ML23111A277
| ML23111A277 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 12/06/1978 |
| From: | NRC/SECY |
| To: | |
| References | |
| Download: ML23111A277 (7) | |
Text
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December 6, 1978 SECY-78-632 COMMISSIONER ACTION For: The Commissioners From: Wllliam J. --Dircks, Acting DTrec-tof-Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safe.guards Thru: Executive Director for Operations~
Subject:
NRC STATEMENTS ON CONCLUSIONS CONCERNING STRATEGIC SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL (SSNM) THEFT ANO DIVERSION
Purpose:
To provide the Commission with staff proposed statements concerning conclusions that can be made about theft or diversion of significant quantities of SSNM in cases where Inventory Differences exist.* This paper does not address the broader matter of safeguards adequacy against- va-rious threats.
Background:
By SECY memorandum of June 2, 1978, the staff was requested to develop, for Commission consideration, a general statement concerning the conclusions that can be made about theft and diversion of significant amounts of SSNM. The Commission guidance noted that:
- Unqualified "no evidence" statements should be avoided in characterizing Inventory Difference matters.
- Qualified "no evidence" statements should not imply a higher degree of confidence than the situation warr ants.
- Statements should be characterized as judgments rather than proof. This judgment is based on a combination of factors, including physical security, material control, and material accounting measures.
Discussion: The safeguards system relied upon to provide assurance that significant quantities of SSNM have not been
- A significant quantity of SSNM is defined for safeguards purposes as 5 Kg of Uranium-235 contained in highly enriched uranium (HEU), or 2 Kg of either plutonium or Uranium-233.
ontact:
Partlow 4176
The Commissioners Discussion: stolen or diverted consis t s of three complementary (can't.) elements; physical protection, material control, and material accounting. Physical protection is relied upon to prevent diversion by deterrence and by prompt detection of attempts to remove or divert SSNM from the facil i ty. Material control is relied upon to provide prompt and continuous information as to the location withi n the plant of discrete items of material in process or storage. Material accounting is relied upon, usually on a less timely basis, to account for the material in the possession of the licensee. Ideally, material accounting measures the success of the other two elements. Often, due to the limitations of material accounting, conclusions must be reached and correctly expressed in those situations where material accounting does not totally account for the SSNM in the possession of a licensee.
Developing a general statement concerning the diversion of a significant quant,tyofSSNM must consider the physical protect ion, materfal control, and material accounting measures in effect during the period under review. A detailed examination and a judgment must be made concerning the adequacy of these safeguards elements to deter, identify and react to a possible theft or diversion on a prompt basis. Appendix A contains a summary of the type of information available to the staff for examination and review and the frequency with which the information is updated. The staff evaluation based on all aspects of a facility's safeguards can resu l t in three judgments regarding theft or diversion of SSNM .
- 1. No information has been identified that would establish a basis to indicate that any significant quantity of SSNM has been stolen or diverted.
- 2. Although no in fo rmation has been identified that would establis h that any significant quantity of SSNM has been stolen or diverted, conditions were such that these acts cannot be ruled out as a possibility.
- 3. Information has been identified which indicates that a theft of SSNM may have occurred.
The Commissioners Discussion: A situation may also arise where there is a need to (con' t.} make a statement concerning the possibility of SSNM theft or diversion before the staff review, analysis and evaluation of the information listed in Appendix A is completed. This situation would require an interim statement of the staff's judgment.
Each of the three cases and the interim position statement are discussed below and the proposed general statement for each is provided.
Case #1 - The staff j udgment leading to the decision that the theft or diversion of a significant quantity of SSNM did not occur is not based on the size of an Inventory Difference, but is based on a synthesis evaluation of licensee reports, inspection and enforcement reports, licensing reviews, and headquarters safeguards evaluation findings which together provide th e basis for a staff judgment that the material has been adequately protected. If, after such review, the staff judgment is that 11 Case #1 11 exists, then the following general statement can be made.
"The NRC staff has eva 1ua ted the phys i ca 1 protection ,
material control, and material accounting measures in effect at Licensee for the period ______ . Each safeguards measure, including the Inventory Difference as determined from the accounting system, has been investigated to the extent deemed necessary by the staff to judge that t he special nuclear materials have been adequately protected. In making this evaluation of available information, the staff has not identified any fact that would estab l ish that strategic special nuclear material has been sto l en or diverted. It, therefore, is the staff judgment that the safeguards system in place at this facility(ies) has been effective in preventing the theft or diversion of a significant quantity of strategic special nuclear material . 11 Case #2 - If the information gathered in the evaluation (ref. Appendix A) indicates that the conditions were such that a diversion of SSNM cannot be ruled out, no one general statement would suffice to cover all pertinent aspects of such a situation. The FBI is the responsible government agency for the investigation of criminal violations of the Atomic Energy Act and would be notified.
The Commissioners Discussion: The general statement to the public in such an event (can't.) would, with the approva l of the FBI, include to the extent possible an unclassified summary of the evaluation conducted and the actions taken as a resu l t of the staff's conclusion that :
" ..* Although the theft or diversion of SSNM has not been established, conditions were such that these acts cannot be ruled out as a possible cause of the Inventory Difference."
An example of-the C-ase-lZsftuat-fon m,gfftlfecfne--1rr whtcn*-
there is a large , i rreconcflable -In-ve*ntory lhTference --
together with the discovery that deficienc ies in the licensee's safeguards program have left open a possible path for undetected SSNM theft.
Case #3 - If the information gathered in the~~efiuat10r1--=_
indicates that a di version of SSNM-may have occurred, (i.e. , there are stronger indications than in Case #2) then the matter would be forwarded to the FBI for review.
The NRC would be -available to assist the FBI where necessary. The general statement to be provided to the public concerning such a situation would be that:
"The NRC staff is cont inuing its evaluation of the physical protection, material control, and material accounting measures in effect at Licensee for the period _ _ _ _ _._ The prel i~ina~y fi_nd_il"!QS_Qf t_b~--
NRC evaluation have b!!~n.J)royj_d~_g ~o. the ~Lfgr_r_eview of possible criminal vi olations of the Atomic Energy Act. Upon completi on of the FBI's review, a report of the NRC review and evaluation will be ava ilabl e to the public."
As identified for "Case #2, 11 there may also be summary information pertinent to this situation which the Commission, with the approval of the FBI, may choose to provide to the publ ic .
Interim Position Statement - If, before the evaluation of the information identified in Appendix A is completed, a statement must be prov ided to the public concerning the possible theft or diversion of SSNM in a particular period, the staff must evaluate and summarize the informati on to date. Any information indi cating that a theft or diversion of SSNM may have occurred wou ld be forwarded to the FBI.
The Commissioners Discussion: Hence, any NRC statement to the public for such an event would be as identified in "Case #3". If, to date, no such information requiring FBI involvement has been identified, then the foll owing general statement can
- be made.
"The NRC staff is curren tl y reviewing and evaluating the physical protection, material control, and material accounting measures in effect at Licensee for the period--,,,-- ----.---* To date, the evaluation of each of the safeguards measures, including the Inventory Difference as determined fro m the accounting system, has not identified any fact that would establish that SSNM has been stolen or diverted."
In all of the above four staff posi.tions, the statements are structured so tha t they can be provided to the public either before the actual Inventory Difference data is declassified or together with the data after it is declassified accord i ng to the recommendations of NSDM-347. It should be noted that these proposed statements do not . represent complete, boilerplate statements which can stand alone in all future cases.
The wide variety of circumstances which must be taken into account in the staff judgment (particularly in Cases #2 and #3) could require that the general state-ments be expanded or sli ghtly modified as necessary to fit the specific circumstances. The Licensed Fuel Facilities Status Report (Gray Book II) can be the vehicle for routinely providing these or similar state-ments concerning the the ft or diversion of SSNM to the public.
A discussion of the general case in which available information does establi sh a basis to indicate theft or diversion has not been included here. That situation is not considered to be amenab le to a general statement within the context of the guidance contained in the SECY memorandum of June 2 and the resu lting statements made by NRC would depend upon the circumstances of the specific case.
Reco111t1endation: That the Commission ap prove and direct the staff use of this paper as general gu idance in preparing answers to questions on conclus io ns concerning SSNM theft and diversion.
The Commissioners Coordination: IE has concurred. ELD has no legal objection.
William J. Dircks, Acting Director Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards
Enclosure:
Appendix A - Safeguards Info.
For Staff Evaluation
APPENDIX A SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION FOR STAFF EVALUATION
~ Frequency of Review
- 1. Licensee Reports (i.e., security As occurring: Immediate report breach, lost SNM, etc.) to NRC.
- 2. Licensee's Inventory Difference Every 2 months.
Report
- licensee's Investigation As required.
Report
- Licensee's reinventory As required.
results
- 3. IE Inspection Reports for Strategic Fuel Facilities
- Physical Protection System reviewed semi-annually.
- Material Control & Majority of system reviewed Accounting semi-annually. Licensee organization and management activities reviewed annually.
- 4. NMSS review of licensee's plans Ongoing and system of safeguards.
- 5. Headquarters Safeguards Evaluation As reports or preliminary information may be available.
- 6. IE Investigation Reports As necessary.
- 7. Intelligence/Threat Information As appropriate.
(IAT)