonable values for Q appear to us to be 0.25 for plutonium, and 0.50 for uranium, with deminimus absolute quantities specified to apply when ~nventories are small.

Paragraph 70.53, (b), (1): Although we have made this point on several occasions in the past, we again take this opportunity to suggest that the criterion: MUF > LE-MUF is not realistic except in an idealized plant. Experience has demonstrated that under actual operating condi-tions, there will always be some positive *amount of true MUF due to unmeasured inventories and process losses, Also, LE-MUF, at least as calculated in our facilities, does not include the effects of

-measurement "mistakes", which are defined as errors in recording, transmitting, and processing the measurement data. These will affect the size of MUF. In view of these consider~tions, it :f.s our view that-the criteripn, MOF > LE-MUF should be replaced by the criterion, MUF >Mo+ LE-tfUF, where Mo is the tolerable true MUF for the fa~ility and time period in question. This criterion would then attach real

Secretary of the Commission Page 5 February 22, 1973 .

significance to those occasions when the observed MUF is excessively large in the sense th.at investigative and corrective actions are in order.

Paragraph 70.23, (c), (1): The same comment is made here as was made for Paragraph 50.55, d; (c), (1).

,Paragraph 70.25, (d), (1): The same comment is made here as was made for Paragraph 50.55, d, (d), (1).

3. Part 73 Paragraph 73.3 2 (d): As currently written, this paragraph requires visible and audible signals. It is suggested that the 11 and 11 be changed to "or."

Paragraph 73.31: These regulations apply to quantities of plutonitm1 in excess of 2,000 grams. It appears that these regulations as written would also apply to spent fuel shipments. l*t is suggested that the elaborate guarding and communication surveillance would be unnecessary for spent fuel because of i.ts accompanying high intensity radiation field. It is suggested that this regulation be rewritten to exclude spent fuel shipments. /

.I ..

Paragraph 73.31, (a), (1),1 (i): This paragraph requires an armed escort of at least two armed guards. We are opposed to the use of armed escorts for the following ,reasons.: 1) they would be ineffective against a significant armed attempt at hijacking; 2) the principal advantage of an*escort should be to observe and report any attempt at hijacking or other suspicious actions toward the truck they are escorting. In a broader sense, this paragraph requires licensees to protect against actions which could be threats to the common denfense and security of the nation. This requirement would better be served by the use of armed Federal officers particularly if the use of deadly force is intended by the requirement that the "armed.escorts take action as circumstances might require to avoid interference with the continuous safe passage: of the cargo vehicle. ' 1 We recommend also that the AEC staff check whether guns are allowed to cross state lines and if sot what type. It is our understanding that hand guns are not allowed.

Paragraph 73.31, (a), (1)~ (ii): This paragraph makes reference to a specially designed truck or trailer which reduces the vulnerability to diversion. It is recommended that design standards be provided to assist in meeting this requirement; otherwise much lost time and motion may result in arriving at a satisfactory design~ This could well be a subject for an ANSI ~tandard and such an effort should be encouraged. Work could undoubtedly benefit on research which has ~een done in this field, and it is recommended that research information be made available to lic~nsees and trucking companies.

Secretary of the Commission 1 Page 6 \ I February 22, 1973 * *,

It is unreasonable to expect licensees to submit design specifications within 60 days after the effective date of this *amendment.

Paragraph 73.31, (a), (5): Radiotelephone communication is not pres-ently 100% reliable in urban area~ and in*all areas w_est of the Miss-issippi. Thus, to meet the two-hour reporting requirement, the truck must stop, leave the highway, and the I driver must find a telephone*,

"This puts *1::ne* truck 'in a *1ess secure pos:tt1on {st"opped and *bff main highways) and requires the waking of the relief driver, It is recom-mended that the reporting time be changed to 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />, which is more consistent with driver relief times. Furthermore, use of truck checks at weigh stations and authorized service/rest stop stations may be a valuable adjunct to'the two-hour reporting requirement and should be investigated. It is recommenqed that the AEC staff meet with trucking companies to explore better and more reliable means of com-munications to meet the*reporting requirement,

• Paragraph 73.31, (a), (6): Design standar.ds for truck identifying letters or numbers should be provided.

Paragraph 73.31, (a) 2 (7): Fingerpr,int type seals should be defined,,

This paragraph permits locked containers for shipping special nuclear material by surface transportation.\ Design standards should be pro-vided which specify the requirements of such containers to meet the invulnerability to diversion requirement of Paragraph 73,31, (a),

(1), (ii). Consideration should be given to the criticality prob-lems of closed vans in the shipment of fuel assemblies in that in the event of an accident the entire van becomes the container. It is impractical to consider the entire van meeting the drop tests now required for com:ainers. Closed vans should only be required for SNM which are highly portable (drums, etc.),

Very truly yours, ff/~

R, Nilson, Manager Quality Assurance and Licensing RN:jkl

Allied-Gulf Nuclear Services HcMord J. Lorson, President & General Manager March 1, 1973 0,e,llUE IIAlt AR 21973 Gfflcellft!teS~

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Secretary U.S. Atomic Energy Commission Washington, D.C. 20545 Attention: Chief, Public Proceedings Staff

Dear Sirs:

Reference is made to your announcement of proposed amendments to Regulations in 10 CFR Part 73, "Physical Protection of Special Nuclear Material" - Security Measures, published in the Federal Register, Vol. 38, No. 21, of February 1, 1973 We find that the date by which comments are to be submitted, March 3, 1973, does not allow sufficient time for a thorough review of such proposed amendments. Therefore, we request that such date for submission of comments be extended by thirty days.

Fbst Office Box 847 Barnwell, South O:lrolina 29812 (803)259-1711 recycled @ paper

A CORPORATION

\7 35 EYE STREET, N. W, WA SHINGTO N, 0. C. 20006 (2021 659 - 2345 February nooHTED USAEO MAR 21973 Secretary omca at the SGtr&l'31Y l'uh!IC PfGCCCdln I U. S, Atomic Energy Commission eran~h Washington , D. C. 20545 d\-Q_

Dea r Sir :

The February 1, 1973 Federal Register (38-FR-3 073-83) contained a variety of proposed regulation changes concerning the physical security for and protection of special nuclear material .

The notices required that written comments and suggestions con-cern ing the proposed amendment s be submitted to the Commis sion by March 3, 1973.

The propos ed amendments, i f adopted, will have a sub-stant ial impact on United Nuclear . In order to fully asses, this impact and furnish the Conunission our comp r ehe nsive comments and suggestions , it is request ed that the time for comments be extended from March 3 , 1973 to April 3, 1973. It would appear to be in the best interests of b oth the Commission and the nuclear industry to provide a response time that will permit adequate consideration by affected parties of these far-reaching proposals.

This l ettar will confirm my oral request to Mr. Frank W.

Karas, Chief, Public Proc eed ings Staff, for such extension .

Sincerely,

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NU CLEA R ENERGY DIVI S IO N GENERAL ELECTR IC COMPAN Y, 175 CURTNER AVENUE, SA N J OSE, CALIFO RNIA 95 114 Phone (408) 297-3000, TWX NO. 910-338-0116 Fe ~ruary 23 , 1973 DOCKETED

~EC MAR 21973 Offiteliit!IIS!lQ' Chi ef, Public Proceedings Branch ..iw~ ~

Cruell U.S. Atom.ic Energy C ommission Washington D. C. 20545 D ea:i.* Sir:

Gen.er.al Elect ric hereby requests an extension o f the comment period of March 3, 1973 specified for the proposed amendments to the Con:1mis sions I regulations, Parts 50, 70 and 73 concerning phydca:i. security and rr1aterials protection.

There are many functional organization components of General Electric s' Nuclear Energy Division who 1nust review the propo sa ls and assesc, their potential im.pact, feasibility or shortcomings as a basis for mutually beneficient response. It has been impossible to ma.ke and distribute copies of the proposal to, and compile res -

pons es £1* on1., the Division I s Transportation and Mate rial Dist ribution, the Nuclear Materials Mana,gement, and the Plant Security representa-tives in ihe short time (app roximately three weeks) since the February 1, 1973 Federal Register was received here on the We st coast.

Accordingly, it is requested that the official comment period on these proposed regulations be extended to a date not earlier than April 30, 19 7 3.

Very truly yours, d/Z,~1--0 B. D. Wilson, Manager

/ Safety & Licensing Coordination MC-273, Ext. 2275 cb BE SURE TO INCLUDE MAIL CODE ON nETUF!N CORRESPONDENCE

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CHIEF, PUBLIC PROCEEDINGS BRANCH U.S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION WASHINGTON D.C. 20545 GENERAL ELECTRIC HEREBY REQUESTS AN EXTENSION OF THE COMMENT PERIOD OF MARCH 3, 1973 SPECIFIED FOR THE PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE COMMISSl9NS' REGULATIONS, PARTS 50, 70 AND 73 CONCERNING PHYSICAL SECURITY AND MATERIALS PROTECTION.

THERE ARE MANY FUNCTIONAL ORGANIZATION COMPONENTS OF G.E. 's NUCLEAR ENERGY DIVISION WHO MUST REVIEW THE PROPOSALS AND ASSESS THEIR POTENTIAl:-

IMPACT, FEASIBILITY OR SHOTCOMINGS AS A BASIS FOR MUTUALLY BENEFICIENT RESPONSE. IT HAS BEEN IM-POSSIBLE TO MAKE ANO DISTRIBUTE COPIES OF THE PRO*

l POSAL TO, AND COMPILE RESPONSES FROM, THE DIVISION~ TRANSPORTATION AND MATERIAL DISTRIBUTION, THE NUCLEAR MATERIALS MGNT, AND THE PLANT SEC*

URITY REPRESENTATIVES IN THE SHORT Tll'IE /APPROX.

THREE WEEKS/ SINCE THE FEB. l, 1973 FEDERAL REGISTER DOCKETED ti&~((\

WAS RECEIVED HERE ON THE WEST COAST.

ACCORDINGLY, IT IS REQUESTED THAT THE OFFICIAL COM-MENT PERIOD ON THESE PROPOSED REGULATIONS BE EXTENDED TO A DATE NOT EARLIER THAN APRIL 30, 1973.

BD WILSON GENERAL ELECTRIC 273 CORR* 2ND PARA 4TH LI NE , 4TH WD SHLD BE SHORTCOMINGS END i ' - '

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P.O. BOX 810 9190 R ED BRANCH ROAD COLUMBIA , MARYLAND 21043 PHONE (301) 730*7100 Refer to:

73-525 February 15., 1973 Secretary of the Commission U.S. Atomic Energy Commission Washington., D. C. 20545 Attention: Chief, Public Proceedings Staff

Subject:

Proposed Revisions of AEC Regulations Governing the Protection of Special Nuclear Materials Gentlemen:

I am writing in response to your recent invitation to comment on your proposed revisions to regulations safeguarding special nuclear materials.

The new regulation would prohibit licensee shipments of "plutonium" aboard passenger-carrying aircraft to 20 grams or 20 curies, whichever is less. It is interpreted that the word "plutonium" would include all isotopes of the element thereby restricting shipment to 20 curies of plutonium-238. This restriction would therefore limit the shipment of Pu-238 to slightly more than 1 gram.

From a safeguards standpoint, the critical mass of Pu-238 is not signifi-cantly different than any other isotope of plutonium. Therefore, the question should be raised as to the necessity for safeguarding Pu-238 to mass quantities far less than the other isotopes of plutonium. It is being penalized under the proposed revision simply because it has the characteristic of a higher specific activity.

As shipment abo a rd passenger-carrying aircraft is a convenience to in-dustry, the proposed revisions would severely penalize companies working with plutonium-238. These include, of course., most of the corporations working with the nuclear powered cardiac pacemaker.

I do not believe this was the intent of the USAEC and hope it was just an oversight. It can be easily rectified by qualifying the isotope., Pu-238., to 20 grams or less with the deletion of the 20 curies.

Sincerely yours, OCKETED ti £C 4~ti!'Jz Thomas S. Bustard, Ph.D.

&2 EB2 2 1973 President tb omca of the se.relary Mlle Proceedings ~-1.;;2.-1'8....~

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ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

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[10 CFR Part 73]

PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL The Atomic Energy CQnnn.ission has under consideration amendments to its regulations in 10 CFR Part 73, "Physical Protection of Special Nuclear Material," which would, in the interest of the common defense and security, strengthen existing requirements for physical protection of special.nuclear material while in transit. \

The amendments would apply to shipments of more than 5,000 grams of uranium-235 (contained in uranium enriched to 20 percent or more in the u2 35 isotope) or 2000 grams of plutonium or uranium-233. They would also apply to combined shipments of these materials which exceed 5000 grams or in a combined shipment of less than 5000 grams where the plutonium or uranium-233 content is greater than 2000 grams.

Under separate amendments to 10 CFR Part 73 a rule is being made effective immediately which would limit the quantities of SNM that can be transported by passenger carrying aircraft to no greater than 20 grams or 20 curies, whichever is less of plutonium* or uranium-233 or 350 grams of uranium-235 (contained in uranium enriched to 20 percent or more in the U-235 isotope).

The amendments being proposed are'intended to reduce the risk of theft of special nuclear material. The factors that lead to theft of vehicle comnodities have been identified in Department of Transportation studies as (a) longer dwell-time in transportation; (b) packages of a size and weight that can be moved by one man; and (c) large number of intervehicular transfers during course of shipment. The amendments being proposed would also implement criteria that have been developed for the protection of special nuclear material in transit, as follows: (a) assurance that a theft or diversion cannot be successfully carried out short of a significant armed attack; (b) assurance of prompt detection of an actual or attempted theft or diversion; .(c) assurance of prompt alerting and timely response of armed guards or police; and (d) assurance against mis routings.

The dwell-time in the transportation system would be reduced by requiring direct shipper to receiver shipments of special nuclear material for truck transportation with no cargo transfers permitted while the special nuclear material is in the cargo. Additionally, when air cargo tr*ansporta-tion is used, the number of different flights would be required to be minimized.

The term "continuous personal custody" in § 73. 31 (a)(l) would be deleted. Reliance would be placed on the monitoring of* shipments at transfer points to assure against mis routings. '.lhe individual who monitors

a shipment could be any individual designated by the licensee or his agent, or as specified in a contract of carriage. Additionally, the shipment would be required to be protected by the. use of a specially designed truck which is dual occupied or by a dual occupied ordinary truck and an armed escort vehicl~ during the truck segment of truck-air shipments and through-11 out entire truck only" shipments. Rail shipments would have to be escorted by two armed guards.

Other measures required to be taken to assure against diversion would.

be the use of closed vans or containers which are secured by locks, and the use of fingerprinted seals on containers. Furthermore. it would *be required that areas of natural disasters or civil disorders be, avoided, and that shipments be prepianned to assure that deliveries occur at a time when the receiver is present to accept receipt of shipments.

In order to assure prompt detection of an actual o! attempted theft or diversion, the location of a truck and/or escort vehicle would be traced by the shipper or receiver, through the use of a continuous com:m.mication capability by radio-telephone on board. Communication would be maintained on at least two-hour* intervals. Where radio-telephone coverage is not available, a telephone call would be required whenever a lapse of coumunication exceeds two hours. A continuous communication capability shall exist between the cargo and escort vehicle.. Further, mofor vehicles

~ed to transport: special nuclear mater'ial would be marked on the top and sides with identifying letters or nmnbers.

A requirement that importers of special nuclear material protect*

each incoming shipment, beginning at the time and place in the United States of the shipment's first discharge from the arriving carrier, would be added. With this change, the protection required for import shipments would be the same as that required for d0Ine1?tic shipments.

Changes to the record keeping requirement of§ 73.41 are being proposed to more clearly define the record.keeping requirements.

The notice of proposed rule making published in the FEDERAL REGISTER on February 3, 1971 (36 F.R. 1914) is withdrawn.

Pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act *of 1954; as amended, and section 553 of title 5 of the United States Code;, notice is hereby given that adoption of the following amendments to 10 CFR Part 73 is contemplated.

Interested persons who desire to submit written comments or suggestions for consideration in connection with the proposed amendments should send them to the Secreta;Y of the Commission, u._ s. Atomic Ene~gy Commission, Washington, D.C. 20545, Attention: Chief Public Proceedings Staff, within thirty (30) days after publication of this notice in the FEDERAL REGISTER. The Commission particularly solicits comments concerning the cost impact of the proposed criteria with regard to. the shipment of. special

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nuclear material. CoJ?ies of comments on the proposed amendments may be examined at the Comnission's Public Document Room at 1717 H Street, N.W.,

Washington, D.c.

1. Section 73.l(a) of 10 CFR Part 73 is amended to read as follows.*

§ 7

3.1 Purpose and Scope

.. (a) This part pres cr7'-hes requirements for the phys,ical protection*

of special nuclear ma:terial by any person who is licensed pursuant to the regulations in Part *10 of this chapter and who imports, exports, transports, delivers to a carrier for transport in a single shipment, takes delivery of a single shipment free on board at the point where it is delivered to a carrier, or possesses at* any site or contiguous sites subject to control by the licensee, of (1) more than 5,000 grams of uranium-235 (contained in

. 235 ) .

uranium enriched to *20 percent or m.:,re in the U- isotope, or 2,000 grams of uranium-233 or plutonium, or (2) a combination of such materials of more than 5,000 grams, or (3) a combinati?n of such ma.teri~ of less than 5,000 grams if the plutonium or uranium-233 content is greater than 2,000 grams.

2. A new ~aragraph (n) is added to§ 73.3 of 10 CFR Part 73 to read as follows:

§ 73.3 Definitions (n) "Dual occupancy protection" means a signature security service plus continuous attendance and surveillance of the shipment through the use of.two drivers or one driver and an authorized individual. A vehicle is attended when at 'least one of the drivers or the authorized individual is in the cab of the transport vehicle, awake, and not in a sieeper berth

or is within 10 feet of an access door leading to the special nuclear material.

3. Paragraph (b) of 73.30 is amended to read as follows:

(b) Shipments by air of special nuclear material in quantities exceeding (1) 20 grams or 20 curies, whichever is less, of plutonium or uranium-233, but not exceeding 2,000 grams of plutonium or uranium-233 or (2) 350 grams but not exceeding 5,000 grams of uranium-235 (contained in uranium enriched to 20 percent or more in the U-235 isotope) are not subject to the requirements of this part other than this section.

4. Section 73.31 is amended to read as follows:

§ 73.31 Physical protection of special nuclear material in transit (a) Except as specified in subparagraph (a)(8) and paragraph (b) of this section, each licensee who transports or who delivers to a carrier for transport special nuclear material, shall ma.~e arrangements to assure that such special nuclear material will be protected in transit as follows:

(1) When truck transportation only is used, special nuclear material shall be transported wider the established procedures of a carrier which provides a system for the physical protection of valuable material in transit

and requires an exchange of hand-to-hand receipts at origin and destination, or by a Commission licensee authorized to transport special nuclear material.

No intermediate stops to transfer special nuclear material or other cargo snall be made between the facility of the shipper and the facility of the I

receiver. The shipment shall be protected by dual occupancy protection as defined in§ 73.3(n). The shipment shall be further protected by one of the following methods:

(i) An armed escort consisting of at least two armed guards shall accompany the shipment in a separate motor vehicle. Escorts shall maintain continuous vigilance for the presence of conditions or situations which might threaten the security of the cargo, take such action as circumstances I

might require to avoid interference with continuous safe passage of the vehicle, provide assistance to, or summon aid for crew of cargo vehicles in case of emergency, check seals and locks at each stop where time permits, and observe vehicles and adjacent areas during stops or layovers. Continuous communication capability shall be provided between the cargo vehicle and the escort vehicle. 'lhe licensee may use his own employees as armed escorts or he may use an agent.

(ii) The shipment shall be made in a specially designed truck or trailer which reduces the vulnerability to diversion. Design features of the truck or trailer shall permit immobilization of the van and provide barriers or deterrents to physical penetration.

Within 60 days after (the eff~ctive date of this amendment), licensees using either method shall submit a plan for the selection, qualification

• and training of armed escorts, or the specification and design of a specially designed truck or trailer, as appropriate.

(2) When both truck and air transportation are used: (i) special nuclear material shall be transported between.a licensee facility and the airport as specified in paragraph (1) of this section. The licensee shall assure that transfers during the air segments of a shipment are minimized.

(ii) Special nuclear material shall be transported tmder the established procedures of a carrier which provides a system for the physical protection of valuable material in transit and require an exchange of hand-to-hand receipts at origin and destination and at all points en route where there is a transfer of custody.

(iii) Special nuclear material shall be monitored by an individual or individuals designated by the licensee or his agent, or as specified by contract of carriage, during each scheduled transfer from storage to a vehicle, from one vehicle to another, or from a vehicle to storage. The monitor shall keep the shipment under constant surveillance from the time it is released from the locked compartment of the truck or aircraft until it is loaded on to another aircraft or truck and that compartment is locked, and while the shipment is in storage. "Constant surveillance" means that the monitor shall be within 10 feet of the access door to the shipment.

The individual who monitors shall be required to notify the carrier and the licensee who made the arrangements for protection of special nuclear material innnediately of any deviation from, or attempted interference with, schedule or routing.

• (3) When rail transportation is used, the shipment shall be escorted by two armed individuals, in the shipment car or an escort car of the train, who shall keep the shipment cars under observation and shall detrain at stops when practicable and time permits to guard the shipment cars and check car or container locks and seals. Radio-telephone communication shall be maintained with a licensee or his agent every two hours or less, and at scheduled stops in the event that radio-telephone

~overage was not available in the last two hours before the stop. In the event no call is received in accordance with these requirements, th~

licensee or his agent shall immediately notify an appropriate law enforce-ment authority and the appropriate Atomic Energy Commission Regulatory Operations Regional Office listed in Appendix A.

(4) Transit times shall be minimized by selecting the most direct route which avoids areas of natural disaster or civil disorders. Ship-ments shall be preplanned to assure that deliveries occur at a time when the receiver at the final delivery point is present to accept receipt of shipment *

. (5) All motor vehicles used to transport special nuclear material and escort vehicles shall be equipped with a radio-telephone which can communi-cate with a licensee or his agent. The licensee or agent with whom communi-cations shall be monitored for different segments of the shipment shall be predesignated before a shipment is made. Radio-telephone calls, to such licensee or agent shall be made at least every two hours to relay position

• and projected route. Telephone calls shall be made every two hours when radio-telephone coverage is not available. In the event no call is received in accordance with these requirements, the licensee or his agent shall immediately notify an appropriate law enforcement authority and the appropriate Atomic Energy Commission Regulatory Operations Regional Office listed in Appendix A.

(6) Motor vehicles shall be marked on top with identifying letters or numbers which will permit identification of the vehicle from the air in clear weather at 1,000 feet above ground level, and marked on the sides and rear with the same letters or numbers to permit identification from the ground.

(7) When surface transportation is used, special nuclear material shall be carried in closed vehicles or containers that are locked.

Fingerprint type seals shall also be used on containers.

(8) A licensee or applicant for a license may apply to the Commission for approval of proposed procedures for transport of special nuclear mate-rial in a manner not otherwise authorized by the regulations of this chapter.

Such application shall include a description and quantity of the special nuclear material involved, the origin and destination, the carriers to be used, the expected time in transit, the number of transfer points, the com-lllllnication to be used, the vehicle visual identification, and the cargo security and surveillance measures to be used.

(b) Each licensee who takes delivery of special nuclear material free-on-board (f.o.b.) the point where it is delivered to a carrier for

• transport shall make the arrangements to assure that such special nuclear

~

material will be protected in transit as prescribed in paragraph (a) of this section, rather than the person who delivers such shipment to the carrier for transport.

(c) Each licensee who imports special nuclear material shall make arrangements to assure that such material will be protected in transit as follows:

(1) An individual designated by the licensee or his agent, or as specified by a contract of carriage, shall confirm the container count at the first place in the United States where the shipment is discharged from the arriving carrier.

(2) The shipment shall be protected after arrival in the United States as provided in paragraphs (a), (d), and (g) of this section.

(d) Each licensee who delivers to a carrier for transport special nuclear material shall immediately notify the consignee by telephone, telegraph, or teletype, of the time of departure of the shipment, and shall notify or confirm with the consignee the method of transportation, including the names of carriers, and the estimated time of arrival of the shipment at its destination. In the case of a shipment free-on-board (f.o.b.) the point where it is delivered' to a carrier for transport, he shall, before the shipment is delivered to the carrier, obtain assurance from the licensee or other person who is to take delivery of the shipment at the f.o.b. point that the physical protection arrangements, required by paragraph (a) of this section for licensed shipments or required by AEC Manual Chapters

• 2401 or 2405 for AEC license-exempt shipments, have been made. He shall also make arrangements with the consignee to be notified immediately by telephone, telegraph, or teletype, of the arrival of the shipment at its destination.

(e) In addition to complying with the requirements specified in paragraphs (a), (d), and (g) of this section, each licensee who exports special nuclear material shall make arrangements with the consignee to be notified immediately by telephone, telegraph, or teletype, of the arrival of the shipment at its destination, or of any such shipment that is lost or nnaccounted for after the estimated time of arrival at its destination.

(f) Each licensee who receives a shipment of special nuclear material shall immediately notify the person who delivered the material to a carrier for transport of the arrival of the shipment at its destination.* In the event such a shipment fails to arrive at ,its destination at the estimated time, the consignee, if a licensee, or in the case of an export shipment, the licensee who exported the shipment, shall immediately notify by telephone, telegraph, or teletype, the Director of the appropriate Atomic Energy Commission Regulatory Operations Regional Office listed in Appendix A, and the licensee or other person who delivered the material to a carrier for transport.

(g) Each licensee who makes arrangements for physical protection of a shipment of special nuclear l!Uj.terial as required by this section shall immediately conduct a trace investigation of any shipment that is lost or unaccounted for after the estimated arrival time and file a report with the

• Conmdasion as specified in § 73.42. If the licensee *who conducts the trace investigation is not the consignee, he shall also immediately report .

the results of his investigation by telephone, telegraph, or teletype to the consignee.

5. Paragraph (c) of§ 73.41 is amended to read as follows:

§ 73.41 Records Each licensee shall keep the following records:

(c) Shipments of special nuclear material subject to the require-ments of this part, including names of carriers, major roads to be used, flight numbers in the case of air shipments, dates and expected times of departure and arrival of shipments, names and addresses of the 100nitor and one alternate monitor at each transfer point, verification of com-111.mication equipment on board the transfer vehicle, names of individuals who are to communicate with the transport vehicle, container seal descrip-tions and identification; and any other information to confirm the means utilized to comply with§ 73.31. Such information shall be recorded prior to shipment.

(Sec. 161, 68 Stat. 948; 42 U.S.C. 2201)

• 14 -

Dated at Germa.ntown, Mdthis 26th day of _J_an-.--u_a_ry.___ _ _ _ _ ,

1973.

For the Atomic Energy Commission aulC.

Secretary of the Bende Commission

=~:~~-r~*  :=~:~~

@QaQ{J ~ ©©!r[Plre:JO!l@uu LAW DEPARTMENT P.O. Box608 San Dieao, California 92112 February 15, 1973 Tel: (714) 453-1000

.)

Secretary of the Commission United States Atomic Energy Commission Washington, D. C. 20545 Attention: Chief, Public Proceedings Staff

Dear Sir:

On February 1, AEC published notice of contemplated revisions of Parts 50, 70 and 73 of its regulations and announced there is no as-surance that comments received after March 3 will be considered.

In matters so complex as those involved in the proposed regula-tory changes, upon which the Commission has undoubtedly been working for a substantial time, an effective period of something like three weeks from the date of receipt of the announcement until the date when com-ments must have been prepared and mailed is inadequate. To give the industry a reasonable opportunity to participate in the proposed rule-making, the period for comments should be extended to something like July 3.

Very truly yours, Q /*;

-b'

~ m e s P.

Attorney

UNIVERSAL Technical Testing Laboratories, Inc.

Nondestructive and Physical ~~ = =--~---==~====-=-

ln1pection for Industrial America -,.

Woodlawn Avenue and North Street Post Office Box 372, Collingdale, Pa. 19023

-.::,:_.*. ~,~ .- :..,; .~. ~. .

r~~ D IWL~ ~-- f'{- 73 3i FR 3083 Secretary of the Commission U. S. Atomic Energy Commission Washington, D. C. 20545 Attention: Chief, Public Proceedings Staff Gentlemen:

We have studied the proposed new regulations with regard to "Standards for Protection Against Radiation" but still find no consideration of a continuing practice we feel is extremely hazardous.

Many firms throughout the United States are 1 icensed by A.E.C. to perform radiog-aphic inspection with isotopes at field construction sites. A.E.C. rightfully takes great pains to assure safety in dealing with radioactive materials, yet nowhere in the code does it specify that at l east two trained people should be present at a field site where isotopes are used for radiography.

As a consequence we know of numerous 1 icensed radio-graphic inspection firms who regularly assign one technician only, to take a source to a field construction site for radio-graphic exposures.

If this man, for any reason we r- e to become i I l or injured on the job, what would become of the radioactive isotope with which he is working?

We feel A.E.C. should clearly require two trained individuals at all field sites. As things stand, even such agencies as GSA specify one radiographer in their requests for bids on construction projects. We feel this practice is not conducive to safety involving isotopes.

Sincerely, CMM:emm

ft,);"!~i'-r t:t!:;: 1...-~ . .

i'i;Wt.~D. RULE i, i \ -~

- Bt ~ 3o'7 5 P~O~i~ ~ULE 1.¥ i \ - 70

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'3Z F~ '30'77 N~O:it:D RULE ff{ -7 3 3~ fR aoi3 69 West Exchan9e Street Saint Paul, Min nesota 55102 February 15, 1973 Secretary of the Commission,

u. s. Atomic Energy Commission Washington, D. c. 20545 Atten: Chief, Public Proceedings Staff Re: License I 22-01448-03

Dear Sir:

This letter is in answer to the notice of February 1, 1973, sent out by Lester R. Rogers, Director, Regulatory Standards.

I have read the proposed changes carefully and am heartily in favor of these changes being put into effect as they are forthright and fair.

mlg

({.'., .. I I'

• f~~iJf; -~u~~. r ti- '13

'3g' FR 308..3 I NC.

4 7 5 PA R K A V E N U E S O U T H

• N E W YO R K, N. Y.

1 0 () 1 6 * <? 1 2) 7 .1. "5 8 3 0 0 February 15, 1973 The Secretary U. S. Atomic Energy Corrrnission Washington, D. C. 20545

Dear Sir:

Notice recently was given that the Atomic Energy Commission has under consideration amendments to its regulations with a deadline for receipt of corrrnents by March 3, 1973 as follows:

10 CFR Part 50 - Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities - Requirements for Physical Security.

10 CFR Part 70 - Special Nuclear Material - Requirements for Physical Security.

10 CFR Part 73 - Physical Protection of Special Nuclear Material.

10 CFR Part 73 - Physical Protection of Special Nuclear Material -

Requirements for Materials Protection.

The above cited documents are *I engthy and comp 1ex and offer sweeping changes in certain areas of the existing regulations. Their practical implications are very difficult to assess.

The Forum 1 s Committee on Nuclear Materials Safeguards which repre-sents a broad cross-section of the nuclear industry including fuel fabricators, utilities, reprocessors, transporters, architects-engineers and consultants is reviewing the proposed amendments with the intention of preparing comments on them. Reflecting on the magnitude and potential long-term impact which the proposed amendments could have on licensees in the commercial fuel cycle, members of our corrrnittee believe that more than 30 days will be required to formulate our conments, particularly in view of the comprehensive nature of the proposed regulation and the fact that they raise a number of questions of interpretation and clarification of Commission intent.

We note that simultaneously with publication of the above cited documents the Commission published a proposed section 10 CFR Part 70 - Special Nuclear Material - Revised Material Control and Accounting Requirements for Special Nuclear Material on which 60 days have been allowed for corrrnent.

The Secretary (2) February 15, 1973 Because of the Interface of these five proposed amendments, ft would facilitate the review process to allow the same colllllent period of 60 days on all of them.

Also, it should be noted that the AIF is sponsoring a Workshop on Protection of Special Nuclear Materials and Facilities, February 18-21.

In addition to the AEC representatives on the enclosed program, other Commission personnel from the Division of Security, the Directorate of Regulatory Standards, and Region II will attend the workshop. About 55 representatives from industry plan to participate and we anticipate a comprehensive discussion of the proposed amendments which should have a significant effect on the Forum's comments, as well as the comments of individual organizations. In light of this and the opinions of our Committee members an extension of the deadline from March 3 to April 2 is herewith requested.

Your favorable consideration of this request and a prompt reply would be appreciated.

Sincerely, c~~r~

Charles Robins CR/tc Enclosure

ULE . ' -7Q._ 0~£~ ;ULE pu- 73 3i FR 30'75 38' FR 308'3-Westinghouse Electric Corporation Power Systems PWR Systems iVlsloo Box 355

~\~ro~£~ *~UL~ PR - 73 Plttsbur gh Ponnsylvanla 15230 February~.,_,.--.1:._

gi FR aoio DOCKETED tl&AEC U. S. Atomic Energy Commission Office of the Secretary Washington, D. C. 20545 Attention: Chief, Public Proceedings Staff Gentlemen:

Subject:

Proposed Rule Making to Revise 10CFR Parts 70 & 73 On February 1, 1973, the USAEC published in the Federal Register, proposed revisions to Parts 70 and 73 of Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations. The changes would impose on the licensee extensive additional requirements dealing with safeguarding special nuclear materials, both in plant and in transit between licensees.

The nature and extent of these proposed changes are such that they will apply primarily to the larger, more complex companies in the industry, where the proper evaluation of their effects involve such diverse areas as employe relations, purchasing, traffic, quality assurance, public relations, works engineering and other inter-related departments. To disseminate the proposed changes, provide adequate background or supporting data, extract comments and data (particularly meaningful cost impact projections,) and integrate them into a comprehensive reply is not practicable within the comment period specified in the published notices.

Therefore, the Westinghouse Electric Corporation requests that the Commission extend the comment period for each of the four proposed changes until May 2, 1973. This extension should enable the nuclear industry to provide complete and documented comments on the proposals, while a delay of that duration should have no deleterious effect on the public health and safety or the common defense and security.

Please notify me promptly of your disposition of this request by writing to me at the above address, or telephoning me at (412) 373-4652.

Very truly yours,

~R~M Karl R. Schendel License Administrator KRS: jh