ML22230A128

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Tran-M791016: Public Meeting Discussion of Commissions Decision-Making Role in Emergency Response
ML22230A128
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Issue date: 10/16/1979
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{{#Wiki_filter:,,. f ( 8ETURN TO SECRETARIAT RECORDS NUCLEAR REGU!.ATOR-Y COMMISSION IN THE MATTER OF: PUBLIC MEETING DISCUSSION* OF COMMISSION' s* DECISION-MAKING ROLE IN EMERGENCY RESPONSE Place - Washington, D. C. Cate - Tuesday, 1.6 October 1979 Pcges 1 - 43 ACE -FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC *. Offo;iaLRe-porta-rs 4.44. North Capitol Street' -Washington, D.C 20001 NATIONWIDE COVERAGE* DAILY Telephone: (202) 347-3700.. J

CR7705 1 DISCLAIMER This is-an unofficial transcript of a* meeting of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission held onTuesday, 16 October 1979 in the Connnissions's offices at 1717 H Street, N. W., Washington, D. C. The meeting was open to public attendance and observation. This transcript has not been reviewed, corrected, or edited, and it may contain

  • inaccuracies.

The transcript is intended solely for general informational purposes. As provided by 10 CFR 9.103, it is not part of the formal or informal record of decision of the matters discussed. Expressions of opinion in this transcript do not necessarily reflect f_inal determinations or beliefs. No pleading or other paper may be filed with the Commission in any proceeding as the result of or addressed to any statement or argument contained herein, except as the Commission may authorize.

{ 70.5 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 i-Federat Reporters, Inc. 25 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION PUBLIC MEETING DISCUSSION OF COMMISSION'S DECISION-MAKING ROLE IN EMERGENCY RESPONSE BEFORE: Room 1130 1717 H Street, N. w. Washington, D. C. Tuesday, 16 October 1979 3:20 p.rn. DR. JOSEPH M. HENDRIE, Chairman VICTOR GILINSKY, Commissioner RICHARDT. KENNEDY, Commissioner PETER A. BRADFORD, Commissioner JOHN F. AHEARNE, Commissioner PRESENT: Messrs. Bickwit, Case, Gossick, Kenneke, and Stello. 2

( 5 13 01 pv LJA V 2 3 4 5 6 7 b 'i 10 l l 12 13 14 15 lb 17 18 IY 20 21 22 23 24 25 3 PROCEEDINGS CHAIRJAN HENDRIE: The meeting will come to order. Does it ~ontinue to be our understanding that we can proceed to an affirmation? MR. BICKWIT: That"s my understanding. CO\\'li*,HSSIOHE?. BRA.JFORD: T would rather do it at the end of this meeting. CHAIRi,\\AN,HEdORIE: I can. Let me then explain 1vhat the schedule looKs like for the rest of the afternoon on the basis of that request. The commission was scheduled to meet now, or, rather, 20 minutes ago, on the subject of its decision on taking a role in emergency response and to discuss what, in part'icular, the commissioners and the commission collegially ought to do in the event of an emergency. I am going to start that meeting in a moment and al.low it to run until 4:15. At that point, wherever we are in the discussion, we will terminate it. The commission, as some of you may know, has since late last week considering the question of the operation of EPICOR-2 at Three Mile Island Unit 2, and a commission order has been promised on that subject. It"s my understanding that we have an order which is acceptable to all of the commissioners, and assuming that to still be ~rue, at 4:15 I will ask my colleagues to join me in voting to hold a short-notice affirmation session or meeting to vote that

5 13 02 ';JV DAV 2 ":l ...J 4 5 0 7 d '-J 10 11 12 13 14 15 lo 17 18 lY 20 21 22 23 24 25 4 order. At 4:30 the commission will adjourn. We have a meeting on some personnel matters that I have to.make sure we get in this afternoon. And a couple of us have to leave by 5:0C, so that the schedule runs fairly tight. With that introauction as to where I think we're going this afternoon, let us turn to the commission's deci sionraaking role in emergency response. 3y way of -- I se~ either the offensive team, or the defensive team, has taken the field -- I'm not sure which (Laughter.) CHAIRi,iAN HENDRIE: -- Or perhaps i t"s the special team with the suicide squad members. I'm not quite sure. (Laughter.) CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: I have* been watching Monday night football. By way of a preliminary note to this discussion, in which I will ask Al Kenneke to lead us through a briefing on some work that his group has done on the subject, I will note tha-c as an interim measure and until the collegial commission d*ecides differently or however it may decide on what role the commission itself and commissioners ought to have in the event of an emergency situation. Last Friday I decided that until the collegial commission decision is in hand on commissioner roles, that

5 13 03 pv JAV 2 3 4 '..) 6 7 b ':I 10 1 I 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 I~ 20 21 22 23 24 25 5* if we have an em~rgency and the emergency managament team of the agency is mustereJ, that I am going to go-off to the response center anc join that effort. Al, why don't you go ahead. I take these are MR. KENJEKE: Ihese are som~ slides that we've pre pared f roiil the pa per. CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: fhat you're going to talk from? GooJ. MR. KENNEKE: I thought I would best start back with the origins of the specific problem, other than Three Mile Island itself, which was a meQo from Commissioner Bradford, in May, in which he called to your attention the need to make some decisions about what your role would be. Can we have -- I hope - a slide 1, please? They've los~ the bulb. You each have sheets in front of you. From the audience"s point of view, I hope the bulb is fixed quickly. CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: Notice the smooth way in which we deal with this emergency. (Laughter.) MR. KENNEKE: Commissioner Bradford put it very basically that the basic question was whether or* not the commission could act collegially in the event of-an emergency response,. an NRC emergency respons~) and if not,

5 l'3 04 -;JV JA 2 4 5 0 7 0 y 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 16 JS,i 20 21 22 23 24 25 6 then various delegations should be ~ade and the matter clarifiea. Particularly, matters that-he suggested be considereci on your agend~ would be the locus of the commission during an emergency - C 31 i de.) -- Decisions to assiGn personnel to sites -- COMJ.\\ISSI0NER GILINSKY: 11 Locus 11 is like where the commission is going to be? MR. KENNEKE: Yes. The base of operations, wnether it's going to be in some corner office on H Street, out in the heart of things, or on site. co;,{MISSIONER KENNEDY: St. Louis? CHAIR~AN HENDRIE: Well, I am going to have to buy more ashtra~s if we're going to run any more out. of my office. JR. KENNEKE: The matter of recommending that protective measures be taken, what the generic implications might be for the plants, 5etting up post-accident investi~ations in the various matters of liaisons. As a result of that memo, the commission met in June and discussed the matter in very broad terms with the staff -- Harold Denton and Vic Stello, primraily, and yourselves., And the questions that seemed to us to summarize

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3 4 ~ 6 7 0 y 10 11 12 13 14 1 :j 16 17 lb 1 <:; 20 21 22 23 24 25 7 that ~eeting were: are there clearly defined areas of crisis 1,anag-:rnent in *,.;hich the commission"s input is desirable or nece~sary; if so, should these responsibilities -- this is the second slide. Excuse me. Slide 2, please. (Slide.) If so, should these responsibilities be handled singly or collegially? It individually, by whom? COMl!iI SS I<H-lER GI LINSKY: Actually, on that point, on the singly, the general co~nsel had some comments on this subject ~R. K~NNEKE: I will come back to that. Co:.,(},HSSIONE~ GILii,iSKY: -- At the meeting last week. Ana I think you ought to address that i:oint. MR. KENNEKEr Yes.* What would the threshold points for commission involvement be? And finally, what would the agenda be in the event you participatea? We then, based on the cornmission"s request, developed what we ho~ed would be the basis for further discussion that reflected the views of everyone. There were very strongly held feelings that needed to be sorted out, and that's basically wha~ we attempted to do, to brdak the probleD down and lay it out in a way that perhaps would allow us to approach it more rationally.

13 J6 J ) 1/ ut*,: '. I 2 .J 4 5 6 7 0 10 1 I 12 13 14 15 16 17 lb 1 s; 20 21 22 23 24 25 d AnJ I have on slide 3 -- (Slid8.) -- An outlind of that ~erao. Simply, as the ba~kground that led to the memo, it broke the problem down into talking about. che values ot corn.mission pan:icipation, what the limits should be~ should you participate, how that rni;Jht take place, what kinds of accidant.s rr:ic_;ht.need to be considered, and what items might be* on that agenda, as well as recommendations for future action. (Slide.) Slide 4, I woul~ like to proceed and t.alk in more detail about. the me:10. Under the heading of 11 Value of Commission Participation -- CO!'.Q,[I SS IOi~t::R AHEARNE: Al, before you 90 in to the details, I am sure it~s obvious, but I would like you to say just a word or two about your answer, your first major question, "Are there clearly defined areas in which commission inpu-c is desirable or necessary? 11 The. 11 desirable or nccessary 11 is from the standpoint of protecting the public health and safety, and solely that; is that correct? 1\\{R. KENHEKE: Yes. I think that's the essence of the basic question. The question is whether your involvement would add ~o safety or detract from safety. CO/~MI SS I ONER AHEARNE: Fine. MR *. KENNEKE: Many individuals that we talked to

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"6 7 0 y - 10 l I 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 IY 20 21 22 23 24 25 felt very s-cron._,11~_, the commission shoulun"t partici;Jate in

naking decisions on resp:Jnsive action, prirr,arily because it goes exactly to the point we just spoke of:

it could cause delay and create difficulty and ma~e things less safe. There are diff~rent perceptions, however, of the co~nission's role, and ic goes to the question of decisionmaking.

  • n-1~r~ really isn"t any great question, I chink,.abouc the role of individual commissioners acting in specific roles, such as spokesmen in particular areas.

There is no,iuestion that JOU have policymaking responsibilities beforehand 3nd in the aftermath. CO/nyiISSIO'.~ER AHEARl*iE: Could I ask you a question on that. 'tou say thac -chere is no concern about individuals acting as spokesmen. ~as any concern expressed about having mul -ciplc S:J<?kesmen? MR

  • Kc NN EKE :

Y e s

  • COMM ISSI ONEi-? AHEARNE:

So, when you say there was no concern - MR. KENNEKE: ~hat I was trying to say is that those who were concerned about the com~ission not participating or ~articipating were concerned that your collegial activities could interfere with decisionmakin~. They were not saying that you could not vote to be participants as individuals in some specific specified way. COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Who is 11 they 11 now?

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1R. Kr
I-i:*~EKE:

I 1*1ould say primarily r:ie,i1bers of the staff, the meDbcirs that we talked to, and what ~e sensed many of the Jifficulties you yourselves rsading jetween the lines.* CDAMISSIONER GILINSKY: Jid you ask them about non-crisis activities? (laughter.) JR. iiNNEKE: We focuseu on e argency requirements. A few other fora exist for that. There is, ho~ever, despite peopleJs concerns about you not participating, I woul0 say a residual concern that there is a specific value to having the commission participate, and they were not trying to say somehow not to capc.ure that value. CO;,U.HSSIONER AHEARNE: What value was that? MR. KENNEi<E: That the response to a nuclear emergency is likely to require decisions that involve value judgments and a9ency commitments of the kind that: the comr.iLssion would norr.-ially be required to make. In that sense, if we could find a way, that would be the sense in which the commission co ulci come in. Clearly, the limitations to commission participation related to your decisionmaking role. The constraints on that primarily was the question of time when you needed to make a decision~

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2 3 4 5 6 7 0 y 10 1 l 12 13 14 15 16 17 ld lY 20 21 22 23 24 25 I I COi-ii*,fL:3SIOi*4E:-t AHEARi*ic: Let me continue to push on this, tecause, as I understand it, you did -- I guess JoB and Ji~ went through this -- did interview a lot of people or talk to a lot of people; is that correct? ~R. K2NNEKE: Yes, one way or another. COMMISSIONEH AHEARNE: The flavor I am getting is t ha t: the co n c e rn *,,,as so l e l y be c au s:.; o f the di ff i c u l ty of something.. that"s moving rapiJly an:J the difficulty of 0 bringin~ in a collegial group to try to have in¢ut into a rapidly evolvin~ -- \\{R. KE!frlEKE: That's the hP.art of the r;ia tter, yes. CO/,fo\\ISSIONER AHEARNE: That"s the heart of the matter. Then you"re saying it was not a concern, A, if the matter weren"t developing rapidly, nor, B, on the judgment that might be reached. MR. K~NNEKE: The question of how much time was available would be the single area in which it seemed feasible that one could define that if there was sufficient time. COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: There was no concern that the judgments that would be reached would not be the one MR. KENN EKE: I think -- and this is my own reaction to my own understanding, and this is generalizing a lot of people>s points of view - that while individuals might. differ,. they, I think, unanimously agree there needs

13 10 ) )V u.A. V t:. 3 4 t.; 0 7 0 10 I I 12 13 14 15 16 17 lb I~ 20 21 22 23 24 25 12 to be a sin,;ile decision 5nci..:: clear-:-cut decision, wha-cever that decision is, 8Ven -chough -chey might personally disagree with t~e particular action. VOICE: There is also concern about the information proolem

  • co;AMISSIONi::i~ AHEARI-/E:

You mean getting enough information in to make the informed decision? VO I CE: Yes. CO\\\\i.[ ISSI ONER i(EhNEiJY: Because individual con:;1issioners v,ould each be seeking diffsrent infor:nation, or 0ec2use i~'s difficul-c to get that much infor~ation to all co~missioners, or both? MR. KEHNEKE: Both in the first compounding sense. \\'./hatever you do, whatever you decide, I chink there was a unani~ous feeling. that the mechanism for informing the cbmmission and receiving requests for that information goes through a single channel, whatever you decide, to simplify the problems of rdsµmse, so that if the situation was rapidly developing, I think it's pretty clear that the commission would have to limit its re si:onse. I think there is a universal feelingo And from what I read in the newspapers and what I sense in the air, I get the feeling that among you all, similarly, that you recognize that.- And so, in that case, you'd have to limit your

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3 4 5 0 7 d ~ 10 I I 12 13 14 15 16 17 ld lY 20 21 22 23 24 25 13 role to official after~the-fact spokesman, perhaps, or possibly designate a single or lead commissioner to oversee the response or resolve. That.1s the only other possibility, and I will come back to that. fhat,,s the point that Commissioner Gilinsky has raiseci. CO.'t\\MISSIONER BRADFORD: Is there in back of this sort of a picture that I guess is pretty close to the picture of the EHT that I 1*1ould have had before Three l.Hle Island; that is, it's a group designated and ap~roved by the commission, functioning under procedures and criteria approved by the commission, and therefore that.1s a good situation for the commission itself not to be involved in? MR. KENdEKE: I think they*"re saying that whatever organizatio~ you set up in advance, that that organization should be allowed to proceed, and everyone should beforehand kno~ what his role is in the event of such a thing, so there would be no confusion. Each would retire to his place to do his thing, or to carry out business if he"s not involved. I think that"s the essence of it. COMM! SS !ONER AHEARNE: I think, in following up some part of what I interpretad in Peter's question, did you get any sense from these people who felt that it was appropriate because of the pull of the events not to have the corr:mission involved,. that they_ felt that they had enough

J 13 12 -:,v J/,.v 2 3 ,I..,. 5 6 7 6 SJ 10 11 12 13 !4 15 16 17 18 I~ 20 21 t:..~ 23 24 25 !4 in the sense of procedur~s and guidance? Eecause the way

  • the chapter is written is that. it.,s supposed -co be operating under the.policies laiJ out by the commission.

Did you get the sense from them that they felt there was adequate laying out of the policies? !*,[R. KEUl\\lEKE: lie can talk more to this. One of his assignments in the g-eneral plan of action )s to revamp the ma~ual chapters. Now, I have got in the back here, at the bottom line, something that was not in the memo. It would be a proposal that Vic could take into account. CO/,L'.H::iSIO>IErt AHEAR>fE:

  • /ai t, now.

I am not really talking about revamping manual chapters. I am really asking the 4uestion: ~id the people in your discussions -- and I can understand this concept that they feel that once things get started the people operating the emergency response want. to have control, single-channel direction, et cetera. But the way -- at lea st the words say that they do all this under policies laid out by the comoission. My ques~ion is: did you get a sense that they believe that there is ade~uate laying out of those policies so that they feel that they have enough guidance framework? MR. KENNEKE: Everything that I know of suggests the staff believes there is plenty of room for improvement. COMM I SS !ONER AHEARNE: Okay*- Is that. another way

) )',J 13 ) JV ~*/...v' 2 3 "i' 5 0 7 b '-:,i 10 I I 12 13 14 15 16 17 lb lY 20 21 22 23 24 25 15 of saying, 11 Yes, they believe thac. th;;fre must he 11 ~R. K~NNEK~: Thar9 should be ~ore improvements, yes. The emeigaricy planning task force told you that, among others. Vic is working on the manual ch~pters, s pe c i f i ca 11 y

  • One or the thin(Js we thought was im f:()rc.an r. to point out was the significance of Three Mile Island itself as a background to the decision with regard to this matter.

TM! was, I thin~, not expected in the sense of being drawn out. It w~s not visualized as the fundamental starting place for planning.

)ne always thought in terms of the immedia~ely unfolding situation~ or decisions went too fast for any kind of questions.

In the case of Tru:ee Mile Island it lasted for sorae period of time, and a peak in terms of public conc~rn arose a couple of days after the beginning of the event. And it seemed to us that it was that very fact that drew the commission more heavily into it. .And there is a la sson in that, in the sense that if ~he i-:,a.tter is Jrawn out, it seems inevitable chat the com:rii ssion wi 11 be lookec.i to as the chief spokes:nan for the agency. They will be the points of contact for various inquiries and so on, and not* the staff. And in that sense, it argues for carefully considering whether or not you should remove yourselves from emergency response. On the other hand --

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  • 21 22 23 24 25 16 CO:.r;,HSSIONEH AHEAR:JE:

In that case, Al, once rlarold got estnblisheci in Harrisburg, the public looked to r.2rold co be cha chier s;:okesman. JR. KiNNErE: No, we're talking about drawing up a policy that will guide future response

  • CO!,*U,II SS I ONER AHEARl E:

I tho ugh t I was detecting your feelin9 that because it s-cretched out, the public inavi tably looks to the cof7lmi ssion. I am just saying I didn't think that was the case. ~R. KiNNE~E: The decision to have additional people go to the site, as I understand it, began to involve co:nmis.::ion advice, in par-r.. CCh(MI SS IOiH.:a AHEARdE: I am only addressing the question of the spokesman. I didn't think that there was any.aifficu~ty once Harold was speaking on this matter.

'r J 14 01 (apuAv 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 ~ 10 - 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 1~ 20 21 22 23 24 25 17 MR. KENNE~E: I'd like to speak to the matter of SJ:)Okesmen. I'll break that matter down further a little further on. There are spokesmen for the internal workings of the thing, people who are involved in protection, and those who are simply inquiring. On the other hand, though Three Illile Island is stretched ou~, we've got to be careful that we not use that to_ bi as, our thinkin;;, tha -c. that" s the only kind of thin,:J that can happen. And th~re are other types of situations, such as safeguards events that one has to be caraful of. The gist of that is trat we should be thinking about planning what kind of emergency situations might require Commission participation, assuming that you should decide you should be involved in some form. What decisions would be appropriate for Commission decision? And what modes might that participation take? In any event, whatdver you come up with it would seem to us would have to be tested by realistic scenarios, and your role and your activities would have to be part of that test. In terms of assuming you had a role, the kinds of things that one would relate to with regard to decision-making would be the subject of the concurrence and perhaps the staff's initial assessment of the severity and t_he imminence of the threat, whether or not to send higher level o.ff icials to the si i:e, whether or not to recommend

I 5 14 02 kapDAV 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 y 10 I I 12 13 14 I :? 16 17 18 I~ 20 21 22 23 24 25 18 that protective actions be taken, whether or not to seek supplementary resources, what actions to take with regard to generic concerns, setting up investigations, for example, decisions equally important to recommending modifying or terminating protective actions. At that time, we concluded that this discussion should focus on the following issues: should the Commission limit its role co oversight, high level liaison, court of last resort, or should it extend its role to decision-making? (Slide.) If the Commission assumes -- one more slide, please. (Slide.) If the Commission assumes a key role in decision-making, what would be the preferred mode of its par~icipation and interactions with the staff? Given that, what additional resources would you need, informational, technical and physical, to assume a substantive role and to make that role effective in emergency response decision-making? Whatever you decide, it seems to us the manual chapter among other things should be revised to spell out more specifically what the Commission.,,s role as well as adjusting the role of tha staff will be in emergency

3 14 03 ~apDAV 19 response. At that time we didn't recommend a specific 2 resolution. That's a month ago. It was premature, it 3 ~ee~ed to us. We didn't know what your individual views 4 were, you needed time to think. about it, you needed to have 5 pieces paper and other things had to happen. o Well, since then - and the last month has been 7 very eventful in that respect -- you've had a chance to 8 think about it. You've had the opportunity to talk with a ~ number of the investigating groups within NRC, outside of 10 NRC. It seems to me now, at least for talking purposes at 11 this meeting, a particular proi:osal might help to solidify 12 the thinking, or at least serve as a point of departure. It 13 seems i:o us that you need to be specific at this point to 14 come to grips with it and answer. 15 The Chairman has laid out, at least for the 16 interim, what he intends to do. I think you as a group now 17 mighc respond to that specific question. Slide seven - 18 19 (Slide.) -- is a copy of the present incident response 20 organization. It has a lot of detail to it, but I wane to 21 _ focus your attention on the very top little box that says 22 11 commission, 11 and everything else beneath that, think of as 23 the IRO, one box, however that is now or however that might 24 be reconsitituted. 0502 now merely says that the Commission 25 has a policy-making role~ Yet in diagrams,. by the line

5 l4 04 k.apuAV 2 3 4 5 0 7 b ":i 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 IY 20 21 22 23 24 25 20 nature of it, it seems to suggest that you hav~ a decision-making role in the line of decisionso The document is pretty claar. That was not the intent. COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: In the manual chapter it's pretty clear. CO,\\{MISSIONER GI LINSKY: What.1s pre tty clear? COi~i'I\\I SS I ONER AHEARNE: That the Commissioner was to be in general policy, but as far as the instant response and emergency action, that EMT was the group fronting. At l ea s t t ha t., s w ha t I t ho u g ht i t was

  • COMJAISSIONER KE.N~'1EJJY:

Yes, that.1s what the manual chapter says. COMiv{ISSIONER BRADFORD: What is ambiguous, I guess, is whether there is an ongoing policy function during the accident. I must say I would have interpreted it as not. But that.,s not absolutely certain. MR. KENNEKE: The meaning of it becomes kind of ambiguous or it.,s almost irrelevant in the sense of not decision-making and it.,s not really involved in the event. It's an off-line operation. (Slide.) it is Now, in slide eight, we have drawn there, on the left of the chart, a simplified diagram of the 0502, the Commission and the incident response organization. ~\\'hat we suggest for your consideration, at least as a point of

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14 15 16 17 18 IY 20 21 22 23 24 25 21 departure for discussion, is that the Commission consider replacing the word 11Commi ss ion II by 11d i rec tor, 11 the chairman of the NRC, ~hat that be understood to Se the decision-making site, unambiguously clear that that person makes the decisions in emergency rei:onses. CO,',iMISS TONER AH EAR.NE: Now, if I understand it, what you're saying is that you happen to be using the same lina block on the left-hand side of the manual chapter but since in the manual chapter that really is not a decision-making line between the Commission and IRO, what you are saying is that you would change that to make that your proposal i.s to make it a decision-making role. So in* essence, whereas in the manual chapter EDO is sort of the senior person making the decisions, you would move that up. MR. KENNEKE: I would say that's right. I would also like to comment, I think there is a,difference of opinion as to what the manual chapter says with regard to Who makes decisions. Even within the staff, it's not clear absolutely, unambiguously, that EDO is in charge. It seems to us we need an unambiguous - COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Wait, wait, wait. Why isn't it clear tha1: the EDO is in charge? MR. KENNEKE: If you read it again you can interpret. it to mean that he is first among equals but not

I I

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3 4 5 6 7 e y 10 I I 12 13 14 1 5 16 17 18 IY 20 21 22 23 24 25 22 quit.e in charge. CCHA;MISSIONER GILINSKY: Where do you read that? Could you read t.hat. over to me? MR. KENNEKE: Lee, I know, knows how he interprets it. But whatever you decide COMJ,!ISSIONER GILINSKY: I assume when he interprets it that he is in charge, am I wrong?

  • COMMISSIONEH AHEARNE:

As far as I can see it says the EDO is director of the executive management team. And when it goes do1-m to I&E it says, 11 serves as a :nember of Elir. 11 N RR serves as a c1ember of E~ff. This is 0502 part one. It-'s the response planning duties. MR *. GOSSI CK: I" d just comment that that-' s been clear in my mind. There are attendant problems with it 9 but that-'s my understanding of the intent. COMMISSIONER BRADR)RDi Did anyone dispute it? COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: It certainly seems very clear. .1/4R. GOSSICK:. They didn-'t dispute it, but there _ were some actions that were taken wi thou.t my knowledge that were a carry-over from the day-to-day kind of operation which is the normal course of behavior. COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Let-'s see, what attendant problems are you referring to specifically? MR.. GOSSICK: People are used to acting on their

) 14 07 ~aplJAV 2 J 4 5 6 7 b y 10 1 I 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 IY 20 21 22 23 24 25 23 own without communicating with EDO during the normal course of business around the NRC. And when ybu're thrust together in the EMT set-up, in the crisis situation, there's a tendency for that kind of action to carry on. COMMISS !ONER AHEARNE: People use resources as though they were - MR. GDSSICK: No, I'm talking about telling people to do*- things, whether it's.their resource or not. COMMISSIONEH GILINSKY: I take it you're talking about ac~ions that are of sufficient magnitude -- MR. GOSSICK: I'm talking about specifically telling the represenc:ative of the state programs office to advise the Pennsylvania people that we're recommending an aler~ - I. mean, an evacuation. I was not aware of that. I thought he acted on his own, overhearing the conversation that had gone on within El,ff, i'lhere we were in a position where we called you to tell you that that was our recommendation. And which we did, promptly thereafter. MR. KENNEKE: Well, I'm unable to document it at the moment, the source of my ambiguity. I don't have a copy which I marked up, but let me sse if I can do it. There is an ambiguity *. CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: Let'*s just note that if there is one it needs to be cleared up. MR.. KENNEKE: That's right. I think we all agree

)

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3 4 5 6 7 b ':t 10 1 l 12 13 14 15 16 17 lb ) 1:,1 20 21 22 23 24 25 24 that it should oe unambiguous as to who wi 11 make dee i.sions and who will speaK for NRC. I think that's really the cleare~t elemenc. COMMISSIOi~ER GILINSKY: Could we return to chis alternative proposal that a ~ember of the Commission, particularly the chairman, direct this center? COMMISSIONER AHEARi~E: EnJorsed by at least one member of tha Commission. CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: But there's an interesting thing Vic's alluding to. There's an interesting proposition Which weJll ask the general counsel to lead us through, and that is the proposition that in asserting that I propose to go to the response center and take charge of the E:,ff, if it has to activate, at least as I say up until some further description_ of Cammi ssion is enunciated by the collegial body, it's not altogether clear what my legal authority is to do so. The law says we can delegate to an officer of the Commission the Commission's powers and so on, but apparently we can't delegate to a commissioner. COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: Could you ex plain that? CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: We might very well be in the position of having to exercise moral suasion on the officers of the staff. MR~ KENNEKE: May I ask a point of personal

l 14 09

~apiJAv /-** 2 3 4 5 0 7 0 it 10 1 r 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 I 'i 20 21 22 23 24 25 25 privilege, and finish the profX)sa.l, the bottom line of which is a hand-off with regard co the legal aspect, with regards -co whe'C.her it can be done, and if so how it can be done. Su'\\:. the point of our suggestion is that the chairman -- since now we are seeking a way to have Commission involvement, the line of succession would not be down to the staff but would be to the other commissioners. If the chairman were not available, whoever was acting would be and it would follow, in effect, the national emergency line of succession unless otherwise specified. As part of the - COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: The same problems would attach to that. MR. KENNEKE: Right, exactly. That"ll be the hand.;..off, and Len* can take it on from there. Part of it would be be cause each of. you then would be somehow giving up something, something along the lines of a best effort requirement on the part of the chairman, to keep you fully informed and to involve you in collegial decision-making to the extent that's feasible. COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: Can you explain, going back to the reason I originally asked the question, you're solely focused UJ:On improving health and safety? MR. KENNEKE: Health and safety, right. COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:, How that requirement gets

) 14 10

<.apuAv 2 3 4 5 b 7 c:; y 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 j -,.i 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 into that MR. K2NNEKE: Which one, specifically? COit.\\I5SIONEli AHEAR.NE: The last one. The best effort to keep informed, et cetera. MR. KENNEKE: Because if the idea is to involve you in an advisory way, co1iegially, to the extent feasible., then you must have the information available to you as best you c*an, so that delay would *not be involved. The. primary emphasis* is on making you capable of advising on a moment.'s notice, should i::.hat be possible. CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: I think John's asking, why aoes that aia safety? I guess the delicate answer you ought to make is that. - COM.MISSIONER KENNEDY: Whose health and safety? CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: If there is time in the decision-making process, then hopefully five commissioners' points of view collectively gathered, are better than one. MR. KENNEKE: You stole the words right out of my mou t.h. VOICE: There is also the third line. CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: I don't know how strongly I endorse that. (Laughter.) COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: You started off very well. Thank you.

14 11

apDA'/

2 3 4

5 6

7 d y 10 1.1 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 IY 20 21 22 23 24 25 27 VOICE: Al's third line if also involved here. Namely that if the Commission undertakes any liaison aci:.ivities, ~learly you have to be in phase with the information, and there,'lould be heal th and safety if you are advising people on the basis of information. COMMISSIOHER AHEARNE: That's absolutely right$ VOICE: So it does have a health and safety .i m pl i cation

  • MR. KENNEKE:

It seems to us also, then, that the commissioners should consider seriously putting yourselves in specific roles within t.he organization, particularly at the interface or the internal workings, which is yourselves and the licerisee, and the state and locals who are working. specifically to deal *,'Ii th the emergency. Interface with those on the outside who are inevitably going to inquire you can start with the White House, Congress, other agencies who have not been involved, industry, insofar as they need to know what the implications are, the international community all of these things occur. And it seems to us that it would be we 11 for you to consider seriously assi"gning those. COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: But, Al, let me ask a difficult question: you* have this situation where you have an emergency unfolding in which there is great tension, great concern and you have a variety of groups that you've

f' 5 14 12 Kapi.JAV 2 3 4 5 6 7 b y 10 I I 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 IY 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 men -cioned - now, the most concerned be in:; the public in the affected area, but all of these others, the Whita House, Congress, et cetera. Is it.a principal,responsibility of the NRC to make sure that that information link or liaison be as accurate as possible? MR. KENNEKE: Yes. COMMISSIONc:R AHEARNE: So doesn"t that. come into some conflict with your suggestion that there oe the best effort, but no-c nacessary - all I"m saying is that I can recognize a certain sensibility protocol issue but it"s not obvious to me that that best information link is served by having the commissioners being the link. MR. K~NNEKE: Let me try to make a distinction. That best effort related to providing you general information.across the board, that would allow you to provide good advice to the director of the aecision-making. The spokesman aspect has each of you, as I would visualize it, in a specific role -- a limited spectrum of the informa~ion, that you indeed -would be the expert. You would be backed up. For example, Congress. The important aspect, it seems to us, is not solely the question of whether you have the decision-maker of the SJ:Okesman have authority to do that. But what is also their stature? COMMISSION ER AHEARNE: It seems to me it" s more

) 14 13

apUAV 2

3 4 5 6 7 0 'I 10 I 1 12 13 14 15 16 1 7 18 IY 20 21 22 23 24 25 the protocol siue that you"re getting wrapped up th,3re with, rather than good information transfet*. l,1.R. KcHNEi(E: Well that is a lesser aspect of it. But it seems to us that you should seriously consider that. The hear-i: of our notion is to make it clear that th1~re"s one person who speaks for the entire agency, that makes the decision. Tnere"s a clear line of succession. But that there be a mechanism for involving the other commissioners collegially through that individual. And then thirdly, and tertiarily, that you consider involving yourselves as the nominal spokesmen for: these various interfaces that will invariably occur. COMMIS3IONER GILINSKY: You"re really saying ;ve ought to take over public affairs and congressional affairs.* MR *. KENNEKE: I think for example, public affairs. COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: Do you mean, Vic, on a routine basis? that. COM.MISSIONER GILI.NSKY: I don-'t want to answer MR. KENNEKE: Okay. Slide nine (Slide.) -- more precisely puts down the proposal. COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: I thought at the bot tom of this you wera going to CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: He"s trying to get through his

5 14 14 kap0A-2 Jo. slides. Until general counsel gets a hold of tha issues. MR. KiNNEK~: There is a bullet on that that says 3 it is recognized that clarification of the legal 4 effectivenes of these recommendation may be needed. But it 5 seems to us fairly straightforward. My understanding is 6 that it can be done, but in che interim whatever decision 7 you make, if you decide to do it, tell Congress what your b intent is and ace on it as an interim measure. ~ I think your interest here, as you point out, is 10 health ana safety. What is the best thing for health and 11 safer.y should another emergency occur? And I will leave the 12 legalities and mechanisms and how that might best be said 13 for Len to describe, but as I understand, it can be done. I 4 The quest ion to you is whet her it oughc to be. 15 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: Since you"re still 16 finishing your slides - 17 MR. KENNEKE: I am finished. lo COM.MISSIONER AHEARNE: But I ~.,ranted to ask one I Y last.quest.ion.. You focused, as I think you started out 20 saying, on the role -- would I be correct in assuming that 21 you also believe that we must, no matter how we come out of 22 23 24 25 this role, we have to put out policy guidance that is clear? MR. KENNEKE: Unambiguous. COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:

  • Okay *.

3.1:5.l

J sh 2

j 4 _) ,_) I 3 -) l*J 11 1-2 13 14 l j 1:5 l / 13 1i 2J 21 22 23 24 2:5 31 .\\F<. GOSSI'.::(: I-'d just li!c9 t:J ma1<e a co':1:-:i::nt ::n that point, Co'.nmissioner Ahearna. 1,'e"re assumin-:; that the role of the whole incident response orJanization and staff action is aosolutely clear as to what the objectiV9S are. 20.\\{MISS IOi~::R AHEA~i!E: It"13t' s *.<1hat I *.*r2s trJinJ t'J get at, you se-=. I d-:Jn"t t:-1ink: it is. I think thera"s = l0t of \\{x. GOSSICK: That"s my ;::ioinL There are :artainly assumptions !::,eing-11a.de aoout comman...:i co'"ltr-::,1 an(.! de:isions. And I"m contandi~J that those decisions come prAtty few and far bet*Neen, even at Three !Hle IsL~nd, th.=it there"s an awful lot of other interaction, com~unicAtion, and notification that goes on that is prov id:=d for oy th13 current structure, which I thick, you ~now, on3 mustn"t lose sight of. MR. KE'.'HEKE: And there are those s;::>ecific occasi-:::ins when someon-a of t'.'"le co;nmissioners would be a;iproprL,te 8S _ an intervenor for the spokesman aspect. GD :\\G,{ ISSI OH =R AHEAJN E: \\*'{hat I thin'< I was tryin9 to get at is ti1at ther~ are secs of evacuation procedur~s. Commissioner Gilins'.<y was having tham worked up in the :niddle of the accident.

fow that's the kind of a framework,

'3 policy that I thin'< has to be in place~ and that's what I think is very appropriate for the commission to lay down guidance on.

'\\

5.15.2 32

,I '.L-:;:. KE.-*li'IE<E: Our focus here was, ~s I tri3d to sh:n, 3

Jy these t*,10 slijes, was the f
Jcus :n~rely at the t0p.

dner3 1 "T Joes the fin3l decision arise? J int3rnal box, whether it's the present organization or som3 revised one, presu~aoly, that woulJ flow. ... ne Jut we'v9 got to ~eal ~ith that ulti~8te decision-maki~g. 3 [hat's tne b~sic qu9stion, and that Juiaes everythi~; elsa J the staff's planninJ. lJ CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: Jo you want to hear bri3fly, one 11 no;Jes, fro:-n the gen9ral counsel? No*H couch yo 11r advice with 12 a c~rtain amount of discretion

  • J' 3 14 Jj

. ',C:i!. SICK,;/IT: I understand. C Laughter.) CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: I would prefer to be at least 16 f0rmally somewhat ignorant of any illegality I contemplate in 11 the actions ~t hand. 1-3 You might point out in a theoretical.sense - IJ CD.\\~MISSID:'.JE?. KENNE::JY: Let u.s not torgst our 2~ ex ~arte and conflict of interest rules; however, as you ta~e 21 that advice. 22 MR. BIC~~IT: Well, I didn~t suggest this meeting. 23 (Laughter.) ~ ~R. BICKWIT: I 1 m not in any way suggesting that 2:::S you,,C"e taking over the E:~T -,.,,ould be illegal in all respe;:ts.

l5. l 5. 3 r;ish 33 CriAIR~AN HE00RIE: Listen, you've Jot to 09 gr8teful 3 for what you can Jet these uays. 4 (Laughter.)

J COWflSSID,~ER GILii"~SKY: It rer.iinds :ne of the st"Jry of the English guast who opened up his ~orning egg and sort of 5tep;-:ied oac'<.

And the host -=S:u~d hi.;1 what was '*rronq with 3 it, ~nd he s~id, oh, ~arts 0f it were excell~nt. lJ 1R. BICK~IT: fhe dividing line as to which pdrts are 11 excellent ~nd which ~arts are not co~es in the phr3se. l~ com~ission action, ~s used in the st~tute. 13 fhere's very little legislative history on what commission 14 action is. But what the statute says is th3t commission I.J

iction can pnly be taken by a majority of the commission, the lj majority of a quorum.

I/ CO\\{MISSIOi"~ER AHEA.{dE: Do you interpret that as 18 being physically present? M~. BICK!/JIT: Yes. Even if a ~atter.involves 2J -:ommission action, it is possible to delegate the c3rrying out 21 of that commission action to a member of the staff. 22 However, the statute Seems clear that it is not possible to 23 de leg ate to a commission any function. 24 So that the question is, if we're talking about taking over 2J the EMT, that includes the authority to issue orders, something

34 th:Jt, in my view, woul::l µrOo3oly be '.*ri tnin the :neaning ot 2

o:nraission 3Ction.

~ ~~'ve got 2 problem. There's very little probleTI if J u're 4 tal~ing about actions which would not fall within the meaning 5 of that ter~. And since the term is very fuzzy, we're in J a muddy area. 3 wi tn *th9 EJO as the airectoc-of thg ':::',1T bec3use I don't hav3 -J the delegation issue orders. 11 j~. SIC~WIT: The difference is th3t under the 11 st3t~te, you could oe delegated it tomorrow. ';lR. GOSSICK: At the present time it"s not. O'.cay. 13 '.{R. BICK?!IT: That"s true. But also, it could be 14 the understanding of the commission that you would do this. 15 That would not. be regarded as in any way a way around this. ]j ,'~R." GOSSICK: The question on this is: Is it I, illagal for the Chai~man as it is for me in the event that 13 it should become necessary to direct Vic or Dento~ to issue I -J an. *'.Jrder? 2J CO)JMISSIONER GILINSKY: What he.,s saying is if 21 that's a praolem, we can fix it. And he's saying that the 22 othar problem 23 .'i{R. GOSSICK: Is more complicated. 24-COMMISSIONER GILL"iSKY; Tnat's right.. It needs a 2j change of the la*w.

35 .:c).'<C.HS:3 I~L!ER AHEA,=UE: 3ut in your vie~.,, can *.*te 2 fix that 9r1olera? In othei words,*c0uld we in som9 w3y giv1 3 joe the authorit/ to direct Harold to give 3n order? 4

C.{?.. BICKWIT: To give an order, Pd be in,:linaJ t.::,

~ oe :oncerned 3bout that. .J CD',{M!SS!CLf::R GILINSKY: You know tnere"s.3 -:ruesti-:-m.. / I'v3 thought about this a little oit and one question is: ~ow 3 ao /OU distinguish an emergency situ3tion from a non-emergency -i sit:J-'3tio:1? IJ I mean Joe"s li30le to g3t completely carried away with 1 l 11 Ln s 3 1 f

  • 1~

CL::rnghter.) 13 Gi--iAI RMAN i-iENDR IE: I pl an to dee lar e one at 4: l j. l 4 ( :_aught e r. ) 15 C~AIRMAN HENDRIE: I"m hoping to have the authority 15 oy then. 1 i COMMISSIONER GILli~SKY: No, seriously, it"s hard to 13 see how you can categorize these sorts of situations. It lJ would be simple if the commLssion itself ha-J authority t:) 2'J delegate to one of its mem~rs or si"npl9r.. 2l CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: You run into the same dgfinition 22 proolem because you"d want to do it beforehand rather than 23 hav3 to convene the commission and declare 3n emergency 24 before you can delegate them. 2.:S Ihen you have the same problem of def inin;J an em~rgency.

3.1:5.5 gsh ~ ..) .) J I ,-3 ) IJ 11 12 13 I -t 1:5 1 j I I 13 1J 2,) 2i 2.:: 23 2 ? - _:J 36 dut I'm ~ssuming t~3t that c3n be j0ne in some kind of t9rms that makes it fairly clear tnat the ChAirmBn isn't, or wn8aver mignt be designatad to run off some Thursday afternoon, ~ecl~re an a~ergency, and vote all the ~aper that he happens to have under his arm

  • CO/,iMISSIONER AHEA:=UE: Al ti1ough, just to oe clear sin*:~ some 9e-:,ple 1,vill be disappear-in-;:, I ~Ather, j 1Jst from

,Tiy ~Joint of 11iew, it is, I'm sure, Lnportant and difficult and subtle and a har:i legal i.ssue, out were an emergency to :cur, I think that Joe should neverthele~s jo that oecJuse han8ling the emergency is r33lly more i~portant. ~R. BICKWIT: I'm not su~gesting th3t it wouldn't be. C:HtMISSICMER BRAD,.:oRO: I 9uess I would r-3ther that the :urr'3nt E)f.T function, until. we've taken the steps necessary t? do it some othar way, I mean is it clear, Al, in 311 that you've laid out, is it clear that ther9 is a Jistinct adv-3nta,]"~ to having the Chair:nan running the Elf as jistinguished frJ:n the EJO? ~R. KENJEKE: The aistinct advantag9 is, I've tried to say, more than Just authority; it's a qu9stion of stature. COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: First of all,*given that w9 Jo nave this bizarre physical distance oetween parts of the agency, suppose the accident moves fa§t anough that some

ritical. decisions have to be made while th,e Chairman is in his car.

j.1:5.i qsh 3 .J 37 1.,t1e senior affi::er ~re38nt is Jill ~3V9 to maka them if decisions ~avg to 03

t-{. KfaMc:<ct It's sug9este;j that you need communicdtians for that car
  • COMMISS IDl'JER B~ADFORD: fh-~t rea Uy won., t

,j-:, it. 3 at the site, if conditions have br~ken down, or at 3ethesda, ) has to make the jacisions. And whatever the protocol is, IJ we.,d have to worry aoout some later tim9. I l ~hen an 9mergency decision has to oe ~ade, it has to oe lJ CHAIRMA~ HENDRIE: Let me tell you what ~y thought 14 has oeen in taking this int3rim step. \\.) I've thoyqht some over the months since fhree 1Hle on what Jj the configuration ought to be, and r.1ve about concluded that I/ ther~ is no way that the commission, and particul3rly the 13 senior commissioner or the Chairman, if he's on th8 ground, lJ is 'Joing to oe able to stand :J:3Ck out of t:-1":! fray 3nd nake *,qhat 2J 3re called ;Jolicy decisions. 21 We were pulled in as soon as things warmed up at Threg 22 Mil1 Island and the same will be true, I*'m 5ure, if anything 23 comparable aver occurs again. 24 It has seemed to me, then, that being the case, that 2:j whoever is ranking -- I've spoken for myself on this int3ri:n

( I

l.
5.15.8*
ish, I

I / I 38 3 oasis, is si~ply Joing to b9 in much better shape to de3l with whatev9r, as head of the 39ency or acting he3j, you have to Jeal with if you're there at the information center, or i at l3ast the cest informatio~ cent~~ we've got within, you ~ know, half an hour or wherever we're likely to oe. .) If things move sloWly, why, I'j expect to see commission9rs ~omB on out and J~tner the group and bave such discussions

3.

and ~ake su:h decisions as seem appr0priate. A~d 1: things J ~ov9* fast, why, whoever is ranking on the spot is going-to IJ hav3 to do ~~at has to De jone. 11 aut I think th9 time scale then Jetermines ko a very 12 heavy dejre~ who decides what, when. 13 Su t I see no advantage and cons id~aol e Ji sadv.antage 14 having had the experience onca of being yet one mor9 Jj communication link removed.from Bethesda~ where even there, 15 the state of information wasn't what I woulj call admirable, I, and cy the time it furthermore gqt filtered into, you know, 18 one more sta~ through the phone lines and so on, the first IJ time, why, it was just that much poorer. 20 I think it's much better to be right there. 21 I have no lack of confidence at all in the E1,ff as 22 constituted, simply to go ahead and manage an e'Tlergency and 23 for all of us to step back and to put our hands in our 2-l-poc:<ets. 2..; I t.'s just that that isn-' t going to be allowed to happen..

gsh 39 ?eo)le are going to want to hear wnat the com~issioners and the Chairman have got to say for tha~selves on behalf of th9 J agency. Anj I think in that circumstance, it's bettei*to go 4 dowr1 there in the trench. .) C()'*,P.HSSHHER AHEAC?NE: I *J!Jess, Joe;** I'd have to j disagree. I think wa really, and obviou~ly, in thre~ minutes I it isn't tha time wa'ra going to d0 it, but in going oac~ to 3 the point earlier. on that I was trying to make, we have to J addr~ss what is the best for getting the protection to tne 10 ~ublic health anj safety. I l And I think at some point wa h3ve to aecide, is it better 12 for the 5 ~r coll~ction to be tryi~? to run the operation or I J i s i t n o*t ? 14 1~ it is better, then I think the instructions have to 15 be very clear to have that either way it oparates *. If it is 15 not, if ind,3pendent of when you say the public won.,t have it 1, or the ConJress w9n't have* it, our primary responsibility is 13 to make sure that the thing si handled the 8st way to 19 protect health and safety. 2J That's a decision we have to ma~e and bear with wh~tever 21 the press ura s a re. 22 COMMISSIONER BRADiORO: It doesn't tak-3 a oig, I 23 t-hi nk, change in 3.ssumptions about Three Mile Is land to 24 change the role of the commission quite a lot. b If you assume on Friday morning that evacuation

L__ l.. )* 5.13.10 40 recommendation had oeen, on the one hanct, clearly conveyed 2 t~ tha State of ?ennsylvania on behalf of tne agencJ, and 3 ,) on the other, cls3rly conveyed to the commission that, i~ f3ct, had bee~ ma~e and was being c3rried out. fhen I'm not sure whether the commission would have Deen 5 going in tha same sense that we were through the weekend. / 3a there may oe some difficulties anJ I haven~t reall/ J thought this through in generaliZi7g from what may have been- } an almost flukish glitch in communications to what the lJ mandatory role of tne commission will be in accident 11 sit!J3tions in which we get communications right and the 12 criteria right in the future. 13 !~y concern about the proi-)osition is, I suppose, is a 14 leg3l one, and that is that these decisions are of such 15 importance, granted the need to-get them maae clearly and lo* articulated clearly during the accident. I would hate to 1, 1< nov1 i ngly set in :not ion 3 m3c hinery which would, attar the la accident, open endless legal cans of worms about whether IJ things ara done on proper authority. 2J fhat's why I think Len's concerns, as exactly stated, are 2 I s e r i,:, us ones

  • 22 COMMISSIOt'-lER AHEA~NE:,~hat I was trying to say i.s-23 I think we ought to decide what we believe is to be the 24 appr,::>pridte way and then,. if it requires s011e sort of change, 2j to propose a change to see how it can be successfully do!"le.

9sh. 41 GO'*.-PUS3Io,,IER ;(E~*TN'=OY: I aJree with that. But I ~ thi~~ that tne point that P~ter 6akes, one ought not to* 3 too quickly ~eneralize from what ~ight have been an anomaly 4 to r~ach conclusions about how to deal with the future. J And it is a very good one and it ought to be thought aoout .J care :f u 11 y. I CHAIRMAi YENDRIE: Well, I will recommend it to your 1Jrgent thin'.<ing and we" 11 lo0k to receive so:ne com11ent.s,:>n-the 10 DPE proµos it ion outlined here in the last pa ~e handout. or two of the / 11 I wonCJer how much more soe 11 inq -::,rJt of t;1i s woul.::1 P-:i th er be 12 useful or straightforward to do, Al. 13 ,',{~. KENNE:CE: I offered it for discussion and, it 14 serv!d that purpose. 15 CtiAIRMAN HENDRIEz I think it's clear enough as it 1 j stands. I-'-::1 oe interested in staff views on it,, commissioner If viaws on it. 11 MR. GOSSICK: l'd just lilo to address one point l~

  • oefore you ask the others.

2:J CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: The others aren"t going to qet 21 any chance. 22 MR. GOSSICK: The 11 running the operation, 11 the 23 term you used, anj decisions, we nged to think very carefully 24 about what are we talking about when we say that. 2::5 We are not running anything; we"re following a situation

5. 1 3 *. 1 2 qsh.

3 4 42 and trying to judgg whethar the actions being taken 3ra odequate, s2.fe.*and appropriate, 3nd whether - As I say, I think it's important that we have it very clearly und3rstood 3nd laid out as to just what the NRC ~ rola is in an emergency. And unless so~ebody can ~rgue us 5 off that point, that could have an eff~ct on the decision we 3 9 ),J 11 12 13 14 Jj 10 I 7 13 IJ 2*J 21 22 23* 24 25 mak~ about who makes 11decisions. 11

  • 1/4R. KENNEKE: The strongest one in there w3s. th~

one atout evacuation. That.,s a question that we decided to recommend. \\f~. GOSSICK: \\'le can"t order it. 1M~. KE:--lNEKE: Exactly the point that I was makim;. MR. GOS3ICK: But certainly, we can make the decision to recommend evacu3tion~ C9MMISS IONER AHEARNEr Then I gather al though w,~ can.,t get a chance that Vic. are you gainQ to have something coming to us? CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: ~ell, the staff has underway some cleaning up C*f the piece: down here labelled "incident response orqanization, 11 which underlies - it's sort of one hierarchical step down-from where we"re arguing now. MR. GOSSICK: W~'ve put down on pa~er, which is curr3ntly being scrubbed, some revi*sions to procedures. We*Te not supposed to formally amend the manual chapter but we* wi 11 foll_ow until such further guidance or direction may-be

43 gsh forthcoming.

2.

CHAIRMAf,/ HENiJRIE: Jkay. 8ell, practicall;, -':ls 3 promised, I'm going to thank Al and participants in the 4 discussion ~nd recom~end this subject to your attention for .J cofTlment and recommendations and further thought. J And turn, then, to the &'.IC0::?-2 order. (Whereupon, at 4:18 p.m., thR committee adjourns~.) '3 -) ( J:J L 11 QJ 12 13 14 )j Jj I 7 L3 1 :t 2J 21 22 23 24 2:>}}

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