ML22314A037
| ML22314A037 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Watts Bar  |
| Issue date: | 11/10/2022 |
| From: | NRC/RGN-II |
| To: | Tennessee Valley Authority |
| References | |
| Download: ML22314A037 (1) | |
Text
Form 3.2-1 Administrative Topics Outline Facility: Watts Bar Date of Examination: 8/8/2022 Examination Level: RO Operating Test Number: 2022-301 Administrative Topic (Step 1)
Activity and Associated K/A (Step 2)
Type Code (Step 3)
Conduct of Operations Calculate QPTR 2.1.25 (3.9)
Ability to interpret reference materials, such as graphs, curves, and tables R, M Conduct of Operations Determine RO License Status 2.1.4 (3.3)
Knowledge of individual licensed operator responsibilities related to shift staffing, such as medical requirements, no-solo operation, maintenance of active license status, 10CFR55, etc R, M Equipment Control CCP Quarterly 2.2.12 (3.7)
Knowledge of surveillance procedures R, N Radiation Control Calculate Stay Time for Emergency Exposure 2.3.12 (3.2)
Knowledge of radiological safety principles and procedures pertaining to licensed operator duties, such as response to radiation monitor alarms, containment entry requirements, fuel handling responsibilities, access to locked high-radiation areas, or alignment of filters R, M Emergency Plan N/A for RO ML22314A037
Instructions for completing Form 3.2-1, Administrative Topics Outline
- 1. For each license level, determine the number of administrative job performance measures (JPMs) and topic areas as follows:
Topic Number of JPMs RO*
SRO and RO Retakes Conduct of Operations 1 (or 2) 2 Equipment Control 1 (or 0) 1 Radiation Control 1 (or 0) 1 Emergency Plan 1 (or 0) 1 Total 4
5
- 2. Enter the associated knowledge and abilities (K/A) statement and summarize the administrative activities for each JPM.
- 3. For each JPM, specify the type codes for location and source as follows:
Location:
(C)ontrol room, (S)imulator, or Class(R)oom Source and Source Criteria:
(P)revious two NRC exams (no more than one JPM that is randomly selected from last two NRC exams)
(D)irect from bank (no more than three for ROs, no more than four for SROs and RO retakes)
(N)ew or Significantly (M)odified from bank (no fewer than one)
- Reactor operator (RO) applicants do not need to be evaluated on every topic (i.e., Equipment Control, Radiation Control, or Emergency Plan can be omitted by doubling up on Conduct of Operations), unless the applicant is taking only the administrative topics portion of the operating test (with a waiver or excusal of the other portions).
Conduct of Operations 1. The examinee calculates Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio using 2-SI-0-21, Excore QPTR & Axial Flux Difference, Attachment 1, QPTR Determination Using Detector Currents. Evaluates results and concludes that the acceptance criteria for 2-SI-0-21, Excore QPTR & Axial Flux Difference, Section 6.1, Excore QPTR Determination is NOT met for N-41, -42, and -44 Lower Detectors. JPM is a MODIFIED bank JPM.
Conduct of Operations 2. The examinee will review and determine RO license status in accordance with OPDP-10, License Status Maintenance, Reactivation, and Proficiency for Non-Licensed Positions.
Examinee determines; RO A is ACTIVE, RO B is INACTIVE, RO C is ACTIVE. JPM is a MODIFIED bank JPM.
Equipment Control. The examinee will perform 1-SI-62-901-A, Centrifugal Charging Pump 1A-A Quarterly Performance Test. Examinee will determine if flow, differential pressure, and pump and motor vibration are within acceptable ranges IAW 1-SI-62-901-A. Examinee determines: Pump flow and differential pressure meet standards, Pump vibration is within the Required Action Range, Speed increaser and motor vibration are in the Alert Range. JPM is a NEW JPM.
Radiation Control. Given current radiation levels and times to complete several tasks, the examinee calculates the Expected Dose for each task and the Expected Total Dose for AUOs 1 and 2 at the completion of the tasks. JPM is a MODIFIED bank JPM.
Form 3.2-1 Administrative Topics Outline Facility: Watts Bar Date of Examination: 8/8/2022 Examination Level: SRO and SROU Operating Test Number: 301 Administrative Topic (Step 1)
Activity and Associated K/A (Step 2)
Type Code (Step 3)
Conduct of Operations Calculate QPTR SRO evaluate Tech Specs 2.1.25 (4.2)
Ability to interpret reference materials, such as graphs, curves, and tables R, M Conduct of Operations Determine License Status 2.1.4 (3.8)
Knowledge of individual licensed operator responsibilities related to shift staffing, such as medical requirements, no-solo operation, maintenance of active license status, 10CFR55, etc R, M Equipment Control CCP Quarterly review SRO evaluate Tech Specs 2.2.12 (4.1)
Knowledge of surveillance procedures R, N Radiation Control Determine ACTIONS required to allow release to continue 2.3.11 (4.3)
Ability to control radiation releases R, N Emergency Plan NOUE Loss of level above spent fuel 2.4.38 (4.4)
Ability to take actions called for in the facility emergency plan, including supporting or acting as emergency coordinator if required R, N
Instructions for completing Form 3.2-1, Administrative Topics Outline
- 1. For each license level, determine the number of administrative job performance measures (JPMs) and topic areas as follows:
Topic Number of JPMs RO*
SRO and RO Retakes Conduct of Operations 1 (or 2) 2 Equipment Control 1 (or 0) 1 Radiation Control 1 (or 0) 1 Emergency Plan 1 (or 0) 1 Total 4
5
- 2. Enter the associated knowledge and abilities (K/A) statement and summarize the administrative activities for each JPM.
- 3. For each JPM, specify the type codes for location and source as follows:
Location:
(C)ontrol room, (S)imulator, or Class(R)oom Source and Source Criteria:
(P)revious two NRC exams (no more than one JPM that is randomly selected from last two NRC exams)
(D)irect from bank (no more than three for ROs, no more than four for SROs and RO retakes)
(N)ew or Significantly (M)odified from bank (no fewer than one)
- Reactor operator (RO) applicants do not need to be evaluated on every topic (i.e., Equipment Control, Radiation Control, or Emergency Plan can be omitted by doubling up on Conduct of Operations), unless the applicant is taking only the administrative topics portion of the operating test (with a waiver or excusal of the other portions).
Conduct of Operations 1. The examinee Calculates Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio using 2-SI-0-21, Excore QPTR & Axial Flux Difference, Attachment 1, QPTR Determination Using Detector Currents. Evaluates results and concludes that the acceptance criterion for 2-SI-0-21, Excore QPTR & Axial Flux Difference, Section 6.1, Excore QPTR Determination is NOT met for N-41, -42, and -44 Lower Detectors. SRO will determine LCO 3.2.4 IS NOT MET. JPM is a MODIFIED bank JPM.
Conduct of Operations 2. The examinee will review and determine license status. Examinee determines; RO A is ACTIVE, RO B is INACTIVE, SRO C is INACTIVE. JPM is a MODIFIED bank JPM.
Equipment Control. The examinee will perform 1-SI-62-901-A, Centrifugal Charging Pump 1A-A Quarterly Performance Test. SRO to evaluate appropriate LCOs. Examinee will determine if flow, differential pressure, and pump and motor vibration are within acceptable ranges IAW 1-SI-62-901-A.
Examinee determines: Pump flow and differential pressure meet standards, Pump vibration is within the Required Action Range, Speed increaser and motor vibration are in the Alert Range. Examinee will determine LCO 3.5.2 NOT MET due to pump vibration in the Required Action Range. JPM is a NEW JPM.
Radiation Control. Given that the Unit 2 Condenser Vacuum Exhaust Monitor is taken out of service for maintenance, the Examinee is expected to identify the correct governing plant procedure and the ACTIONS required to allow continued releases. JPM is a NEW JPM.
Emergency Plan. The event is classified as a NOUE based on EAL RU2 - UNPLANNED loss of water level above irradiated fuel. Notifications are made per EPIP-2. The declaration is made within 15 minutes of task start and state notification made within 15 minutes of declaration. JPM is a NEW JPM.
Form 3.2-2 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Facility: __Watts Bar_________________ Date of Examination: 08/08/2022 Operating Test Number: __2022-301__
Exam Level:
RO SRO-I SRO-U System/JPM Title Type Code Safety Function Control Room Systems A. Respond to continuous rod motion 001AA1.05 (4.2)
Respond to continuous rod motion with no demand per 1-AOI-2 A, S, M 1
B. Place Excess Letdown in Service 004A4.06 (3.8)
Place excess letdown in service per 1-AOI RCS leak A, S, M 2
C. Isolate Cold Leg Accumulators E03EA1.06 (4.1)
Isolate Cold Leg Accumulators per 1-E-1 A, S, E, M 3
D. Swap RHR from Train A to Train B 005A2.03 (3.8/3.9)
Swap RHR Trains per 1-SOI-74.01, Loss of RHR A, S, L, N 4P E. Place RHR Spray in Service 026A2.04 (3.9/4.0)
Place RHR Spray in service per 1-E-1 S, M, EN 5
F. Transfer Unit Board 1C 062A4.08 (4.0)
Transfer Unit Board 1C per 1-SOI-201.03 A, S, N 6
G. Startup Instrument Room Purge 029A4.01 (2.7)
Place Instrument Purge in service per 1-SOI-30.02 S, D 8
H. Alternate TBBPs 003A4.08 (3.5)
Alternate TBBPs per 1-SOI-70.01 S, D 4P
In-Plant Systems I. Alignment Upper Containment Monitor to Lower Containment Locally (Unit 2) 073A4.02 (3.7)
Alignment Upper Containment Monitor to Lower Containment per 0-SOI-90.02 R, N 7
J. Remote Shutdown of Ventilation for Loss of Auxiliary Air 078A4.030 (3.2)
Perform 0-AOI-10 Attachment 2 to OPEN breakers for remote shutdown of Ventilation N, E 8
K. Isolate a Steam Generator Tube Leak (MSIV Fails to Close) per 2-E-3 Attachment 4 038EA1.01 (3.8)
N, E 4S
- 1. Determine the number of control room system and in-plant system job performance measures (JPMs) to develop using the following table:
License Level Control Room In-Plant Total Reactor Operator (RO) 8 3
11 Senior Reactor Operator-Instant (SRO-I) 7 3
10 Senior Reactor Operator-Upgrade (SRO-U) 2 or 3 3 or 2 5
- 2. Select safety functions and systems for each JPM as follows:
Refer to Section 1.9 of the applicable knowledge and abilities (K/A) catalog for the plant systems organized by safety function. For pressurized-water reactor operating tests, the primary and secondary systems listed under Safety Function 4, Heat Removal from Reactor Core, in Section 1.9 of the applicable K/A catalog, may be treated as separate safety functions (i.e., two systems, one primary and one secondary, may be selected from Safety Function 4). From the safety function groupings identified in the K/A catalog, select the appropriate number of plant systems by safety functions to be evaluated based on the applicants license level (see the table in step 1).
For RO/SRO-I applicants: Each of the control room system JPMs and, separately, each of the in-plant system JPMs must evaluate a different safety function, and the same system or evolution cannot be used to evaluate more than one safety function in each location. One of the control room system JPMs must be an engineered safety feature.
For SRO-U applicants: Evaluate SRO-U applicants on five different safety functions.
One of the control room system JPMs must be an engineered safety feature, and the same system or evolution cannot be used to evaluate more than one safety function.
- 3. Select a task for each JPM that supports, either directly or indirectly and in a meaningful way, the successful fulfillment of the associated safety function. Select the task from the applicable K/A catalog (K/As for plant systems or emergency and abnormal plant evolutions) or the facility licensees site-specific task list. If this task has an associated K/A, the K/A should have an importance rating of at least 2.5 in the RO column. K/As that have importance ratings of less than 2.5 may be used if justified based on plant priorities; inform the NRC chief examiner if selecting K/As with an importance rating less than 2.5.
The selected tasks must be different from the events and evolutions conducted during the simulator operating test and tasks tested on the written examination. A task that is similar to a simulator scenario event may be acceptable if the actions required to complete the task are significantly different from those required in response to the scenario event.
Apply the following specific task selection criteria:
At least one of the tasks shall be related to a shutdown or low-power condition.
Four to six of the tasks for RO and SRO-I applicants shall require execution of alternative paths within the facility licensees operating procedures. Two to three of the tasks for SRO-U applicants shall require execution of alternative paths within the facility licensees operating procedures.
At least one alternate path JPM must be new or modified from the bank.
At least one of the tasks conducted in the plant shall evaluate the applicants ability to implement actions required during an emergency or abnormal condition.
At least one of the tasks conducted in the plant shall require the applicant to enter the radiologically controlled area. This provides an excellent opportunity for the applicant to discuss or demonstrate radiation control administrative subjects.
If it is not possible to develop or locate a suitable task for a selected system, return to step 2 and select a different system.
- 4. For each JPM, specify the codes for type, source, and location:
Code License Level Criteria RO SRO-I SRO-U (A)lternate path 4-6 4-6 2-3 (C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank 9
8 4
(E)mergency or abnormal in-plant 1
1 1
(EN)gineered safety feature (for control room system) 1 1
1 (L)ow power/shutdown 1
1 1
(N)ew or (M)odified from bank (must apply to at least one alternate path JPM) 2 2
1 (P)revious two exams (randomly selected) 3 3
2 (R)adiologically controlled area 1
1 1
(S)imulator
A. Unit 1 power 100%. PRM N42 failed last shift and has been repaired. 1-AOI-4 Section 3.4, has been completed through step 16.a. Examinee has been directed to restore PRM N42 to service to complete 1-AOI-4. During PRM N42 restoration, when rods are placed in AUTO, group Delta rods will insert with no demand requiring the examinee to trip the reactor in accordance with 1-AOI-2, Malfunction of Reactor Control System. This JPM is a MODIFIED JPM.
B. Unit 1 100% power. Small leak on normal letdown. Examinee is directed to place excess letdown in service per 1-AOI-6, Step 16 RNO. During the evolution, a RCS leak will develop and the examinee should determine that reactor trip conditions will be met imminently and the reactor should be tripped. The examinee may consult 1-AOI-6 or may take action as a prudent action once reactor trip conditions are met and the automatic actions failed. JPM is a MODIFIED bank JPM.
C. A large break LOCA has occurred. 1-E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant, has just been resumed after performance of 1-ES-1.3, Transfer to Containment Sump. Appendix A, CLA Breaker Operation, of 1-E-1 is complete. The examinee is directed to isolate Cold Leg Accumulators in accordance with 1-E-1, Step 25. When the examinee closes the first CLA isolation valve, a loss of 6.9 kV SDBD 1B requires the examine to vent Cold Leg Accumulators 2 and 4 using step 25 RNO. JPM is a MODIFIED bank JPM.
D. Unit 1 is in Mode 5. The examinees is directed to swap RHR from A to B train. A train RHR pump will trip requiring response per 1-AOI-14, Loss of RHR Shutdown Cooling. This is a NEW JPM.
E. Unit 1 was at 100% when a Large Break LOCA occurred. 1-E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant, has just been resumed after performance of 1-ES-1.3, Transfer to Containment Sump.
The examinee is directed to perform 1-E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant, Step 26, DETERMINE if RHR spray should be placed in service. JPM is a MODIFIED bank JPM.
F. Unit 1 is at 100% power, 1C 6.9KV Unit board is powered from its alternate source. The examinee is directed to transfer 1C Unit Board to Normal using 1-SOI-201.3, 6.9 KV Unit Board 1C. The transfer fails requiring entry into and performance of 1-AOI-37, Turbine Runback Section 3.4, Manual Turbine Runback. This JPM is a NEW JPM.
G. The examinee places Instrument Room Purge in service using 1-SOI-30.02, Containment Purge System, Section 5.4, Start Up Instrument Room Purge, steps 6 through Step 11. This is a BANK JPM.
H. Thermal Barrier Booster Pump 1B is started. Thermal Barrier Booster Pump 1A is stopped and both hand switches are returned to P-AUTO per 1-SOI-70.01, Section 8.7. This is a BANK JPM.
I. Unit 2 startup is in progress. Power is currently 10%. 2-RM-90-106, Lower Containment Air Monitor, and 2-RM-90-112, Upper Containment Air Monitor, were aligned and were sampling their respective containments (normal alignment). 2-RM-90-106 has tripped, neither sample pump could be restarted, and the monitor was shutdown per the appropriate procedure. The examinee is directed to align 2-RM-90-112 to sample lower containment in accordance with 0-SOI-90.02, Section 8.3, Step [5]. This JPM is a NEW JPM.
J. Control Room operators are responding to a Loss of Auxiliary Air using 0-AOI-10, Loss of Control Air, Section 3.2, Loss of Auxiliary Air, due to an unisolable header rupture. The examinee is directed to perform Attachment 2 of 0-AOI-10 for the A Train Air Header. This JPM is a NEW JPM.
K. Unit 2 is in Mode 3 after a Steam Generator tube rupture on SG #2. The Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) on SG # 2 has failed to close. The examinee is directed to locally isolate the steam traps and Main Feed Pump Turbine on the main steam system by performing 2-E-3,, Steamline Isolation (Local). This JPM is a NEW JPM.
Form 3.2-2 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Facility: __Watts Bar_________________ Date of Examination: 08/08/2022 Operating Test Number: __2022-301__
Exam Level:
RO SRO-I SRO-U System/JPM Title Type Code Safety Function Control Room Systems A. Respond to continuous rod motion 001AA1.05 (4.2)
Respond to continuous rod motion with no demand per 1-AOI-2 A, S, M 1
B. Place Excess Letdown in Service 004A4.06 (3.8)
Place excess letdown in service per 1-AOI RCS leak A, S, M 2
C. Isolate Cold Leg Accumulators E03EA1.06 (4.1)
Isolate Cold Leg Accumulators per 1-E-1 A, S, E, M 3
D. Swap RHR from Train A to Train B 005A2.03 (3.8/3.9)
Swap RHR Trains per 1-SOI-74.01, Loss of RHR A, S, L, N 4P E. Place RHR Spray in Service 026A2.04 (3.9/4.0)
Place RHR Spray in service per 1-E-1 S, M, EN 5
F. Transfer Unit Board 1C 062A4.08 (4.0)
Transfer Unit Board 1C per 1-SOI-201.03 A, S, N 6
G. Startup Instrument Room Purge 029A4.01 (2.7)
Place Instrument Purge in service per 1-SOI-30.02 S, D 8
H. RO ONLY
In-Plant Systems I. Alignment Upper Containment Monitor to Lower Containment Locally (Unit 2) 073A4.02 (3.6)
Alignment Upper Containment Monitor to Lower Containment per 0-SOI-90.02 R, N 7
J. Remote Shutdown of Ventilation for Loss of Auxiliary Air 078A4.030 (3.2)
AOI-10 Attachment 2 to OPEN breakers for remote shutdown of Ventilation N, E 8
K. Isolate a Steam Generator Tube Leak (MSIV Fails to Close per 2-E-3 Attachment 4 038EA1.01 (3.8)
N, E 4S
- 1. Determine the number of control room system and in-plant system job performance measures (JPMs) to develop using the following table:
License Level Control Room In-Plant Total Reactor Operator (RO) 8 3
11 Senior Reactor Operator-Instant (SRO-I) 7 3
10 Senior Reactor Operator-Upgrade (SRO-U) 2 or 3 3 or 2 5
- 2. Select safety functions and systems for each JPM as follows:
Refer to Section 1.9 of the applicable knowledge and abilities (K/A) catalog for the plant systems organized by safety function. For pressurized-water reactor operating tests, the primary and secondary systems listed under Safety Function 4, Heat Removal from Reactor Core, in Section 1.9 of the applicable K/A catalog, may be treated as separate safety functions (i.e., two systems, one primary and one secondary, may be selected from Safety Function 4). From the safety function groupings identified in the K/A catalog, select the appropriate number of plant systems by safety functions to be evaluated based on the applicants license level (see the table in step 1).
For RO/SRO-I applicants: Each of the control room system JPMs and, separately, each of the in-plant system JPMs must evaluate a different safety function, and the same system or evolution cannot be used to evaluate more than one safety function in each location. One of the control room system JPMs must be an engineered safety feature.
For SRO-U applicants: Evaluate SRO-U applicants on five different safety functions.
One of the control room system JPMs must be an engineered safety feature, and the same system or evolution cannot be used to evaluate more than one safety function.
- 3. Select a task for each JPM that supports, either directly or indirectly and in a meaningful way, the successful fulfillment of the associated safety function. Select the task from the applicable K/A catalog (K/As for plant systems or emergency and abnormal plant evolutions) or the facility licensees site-specific task list. If this task has an associated K/A, the K/A should have an importance rating of at least 2.5 in the RO column. K/As that have importance ratings of less than 2.5 may be used if justified based on plant priorities; inform the NRC chief examiner if selecting K/As with an importance rating less than 2.5.
The selected tasks must be different from the events and evolutions conducted during the simulator operating test and tasks tested on the written examination. A task that is similar to a simulator scenario event may be acceptable if the actions required to complete the task are significantly different from those required in response to the scenario event.
Apply the following specific task selection criteria:
At least one of the tasks shall be related to a shutdown or low-power condition.
Four to six of the tasks for RO and SRO-I applicants shall require execution of alternative paths within the facility licensees operating procedures. Two to three of the tasks for SRO-U applicants shall require execution of alternative paths within the facility licensees operating procedures.
At least one alternate path JPM must be new or modified from the bank.
At least one of the tasks conducted in the plant shall evaluate the applicants ability to implement actions required during an emergency or abnormal condition.
At least one of the tasks conducted in the plant shall require the applicant to enter the radiologically controlled area. This provides an excellent opportunity for the applicant to discuss or demonstrate radiation control administrative subjects.
If it is not possible to develop or locate a suitable task for a selected system, return to step 2 and select a different system.
- 4. For each JPM, specify the codes for type, source, and location:
Code License Level Criteria RO SRO-I SRO-U (A)lternate path 4-6 4-6 2-3 (C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank 9
8 4
(E)mergency or abnormal in-plant 1
1 1
(EN)gineered safety feature (for control room system) 1 1
1 (L)ow power/shutdown 1
1 1
(N)ew or (M)odified from bank (must apply to at least one alternate path JPM) 2 2
1 (P)revious two exams (randomly selected) 3 3
2 (R)adiologically controlled area 1
1 1
(S)imulator
A. Unit 1 power 100%. PRM N42 failed last shift and has been repaired. 1-AOI-4 Section 3.4, has been completed through step 16.a. Examinee has been directed to restore PRM N42 to service to complete 1-AOI-4. During PRM N42 restoration, when rods are placed in AUTO, group Delta rods will insert with no demand requiring the examinee to trip the reactor in accordance with 1-AOI-2, Malfunction of Reactor Control System. This JPM is a MODIFIED JPM.
B. Unit 1 100% power. Small leak on normal letdown. Examinee is directed to place excess letdown in service per 1-AOI-6, Step 16 RNO. During the evolution, a RCS leak will develop and the examinee should determine that reactor trip conditions will be met imminently and the reactor should be tripped. The examinee may consult 1-AOI-6 or may take action as a prudent action once reactor trip conditions are met and the automatic actions failed. JPM is a MODIFIED bank JPM.
C. A large break LOCA has occurred. 1-E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant, has just been resumed after performance of 1-ES-1.3, Transfer to Containment Sump. Appendix A, CLA Breaker Operation, of 1-E-1 is complete. The examinee is directed to isolate Cold Leg Accumulators in accordance with 1-E-1, Step 25. When the examinee closes the first CLA isolation valve, a loss of 6.9 kV SDBD 1B requires the examinee to vent Cold Leg Accumulators 2 and 4 using step 25 RNO. JPM is a MODIFIED bank JPM.
D. Unit 1 is in Mode 5. The examinees is directed to swap RHR from A to B train. A train RHR pump will trip requiring response per 1-AOI-14, Loss of RHR Shutdown Cooling. This is a NEW JPM.
E. Unit 1 was at 100% when a Large Break LOCA occurred. 1-E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant, has just been resumed after performance of 1-ES-1.3, Transfer to Containment Sump.
The examinee is directed to perform 1-E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant, Step 26, DETERMINE if RHR spray should be placed in service. JPM is a MODIFIED bank JPM.
F. Unit 1 is at 100% power, 1C 6.9KV Unit board is powered from its alternate source. The examinee is directed to transfer 1C Unit Board to Normal using 1-SOI-201.3, 6.9 KV Unit Board 1C. The transfer fails requiring entry into and performance of 1-AOI-37, Turbine Runback Section 3.4, Manual Turbine Runback. This JPM is a NEW JPM.
G. The examinee places Instrument Room Purge in service using 1-SOI-30.02, Containment Purge System, Section 5.4, Start Up Instrument Room Purge, steps 6 through Step 11. This is a BANK JPM.
H. RO and SRO-U ONLY I. Unit 2 startup is in progress. Power is currently 10%. 2-RM-90-106, Lower Containment Air Monitor, and 2-RM-90-112, Upper Containment Air Monitor, were aligned and were sampling their respective containments (normal alignment). 2-RM-90-106 has tripped, neither sample pump could be restarted, and the monitor was shutdown per the appropriate procedure. The examinee is directed to align 2-RM-90-112 to sample lower containment in accordance with 0-SOI-90.02, Section 8.3, Step [5]. This JPM is a NEW JPM.
J. Control Room operators are responding to a Loss of Auxiliary Air using 0-AOI-10, Loss of Control Air, Section 3.2, Loss of Auxiliary Air, due to an unisolable header rupture. The
examinee is directed to perform Attachment 2 of 0-AOI-10 for the A Train Air Header. This JPM is a NEW JPM.
K. Unit 2 is in Mode 3 after a Steam Generator tube rupture on SG #2. The Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) on SG # 2 has failed to close. The examinee is directed to locally isolate the steam traps and Main Feed Pump Turbine on the main steam system by performing 2-E-3,, Steamline Isolation (Local). This JPM is a NEW JPM.
Form 3.2-2 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Facility: __Watts Bar_________________ Date of Examination: 08/08/2022 Operating Test Number: 2022-301 Exam Level:
RO SRO-I SRO-U System/JPM Title Type Code Safety Function Control Room Systems A. N/A B. N/A C. Isolate Cold Leg Accumulators E03EA1.06 (4.1)
Isolate Cold Leg Accumulators per 1-E-1 A, S, E, M 3
D. Swap RHR from Train A to Train B 005A2.03 (3.8/3.9)
Swap RHR Trains per 1-SOI-74.01, Loss of RHR A, S, L, N 4P E. Place RHR Spray in Service 026A2.04 (3.9/4.0)
Place RHR Spray in service per 1-E-1 S, M, EN 5
F. N/A G. N/A H. N/A
In-Plant Systems I. Alignment Upper Containment Monitor to Lower Containment Locally (Unit 2) 073A4.02 (3.6)
Alignment Upper Containment Monitor to Lower Containment per 0-SOI-90.02 R, N 7
J. Remote Shutdown of Ventilation for Loss of Auxiliary Air 078A4.030 (3.2)
AOI-10 Attachment 2 to OPEN breakers for remote shutdown of Ventilation N, E 8
K. N/A
- 1. Determine the number of control room system and in-plant system job performance measures (JPMs) to develop using the following table:
License Level Control Room In-Plant Total Reactor Operator (RO) 8 3
11 Senior Reactor Operator-Instant (SRO-I) 7 3
10 Senior Reactor Operator-Upgrade (SRO-U) 2 or 3 3 or 2 5
- 2. Select safety functions and systems for each JPM as follows:
Refer to Section 1.9 of the applicable knowledge and abilities (K/A) catalog for the plant systems organized by safety function. For pressurized-water reactor operating tests, the primary and secondary systems listed under Safety Function 4, Heat Removal from Reactor Core, in Section 1.9 of the applicable K/A catalog, may be treated as separate safety functions (i.e., two systems, one primary and one secondary, may be selected from Safety Function 4). From the safety function groupings identified in the K/A catalog, select the appropriate number of plant systems by safety functions to be evaluated based on the applicants license level (see the table in step 1).
For RO/SRO-I applicants: Each of the control room system JPMs and, separately, each of the in-plant system JPMs must evaluate a different safety function, and the same system or evolution cannot be used to evaluate more than one safety function in each location. One of the control room system JPMs must be an engineered safety feature.
For SRO-U applicants: Evaluate SRO-U applicants on five different safety functions.
One of the control room system JPMs must be an engineered safety feature, and the same system or evolution cannot be used to evaluate more than one safety function.
- 3. Select a task for each JPM that supports, either directly or indirectly and in a meaningful way, the successful fulfillment of the associated safety function. Select the task from the applicable K/A catalog (K/As for plant systems or emergency and abnormal plant evolutions) or the facility licensees site-specific task list. If this task has an associated K/A, the K/A should have an importance rating of at least 2.5 in the RO column. K/As that have importance ratings of less than 2.5 may be used if justified based on plant priorities; inform the NRC chief examiner if selecting K/As with an importance rating less than 2.5.
The selected tasks must be different from the events and evolutions conducted during the simulator operating test and tasks tested on the written examination. A task that is similar to a simulator scenario event may be acceptable if the actions required to complete the task are significantly different from those required in response to the scenario event.
Apply the following specific task selection criteria:
At least one of the tasks shall be related to a shutdown or low-power condition.
Four to six of the tasks for RO and SRO-I applicants shall require execution of alternative paths within the facility licensees operating procedures. Two to three of the tasks for SRO-U applicants shall require execution of alternative paths within the facility licensees operating procedures.
At least one alternate path JPM must be new or modified from the bank.
At least one of the tasks conducted in the plant shall evaluate the applicants ability to implement actions required during an emergency or abnormal condition.
At least one of the tasks conducted in the plant shall require the applicant to enter the radiologically controlled area. This provides an excellent opportunity for the applicant to discuss or demonstrate radiation control administrative subjects.
If it is not possible to develop or locate a suitable task for a selected system, return to step 2 and select a different system.
- 4. For each JPM, specify the codes for type, source, and location:
Code License Level Criteria RO SRO-I SRO-U (A)lternate path 4-6 4-6 2-3 (C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank 9
8 4
(E)mergency or abnormal in-plant 1
1 1
(EN)gineered safety feature (for control room system) 1 1
1 (L)ow power/shutdown 1
1 1
(N)ew or (M)odified from bank (must apply to at least one alternate path JPM) 2 2
1 (P)revious two exams (randomly selected) 3 3
2 (R)adiologically controlled area 1
1 1
(S)imulator
C. A large break LOCA has occurred. 1-E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant, has just been resumed after performance of 1-ES-1.3, Transfer to Containment Sump. Appendix A, CLA Breaker Operation, of 1-E-1 is complete. The examinee is directed to isolate Cold Leg Accumulators in accordance with 1-E-1, Step 25. When the examinee closes the first CLA isolation valve, a loss of 6.9 kV SDBD 1B requires the examine to vent Cold Leg Accumulators 2 and 4 using step 25 RNO. JPM is a MODIFIED bank JPM.
D. Unit 1 is in Mode 5. The examinees is directed to swap RHR from A to B train. A train RHR pump will trip requiring response per 1-AOI-14, Loss of RHR Shutdown Cooling. This is a NEW JPM.
E. Unit 1 was at 100% when a Large Break LOCA occurred. 1-E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant, has just been resumed after performance of 1-ES-1.3, Transfer to Containment Sump.
The examinee is directed to perform 1-E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant, Step 26, DETERMINE if RHR spray should be placed in service. JPM is a MODIFIED bank JPM.
I. Unit 2 startup is in progress. Power is currently 10%. 2-RM-90-106, Lower Containment Air Monitor, and 2-RM-90-112, Upper Containment Air Monitor, were aligned and were sampling their respective containments (normal alignment). 2-RM-90-106 has tripped, neither sample pump could be restarted, and the monitor was shutdown per the appropriate procedure. The examinee is directed to align 2-RM-90-112 to sample lower containment in accordance with 0-SOI-90.02, Section 8.3, Step [5]. This JPM is a NEW JPM.
J. Control Room operators are responding to a Loss of Auxiliary Air using 0-AOI-10, Loss of Control Air, Section 3.2, Loss of Auxiliary Air, due to an unisolable header rupture. The examinee is directed to perform Attachment 2 of 0-AOI-10 for the A Train Air Header. This JPM is a NEW JPM.
Form 3.4-1 Events and Evolutions Checklist E
A V
P E
P N
T L
T O
I T
C T
A A
Y S
A B
S A
B S
A B
S A
B L
N P
R T
O R
T O
R T
O R
T O
T E
O C
P O
C P
O C
P O
C P
RO I
U RO SRO-I NOR 1
1 1
I/C 4
4 2
SRO-U MAJ 2
2 1
Man. Ctrl 1
1 0
TS 0
2 2
RO SRO-I NOR 1
1 1
I/C 4
4 2
SRO-U MAJ 2
2 1
Man. Ctrl 1
1 0
TS 0
2 2
RO SRO-I NOR 1
1 1
I/C 4
4 2
SRO-U MAJ 2
2 1
Man. Ctrl 1
1 0
TS 0
2 2
RO SRO-I NOR 1
1 1
I/C 4
4 2
SRO-U MAJ 2
2 1
Man. Ctrl 1
1 0
TS 0
2 2
RO SRO-I NOR 1
1 1
I/C 4
4 2
SRO-U MAJ 2
2 1
Man. Ctrl 1
1 0
TS 0
2 2
1 0
1 RX 1
0 1
RX 1
1 0
RX RX 1
0 1
0 1
1 RX U
M*
POSITION POSITION POSITION POSITION Facility:
Date of Exam:
Operating Test No.:
Scenarios 1
2 3
4 M
I N
I M
- DWWV%DU
$XJXVW
Form 3.4-1 Events and Evolutions Checklist E
A V
P E
P N
T L
T O
I T
C T
A A
Y S
A B
S A
B S
A B
S A
B L
N P
R T
O R
T O
R T
O R
T O
T E
O C
P O
C P
O C
P O
C P
RO I
U RO SRO-I NOR 1
1 1
I/C 4
4 SRO-U MAJ 2
2 Man. Ctrl 1
1 TS 0
2 RO SRO-I NOR 1
1 I/C 4
4 4
SRO-U MAJ 2
2 Man. Ctrl 1
1 1
TS 2
0 RO SRO-I NOR 1
1 1
I/C 4
4 SRO-U MAJ 2
2 Man. Ctrl 1
1 TS 0
2 0
RO SRO-I NOR 1
1 1
I/C 4
4 SRO-U MAJ 2
2 Man. Ctrl 1
1 1
TS 0
2 RO SRO-I NOR 1
1 I/C 4
4 4
SRO-U MAJ 2
2 Man. Ctrl 1
1 TS 2
0 1
1 RX 1
1 RX 1
1 RX RX 1
1 0
1 1
RX U
M*
POSITION POSITION POSITION POSITION Facility:
Date of Exam:
Operating Test No.:
Scenarios 1
2 1
M I
N I
M
- DWWV%DU
$XJXVW
0
0
0
0
Form 3.4-1 Events and Evolutions Checklist E
A V
P E
P N
T L
T O
I T
C T
A A
Y S
A B
S A
B S
A B
S A
B L
N P
R T
O R
T O
R T
O R
T O
T E
O C
P O
C P
O C
P O
C P
RO I
U RO SRO-I NOR 1
1 1
I/C 4
4 SRO-U MAJ 2
2 Man. Ctrl 1
1 TS 0
2 RO SRO-I NOR 1
1 I/C 4
4 4
SRO-U MAJ 2
2 Man. Ctrl 1
1 1
TS 2
0 RO SRO-I NOR 1
1 1
I/C 4
4 SRO-U MAJ 2
2 Man. Ctrl 1
1 TS 0
2 0
RO SRO-I NOR 1
1 1
I/C 4
4 SRO-U MAJ 2
2 Man. Ctrl 1
1 1
TS 0
2 RO SRO-I NOR 1
1 I/C 4
4 4
SRO-U MAJ 2
2 Man. Ctrl 1
1 TS 2
0 0
1 1
RX 0
1 1
RX 1
1 RX RX 0
1 1
0 1
1 RX U
M*
POSITION POSITION POSITION POSITION Facility:
Date of Exam:
Operating Test No.:
Scenarios 1
2 1
M I
N I
M
- DWWV%DU
$XJXVW
Form 3.4-1 Instructions for the Events and Evolutions Checklist 1.
Mark the applicant license level for each simulator operating test number.
2.
For the set of scenario columns, fill in the associated event number from Form 3.3-1, Scenario Outline, to show the specific event types being used for the applicant while in the assigned crew position for that scenario.
- Minimums are subject to the instructions in Section C.2, License Level Criteria.
KEY: RX = Reactivity Manipulation; NOR = Normal Evolution; I/C = Instrument/Component Failure; MAJ = Major Transient; Man. Ctrl = Manual Control of Automatic Function; TS = Technical Specification Evaluation; RO = Reactor Operator; SRO-I or I = Instant Senior Reactor Operator; SRO-U or U = Upgrade Senior Reactor Operator; SRO = Senior Reactor Operator; ATC = At the Controls; and BOP = Balance of Plan
Facility: Watts Bar Exam Date: August 2022 1
JPM # or title 2
Type (S/P/A) 3 ALT (Y/N) 4 LOD (1-5) 5 JPM Errors 6
U/E/S 7
Explanation LOD REF IC TSK CUE CS TL 1R (RO A1a)
A N
2 X
S Is there an error band in step #5?
Is there an error band in step #6?
Is there an error band in step #7?
I see the error value in step #8. How did you arrive at this value?
Error bands added. SAT 2R (RO A1b)
A N
>1 X
S Remove the reference to OPDP-10 in the reference. They should be able to find the reference themselves Changed as requested. SAT.
3R (RO A2)
A N
2 X
ES Need to insert error bands. I know the directions say to round to nearest hundredths, but I dont want to fail if they round incorrectly.
Error bands added. SAT 4R (RO A3)
A N
1 X
s This one is a bit too simplistic. We are asking them to do the same type of calculation twice and then add 900 or 50 to it and thats it. Could we at least ask them if they need to exceed their occupational dose limits (i.e.; does this fall under PSE?). I think, but dont have the procedures to verify, that this does not meet TVAs PSE requirements.
Changed to add complexity. Now SAT 1S (SRO A1a)
A N
2 X
S Same comments as R1 Error bands added. SAT 2S (SRO A1b)
A N
1 X
S This is the same as the R2 task except a direct lookup for refueling SRO.
Changed as suggested. SAT
Facility: Watts Bar Exam Date: August 2022 1
JPM # or title 2
Type (S/P/A) 3 ALT (Y/N) 4 LOD (1-5) 5 JPM Errors 6
U/E/S 7
Explanation LOD REF IC TSK CUE CS TL If you use the same data as in the RO JPM but add some medical information (i.e., one of the operators had lasik on his off time, another just returned from COVID, the third broke a bone none of which has been reported to medical) and ask if they can stand watch.
Again, no reference to OPDP-10.
1 JPM # or title 2
Type (S/P/A) 3 ALT (Y/N) 4 LOD (1-5) 5 JPM Errors 6
U/E/S 7
Explanation LOD REF IC TSK CUE CS TL 3S (SRO A2)
A N
2 S
Same comment as 3R Error bands added. SAT 4S (SRO A3)
A N
2 X
S Would you add ODCM Table 1.1-2 before Action C on the key please?
Changed as requested. SAT 5S (SRO A4)
A N
2 X
S Is there a reason we are not filling out the form?
Choosing the NOUE form after declaring a NOUE may not really be a separate step.
Changed as requested. SAT a
S Y
3 X
S Lets put words in the initiating cue to restore rod control to auto.
Changed as requested. SAT b
S Y
2 S
This looks like a cold leg loop LOCA, would it be wrong for the applicant to isolate excess letdown prior to tripping. It would be logical to assume the leak was there c
S Y
3 S
d S
Y 3
X S
Is step #3 really critical to complete the task? I agree that that it is critical to equipment protection but that is not what we are testing.
Task Standard adjusted. SAT
Form 2.3 -3 Operating Test Review Worksheet (JPMs)
Facility: Watts Bar Exam Date: August 2022 1
JPM # or title 2
Type (S/P/A) 3 ALT (Y/N) 4 LOD (1-5) 5 JPM Errors 6
U/E/S 7
Explanation LOD REF IC TSK CUE CS TL Is step #15 not critical because it does not affect the flow path?
e S
N 2
S f
S Y
3 S
g S
N 2
S h
S N
2 S
i P
N 2
S j
P N
2 S
k P
N 2
S
Form 2.3-3 Instructions for Completing the JPM Table
- 1. Enter the JPM number and/or title.
- 2. Enter the type of JPM(S)imulator, (P)lant, or (A)dministrative.
- 3. Enter (Y)es or (N)o for an Alternate Path JPM.
- 4. Rate the level of difficulty (LOD) of each JPM using a scale of 1-5 (easy-difficult). A JPM containing less than two critical steps, a JPM that tests solely for recall or memorization, or a JPM that involves directly looking up a single correct answer is likely LOD = 1 (too easy). Conversely, a JPM with over 30 steps or a JPM that takes more than 45 minutes to complete is likely LOD = 5 (too difficult).
- 5. Check the appropriate block for each JPM error type, using the following criteria:
LOD = 1 or 5 is unsatisfactory (U).
REF: The JPM lacks required references, tools, or procedures (U).
IC: The JPM initial conditions are missing or the JPM lacks an adequate initial cue (U).
CUE: The JPM lacks adequate evaluator cues to allow the applicant to complete the task, or the evaluator cues are subjective or leading (U).
TSK: The JPM lacks a task standard or lacks completion criteria for a task standard (U).
CS: The JPM contains errors in designating critical steps, or the JPM lacks an adequate performance standard for a critical step (U).
TL: The JPM validation times are unreasonable, or a time-critical JPM lacks a completion time (U).
- 6. Mark the JPM as unsatisfactory (U), satisfactory (S), or needs enhancements (E). A JPM is (U) if it has one or more (U) errors as determined in step 5. Examples of enhancements include formatting, spelling, or other minor changes.
- 7. Briefly describe any JPM determined to be unsatisfactory (U) or needing enhancement (E). Save initial review comments and detail subsequent comment resolution so that each exam-bound JPM is marked by a satisfactory (S) resolution on this form.
Form 2.3-3 Operating Test Review Worksheet (Scenarios)
Facility: Watts Bar Scenario: 1 Exam Date: August 2022 1
Scenario Event ID/Name:
2 Scenario event errors (X marks TS or CT existence) 3 U/E/S 4
Explanation Realism/
Credibility Performance Standards Verifiable Actions Critical Task TS 1
X Y
S Is the verifiable task to bypass the failed transmitter in DCS? Is there no affect on any of the systems that they would need to do something (charging, letdown, heaters, etc.?)
Minimizing this as verifiable task. SAT 2
S Lets make sure that the crews have adequate time to catch this and control SG levels manually.
Will this significantly affect the BOPs ability to respond to future failures?
3 Y
S 4
S 5
S 6
S 7
S 8
S Lets ensure that the CTs failure criteria can be met in a reasonable time frame.
Done. Sat
Form 2.3-3 Instructions for Completing the Scenario Table
- 1. For each scenario, enter the scenario event names and descriptions.
- 2. Review the individual events contained in each scenario, and identify and mark event errors:
The scenario guide event description is not realistic/credibleunsatisfactory (U).
The scenario guide event description lacks adequate crew/operator performance standardsneeds enhancement (E).
The scenario guide event description lacks verifiable actions for a credited normal event, reactivity event instrument/component malfunction, or technical specification (TS) event (or a combination of these) (U).
The scenario guide event description incorrectly designates an event as a critical task (i.e., a noncritical task labeled as critical or a critical task labeled as noncritical). This includes critical tasks that do not meet the critical task criteria (i.e., the critical task does not have a measurable performance standard) (U).
The scenario guide event description incorrectly designates entry into TS actions when not required or does not designate entry into TS actions when required (U).
- 3. Based on the outcome in step 2, mark the scenario event as unsatisfactory (U), satisfactory (S), or needs enhancements (E). An event is (U) if it has one or more (U) errors as determined in step 2. Examples of enhancements include formatting, spelling, or other minor changes.
- 4. Briefly describe any scenario event determined to be unsatisfactory (U) or needing enhancement (E). Save initial review comments and detail subsequent comment resolution so that each exam-bound scenario event is marked by a satisfactory (S) resolution on this form.
Form 2.3-3 Operating Test Review Worksheet (Scenarios)
Facility: Watts Bar Scenario: 3 Exam Date: August 2022 1
Scenario Event ID/Name:
2 Scenario event errors (Y marks TS existence) 3 U/E/S 4
Explanation Realism/
Credibility Performance Standards Verifiable Actions Critical Task TS 1
Y S
2 Y
S 3
S 4
Y S
5 S
6 S
7
Form 2.3-3 Instructions for Completing the Scenario Table
- 5. For each scenario, enter the scenario event names and descriptions.
- 6. Review the individual events contained in each scenario, and identify and mark event errors:
The scenario guide event description is not realistic/credibleunsatisfactory (U).
The scenario guide event description lacks adequate crew/operator performance standardsneeds enhancement (E).
The scenario guide event description lacks verifiable actions for a credited normal event, reactivity event instrument/component malfunction, or technical specification (TS) event (or a combination of these) (U).
The scenario guide event description incorrectly designates an event as a critical task (i.e., a noncritical task labeled as critical or a critical task labeled as noncritical). This includes critical tasks that do not meet the critical task criteria (i.e., the critical task does not have a measurable performance standard) (U).
The scenario guide event description incorrectly designates entry into TS actions when not required or does not designate entry into TS actions when required (U).
- 7. Based on the outcome in step 2, mark the scenario event as unsatisfactory (U), satisfactory (S), or needs enhancements (E). An event is (U) if it has one or more (U) errors as determined in step 2. Examples of enhancements include formatting, spelling, or other minor changes.
Briefly describe any scenario event determined to be unsatisfactory (U) or needing enhancement (E). Save initial review comments and detail subsequent comment resolution so that each exam-bound scenario event is marked by a satisfactory (S) resolution on this form.
Form 2.3-3 Operating Test Review Worksheet (Scenarios)
Facility: Watts Bar Scenario: 4 Exam Date: August 2022 1
Scenario Event ID/Name:
2 Scenario event errors (Y marks TS existence) 3 U/E/S 4
Explanation Realism/
Credibility Performance Standards Verifiable Actions Critical Task TS 1
S 2
Y S
3 Y
S 4
S 5
S 6
S 7
S 8
S Critical Tasks need to be written slightly differently. First one is OK as written. Depressurize prior to meeting bleed and feed criteria.
Changed as suggested. SAT 9
S Second CT should be to feed prior to meeting the S/G level criteria only.
Changed as suggested. SAT
Form 2.3-3 Instructions for Completing the Scenario Table
- 8. For each scenario, enter the scenario event names and descriptions.
- 9. Review the individual events contained in each scenario, and identify and mark event errors:
The scenario guide event description is not realistic/credibleunsatisfactory (U).
The scenario guide event description lacks adequate crew/operator performance standardsneeds enhancement (E).
The scenario guide event description lacks verifiable actions for a credited normal event, reactivity event instrument/component malfunction, or technical specification (TS) event (or a combination of these) (U).
The scenario guide event description incorrectly designates an event as a critical task (i.e., a noncritical task labeled as critical or a critical task labeled as noncritical). This includes critical tasks that do not meet the critical task criteria (i.e., the critical task does not have a measurable performance standard) (U).
The scenario guide event description incorrectly designates entry into TS actions when not required or does not designate entry into TS actions when required (U).
- 10. Based on the outcome in step 2, mark the scenario event as unsatisfactory (U), satisfactory (S), or needs enhancements (E). An event is (U) if it has one or more (U) errors as determined in step 2. Examples of enhancements include formatting, spelling, or other minor changes.
Briefly describe any scenario event determined to be unsatisfactory (U) or needing enhancement (E). Save initial review comments and detail subsequent comment resolution so that each exam-bound scenario event is marked by a satisfactory (S) resolution on this form.
Form 4.1-PWR Pressurized-Water Reactor Examination Outline Notes: CO = Conduct of Operations; EC = Equipment Control; RC = Radiation Control; EM = Emergency Procedures/Plan These systems/evolutions may be eliminated from the sample when Revision 2 of the K/A catalog is used to develop the sample plan These systems/evolutions are only included as part of the sample (as applicable to the facility) when Revision 2 of the K/A catalog is used to develop the sample plan Facility: Watts Bar Date of Exam: August, 2022 Tier Group RO K/A Category Points SRO-Only Points K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G Total A2 G
Total
- 1.
Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions 1
3 3 3
N/A 3 3 N/A 3
18 3
3 6
2 1 1 1
2 1
2 8
2 2
4 Tier Totals 4 4 4
5 4 5
26 5
5 10
- 2.
Plant Systems 1
3 3 3
3 2 2 2 3 2 3
2 28 3
2 5
2 1 1 1
0 1 1 1 1 1 0
1 9
1 1
1 3
Tier Totals 4 4 4
3 3 3 3 4 3 3
3 37 4
4 8
- 3.
Generic Knowledge and Abilities Categories CO EC RC EM 6
CO EC RC EM 7
2 2
1 1
2 2
1 2
- 4. Theory Reactor Theory Thermodynamics 6
3 3
Form 4.1-PWR PWR Examination Outline Page 2 Emergency and Abnormal Plant EvolutionsTier 1/Group 1 (RO/SRO)
E/APE # / Name K1 K2 K3 A1 A2 G K/A Topic(s)
IR 000007 (EPE 7; BW E02&E10; CE E02)
Reactor Trip, Stabilization, Recovery X
007EA2.06; Ability to determine and/or interpret the following as they apply to a Reactor Trip: Occurrence of a reactor trip.
3.7 000008 (APE 8) Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident X
X 008AA1.02; Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to a Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident:
CVCS system to control PZR level/pressure.
008AG2.1.20; Ability to interpret and execute procedure steps.
3.6 4.6 000009 (EPE 9) Small-Break LOCA X
009EA2.38; Ability to determine and/or interpret the following as they apply to a Small-Break LOCA: Existence of head bubble.
4.0 000011 (EPE 11) Large-Break LOCA X 011EG2.2.44; Ability to interpret control room indications to verify the status and operation of a system and understand how operator actions and directives affect plant and system conditions 4.2 000015 (APE 15) Reactor Coolant Pump Malfunctions X
015AA1.15; Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to Reactor Coolant Pump Malfunctions:
High-power/low-flow reactor trip block status.
3.4 000022 (APE 22) Loss of Reactor Coolant Makeup X
022AK3.02; Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses and/or actions as they apply to Loss of Reactor Coolant Makeup: Actions contained in AOPs.
3.7 000025 (APE 25) Loss of Residual Heat Removal System X
025AK1.05; Knowledge of the operational implications and/or cause and effect relationships of the following as they apply to the Loss of the Residual Heat Removal System: RHR gas binding.
3.8 000026 (APE 26) Loss of Component Cooling Water X 026AG2.1.45; Ability to identify and interpret diverse indications to validate the response of another indication.
4.3 000027 (APE 27) Pressurizer Pressure Control System Malfunction X
027AK3.01; Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses and/or actions as they apply to a Pressurizer Pressure Control System Malfunction: Isolation of PZR spray following loss of PZR heaters.
3.8
000029 (EPE 29) Anticipated Transient Without Scram X
029EK2.09; Knowledge of the relationship between Anticipated Transient Without Scram and the following systems or components: ESFAS.
3.9 000038 (EPE 38) Steam Generator Tube Rupture X
038EK1.07; Knowledge of the operational implications and/or cause and effect relationships of the following as they apply to a Steam Generator Tube Rupture:
Continuing to feed a ruptured S/G to prevent exceeding the low level limit.
3.7 000040 (APE 40; BW E05; CE E05; W E12)
Steam Line RuptureExcessive Heat Transfer X WE12EG2.4.6; Knowledge of emergency and abnormal operating procedures major action categories.
3.7 000054 (APE 54; CE E06) Loss of Main Feedwater X
054AK2.03; Knowledge of the relationship between Loss of Main Feedwater and the following systems or components:
MFW pumps.
3.3 000055 (EPE 55) Station Blackout X
055EA2.06; Ability to determine and/or interpret the following as they apply to a Station Blackout: Faults and lockouts that must be cleared before reenergizing buses.
3.9 000056 (APE 56) Loss of Offsite Power X
056AA2.86; Ability to determine and/or interpret the following as they apply to Loss of Offsite Power: Main steam pressure.
3.3 000057 (APE 57) Loss of Vital AC Instrument Bus X 057AG2.4.30; Knowledge of events related to system operation/status that must be reported to internal organizations or external agencies, such as the State, the NRC, or the transmission system operator.
4.1 000058 (APE 58) Loss of DC Power X
058AA2.03; Ability to determine and/or interpret the following as they apply to Loss of DC Power: Impact on ability to operate and monitor plant systems.
4.0 000062 (APE 62) Loss of Service Water X
062AA1.01; Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to Loss of Service Water: Service water temperature indications.
3.4 000065 (APE 65) Loss of Instrument Air X
065AK2.11; Knowledge of the relationship between Loss of Instrument Air and the following systems or components: RHRS.
3.6
000077 (APE 77) Generator Voltage and Electric Grid Disturbances X
077AA2.07; Ability to determine and/or interpret the following as they apply to Generator Voltage and Electric Grid Disturbances: Status of ESFs.
3.6 (W E04) LOCA Outside Containment X
WE04EK3.06; Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses and/or actions as they apply to LOCA Outside Containment: Identifying and isolating the break.
4.3 (W E11) Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation X
WE11EK1.04; Knowledge of the operational implications and/or cause and effect relationships of the following as they apply to Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation: LOCA outside containment.
4.0 (BW E04; W E05) Inadequate Heat TransferLoss of Secondary Heat Sink X WE05EG2.2.22; Knowledge of limiting conditions for operation and safety limits.
4.0 K/A Category Totals:
3 3 3 3 3 3
Group Point Total:
18/6 3
3
Form 4.1-PWR PWR Examination Outline Page 3 Emergency and Abnormal Plant EvolutionsTier 1/Group 2 (RO/SRO)
E/APE # / Name K1 K2 K3 A1 A2 G K/A Topic(s)
IR 000001 (APE 1) Continuous Rod Withdrawal 000003 (APE 3) Dropped Control Rod 000005 (APE 5) Inoperable/Stuck Control Rod X 005AG2.4.2: Knowledge of system setpoints, interlocks, and automatic actions associated with emergency and abnormal operating procedure entry conditions.
4.6 000024 (APE 24) Emergency Boration 000028 (APE 28) Pressurizer Level Control Malfunction X
028AA2.11; Ability to determine and/or interpret the following as they apply to a Pressurizer Level Control Malfunction:
Leak in PZR.
4.0 000032 (APE 32) Loss of Source Range Nuclear Instrumentation 000033 (APE 33) Loss of Intermediate Range Nuclear Instrumentation 000036 (APE 36; BW/A08) Fuel Handling Incidents X
036AA2.05; Ability to determine and/or interpret the following as they apply to Fuel Handling Incidents:
Containment isolation/closure.
3.8 000037 (APE 37) Steam Generator Tube Leak X
037AK3.09; Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses and/or actions as they apply to a Steam Generator Tube Leak: Selecting rate of load reduction.
3.2 000051 (APE 51) Loss of Condenser Vacuum 000059 (APE 59) Accidental Liquid Radwaste Release 000060 (APE 60) Accidental Gaseous Radwaste Release 000061 (APE 61) Area Radiation Monitoring System Alarms X 060AG2.4.20; Knowledge of the operational implications of emergency and abnormal operating procedures warnings, cautions, and notes.
3.8
000067 (APE 67) Plant Fire On Site 000068 (APE 68; BW A06) Control Room Evacuation X 068AG2.4.34; Knowledge of RO responsibilities outside the main control room during an emergency.
4.2 000069 (APE 69; W E14) Loss of Containment Integrity 000074 (EPE 74; W E06 & E07) Inadequate Core Cooling 000076 (APE 76) High Reactor Coolant Activity X
076AA1.06; Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to High Reactor Coolant Activity: RCS.
3.3 000078 (APE 78*) RCS Leak X
078AA2.06; Ability to determine and/or interpret the following as they apply to a Reactor Coolant System Leak: Low-pressure SWS activity monitor.
3.0 (W E01 & E02) Rediagnosis & SI Termination X
WE02K2.08; Knowledge of the operational implications and/or cause and effect relationships of the following as they apply to SI Termination: Conditions required to start a RCP.
3.5 (W E13) Steam Generator Overpressure X
WE13EK1.04; Knowledge of the operational implications and/or cause and effect relationships of the following as they apply to Steam Generator Overpressure: Conditions required to cause overpressurization of a S/G.
3.2 (W E15) Containment Flooding X WE15EG2.4.44; Knowledge of emergency plan implementing procedures protective action recommendations.
4.4 (W E16) High Containment Radiation (BW A01) Plant Runback (BW A02 & A03) Loss of NNI-X/Y (BW A04) Turbine Trip (BW A05) Emergency Diesel Actuation (BW A07) Flooding (BW E03) Inadequate Subcooling Margin (BW E08; W E03) LOCA CooldownDepressurization
(BW E09; CE A13**; W E09 & E10) Natural Circulation X
WE09EK3.07; Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses and/or actions as they apply to Natural Circulation Operations: Borating to cold shutdown boron concentration.
3.7 (BW E13 & E14) EOP Rules and Enclosures (CE A11**; W E08) RCS OvercoolingPressurized Thermal Shock (CE A16) Excess RCS Leakage (CE E09) Functional Recovery (CE E13*) Loss of Forced Circulation/LOOP/Blackout K/A Category Point Totals:
1 1 1 2 1 2 Group Point Total:
8/4 2 2
Form 4.1-PWR PWR Examination Outline Page 4 Plant SystemsTier 2/Group 1 (RO/SRO)
System # / Name K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G K/A Topic(s)
IR 003 (SF4P RCP) Reactor Coolant Pump X
003A2.06; Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the Reactor Coolant Pump System and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal operations: CCWS malfunction.
3.5 004 (SF1; SF2 CVCS) Chemical and Volume Control X
004K5.34; Knowledge of the operational implications or cause and effect relationships of the following concepts as they apply to the Chemical and Volume Control System: For ion exchangers:
demineralization, boration/deboration, thermal regeneration, and lithium control.
2.8 005 (SF4P RHR) Residual Heat Removal X
005K4.11; Knowledge of Residual Heat Removal System design features and/or interlocks that provide for the following: Lineup for low head recirculation mode (external and internal).
4.0 006 (SF2; SF3 ECCS) Emergency Core Cooling X
X 006A1.10; Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters associated with operation of the Emergency Core Cooling System, including: CVCS letdown flow.
006A4.05; Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room:
Transfer of ECCS flowpaths.
3.0 4.1
007 (SF5 PRTS) Pressurizer Relief/Quench Tank X
007K3.01; Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the Pressurizer Relief Tank/Quench Tank System will have on the following systems or system parameters:
Containment.
3.4 008 (SF8 CCW) Component Cooling Water X
X 008A2.07; Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the Component Cooling Water System and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal operations: Consequences of high/low CCW flow rates.
008K2.01; Knowledge of electrical power supplies to the following:
CCW valves.
2.9 3.0 010 (SF3 PZR PCS) Pressurizer Pressure Control X
010K4.01; Knowledge of Pressurizer Pressure Control System design features and/or interlocks that provide for the following: Spray valve warmup.
2.8 012 (SF7 RPS) Reactor Protection X
X 012A2.06; Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the Reactor Protection System and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal operations: Failure of RPS signal to trip the reactor 012A3.06; Ability to monitor automatic features of the Reactor Protection System, including: Trip logic.
4.7 4.1
013 (SF2 ESFAS) Engineered Safety Features Actuation X
X 013A2.06; Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the Engineered Safety Features Actuation System and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal operations: Inadvertent ESFAS actuation.
013G191002K1.03; Effects of gas or steam on liquid flow rate indications (erroneous reading).
3.5 2.9 022 (SF5 CCS) Containment Cooling X
022K3.04; Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the Containment Cooling System will have on the following systems or system parameters: CNT.
3.9 025 (SF5 ICE) Ice Condenser X
X 025K2.03; Knowledge of electrical power supplies to the following:
Isolation valves.
025A4.01; Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room:
Ice condenser isolation valves.
3.0 3.6 026 (SF5 CSS) Containment Spray X 026K1.02; Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause and effect relationships between the Containment Spray System and the following systems: Cooling water.
3.6 039 (SF4S MSS) Main and Reheat Steam X
X 039K1.10; Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause and effect relationships between the Main and Reheat Steam System and the following systems: Auxiliary steam system.
039A4.03; Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room:
MFW pump turbines.
2.7 3.4
059 (SF4S MFW) Main Feedwater X
X 059K5.13; Knowledge of the operational implications or cause and effect relationships of the following concepts as they apply to the Main Feedwater System: Reasons for monitoring MFW pump suction flow/pressure.
059G191001K1.05; Equipment protection/safety concerns in the use of gate valves (protect valve seals/open slowly).
3.3 2.8 061 (SF4S AFW)
Auxiliary/Emergency Feedwater X
061K6.02; Knowledge of the effect of the following plant conditions, system malfunctions, or component malfunctions on the Auxiliary/Emergency Feedwater System: AFW pump.
4.0 062 (SF6 ED AC) AC Electrical Distribution X
X 062K2.01; Knowledge of electrical power supplies to the following:
Major bus or motor control center power supplies.
062G2.1.7; Ability to evaluate plant performance and make operational judgments based on operating characteristics, reactor behavior, and instrument interpretation.
3.8 4.7
063 (SF6 ED DC) DC Electrical Distribution X
X 063K1.02; Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause and effect relationships between the DC Electrical Distribution System and the following systems: AC electrical system.
063A2.03; Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the DC Electrical Distribution System and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal operations: Malfunction of battery chargers.
4.0 3.6 064 (SF6 EDG) Emergency Diesel Generator X
064K5.12; Knowledge of the operational implications or cause and effect relationships of the following concepts as they apply to the Emergency Diesel Generators:
sequences of the premature opening of a breaker under load.
3.3 073 (SF7 PRM) Process Radiation Monitoring X
073A1.01; Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters associated with operation of the Process Radiation Monitoring System, including: Radiation levels.
3.5 076 (SF4S SW) Service Water X
X 076K4.06; Knowledge of Service Water System design features and/or interlocks that provide for the following: Service water train separation.
076G2.1.32; Ability to explain and apply system precautions, limitations, notes, or cautions.
3.4 3.8
078 (SF8 IAS) Instrument Air X
X 078A3.03; Ability to monitor automatic features of the Instrument Air System, including: Air compressor loading/unloading.
078A2.03; Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the Instrument Air System and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal operations: Cooling water malfunction.
2.9 3.1 103 (SF5 CNT) Containment X
103K3.04; Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the Containment System will have on the following systems or system parameters: Shield building vent system.
3.0 053 (SF1; SF4P ICS*) Integrated Control K/A Category Point Totals:
3 3 3 3 2 2 2 3 2 3 2 Group Point Total:
28/5 3
2
Form 4.1-PWR PWR Examination Outline Page 5 Plant SystemsTier 2/Group 2 (RO/SRO)
System # / Name K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G K/A Topic(s)
IR 001 (SF1 CRDS) Control Rod Drive 002 (SF2; SF4P RCS) Reactor Coolant X
002K1.09; Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause and effect relationships between the Reactor Coolant System and the following systems: PZR system.
4.2 011 (SF2 PZR LCS)
Pressurizer Level Control X
011K2.01; Knowledge of electrical power supplies to the following:
PZR heaters.
3.3 014 (SF1 RPI) Rod Position Indication X
014A2.06; Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the Rod Position Indication System and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal operations: Loss of LVDT.
3.3 015 (SF7 NI) Nuclear Instrumentation X 015G191002K1.17; Effects of core voiding on neutron detection.
3.5 016 (SF7 NNI) Nonnuclear Instrumentation 017 (SF7 ITM) In-Core Temperature Monitor X 017G2.2.38; Knowledge of conditions and limitations in the facility license instrumentation.
4.5 027 (SF5 CIRS) Containment Iodine Removal 028 (SF5 HRPS) Hydrogen Recombiner and Purge Control 029 (SF8 CPS) Containment Purge 033 (SF8 SFPCS) Spent Fuel Pool Cooling 034 (SF8 FHS) Fuel Handling Equipment X
034K5.02; Knowledge of the operational implications or cause and effect relationships of the following concepts as they apply to the Fuel Handling Equipment System:
Load limitations.
2.9
035 (SF 4P SG) Steam Generator X
035A3.02; Ability to monitor automatic features of the Steam Generator System, including: MAD valves, S/G atmospheric relief valves, or the SDS.
3.9 041 (SF4S SDS) Steam Dump/Turbine Bypass Control X
041K5.03; Knowledge of the operational implications or cause and effect relationships of the following concepts as they apply to the Steam Dump System and Turbine Bypass Control: Steam dump valve flow characteristics.
2.7 045 (SF 4S MT/G) Main Turbine Generator X
045K6.01; Knowledge of the effect of the following plant conditions, system malfunctions, or component malfunctions on the Main Turbine Generator System: Generator stator cooling (turbine building CCW).
3.2 055 (SF4S CARS) Condenser Air Removal 056 (SF4S CDS) Condensate X
056A2.17; Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the Condensate System and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal operations: IAS malfunction.
3.0 068 (SF9 LRS) Liquid Radwaste 071 (SF9 WGS) Waste Gas Disposal 072 (SF7 ARM) Area Radiation Monitoring 075 (SF8 CW) Circulating Water X
075K6.04; Knowledge of the effect of the following plant conditions, system malfunctions, or component malfunctions on the Circulating Water System: CWS pump malfunctions.
2.9 079 (SF8 SAS**) Station Air
Form 4.1-COMMON Common Examination Outline Facility: Watts Bar Date of Exam: August 2022 Generic Knowledge and AbilitiesTier 3 (RO/SRO)
Category K/A #
Topic RO SRO-Only IR IR
- 1.
Conduct of Operations 2.1.37 Knowledge of procedures, guidelines, or limitations associated with reactivity management 4.3 2.1.40 Knowledge of refueling administrative requirements 2.8 2.1.41 Knowledge of the refueling process 3.7 2.1.34 Knowledge of RCS or balance-of-plant chemistry controls, including parameters measured and reasons for the control 3.5 Subtotal N/A 2
N/A 2
- 2.
Equipment Control 2.2.6 Knowledge of the process for making changes to procedures 3.0 2.2.43 Knowledge of the process used to track inoperable alarms 3.0 2.2.7 Knowledge f the process for conducting infrequently performed tests or evolutions 3.6 2.2.5 Knowledge of the process for making design or operating changes to the facility, such as 10 CFR 50.59, Changes, Tests and Experiments, screening and evaluation processes, administrative processes for temporary modifications, disabling annunciators, or installation of temporary equipment 3.2 Subtotal N/A 2
N/A 2
086 (SF8 FP) Fire Protection X
086K3.04; Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the Fire Protection System will have on the following systems or system parameters: AC distribution.
2.8 050 (SF 9 CRV*) Control Room Ventilation K/A Category Point Totals:
1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 Group Point Total:
9/3 1
1 1
- 3.
Radiation Control 2.3.12 Knowledge of radiological safety principles and procedures pertaining to licensed operator duties, such as response to radiation monitor alarms, containment entry requirements, fuel handling responsibilities, access to locked high-radiation areas, or alignment of filters 3.2 2.3.11 Ability to control radiation releases 4.3 2.3.
Subtotal N/A 1
N/A 1
- 4.
Emergency Procedures/
Plan 2.4.23 Knowledge of the bases for prioritizing emergency operating procedures 3.4 2.4.25 Knowledge of fire protection procedures 3.7 2.4.30 Knowledge of events related to system operation/status that must be reported to internal organizations or external agencies, such as the State, the NRC, or the transmission system operator 4.1 Subtotal N/A 1
N/A 2
Tier 3 Point Total 6
7 TheoryTier 4 (RO)
Category K/A #
Topic RO IR Reactor Theory 6
192005K1.17; Discuss rod insertion limits 3.9 6
192006K1.10; Plot the curve and explain the reasoning for the reactivity insertion by xenon-135 versus time for the following: reactor startup with xenon-135 already present in the core 3.2 6
192004K1.03; Describe the effect on the magnitude of the temperature coefficient of reactivity from changes in the following: core age 3.1 Subtotal N/A 3
Thermodynamics 6
193008K1.21; Explain the conditions that must exist to establish natural circulation 4.2 6
193006K1.06; Define or explain the following terms and concepts: mass flow rate 3.0 6
193004K1.15; Determine the exit conditions for a throttling process based on the use of steam and/or water 2.8 Subtotal N/A 3
Tier 4 Point Total 6
Form 4.1-1 Record of Rejected Knowledge and Abilities Refer to Examination Standard (ES)-4.2, Developing Written Examinations, Section B.3, for deviations from the approved written examination outline.
Tier/Group Randomly Selected K/A Reason for Rejection 1/1 011EG2.1.25 No graphs, curves or tables in LOCA procedure. Changed to 011EG2.2.44.
1/1 022AK3.05 No procedural guidance to avoid transients. Changed to 022AK3.02.
1/1 WE05EG2.2.4 Units Loss of heat sink procedures will be identical at time of licensing. Changed to WE05EG2.2.22.
Form 2.3-5 Written Examination Review Worksheet Q#
- 1.
LOK (F/H)
- 2.
LOD (1-5)
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. K/A Use Flaws
- 6. Source (B/M/N)
- 7. Status (U/E/S)
- 8. Explanation Stem Focus Cues T/F Cred.
Dist.
Partial Job Link Minutia
- /Units Logic Q-K/A License Level 1
H 2
N S
007EA2.06 2
H 2
N S
008AA1.02 Second question needs to state When pressurizer level and subcooling criteria are met, the crew will FIRST Amended as recommend 3
H 2
X N
S 011EG2.2.44 C distractor is not very plausible. How about we make 2 of the indicators for RWST level not yet in the red band. Then ask if auto recirc actuation is met and then ask when it is met, if FCV-63-73 will open.
See Question 62 for more information Picture changed as requested. Question not revised the annunciator only requires 1 of 4, valve alignment requires 2 of 4. SAT.
4 H
2 N
S 015AA1.15 5
L 3
N S
022AK3.02 6
H 3
B S
025AK1.05 Change the second part of the question to is/is NOT caused by an inadequate NPSH due to high RCS temperature Amended as recommend 7
H 3
N S
027AK3.01 ON is problematic with the second question. If the heaters are on why close the spray valves. How about The OAC is/is NOT required to take MANUAL actions to manually reposition the PZR Spray valves Changed CLOSE to operate. SAT 8
L 2
N S
029EK2.09
Q#
- 1.
LOK (F/H)
- 2.
LOD (1-5)
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. K/A Use Flaws
- 6. Source (B/M/N)
- 7. Status (U/E/S)
- 8. Explanation Stem Focus Cues T/F Cred.
Dist.
Partial Job Link Minutia
- /Units Logic Q-K/A License Level 9
H 2
N S
038EK1.07 10 L
2 B
S WE12EG2.4.6 11 H
2 X
N S
054AK2.03:
If the MFRVs can be opened to cause SG levels to rise to the normal band, then it would be a correct answer. Add per procedure xxx to the second question stem to correct this.
Essentially amended as recommend. SAT 12 L
2 N
S 055EA2.06 13 F
2 N
S 058AA2.03 14 F
2 N
S 062AA1.01 Question is a little disjointed. How about we change the first question to ERCW pump C-A will/will NOT be started based upon ERCW temperature?
Amended as recommend 15 F
3 N
S 065AK2.11 16 F
3 N
S WE04EK3.06 Most probable is pretty much a giveaway. How about most probable in low pressure piping/ due to amount of piping outside containment/ high pressure piping/
due to amount of piping outside of containment.
Essentially amended as recommend 17 F
2 N
S WE11EK1.04 18 H
2 N
S WE05EG2.2.22 17 F
2 N
S WE11EK1.04 18 H
2 N
S WE05EG2.2.22 19 H
2 N
S 028AA2.11 The controller is maintaining level but not at programmed level, correct?
20 F
2 N
S 037AK3.09
Q#
- 1.
LOK (F/H)
- 2.
LOD (1-5)
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. K/A Use Flaws
- 6. Source (B/M/N)
- 7. Status (U/E/S)
- 8. Explanation Stem Focus Cues T/F Cred.
Dist.
Partial Job Link Minutia
- /Units Logic Q-K/A License Level 21 H
3 N
S 061AG2.4.20 The K/A number is wrong. I gave you the wrong number in the original outline. I have corrected my copies and all future versions of the outline will be 061AG2.4.20.
Amended as recommend 22 F
2 X
X N
S 068AG2.4.34 The changes in terminology in this one is confusing.
For the first question toggle between OATC and AUO.
For the second question, toggle between OATC and NUSO.
Unable to toggle as suggested, would have left no correct answer. Answers adjusted to ensure that each title is a unique individual and that each person identified does have a task in the procedures referenced. SAT.
23 F
2 N
S 76AA1.06 24 H
2 X
N S
WE02K1.08 The second part has teaching in it. Remove to provide PZR spray from the stem of the second question and replace it with if available.
I mis-typed. The correct K/A is WE02EK1.08. I have corrected my outlines.
Essentially amended as recommend 25 H
2 X
N S
WE13EK1.04 The first question implies the answer is that all safeties failed. Could we reword this to ask the minimum number of safeties that must have failed?
We could toggle on 4 or 5. Another option would be to just ask the revised first question and give the answers as 2, 3, 4, or 5.
Amended as first recommend
Q#
- 1.
LOK (F/H)
- 2.
LOD (1-5)
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. K/A Use Flaws
- 6. Source (B/M/N)
- 7. Status (U/E/S)
- 8. Explanation Stem Focus Cues T/F Cred.
Dist.
Partial Job Link Minutia
- /Units Logic Q-K/A License Level 26 H
2 X
X N
S WE09EK3.07 Wording needs work here.
I think we can lose the times and make the first question ask if an RCS cooldown can begin once boration has begun.
The second question really doesnt work. What does insurge from the pressurizer mean? How about we ask if after borating to shutdown boron concentration is complete, the boron sample will be at / about 15%
greater than cold shutdown boron Im open to other ideas Times stayed. Thats OK. Second question reworded to ensure basis portion of K/A is maintained and that the question is plausible. SAT.
27 H
2 B
S 003A2.06 28 H
X N
S 004K5.34 Distractor analysis for A and B have wrong CB, 500 ppm vice 200. Im assuming the graph is using data from 200 ppm.
If they follow the procedure, the crew will flush the demin to the HUT until boron concentration in effluent matches RCS.
This is a Tier 2 question. We could ask if the crew were to place the IX in service without a flush, what would be the affect (i.e., remove procedure reference)
Wording revised to address concerns. SAT.
29 H
2 X
N S
005K4.11 The question is convoluted, using similar logic to question 3. Question 3 makes a really good match for this K/A.
Question was totally rewritten. New question is SAT.
30 F
2 N
S 006A1.10 31 H
2 N
S 006A4.05 32 H
>1 N
S 007K3.01
Q#
- 1.
LOK (F/H)
- 2.
LOD (1-5)
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. K/A Use Flaws
- 6. Source (B/M/N)
- 7. Status (U/E/S)
- 8. Explanation Stem Focus Cues T/F Cred.
Dist.
Partial Job Link Minutia
- /Units Logic Q-K/A License Level 33 H
2 N
S 008A2.07 34 F
2 N
S 08K2.01 35 F
3 N
S 010K4.01 36 F
2 N
S 012A3.06 You can remove all of the stem before question 1. It adds nothing to the question.
Amended as recommend 37 H
2 N
S 013A2.06 38 H
2 X
N E
013G191002K1.03 A bit too much teaching here. How about we drop the amp reading information and make the first question ask Cavitation is confirmed by __(1)__ flow on 1-FI-63-91A. Toggle on oscillating and no. Second question is fine.
After discussion with exam team, what was thought to be to much teaching was ensuring that that the applicants couldnt think that the pump was totally air bound. Amps would not fluctuate then too. Question is OK as is.
39 H
3 B
S 022K3.04 40 F
2 N
S 025K2.03 41 F
2 N
S 025A4.01 42 F
3 N
S 026K1.02 43 F
2 N
S 039K1.10
Q#
- 1.
LOK (F/H)
- 2.
LOD (1-5)
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. K/A Use Flaws
- 6. Source (B/M/N)
- 7. Status (U/E/S)
- 8. Explanation Stem Focus Cues T/F Cred.
Dist.
Partial Job Link Minutia
- /Units Logic Q-K/A License Level 44 H
3 N
S 039A4.03 Change the second question to controlled by 1-SIC-46-20A, MFPT A - SPEED CONTROL Essentially amended as recommend 45 F
2 N
S 059K5.13 Change second question to is / is NOT required to trip BOTH MFPTs Amended as recommend 46 F
2 X
N S
59G191001K1.05 What prohibits gate valves (or at least this one in particular) from being used to throttle? I know they perform this function terribly, but nothing prohibits this.
How about This valve is / is NOT used for throttling flow?
Essentially amended as recommend 47 F
>1 B
S 061K6.02 48 F
2 B
S 062K2.01 49 H
3 B
S 063K1.02 50 H
2 N
S 064K5.12 51 F
2 N
S 073A1.01 52 F
2 N
S 076K4.06 53 H
2 N
S 078A3.03 Just a grammatical point crew is singular. Answer 2 should be is / is NOT Amended as recommend 54 F
2 X
N S
103K3.04 There is no malfunction of containment. K/A not met.
Added that the phase B isolation was spurious.
Question is SAT.
Q#
- 1.
LOK (F/H)
- 2.
LOD (1-5)
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. K/A Use Flaws
- 6. Source (B/M/N)
- 7. Status (U/E/S)
- 8. Explanation Stem Focus Cues T/F Cred.
Dist.
Partial Job Link Minutia
- /Units Logic Q-K/A License Level 55 F
>1 N
S 002K1.09 56 F
>1 B
S 011K2.01 57 H
2 B
S 015G191002K1.17 58 H
>1 N
S 035A3.02 59 H
2 N
S 041K5.03 Change the second question to All 12 Steam Dumps are /are NOT available to recommence the cooldown Amended as recommend 60 H
2 N
S 045K6.01 61 F
3 N
S 056A2.17 62 H
2 X
N S
075K6.04 Change the first question to Condenser Pressure will rise/lower and the second question to Mwe will remain stable/lower. Otherwise the distractors are too implausible.
Amended as recommend 63 H
3 X
N S
086K3.04 A and B make sense. Is there a way the SD board would not be normally aligned if CSST C remained energized? Conversely, is there a way it would remain normally aligned if CSST C was not energized?
Applicants are expected to know that CSST C is the normal power supply to 1A-A SDBD. That is what they are testing here. If they dont know that C and D are highly plausible. Question is SAT as is.
64 F
2 N
S G2.1.37 Grammar: change the word a from During a plant to all.
Remove or non-conservative from second question.
Make the second question number be 2 instead of 1.
Amended as recommend
Q#
- 1.
LOK (F/H)
- 2.
LOD (1-5)
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. K/A Use Flaws
- 6. Source (B/M/N)
- 7. Status (U/E/S)
- 8. Explanation Stem Focus Cues T/F Cred.
Dist.
Partial Job Link Minutia
- /Units Logic Q-K/A License Level 65 F
2 B
S G2.1.40 66 F
2 N
S G2.2.6 67 F
2 X
N s
G2.2.43 Reword first question to have them choose between the orange sticker and the green plastic lens cover.
Essentially amended as recommend 68 H
3 B
S G2.3.12 K/A is not really met for a tier 3 question. This is really just another tier 2 question. It needs to be more generic such as at power containment entry requirements or RO fuel accident responsibilities.
Question was fully replaced. New question is SAT.
69 F
2 X
N S
G2.4.23 A better way to do this might be to list 3 or 4 different FRPs and ask which is highest priority and which is second. That way you can test colors and functions at the same time.
Suggestion did not test the basis. Original question is OK.
70 H
2 N
S 192005K1.17 71 H
2 X
N S
92006K1.10 The wording for the second question is a bit off. The reactivity change Is because decay exceeds production but still both are happening. Why not have another delay (say 60 hours6.944444e-4 days <br />0.0167 hours <br />9.920635e-5 weeks <br />2.283e-5 months <br />) and ask what rod height will do there too.
Essentially amended as recommend 72 F
2 N
S 192004K1.03 73 F
2 X
B S
193008K1.21 For question 1 add must be greater than a minimum of __(1)__.
Amended as recommend 74 H
2 N
S 193006K1.06 75 H
3 B
S 193004K1.15
Q#
- 1.
LOK (F/H)
- 2.
LOD (1-5)
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. K/A Use Flaws
- 6. Source (B/M/N)
- 7. Status (U/E/S)
- 8. Explanation Stem Focus Cues T/F Cred.
Dist.
Partial Job Link Minutia
- /Units Logic Q-K/A License Level 76 H
3 B
S 008AG2.1.20 77 H
2 X
N S
009EA2.38 Knowledge of what constitutes a colored path is RO knowledge.
Instead make the second question ask which method to cool the head is procedurally required to be tried first, RCP sweep or vessel cooling with CRD and containment coolers.
Misread question. This is testing rules of usage of yellow path procedures. This is SRO knowledge original question is SAT.
78 H
2 X
N S
026AG2.1.45 Both levels are below 60%. This is indicative of a closed vent or instrument problem. Im not sure why the unit was tripped. Both levels are adequate for continued operation. If asked which low level caused me to trip the reactor, Im going to say the lower one.
The first question just does not work. The second is OK but does not proceed logically from the first.
Im not sure this is an easy fix. Perhaps TS or transition to another procedure to get SRO.
Changed the question to make both levels at 58%
(baffle top). This fixes the first question. Question is now SAT.
79 H
2 N
S 056AA2.86 80 H
3 N
S 057AG2.4.30 81 H
3 B
S 077AA2.07 82 H
3 X
N S
005AG2.4.2 K/A is not really matched here. Were looking for system setpoints, interlocks, and automatic actions.
None of these are really associated with this failure.
Id recommend a different K/A if you want it.
Question was totally rewritten. New question is SAT.
Q#
- 1.
LOK (F/H)
- 2.
LOD (1-5)
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. K/A Use Flaws
- 6. Source (B/M/N)
- 7. Status (U/E/S)
- 8. Explanation Stem Focus Cues T/F Cred.
Dist.
Partial Job Link Minutia
- /Units Logic Q-K/A License Level 83 H
3 B
S 036AA2.05 84 H
2 X
N S
078AA2.06 K/A is not met. You are not determining leakage rate nor interpreting SWS leakage data in the question.
How about you give the person data on the Letdown HX and the RCP Seal Water HX and let them determine where the leak is? (Id choose a high Letdown flow personally, but it is your choice).
Second part is fine.
Essentially amended as recommend 85 F
2 N
S WE15EG2.4.44 86 H
2 N
S 012A2.06 87 H
1 X
X B
S 062G2.1.7 This second part is a direct lookup. Yes, I know it was approved in 2016, but that was wrong.
As an idea, Lets start out with maintenance on one of the shutdown boards. While restoring the bus 7.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> later have a different shutdown panel fail.
Somewhere with one of those failures, ask an effect on the plant question. While restoring the bus 7.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> later have the vital bus drop. Ask the most limiting time to restore 1 hr or 2 hrs Or something totally different if you dont care for that suggestion.
Rewritten after discussion. Revised question is SAT.
88 H
2 M
S 063A2.03 89 H
2 X
N S
076G2.1.3 The first question seems to be self-evident. How about we change the first question to AOI-13 is / is NOT required to be worked concurrently with E-).
Second question works as written.
Amended as recommend 90 H
3 N
S 078A2.03 91 H
2 N
S 014A2.06
Q#
- 1.
LOK (F/H)
- 2.
LOD (1-5)
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. K/A Use Flaws
- 6. Source (B/M/N)
- 7. Status (U/E/S)
- 8. Explanation Stem Focus Cue s
T/F Cred. Dist. Partial Job Link Minutia
- /Units Logic Q-K/A License Level 92 F
2 N
S 017G2.2.38 93 H
3 B
S 034K5.02 94 F
3 X
B S
G2.1.41 C and D are very similar. It kind of implies that A and B are not the right answer.
How about we move it around a bit A maximum of 1 / 2 UN-IRRADIATED assemblies within the fuel-handling area A maximum of 2 / 3 assemblies within the refueling canal Amended as recommend 95 F
2 X
N S
G2.1.34 Delete the timed information and just ask WOOTF and Technical Specifications Chemistry is required to sample the RCS for Dose Equivalent I-131 when power is changed more than a minimum of 10% / 15% per hour.
A basis for the LCO limit on the Specific Activity of the RCS is to ensure that the offsite and control room doses will not exceed limits following a LBLOCA /
MSLB.
Amended as recommend 96 F
2 N
S G2.2.7 97 F
2 X
N E
G2.2.5 Change the second question to with maintenance in progress for 50 days Amended as recommend 98 F
2 B
S G2.3.11 99 H
3 N
S G2.4.25 100 F
2 M
S G2.4.30
Form 2.3-5 Instructions for Written Examination Review Worksheet Refer to ES-4.2 for the definitions of terms used in this worksheet for the written examination.
Review each question (Q) as submitted and as subsequently revised and document the following in the associated worksheet columns:
- 1. Enter the level of knowledge (LOK) as either (F)undamental or (H)igher cognitive level.
- 2. Enter the level of difficulty (LOD) from 1 (easy) to 5 (difficult); mark direct lookup questions (applicant can directly determine the answer from the provided reference) as LOD 1. A question is (U)nsatisfactory if it is LOD 1 or LOD 5.
- 3. Check the appropriate box if a psychometric flaw is identified:
Stem Focus: The stem lacks enough focus to elicit the correct answer (e.g., unclear intent, more information is needed, or too much needless information). This is an (U)nsatisfactory question.
Cues: The stem or one or more answer choices contains cues (e.g., clues, specific determiners, phrasing, length). This is an (U)nsatisfactory question.
T/F: All of the answer choices are a collection of unrelated true/false statements. This is an (U)nsatisfactory question.
Cred. Dist.: The distractors are not credible; single implausible distractors require (E)nhancement, and more than one noncredible distractor in the same question results in an (U)satisfactory question.
Partial: One or more distractors are partially correct (e.g., if the applicant can make unstated assumptions that are not contradicted by the stem). This is an (U)nsatisfactory question.
- 4. Check the appropriate box if a job content flaw is identified:
Job Link: The question is not linked to the job requirements (i.e., the question has a valid knowledge or ability (K/A) but, as written, is not operational in content). This is an (U)nsatisfactory question.
Minutia: The question requires the recall of knowledge that is too specific for the closed-reference test mode (i.e., it is not required to be known from memory). This is an (U)nsatisfactory question.
- /Units: The question contains data with an unrealistic level of accuracy or inconsistent units (e.g., panel meter in percent with question in gallons). This is an (U)nsatisfactory question.
Logic: The question requires backward or reverse logic or application compared to the job requirements. This is an (U)nsatisfactory question.
- 5. Check the first box if a K/A mismatch flaw exists. Check the second box if the question is flawed because it is written at the wrong license level. Either condition results in an (U)nsatisfactory question.
- 6. Enter the questions source: (B)ank, (M)odified, or (N)ew. Verify that (M)odified questions meet the criteria of ES-4.2.
- 7. Based on the review performed in steps 2-5, mark the question as (U)nsatisfactory, in need of (E)nhancement, or (S)atisfactory.
- 8. Fully explain the reason for any (U) in column 7 (e.g., how the psychometric attributes are not being met).
- 9. Save the initial review comments and detail subsequent comment resolution so that each exam-bound question is marked by an (S) on this form.