ML23111A277
| ML23111A277 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 12/06/1978 |
| From: | NRC/SECY |
| To: | |
| References | |
| Download: ML23111A277 (7) | |
Text
-. '
December 6, 1978 SECY-78-632
COMMISSIONER ACTION For: The Commissioners From: Wllliam J. --Dircks, Acting DTrec-tof -
Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safe.guards Thru: Executive Director for Operations~
Subject:
NRC STATEMENTS ON CONCLUSIONS CONCERNING STRATEGIC SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL (SSNM) THEFT ANO DIVERSION
Purpose:
To provide the Commission with staff proposed statements concerning conclusions that can be made about theft or where Inventory Differences exist.* This paper does diversion of significant quantities of SSNM in cases not address the broader matter of safeguards adequacy against - va-rious threats.
Background:
By SECY memorandum of June 2, 1978, the staff was requested to develop, for Commission consideration, a general statement concerning the conclusions that can be made about theft and diversion of significant amounts of SSNM. The Commission guidance noted that:
- Unqualified avoided in characterizing Inventory Difference matters. "no evidence" statements should be
- Qualified a higher degree of confidence than the situation "no evidence" statements should not imply warr ants.
- Statements should be characterized as judgments rather than proof. This judgment is based on a combination of factors, including physical security, material control, and material accounting measures.
Discussion: The safeguards system relied upon to provide assurance that significant quantities of SSNM have not been
- A significant quantity of SSNM is defined for safeguards purposes as 5 Kg of Uranium-235 contained in highly enriched uranium (HEU), or 2 Kg of either plutonium or Uranium-233.
ontact: Partlow 4176
The Commissioners - 2 -
Discussion: stolen or diverted consis t s of three complementary (can't.) and material accounting. Physical protection is elements; physical protection, material control, relied upon to preven t dive rsion by deterrence and SSNM from the facil i ty. Ma terial control is relied by prompt detection of attempts to remove or divert upon to provide prompt and continuous information as to the location withi n the plant of discrete items of material in process or storage. Material accounting is relie d upo n, usually on a less timely of the licensee. Ideally, material accounting measures basis, to account for the material in the possession the success of the other two elements. Often, due must be reached and corr ec tly expressed in those to the limitations of material accounting, conclusions account for the Ssituations where material accounting does not totally SNM in the possession of a licensee.
of a significant Developing a general statement concerning the diversion quant,tyofSSNM must consider the physical protect i on, materfal control, and material accounting measures in effect during the period under review. A detailed examination and a judgment must be made concerning the adequacy of these safeguards elements to deter, ide ntify and react to a possible theft or diversion on a prompt basis. Appendix A contains a su mma ry of the type of information available with which the information is updated. The staff to the staff for examination and review and the frequency evaluation based on all aspects of a facility's safeguards can resu l t in three judgments regarding theft or diversion of SS NM.
- 1. No information has been identified that would establish a basis to indicate that any significant quantity of SSNM has been stolen or diverted.
- 2. Although no in fo rmation has been identified that would establis h that any significant quantity of SSNM has been stolen or diverted, conditions were such that these acts cannot be ruled out as a possibility.
- 3. Information has bthat a the f t of SSNM may have occurred. een identified which indicates
The Commissioners - 3 -
Discussion: A situation may also arise where there is a need to make a statement concerning the possibility of SSNM (con' t.} theft or diversion before the staff review, analysis and evaluation of the information listed in Appendix A is completed. This situation would require a n interim statement of the staff's judgment.
Each of the three cases and the interim position statement are discussed belo w and the proposed general statement for each is provided.
Case #1 - The staff j udgment leading to the decision of SSNM did not occur is not based on the size of an that the theft or diversion of a significant quantity evaluation of licensee reports, inspection and enforcement Inventory Difference, but is based on a synthesis reports, licensing reviews, and headquarters safeguards evaluation findings which together provide th e basis for a staff judgment that the material has been adequately protected. If, after such review, the staff judgment is that 11 Case #1 11 exists, then the following general statement can be made.
material control, and material accounting measures in " The NRC staff has eva 1 ua ted the phys i ca 1 protection,
safeguards measure, including the Inventory Difference effect at Licensee for the period ______. Each as determined from the accounting system, has been investigated to the extent deemed necessary by the staff to judge that t he special nuclear materials have been adequately protected. In making this evaluation of available information, the staff has not identified any fact that would estab l ish that strategic special nuclear material has been sto l en or diverted. It, therefore, is the staff judgment that the safeguards system in place at this facility(ies) has been effective in preventing the theft or diversion of a significant quantity of strategic special nuclear material. 11 Case #2 - If the information gathered in the evaluation (ref. Appendix A) indicates that the conditions were such general statement would suffice to cover all pertinent that a diversion of SSNM cannot be ruled out, no one aspects of such a situation. The FBI is the responsible government agency for the investigation of criminal violations of the Atomic Energy Act and would be notified.
The Commissioners - 4 -
Discussion: (can't.) The general statement to th e public in such an event would, with the app rova l of the FBI, include to the extent possible an unclassified summary of the evaluation conducted and the action s taken as a resu l t of the staff's conclusion that :
" has not been established, conditions were..* Although the theft or diversion of SSNM such that these acts cannot be ruled out as a possible cause of the Inventory Difference."
An example of-the C-ase-lZsftuat-fon m,gfftlfecfne -- 1rr whtcn*-
there is a large, together with the discovery that deficienc ie s in the i r re concflable - In-ve*ntory lhTferen ce --
licensee's safeguards program have left open a possible path for undetected SSNM theft.
Case #3 - If the in for mation gathered in indicates that a di ver sion of SSNM-may have occurred, the~~efiuat10r1 --=_
(i.e., there are stronger indications than in Case #2)
The NRC would be - available to assist the FBI where then the matter would be forwarded to the FBI for review.
necessary. The gen eral statement to be provided to the public concerning s uch a situat ion would be that:
"The NRC staff is cont inuing its evaluation of the accounting measures in effect at Licensee for the physical protection, material control, and material period _____._ The prel i~ina~y fi_nd_il"!QS_Qf t_b~--
of possible crimina l vi olations of the Atomic Energy NRC evaluation have b!!~n.J)royj_d~_g ~o. the ~Lfgr_r_eview Act. Upon completion of th e FBI's review, a report of the NRC review and evaluation will be a va ilabl e to the public."
As identified for "Case #2, 11 there may also be summary information pertinent to this situation which the Commission, with the approval of the FBI, may choose to provide to the publ ic.
Interim Position Statement - If, before the evaluation of statement must be pr ov ided to the public concerning the possible the information identified in Appendix A is completed, a must evaluate and s um marize the informati on to date. Any theft or diversion of SSNM in a particular period, the staff may have occurred winformation in di cating that a theft or diversion of SSNM ou ld be forwarded to the FBI.
The Commissioners - 5 -
Discussion: Hence, any NRC statement to the public for such an event would be as identified in "Case #3". If, to date, no such information requiring FBI involvement has been identified, then the foll owing general statement can
- be made.
"The NRC staff is c ur ren tl y reviewing and evaluating material accounting measures in effect at Licensee the physical protection, material control, and of each of the safe gu ards measures, including the Inventory for the period--,,,- - ----.---* To date, the evaluation Difference as determined fro m the accounting system, has not identified any fact that would establish that SSNM has been stolen or diverted."
are structured so tha t they can be provided to the In all of the above four staff posi.tions, the statements data is declassified or together with the data after public either before the actual Inventory Difference it is declassified accord i ng to the recommendations of statements do not. r ep resent complete, boilerplate NSDM-347. It should be noted that these proposed statements which can stand alone in all future cases.
The into account in the staff judgment (particularly in wide variety of circumstances which must be taken Cases #2 and #3) could require that the general state-ments be expanded or sli ghtly modified as necessary to fit the specific circumstances. The Licensed Fuel vehicle for routinely providing these or similar state-Facilities Status Report (Gray Book II) can be the ments concerning the the f t or diversion of SSNM to the public.
A discussion of the ge neral case in which available information does establi sh a basis to indicate theft or diversion has not be en included here. That situation is not considered to be amen ab le to a general statement within the context of the guidance contained in the SECY memorandum depend upon the circumstances of the specific case. of June 2 and the re su lt ing statements made by NRC would
Reco111t1endation: That the Commission ap prove and direct the staff use of this paper as general gu id ance in preparing answers to questions on conclus io ns concerning SSNM theft and diversion.
The Commissio ners Coordination: IE has concurred. ELD has no legal objection.
Enclosure:
Appendix A -Safeguards Info.
For Staff Evaluation William J. Dircks, Acting Director Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards APPENDIX A SAFEGUARDS I NF ORMATION FOR STAFF EVALUATION
~ Frequency of Review
- 1. Licensee Reports (i.e., security As occurring: Immediate report breach, lost SNM, etc.) to NRC.
- 2. Licensee's Inventory Difference Report Every 2 months.
- licensee's Investigation As required.
Report
- Licensee's reinventory results As required.
- 3. IE Inspection Reports for Strategic Fuel Facilities
- Physical Protection System reviewed semi-annually.
- Material Control & Majority of system reviewed Accounting semi-annually. Licensee organization and management activities reviewed annually.
- 4. NMSS review of licensee's plans and system of safeguards. Ongoing
- 5. Headquarters Safeguards Evaluation As reports or preliminary information may be available.
- 6. IE Investigation Reports As necessary.
- 7. Intelligence/Threat Information (IAT) As appropriate.