ML23038A165

Proposed Scenarios

ML23038A165
Person / Time
Site:	Perry
Issue date:	01/12/2023
From:	NRC/RGN-III/DORS/OB
To:	Energy Harbor Nuclear Corp
Greg Roach
Shared Package
ML21188A233	List: L-22-184, Proposed Exam Cover Letter 2022 Signed ML23038A157 ML23038A158 ML23038A161 ML23038A162 ML23038A164 ML23038A165 ML23038A166 ML23038A167
References
Download: ML23038A165 (66)

Text

Form 3.3-1 Scenario Outline Facility:

Perry Scenario #:

1. 1 - 100% Power Scenario Source:

New Op. Test #:

2022-1 Examiners:

Applicants/

Operators:

Initial Conditions: Plant is at 100% power. Main Generator was placed on the Manual Voltage Regulator yesterday for repair of the Auto Voltage Regulator. Maintenance is now complete on the Auto Voltage Regulator.

Stator Water Cooling Pump B, N43-C001B is tagged out for bearing replacement. The M29 Control Room Humidification Boiler is tagged out for leak repair. HPCS Pump, 1E22-C001 is tagged out for seal leak repair (Two days into the LCO). Hydrogen Analyzer B was tagged out yesterday for inlet cooling valve replacement (One day into the LCO). CNTMT SPRAY SECOND SHUTOFF, 1E12-F537A is tagged out for MOVATS testing (Twelve hours into the LCO). SCC will request a power reduction later this shift. eSOMS Narrative Log is down. PSA Risk is Green and the Grid Risk is Normal.

Turnover / Planned Activities: Shift main generator from Manual Voltage Regulator to Auto Voltage Regulator.

When contacted by SCC, lower power to meet SCC request IAW reactivity plan and IOI-3. Make any Narrative Log entries on your note pads. Perform Prejob Briefs and Reactivity Briefs prior to entering the Simulator.

Critical Tasks:

1. Isolate leak into Secondary Containment

2. Initiate ARI to cause control rod insertion

3. Anticipate ED or ED to allow LP ECCS systems to inject

4. Restore/maintain RPV level above TAF using LP ECCS systems.

Event No.

Malf.

No.

Event Type*

Event Description 1

N-BOP/SRO Shift Main Generator to Auto Voltage Regulator 2

R-ATC/SRO Extraction Steam isolated to FW Heater #6A Enter ONI-N36 3

C-ATC/SRO Condensate Booster Pump A trips 4

I-BOP/SRO TS - SRO MC-BOP RCIC Suppression Pool Level instrument fails high Tech Spec 3.3.5.3 5

C-BOP/SRO TS - SRO MC-BOP Leak in RWCU pump room Enter EOP-03 Tech Spec 3.3.6.1 6

M-All Loss of Feedwater 7

C-ATC/SRO RPS fails in AUTO and MANUAL - ARI fails in AUTO - ARI works in Manual Enter EOP-01 8

C-ATC/SRO MC-ATC Generator Field Breaker fails to auto open 9

M-All Loss of High-Pressure Injection - Anticipate Emergency Depressurization 10 M-All (Conditional) ED if unable to maintain RPV level > -25 with LPCS (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor, (TS)Tech Spec, (MC)Manual Control

NRC Exam Scenario #1 Event Summary Summary Initially, the plant is at 100% power with the Main Generator on the MANUAL Voltage Regulator because of repair work on the Auto Voltage Regulator. Work is now complete on the Auto Voltage Regulator. Stator Water Cooling Pump B, The M29 Control Room Humidification Boiler, HPCS Pump, Hydrogen Analyzer B, and CNTMT SPRAY SECOND SHUTOFF, 1E12-F537A valve are tagged out. Two days into the LCO for the HPCS Pump, one day into the LCO for H2 Analyzer B and twelve hours into the LCO for 1E12-F537A. SCC will request a power reduction later this shift.

Planned Activities for the shift: Shift to the Auto Voltage Regulator and adjust power per SCC request.

1 The US directs the BOP to shift the Main Generator to the AUTO Voltage Regulator IAW SOI-N32 Section 7.26, Transfer from the Manual Voltage Regulator to the Auto Voltage Regulator 2

At the Lead Evaluators cue, Extraction Steam to FW Heater 6A isolates requiring a power reduction to <96%. Entry into ONI-C51 for unplanned Rx power change and ONI-N36 for loss of FW heating.

3 At the Lead Evaluators cue, Condensate Booster Pump A will trip on over current. The ATC will start the standby CBP.

4 At the Lead Evaluators cue, RCIC Suppression Pool level instrument fails high causing RCIC suction to shift from CST to SP. The shift will not complete and the BOP will complete the shift. The SRO will evaluate Tech Specs.

5 At the Lead Evaluators cue, a leak develops in the RWCU pump room. The crew enters EOP-03 and takes action to manually isolate the leak when automatic actions fail. A failure of the Isolation Instrumentation prevents RWCU PCIVs from automatically isolating. RO will manually close RWCU valves to isolate the leak. SRO will evaluate Tech Specs for failed instrumentation.

6 At the Lead Evaluators cue, Hot Surge Tank level instrument fails downscale resulting in a loss of all FW pumps. RCIC auto starts on Level 2.

7 Automatic and Manual scram will not work. Automatic ARI will not work. The RO must manually initiate ARI to cause control rod insertion.

8 Generator field breaker fails to auto open when main turbine trips after the scram. ATC opens it 9

A few minutes after the scram, RCIC will trip resulting in a loss of high-pressure injection. IAW EOP-01, all low-pressure ECCS systems will be started and prepared for injection. IAW EOP-01, the SRO will direct Anticipate Emergency Depressurization (AED) to use LPCS on loss of HP injection.

The SRO should terminate AED and stabilize RPV pressure when LPCS is injecting sufficiently to start recovering RPV level. Alternatively, if the crew determines that they cannot maintain RPV level > -25 the crew may decide to Emergency Depressurize the RPV.

10 (Contingency) If the crew determines that they cannot maintain RPV Level > -25, the crew may elect to ED.

At the Lead Evaluators discretion, and once the crew has demonstrated the ability to manually insert control rods and establish injection to restored RPV, the scenario may be terminated.

Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op. Test No.: 2022-1 Scenario No.: 1 - 100%

Page 1 of 21 Event

Description:

N/A - Driver Instructions Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Driver Driver Simulator Setup:

Reset Simulator to IC 151 Load Schedule File: 2022 Scen-1.sch Verify Schedule File NRC 2022 H2 Analyzers.sch loads Verify Event File: NRC 2022 Scen-1.evt loads Remove Requal IOI-3 and Rod Book from horseshoe.

Place STAR marker on Manual Voltage Regulator In Director, if necessary, toggle Override ZL1M51HS1B-GRN to OFF If P845-B1 alarm in, insert malfunction 1H13P8451AB1 to ALARM OFF Driver Driver Verify Initial Conditions:

Reactor Power 100%. MOC_STARTUP_TRAINING_SEQ Pull Sheets, Rods @

Step 67.

Verify APRM gains are adjusted Place yellow switch cap on:

• HPCS Pump & Injection valve

• 1N43-C001B

• H2 Analyzer B SYSTEM FUNCTION SWITCH

• 1E12-F537A Green Risk.

Driver Driver Initial Conditions:

Plant is at 100% power. Main Generator was placed on the Manual Voltage Regulator yesterday for repair of the Auto Voltage Regulator. Maintenance is now complete on the Auto Voltage Regulator. Stator Water Cooling Pump B, N43-C001B is tagged out for bearing replacement. The M29 Control Room Humidification Boiler is tagged out for leak repair. HPCS Pump, 1E22-C001 is tagged out for seal leak repair (Two days into the LCO). Hydrogen Analyzer B was tagged out yesterday for inlet cooling valve replacement (One day into the LCO).

CNTMT SPRAY SECOND SHUTOFF, 1E12-F537A is tagged out for MOVATS testing (Twelve hours into the LCO). SCC will request a power reduction later this shift. eSOMS Narrative Log is down. PSA Risk is Green and the Grid Risk is Normal.

Turnover: Planned activities; Shift main generator from Manual Voltage Regulator to Auto Voltage Regulator.

When contacted by SCC, lower power to meet SCC request IAW reactivity plan and IOI-3. Make any Narrative Log entries on your note pads. Perform Prejob Briefs and Reactivity Briefs prior to entering the Simulator.

Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op. Test No.: 2022-1 Scenario No.: 1 - 100%

Event No.:

1 Page 2 of 21 Event

Description:

1

- Shift Main Generator to Auto Voltage Regulator Symptoms/Cue: From Turnover Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Driver Role play as SCC as directed.

SRO Direct BOP to transfer Main Generator to AUTO Voltage Regulator BOP Perform SOI-N32, Main Turbine Generator And Turning Gear System and transfer to the Auto Voltage Regulator.

7.26 Transfer from the Manual Voltage Regulator to the Auto Voltage Regulator 7.26.1 ADJUST the AUTO. VOLT. ADJUST to achieve 0 volts on the REG TRANSFER DIFF VOLTS.

7.26.2 PLACE the VOLTAGE REGULATOR in AUTO.

7.26.3 MAINTAIN the desired output voltage using the AUTO. VOLT.

ADJUST.

7.26.4 NOTIFY the S.C.C. Generation Dispatcher of shifting to Automatic Voltage Regulation.

7.26.5 RECORD shifting to Automatic Voltage Regulation in the Plant Narrative log.

BOP Inform SRO when voltage regulator transfer is complete.

Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op. Test No.: 2022-1 Scenario No.: 1 - 100%

Event No.:

2 Page 3 of 21 Event

Description:

2

- Extraction Steam isolated to FW Heater #6A Enter ONI-N36 Symptoms/Cue: ARI-H13-P870-05-E1 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Driver

• When directed, insert Event 2.

• Role play as directed.

• If directed to manually open Heater 6A Drain to Cndr 1N25-F280A, then in 1/2 hour report the valve has been manually opened

• If asked to look at HEATER 6A DRN TO HTR 5A, 1N25-F290A locally, after appropriate time, respond that it looks like it is sticking.

• If directed (as I&C) to pull trip units C71-N652AD, IAW ONI-N36 Step 2.0, wait 4 minutes them report trip units pulled.

ATC Announce unexpected alarms and give stability report.

BOP Announce HTR 6A EXST & INLET DRAINS ISOL LEVEL HIGH alarm.

Walkdown H13-P870 and determine and announce 6A FW Heater is isolating/has isolated.

Report ONI-N36 entry condition.

Evaluator Some automatic #6 FW Heater valves reposition during and after this event. The crew may reposition the valves to the Automatic Actions position of the ARI.

SRO Announce entry into ONI-N36, Loss of Feedwater Heating ATC Perform ONI-N36 Immediate Action - Lower Rx power 96% using Recirc Flow.

(<3608 MWt)

Evaluator Power reduction should be immediate and performed without direction from the SRO. Depending on timing of action to lower Rx power, may get Turbine Bypass Valve open.

SRO Announce entry into ONI-C51, Unplanned Change in Rx Power or Reactivity and obtain ONI-C51 Flow Chart BOP Monitor the remaining FW heaters for proper operation.

SRO Direct ATC and BOP to perform Supplemental Actions in ONI-N36 and Subsequent Operator Actions for ARI H13-P870-05A-E1 BOP Verify that the valves identified in ARI H13-P870-5A-E1 have automatically repositioned. Perform ARI Subsequent Operator Actions when directed by the SRO SRO Direct ONI-C51 flow chart Actions:

Direct ATC to monitor nuclear instrumentation for oscillations and Scram the Rx if any occur (Step C51-4)

Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op. Test No.: 2022-1 Scenario No.: 1 - 100%

Event No.:

2 Page 4 of 21 Event

Description:

2

- Extraction Steam isolated to FW Heater #6A Enter ONI-N36 Symptoms/Cue: ARI-H13-P870-05-E1 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ATC Monitor nuclear instrumentation for oscillations and Scram the Rx if any occur SRO Direct BOP to perform ONI-SPI-G4 Power Verification. (ONI-C51-flow chart Step C51-5)

BOP Perform ONI-SPI G4, Power Verification.

SRO Direct ATC to confirm jet pump operation within established limits. (ONI-C51 flow chart Step C51-15)

ATC Confirm jet pump operation within established limits by observing ICS Jet Pump Screen and report to SRO SRO Continue working through ONI-C51 Flow Chart to EXIT boxes.

Evaluator SRO may refer to Tech Specs based on ONI-N36 Attachment 3. However, at the current power level and plant conditions, all LCOs are being met.

Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op. Test No.: 2022-1 Scenario No.: 1 - 100%

Event No.:

3 Page 5 of 21 Event

Description:

3

- Condensate Booster Pump A trips Symptoms/Cue: ARI-H13-P680-02-D6 & A6 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Driver

• When directed, insert Event 3.

• Role play as NLO as directed.

• If asked to investigate CBP A pump, report that the motor is hot to the touch.

• If asked to investigate CBP A breaker, H1103, report that the Overcurrent relay is tripped.

• If requested to respond as NLO to Condensate Filter System - High Differential Pressure alarm - reset on Acknowledgement (Use Extreme View to acknowledge local alarms)

Evaluator ATC has approximately 3.5 minutes before HST level lowers to 60. Starting the 2nd Condensate Booster pump will stop level lowering and restore HST level.

ATC Announce unexpected alarms and give stability report.

Observe alarms, CBP breaker status lights, and discharge pressure meters on P680 and determines CBP A has tripped.

Informs crew of CBP A trip.

SRO Direct ATC to perform ARI Subsequent Actions if ATC not doing so.

ATC Refers to ARI-H13-P680-02-A6 and starts standby CBP IAW Subsequent Actions:

4.1 IF the turbine has NOT tripped, THEN start the standby CBP, 1N21-C002C 4.2 MONITOR HOT SURGE TANK LEVEL & CNDS TO HTR 4 FLOW.

1N21-R323 4.3 IF required, THEN REDUCE reactor power to stabilize Hot Surge Tank level. 1N21-R323 4.4 MAINTAIN motor current <353 amps. (1N21-C001B & 1N21-C001C)

ATC Inform SRO that CBP C was started and HST level is recovering.

BOP Direct NLOs to investigate CBP trip and local condensate filter alarms.

Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op. Test No.: 2022-1 Scenario No.: 1 - 100%

Event No.:

4 Page 6 of 21 Event

Description:

4

- RCIC Suppression Pool Level instrument fails high Symptoms/Cue: ARI-H13-P601-21-G5 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Driver Prior to inserting Event 4, place picture of E51-N636A & E on P629 Driver

• When directed, insert Event 4.

• If requested report as I&C Tech that I&C will begin preparing a work package to investigate.

ATC Announce unexpected alarms and give stability report.

Evaluator NOP-OP-1002, Conduct Of Operations, Section 4.10.3 step 5 states If automatic actions fail to occur when required, it is the responsibility of the operator to take manual actions to perform the system or component function. Pump or component auto start failures are examples where operators are expected to take manual action.

BOP Announce RCIC SUPR POOL SUCT VLV OPEN SUPR PL LVL HI alarm.

Walkdown H13-P601 and determine that RCIC PUMP SUPR PL SUCT ISOL, 1E51-F031, is opening but RCIC PUMP CST SUCTION VALVE, 1E51-F010, did not close.

Announces that Immediate Actions did not occur and closes 1E51-F010.

Verifies that 1E51-F010 closes.

BOP Inform SRO that 1E51-F010 is closed.

Evaluator 1E51-F010 gets a close signal from the open limit switch of the 1E51-F031 valve.

BOP Observes Suppression Pool level indications and reports that levels are within normal band.

SRO Direct BOP to investigate back panels for indication of Suppression Pool level indication problem.

BOP Investigates back panels and informs SRO that 1E51-N636A is pegged high, is tripped and has a gross fail light illuminated on panel P629.

Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op. Test No.: 2022-1 Scenario No.: 1 - 100%

Event No.:

4 Page 7 of 21 Event

Description:

4

- RCIC Suppression Pool Level instrument fails high Symptoms/Cue: ARI-H13-P601-21-G5 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO Evaluate Technical Specifications TS 3.3.5.3 Action A.1 - Enter the Condition referenced in Table 3.3.5.3 Immediately D.2.1 - Place channel in trip - 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> OR D2.2 - Align RCIC pump suction to the suppression pool - 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> Evaluator TS 3.3.5.3 Action D.1 not required since RCIC suction is on Suppression Pool.

TS 3.3.5.3 Action D.2.2 requirements are already met since RCIC pump is now aligned to Suppression Pool.

Driver Following Event 4, remove picture of E51-N636A & E from P629

Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op. Test No.: 2022-1 Scenario No.: 1 - 100%

Event No.:

5 Page 8 of 21 Event

Description:

5

- Leak in RWCU pump room Enter EOP-03 Symptoms/Cue: ARI-H13-P680-01-B4, C4, D4, D5, & C5 and ARI-H13-P601-18-A3 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Driver

• When directed, insert Event 5.

• Role play as NLO as directed.

Evaluator It takes approximately 2 minutes for first alarm to come in after event is initiated.

It is not anticipated that the crew will enter EOP-01. The leakage from RWCU is isolable from the control room.

ATC Announce unexpected alarms and give stability report.

BOP Walkdown back panel H13-P632 / P642 and informs crew that RWCU Pump A Room temperature is rising. Monitors area temperatures using EOP-03 Condition Monitoring Hardcard ATC Announce unexpected RWCU ISOL PUMP A/B RM TEMP HI alarm and give stability report. Inform crew that this is an EOP-03 entry condition.

BOP Review ARI and valve Isolation Matrix determine that RWCU failed to isolate.

Inform SRO that none of the required RWCU isolation valves closed.

Driver If asked to investigate RWCU rooms for leakage:

Before isolation - Report steam coming from RWCU rooms and cant get closer for a better look.

After isolation - Report steam visible in RWCU rooms but diminishing and dont feel safe to get closer for a better look.

If asked to investigate RCIC room, report no visible leakage.

SRO Announce entry into EOP-03, Secondary Containment Control and ONI-N11, Pipe Break Outside Containment.

Direct BOP to Monitor and Control SC area Temperatures and Water Levels.

Direct BOP to perform Immediate and Supplemental Actions of ONI-N11 Direct crew to perform Rapid Manual Shutdown of RWCU.

Direct BOP to isolate all systems discharging into the affected SC area. (Critical Task 1)

BOP/ATC Performs Rapid Manual Shutdown of RWCU. (Trips both RWCU Pumps)

BOP/ATC Make plant announcement to evacuate the Aux Building.

BOP Isolate RWCU as directed. (Critical Task 1)

BOP Continues to monitor area temperatures using EOP-03 Condition Monitoring Hardcard to determine if isolation actions were effective.

Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op. Test No.: 2022-1 Scenario No.: 1 - 100%

Event No.:

5 Page 9 of 21 Event

Description:

5

- Leak in RWCU pump room Enter EOP-03 Symptoms/Cue: ARI-H13-P680-01-B4, C4, D4, D5, & C5 and ARI-H13-P601-18-A3 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Evaluator It will take several minutes for RWCU pump room temperature to stabilize then start to lower.

Evaluate Technical Specifications T.S. 3.3.6.1 Action A.1 - Place channel in trip. - 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> for Functions other than Functions 2.b, 5.b, and 5.d B.1 - Restore isolation capability - 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> C.1 - Enter the Condition referenced in Table 3.3.6.1-1 for the Channel -

Immediately F.1 - Isolate the affected penetration flow path(s). - 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> Evaluator Condition B is entered because the isolation Function is lost for Group 7 valves.

Condition C is entered 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> after Condition B.

Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op. Test No.: 2022-1 Scenario No.: 1 - 100%

Event No.:

6 Page 10 of 21 Event

Description:

6

- Loss of Feedwater Symptoms/Cue: ARI-H13-P680-0002-E3, ARI-H13-P680-003-D1 through D4 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Driver

• When directed, insert Event 6

• Role play as directed Evaluator Initiating event is failed instrument causing a low Hot Surge Tank level indication which will trip all RFBPs.

If all RFBPs tripped due to low Hot Surge Tank level, then RFP A, RFP B and the MFP will trip.

ATC Announce unexpected alarms and loss of all feedwater.

ATC Announce Low Hot Surge Tank Level followed by loss of all RFBPs Determine that Reactor Water Level is below Level 3 and that Scram did not occur BOP Make Plant announcement for the Scram and evacuate containment ATC Locks the Mode Switch in Shutdown.

Determines that scram did not occur.

Evaluator Actions continue in subsequent sequences.

Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op. Test No.: 2022-1 Scenario No.: 1 - 100%

Event No.:

7 Page 11 of 21 Event

Description:

7

- RPS fails in AUTO and MANUAL - ARI fails in AUTO - ARI works in Manual Symptoms/Cue: RPV level trend Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Driver Role play as directed.

Evaluator Automatic and manual scram actions will not work. Also, if RPV level lowers to L2, automatic ARI will not insert rods. A manual ARI initiation will cause control rods to insert.

ATC Recognizes failure of Mode Switch and RPS pushbuttons and initiates ARI.

(Critical Task 2)

Recognize manual ARI inserts all control rods.

ATC Perform Scram Hard Card Actions:

1. VERIFY the following actions completed:

• Mode Switch Locked in Shutdown. (Note power once scram signal inserted)

• RPS Initiated, if all control rods are not fully inserted.

• ARI Initiated, if RPS failed to Scram the reactor.

Evaluator Step 2 below is N/A as all rods are inserted.

ATC

2. IF Reactor power is above 4%, THEN PERFORM the following:

3. STABILIZE Reactor level using Feedwater / RCIC / HPCS.

4. STABILIZE Reactor pressure using Turbine / Turbine Bypass valves / SRVs

5. PERFORM crew update with the following information:

• The Mode Switch is locked in shutdown (RPS and ARI initiated if required)

• Reactor Power is ________________%

• Reactor Pressure is _______________psig

• Reactor Level is __________________inches

• EOP-01 Entry IS / IS NOT met SRO Enter EOP-01, RPV Control Evaluator When Turbine Bypass Valves close, ATC should stabilize RPV pressure using the Pressure Control Hardcard as time permits.

Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op. Test No.: 2022-1 Scenario No.: 1 - 100%

Event No.:

8 Page 12 of 21 Event

Description:

8

- Generator Field Breaker fails to auto open Symptoms/Cue: Generator Field Breaker status light Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ATC Continues Scram Hard Card Actions:

6. WHEN generator load is reduced to less than 90 MWe, THEN PERFORM the following:

a) Depressing the TURBINE TRIP push-button.

b) VERIFY the following:

• MAIN STOP VALVES are shut (4)

• CONTROL VALVES are shut (4)

• COMBINED INTERMEDIATE VALVEs are shut (6)

• GEN BRKRs S-610-PY-TIE and S-611-PY-TIE is open

• GEN FIELD BREAKER is open

• EXCITER FIELD BREAKER is open ATC Recognize the Generator Field Breaker failed to automatically trip and take the Generator Field Breaker handle to TRIP.

Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op. Test No.: 2022-1 Scenario No.: 1 - 100%

Event No.:

9 Page 13 of 21 Event

Description:

9

- Loss of High-Pressure Injection - Anticipate Emergency Depressurization Symptoms/Cue: From EOP-01 Level leg Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Evaluator RCIC will feed the RPV for several minutes following the scram then will trip.

SRO In EOP-01, RPV Control Answers YES to Decision Diamonds, Are APRMs downscale and Is the Reactor shutdown by control rods Crew Identify RCIC trip and announce loss of all high pressure injection.

SRO Enters Level Control leg:

Direct BOP to verify Actuations and Isolations for L3 and L2.

Works way down Level Leg and directs EOP-SPI 4.1, CRD Alternate Injection and EOP-SPI 4.5, SLC Demin Water Alternate Injection ATC/BOP Performs EOP-SPI 4.1 and EOP-SPI 4.5.

SRO Determines that RPV level cannot be maintained >130 and directs BOP to lineup low pressure ECCS systems for injection to lineup injection systems IAW:

EOP-SPI 6.5, LPCS Injection EOP-SPI 6.1, RHR A Injection EOP-SPI 6.2, RHR B Injection EOP-SPI 6.3, RHR C Injection BOP Commence lining up LP systems for injection and informs the SRO when 2 systems are lined up for injection.

Informs SRO when all LP systems are lined up for injection.

SRO Continue EOP-01, RPV Control - Level Leg actions.

Answers NO to Decision Diamond, Can RPV level be restored and maintained 130 in. to 219 in.

Answers YES to Decision Diamond, Can two or more ECCS/Feedwater sources be lined up Makes determination that RPV level cannot be maintained above 16.5 in. and proceeds through Hold Box.

Determines that AED is required before RPV level lowers to 16.5 inches or ED is required before RPV level lowers to -25 inches.

Enters EOP-02 and directs BOP to startup B H2 analyzer and H2 igniters.

Evaluator The SRO can determine that RPV level cannot be maintained >16.5 when existing injection cannot arrest the RPV level decrease, regardless of how high above 16.5 actual RPV level is

Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op. Test No.: 2022-1 Scenario No.: 1 - 100%

Event No.:

9 Page 14 of 21 Event

Description:

9

- Loss of High-Pressure Injection - Anticipate Emergency Depressurization Symptoms/Cue: From EOP-01 Level leg Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Evaluator If AED is commenced with RPV level is > 30 inches, AED will be successful and preclude need to ED.

Crew may elect to Emergency Depressurize rather than AED. In this case, the ED portion of Critical Task-3 will be evaluated rather than the AED portion of Critical Task-3. The auto ADS initiation has been disabled. Additionally, ED may cause RPV water level to go below TAF which would require evaluation of Contingency Critical Task 4 If crew fails to commence AED action, nine minutes after the scram an SRV will fail open causing additional loss of inventory. Depending on timing, this may require crew to Emergency Depressurize.

SRO Enters Pressure Control leg:

Enters Anticipate ED 1st If-While-Executing Step (IWE) and directs BOP to perform EOP-SPI 2.3 to bypass MSIV interlocks.

Direct ATC to USE Main Turbine Bypass Valves to rapidly depressurize the RPV as needed to preclude Emergency Depressurization and EXCEED Cool down rate as required (Critical Task 3)

Direct ATC/BOP to monitor for low-pressure injection.

ATC Operates the BPV Jack to open Bypass Valves (Critical Task 3)

BOP Performs EOP-SPI 2.3 to bypass MSIV low level isolation ATC/BOP Monitor for LPCS injection.

Inform SRO when injection has commenced Report when RPV level is stabilized and recovering.

Evaluator Crew should have ability to lower RPV pressure enough to obtain injection from LPCS, then stabilize RPV pressure and control LPCS injection.

SRO Determines that RPV level can be stabilized/recovered with low-pressure injection systems and determines that AED is no longer required and proceeds to stabilize RPV pressure step.

Directs ATC to stabilize RPV pressure to establish a cooldown rate < 100 °F/ hour.

Directs ATC to establish an RPV level band of 178 to 260 inches.

ATC Operates BPV Jack to stabilize RPV pressure.

Controls low-pressure injection to raise Rx water level.

Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op. Test No.: 2022-1 Scenario No.: 1 - 100%

Event No.: 10 Page 15 of 21 Event

Description:

10 - (Conditional) ED if unable to maintain RPV level > -25 with LPCS Symptoms/Cue:

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO From the EOP-01 Level Control Leg Makes determination that Emergency Depressurization is Required before RPV level lowers to -25 inches and transitions to EOP-01-2, Emergency RPV Depressurization.

SRO Enters EOP-01-2, Emergency RPV Depressurization.

Answers NO to Decision Diamond, Has Drywell Pressure exceeded 1.68 psig.

Directs ATC/BOP to open all ADS valves. (Critical Task-3)

ATC/BOP Opens all ADS valves. (Critical Task-3)

Inform SRO that 8 ADS valves are open.

SRO Answers YES to Decision Diamond, Are 6 or more SRVs Open.

Directs crew to maintain RPV pressure <30 psig.

Directs ATC to establish RPV level band of 178 to 260 inches.

ATC Controls low-pressure injection to raise Rx water level >TAF. (Contingency Critical Task 4)

Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op. Test No.: 2022-1 Scenario No.: 1 - 100%

Page 16 of 21 Event

Description:

Scenario Termination Criteria Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

1. Primary leak into Secondary Containment is isolated

2. Reactor shutdown.

3. RPV pressure lowered to allow low-pressure injection to recover RPV level.

4. Lead Examiners discretion

Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op. Test No.: 2022-1 Scenario No.: 1 - 100%

Page 17 of 21 Event

Description:

Critical Task 1 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior With a primary system discharging into the secondary containment, take action to manually isolate the break.

1. Safety Significance:

Isolating high energy sources can preclude failure of secondary containment and subsequent radiation release to the public.

2. Cues:

Procedural compliance.

Area temperature indication.

3. Measured by:

With the reactor at pressure and a primary system discharging into the secondary containment, operator takes action to manually isolate the break within 15 minutes.

4. Feedback:

Valve position indication.

In field reports.

NOTE: 15 minute criteria for isolation based on entry into E-plan (SU5.1)

Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op. Test No.: 2022-1 Scenario No.: 1 - 100%

Page 18 of 21 Event

Description:

Critical Task 2 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior With a reactor scram required and the reactor not shutdown, take action to reduce power by initiating ARI to cause control rod insertion.

1. Safety Significance:

Shutting down reactor can preclude failure of containment or equipment necessary for the safe shutdown of the plant.

Correct reactivity control.

2. Cues:

Reactor power indication.

Procedural compliance.

3. Measured by:

Observation - ARI pushbuttons armed and depressed to cause control rod insertion prior to RPV level lowering to Level 1.

4. Feedback:

Reactor power trend.

Rod status indication

Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op. Test No.: 2022-1 Scenario No.: 1 - 100%

Page 19 of 21 Event

Description:

Critical Task 3 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior With reactor shutdown and reflood systems available, reduce RPV pressure to allow for restoration of RPV level by low pressure injection.

1. Safety Significance:

Maintain adequate core cooling; prevent degradation of fission product barrier.

2. Cues:

Procedural compliance (ED required, ED Anticipated, controlled cooldown, use of 5-5-2 LPCS injection strategy)

Water level trend.

3. Measured by:

Observation:

ED Anticipated Bypass Valve Jack used to reduce RPV pressure without regard to cooldown rate.

ED Required At least 6 SRVs opened prior to RPV level dropping below -25.

4. Feedback:

RPV pressure trend.

Bypass Valve / SRV position indications.

Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op. Test No.: 2022-1 Scenario No.: 1 - 100%

Page 20 of 21 Event

Description:

Critical Task 4 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior With RPV pressure below the Shutoff Head of the available injections system(s),

operate available Low-Pressure ECCS injection system(s) to restore and maintain RPV water level above T.A.F. (0 inches).

1.

Safety Significance:

Maintaining adequate core cooling.

2.

Cues:

Procedural compliance.

Pressure below low pressure ECCS system(s) shutoff head.

3.

Measured by:

Operator manually starts or initiates at least one low pressure ECCS system and injects into the RPV to restore and maintain water level above 0 inches.

4.

Feedback:

Reactor water level trend.

Reactor pressure trend.

Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op. Test No.: 2022-1 Scenario No.:1 - 100%

Page 21 of 21 Event

Description:

Procedures to verify clean Procedure Number Check IV Procedure Number Check IV ARI-H13-P601-18-A3 ARI-H13-P601-21-G5 ARI-H13-P680-0002-E3 ARI-H13-P680-003-D1 through D4 ARI-H13-P680-01-B4, C4, &C5 ARI-H13-P680-02-A6 & -D6 ARI-H13-P870-05-E1 EOP & ONI Charts EOP-SPI 2.3 EOP-SPI 4.1 EOP-SPI 4.5 EOP-SPI 6.1 EOP-SPI 6.2 EOP-SPI 6.3 EOP-SPI 6.5 Hardcards - All ONI-C51 ONI-N36 ONI-SPI G.4 ORM 6.2.1 PDB-I-03 pp. 12-15 SOI-N21 P&Ls & Sects 4.4, 6.1, & 7.3 SOI-N32 P&Ls and Sect 7.26 SRO Oversight Checklist TS 3.3.1.1 TS 3.3.5.3 TS 3.6.1.3

Form 3.3-1 Scenario Outline Facility:

Perry Scenario #:

1. 2 - 80% Power Scenario Source:

New Op. Test #:

2022-1 Examiners:

Applicants/

Operators:

Initial Conditions:

Plant is at 80% power due to FW limitations. CCCW Chill Water Pump C, P47-C001C is tagged out for motor replacement. Stator Water Cooling Pump B, N43-C001B is tagged out for bearing replacement. The M29 Control Room Humidification Boiler is tagged out for leak repair. Hydrogen Analyzer B was tagged out yesterday for inlet cooling valve replacement (One day into the LCO). CNTMT SPRAY SECOND SHUTOFF, 1E12-F537A is tagged out for MOVATS testing (Twelve hours into the LCO). Replacement of a speed sensor on RFPT B is complete. Maintenance Engineer requested Ops to pause RFPT B startup at various RPMs to gather data. Currently RFPT B is in AUTO and the MFP is in MANUAL. eSOMS Narrative Log is down. PSA Risk is Green and the Grid Risk is Normal.

Turnover / Planned Activities: Continue Feedwater shift from MFP to RFPT B. An NLO is on station to support the shift. Raise reactor power to 85% power IAW reactivity plan and IOI-3. Make any Narrative Log entries on your note pads. Perform Prejob Briefs and Reactivity Briefs prior to entering the Simulator.

Critical Tasks:

1. Insert manual reactor scram when power oscillations are observed and auto RPS fails

2. When Containment temperature cannot be maintained < 185 °F, perform ED Event No.

Malf.

No.

Event Type*

Event Description 1

N-BOP/SRO Shift from MFP to RFPT A & B in service 2

R-ATC/SRO Raise Rx power to 85% (Control Rods) 3 C-ATC/SRO TS-SRO Uncoupled Control Rod Tech Spec 3.1.3 4

C-BOP/SRO ESW Pump House Fan B loses power 5

C-ATC/SRO MC-ATC HST Level Control Valve, N21-F230 fails closed 6

TS-SRO Combustible Gas Mixing Compressor A power loss Tech Spec 3.6.3.3 7

C-ATC/SRO Rx Recirc pumps down-shift to SLOW Enter ONI-C51 8

C-ATC/SRO Power oscillations Enter EOP-01 on failure to Scram 9

M-ALL SDV Leak in Containment Enter EOP-02 10 C-BOP/SRO Failure of Containment Spray valve Enter EOP-01-2 Emergency Depressurize 11 C-BOP/SRO SRV B21-F041A fails to open on ED (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor, (TS)Tech Spec, (MC)Manual Control

NRC Exam Scenario #2 Event Summary Initially, the plant is at 80% power based on Feedwater Pump limitations with RFPT B OOS.

CCCW Chill Water Pump C, Stator Water Cooling Pump B, The M29 Control Room Humidification Boiler are OOS, Hydrogen Analyzer B was tagged out yesterday for inlet cooling valve replacement (One day into the LCO), and CNTMT SPRAY SECOND SHUTOFF valve (Twelve hours into the LCO),

are tagged out. Repair on RFPT B is complete. Maintenance Engineer requested Ops pause RFPT B startup at various RPMs to gather data. Currently RFPT B is in AUTO and the MFP is in MANUAL.

Planned activities for the shift include, continuing Feedwater shift from MFP to RFPT B. then, raising reactor power to 85% power IAW reactivity plan and IOI-3.

1 The US will direct the BOP to continue Feedwater shift from MFP & 1 RFPT to 2 RFPTs.

2 The US will direct the Crew to commence power increase to 85% with control rods following FW pump shift.

3 The last control rod to be withdrawn will be shown to be uncoupled during the coupling check. The crew will insert the control rod to position 00. The SRO will evaluate TS 3.1.3 4

At the Lead Evaluators cue, the running (B) Emergency Service Water pump house fan will fail. BOP will shift to the A ESWPH fan. The SRO will evaluate Operability of the B ESW system and determine that it remains Operable.

5 At the Lead Evaluators cue, the Hot Surge Tank level control valve, N21-F230 will fail closed. The ATC will take manual control of N21-F220 to maintain condensate flow.

6 At the Lead Evaluators cue, the Combustible Gas Mixing Compressor B will lose power. SRO will evaluate TS 3.6.3.3.

7 At the Lead Evaluators cue, both Rx Recirc pumps will down shift to SLOW. Crew will enter ONI-C51 and insert cram rods.

8 After the Recirc Pump downshift Power Oscillations are observed requiring a Rx scram. Both Auto and Manual RPS actions fail and Auto ARI actions fail. The crew will insert rods by manual ARI initiation.

9 Shortly after the scram, a leak will be revealed in the Scram Discharge Volume (SDV) causing containment temperature and pressure to rise. Crew enters EOP-02 and attempts to spray containment.

10 Containment Spray fails and Crew re-enters EOP-01 and transition to EOP-01-2, ED and depressurizes the Rx.

11 While performing ED, ADS SRV B21-F041A fails to open and the crew will open other non-ADS SRV to obtain 8 SRVs open.

At the Lead Evaluators discretion, and once the crew has demonstrated the ability to manually insert control rods, successfully completed the Emergency Depressurization, restored RPV level control, the scenario may be terminated.

Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op. Test No.: 2022-1 Scenario No.: 2 - 80%

Page 1 of 22 Event

Description:

N/A - Driver Instructions Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Driver Driver Simulator Setup:

Reset Simulator to IC 152 Load Schedule File: NRC 2022-2.sch Verify Schedule File NRC 2022 H2 Analyzers.sch loads Verify Event File: NRC 2022-2.evt Loads In Director, if necessary, toggle Override ZL1M51HS1B-GRN to OFF Remove Requal IOI-3 and Rod Book from horseshoe.

Markup Crew Sheet to show Turbine Tour NLO supporting FW shift Driver Driver Verify Initial Conditions:

Reactor Power 80%. MOC_STARTUP_TRAINING_SEQ Pull Sheets, Rods @

Step 67 with last 2 inserted to 12.

IOI-3 Attachment 3 is in progress.

Verify APRM gains are adjusted Place yellow switch cap on:

• CCCW C Chiller & CW Pump

• N43-C001B

• H2 Analyzer B SYSTEM FUNCTION SWITCH

• 1E12-F537A Green Risk.

Driver Driver Initial Conditions:

Plant is at 80% power due to FW limitations. CCCW Chill Water Pump C, P47-C001C is tagged out for motor replacement. Stator Water Cooling Pump B, N43-C001B is tagged out for bearing replacement. The M29 Control Room Humidification Boiler is tagged out for leak repair. Hydrogen Analyzer B was tagged out yesterday for inlet cooling valve replacement (One day into the LCO).

CNTMT SPRAY SECOND SHUTOFF, 1E12-F537A is tagged out for MOVATS testing (Twelve hours into the LCO). Replacement of a speed sensor on RFPT B is complete. Maintenance Engineer requested Ops to pause RFPT B startup at various RPMs to gather data. Currently RFPT B is in AUTO and the MFP is in MANUAL.

eSOMS Narrative Log is down. PSA Risk is Green and the Grid Risk is Normal.

Turnover: Planned activities; Continue Feedwater shift from MFP to RFPT B. An NLO is on station to support the shift. Raise reactor power to 85% power IAW reactivity plan and IOI-3. Make any Narrative Log entries on your note pads.

Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op. Test No.: 2022-1 Scenario No.: 2 - 80%

Event No.:

1 Page 2 of 22 Event

Description:

1

- Shift from MFP to RFPT A & B in service Symptoms/Cue: From Turnover Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Driver Role play as NLO as directed.

If directed to crack open 1N27-F100B, initiate Event 1.

SRO Direct BOP to shift from MFP to RFPT A & B in service and shutdown the MFP IAW SOI-C34, Feedwater Control System.

Provide oversight.

BOP Perform SOI-C34, Placing Reactor Feed Pump in Service from 1100 RPM:

4.4 Placing Reactor Feed Pump in Service from 1100 RPM to RFPT Flow Control 4.4.17 IF removing a feed pump from service, THEN REFER TO one of the following:

• Section 6.2, MFP Shutdown to Casing Warmup BOP Perform SOI-C34, MFP Shutdown to Casing Warmup:

6.2 MFP Shutdown to Casing Warmup 6.2.1 DIRECT Chemistry to ALIGN Hydrogen Water Chemistry as required.

NOTES The MFP min flow/recirc flowpath is NOT adequate to support operation of the Hydrogen Water Chemistry (HWC) system. As a result, when flow to the vessel from the MFP is stopped, the HWC system may trip if Chemistry has not completed the realignment of the HWC system.

The Margins and Limits Hardcard (OAI-1703) should be reviewed for this evolution.

6.2.2 CONFIRM one or both of the following:

• RFPT A operating with the RFPT A MANUAL/AUTO STATION in AUTO 1C34-R601A

• RFPT B operating with the RFPT B MANUAL/AUTO STATION in AUTO 1C34-R601B 6.2.3 VERIFY that the capacity of the remaining Feed Pumps is sufficient to maintain RPV Level.

6.2.4 VERIFY the MFP FCV MAN/AUTO STATION is in MANUAL.

1C34-R601C 6.2.5 WHILE maintaining RPV level in band, ADJUST the MFP FCV MAN/AUTO STATION to 0%.

1C34-R601C

Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op. Test No.: 2022-1 Scenario No.: 2 - 80%

Event No.:

1 Page 3 of 22 Event

Description:

1

- Shift from MFP to RFPT A & B in service Symptoms/Cue: From Turnover Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP 6.2.6 VERIFY the following valves are closed:

• MFP FULL FLOW CONTROL VALVE 1N27-F010

• MFP LOW FLOW CONTROL VALVE 1N27-F110 6.2.7 PLACE the MFP in OFF.

1N27-C004 6.2.8 VERIFY the MFP RCIRC FLOW CONTROLLER at 0%.

1N27-R077 6.2.9 RFPT A is NOT Tripped 1N27-C003A RFPT B is NOT Tripped 1N27-C003B THEN PERFORM the following:

6.2.9.a PLACE the MFP in AUTO.

1N27-C004 6.2.9.b VERIFY the MFP AUTO XFER is ENABLED.

Continue with SOI-C34, Placing Reactor Feed Pump in Service from 1100 RPM:

4.4.18 SLOWLY ADJUST the RECIRC FLOW CONTROLLER MINIMUM OUTPUT to 0% OR until minimum flow requirements are satisfied for any operating feedwater pump. 1N27-K162B_OP1 4.4.19 BOTH of the RFP Suction Flow transmitters are indicating on scale BOTH of the RFP Suction Flow transmitters are available THEN REMOVE the bypassed transmitter from bypass:

• RFPT SUCT FLOW RDNT XMTR 1N27-N087A 1N27-N087B 4.4.20 IF NOT performed in Step 4.4.12.d, THEN DIRECT Chemistry to ALIGN Hydrogen Water Chemistry as required.

BOP Inform SRO that Feedwater shift is complete

Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op. Test No.: 2022-1 Scenario No.: 2 - 80%

Event No.:

2 Page 4 of 22 Event

Description:

2

- Raise Rx power to 85%

Symptoms/Cue: From Turnover Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Driver Role play as Tenaska, Rx Engineer, RP, and Chemistry as directed.

SRO Direct ATC to raise reactor power to 85% IAW the Reactivity Plan and IOI-3, Power Maneuvering, Attachment 3.

Provide oversight Evaluator It is expected that the ATC will use Control Rods to raise power.

When the 2nd rod is withdrawn for a coupling check at position 48 it will become uncoupled. See Event-3 The RWL enforces a 2-notch limit for withdrawal at this Rx power level. The Candidate will need to deselect and reselect the control rods every two notches.

ATC Notify Tenaska, RP and Chemistry of intended power change ATC Perform SOI-C11(RC&IS), Rod Control And Information System to raise power.

7.1 Single Rod Selection 7.1.1 Momentarily depress DRIVE MODE to select INDIVID DRIVE mode.

7.1.2 Simultaneously depress the XX and YY coordinates for any rod member of that gang on the RSM to select the desired gang.

7.5 Continuous Withdrawal For A Single Rod or Gang 7.5.1 Select the single rod or rod gang.

7.5.2 Simultaneously Depress And Hold the following:

• WITHDRAW

• CONT WITHDRAW 7.5.3 Observe the following:

• The IN light comes on.

• The OUT light comes on

• The CONT OUT light comes on

• The RDM is updating rod or gang positions.

• Expected changes occur in nuclear instrumentation 7.5.4 When the rod or gang just passes the desired position, then release both pushbuttons to allow the rod or gang to settle into the desired notch.

7.5.5 Observe the following:

• The RDM indicates the new rod position(s).

• The SETTLE light comes on for approximately 6 seconds and goes off.

• If in gang withdrawal, the new position is displayed in the GANG POSITION subsection of the RDM and the green STABLE status LED will be on.

Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op. Test No.: 2022-1 Scenario No.: 2 - 80%

Event No.:

2 Page 5 of 22 Event

Description:

2

- Raise Rx power to 85%

Symptoms/Cue: From Turnover Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO Report to SRO that Control Rod 34-23 is uncoupled and this is an entry condition to ONI-C11-2, Uncoupled Control Rod SRO Enter ONI-C11-2, Uncoupled Control Rod ATC Report to SCC that power increase is on hold.

Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op. Test No.: 2022-1 Scenario No.: 2 - 80%

Event No.:

3 Page 6 of 22 Event

Description:

3

- Uncoupled Control Rod Symptoms/Cue: ARI-H13-P680-05-D9 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Driver Role play as Rx Engineer and NLO as directed.

If asked about a recovery plan, one will be developed within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> SRO Direct ATC to stop control rod withdrawal ATC Inform SRO that control rod withdrawal has been stopped.

SRO Reviews Supplemental actions of ONI-C11-2 4.1 CONTACT the Reactor Engineer.

4.2 IF the Periodic Log is available, THEN DETERMINE if the following have been exceeded:

• Local power limits

• Gross power limits Directs BOP to contact Rx Engineer and run a Periodic Log SRO Continues reviewing Supplemental actions of ONI-C11-2 CAUTION Scramming a control rod drive with an uncoupled rod could result in control rod or drive damage.

NOTE In Mode 1 and 2, an uncoupled control rod needs to be fully inserted within 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> AND disarmed within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> to comply with Technical Specifications (T.S. 3.1.3 and 3.10.8) 4.3 IF in Mode 1, THEN PERFORM the following:

4.3.1 DECLARE the control rod inoperable.

4.3.2 INSERT the control rod to the position from which it was withdrawn.

Directs ATC to insert control rod 34-23 to position 12.

ATC Inserts control rod 34-23 to position 12.

Informs SRO that control rod 34-23 is at position 12 SRO 4.3.3 DIRECT the Reactor Engineer to develop an action plan for control rod recoupling.

Contacts Rx Engineering to develop an action plan for recoupling.

Determines that action plan preparation will not meet Tech Spec requirements and directs ATC to fully insert control 34-23 ATC Inserts control rod 34-23 from position 12 to 00.

Informs SRO that control rod 34-23 is fully inserted

Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op. Test No.: 2022-1 Scenario No.: 2 - 80%

Event No.:

3 Page 7 of 22 Event

Description:

3

- Uncoupled Control Rod Symptoms/Cue: ARI-H13-P680-05-D9 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO Directs ATC/BOP to direct NLO to disarm control rod 34-23.

ATC/BOP Directs NLO to disarm control rod 34-23.

SRO Evaluate Tech Specs Tech Spec. 3.1.3 Action C.1 - Fully insert inoperable control rod. - 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> AND C.2 - Disarm the associated CRD. - 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />

Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op. Test No.: 2022-1 Scenario No.: 2 - 80%

Event No.:

4 Page 8 of 22 Event

Description:

4

- ESW Pump House Fan B loses power Symptoms/Cue: ARI-H13-P800-01-D4 & E4 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Driver

• When directed, initiate Event 4

• Role play as NLO as directed

• If asked to investigate MCC EF1C12-J, 2 mainline power fuses are blown Evaluator The Power Loss alarm will be preceded by a Low Flow alarm for 60 seconds. The ARI for the Low Flow contains direction to start the A vent fan.

IAW OAI-1701, if either train of ESWPH ventilation is functional, then Operability of ESW is maintained ATC Announce unexpected P800 alarm and give stability report.

BOP Announce ESW B PUMP HOUSE SUPP FAN FLOW LOW alarm and ESW PUMP HOUSE VENT SYSTEM OVLD/PWR LOST alarms. Walkdown H13-P800 and determine and ESW B pump house fan has lost power.

Reviews ARI and informs SRO of need to startup ESW Pump House vent fan A.

Direct NLO to investigate loss of power to ESW pump hours fan.

SRO Evaluate Operability of ESW B with ESW B pump house fan off and ESW pump hours fan in operation.

Direct BOP to startup ESW Pump House vent fan A.

BOP Performs SOI-M32, Manual Startup From Standby Ready to start ESWPH fan A.

4.3.1 Take the oncoming ESW PMP HOUSE VENT SUPP FAN 1 control switch to START.

1M32-C001A 4.3.2 Verify the oncoming ESW PMP HOUSE EXH LOUVER 70 opens.

1M32-F070A Inform SRO that ESWPH supply fan A has been started

Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op. Test No.: 2022-1 Scenario No.: 2 - 80%

Event No.:

5 Page 9 of 22 Event

Description:

5

- HST Level Control Valve, N21-F230 fails closed Symptoms/Cue: ARI-H13-P680-07-E12 & ARI-H13-P680-02-E3 & D2 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Driver

• When directed, initiate Event 5.

• Role play as NLO as directed.

• If directed to investigate N21-F230 locally, inform crew that there is nothing abnormal locally.

ATC Announce unexpected alarms and give stability report.

Observes HST level controller not operating properly and Condensate flow decreasing.

Reports HST level and trend ATC Inform the SRO of the need to place HST Level controller in MANUAL.

Evaluator Directed HST level band should be between Lo & Hi level alarms (104131)

If Candidate opens N21-F220 too much for too long, a Hot Surge Tank high level may result. This may cause an isolation of #4 FW heater. The isolation can be stopped if HST level is lowered and the Extraction Steam valve to the #4 FW heater closure is stopped. If the isolation is completed, the crew will need to enter ONI-N36 for a heater isolation and ONI-C51 if a power change occurs.

SRO Direct ATC to take manual control of HST Level controller.

Direct HST level band.

Direct ATC to insert a manual scram if HST level lowers to 60 inches IAW Margins and Limits Hardcard.

ATC Attempts to place HST Level controller in MANUAL and attempts to adjust HST Level control valve position.

Determines HST level controller is not responding and will need to adjust HST Alternate Level control valve, N21-F220.

SRO Directs ATC to take control of HST level using Alternate Hot Surge Tank Level Control IAW SOI-N21 ATC Performs SOI-N21, Condensate System to control HST level 7.18 Alternate Hot Surge Tank Level Control NOTES

• This section may be performed upon a malfunction of the Hot Surge Tank Level Control Valve, 1N21-F230, OR when supplemental flow is required in the event feedwater heater drains are being sent directly to the condenser.

• 1N21-F220, HST LVL CV MANUAL CONTROL potentiometer is adjusted by IOI-3, Power Changes as necessary to maintain Hot Surge Tank Level, and may be open, dependent on Reactor power level.

7.18.1 MANUALLY CONTROL HST Level with 1N21-F220, HST LVL CV MANUAL CONTROL potentiometer as follows:

Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op. Test No.: 2022-1 Scenario No.: 2 - 80%

Event No.:

5 Page 10 of 22 Event

Description:

5

- HST Level Control Valve, N21-F230 fails closed Symptoms/Cue: ARI-H13-P680-07-E12 & ARI-H13-P680-02-E3 & D2 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ATC 7.18.1.a IF HST LVL CV MANUAL CONTROL is OFF, THEN VERIFY the following:

• HST LVL CV MANUAL CONTROL is adjusted to zero 1N21-F220 closed 1N21-R7097.18.1.b VERIFY the HST LVL CV MANUAL CONTROL in ON.

7.18.1.c SIMULTANEOUSLY PERFORM the following to control Hot Surge Tank Level at 104 to 131 inches.

7.18.1.c.1 ADJUST the HST LVL CV MANUAL CONTROL potentiometer.

7.18.1.c.2 IF desired, THEN PERFORM the following:

• PLACE the HOT SURGE TANK LEVEL CONTROL, 1N21-F230 in MANUAL.

1N21-R475

• CLOSE the HOT SURGE TANK LEVEL CONTROL valve.

1N21-F230 7.18.1.d STABILIZE Hot Surge Tank level at the desired level.

ATC Inform SRO that HST level is recovering.

SRO Direct level band for Hot Surge Tank ATC Controls Hot Surge Tank level in directed band.

Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op. Test No.: 2022-1 Scenario No.: 2 - 80%

Event No.:

6 Page 11 of 22 Event

Description:

6

- Combustible Gas Mixing Compressor A power loss Symptoms/Cue: ARI-H13-P800-02-A5 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Driver

• When directed, initiate Event 6

• If requested to investigate the disconnect (EF1B08-T) for CGMC A - inform the BOP that the control power fuse is blown - no obvious reason ATC Announce unexpected P800 alarm and give stability report.

BOP Investigate P800 alarm and determine that Combustible Gas Mixing Compressor A has no power and inform SRO.

Dispatch an NLO to investigate the loss of power.

Review ARI-H13-P800-2-A5 and informs SRO of possible Tech Spec implications.

SRO Evaluate Tech Specs T.S. 3.6.3.3 Action A.1 - Restore combustible mixing subsystem to OPERABLE status. - 30 days

Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op. Test No.: 2022-1 Scenario No.: 2 - 80%

Event No.:

7 Page 12 of 22 Event

Description:

7

- Rx Recirc pumps down-shift to SLOW Enter ONI-C51 Symptoms/Cue: ARI-H13-P680-04-A3 & A12 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Driver

• When directed, initiate Event 7.

• Role play as Rx Engineer as directed.

• After the first Cram Rod is inserted, power oscillations will worsen (next event)

Evaluator Power oscillations (next Event) will commence a few minutes after the down-shift and will worsen upon insertion of the first Cram Rod.

ATC Announces Unexpected alarms and gives stability report.

Determines that both A and B Recirculation pumps have shifted to slow speed and informs SRO of entry condition to ONI-C51.

ATC Observes Reactor Power and Core Plate P and determines that the Immediate Exit Region of the Power To Flow Map has been entered and action to insert Cram Rods is necessary (per FTI-B02).

SRO Announces entry into ONI-C51 and confirms that plant is in Immediate Exit Region of Power To Flow Map. Verifies that ATC is inserting Cram Rods per FTI-B02.

SRO Directs ATC to monitor nuclear instruments for power oscillations. If oscillations are observed, then scram the reactor.

ATC Perform FTI-B02, Control Rod Movements to insert Cram Rods.

4.7 Use of Cram Rods NOTE There are three methods to control the use of cram rods. The Command SRO will select the method to be used based on the situation 4.7.1 Method 1 - Use of the Control Rod Movement Sheet

1. Insert Cram Rods listed on the Control Rod Movement Sheet steps in descending order.

2. Gang motion is recommended where not prohibited.

3. Select the control rods listed in the Current Step of the Control Rod Movement Sheet and continuously insert to positions between 04 and 00, inclusive. Further leveling of all rods in a step between 04 and 00 is not required. Skip the step if the rods are already between 04 and 00.

4. Per Step 4.5.5, the Current Step is the lowest numbered step in which all the control rods in that step are not positioned at the withdrawal limit. If all steps are at the withdrawal limit, then the last step is the current step.

5. Do not leave control rods at an intermediate position, i.e., a position other than the withdraw limit or between 04 and 00.

6. Complete the insertion of a control rod or gang in the step even if the required power reduction has been achieved.

Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op. Test No.: 2022-1 Scenario No.: 2 - 80%

Event No.:

7 Page 13 of 22 Event

Description:

7

- Rx Recirc pumps down-shift to SLOW Enter ONI-C51 Symptoms/Cue: ARI-H13-P680-04-A3 & A12 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

7. Document in the comments on the Control Rod Movement Sheets the altered insert limits when inserting Cram Rods. Documentation may be performed when plant conditions permit.

8. Deselect the final Cram Rod or gang to reset the Rod Withdrawal Limiter, RWL.

9. Continue with Step 4.7.4.

4.7.4 When Cram Rods are inserted and Thermal Power is 19% RTP, assume the Rod Pattern does not meet the Low Power Setpoint constraints of the Rod Pattern Controller.

4.7.5 Increasing recirc flow after inserting Cram Rods may lead to thermal limits problems.

4.7.6 Contact Reactor Engineering expeditiously after the insertion of Cram Rods for the coordination of recovery actions.

Evaluator It is not expected that the SRO will progress past the evaluation of thermal limits in ONI-C51 prior to receiving a 1/2 scram on OPRMs.

Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op. Test No.: 2022-1 Scenario No.: 2 - 80%

Event No.:

8 Page 14 of 22 Event

Description:

8

- Power oscillations Enter EOP-01 on failure to Scram Symptoms/Cue: ARI-H13-P680-6A-A3 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Evaluator After first Cram Rod is inserted in previous Event, Power Oscillations will worsen.

Evaluator Numerous annunciators will alarm as power oscillations start then increase in size.

ATC should be able to diagnose power oscillations by observing P680 annunciators and APRM indications. Prior to manually scramming its expected that a full scram signal will be generated (but automatic scram will not occur).

ATC Respond to alarms on P680. Recognize a Reactor scram should have occurred Recognize failure of automatic and manual Rx scram and arms and depresses ARI pushbuttons (Critical Task 1)

Commence Reactor Scram Hardcard actions

1. VERIFY the following actions completed:

• Mode Switch Locked in Shutdown (Note power once scram signal inserted)

• RPS Initiated, if all control rods are not fully inserted

• ARI Initiated, if RPS failed to Scram the reactor

2. IF Reactor Power is above 4% OR unknown, THEN PERFORM the following:

3. STABILIZE Reactor level using Feedwater / RCIC / HPCS

4. STABILIZE Reactor pressure using Turbine / Turbine Bypass valves / SRVs

5. PERFORM crew update with the following information:

• The Mode Switch is locked in shutdown, (RPS and ARI initiated if required)

• Reactor Power is

(~0%)

• Reactor Pressure is _______________psig

• Reactor Level is __________________inches

• EOP-01 Entry IS / IS NOT met

• IF MSIVs are closed, THEN a Time Critical Operator Action for Suppression Pool Cooling is applicable.

Time: _____________.

SRO Announce entry into EOP-01, RPV Control SRO Works way through EOP-01 Chart.

Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op. Test No.: 2022-1 Scenario No.: 2 - 80%

Event No.:

9 Page 15 of 22 Event

Description:

9

- SDV Leak in Containment Enter EOP-02 Symptoms/Cue: ARI-H13-P601-17-D2 & 20-F4 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Evaluator By the time Containment Temperature annunciators alarm and the crew recognizes Containment temperature and pressure are rising, Containment pressure should be

>0.8 psig (condition in first IWE block for Containment Spray Operations).

With Containment Spray A valve tagged out, crew will need to use Containment Spray B, which has a 35 second time delay. Valve E12-F028B will lose power when called to open.

Crew Announce unexpected Containment Temperature alarms and identify Containment Temperature and pressure are rising. Identify entry conditions into EOP-02.

SRO Announce entry into EOP-02, Primary Containment Control.

Works way to 1st If-While-Executing Step (IWE) and directs BOP/ATC to perform EOP-SPI 3.1 to spray Containment.

Direct BOP to monitor and control Containment parameters.

Directs BOP to operate all available Containment cooling and bypass CVCW isolations BOP/ATC Initiate Containment Spray IAW EOP-SPI 3.1.

3.0 RHR Containment Spray Loop B is NOT lined up to vent Containment Containment Spray A loop is NOT initiated Additional Containment Spray is required Containment Spray B loop is available THEN INITIATE Containment Spray B Loop as follows:

3.1 IF Drywell Pressure is less than 1.68 psig, THEN AT H13-P618, PLACE CNTMT SPRAY B HI DW PRESS BYP Keylock switch in BYPASS.

E12A-S76 3.2 CONFIRM Containment Pressure is above 0.8 psig.

3.3 ARM AND DEPRESS CNTMT SPRAY B MANUAL INITIATION pushbutton for at least 35 seconds.

E12A-S63B 3.4 VERIFY RHR PUMP B is running.

E12-C002B 3.5 IF ESW PUMP B is available, THEN VERIFY ESW PUMP B is running.

P45-C001B 3.6 IF ECC PUMP B is available, THEN VERIFY ECC PUMP B is running.

P42-C001B 3.7 VERIFY the following valves are OPEN:

• CNTMT SPRAY B FIRST SHUTOFF E12-F028B

• CNTMT SPRAY B SECOND SHUTOFF E12-F537B

Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op. Test No.: 2022-1 Scenario No.: 2 - 80%

Event No.:

9 Page 16 of 22 Event

Description:

9

- SDV Leak in Containment Enter EOP-02 Symptoms/Cue: ARI-H13-P601-17-D2 & 20-F4 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP Operates all available Containment cooling fans, bypasses CVCW isolations IAW EOP-SPI 2.2, and directs NLO to restart a Containment Vessel chiller.

BOP/ATC Identifies that CNTMT SPRAY B FIRST SHUTOFF, E12-F028B lost power and did not open and Containment Spray could not be initiated and informs the SRO.

Evaluator Continued on next Event

Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op. Test No.: 2022-1 Scenario No.: 2 - 80%

Event No.: 10 Page 17 of 22 Event

Description:

10 - Failure of Containment Spray valve Enter EOP-01-2 Emergency Depressurize Symptoms/Cue:

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO Continue EOP-02 actions.

Determines in EOP-02 Step CN/T-3 that Containment temperature cannot be maintained below 185 °F and Emergency Depressurization is required.

SRO Reenters EOP-01 and works way to 1st IWE block in Pressure Control Leg.

Determines Emergency Depressurization is or has been required and transitions to EOP-01-2, RPV Emergency Depressurization.

SRO Works way down EOP-01-2 chart and Answers YES to Decision Diamond, Has Drywell Pressure exceeded 1.68 psig.

Directs BOP to Prevent ECCS systems not required for continuous injection.

Directs ATC/BOP to open all ADS valves. (Critical Task-2)

ATC/BOP Opens all ADS valves (Critical Task-2)

Determines ADS SRV 1B21-F041A failed to open and informs SRO.

Evaluator Continued on next Event

Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op. Test No.: 2022-1 Scenario No.: 2 - 80%

Event No.: 11 Page 18 of 22 Event

Description:

11 - SRV B21-F041A fails to open on ED Symptoms/Cue:

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Evaluator It is not anticipated that RPV water level will go below TAF. Therefore restoring RPV water level >TAF was not included as a Critical Task.

SRO Continue EOP-01-2 actions.

Directs ATC/BOP to open additional SRVs until 8 SRVs are open.

ATC/BOP Open an additional SRV to obtain 8 open SRVs and informs SRO.

SRO Directs ATC/BOP to establish an RPV level band of 150 to 219 inches and override ECCS systems as necessary to maintain level in band.

ATC/BOP Coordinate injection of ECCS and Feedwater to establish directed level band.

Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op. Test No.: 2022-1 Scenario No.: 2 - 80%

Page 19 of 22 Event

Description:

Scenario Termination Criteria Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

1. Reactor is shutdown

2. Reactor depressurization to less than or equal to 30 psig is in progress

3. RPV water level controlled/restored

4. Lead Examiners discretion

Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op. Test No.: 2022-1 Scenario No.: 2 - 80%

Page 20 of 22 Event

Description:

Critical Task 1 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior If a reactor scram is required and RPS fails to shutdown the reactor, initiate ARI.

1.

Safety Significance:

Shutting down reactor can preclude failure of containment or equipment necessary for the safe shutdown of the plant.

Correct reactivity control.

2. Cues:

Reactor power indication.

Procedural compliance.

3. Measured by:

Observation - ARI pushbuttons armed and depressed to cause control rod insertion.

4. Feedback:

Reactor power trend.

Rod status indication.

Under worst-case conditions, thermal-hydraulic induced flux oscillations can grow very rapidly, reaching 25% peak-to-peak in approximately 60 seconds and resulting in some fuel damage within 120 seconds of a significant reduction in recirculation flow. EOP-01-5 p 29

Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op. Test No.: 2022-1 Scenario No.: 2 - 80%

Page 21 of 22 Event

Description:

Critical Task 2 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior When Containment Temperature cannot be maintained below the Containment Design Temperature limit (185 °F), perform Emergency Depressurization.

1.

Safety Significance:

Precludes failure of containment and exceeding environmental qualification of safety related electrical equipment within the containment.

2.

Cues:

Procedural compliance High Containment Temperature

3. Measured by:

Observation - Prior to exceeding 185 °F, perform ED activities per the following guidance:

If operation IAW EOP-01:

At least 6 SRV opened.

4.

Feedback:

RPV pressure decreasing SRV / Bypass Valve open status indications

Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op. Test No.: 2022-1 Scenario No.:2 - 80%

Page 22 of 22 Event

Description:

Procedures to verify clean Procedure Number Check IV Procedure Number Check IV ARI-H13-P601-17-B6 SOI-C34, Sec. 4.2, 6.3, 6.4 ARI-H13-P601-17-D2 SOI-C11(RC&IS) 7.1 & 7.5 ARI-H13-P601-20-F4 SOI-M32 Sec. 4.3 & P&Ls ARI-H13-P680-02-E1, E3 & D2 SOI-N21 Sec. 7.18 ARI-H13-P680-04-A3 & A12 SRO Oversight Checklist ARI-H13-P680-05-D9 TS 3.1.3 & Bases ARI-H13-P680-07-E12 TS 3.6.3.3 & Bases ARI-H13-P800-1-D4 & E4 ARI-H13-P800-2-A5 EOP & ONI Charts EOP-SPI 2.2 EOP-SPI 3.1 FTI-B0002 page 32 Hardcards - All IOI-3 OAI-1701 ONI-C11-2 ONI-C51

Form 3.3-1 Scenario Outline Facility:

Perry Scenario #:

1. 3 - 96% Power Scenario Source:

New Op. Test #:

2022-1 Examiners:

Applicants/

Operators:

Initial Conditions:

Power was reduced two hours ago to 96% for surveillance testing, which is now complete.

SCC has requested we restore to rated power. The M29 Control Room Humidification Boiler is tagged out for leak repair. TBCC Pump C, P44-C001C is tagged out for seal replacement. Stator Water Cooling Pump B, N43-C001B is tagged out for bearing replacement. Hydrogen Analyzer B was tagged out yesterday for inlet cooling valve replacement (One day into the LCO). eSOMS Narrative Log is down. PSA Risk is Green and the Grid Risk is Normal.

Turnover / Planned Activities: Raise Reactor Power to 100% IAW reactivity plan and IOI-3 per SCC request.

Start HPCS in Full Flow Test SP mode for vibration analysis. An NLO is on station to support HPCS startup. Contact Maintenance Engineer for vibration analysis when HPCS is started. Once vibration analysis is complete, place HPCS in Standby. Perform Prejob Briefs and Reactivity Briefs prior to entering the Simulator.

Critical Tasks:

1. Manually insert control rods during an ATWS

2. Manually start RCIC to avoid Emergency Depressurization on low RPV level Event No.

Malf.

No.

Event Type*

Event Description 1

R-ATC/SRO Raise Reactor Power to 100% (Flow) 2 N-BOP/SRO TS-SRO Start HPCS in Test Mode to Suppression Pool Tech Spec 3.5.1 3

C-BOP/SRO NCC A Pump trip Enter ONI-P43 4

C-ATC/SRO APRM H fails upscale 5

C-BOP/SRO TS-SRO Shutdown HPCS Test Valve, E22-F023 Loses power Tech Specs 3.5.1 & 3.6.1.3 6

C-BOP/SRO R-ATC/SRO Earthquake > OBE Enter ONI-D51 Initiate Normal Rx Shutdown:

Start all ESW loops 7

TS-SRO Earthquake causes leak in SLC tank Tech Spec 3.1.7 8

C-ATC/SRO 2nd Earthquake causes Loss of Feedwater Enter EOP-01 9

M-All MC-ATC Low power ATWS Enter EOP-01-5 10 C-BOP/SRO MC-BOP RCIC auto start failure (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor, (TS)Tech Spec, (MC)Manual Control

NRC Exam Scenario #3 Event Summary The plant reduced power to 96% for surveillance testing a two hours ago, which is now complete. SCC has requested we restore to rated power. The M29 Control Room Humidification Boiler, TBCC Pump C, Stator Water Cooling Pump B, and Hydrogen Analyzer B are tagged out. H2 Analyzer B is one day into the LCO.

Planned activities for the shift include, raising power to 100% IAW reactivity plan and IOI-3, start HPCS in Test Mode to SP, and then restore to standby readiness.

1 The US will direct the Crew to commence power increase to 100% using Rx Recirc flow.

2 The US will direct the BOP to start HPCS in Test (SP to SP) Mode for HPCS Pump vibration testing. SRO will evaluate Tech Specs 3.5.1.

3 At the Lead Evaluators cue, NCC A pump will trip and crew enters ONI-P43 and starts standby NCC pump.

4 At the Lead Evaluators cue, APRM H will fail upscale. The crew will bypass APRM H and reset RPS 1/2 scram 5

Once informed that vibration analysis is complete, the US will direct the BOP to shutdown the HPCS pump. E22-F023 will lose power while closing. BOP will stop HPCS pump. SRO will evaluate Tech Specs 3.5.1 & 3.6.1.3 6

At the Lead Evaluators cue, an OBE earthquake will require entry into ONI-D51 and require a normal reactor shutdown.

7 The earthquake causes a leak from the SLC tank. SRO will evaluate Tech Spec 3.1.7 8

At the Lead Evaluators cue, a 2nd earthquake causes a loss of FW. The US will enter EOP-01.

9 Auto RPS and ARI fail - ATC Arms & Depresses RPS PBs. Several rods fail to insert. The Crew enters EOP-01, RPV Control and transitions to EOP-01-5, ATWS RPV Control. ROs insert control rods and commences cooldown.

10 RCIC fails to auto start at L2 and the BOP will manually initiate RCIC to restore HP injection.

At the Lead Evaluators discretion, and once the crew has demonstrated the ability to manually insert control rods and establish injection to restored RPV, the scenario may be terminated.

Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op. Test No.: 2022-1 Scenario No.: 3 - 96%

Page 1 of 17 Event

Description:

N/A - Driver Instructions Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Driver Driver Simulator Setup:

Reset Simulator to IC 153.

Verify earthquake sound computer works.

Load Schedule File: 2022 Scen-3.sch.

Verify Schedule File NRC 2022 H2 Analyzers.sch loads.

Verify Schedule Files: 2022 Scen-3-A.sch, 2022 Scen-3-Seismic1.sch, & 2022 Scen-3-Seismic2.sch are available to load.

In Director, if necessary, toggle Override ZL1M51HS1B-GRN to OFF Mark-up Crew Sheet to show NI-In NLO Supporting HPCS run.

Driver Driver Verify Initial Conditions:

Reactor Power 96%. MOC_STARTUP_TRAINING_SEQ Pull Sheets, Rods @

Step 67.

IOI-3 Attachment 3 is in progress.

Place yellow switch cap on:

• TBCC Pump C

• Stator Water Cooling Pump B

• H2 Analyzer B SYSTEM FUNCTION SWITCH Green Risk.

Driver Driver Initial Conditions:

Power was reduced two hours ago to 96% for surveillance testing, which is now complete. SCC has requested we restore to rated power. The M29 Control Room Humidification Boiler is tagged out for leak repair. TBCC Pump C, P44-C001C is tagged out for seal replacement. Stator Water Cooling Pump B, N43-C001B is tagged out for bearing replacement. Hydrogen Analyzer B was tagged out yesterday for inlet cooling valve replacement (One day into the LCO). eSOMS Narrative Log is down. PSA Risk is Green and the Grid Risk is Normal.

Turnover: Planned activities; Raise Reactor Power to 100% IAW reactivity plan and IOI-3 per SCC request. Start HPCS in Full Flow Test SP mode for vibration analysis. An NLO is on station to support HPCS startup. Contact Maintenance Engineer for vibration analysis when HPCS is started. Once vibration analysis is complete, place HPCS in Standby.

Perform Prejob Briefs and Reactivity Briefs prior to entering the Simulator.

Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op. Test No.: 2022-1 Scenario No.: 3 - 96%

Event No.:

1 Page 2 of 17 Event

Description:

1

- Raise Reactor Power to 100%

Symptoms/Cue: From Turnover Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Driver Role play as Rx Engineer, RP, SCC, and Chemistry as directed.

SRO Direct ATC to raise reactor power to 100% IAW the Reactivity Plan and IOI-3, Power Maneuvering, Attachment 3.

Provide oversight Evaluator It is expected that the ATC will use Recirc Flow to raise power.

ATC should maintain Loop Flow mismatch <5% (observable on overhead screen)

Target power is 3758 MWT (100%)

ATC Notify RP and Chemistry of intended power change ATC Perform SOI-B33, Reactor Recirculation System to raise Rx power.

Section 7.7, Rcirc Flow Control in Loop Manual 7.7.1 Confirm RCIRC LOOP FLOW CONTROL is in MAN.

1B33K603A 7.7.2 Confirm RCIRC LOOP FLOW CONTROL is in MAN.

1B33K603B 7.7.3 Adjust the following as required for the desired Recirc Flow while maintaining recirculation loop flow mismatch within limits:

RCIRC LOOP FLOW CONTROL 1B33K603A RCIRC LOOP FLOW CONTROL 1B33K603B 7.7.4 When Rcirc Flow Control valves are full open, 1B33K603A/ 1B33K603B then verify that the RCIRC LOOP FLOW CONTROL is not in saturation (approximately 0%/SEC) by monitoring the ICS point RECIRC FCV VEL CONT OUTPUT. B33 EA015/ B33 EA016 ATC Report to SRO that Reactor power has been raised to 100% power using Rx Recirc flow.

ATC Report to SCC that power is at 100%

Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op. Test No.: 2022-1 Scenario No.: 3 - 96%

Event No.:

2 Page 3 of 17 Event

Description:

2

- Start HPCS in Test Mode to Suppression Pool Symptoms/Cue: From Turnover Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Driver Role play as RP, NLOs and Jeff Reeves as directed.

SRO Direct BOP to start HPCS in Test Mode to the Suppression Pool IAW SOI-E22A, High Pressure Core Spray System, section 7.9 HPCS Full Flow Test to Suppression Pool Evaluator HPCS is to be declared Inoperable when operating in secondary mode. (P&L 2.17)

SRO Evaluate Tech Specs for HPCS operating in a secondary mode.

T.S. 3.5.1 Action B.1 - Verify by administrative means RCIC System is OPERABLE when RCIC is required to be OPERABLE. - 1 Hour B.2 - Restore HPCS to OPERABLE status - 14 days BOP Perform SOI-E22A, High Pressure Core Spray System to start HPCS in Test Mode to Suppression Pool 7.9.1 RECORD the appropriate Maintenance Rule status in the Plant Narrative Log.

7.9.2 NOTIFY Radiation Protection that a Suppression Pool evolution will be conducted so the survey frequency may be increased as necessary.

7.9.3 REFER TO SOI-P45/49 and START the HPCS ESW Loop.

BOP 4.5 HPCS ESW Loop Manual Startup from Standby Readiness 4.5.1 TAKE the HPCS ESW PUMP control switch to START.

1P45C002 4.5.2 VERIFY the following:

• HPCS ESW PUMP DISCH VALVE starts opening.

1P45-F140

• WHEN the discharge valve reaches approximately 10% open, THEN the HPCS ESW PUMP starts.

1P45C002

• HPCS ESW PUMP DISCH VALVE opens fully.

1P45-F140 4.5.3 DIRECT Chemistry to perform the following:

• OBTAIN required samples per REC-0104.

• CHLORINATE HPCS ESW as required.

4.5.4 RECORD in the Narrative Log a Channel Check of ESW Effluent flow indication per the Technical Specification Rounds.

BOP Continues with HPCS startup.

7.9.4 REFER TO SOI-G42 and VERIFY the Suppression Pool Cleanup System is shutdown.

Verifies SPCU is shutdown.

Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op. Test No.: 2022-1 Scenario No.: 3 - 96%

Event No.:

2 Page 4 of 17 Event

Description:

2

- Start HPCS in Test Mode to Suppression Pool Symptoms/Cue: From Turnover Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP Continues with HPCS startup.

7.9.5 VERIFY the HPCS SUPR POOL SUCTION VALVE is open.

1E22F015 7.9.6 VERIFY the HPCS CST SUCTION VALVE is closed.

1E22F001 7.9.7 TAKE the HPCS PUMP to START.

1E22C001 7.9.8 VERIFY the HPCS PUMP MIN FLOW VALVE opens.

BOP CAUTION Prior to opening 1E22-F023, the HPCS Pump must be running to prevent draining HPCS lines to the Suppression Pool which may result in severe water hammer.

7.9.9 WHILE performing the following step, VERIFY the HPCS PUMP MIN FLOW VALVE closes WHEN HPCS PUMP FLOW is >725 gpm.1E22F012 1E22R603 7.9.10 HOLD the HPCS TEST VALVE TO SUPR POOL in OPEN UNTIL one of the following conditions is met:

1E22F023

• HPCS PUMP FLOW indicates 7800 gpm 1E22-R603

• HPCS TEST VALVE TO SUPR POOL is full open.

1E22-F023

Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op. Test No.: 2022-1 Scenario No.: 3 - 96%

Event No.:

3 Page 5 of 17 Event

Description:

3

- NCC A Pump trip Enter ONI-P43 Symptoms/Cue: ARI-H13-P970-B1 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Driver

• When directed, insert Event 3.

• Role play as NLO as directed.

• If asked to investigate NCC A pump, report that you observe nothing abnormal.

• If asked to investigate NCC A breaker XH1102, report that the Overcurrent relay is tripped.

ATC Announce unexpected P970 alarm and give stability report.

BOP Announce NCC PUMP DISCH HEADER PRESSURE LOW alarm. Walkdown H13-P970 and determine NCC A Pump is not running.

BOP Review ARI-H13-P970-0001-B1, 4.1 REFER TO ONI-P43, Loss of Nuclear Closed Cooling.

Inform the SRO of entry condition for ONI-P43, Loss of Nuclear Closed Cooling SRO Enters ONI-P43, Loss of Nuclear Closed Cooling Evaluator The BOP should perform ONI-P43 Immediate Actions from memory without SRO direction Immediate Action 3.1 is N/A BOP The BOP will start a Standby NCC pump IAW the Immediate Actions of ONI-P43 3.0 Immediate Actions 3.2 Only one NCC Pump is running A Standby NCC Pump is available START a standby NCC Pump SRO Directs the BOP to perform Supplemental Actions of ONI-P43 BOP Reviews ONI-P43 Supplemental Actions and determines none are applicable and informs SRO

Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op. Test No.: 2022-1 Scenario No.: 3 - 96%

Event No.:

4 Page 6 of 17 Event

Description:

4

- APRM H fails upscale Symptoms/Cue: ARI-H13-P680-06-C4 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Driver

• When directed, insert Event 4.

• Role play as I&C as directed.

• If asked to investigate APRM failure, report that you agree it looks failed and you will write a Notification and a CR.

ATC Announce multiple unexpected P680 alarms and give stability report.

ATC Announce APRM UPSC INOP/TRIP OPRM D/H TRIP & ROD BLOCK APRM UPSCALE alarms. Walkdown H13-P680 and determine that APRM H failed and informs SRO Reviews ARIs for possible cause and actions to perform and informs SRO:

• ROD BLOCK APRM UPSCALE 4.6 If an APRM has failed, then refer to SOI-C51 (APRM) and bypass it.

SRO Directs BOP/ATC to bypass APRM H and reset 1/2 scram.

BOP/ATC Perform SOI-C51(APRM), Average Power Range Monitor System to bypass APRM H 7.4 Bypassing an APRM Channel 7.4.1 Refer to Technical Specification Table 3.3.1.1-1 Item 2 for applicability.

7.4.3 Place the NEUTRON MONITOR BYPASS, APRM joystick on 1H13-P680, in the BYPASS position for the APRM Channel being bypassed. 1C51B-S6 CH H 7.4.4 Confirm that the APRM Bypass status light comes on at the selected APRMs Power Range Neutron Mon Panel. 1H13-P672 ATC/BOP Perform SOI-C71, Reactor Protection System to reset the half scram.

7.4 Reset RPS 7.4.1 Verify the following:

• The conditions which caused the full or half scram have cleared.

• There is reasonable assurance that another scram signal will not be generated.

7.4.4 Momentarily depress the appropriate RPS division pushbuttons on P680: RPS B 1C71A-S5D ATC Inform SRO that APRM H was bypassed and the half scram was reset.

Evaluator Tech Spec require 3 Operable channels per trip system - LCO 3.3.1.1 is met SRO Evaluate Tech Specs and determine LCO 3.3.1.1 is met.

Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op. Test No.: 2022-1 Scenario No.: 3 - 96%

Event No.:

5 Page 7 of 17 Event

Description:

5

- Shutdown HPCS Test Valve, E22-F023 Loses power Symptoms/Cue: ARI-H13-P601-16-D4 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Driver

• When directed, call the Control Room as Maintenance Engineer and inform them that vibration testing is completed and is satisfactory and inform them that the HPCS pump may be shutdown.

• Role play as NLO as directed.

• If asked to investigate MCC EF1E1-L for E22-F023, report that the control power transformer is heat damaged and the control power fuse is blown.

• If directed to close E22-F023 locally, respond that the valve is stuck.

• If directed to S/D HPCS to secured status, initiate Event 27 to rack out breaker EH1304. Initiate Event 28 to open EF1E1-F for E22-F004 (inj valve) and initiate Event 29 to open EF1E1-C for water leg pump.

SRO Directs the BOP to shutdown the HPCS pump to standby Evaluator While closing 1E22F023, the valve will lose power while still partially open.

BOP Continues SOI-E22A, Section 7.9 7.9.11 WHEN desired to shutdown Full Flow Test to the Suppression Pool, THEN PERFORM the remaining steps of this section.

7.9.12 HOLD the HPCS TEST VALVE TO SUPR POOL in CLOSE UNTIL the HPCS PUMP FLOW is 500-600 gpm.

1E22F023 1E22R603 ATC Announce unexpected P601 alarm and give stability report.

BOP Announce HPCS OUT OF SERVICE alarm received.

BOP Recognizes the MOV POWER LOSS amber light illuminated on the status matrix, the loss of valve indication on 1E22-F023, and flow indicated on 1E22-R603 and informs the SRO SRO Evaluate Tech Specs T.S. 3.5.1 Action Previously evaluated when HPCS was started. RAs are still applicable.

T.S.3.6.1.3 Action A.1 - Isolate the affected penetration flow path - 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> Evaluator Isolation of the affected penetration flow path requires HPCS pump to be shutdown.

SRO Direct BOP to shutdown HPCS pump.

BOP Continues SOI-E22A, Section 7.9 7.9.15 Take the HPCS pump to stop.

1E22-C001 Inform SRO that HPCS is shutdown.

Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op. Test No.: 2022-1 Scenario No.: 3 - 96%

Event No.:

6 Page 8 of 17 Event

Description:

6

- Earthquake > OBE Enter ONI-D51 Initiate Normal Rx Shutdown & Start all ESW loops Symptoms/Cue: ARI-H13-P680-08-C3 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Driver

• When directed, initiate Event 6. Then, call the control room as the Security Shift Supervisor and report that several Officers reported they felt an earthquake.

• Role play as directed.

• If asked about ERROR OR TROUBLE LEDs on local panel H51-P021 -

respond that none are illuminated.

• If asked about TRIGGER LEDs on local panel H51-P021 - respond that all are illuminated.

• Five minutes after earthquake, after being directed to local panel H51-P021, report OBE and CAV lights are illuminated.

ATC Announce multiple unexpected alarms and give stability report.

ATC Announce SEISMIC ALARM P969 & multiple equipment vibration alarms.

Reviews ARI H13-P680-8-C3 for possible cause and actions to perform:

4.1 If personnel on site felt an earthquake, then go to ONI-D51 Earthquake.

4.2 Report indications from local panel H51-P021 to the Control Room.

Directs NLO to report to H51-P021 and report indications.

Evaluator The OBE ALARM light on P696 will illuminate 5 minutes after the earthquake.

Startup of ESW pumps is performed after the light illuminates.

BOP Walks down P969 and observe seismic TRIGGER ALARM light illuminated and inform SRO.

Continues to monitor P969 for OBE light illumination SRO Enters ONI-D51 Earthquake Directs the BOP to perform ONI-D51 Supplemental Actions.

BOP Performs ONI-D51 Supplemental Actions.

4.1 DETERMINE magnitude of the earthquake in accordance with Section 1.0 Parameters from indications received at the following:

(Direct NLO to investigate Seismic Instrument Panel, H51-P021 at IBO/02 599.)

BOP 4.5 IF indications exist that OBE levels have been exceeded, THEN PERFORM the following concurrently:

4.5.1 PERFORM the following:

• REFER TO Attachment 2, Inside Actions and PERFORM the required actions.

• REFER TO Attachment 1, Safe Shutdown Buildings/Areas Inspection and INSPECT Safe Shutdown Buildings/Areas to ensure that Safe Shutdown capability is maintained.

• REFER TO Attachment 3, Outside Actions and PERFORM the required actions.

Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op. Test No.: 2022-1 Scenario No.: 3 - 96%

Event No.:

6 Page 9 of 17 Event

Description:

6

- Earthquake > OBE Enter ONI-D51 Initiate Normal Rx Shutdown & Start all ESW loops Symptoms/Cue: ARI-H13-P680-08-C3 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP (BOP starts all loops of ESW and ESW Pump House Ventilation) 4.5.2 REFER TO SOI-P45/49 and PERFORM the following:

• ESW Loop A (B) Manual Startup from Standby Readiness.

• HPCS ESW Manual Startup from Standby Readiness.

BOP/ATC 4.5.3 Evaluate the following plant parameters to determine the extent of any plant damage:

• Control rod positions

• Reactor power and water level

• Feedwater flow and Steam flow

• Generator load

• Condenser vacuum

• Turbine vibration and bearing temperatures

• Sump alarms and pump-out rates.

• Off-Gas flow rates

• Airborne, Process and Area Radiation Monitors BOP 4.5.5 IF Cumulative Absolute Velocity (CAV) has been exceeded, then perform a normal reactor shutdown in accordance with IOI-3, Power Changes and IOI-4, Shutdown.

SRO Directs crew to commence a normal reactor shutdown in accordance with IOI-3 starting at Section 4.7 ATC Commences lowering Rx power IAW Reactivity Plan (insert control rods - 1 group then Recirc Flow to 58 Mlbm/hr.)

Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op. Test No.: 2022-1 Scenario No.: 3 - 96%

Event No.:

7 Page 10 of 17 Event

Description:

7

- Earthquake causes leak in SLC tank Symptoms/Cue: ARI-H13-P601-19-F1 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Driver

• Event 7 is initiated by Event 6 and will become apparent a few minutes after the earthquake.

• Role play as NLO as directed.

• If asked to investigate SLC tank leak, report that there is a cracked weld on the B pump suction line at the tank.

ATC Announce unexpected P601 alarm and give stability report.

BOP Announce SLC STORAGE TANK LEVEL HI/LO P601-19A, F1.

SRO Directs the BOP to report the level in the SLC Tank SRO Evaluate Tech Specs T.S. 3.1.7 Action A.1 - Restore SLC subsystem to operable status - 7 days B.1 - Restore one SLC subsystem to OPERABLE status - 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />

Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op. Test No.: 2022-1 Scenario No.: 3 - 96%

Event No.:

8 Page 11 of 17 Event

Description:

8

- 2nd Earthquake causes Loss of Feedwater Enter EOP-01 Symptoms/Cue: ARI-H13-P680-03-D6, D7, & D8 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Driver When directed, insert Event 8.

Call Control Room as Security SS to inform that aftershock reported by guards.

Evaluator Automatic and manual scram actions will not work. Also, if RPV level lowers to L2, automatic ARI will not insert rods. Control rods must be manually inserted.

ATC Announce 2nd earthquake and multiple unexpected alarms.

ATC Recognizes loss of all feedwater.

Informs crew of loss of feedwater and intent to scram the Rx.

Takes actions to scram the Rx.

BOP Make Plant announcement for the Scram and evacuate containment ATC Recognizes failure of Mode Switch and RPS pushbuttons and initiates ARI.

ATC Performs Scram Hard Card Actions:

1. VERIFY the following actions completed:

• Mode Switch Locked in Shutdown. (Note power once scram signal inserted)

• RPS Initiated, if all control rods are not fully inserted.

• ARI Initiated, if RPS failed to Scram the reactor.

Evaluator Step 2 below is N/A as Rx power is < 4%.

ATC

2. IF Reactor power is above 4%, THEN PERFORM the following:

ATC

3. STABILIZE Reactor level using Feedwater / RCIC / HPCS.

4. STABILIZE Reactor pressure using Turbine / Turbine Bypass valves / SRVs ATC

5. PERFORM crew update with the following information:

• The Mode Switch is locked in shutdown (RPS and ARI initiated if required)

• Reactor Power is ________________%

• Reactor Pressure is _______________psig

• Reactor Level is __________________inches

• EOP-01 Entry IS / IS NOT met ATC Inform SRO that 5 control rods are not fully inserted.

SRO Announce entry into EOP-01, RPV Control SRO Works way through EOP-01 chart and answers NO at Decision Diamond, Is the Reactor shutdown by control rods SRO Transitions to EOP-01-5, ATWS RPV Control

Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op. Test No.: 2022-1 Scenario No.: 3 - 96%

Event No.:

9 Page 12 of 17 Event

Description:

9

- Low power ATWS Enter EOP-01-5 Symptoms/Cue: Control Rod positions / Rod Full-In lights Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO Announces entry into EOP-01-5, ATWS RPV Control.

SRO Enters Power Control leg:

Directs ATC to perform EOP-SPI 1.1 through 1.7 to insert control rods.

(Critical Task 1)

Evaluator EOP-SPI 1.3 will be most expeditious method to insert the control rods.

ATC/BOP Coordinate to perform EOP-SPI 1.2 and/or 1.3 to insert control rods (Critical Task 1)

ATC Announce control rods are inserting.

Announce when all control rods are inserted.

SRO Enters Pressure Control leg:

Direct ATC to maintain pressure band of 800 to 1000 psig (nominal) or lower if required.

ATC Maintains RPV pressure in directed band.

Performs Pressure Control Hardcard actions if required SRO Enters Level Control leg:

Directs BOP to Inhibit ADS.

Direct BOP to verify Actuations and Isolations for L3 and L2.

Direct BOP to perform EOP-SPI 2.5, Bypass of LOCA Interlocks.

Direct ATC to restore/maintain RPV level band of 178 to 219 inches (nominal) or -

25 to 100 inches (maximum) using one of more of the Table L-1 Injection Sources (Critical Task 2)

BOP Inhibits ADS.

Verifies Actuations and Isolations for L3 and L2.

Perform EOP-SPI 2.5, Bypass of LOCA Interlocks.

ATC/BOP Determines RCIC did not auto start on Level 2 Evaluator RCIC failure to start continued on next event.

SRO Transition to EOP-01 when all control rods are inserted.

Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op. Test No.: 2022-1 Scenario No.: 3 - 96%

Event No.: 10 Page 13 of 17 Event

Description:

10 - RCIC auto start failure Symptoms/Cue: RPV level/RCIC Initiation Status Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Evaluator HPCS is unable to inject to the RPV due to the failed Test Valve BOP Recognize that RCIC failed to initiate on L2 and inform the SRO.

SRO Direct the ATC/BOP to start RCIC IAW EOP-SPI 6.6 (Critical Task 2)

Evaluator EOP-SPI 6.6 steps 1 and 2 may be performed from memory.

ATC/BOP Performs RCIC Start IAW EOP-SPI 6.6 2.0 IF RCIC is in Standby Readiness, THEN PERFORM the following:

2.1 ARM AND DEPRESS the RCIC MAN INIT.

1E51A-S37 (ATC/BOP restores RPV level to directed band) (Critical Task 2)

Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op. Test No.: 2022-1 Scenario No.: 3 - 96%

Page 14 of 17 Event

Description:

Scenario Termination Criteria Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

1. All control rods are inserted.

2. Injects to establish RPV level between 150 and 219.

3. Lead Examiners discretion

Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op. Test No.: 2022-1 Scenario No.: 3 - 96%

Page 15 of 17 Event

Description:

Critical Task 1 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior With reactor scram required and the reactor not shutdown, initiate action to reduce power by inserting control rods.

1.

Safety Significance:

Shutting down reactor can preclude failure of Containment or equipment necessary for the safe shutdown of the plant.

2.

Cues:

Procedural compliance.

3.

Measured by:

Control rod insertion commenced in accordance with Section 1.0 of EOP-SPI's.

4.

Feedback:

Reactor Power trend.

Control Rod indication.

Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op. Test No.: 2022-1 Scenario No.: 3 - 96%

Page 16 of 17 Event

Description:

Critical Task 2 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Prior to decision to Emergency Depressurize based on low RPV level, RCIC is manually initiated or started.

1.

Safety Significance:

Maintaining adequate core cooling.

2.

Cues:

RPV level indication.

3.

Measured by:

RCIC is manually started and used for injection before decision to perform Emergency Depressurization is made.

4.

Feedback:

RPV level trend.

RCIC injection valve open.

Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op. Test No.: 2022-1 Scenario No.:3 - 96%

Page 17 of 17 Event

Description:

Procedures to verify clean Procedure Number Check IV Procedure Number Check IV ARI-H13-P601-19-F1 ARI-H13-P680-03-D6, D7, & D8 ARI-H13-P680-05(B7, B9, E10)

ARI-H13-P680-06 (C4, E5)

ARI-H13-P680-08-C3 ARI-H13-P970-B1 EOP & ONI Charts EOP-SPI 1.11.7 EOP-SPI 2.3 EOP-SPI 2.8 EOP-SPI-6.6 Hardcards - All ONI-C34 ONI-D51 ONI-P43 SOI-B33 P&Ls & Section 7.7 SOI-C51 (APRM) P&Ls & Section 7.4 SOI-C71 P&L & 7.4 SOI-E22A P&Ls & Section 7.2 & 7.9 SOI-G42 6.1 & 6.2 SOI-P45/49 P&Ls & Section 4.2 & 4.5 SRO Oversight Checklist TS 3.1.7 and Bases TS 3.3.1.1 and Bases and Table TS 3.5.1 and Bases TS 3.6.1.3 and Bases