ML22230A202
| ML22230A202 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 04/03/1978 |
| From: | NRC/OCM |
| To: | |
| References | |
| Tran-M780403 | |
| Download: ML22230A202 (1) | |
Text
ORIGINAl:
. J RETURN TO SECRETARIAT RECORDS NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION IN THE MATTER OF:
PUBLIC MEETING SECY-78-164 - PLAN FOR RESEARCH TO IMPROVE THE SAFETY OF LIGHT-WATER NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS Place - Washington, D. C.
Date - Monday, 3 April 1978 Pages 1-39 Telephone:
(202) 3<1.7-3700 ACE - FEDERAL REPORTERS, lNC.
Offid..al Reporters 4.44 North Capitol Street Washington, D.C.20001 NAT:ONWICE COVERAGc
- DAILY
DISCLAIMER This is an unofficial transcript of a meeting of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission held on April 3, 1978 in the Commission's offices at 1717 H Street, N. W., Washington, D. C. The meeting was open to public attendance and observation. This transcript has not been revie\*Jed, corrected, or edited, and it may contain inaccuracies.
The transcript is intended solely for general informational purposes.
As provided by 10 CFR 9.103, it is not part of the formal or informal record of decision of the matters discussed. Expressions of opinion in this transcript do not necessarily reflect final determinations or beliefs. No pleading or other paper may be filed with the Commission in any proceeding as the result of or addressed to any statement or argument contained herein, except as the Commission may authorize.
1 CR 6938 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA CRAIG:fr
- NR 2 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3
4 PUBLIC MEETING 5
6 SECY-78-164 - PLAN FOR RESEARCH TO IMPROVE THE SAFETY 7
OF LIGHT-WATER NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS 8
9 10 11
- 12 13 14 Room 1130 1717 H Street, N. W.
Washington, D.C.
Monday, 3 April 1978 15 The Commission met, pursuant to notice, at 1:45 p.m.
16 ,BEFORE:
17 DR. JOSEPH M. HENDRIE, Chairman 18 PETER A. BRADFORD, Commissioner 19 RICHARDT. KENNEDY, Commissioner 20 VICTOR GILINSKY, Commissioner 21 PRESENT:
22 SAMUEL CHILK, Secretary 23 H. SHAPAR, Executive Legal Director 24 J. KELLEY, Acting Legal Counsel
. Ace-Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 L. GOSSICK
la CR 6938 s. HANAUER CRAIG: fr NR 2 s. LEVINE 3 K. PEDERSON 4 ALSO PRESENT:
5 E. CASE 6
7 8
9 10 11
- 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 Ace-Federal Reporters, Inc.
25
2
- 1 CK /fml P R O C E E D I N G S CR6938 2 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Why don't you go ahead?
3 I
- MR. GOS SICK: ./Fine.
4 We are hear to present the plan for research to 5 improve the safety of LWRs.
6 MR. LEVThJE: will present the paper.
7 MR. LEVINE: The paper is Section 78-164.
8 I have Steve Hanauer, who was a great help in 9
sorting all this matter out and helping us get at the answer.
10 The paper has attached to it the third draft of the report, 11 which is NUREG,0338.
12 We would like Commission approval of the report 13 prior to submitting it to Congress.
14 In addition to whatever chang~s:: the Commission may 15 think are needed, we have some minor editorial changes in our 16 own mind to make also. Submission of the subject plan is re-17 quired by the Congress on 4-12, April 12, '78. It is required 18 by our fiscal 1978 authorization act. This act required us to 19 develop a long range plan for the development of new or improved 20 safety systems for nuclear,~~plants. To prepare the plan 21 we formed a research review group ori approved reactor safety.
22 We held /two meetings, one in January and one in 23 February.
At ;the first meeting we presented an outline of the 24 report and discussed the approach to its preparation. At the Ace-Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 second meeting the group reviewed the first draft of the report,
3 fm2 which, although not then complete, contained the same recomenda 2 tions that are in the ,third repor~;that is before you.
l__-
3 Could I have slide one,~please?
4 (.Slide.)
5 Slide one indicates the membership of the research 6 review group. We had members of RES, Standards and Licensing.
7 (Slide.)
8 The second slide is a list of the consultants to the 9 research group, and it includes a number of -,v1ewpoints. It 10 includes utilities, reactor manufacturers, some private con-11 sultants and some independent viewpoints, particularly I call 12 to your attention Mr. Breidenbaugh, Mr. Brockett, Dorfan was 13 a member of the APS study group on reactor safety; so was 14 Findleyson and Carl Kouts of our Union of Concerned Scientists, 15 now a private consultant.
16 -so we had a broad spectrum. We try to get as many 17 viewpoints as.we could. We had two memebers of DOE, Mr.
18 Brechure and Mr. Kerseski of Department of Energy who were 19 helpful in preparing the plan. We got.many useful arid objectiv 20 comments from everyone involved.
21 All the discussion received froTI):the consultants, 22 as well as those of_other people who we canvassed for ideas, 23 are summarized in Appendix C to the report and the disposition 24 of all their comments is indicated.
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25 The NRC Staff also met with a ACRS Subcommittee
4 fm3 in February, and the full Committee in March. The full 2 Committee reviewed the second draft of the report. The ACRS 3 concurs in the recommended research projects and believes they 4 should be undertaken even though their risk reduction potention 5 is unknown. They believe these .studies will serve to 6 place the extent and suitability of proper safety improvements.
7 The letter they : to us is attached to the reports in a Appendix A.
9 We have also included in the paper to the Commission 10 the letters from all the consultants, the research reviewers, 11 and their comments are available to you.
12 (Slide.)
13 Could I have slide three, please?
14 Slide three shows the way in which we collects 15 suggestions, the sources from which they were selected. We 16 gave particular weight to those from the ACRS, the NRC Staff 17 and our consultants.
18 We also considered the other.sources of suggestions 19 for improved research, research on improved safety. These 20 several hundred, 200 or so suggestions, were consolidated into 21 16 research topics that incorporated like kinds of things.
22 They were evaluated against a set of criteria based on the 23 breadth of technical support, the risk reduction potential, 24 the generic applicability to reactors, a large number versus Ace-Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 a small number of reactors, the timeliness in which they could be implemented and the cost of implementation.
5 fm4 As a result of the evaluation five research topics 2 were selected, plus two general studies.
3 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: You were presumably looking 4 for things that weren't being examined now?
5 MR. LEVINE: No. It went beyond that.
6 If I could have the next slide, it will show that.
7 Well, if you wait just a minute I will get to that.
8 The one qfter this.
9 (Slide.)
10 Of those 16 research topics, we selected the follow-11 ing five: Alternate containment concepts, alternate decay 12 heat removal concepts, alternate ECC concepts, improved in~
13 plant accident response and advanced seismic design.
14 For instance, of that list, we are already working, 15 for instance, to some extent on alternate ECCS concepts.
l6 What we are recommending here would be an expanded 17 program in that area.
18 We are already working,for instance, on improved 19 seismic modeling from. a probabi_i!:ist+/-c viewpoint. This would 20 expand that program and add other things to it such as seismic 21 decoupling. So, there is a mixture of things. There are 22 some things that are currently ongoing in our confirmatory 23 program, and there are some things that are Qrand new.
24 (Slide.)
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25 The next graph indicates those which were not selecte .
6 fm5 In fact, the asterisk shows those where work is already going 2 on in our current program. The others are new thoughts. All 3 of these concepts are proposed to be pursued by making studies 4 over the next year to investigate whether, by understanding the 5 more deeply and doing some value impact analyses, one should 6 pick any of these up and pursue them further.
7 So, none of these 16 topics has been deleted. It 8 is only a question of emphasis.
9 (Slide.)
10 Now, we are going into looking at each of' the topics 11 recommended for research. The first one is alternate contain-12 ment concepts. You can see the breadth of support was high.
13 Risk reduction potential is high. Generic applicability spaces 14 from high to low depending upon which concept you are talking 15 about. Some concepts would be applicable to only new reactors.
16 Other concepts can be backfit so that they are more genericall 17 applicable. Some would apply only to one kind of reactor 18 and not another kind.
19 The next slide 20 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: The cost, when you say 21 medium to high, that is the $10- to $50 million a plant range?
22 MR. LEVINE: No. 10 to 50 is the medium and 23 over 50 is high~
24 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:;, Then, I don't know, what is Ace-Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 it? It is somewhere over 10?
7 fm6 MR. LEVINE: Under 10 is small.
2 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: When you say it is medium to 3 high --
4 MR. LEVINE: That means some would be high cost, 5 some of the concepts would be medium.
6 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: I understand, thank you.
7 MR. LEVINE: The two projects we proposed are the 8 vented containment concept, taking two years and about $600,000.
9 This would define conceptual system configurations and 10 filters to determine the feasibility, sizing and cost. What 11 we have in mind is that if you had an accident in which the core 12 were to melt; you would surely, in many accident sequences, 13 rupture the containment because of the pressure genterated within 14 it. If you could vent that pressure -- and then you would get 15 an uncontrolled release of lare amounts 6f radioactivity. If 16 you were to vent the containment, you would prevent that pressu . . . e1.,.,
17 high pressure from occurring, but you would be releasing th~
18 radioactivity through the vent.
19 But if you filter it, you can then filter out much 20 of the radioactivity. it turns out if you look at WASH-1400, 21 the bulk of the risk comes from accident sequences where you 22 rupture the containment above ground. If you prevent that from 23 happening, converting an uncontrolled release to a controlled 24 release, you can really reduce the risk significantly. So, Ace-Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 we would look .at serious configurations of doing that and
8 fm7 perform value impact analyses on the various options and-report,.
2 that out.
3 We then look at other concepts, some of which have 4 been studies in a preliminary way and were reported before to 5 the Commission, results of,the Sandia study report.
6 Looking at larger volume, higher pressure capability, 7 et cetera. Improved capability to deal with fuel-water 8 interactions and hydrogen burning.
9 And on undergrounding, we though we would wait to 10 evalute the results of the California study being done by 11 Aerospace before.we decide where. to go from here. So, there 12 is money put in there to evaluate that study and decide whether 13 we want to go further than that or not as part of this program.
14 The next project is alternate decay heat removal 15 concepts.
16 (Slide.}
17 Again showing a high breadth of support, high risk 18 reduction potential, and again, medium to high cost, depending 19 on which option you pick.
20 Also showing some uncertainty in our ability to
- end 1 21 22 23 estimate costs.. To estimate applicability. Cost is medium.:*
24 Ace-Federal Reporters, Inc.
25
9 (Slide.)
2 The first project we would consider, an add-on decay 3 heat removal system over and above .those already installed in 4 reactors. The purpose being .to improve the o,verall 5 reliability of decay heat removal. A two-year task, taking 6 $600,000. I note energy only because we would want an 7 individual design done that we could then assess.
8 We have talked to DOE and DOE is agreeable to 9 performing a detailed design .of an add-on system to m.eet 10 requirements that we would specify. Then, we would evaluate
- JI 12 13 the reliability achievable on such a system.
We would consider things such as independence of equipment, redundancy, separation or bunkering, trying to 14 improy,e operational reliability. Develop performance and 15 safety design for such a system, if implemented.
16 We would request DOE .to develop the design, as I 17 poin.ted out, and perform a quantitative al.lay impact analysis.
18 There ha:ve been other suggestions in this area that have been 19 suggested to improve the capability to remove decay heat. One 20 is to not_ shut the reactor down. That is, to make it 21 operational after a turbine trip by bypassing s.team flow to 22 the condensor, and leave the reactor in an operating 23 condition.
24 Other suggestions are to improve backup f.eed water 25 system, to look at passive decay heat removal systems and
10 diverse heat sinks such as deep wells. All those would be 2 looked at to see what options for improvement might be 3 taken.
4 (Slide.)
5 The nex~ topic is alternate ECC concepts. This has 6 a high breadth of support. It was assessed as being of 7 medium risk reduction potential because the core melts, 8 accidents due to failure of emergency c.ore cooling system, do 9 not dominate the risks by a large factor.
10 There are still other accident sequences where you l1 would get core melts and you would not change the overall 12 probability of core melts very much by improving ECCS systems.
13 Generic applicability is medium. That is because we don't 14 know to what extent we can backfit. Cost of implementation 15 could be low to medium.
16 (Slide.)
17 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY.: Let me ask you, do you have 18 some notions as to what some of these systems would look like?
19 MR. LEVINE: Yes, that is right here, in fact.
20 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: I see.
21 MR. LEVINE: We are estimating several aspects of 22 this task. We have to modify our computer codes to be able 23 to handle alternate injection points and other kinds of 24 things ad indicated in the second list. We perform a variety 25 of system performance calculations with modified codes which
J1 would be quite expensive, and look, include such things as 2 alternate locations of fluid injection. Devices to divert or 3 restrict fluide flow.
4 For instance, you could put check valves in so that 5 all your cold-leg breaks became hot-leg breaks, which are much 6 easier to handle. One would have to look at that; increased 7 volume or pressure of available fluid, to get it in earlier.
8 And other configurations that people might suggest.
9 We would accelerate the conversion of semiscale 10 and current planned semiscale UHI tests so we can get those 11 over with and get on to our alternate ECCS program. We always 12 plan on semiscale. That would take a year and require 13 $2 million. Again, we would perform preliminary valuey 14 impact evaluations to pick those that would be or look most 15 desirable to do further work on.
16 (Slide.)
17 Improved in-plant accident response. This is of 18 great interest because we are concerned about two things 19 abovt operators. One, when an accident happens, we are 20 concerned about their ability to diagnose correctly what is 21 happening so they can take the correct action.
22 We also know that they may have, in WASH 1400, 23 operator errors, in testing and maintainence, and el sew here 24 make significant contributions ~o accident risks. So it was 25 felt that this should be studied. Had high breadth of
69.02.4 12 sjc support, risk reduction potential, high to medium.
2 A_pplicability is high, and cost would be low.
3 (Slide.)
4 This slide shows some details. A study of current 5 research on improving operator information assimilation under 6 reactor accident conditions. This would be an analysis of 7 what is available to the reactor operator, what is he supposed 8 to do with that information in the event of an accident, and 9 what is the likelihood that he will be able .to do the 10 right -- diagnose it correctly.
1I That would lead into the next study which is to 12 look at automatic monitoring and diagnostic systems, for 13 instance, using a computer to help the operator diagnose and 14 decide *.on pro per courses of action.
15 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: What about the qualification 16 of operators?
17 MR. LEVINE: That is also part of this. That is an 18 abbreviated slide. We would look at improved use of 19 simulators for operator training. Try to see what is involved 20 in getting a higher quality operator in the plant. We would 21 be looking at operating an emergency procedures for accident 22 response.
23 Again in WASH 1400, we found that some of these 24 procedures are not very well written. We found, however, 25 that the plan,t operators knew about that and had, in fact,
13 adjusted this in their own mind to correct courses of 2 action.
3 We looked at the man-machine interface, the 4 information presentation pattern recognition, control of 5 design, et cetera. We would also look at a very difficult 6 task called human initiation of accidents by erroneous action 7 as opposed to deliberate actions.
8 This is very difficult to do, but we would start 9 trying to develop techniques for looking at that, and seeing 10 if such things would contribute to accident risks and what JI might be done about them.
12 (Slide.)
13 Advanced seismic design has medium breadth of 14 support. Risk reduction potential is high to medium. Again, 15 depending upon potential success of any of these things I will 16 discuss in a few minutes.
17 The generic applicability would generally be low 18 because it would probably a,pply only to new plants. It may, I9 in fact, apply only to new plants in certain areas. Cost of 20 implementation would be medium to high.
21 (Slides) 22 We were to review the candidate concepts that were 23 proposed by a number of people. These include increased 24 energy absorption capabil i.ty, component isolation, foundation 25 isolation, and flotation in the fluid-filled basin. The last
14 th~ee, isolation and basin concepts, really can be determined 2 to fit the category of attenuating the impace of the seismic 3 forces on the plant by floating it in a pond. Decoupling is 4 the answer.
5 The first item, increased energy absorption 6 capabili.ty, may very well be a high payoff area. There are 7 standard -- there are technique.s that have been used in other 8 applications where," instead of designing the plant to meet 9 total allowable stresses, one, in fact, allows the plant to IO .. deform slightly for the very large earthquakes.
lI The small amount of deformation, far before the 12 point of failure, would allow you to absorb significant 13 amounts of energy. This is not now permitted in design, and 14 exploration of this looks like a potentially high payoff area.
15 In fact'" if that were to pan out, you would find existing 16 plants could probably take significantly more seismic impact 17 than they are currently stated to by current design 18 procedures.
19 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: That is not a matter of putting 20 equipment into plants~ but rather improving the 21 MR. LEVINE: Analytical capability.
22 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: Analytical capabi li.ty?
23 MR. LEVINE: Yes.
24 MR. HANAUER: And verifying it.
25 MR. LEVINE: You would have to do some tests to
15 verify it.
2 3
4 5
6 7
8 9
10 l1 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
CR6938 16 CK3 kdsl COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: What would it mean to say 2 existing plant could take more?
3 MR. LEVINE: It is a matter of definition only.
4 You are allowed to take a certain stress for a given seismic 5 load. If you get a slightly higher seismic load, it doesn't 6 mean the plant fails. It is now considered to be unacceptable, 7 if you have a seismic load higher, that would give you stresses 8 higher than the code allows.
9 On the other hand, if you change the definition 10 to say instead of keeping the r.esponse of the components 11 and structures within elastic limits so that they would
- 12 13 14 undergo no permanent deformation, if you allowed them to deform slightly, you could tolerate much higher earthquakes without having accidents.
15 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: As to plants in place, 16 tthat wouldn't make any practical difference in the way you 17 operate them in the future, would it? Or would it?
18 MR. LEVINE: It might happen that in a reassessment 19 of the seismic loading capability by ourselves, *,,,the ->
20 USGS would say that plant should really have been designed 21 for an earthquake of .3g instead of .25g. Then all you 22 would have to do is reanalyze the plant and say it still 23 meets .3g, even though it was designed for .25.
24 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: So in some situations Ace-Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 where you might otherwise have to shut a plant down, you
17 kds2 would keep it open?
2 MR. LEVINE: That is a sort of simplistic way of 3 looking at it. There is much more involved in it actually.
4 You could -- you really have to think about earthquakes as 5 being a continuous spectrum of magnitudes in which we select 6 some number as a design basis.
7 One should really evaluate the plants against 8 this continuous spectrum as a function of probability, and 9 see if they can survive that.on a risk assessment basis.
10 We are doing modeling in our current confirmatory 11 program in that direction. This would be a very useful
- 12 13 14 concept.
COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: You are saying if they include analysis of deformation, you may discover you can 15 live with earthquakes that are bigger than you thought you 16 could handle?
17 MR. LEVINE: Exactly. That is precisely right.
18 In fact, this whole concept was proposed by Newmark when 19 we first started into the seismic area. For one reason or 20 another, it was never fully implemented.
21 I am not sure what all the reasons were. I guess 22 people didn't feeili they wanted to get involved in the plastic 23 design area. We have learned a lot more about that now. It 24 becomes technically feasible to do that.
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25 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: You are saying if you get
18 kds3 comfortable with this area you may in fact allow plants be 2 designed to take this into account?
3 MR. LEVINE: Yes. For instance, in many areas you 4 say you will not get failure until there is 20 percent strain.
5 You might allow one percent strain~ One percent strain in 6 fact absorbs a tremendous amount of energy. You could 7 tolerate higher increase without having accidents.
8 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: What happens after it 9 is gone plastic, though? You may have to replace a lot of 10 equipment.
11 MR. LEVINE: Yes, but that is a prob~em, except
- 12 13 14 the probability of earthquakes is low enough that one might be able to tolerate that.
COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: All right.
15 MR. LEVINE: Next slide.
16 (Slide.)
17 This is a task to improve methodoiliogy for 18 evaluating re*search topics. We keep talking cavalierly 19 about performing value.impact analyses that will try to give 20 a quantitative assessment of risk reduction potential, costs 21 and applicability, and the like.
22 We sort of have(~done it judgmentally and 23 qualitatively in preparing this report; but you need a much 24 finer tool than we have so far at hand to distinguish between Ace-Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 a lot of alternates.
19 kds4 So we wanted to undertake what I regard to be a 2 very important task, to develop a good way of.doing value 3 impact analyses. That is what this task is all about.
4 I foresee it going on for several years, with 5 the first year starting at ~l/2 million. We will probably 6 have to do it again and again, maybe two or three times, 7 because it wouldn't be~easy; and I am sure a lot of people 8 will pick at it.-- sort of like WASH-1400, where a lot of 9 people picked at it. But if we are going to use it, we have 10 to resolve it.
11 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: You are talking about a
- 12 13 14 study which is almost as large as WASH-1400?
really is.
MR. LEVINE: No, no. This is much smaller.
It will be sort of based on a difference in It 15 risk concept as opposed to an absolute determination of risk.
16 That is, we wilLJ ,sav, use WASH-1400 as a definition of what 17 exists now, and look at the differences from that.
18 Now that is too simple a statement. We reallv 19 look at .the engineering ins+/-ghts we, derive from WASH-1400, 20 which we think are much more precise than the overall answer 21 in WASH-1400. Then we look at differences in these 22 engineering insights and quantify them.
23 I think we can do that with a precision that will 24 be acceptable to a great many people; and the research Ace-Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 reviewers endorsed this, so did ACRS.
20 kds5. MR. PEDERSON: How does this work here relate? I 2 know the ACRS in their letter said they thought i t would be 3 very difficult to get this down to a really useful level 4 without dealing with the basic questidm.-.1.of how safe is safe 5 enough.
6 MR. LEVINE: No, they didn't say. It seems 7 evident that at some point --
8 MR. PEDERSON: It says it seems evident i t will be 9 extremely difficult to provide a suitable methodology without 10 at some point addressing the question of how safe is safe 11 enough.
- 12 13 14 f0llowing:
MR. LEVINE: Yes. I think that means the Let's say we go through this round o~ topics.
We do the five research topics we picked, and we decide 15 to implement those; and as a result of looking at the 16 other sixteen,;: .we \picked five or ten more. Where do you 17 stop? is their question.
18 Their question is not that you can't deff~16pe~
19 value impact analysis on a relative basis. It is how do you 20 determine where to stop? In other w0rds, how safe is 21 safe enough? In other words, you can go on forever and 22 find more improvements.
23 MR. PEDERSON: I agree. What I am asking, is 24 this a step in helping you --
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25 MR. LEVINE: No. No. We have as part of OUE
21 kds6 confirmatory program a program to start research in the area 2 of how safe is safe enough. We are just beginning to do that.
3 (Slide.)
4 The next slide just lists the other 16 topics, 5 and says we are going to -study those and find out -- not the 6 other 16, the other 11; 16 minus the 5.
7 We are going to look at all of these and decide
-8 whether there is anything further worth doing --
9 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: These are the ones you 10 rejected?
11 MR. LEVINE: Yes. We are going to look at these
- 12 13 14 11 in some detail. ,:Wi-bh;:a finer value impact tool available, we may pick up some of those.
(Slide.)
15 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: They could come out as 16 well as those you accepted.
17 MR. LEVINE: In what sense? The funding?
18 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Funding.
19 MR. LEVINE: No, the funding is less. That is 20 for 11, not one at a time.
21 (Slide.)
22 The next viewgraph shows you overall funding, 23 as a matter of fact. It shows you the five we selected, 24 A through E, and the time scale. Then it shows the improved Ace-Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 methodology and scoping studies,.:adding to a total of
22 kds7 $13.4 million. We will need additional staff.
2 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Let me ask: you seem to 3 think*::.the::a.l<ternate contalinment concepts are.: promising.
4 MR. LEVINE: I would say in my m+/-nd this is the 5 mostJ.,promising I of all, yes.
6 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Now the alternate ECCS 7 concepts 8 MR. LEVINE: Are less promising in my book.
9 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: But you get almost £our 10 times as much money.
11 MR. LEVINE: Let me talk about that a little bit.
- 12 13 14 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
you have to go over.
threshold.
Certain thresholds that Unfortunately, ECCS has a high 15 MR. LEVINE: That's correct; but it is also more 16 than that. People really want us to develop some systems 17 where the analysis will be much simpler and less open to 18 question; that is, the complexity of the physical processes 19 will become simpler and more -- the analysis will be more 20 believable. That is what we are going to try to do here, 21 mostly, and try to look at injecting the lower plenum and 22 other places to see if you can avoid things like bypass and 23 the like;: '.:That:;_is what the principal effort will be devoted 24 to here.
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25 MR. HANAUER: Here's another point: Several
23 kds8 hundred million dollars have already been spent in ECCS 2 research; and to make a significant improvement in that is 3 going to take a different order of effort than on some of 4 these others.
5 MR. LEVINE: Next slide.
6 {Slide.)
7 These are the recommendations in the paper. We 8 would like your approval to send the plan to Congress. We 9 have proposed, if you wish, that perhaps $1 million could be 10 reprogrammedcin '78 to get an earlier start on this, and 11 that you authorize the Comptroller to seek a Fiscal '79 12 budget amendment for the proposed program.
13 There is a letter attached to the paper for 14 reporting forward the report to Congress. We would like 15 your approval.
e-3 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 Ace-Federal Reporters, Inc.
25
24 COMMLSSIONER GILINSKY: Could you go back to -the 2 earlier slide?
3 MR. LEVINE: Yes. Go back one, please. 13.
4 (Slide.)
5 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: In some sense you are saying 6 that it is worth spending $4 million on ECC rather than, say, 7 spending more money at this point on containment concepts. Or 8 do you feel compelled to have some number of alternatives here?
9 MR. LEVINE: Let me put it this way. There is a 10 long-history of suggestions for work on improved safety 11 research, for improved safety and research, that come from the 12 .ACRS from the APS Study Group on Light water Safety and from 13 other sources, from the NRC Staff and from our consultants.
- 14. If you examine that long list, these first five I5 emerge as things that look interesting enough to do and have 16 some risk reduction potential.
17 I guess Item E looks more like a perception -- not 18 E. C looks more like a preception in risk reduction than real, J9 - but that may be worth it, too.
20 Perhaps we can convince people that we can design a 21 system whose functional capabilities by analysis are clearly 22 demonstrable, we might be further ahead than we would otherwise 23 be.
24 Again, as I said before, I think Item A is my 25 highest priority item by a significant margin over and above
69.04 ..2 25 jon any of the others in terms of actual risk reduction achievable.
2 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: You have somewhat the same 3 situation with regard to E. A fair chunk of dollars which is 4 required as a sort of threshold to make it, make a dent on the 5 prob! em.
6 Now, in fact, in E, what you are working on in terms 7 of the analysis methods, won 1 t make any difference in the real 8 situation in real plants that exist. They have a certain 9 seismic resistance which is there now. No matter how you JO analyze it, it is going to be the same.
11 a>MMISSIONER GILINSKY: But you might feel better 12 about it.
13 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: But if you are under-analyzing, 14 as you say, you may feel badly about a situation in which you 15 have every .right to feel good if you were capable of a better 16 analysis.
17 _ But it is a complex area and would take a lot of 18
- work to make a dent on it. And research's guess is that that 19 will run $3.5-odd million to make a dent, and even - they 20 think it reasonable .to pro pose it, even though you can make a 21 bigger dent in other areas with less money.
22 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: So what is .the 23 interrelationship betwsen these projects and the .. listening 24 process? That is, as you do work on alternate containment 25 concepts, how does that tie into ongoing plant design and
26 licensing?
2 MR. LEVINE: That is address in the report and I 3 should have mentioned it. This is the question of how do you 4 implement the results of research. It depends on what you 5 find.
6 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: Okay. Some kinds of 7 research, I can grasp that more easily than others.
8 MR. LEVINE: Let's take Item A, and our value impact 9 analysis turns out to be favorable, and there is significant 10 risk reduction potential at not too much .. cost, it is a 11 generically applicable backfitable item.
12 I would think, then, that we would send this over 13 to the licensing and standards people, and they would examine 14 the matter as a matter of implementation.
15 Should it be implemented or not?
16 There would have to be regulations made. Safety 17 guides, perhaps. There might have to be a hearing, a 18 rulemaking hearing, et cetera. Then a decision would be made 19 whether to implement it or not.
20 The implementation would be a set of regulatory 21 requirements and/or guides which the industry would then have 22 to meet. And the tndustry woµld propose designs which would 23 then be reviewed in the regulatory process to see that they 24 meet the regulatory requirements.
25 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: Those designs would be what,
27 they would be more complete forms --
2 MR. LEVINE: Detailed physical designs to meet 3 the requirements, regulatory requirements that would be 4 stated quite much more generally than you do in design.
5 COMMISSIONER. BRADFORD: . Wouldn'.t the requirements 6 themselves necessarily flow from some fairly good idea -
7 MR. LEVINE: From a conceptual design, but not a 8 detailed design, yes. One has to think about two subjects 9 here. One is how reliable is the system, and the other is 10 will a system of the following general nature perform the J1 function you want it to perform.
12 The latter question can be settled by a conceptual 13 design with enough demonstration and data to show that if it 14 operates it will in fact perform the function you want with a 15 high confidence level.
16 On the other hand, if you look at the alternate 17 decay heat removal where you are really interested in 18 improving the reliability of deay heat removal, there you 19 n~ed a detailed system design in order to have reliability.
20 That is the difference between the two.
21 COMMISSIONER-BRADFORD: So on the second one, in 22 fact you would actually have to do .the detailed design?
23 MR. LEVINE: We would ask someone else to do the 24 design because we would not want to review our own design.
25 Then we would evaluate that design and that would be then a
28 demonstration of feasibility of what is achievable by this 2 c6nce pt.
3 Then we could again write performance requirements 4 which could then be met by the industry in whatever way they 5 cared to meet them.
6 So dLfference is one between operability and 7 functional capability.
8 MR. HANAUER: Consider thevented containment, for J
9 example. At the moment we have a concept that you can say in a IO few paragraphs. The study. wouLd pu_t some flesh and bones on l I that and would decide that certain *-- the vented containment 12 would do certain things for you. One would then say if this 13 were all accepted, we want new plants, let's suppose, to have 14 containments that will do this, this~ and this. That will, 15 upon the o.ccurrence of an overpressure, not break, but will 16 vent the gases through filters. And an appropriate design 17 basis is so and so much gas with so and so much radioactivity.
18 And we would have some kind of conceptual study that would show 19 that was the right sort of thing.
20 Then somebody would have to make a design, so much 21 concrete, so much steel, so big a round, such and such pipes, 22 such and such valves, such and such filters. And then come in 23 and they would have an analysis that, indeed, this collection 24 of expensive hardware would handle .so much gas with so much 25 radioactivity in it and so on.
29 COMMISSI.ONER BRADFORD: How long of a process are we 2 talking about from the time that you conclude that the concept 3 is workable, does it then have to go out for comment before it 4 can_become a requirement?
5 MR. LEVINE: Several years, one to three years 6 before it could be implemented as a regulatory requirement and 7 some years-for the industry to put it in.
8 If it were applicable only to new plants, it would 9 then hav*e a new plant delay time on top of it. If it is IO back-f i ttable ~ it would be .sti 11 several years to get it in a lI plant.
12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
30 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: In pursuing a project like 2 that, are you saying that there is doubt that existing 3 containments would work under pressures that they are likely 4 to encounter?
5 MR. LEVINE: The* current -
6 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: That they might encounter in 7 unlikely circumstances.
8 MR. LEVINE: Current containments meet current 9 regulatory requirements. Current requirements do not consider 10 accidents in which the core melts. If the core were to melt, JI all of the containments n9w proposed.for reactors would fail 12 in one way or another. The worst mode of failure in terms 13 of, well one the worst modes of failure, in terms of 14 consequences to the public is this overpressure rupture.
15 So, clearly, if one can prevent that overpressure 16 rup.tur.e, or reduce its likelihood is what. you are talking 17 about, and prevent the uncontrolled release of radioactivity, 18 you would be further ahead.
19 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: And you feel $1.1 million 20 does~Justice to that category?
21 MR. LEVJNE: I think- so, yes. There's been 22 significant work done in this area already. We would have to 23 polish i.t up.
24 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: Let me ask a related but slightly 25 different question. Never mind whether $1 .1 is okay for item A,
31 and 3.9 is right for item C. Is 13.4 about right for the 2 group, recognizing that we might, down the line, very well 3 might want to shovel some funds back and forth. Maybe C would 4 turn out ultimately to be 2.7 and A 1.6.
- 5. MR. LEVINE: The estimates is quite inexact. I 6 would say it is plus or minus $3 million but it is about right 7 for the_ group.
8 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: I notice in the report on 9 page 1-5, it talks about 3 types of research. Research for 10 improved safety, confirmatory research and developmental J1 research. I just want to be sure that we understand the limits 12 of our statute. I would like to have it confirmed, in fact, 13 the original distinction of confirmatory research has been 14 extended to permit this kind of . research.
15 MR. LEVINE: That is what I believe.
16 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: I understand that. What I am 17 trying to do is get a clear and unquestioned confirmation of 18 this. I guess we will get some when we submit it to the 19 Congress for .their approval.~ But, on the other hand, I 20 think --
21 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: That's a good test.
22 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: That's the ultimate tes-t.
23 But I think we have an obligation to consider the statute 24 ourselves before we submit something to the Congress. And I 25 guess I would like to hear from our respective legal experts.
32 MR. KELLEY: On the face of it, we saw no legal 2 objection to this. If you want us to take another look at it, 3 we will be happy .to do that and get back to you quickly.
4 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: What does no legal objection 5 mean in this case?
6 MR. KELLEY: It means i.t looks okay to us.
7 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: Does it look okay to you?
8 MR. SHAPAR: It looks okay to me. I think it's well 9 within our statutory authority. I would be happy to take 10 another look --
11 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: No, I am I just want to be 12 _ sure that, within the statutory authority as it was originally 13 conveyed, that is, when the original concepts of confirmatory 14 research were enunciated, or only because of the language of 15 the authorization act.
16 MR. SHAPAR: As you may recall, the langugage of the 17 original act on this is amorphous. You won't find the term 18 confirmatory research in thax statute as such. You will find 19 it developed in the leg~slative history where the precise 20 dimensions of the word was a very difficult task to determine.
21 Looking at both -- that we have full legislative 22 authority now, I have very little question.
23 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: Then there is one other 24 question. On the assumption that it is perfectly reasonable 25 certainly from a legal point of view to go forward with this,
33 I
what assurances can we give the Congress, what assurances I
2 indeed can we have for ourselves at this point that we are not 3 in some sense duplicating work that is being done by DOE?
4 Or, indeed, doing work which properly ought to be done by DOE 5 within ,the limi.ts of its own statute?
6 MR. LEVINE: Well, there is no question about 7 duplication. We have met extensively with DOE. They are not 8 planning any work liie this. About their statute, I guess 9 I am the wrong person to interpret that.
10 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: No, my quest ion is, is it J1 something that ought to be done by DOE, are we doing it simply 12 because they didn't? Or is it something that properly ought 13 to be done by us, really, and wasn't conceived of as something 14 DOE would in the formal course of business be doing?
15 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: . What if one of these things 16 turns out to be promising, some al tern ate ECCS concept and 17 you think it ought to be tested out on some sub~tantial scale.
18 ,What would end up doing that, have we thought about that?
19 MR. LEVINE: Yes. I have. Eirst, let me answer the 20 first part of the question. I think the kind of work we have 21 proposed here is mqre properly done by us as we have suggested 22 because we are the ones who can best determine the risk 23 reduction potential as well as the overall value. In regard 24 to the latter, I think there are 2 courses available; one you 25 suggest, ECCS, for instance, one could, depending upon what
- 7 I
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34 I
I
. I one comes up with, perhaps do it on one of our sxisting I 2 facilities by modification. If one wants soma more substantial I I
3 demonstration on a real plant, it would be very hard to get I 4 even i~ you installed the system because you would not want I I
5 to undergo a LOCA in a real plant. I 6 So, I think more likely, you would try to do it on I I
7 one of our facilities like semiscale, or perhaps even LOFT I I
8 at some later time. LOFT has so many capabilities for I
9 alternate ECCS concepts to be applied to it. I 10 MR. SHAPARz There is a thread of legislative JI history here, that Congress did not intend for us to duplicate 12 major ERDA facilities, whatever that may be.
13 MR. LEVINE: I think that meant not to build our own 14 laboratories. That's been -the way we have 15 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD-: You have talked a little 16 about priorities among the items there. How does this program 17 interrelate with the ongoing reactor safety research and 18 are these dollars competitive also with whatever research may 19 be entailed in the generic issues resolutions?
20 21
- 22 23 24 25
35 MR. LEVJNEa I don.'.t see any overlap with 2 generic Lssue s. As I poin-t;ed out before,. some of these 3 c9ncepts are partly beJ_ng done al ready in our existing 4 program. The most obvious one is al terna_te ECCS where we 5 have already done some work and are defining some more.
6 This is Item C. This is an attempt to expand 7 that and look at it in a deeper way more quickly.
8 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: I guess I haven't made 9 my question very clear. I am not talking so much about JO overlap. When you look at that particular $14.9 million 11 and decide that you are going to get more of a payoff on 12 that money in those projects, are you saying that relative to 13 all the other areas in which wa might be spending research_
14 money?
15 MR. LEVINE; I am not sure I understand the 16 question. Let me take two examples. This is ~bout the 17 only way I can think about it. One of the research topics 18 that we have not suggested for pursuit is called non-19 destructive examination of the steel in the primary coolant 20 system. There we already have a very large program going, 21 because it is nseded to confirm the adequacy of the con-22 struction of plants so that you are sure the plant is well 23 built. At the same time, if you ar sure the plant is better 24 built than you otherwise were., without this, you have a safer 25 plant.
- I I
I I
36 I So that is a kind of _a program that is half in 2 conformatory and half in approved. We_ just left it in 3 confirmatory where it belongs, or where we have it.
4 These things are mostly other things that we would 5 not be doing. The bulk of our program, however, relates to 6 confirming the adequacy of existing designs. The bulk of the 7 money we are spending in emergency core cooling, for instance, 8 and code development, relates to confirming the adequacy of 9 existing designs of emergfency core cooling systems.
10 They will not give you safe reactors. It is
. 11 a confirmatory program. It is reducing the uncertainties and 12 the understanding of the safety of excisting reactors, that is 13 what the bulk of our program is.
14 MR. GOSS ICK: Let me ask if Commmi ssioner 15 Bradford's question is like this: assume next year you have 16 got the program started, and you have got it funded. The 17 following year you are, you know, told to keep an absolutely 18 tight budget, and you a~e faced.with either not funding this 19 or knocking out some of your current program.
20 How do you decide which you do, what is the 21 priority between the two. Is that kind of what you are 22 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: Let me put it another way.
23 Supposing it goes before the Congre.ss and .some Congressman 24 looks at Joe and says, "You have got, what is it, a hundred 25 and however many unresolved generic issues, you have resolved
1 I
I 169.06.3 37 I bw five of them this year, at that rate you will. resolve the I 2 last one a long time from now. At that rate why aren 1 t I
I 3 you spending that $14 million in that area?-11 I
4 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Let Joe answer it.
I I 5 (Laughter.)
I 6 MR. LEVINE: Well, you know, we already have a I
I 7 posture that the reactors we are licensing are safe enough I
8 with those generic issues outstanding, otherwise we wouldn1 t I
9 have licensed the reactors.
10 MR. CASE: For some length of time, not forever.
11 MR. GOSSICK: This does raise the more general 12 questions about what is the priority of the program vis-a-vis 13 some of the other things we are trying to do and for which we 14 are having to go back for funds for. I think that is a fair 15 question the Commission has to focus on, decide whether or 16 not we go ahead and try to get this thing started at the 17 expense of something else, strictly on no new money or no 18 new program.
19 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: I guess that is the question 20 I would 1 ike to focus on. In par ti cul ar, I would 1 ike to focu 21 on the manpower requirements. It seems to me if you put 22 $1 million, it is pror:osed that we might think now in terms of 23 reprogramming to the amount of $JOO for the rest of the year, 24 if we do, we are going to have to put some kind of manpower on 25 it to make that useful.
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38 My question is, should we do this before we gex 2 a clear indication from the Congress that,in fact, they are 3 going to provide additional funds? If we do, then we have 4 already established a higher priority for this program than 5 for some other programs which will have to suffer the loss 6 of this manpower.
7 MR. LEVINE: I agree with you ~ompletely. In fact, 8 that was my perception, tht we would not start anything .this 9 year, unless there was a reprogramminmg approved for '79.
10 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Well, we will have to take 11 a look at it very carefully. So we have got your proposal.
12 We will take a look at it.
13 MR. LEVINE: I have only one reminder, sir. It 14 has to get down to the Congress by the 12th of April.
15 COMMI-5SIONER GILINSKY: Duly noted. Thank you.
16 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: I might say I thought it was 17 a pretty decent report. I have been avoiding Commission I8 papers for some weeks now. I found that a very pleasant 19 period. This was the first one that I dove back into, in 20 spite of its volume, and I found it an excellent paper.
21 MR. LEVINE: Thank you.
22 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: You are to be commended on it, 23 and the group that worked on it is to be commended in it.
24 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Yes, I think that's right.
25 Thank you.
39 Why don't we take a .thr.ee-.minute break. Then 2 we will start up again.
3 (Whereupon, at 2:40 p.m., the hearing was 4 adjourned.)
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