ML22216A189

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
April 2021 Proposed Scenarios
ML22216A189
Person / Time
Site: Dresden  Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 05/14/2021
From: Chuck Zoia
NRC/RGN-III/DRS/OLB
To:
Exelon Generation Co
Zoia C
Shared Package
ML20136A312 List:
References
Download: ML22216A189 (65)
v • d • e


Text

Dresden Generating Station ILT-N-2 LOWER POWER USING FLOW SECURE RFP AND C/CB PMP HPCI ISOLATION DUE TO STEAM LEAK CRD PUMP TRIP CORE SPRAY SYSTEM LOW PRESSURE RFP VENT FAN TRIP RECIRC LEAK IN DW - MANUAL SCRAM CORE SPRAY PUMP FAILS TO AUTO START LOSS OF FEED - ED ON LEVEL Rev. 00 01/21 Developed By:

Exam Author Date Approved By:

Facility Representative Date

Scenario Outline Facility: Dresden Generating Station Scenario No.: 2021-301 ILT-N-2 Op-Test No.: 2021-301 Examiners Operators / crew position

/ ATC

/ BOP

/ CRS Initial Conditions: Unit 2 is at 85% Power.

Site is under a high winds advisory due to inclement weather.

Turnover: A Condensate/Condensate Booster Pump is experiencing high vibrations and needs to be removed from service for maintenance once power is lowered to 82% per DGP 03-01, Power Changes, step G.4.

Critical Tasks: RPV-1.1/2.1 - If the RPV level trend is not reversible with an RPV injection source lined up with a pump running, initiate emergency depressurization with RPV water level between the Top-of-Active Fuel and the Minimum Steam Cooling RPV Water Level or within two and 1/2 minutes after TAF is reached, whichever is later. When conditions are met per DEOP 400-2, Emergency Depressurization, the minimum number of available SRVs required for emergency depressurization (MNSRED) are opened.

RPV-1.5 - Per DEOP 100, RPV Control, with automatic ADS timer initiated, inhibit ADS before an automatic actuation occurs.

Event Malf. Event Event No. No. Type* Description #

1 NONE R ATC Lower Power with flow 2 NONE N ATC Secure RFP and C/CB Pump 3 HPRMBRKP C/T BOP / CRS HPCI Isolation due to Steam Leak 4 RDPPBTRP C/T ATC / CRS CRD Pump Trip 5 CSP501B C/T BOP / CRS Core Spray System Low Pressure 6 X10 C ATC RFP Vent Fan Trip 7 F41 M Team Recirc Leak in DW - Manual Scram CS2AFTC 8 C BOP Core Spray Pump Fails to Auto Start CSLAUPPA RLMRASP 9 M Team Loss of Feed - Emergency Depressurization on Level RLMRBSP

  • (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor, (T)ech Spec
  1. (New) - Event not used on previous 2 NRC Exams, (Pre) - Event used on previous 2 NRC Exams Scenario Objective:

Evaluate the Teams ability to operate the plant with a RCS leak and loss of all feedwater pumps.

Scenario Initial Conditions

1. Unit 2 is at ~85% power.
2. The following equipment is OOS:
a. None
3. LCOs:
a. None Scenario Sequence Page 2 of 23

Event # Description 1 Lower Power with Flow:

The ATC will lower power to about 82% power in preparation to remove a RFP and C/CB Pump from service using DGP 03-01, Power changes.

2 Secure RFP and C/CB Pump:

The ATC will secure C RFP and A C/CB Pump per DGP 03-01 due to high vibes.

3 HPCI Isolation due to Steam Leak:

A Group 4 HPCI isolation occurs due to a steam leak in the HPCI system. The 2-2301-4 does not automatically isolate. The BOP will have to manually close 2-2301-4 using DAN 902-3 C-7, HPCI Auto Isol Initiated. The CRS will enter TS 3.5.1 Condition G and TS 3.3.6.1 Condition A.

4 CRD Pump Trip:

The running CRD pump will trip on overcurrent. The ATC will start the standby CRD pump. The CRS will enter TRM 3.3.h Condition A for loss of flow to the RVWLIS backfill lines.

5 Core Spray System Low Pressure:

A relief valve failure causes 902-3 D-7, 2A/B Core Spray Hdr Press Lo to alarm. The BOP will close the Core Spray Pump suction valve to isolate the leak. The CRS will enter TS 3.5.1 Condition B for the inoperable Core Spray subsystem and Condition K for HPCI also being INOP, which will also lead to a TS 3.0.3 entry.

6 RFP Vent Fan Trip:

The operating RFP vent fan trips, the standby RFP vent fan fails to auto start. The ATC will start the standby RFP vent fan.

7 RCS Leak - Manual SCRAM:

A Reactor Coolant leak occurs causing DW Pressure to rise slowly. The crew will enter DOA 0040-01, Slow Leak and take SCRAM prep actions per DGP 02-03, SCRAM. The BOP will also place Max Torus Cooling online. When DW Pressure reaches 1.5 psig, the ATC will perform a manual SCRAM.

8 A Core Spray Pump fails to Auto Start:

When DW Pressure rises above 2.0 psig, the 2A Core Spray Pump will fail to start automatically. The BOP will manually start 2A CS Pump.

9 Loss of Feed - Emergency Depressurization on Level:

Once the manual SCRAM is performed, the Reactor Feed Pumps will trip on low suction pressure and will be unable to be restarted. The crew will start Drywell Sprays when DW Pressure is greater than 9 psig. When RPV Level reaches Top of Active Fuel, the crew will enter DEOP 400-2, Emergency Depressurization.

Event One - Lower Power with Flow The ATC will lower power using flow.

Malfunctions required: 0

  • None Success Path:
  • Power at approximately 82%.

Event Two - Secure RFP and Cond/CB Pump The ATC will secure C RFP and A C/CB Pump.

Malfunctions required: 0

  • None Success Path:
  • C RFP and A C/CB Pump secured.

Page 3 of 23

Event Three - HPCI Isolation due to Steam Leak HPCI will auto isolate due a steam leak. The 2-2301-4 will not isolate.

Malfunctions required: 2

  • (2-2301-4 mechanically bound)
  • (HPCI Isolation due to steam leak)

Success Path:

  • Verifies HPCI isolation.
  • Manually closes 2-2301-4.
  • Determines Technical Specifications.

Event Four - CRD Pump Trip 2B CRD Pump will trip on overcurrent.

Malfunctions required: 1

  • (CRD Pump overcurrent trip)

Success Path:

  • Starts 2A CRD Pump.
  • Determines Technical Specifications requirements.

Event Five - Core Spray System Low Pressure 902-3 D-7 2A/2B Core Spray Hdr Press Lo alarm comes in due to failure of the relief valve.

Malfunctions Required: 1

Success Path:

  • Determines Technical Specifications requirements.

Event Six - RFP Vent Fan Trip The running RFP Vent Fan will trip and the standby RFP Vent Fan will not auto start.

Malfunctions required: 2

  • (RFP Vent Fan Trip)
  • (Failure of Standby Vent Fan to auto start)

Success Path:

Malfunctions required: 2

  • (Increase size of the leak)

Success Path:

  • Initiate Drywell Sprays when Drywell Pressure reaches 9 psig.

Page 4 of 23

Event Eight - Core Spray Pump fails to auto start 2A Core Spray Pump fails to automatically start when 2.0 psig Drywell Pressure actuation occurs.

Malfunctions required: 1

Success Path:

Malfunctions required: 1

  • (Loss of RFP suction pressure)

Success Path:

  • Initiate Emergency Depressurization once TAF is reached Page 5 of 23

PRE-SCENARIO ACTIVITIES 1 If applicable, conduct pre-scenario activities in accordance with TQ-AA-155-J040, SIMULATOR EXAMINATION BRIEFING.

a. Direct the crew to perform their briefs prior to entering the simulator.
b. Provide the Team a copy of DGP 03-01, Power Changes.

2 Simulator Setup (the following steps can be done in any logical order)

a. Initialize simulator in an ~85% power IC. (IC 341 used for validation)
b. Cut in/out Cond Demins as needed, to maintain DP within limits.
c. Ensure running Condensate pump amps within limits.
d. Ensure CRD parameters are normal, and CRD Drive Pressure is 250 to 280 psid.

3 Verify the following simulator conditions:

a. Verify Reactor Power ~85%, adjust rods or Recirc as appropriate.
b. Ensure 2B CRD Pump is running.
c. Ensure 2A RFP Vent Fan is running.

4 Run Pump_Sumps.cae NOTE: Do NOT run the initial setup CAEP file until the above setup is completed.

5 Run the initial setup CAEP file: 20-1 (2021-301) ILT-N-2.cae 6 Place the following equipment out of service:

a. None 7 Complete the Simulator Setup Checklist.

Symbols are used throughout the text to identify specific items as indicated below:

Critical Tasks Required Actions o Optional Actions Page 6 of 23

Event One - Lower Power with Flow Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior SIMULATOR OPERATOR ROLE PLAY:

28 If requested to set gains to 1, (wait 3 min) activate TRIGGER 28, then report gains set to 1. (This trigger can be triggered OFF, then back ON to adjust gains more than once).

SIMULATOR OPERATOR ROLE PLAY:

EO is on station at C RFP ready for it to be secured.

CRS Directs ATC to lower power with flow using DGP 03-01, Power Changes.

ATC Lowers Reactor Power to 82% (FW Flow between 9.0 and 9.8 Mlbm/hr) using DGP 03-01 Step G.4 Emergency Load Decrease Guidance by pressing the LOWER HIGH button on the Recirc Master Controller.

BOP Assists ATC with lowering reactor power.

Event 1 Completion Criteria:

Reactor Power lowered to allow a RFP to be secured,

-- AND/OR --

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner.

Page 7 of 23

Event Two - Secure RFP and C/CB Pump Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior NOTE:

Once Reactor Power is lowered, the crew will then secure 2C RFP and 2A C/CB Pump.

When the operator verifies runback logic NOT armed on Bailey OIS, give the following cue:

Runback Logic is not armed.

ROLE PLAY:

EO at 2C RFP report the following:

Standing by to secure 2C RFP.

EO to verify 2C at rest, wait 30 sec, and report the following:

2C RFP is at rest.

EO to 2A Condensate Pump, wait 1 min, and report the following:

Standing by to secure 2A Condensate Pump.

EO to verify 2A Condensate Pump at rest, wait 30 sec, and report the following:

2A Condensate Pump is at rest.

ATC Coordinates with EO for securing 2C RFP and 2A C/CB Pump.

Secures 2C RFP and 2A C/CB Pump using DGP 03-01 by performing the following:

  • Verifies FW Flow is between 9.0 and 9.8 Mlbm/hr.
  • Verifies recirc runback logic is NOT armed on Bailey OIS.
  • Closes MO 2-3201C, 2C RFP DISCH VLV.
  • Secures 2C RFP by taking the control switch to STOP.
  • When 2C RFP comes to rest, opens MO 2-3201C.
  • Stops 2A C/CB Pump by placing the control switch to NAT.

BOP Assists with securing 2C RFP and 2A C/CB Pump.

CRS Directs ATC to secure 2C RFP and 2A C/CB Pump.

Event 2 Completion Criteria:

2C RFP and 2A C/CB Pump secured,

-- AND/OR--

At the direction of the Lead Examiner.

Page 8 of 23

Event Three - HPCI Isolation due to Steam Leak Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior SIMULATOR OPERATOR:

At the discretion of the Floor Instructor / Lead Evaluator, activate TRIGGER 1, which causes a HPCI 1 Steam Line leak on the Torus Catwalk. HPCI will auto isolate but the 2-2301-4 will not isolate.

When the operator manually closes 2-2301-4, verify TRIGGERS 2 & 3 auto actuate to delete the 2&3 binding and steam leak malfunctions.

ROLE PLAY:

EO to Torus Catwalk, wait 2 minutes, and report the following:

(2-2301-4 valve is open) There is a loud hissing sound and steam coming from the Torus Catwalk.

(2-2301-4 valve closed) There is steam dissipating on the Torus Catwalk.

EO to HPCI room, wait 2 minutes, and report the following:

There is nothing abnormal in the HPCI Room.

BOP Announces and references the following DANs:

  • DAN 902-3 A-1, RX BLDG RAD HI
  • DAN 902-3 C-7, HPCI AUTO ISOL INITIATED Uses DAN 902-3 C-7 to verify HPCI Isolation:
  • Notices MO 2-2301-4 did not auto isolate.
  • Manually closes MO 2-2301-4 by placing the control switch to CLOSE or PTL.

CRS Directs BOP to close HPCI GP 4 isolation valves.

May enter DEOP 0300-01, Secondary Containment Control.

References Technical Specifications and determines:

  • TS 3.5.1 Condition G.1 and G.2, Verify Isolation Condenser is OPERABLE immediately AND restore HPCI System to OPERABLE status within 14 days.
  • TS 3.6.1.3 Condition A.1, Isolate the affected penetration flow path within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.
  • May reference TS 3.3.6.1 Condition A and B for PCI Instrumentation.

ATC Monitors panels and assists as directed.

Event 3 Completion Criteria:

HPCI isolation complete AND, Tech Specs have been addressed,

-- AND/OR --

At the discretion of the Floor Instructor/Lead Evaluator.

Page 9 of 23

Event Four - CRD Pump Trip Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior SIMULATOR OPERATOR:

At the discretion of the Floor Instructor / Lead Evaluator, activate TRIGGER 4 to cause a trip of 2B 4 CRD Pump on overcurrent.

ROLE PLAY:

EO to check breaker at Bus 24, wait 2 min, and report the following:

The breaker for 2B CRD Pump is tripped open with an overcurrent flag up.

EO to check 2B CRD pump, wait 2 min, and report the following:

2B CRD Pump is at rest and the motor is hot to the touch.

EO to check 2A CRD pump, wait 30 sec, and report the following:

2A CRD Pump is operating properly.

ATC Announces and references DAN 902-5 B-2, ROD DRIVE PP TRIP Takes actions per DAN 902-5 B-2 and/or DOA 0300-01, Control Rod Drive System Failure:

  • Takes manual control of FIC 2-340-1 CRD FLOW CONTRL (if valve has gone open).
  • Starts 2B CRD pump.
  • Verifies CRD parameters return to previous values
  • May take FIC 2-340-1 CRD FLOW CONTRL to open/automatic, if closed previously.
  • Place the control switch for 2A CRD pump in PTL per DOA 6500-10, 4kV Circuit Breaker Trip CRS Directs entry into DOA 0300-01 and DOA 6500-10 Establishes contingency actions if 2nd CRD pump fails Contacts outside organizations for assistance Enters TRM 3.3.h, Reactor Vessel Water Level Instrumentation System (RVWLIS) Backfill System, due to short loss of RVWLIS supply. Restore inoperable RVWLIS Backfill System lines to OPERABLE status within 7 days.

BOP Monitors panels and assists as directed.

Event 4 Completion Criteria:

2A CRD Pump started and DOA actions complete,

-- AND/OR--

At the discretion of the Floor Instructor/Lead Evaluator.

Page 10 of 23

Event Five - Core Spray System Low Pressure Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior SIMULATOR OPERATOR:

5 At the discretion of the Lead Examiner, activate TRIGGER 5, which lowers Core Spray System Pressure and brings in 902-3 D-7.

ROLE PLAY:

EO to investigate ECCS Jockey pump, wait 2 min, and report the following:

The ECCS jockey pump is operating normally.

EO to check 2B Core Spray system, wait 2 min, and report the following:

Water is spraying onto the 2B Core Spray motor from relief valve RV 2-1402-28B.

If asked if the leak can be isolated, report the following:

Closing valve 2-1402-3B should isolate the leak.

If asked about the status of the sump, wait 30 sec, and report the following:

The sump pumps are keeping up with the leak.

If asked the status of the leak, respond as follows:

(2-1402-3B is open) The leak rate is unchanged.

(2-1402-3B is closed) The leak rate has slowed and is not spraying the 2B Core Spray pump motor.

If asked if water sprayed onto 2C & 2D LPCI pumps, report the following:

The 2C & 2D LPCI pumps were not sprayed on. They are dry.

7 If directed to isolate keepfill, wait 30 sec, insert TRIGGER 7, and report the following:

Keepfill has been isolated to 2B Core Spray.

BOP Announces and references DAN 902-3 D-7, 2A/B CORE SPRAY HDR PRESS LO.

Takes actions of DAN 902-3 D-7:

  • Verify FLOW TEST VLV MO 2-1402-4B is fully closed.
  • Verify PP DISCH VLV MO 2-1402-24B is fully open.

Dispatches EO to inspect ECCS jockey pump for proper operation.

Places 2B Core Spray pump in PTL.

May close 2B Core Spray pump discharge valve Closes 2B Core Spray pump suction valve.

CRS Directs carrying out actions of the DAN.

References Technical Specifications and determines:

Directs 2B Core Spray pump placed in PTL.

May direct closing keepfill to 2B Core Spray system.

May direct closing 2B Core Spray pump discharge valve.

Directs closing 2B Core Spray suction valve.

Page 11 of 23

Event Five - Core Spray System Low Pressure Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior Event 5 Completion Criteria:

2B Core Spray Pump in PTL AND, 2B Core Spray Pump Suction Valve closed AND, Tech Specs Have Been Addressed.

-- AND/OR --

At the direction of the Lead Examiner.

Page 12 of 23

Event Six - RFP Vent Fan Trip Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior SIMULATOR OPERATOR:

8 At the discretion of the Lead Examiner, activate TRIGGER 8, which causes 2A RFP vent fan to trip. The initial setup prevents 2B RFP vent fan from auto starting.

ROLE PLAY:

EO to check operation of 2B RFP vent fan, wait 2 min, and then report the following:

2B RFP vent fan is operating normally.

EO to check 2A RFP vent fan breaker, wait 2 min, and then report the following:

2A RFP vent fan breaker tripped on over current and is open.

NOTE:

Per DOP 5750-06, Reactor Feed Pump Motor Ventilation System, fan control switches should be held in CLOSE for 45 seconds to allow airflow to develop. If the Team does not successfully start 2B RFP Vent fan due to not holding the control switch long enough, then the RFP high stator temperature computer alarm will come in.

ATC Announces and references DAN 902-6 F-8, RFP Vent Fan Trip.

Determines 2B RFP Vent Fan did not auto start as expected and manually starts it.

Sends operator to check status of the 2A RFP vent fan breaker at Bus 25.

Sends operator to check operation of the 2B RFP vent fan.

Performs DOP 6700-20, 480V Circuit Breaker Trip.

  • Places Control Switch for 2A RFP Vent Fan in PTL.

CRS Directs starting 2B RFP vent fan.

Enters DOP 6700-20, 480V Circuit Breaker Trip.

May reference DOA 5750-01, Ventilation System Failure.

May reference DOP 5750-06, Reactor Feed Pump Motor Ventilation System.

BOP Monitors panels and assists as directed.

Event 6 Completion Criteria:

2B RFP Vent Fan started,

-- AND/OR --

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner.

Page 13 of 23

Event Seven - Recirc Leak in DW - Manual Scram Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior SIMULATOR OPERATOR:

10 At the discretion of the Lead examiner, activate TRIGGER 10, which causes a small Recirc Loop leak to develop in the Drywell.

ROLE PLAY:

U-3 NSO to report Drywell pressure status, report the following:

U-3 Drywell pressure is 1.2 psig and steady.

EO to check Drywell CAM, wait 2 min, and report the following:

The Drywell CAM is reading 4700 counts and trending up.

EO to check Cribhouse inlet temperature, wait 5 min, and report the following:

Cribhouse inlet temp is 70oF.

TEAM Recognizes and announces that Drywell pressure is slowly rising.

May direct an operator to check the Unit 2 Drywell CAM.

May direct operators to search for leaks.

CRS Enters and directs performance of DOA 0040-01, SLOW LEAK.

Set Scram contingency of 1.5 psig DW pressure. (Since DW pressure starts much lower than normal, may set a lower pressure Scram contingency.)

May enter DGP 02-03, REACTOR SCRAM, and direct taking scram preparatory actions.

Prior to reaching the Drywell Pressure scram setpoint, directs a manual reactor scram per DGP 02-03.

ATC Performs the following actions per DOA 0040-01 as directed:

Maintain Level with FWLCS (immediate action).

Monitors leakage rate, reactor water level, and Drywell pressure.

Inserts manual reactor scram prior to 1.5 psig DW pressure (or as directed by CRS).

BOP Performs the following actions per DOA 0040-01 as directed:

Notifies Shift Supervisor and Rad Protection.

Directs search for leak.

Shutdown H2 Addition.

Makes PA announcement.

Verify Crib House inlet temperature is <95oF.

Initiates Torus cooling per DOP 1500-02, TORUS WATER COOLING MODE OF LOW PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION SYSTEM, Hard Card.

ATC / BOP Performs scram preparatory actions per DGP 02-03 as directed.

Starts MSP and TGOP.

Trips H2 addition.

Page 14 of 23

Event Seven - Recirc Leak in DW - Manual Scram Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior ATC Performs the following actions per DGP 02-03 as directed:

Presses scram pushbuttons Places mode switch in shutdown Check rods inserted.

Verifies Recirc Pumps run back.

Maintains RPV/L between +25 and +35 inches or as directed by Unit Supervisor.

Inserts SRM/IRMs.

CRS Enters DEOP 100, RPV Control, and directs actions:

Verification of all isolations, ECCS and EDG starts.

Holding RPV/L +8 to +48 inches.

Maintaining RPV/P <1060 psig using the BPVs.

Event 7 Completion Criteria:

Manual Reactor Scram performed,

-- AND / OR --

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner.

Page 15 of 23

Event Eight - Core Spray Pump Fails to Auto Start Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior SIMULATOR OPERATOR:

Once Drywell Pressure reaches the 2.0 psig actuation, 2A Core Spray Pump will not start automatically.

Once the BOP manually starts 2A Core Spray Pump, verify TRIGGER 11 actuates to delete the auto 11 start failure.

BOP Notices 2A Core Spray Pump did not start automatically.

Starts 2A Core Spray Pump manually by placing the control switch to START.

Informs supervisor that 2A Core Spray Pump did not start automatically.

CRS Acknowledges report of 2A Core Spray Pump.

Event 8 Completion Criteria:

2A Core Spray Pump is manually started,

-- AND / OR --

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner.

Page 16 of 23

Event Nine - Loss of Feed - Emergency Depressurization on Level Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior SIMULATOR OPERATOR:

13 At the discretion of the Lead examiner, activate TRIGGER 13, which increases the size of the Recirc Loop leak in the Drywell.

Verify TRIGGER 12, automatically activates when the Mode Switch is placed to S/D. After 1 min, this 12 causes all feedwater pumps to trip on low suction pressure.

ROLE PLAY:

EO sent to check operation of EDGs, wait 2 min, and report the following:

U2 and 2/3 EDGs are operating properly.

EO sent to cutout demin beds, wait 3 min, cutout demin beds as necessary (using Instructor Station) and report the following:

Condensate demin beds have been cutout.

Acknowledge other requests and delay as necessary.

ATC Determines/announces all feedwater pumps are tripped and cannot be restarted.

Starts SBLC for level control as directed.

TEAM Determines/announces Drywell pressure rapidly rising.

Determines/announces RPV level is dropping.

CRS Directs starting SBLC for level control Determines insufficient high pressure feed is available, then performs/directs:

Inhibiting ADS before -59 inches. (RPV-1.5)

Verifying at least two low pressure injection systems available.

Waiting until RPV level drops to TAF.

Verifying any low pressure system lined up with a pump running.

BOP Inhibits ADS as directed. (RPV-1.5)

CRS Enters DEOP 0200-01, Primary Containment Control, when PC/P reaches 2 psig and performs/directs:

Monitoring of PC/P.

Initiation of torus sprays before PC/P of 9 psig.

When PC/P is above 9 psig or before DW/T reaches 281°F:

  • Verification of DSIL.
  • Tripping of Recirc pumps.
  • Tripping of DW coolers.
  • Initiation of DW sprays.

Monitoring of DW/T. (D/W sprays may be initiated for temp control)

Monitoring of SP/T and initiation of torus cooling.

Monitors SP/L.

Verifies initiation of drywell and torus H2/O2 monitors.

Orders Torus / DW Spray secured before Torus / DW pressure drops to 0 psig Page 17 of 23

Event Nine - Loss of Feed - Emergency Depressurization on Level Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior BOP Performs DEOP 0200-01, Primary Containment Control, actions as directed:

Monitors PC/P Initiates torus sprays and drywell sprays per Hard Card as directed.

Monitors DW/T.

Monitors SP/T and initiates torus cooling per Hard Card LPCI/CCSW OPERATION as directed.

Monitors SP/L.

Verifies initiation of drywell and torus H2/O2 monitors.

Secures Torus / DW Spray before Torus / DW pressure drops to 0 psig CRS If the RPV level trend is not reversible with an RPV injection source lined up, with a pump running, with RPV level between TAF and the MSCRWL directs entering DEOP 0400-02, Emergency Depressurization, and directs:

Verification that SP/L >6 feet.

Opening all ADS valves. (RPV-1.1)

Verification all relief valves are open. (RPV-2.1)

BOP Performs DEOP 0400-02, Emergency Depressurization, as directed:

Verifies SP/L >6 feet.

Opens all ADS valves. (RPV-1.1)

Verifies all relief valves are open. (RPV-2.1)

Event 9 Completion Criteria:

Sprays the Drywell AND, Emergency Depressurization in progress,

-- AND / OR --

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner.

Page 18 of 23

References PROCEDURE TITLE DAN 902-3 A-1 Rx Bldg Rad Hi DAN 902-3 C-7 HPCI Auto Isol Initiated DAN 902-3 D-7 2A/B Core Spray Hdr Press Lo DAN 902-5 B-2 Rod Drive PP Trip DAN 902-6 F-8 RFP Vent Fan Trip DEOP 100 RPV Control DEOP 200-01 Primary Containment Control DEOP 300-01 Secondary Containment Control DEOP 400-2 Emergency Depressurization DGP 02-03 Reactor Scram DGP 03-01 Power Changes DOA 0040-01 Slow Leak DOA 0300-01 Control Rod Drive System Failure DOA 5750-01 Ventilation System Failure DOA 6500-10 4kV Circuit Breaker Trip DOP 1500-02 Torus Water Cooling Mode of Low Pressure Coolant Injection System DOP 5750-06 Reactor Feed Pump Motor Ventilation System DOP 6700-20 480V Circuit Breaker Trip OP-DR-103-102-1002 Strategies for Successful Transient Mitigation TRM 3.3.h Reactor Vessel Water Level Instrumentation System (RVWLIS) Backfill System LCO 3.0.3 LCO Applicability TS 3.3.6.1 Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation TS 3.5.1 ECCS - Operating TS 3.6.1.3 Primary Containment Isolation Valves (PCIVs)

Page 19 of 23

Simulator Scenario Review Checklist ILT-N-2 Quantitative Attributes 7 Total malfunctions (5 to 8) 2 Malfunctions after EOP entry (1 to 2) 4 Abnormal events (2 to 4) 2 Major transients (1 to 2) 2 EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1 to 2) 1 EOPs contingency requiring substantive actions (0 to 2) 2 Crew critical tasks (2 to 3)

Page 20 of 23

CAEP Files

  1. CAEP file for ILT-N-2
  1. ILT 2021-301 (20-1)
  1. Written by DSS
  1. 01/21
        1. INITIAL CONDITIONS ####
  1. Sets HPCI room and RB South Access shielding to prevent exceedingly high rad levels set rmkshld17 = 280.0 set rmkshld13 = 5000
  1. Binds 2-2301-4 100% open as setup for Event 3 imf hp4vlbn 100.0
  1. Prevents auto start of 2B RFP Vent Fan imf x13
  1. Sets 2A Core Spray pump breaker to not close on the 2# signal and overrides the Auto Trip light imf cs2aftc irf cslauppa offl2
        1. EVENT TRIGGERS ####
  1. Event Trigger 1 causes a HPCI steam line leak (Event 3) trgset 1 "0"l2 imf hprmbrkp (1) 10 2:00l2
  1. Event Trigger 2 deletes the mechnical binding malfunction for 2-2301-4 trgset 2 "hwhpdcl4 .or. hwhpdlk4"l4 trg 2 "dmf hp4vlbn"l4
  1. Event Trigger 3 deletes the HPCI steam leak when the 2-2301-4 is manually closed trgset 3 ".not. hwhplop4"l4 trg 3 "dmf hprmbrkp"l4
  1. Event Trigger 4 trips the 2B CRD pump (Event 4) trgset 4 "0"l6 imf rdppbtrp (4 5)l6
  1. Event Trigger 5 causes 2B Core Spray System Low Pressure (Event 5) trgset 5 "0"l6 ior csp501b (5) 25.0 3:00 72.0l6
  1. Event Trigger 6 will drive up the 2B Core Spray Low Pressure alarm trgset 6 "hwsp501b < 50.0"l8 imf ser0089 (6) onl8
  1. Event Trigger 7 will isolate keepfill to 2B Core Spray pump trgset 7 "0"l8 irf csbfilof (7) closedl8
  1. Event Trigger 8 trips the 2A RFP Vent Fan (Event 6) trgset 8 "0"l9 imf x10 (8)l9
  1. Event Trigger 10 causes a 0.2% leak from Recirc suction over a 2 minute ramp (Event 7) trgset 10 "0"l12 imf f41 (10) 0.01 2:00l12
  1. Event Trigger 11 will delete the 2A Core Spray pump breaker malfunction allowing it to start (Event 8) trgset 11 "hwcsdclppa"l12 trg 11 "dmf cs2aftc"l12 Page 21 of 23
  1. Event Trigger 12 activates when Mode switch taken to Shutdown to cause RFP Suction Pressure to lower and trip all RFPs (Event 9) trgset 12 "rpdmode4"l14 imf rlmrasp (12) -600 5:00l14 imf rlmrbsp (12) -600 5:00l14
  1. Event Trigger 13 will increase the size of the leak to get above 9 psig in the Drywell trgset 13 "0"l14 trg 13 "mmf f41 2.0"l14
  1. Event Trigger 14 closes the 2-0301-25 valve trgset 14 "0"l16 irf rd25pos (14) 0.0l16
  1. Event Trigger 15 will increase the size of the leak to lower level faster trgset 15 "0"l16 trg 15 "mmf f41 5.0"l16
  1. Event Trigger 28 sets gain for all 6 APRMs.

trgset 28 "0"l36 trg 28 "irf niagainf true"l36

  1. Event Trigger 29 resets the shielding constants that were changed for this scenario trgset 29 "0"l18 trg 29 "set rmkshld17 = 170000"l18
  1. Event Trigger 30 works with Trigger 29 trgset "et_array(29)"l18 trg 30 "set rmkshld13 = 170000"l18
        1. END ####

Page 22 of 23

Unit 2 Risk: GREEN Unit 3 Risk: GREEN Unit 2 is in Mode 1 at 85% power, Unit 3 is at 100% power.

Leading Thermal Limit: MFLCPR @ 0.881 Leading Thermal Limit: MFLCPR @ 0.883 Action limit: 0.980 Action Limit: 0.980 Equipment Unavailable: None Equipment Unavailable: None Protected Equipment: None Protected Equipment: None Current Action Statements None LCO Started: None LCO Expires: None Cause: N/A Unit 2 Plant Status Today Unit 2 Activities

        • Shift 1 Activities ****
        • Shift 2 Activities ****

Remove 2C RFP & 2A C/CB Pump from service due to high vibes

        • Shift 3 Activities ****

TURNOVER:

2A Condensate/Condensate Booster Pump is experiencing high vibrations and needs to be removed from service for maintenance once power is lowered to 82% per DGP 03-01, Power Changes, step G.4.

Page 23 of 23

Dresden Generating Station ILT-N-3 RESTORE 345KV BT 4-5 CB RAISE REACTOR POWER USING RECIRC FLOW RECIRC PUMP SPEED CONTROLLER FAILURE RB VENT RAD MON FAILS UPSCALE, SBGT FAILS TO AUTO START STATOR WATER COOLING PUMP TRIP SPURIOUS GROUP I - SCRAM HYDRAULIC ATWS SBLC RELIEF VALVE FAILS OPEN Rev. 00 01/21 Developed By:

Exam Author Date Approved By:

Facility Representative Date

Scenario Outline Facility: Dresden Generating Station Scenario No.: 2021-301 ILT-N-3 Op-Test No.: 2021-301 Examiners Operators / crew position

/ ATC

/ BOP

/ CRS Initial Conditions: Unit 2 is at 78% Power.

U2 Isolation Condenser is OOS.

Turnover: During initial power ascension following a refuel outage, 345kV Bus Tie 4-5 CB tripped. Repairs have been completed and the 345kV Switchyard is ready to be returned to a normal lineup. Once restored, continue on with power ascension to raise reactor power to 90% using recirc flow per QNE guidance.

Critical Tasks: RPV-5.1 - With a reactor scram required and the reactor not shutdown, take action per DEOP 400-5, Failure to Scram, to reduce power by inserting control rods.

RPV-5.3 - With a reactor scram required and the reactor not shutdown, take action per DEOP 400-5, Failure to Scram, to reduce power by injecting boron before torus temperature reaches the Boron Injection Initiation Temperature (BIIT @ < 110o F).

RPV-5.5 - Once DEOP 400-5, Failure to Scram power/level control leg, is entered with reactor power is > 6% -AND-RPV level is > -35 inches, terminate and prevent injection (with exception of boron and CRD) into the RPV.

RPV-5.6 - Once DEOP 400-5, Failure to Scram, is entered -AND-reactor power is > 6% -AND- reactor level is > the Top-of-Active Fuel - AND- drywell pressure is > 2 psig or an ERV is open -AND- torus temperature is > 110o F, terminate and prevent injection (with exception of boron and CRD) into the RPV.

Event Malf. Event Event No. No. Type* Description #

1 NONE N BOP Restore 345kV Bus Tie 4-5 Circuit Breaker 2 NONE R ATC Raise Reactor Power using Recirc Flow 3 RR02A C/T ATC / CRS Recirc Pump Speed Controller Failure RADRBVAH VGDSTBYA 4 C/T BOP / CRS RB Vent Rad Monitor Fails Upscale, SBGT Fails to Auto Start VGDPRIMA VGDSTRTA 5 T50 C BOP Stator Water Cooling Pump Trip 6 CIGP1I M Team Spurious Group 1 - SCRAM RDHLVFPA RDHLDEGA 7 M Team Hydraulic ATWS RDHLVFPB RDHLDEGB SCRLFVAD 8 C ATC SBLC Relief Valve Fails Open SCRLFVBD

  • (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor, (T)ech Spec
  1. (New) - Event not used on previous 2 NRC Exams, (Pre) - Event used on previous 2 NRC Exams Scenario Objective:

Evaluate the Teams ability to operate the plant with an ATWS and a Group 1.

Page 2 of 20

Scenario Initial Conditions

1. Unit 2 is at ~78% power.
2. The following equipment is OOS:
a. U2 Isolation Condenser
3. LCOs:
a. TS 3.5.3 Condition A Scenario Sequence Event # Description 1 Restore 345kV Bus Tie 4-5 CB:

The BOP will close 345kV BT 4-5 CB per DOP 6400-13, Electrical Yard Switching.

2 Raise Reactor Power using Recirc Flow:

The ATC will raise reactor power using recirculation flow to 90% per DGP 03-01, Power Changes and QNE guidance.

3 Recirc Pump Speed Controller Failure:

2A Recirc ASD cell fault occurs causing 2A Recirc Pump Speed to lower by 6%. The ATC will lower 2B Recirc Pump speed to match 2A Recirc Pump speed. The CRS will enter TS 3.4.1 Condition B for the speed mismatch.

4 RB Vent Rad Monitor Fails Upscale, SBGT Fails to Auto Start:

The RB Vent Rad Monitor will fail upscale and both trains of SBGT will fail to start automatically. The BOP will place 2/3B SBGT Train in service by placing the control switch to START. The CRS will enter TS 3.3.6.2 Condition A.1, TS 3.3.7.1 Condition A2, TS 3.6.4.1 Condition A, and TS 3.6.4.3 Condition D.

5 Stator Water Cooling Pump Trip:

2A SWC Pump trips and the standby pump 2B does not auto start. The BOP starts the 2B SWC Pump by placing the control switch to START.

6 Spurious Group 1 - Scram:

A spurious Group 1 isolation occurs causing the reactor the scram automatically. The crew will notice that the rods did not insert and ARI is unsuccessful. They will enter DEOP 100 and DEOP 400-05.

7 Hydraulic ATWS:

The crew will manually drive control rods and perform repeated scrams per DEOP 500-05 to insert all control rods.

8 SBLC Relief Valve Fails Open:

The ATC will initiate one train of SBLC and notice that it is not injecting. The ATC will then initiate the other train of SBLC.

Event One - Restore 345kV Bus Tie 4-5 CB The BOP will close the 345kV Bus Tie 4-5 Circuit Breaker.

Malfunctions required: 0

  • None Success Path:
  • 345kV Bus Tie 4-5 Circuit Breaker closed.

Event Two - Raise Reactor Power Using Recirc Flow The ATC will raise power using recirc flow.

Malfunctions required: 0 Page 3 of 20

  • None Success Path:
  • Reactor Power raised to 90%.

Event Three - Recirc Pump Speed Controller Failure 2A Recirc ASD cell fault causes 2A Recirc Pump speed to lower by 6%.

Malfunctions required: 1

  • (2A ASD cell fault)

Success Path:

  • Lowers 2B Recirc Pump speed to match 2a Recirc Pump speed.
  • Determines Technical Specifications requirements.

Event Four - RB Rad Monitor Fails Upscale, SBGT fails to Auto Start Reactor Building Radiation Monitor fails upscale and SBGT fails to start automatically.

Malfunctions required: 3

  • (RB Rad Monitor Fails upscale)
  • (2/3A SBGT Failure to Auto Start)
  • (2/3B SBGT Failure to Auto Start)

Success Path:

  • Starts 2B SBGT Train.
  • Determines Technical Specifications requirements.

Event Five - Stator Water Cooling Pump Trip 2A SWC Pump trips and the standby pump does not auto start.

Malfunctions Required: 1

  • (2A SWC Pump trip)

Success Path:

  • Starts standby SWC Pump.

Event Six - Spurious Group 1 - SCRAM Spurious Group 1 causes the reactor to automatically scram.

Malfunctions Required: 1

  • (Spurious Group 1)

Success Path:

  • Enters DEOP 100 and DEOP 400-5.

Event Seven - Hydraulic ATWS After the reactor automatically scrams, all rods do not insert. ARI is unsuccessful.

Malfunctions required: 1

Success Path:

Page 4 of 20

Event Eight - SBLC Relief Valve Failure The relief valve fails open in the operating SBLC Train.

Malfunctions required: 1

  • (SBLC Relief Valve Failure)

Success Path:

  • Starts other train of SBLC.

Page 5 of 20

PRE-SCENARIO ACTIVITIES 1 If applicable, conduct pre-scenario activities in accordance with TQ-AA-155-J040, SIMULATOR EXAMINATION BRIEFING.

a. Direct the crew to perform their briefs prior to entering the simulator.
b. Provide the Team Switching Orders to restore 345kV Bus Tie 4-5 Circuit Breaker.
c. Provide the team a marked up copy of DOP 6400-13, Electrical Yard Switching.
d. Provide the team a marked up copy of DGP 03-01, Power Changes.
e. Provide the team a marked up copy of DOP 0202-03, Reactor Recirculation Flow Control System Operation.

2 Simulator Setup (the following steps can be done in any logical order)

a. Initialize simulator in an ~78% power IC. (IC 342 used for validation)
b. Cut in/out Cond Demins as needed, to maintain DP within limits.
c. Ensure running Condensate pump amps within limits.
d. Ensure CRD parameters are normal, and CRD Drive Pressure is 250 to 280 psid.

3 Verify the following simulator conditions:

a. Verify Reactor Power ~78%, adjust rods or Recirc as appropriate.

4 Run Pump_Sumps.cae NOTE: Do NOT run the initial setup CAEP file until the above setup is completed.

5 Run the initial setup CAEP file: 20-1 (2021-301) ILT-N-2.cae 6 Place the following equipment out of service:

a. U2 Isolation Condenser 7 Place protected pathways on the following equipment:
a. U2 HPCI 8 Complete the Simulator Setup Checklist.

Symbols are used throughout the text to identify specific items as indicated below:

Critical Tasks Required Actions o Optional Actions Page 6 of 20

Event One - Restore 345kV Bus Tie 4-5 CB Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior SIMULATOR OPERATOR ROLE PLAY:

28 If requested to set gains to 1, (wait 3 min) activate TRIGGER 28, then report gains set to 1. (This trigger can be triggered OFF, then back ON to adjust gains more than once).

SIMULATOR OPERATOR ROLE PLAY:

EO is on station at 345kV Bus Tie 4-5 Circuit Breaker ready for it to be closed.

EO to verify CB is closed, wait 30 sec, then report the following:

345kV Bus Tie 4-5 Circuit Breaker indicates closed in the field.

CRS Directs BOP to restore the 345kV Switchyard to a normal lineup.

Informs TSO of completion.

BOP Closes 345kV Bus Tie 4-5 Circuit Breaker per DOP 6400-13, Electrical Yard Switching Step G.2.k:

  • Places SYNCH switch in ON.
  • Reviews sync-running and sync-incoming voltmeters to validate expected response.
  • Closes the 345 kV Bus Tie 4-5 Circuit Breaker by placing the control switch to CLOSE.
  • Places SYNCH SW to OFF.
  • Verifies the CB indicates closed on the 923-2 Panel and locally via the EO.
  • Informs CRS that task is complete.

ATC Monitors panels and assists as directed.

Event 1 Completion Criteria:

345kV Bus Tie 4-5 Circuit Breaker closed,

-- AND/OR --

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner.

Page 7 of 20

Event Two - Raise Reactor Power Using Recirc Flow Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior NOTE:

The crew will raise reactor power to approximately 90% with recirculation flow per QNE guidance.

With 2 RFPs running, the maximum allowable feed flow rate is 9.8 Mlbm/hr.

CRS Directs ATC to raise Reactor Power to 90% using Recirc Flow per DGP 03-01, Power Changes.

ATC Performs the following actions per DGP 03-01, Power Changes, and DOP 0202-03, Reactor Recirculation Flow Control System Operation, as directed:

  • Raises Recirc Pump speed using Panel 902-5 Recirc Master Flow Control Station speed pushbutton RAISE HIGH.

BOP Monitors panels and assists as directed.

Event 2 Completion Criteria:

Sufficient power increase,

-- AND/OR--

At the direction of the Lead Examiner.

Page 8 of 20

Event Three - Recirc Pump Speed Controller Failure Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior SIMULATOR OPERATOR:

At the discretion of the Floor Instructor / Lead Evaluator, activate TRIGGER 1, which causes a cell fault 1 in 2A Recirc ASD and lowers 2A Recirc Pump speed by 6%.

ROLE PLAY:

EO to 2A ASD Trailer, wait 3 min, and report the following:

The HMI indicates that 2A ASD generated a Speed Hold.

FLOOR INSTRUCTOR ROLE PLAY:

Operator to check ASD HMI in back panels, report the following:

The HMI indicates that 2A ASD generated a Speed Hold.

ATC Announces and references the following DANs:

  • DAN 902-4 B-1, 2A RECIRC DRIVE MINOR TROUBLE
  • DAN 902-4 C-1, RECIRC DRIVE A SPEED HOLD Performs the following using DAN actions:
  • Dispatches EO to 2A ASD Trailer.
  • Checks HMI on Panel 902-18.
  • Determines that the flow mismatch is > 5% between the Recirc Pump flow indicators and informs CRS.

CRS Directs entry into DGA-7, Unexpected Reactivity Change.

References Technical Specifications and determines:

  • TS 3.4.1 Condition B, Declare the recirculation loop with lower flow to be not in operation within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.

Directs ATC to clear alarms and match Recirculation Pump Speeds.

Once flows are matched, exits TS 3.4.1 Condition B.

ATC Resets Speed Hold using DAN actions by performing the following:

  • Momentarily places 2A ASD Speed Hold switch to RESET.
  • Matches 2A and 2B Recirc Pump speeds as necessary.

BOP Performs DGA-7 actions.

  • Runs an OR-7.
  • Contacts QNE.

Monitors panels and assists as directed.

Event 3 Completion Criteria:

Recirc Pump Speeds matched AND, Tech Specs have been addressed,

-- AND/OR --

At the discretion of the Floor Instructor/Lead Evaluator.

Page 9 of 20

Event Four - RB Vent Rad Monitor Fails Upscale with SBGT failure to Auto Start Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior SIMULATOR OPERATOR:

At the discretion of the Floor Instructor / Lead Evaluator, activate TRIGGER 2 to cause 2A Rx Bldg 2 Vent Rad Monitor upscale. Both SBGT trains will fail to automatically start.

ROLE PLAY:

EO to check SBGT Trains, wait 4 min, and report the following:

I smell burnt electrical insulation coming from Panel 2223-28A. There is no fire EO to check Rx Bldg D/P on the Refuel Floor, wait 2 min, and report the following:

Rx Bldg D/P is (use Instructor Station value OR variable VRP4).

Acknowledge requests as plant support groups.

BOP Announces and references the following DANs:

  • 902-3 F-14, RX BLDG VENT CH A RAD HI HI
  • 923-5 A-1(4), U2(3) RX BLDG VENT/EXH FAN TRIP
  • 923-5 C-1, RX BLDG DP LO.

Checks back panels and determines that 2A RB Vent Rad Monitor has failed upscale and a valid high rad condition does not exist.

Verifies RB Ventilation Systems on both Units isolated by verifying damper positions on Panel 923-5.

Verifies proper operation of SBGT:

  • Recognizes that neither train of SBGT has started and informs CRS.

CRS Responds to reports of failed RB Vent Rad Monitor and SBGT.

May enter DEOP 0300-01, Secondary Containment Control, if RB D/P drops to 0 inches.

Enters DOA 7500-01, Standby Gas Treatment System Fan Trip.

Refers to Technical Specifications and determines:

ATC Monitors panels and assists as directed.

Event 4 Completion Criteria:

2/3B SBGT Train started AND, Tech Specs have been addressed,

-- AND/OR--

At the discretion of the Floor Instructor/Lead Evaluator.

Page 10 of 20

Event Five - Stator Water Cooling Pump Trip Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior SIMULATOR OPERATOR:

3 At the discretion of the Lead Examiner, activate TRIGGER 3, which trips 2A Stator Water Cooling Pump on overcurrent and 2B Stator Water Cooling Pump fails to auto start.

ROLE PLAY:

10 As the EO sent to acknowledge the stator cooling water trouble and/or the H2 Seal Oil & Alterrex Pnl Trouble alarm (wait 2 min), activate TRIGGER 10 and report: I have acknowledged stator cooling water trouble and/or the H2 Seal Oil & Alterrex Pnl Trouble alarm. The alarms are cleared and were

. (Use table below to determine report) 902-7 alarm received Local alarm to report Inlet Flow Low, &

902-7 C-10, Stator Clg Panel Trouble Inlet Pressure Low 902-7 E-11, H2 Seal Oil & Alterrex Pnl Trouble Rectifier Coolant Flow Low.

902-7 C-3, Turb Stator Coolant Runback Turbine Runback As the EO sent to check cause of 2A Stator Cooling Water Pump trip (wait 2 min), then report:

2A Stator Cooling Water Pump tripped on overcurrent.

As the EO sent to check cause of 2B Stator Cooling Water Pump (wait 2 min), then report:

2B Stator Cooling Water Pump is operating properly.

BOP Announces the following alarms:

DAN 902-7 B-10, Stator Clg PP Trip DAN 902-7 C-10, Stator Clg Panel Trouble DAN 902-7 E-11, H2 Seal Oil & Alterrex Pnl Trouble DAN 902-7 C-3, Turb Stator Coolant Runback DAN 902-7 A-5, Turbine Control Major Trouble Performs appropriate actions per DOA 7400-01, Failure of the Stator Coolant System:

Starts 2B Stator Cooling Water Pump (Immediate Action)

Sends EO to check breaker and 2A Stator Cooling Water Pump for cause of trip.

Performs DOP 6700-20, 480V Circuit Breaker Trip.

CRS Enters and directs performance of DOA 7400-01, Failure of the Stator Coolant System.

Enters and directs performance of DOP 6700-20, 480V Circuit Breaker Trip.

ATC Monitors panels and assists as directed.

Event 5 Completion Criteria:

2B Stator Water Cooling Pump started AND, 2A Stator Water Cooling Pump Control Switch in PTL,

-- AND/OR--

At the direction of the Lead Examiner.

Page 11 of 20

Event Six - Spurious Group 1 - Automatic Scram Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior SIMULATOR OPERATOR:

4 At the discretion of the Lead Examiner, activate TRIGGER 4, which initiates a spurious Group 1. Group 1 pressure setpoint will drift causing MSIVs to close. The reactor will automatically scram.

ATC Reports Automatic Reactor Scram due to Group 1 from MSIVs closing.

Performs the following actions per DGP 02-03 as directed:

  • Presses scram pushbuttons.
  • Places mode switch in shutdown.
  • Check rods inserted.
  • Announces a Hydraulic ATWS due to rods not inserted.

CRS Enters DEOP 100, RPV Control, and immediately exits to DEOP 400-5, Failure to Scram, due to ATWS.

BOP May identify and report MSIV closure due to Group 1.

Event 6 Completion Criteria:

Team has entered DEOP 400-5,

-- AND/OR --

At the direction of the Lead Examiner.

Page 12 of 20

Event Seven - Hydraulic ATWS Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior NOTE:

This event is a continuation of Event Five - Spurious Group 1 and Automatic Reactor Scram.

SIMULATOR OPERATOR:

When directed to bypass Off Gas High Rad Isolations, wait 1 min, then insert TRIGGER 9, and inform 9 the Floor Instructor.

6 When directed to pull ARI fuses, wait 1 min, then insert TRIGGER 6, and inform the Floor Instructor.

When directed to install RPS Scram Jumpers, wait 2 min, then insert TRIGGER 5, and inform the Floor 5 Instructor.

ATC Performs the following actions per DGP 02-03, Reactor Scram, as directed:

Initiates ARI / Determines ARI did not insert control rods.

Announces ATWS condition and RX power is >6%.

Places MSIV LO-LO LVL Bypass Keylocks in BYPASS.

Runs recirc pumps back to minimum.

Lowers FWLC setpoint to -40 inches.

Trips recirc pumps.

Initiates one train of SBLC. (See Event 7)

Maintains RPV/L between -162 inches and the level lowered to.

If directed and RX power >6%, terminating and preventing all injection except boron and CRD until RPV level 35 inches. (RPV-5.5)

If directed and RX power >6% AND Rx Lvl > TAF AND DW Press > 2 psig or an ERV is open AND Torus Temp > 110oF, terminating and preventing all injection except boron and CRD into the RPV.

(RPV-5.6)

  • Verify FWRV controllers are in MAN and output is ZERO.
  • Verify FWRVs indicate closed CRS Directs/performs actions of DEOP 0400-05, Failure to Scram:

Placing ADS to inhibit.

Placing Core Spray pumps in PTL.

Verifying required auto actions.

Placing MSIV LO-LO LVL Bypass Keylocks in BYPASS.

Installing of the jumpers for the Off Gas high Rad isolations.

If RX power >6%, terminating and preventing all injection except boron and CRD until RPV level

-35 inches. (RPV-5.5)

If RX power >6% AND Rx Lvl > TAF AND DW Press > 2 psig or an ERV is open AND Torus Temp >

110oF, terminating and preventing all injection except boron and CRD into the RPV. (RPV-5.6)

Holding RPV level between -162 inches and the level lowered to.

Stabilizing RPV pressure below 1060 psig.

Inserting control rods using Alternate Rod Insertion. (RPV-5.1)

  • Directs repeated scram/resets defeating RPS logic.

Page 13 of 20

Event Seven - Hydraulic ATWS Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior BOP If override conditions are met, and when directed, terminates and prevents all injection except boron and CRD at the 902-3 panel as follows (RPV-5.5, RPV-5.6):

  • Verify/place HPCI Aux Oil Pump AND HPCI 14 valve in PTL.
  • Verify HPCI flow controller in AUTO AND reduce setpoint to 2000 gpm.
  • Places 2-1501-22A/B valves in Pull-to-Close.

ATC / BOP Inserts control rods per DEOP 500-05, Alternate Insertion of Control Rods, as follows: (RPV-5.1)

Drives rods by:

  • Bypassing the RWM.
  • Maximizing CRD drive water pressure.

o Start a second CRD pump o Open the CRD flow control valve (flow controller in manual) o Adjust drive water pressure using MO 2-302-8

  • Uses either the ROD MOVEMENT CONTROL switch or the EMERG ROD IN position of the ROD OUT NOTCH OVERRIDE switch.

Performs repeated scram/resets defeating RPS logic:

  • Directs ARI fuses pulled if RPV level is lowered below - 59 in.
  • Directs scram jumpers installed.
  • Places SDV Hi Water Bypass in the BYPASS position.
  • Closes the SDV vent and drain valves.
  • Opens SDV Vent and Drain valves.
  • Manually scrams the reactor when the SDV is drained.
  • Repeats as necessary.

CRS Based on report that all control rods are inserted, exits DEOP 0400-05 and re-enters DEOP 0100.

Event 7 Completion Criteria:

All rods inserted AND, Team re-enters DEOP 100,

-- AND/OR --

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner.

Page 14 of 20

Event Eight - SBLC Relief Valve Failure Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior NOTE:

This event is a continuation from Event 6 - Hydraulic ATWS.

The ATC will start one train of SBLC. Sufficient flow will not develop due to a leak in the relief valve.

The ATC will then start the other train of SBLC.

SIMULATOR OPERATOR:

When the second train of SBLC is started, verify either TRIGGER 7 or TRIGGER 8 has actuated to clear 7 or 8 the failed relief valve.

ATC Starts one train of SBLC per DGP 02-03 by placing the control switch to SYS 1 or SYS 2.

Notices SBLC is not injecting on PI-2-1140-1, PP DISCH HDR PRESS, and informs CRS.

Starts other train of SBLC. (RPV-5.3)

CRS Directs ATC to start other train of SBLC. (RPV-5.3)

Event 8 Completion Criteria:

SBLC is injecting into the RPV,

-- AND / OR --

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner.

Page 15 of 20

References PROCEDURE TITLE DAN 902-3 F-14 Rx Bldg Vent Ch A Hi Hi DAN 902-4 B-1 2A Recirc Drive Minor Trouble DAN 902-4 C-1 Recirc Drive A Speed Hold DAN 923-5 A-1 U2 Rx Bldg Vent/Exh Fan Trip DAN 923-5 A-4 U3 Rx Bldg Vent/Exh Fan Trip DAN 923-5 C-1 Rx Bldg DP Lo DEOP 100 RPV Control DEOP 300-01 Secondary Containment Control DEOP 400-5 Failure to Scram DGA-07 Unexpected Reactivity Change DGP 02-03 Reactor Scram DGP 03-01 Power Changes DOA 0202-03 Reactor Recirculation System Flow Control Failure DOA 7500-01 Standby Gas Treatment System Fan Trip DOP 0202-03 Reactor Recirculation Flow Control System Operation DOP 6400-13 Electrical Yard Switching OP-DR-103-102-1002 Strategies for Successful Transient Mitigation TS 3.3.6.2 Secondary Containment Isolation Instrumentation TS 3.3.7.1 Control Room Emergency Ventilation (CREV) System Instrumentation TS 3.4.1 Recirculation Loops Operating TS 3.6.4.1 Secondary Containment TS 3.6.4.3 Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System Page 16 of 20

Simulator Scenario Review Checklist ILT-N-3 Quantitative Attributes 7 Total malfunctions (5 to 8) 2 Malfunctions after EOP entry (1 to 2) 3 Abnormal events (2 to 4) 2 Major transients (1 to 2) 2 EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1 to 2) 1 EOPs contingency requiring substantive actions (0 to 2) 4 Crew critical tasks (2 to 3)

Page 17 of 20

CAEP Files

  1. CAEP file for ILT-N-3
  1. ILT 2021-301 (20-1)
  1. Written by DSS
  1. 01/21
        1. INITIAL CONDITIONS ####
  1. Overrides OFF the alarm that comes up due to the 2/3A SBGT control switch in OFF imf ser1896 off
  1. Fails 2/3A SBGT by overriding its control switch ior vgdstbya off ior vgdprima off ior vgdstrta off
  1. Overrides OFF the alarm that comes up due to the 2/3B SBGT control switch in OFF imf ser1910 offl2
  1. Fails 2/3B SBGT STBY position of its control switch.

ior vgdstbyb offl2

  1. Sets the SBLC relief valves to 50 psig (Event 7) imf scrlfvad 50l2 imf scrlfvbd 50l2
  1. Sets hydraulic ATWS conditions (Event 6) imf rdhlvfpa 91.0l4 imf rdhldega 91.0l4 imf rdhlvfpb 91.0l4 imf rdhldegb 91.0l4
        1. EVENT TRIGGERS ####
  1. Event Trigger 1 causes a 2A Recirc ASD Cell Fault (Event 3) trgset 1 "0"l6 imf rr02a (1)l6
  1. Event Trigger 2 fails RX Bldg Vent Rad monitor upscale (Events 4) trgset 2 "0"l6 imf radrbvah (2)l6
  1. Event Trigger 3 causes a spurious Group I isolation (Event 5) trgset 3 "0"l8 imf cigp1i (3)l8
  1. Event Trigger 4 lifts Off-gas High Rad isolations trgset 4 "0"l8 irf ogogjp (4) inl8
  1. Event Trigger 5 inserts the scram jumpers trgset 5 "0"l10 irf rpjumpas (5) truel10
  1. Event Trigger 6 pulls the ARI fuses trgset 6 "0"l10 irf aw4 (6) truel10
  1. Event Trigger 7 will activate when SBLC is taken to SYS1 and delete the malfunction for the 2B SBLC Relief valve trgset 7 "hwscd301(1)"l12 trg 7 "dmf scrlfvbd"l12
  1. Event Trigger 8 will activate when SBLC is taken to SYS2 and delete the malfunction for the 2A SBLC Relief valve trgset 8 "hwscd301(2)"l12 Page 18 of 20

trg 7 "dmf scrlfvad"l12

  1. Event Trigger 28 sets gain for all 6 APRMs.

trgset 28 "0"l36 trg 28 "irf niagainf true"l36

        1. END ####

Page 19 of 20

Unit 2 Risk: GREEN Unit 3 Risk: GREEN Unit 2 is in Mode 1 at 78% power, Unit 3 is at 100% power.

Leading Thermal Limit: MFLCPR @ 0.881 Leading Thermal Limit: MFLCPR @ 0.883 Action limit: 0.980 Action Limit: 0.980 Equipment Unavailable: None Equipment Unavailable: None Protected Equipment: None Protected Equipment: None Current Action Statements None LCO Started: None LCO Expires: None Cause: N/A Unit 2 Plant Status Today Unit 2 Activities

        • Shift 1 Activities ****
        • Shift 2 Activities ****

Restore 345kV Bus Tie 4-5 CB Power Ascension

        • Shift 3 Activities ****

Turnover:

During initial power ascension following a refuel outage, 345kV Bus Tie 4-5 CB tripped. Repairs have been completed and the 345kV Switchyard is ready to be returned to a normal lineup. Once restored, continue on with power ascension to raise reactor power to 90% using recirc flow per QNE guidance.

Page 20 of 20

Dresden Generating Station ILT-N-4 SECURE RWCU REJECT TO CONDENSER RAISE POWER WITH RODS ERV SPURIOUS OPEN DEGRADED TBCCW PUMP IRM FAILS UPSCALE - PARTIAL HALF SCRAM MR LVL REF LEG FAILURE - SCRAM FAILURE OF RWCU ISOLATION LOSS OF LEVEL INDICATION - RPV FLOODING Rev. 00 01/21 Developed By:

Exam Author Date Approved By:

Facility Representative Date

Scenario Outline Facility: Dresden Generating Station Scenario No.: 2021-301 ILT-N-4 Op-Test No.: 2021-301 Examiners Operators / crew position

/ ATC

/ BOP

/ CRS Initial Conditions: Unit 2 is in Mode 2. Reactor Power is stable at 8%

Turnover: Per DGP 01-01, Unit Startup, step G.56, stop rejecting to the Condenser with RWCU. Once complete, continue raising power to 10% per DGP 01-01 in preparation to put the Mode Switch in RUN.

Critical Tasks: RPV-4.1 - When RPV water level cannot be determined by multiple direct or indirect indications as defined by DEOP 0010-10, enter DEOP 400-1, RPV Flooding.

RPV-4.3 - When conditions are met per DEOP 400-1, RPV Flooding, the minimum number of available SRVs required for emergency depressurization (MNSRED) are opened.

RPV-4.4 - Following emergency depressurization during non-ATWS RPV Flooding, maximize injection and do not divert available RPV injection flow paths until the RPV is flooded to the Main Steam Lines.

Event Malf. Event Event No. No. Type* Description #

1 NONE N BOP Secure Rejecting to Condenser with RWCU 2 NONE R ATC Raise Power with Rods 3 ADS3ESD C/T BOP / CRS ERV Spurious Open WTPPDSH1 4 HWWTPPDSH(1) C BOP Degraded TBCCW Pump HWWTBPMP(1)

NII17POT 5 I/T ATC / CRS IRM Fails Upscale - Partial Half Scram B15 6 NVM100BP M TEAM Medium Range Level Reference Leg Leak, Rise in DW Press - Scram 7 CIRWCUAP C ATC Failure of RWCU to Isolate NVM100AP NVM129AP 8 M TEAM Loss of Level Indication - RPV Flooding NVM106AP/BP NVML112P

  • (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor, (T)ech Spec
  1. (New) - Event not used on previous 2 NRC Exams, (Pre) - Event used on previous 2 NRC Exams Scenario Objective:

Evaluate the Teams ability to operate the plant with a level reference leg leak and loss of all level indication.

Scenario Initial Conditions

1. Unit 2 is at ~8% power.
2. The following equipment is OOS:
a. None
3. LCOs:
a. None Page 2 of 22

Scenario Sequence Event # Description 1 Secure RWCU Reject to the Condenser:

The BOP will secure blowdown to the main condenser with RWCU per DOP 1200-02, RWCU System Blowdown.

2 Raise Power with Rods:

The ATC, as directed from the CRS, will continue power ascension for unit startup by withdrawing control rods.

3 ERV Spurious Open:

2E ERV setpoint will drift causing 2E ERV to open. The BOP will attempt to close the ERV from the MCR per DOA 0250-01, Relief Valve Failure. Attempts to close form the MCR will not be successful. The CRS will direct pulling 2E ERV fuses and address Technical Specifications.

4 Degraded TBCCW Pump:

2B TBCCW Pump flow becomes degraded and eventually trips. The BOP will start 2A TBCCW pump.

5 IRM fails Upscale - Partial Half Scram:

IRM Channel 17 fails upscale and a partial half scram occurs. The CRS addresses Technical Specifications. The ATC inserts a full half scram and bypasses the failed IRM.

6 MR Level Reference Leg Leak, Rise in DW Pressure - Scram:

2B MR Level begins to fail high and Drywell pressure starts to increase due to a leak in the reference leg of the 2B MR Level Instrument. The ATC will perform a manual scram when Drywell pressure approaches 1.5 psig.

7 Failure of RWCU to Isolate:

The ATC will notice that the RWCU system did not fully isolate. The 2-1201-1 failed to auto close. The ATC will manually close the 2-1201-1.

8 Loss of Level Indication - RPV Flooding:

A loss of RPV level indication occurs due to multiple transmitter failures. The CRS will enter and direct actions from DEOP 0400-01, RPV Flooding .

Event One - Secure RWCU Reject to the Condenser The BOP will secure rejecting to the Condenser.

Malfunctions required: 0

  • None Success Path:
  • Secures RWCU reject.

Event Two - Raise Power with Rods The ATC will raise power by withdrawing control rods per DGP 01-01, DGP 02-03, and the REMA.

Malfunctions required: 0

  • None Success Path:

Page 3 of 22

Event Three - ERV Spurious Open 2E ERV will spuriously open.

Malfunctions required: 1

  • (2E ERV Spuriously Opens)

Success Path:

  • Attempts to close 2E ERV.
  • Performs actions of DOA 0250-01, Relief Valve Failure.
  • Has 2E ERV fuses removed.
  • Determines Technical Specifications requirements.

Event Four - Degraded TBCCW Pump 2B TBCCW Pump develops degraded flow and trips.

Malfunctions required: 1

  • (TBCCW Pump degraded flow)

Success Path:

  • Starts 2A TBCCW Pump.

Event Five - IRM Fails Upscale - Partial Half Scram IRM 17 fails upscale with a partial half scram.

Malfunctions Required: 2

  • (IRM 17 fails upscale)

Success Path:

  • IRM 17 placed in bypass.
  • Determines Technical Specifications requirements.

Event Six - MR Level Reference Leg Leak, Rise in DW Press - Scram A leak in the 2B MR Level Reference Leg causes drywell pressure to rise.

Malfunctions required: 2

  • (2B MR Level Reference Leg Leak)
  • (Leak in the Drywell)

Success Path:

  • Scrams the reactor when drywell pressure approaches 1.5 psig.

Page 4 of 22

Event Seven - Failure of RWCU to Isolate After the scram, the RWCU fails to fully isolate. The 2-1201-1 fails to auto close.

Malfunctions required: 1

  • (Incomplete Group 3 Isolation)

Success Path:

  • Manually closes the 2-1201-1.

Event Eight - Loss of Level Indication - RPV Flooding A loss of RPV Level Indication occurs due to multiple transmitter failures.

Malfunctions required: 1

  • (Loss of RPV Level Indication)

Success Path:

  • Performs DEOP 0400-01, RPV Flooding.

Page 5 of 22

PRE-SCENARIO ACTIVITIES 1 If applicable, conduct pre-scenario activities in accordance with TQ-AA-155-J040, SIMULATOR EXAMINATION BRIEFING.

a. Direct the crew to perform their briefs prior to entering the simulator.
b. Provide the Team a copy of DGP 03-01, Power Changes.
c. Provide the Team a copy of DGP 01-01, Unit Startup, and the REMA.
d. Provide the Team a copy of DOP 1200-02, RWCU System Blowdown.

2 Simulator Setup (the following steps can be done in any logical order)

a. Initialize simulator in an ~8% power IC. (IC 343 used for validation)
b. Cut in/out Cond Demins as needed, to maintain DP within limits.
c. Ensure running Condensate pump amps within limits.
d. Ensure CRD parameters are normal, and CRD Drive Pressure is 250 to 280 psid.

3 Verify the following simulator conditions:

a. Verify Reactor Power ~8%, adjust rods or Recirc as appropriate.
b. Ensure 2B TBCCW Pump is running.

4 Run Pump_Sumps.cae NOTE: Do NOT run the initial setup CAEP file until the above setup is completed.

5 Run the initial setup CAEP file: 20-1 (2021-301) ILT-N-4.cae 6 Place the following equipment out of service:

a. None 7 Complete the Simulator Setup Checklist.

Symbols are used throughout the text to identify specific items as indicated below:

Critical Tasks Required Actions o Optional Actions Page 6 of 22

Event One - Secure RWCU Reject to the Condenser Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior SIMULATOR OPERATOR ROLE PLAY:

28 If requested to set gains to 1, (wait 3 min) activate TRIGGER 28, then report gains set to 1. (This trigger can be triggered OFF, then back ON to adjust gains more than once).

CRS Directs ATC to secure RWCU reject to the condenser per DOP 1200-02, RWCU System Blowdown.

BOP Secures blowdown (reject) to the main condenser as follows:

  • Lowers demand (CLOSE) on RMC 2-1290-12, DRN FLOW CONTLR, to minimum (ZERO).
  • When flow is zero, as indicated on FI 2-1290-13, BLOWDN FLOW, then close MO 2-1201-11, BLOWDN TO CONDR.

ATC Monitors panels and assists as directed.

Event 1 Completion Criteria:

RWCU Reject to the Condenser secured,

-- AND/OR --

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner.

Page 7 of 22

Event Two - Raise Power with Rods Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior CRS Directs pulling control rods.

Reviews REMA.

Designates second verifier.

Directs NSO to pulls rods.

ATC Performs the following actions per DOP 0400-01, REACTOR MANUAL CONTROL SYSTEM OPERATION, and DGP 03-04, CONTROL ROD MOVEMENTS, as directed Verifies the following prior to moving first control rod:

Control rod selected on the select matrix is correct rod.

Verifies rod pattern States the following:

  • Controlling document
  • Step and array
  • Initial position
  • Movement (single or continuous)
  • Direction
  • Target Position Verifies the following on subsequent control rods:

Control rod selected on the select matrix is correct rod.

States the following:

  • Initial position
  • Movement (single or continuous)
  • Direction
  • Target Position Second Verification requirements satisfied.

Rod Out Permit light is illuminated.

Drive water pressure at nominal 260 psid.

Withdraws rods as follows:

Moves Rod Out Notch Override (RONOR) Switch to NOTCH OVERRIDE position (use of RONOR switch is optional) and the Rod Movement Control switch to ROD OUT.

Verifies ON light illuminated and proper Control Rod Timer operation.

Releases switches before target position is reached. (If rod is being withdrawn to 48, then switches are held to 48 with coupling check)

Verifies rod settles to target position and proper response of nuclear instrumentation.

Page 8 of 22

Event Two - Raise Power with Rods Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior BOP Performs second verification checks.

For first rod in a step:

Verifies correct control rod pattern Verifies correct step and array.

Compares CRD and intended movement with controlling document: point to, touch, or mark controlling document.

State the following:

  • Repeat back and agree with intended movement For all rods moved:

Verifies correct control rod selected.

Verifies planned control rod motion is correct.

Immediately notify the NSO of errors during rod motion.

Verifies control rod at target position.

Event 2 Completion Criteria:

Sufficient power increase,

-- AND/OR--

At the direction of the Lead Examiner.

Page 9 of 22

Event Three - ERV Spurious Open Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior SIMULATOR OPERATOR:

At the discretion of the Floor Instructor / Lead Evaluator, activate TRIGGER 1, which causes 2E ERV to 1 spuriously open due to an electrical failure.

ROLE PLAY:

2 EO to pull control power fuses for 2E ERV, wait 3 min, activate TRIGGER 2 to remove control power fuses, and report the following via phone:

I have pulled the 2E ERV fuses.

QNE to evaluate core parameters, wait 2 min, and report the following:

Core parameters are within limits.

BOP Announces and references DAN 902-3 E-12, 2E ELECTROMATIC RELIEF VALVE OPEN.

Enters DOA 0250-01, Relief Valve Failure and performs the following immediate actions:

  • Places 2E ERV control switch to OFF.

CRS Enters DOA 0250-01, Relief Valve Failure, and directs actions.

Enters and directs actions of DGA-7, Unexpected Reactivity Change ATC Performs a 5 Panel Update and informs the Team of power, pressure, level, & drywell pressure.

Performs actions of DGA-7 as directed:

  • Contacts QNE
  • Runs OD-7 BOP Determines that E ERV is still open and performs subsequent actions of DOA 0250-01:

Cycles E ERV control switch to MAN and OFF twice.

Cycles the ADS INHIBIT switch from NORMAL to INHIBIT to NORMAL several times.

Directs E ERV control power fuses pulled.

Monitors Turbine Bypass Valve Operation.

May check hydrogen addition operation.

Resets the acoustic monitor.

CRS May enter DEOP 0200-01, Primary Containment Control, due to Torus Temp > 95oF.

Declares E ERV inoperable.

Determines following Technical Specifications apply:

  • 3.4.3, Safety and Relief Valves, Condition A.1: Restore the relief valve to OPERABLE status within 14 days.
  • 3.6.1.8, Suppression Chamber-to-Drywell Vacuum Breaker, SR 3.6.1.8.2: Perform a functional test of each required vacuum breaker within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
  • May refer to 3.3.6.3, Relief Valve Instrumentation.

Event 3 Completion Criteria:

2E ERV closed AND, Tech Specs have been addressed,

-- AND/OR --

At the discretion of the Floor Instructor/Lead Evaluator.

Page 10 of 22

Event Four - Degraded TBCCW Pump Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior SIMULATOR OPERATOR:

At the discretion of the Floor Instructor / Lead Evaluator, activate TRIGGER 3 to cause 2B TBCCW 3 Pump to degrade.

ROLE PLAY:

EO to check 2B TBCCW Pump, wait 2 min, and report the following:

(If 2B TBCCW Pump is still operating) 2B TBCCW Pump is making a loud grinding noise.

(If 2B TBCCW Pump is secured) 2B TBCCW Pump is at rest.

EO to check 2A TBCCW Pump, wait 2 min, and report the following:

2A TBCCW Pump is operating normally.

EO to check 2A CRD pump, wait 30 sec, and report the following:

2A CRD Pump is operating properly.

BOP Announces and references DAN 923-1 D-2, U2 OR U3 TBCCW PRESS LO and performs the following actions:

  • Starts 2A TBCCW pump per DOA 3800-01, Loss of Turbine Building Closed Cooling Water.
  • Follows up with Dan 923-1 D-2.
  • Verifies TBCCW pressure returns to normal.
  • Stops 2B TBCCW pump.
  • If 2B TBCCW pump trips, announces alarm 923-1 C-2, U2 OR U3 TBCCW PP TRIP.
  • Performs DOA 3800-01, Loss of Turbine Building Closed Cooling Water, as directed.

CRS Directs entry into DOA 3800-01, Loss of Turbine Building Closed Cooling Water.

ATC Monitors panels and assists as directed.

Event 4 Completion Criteria:

2A TBCCW pump started and 2B TBCCW pump secured,

-- AND/OR--

At the discretion of the Floor Instructor/Lead Evaluator.

Page 11 of 22

Event Five - IRM Fails Upscale - Partial Half Scram Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior SIMULATOR OPERATOR:

6 At the discretion of the Lead Examiner, activate TRIGGER 6, to fail IRM 17 upscale.

Verify TRIGGER 29 automatically activates when the B Manual Scram Pushbutton is depressed to 29 remove the partial half scram malfunction.

ATC Announces and references DAN 902-5 C-15, CHANNEL B IRM HI HI/INOP.

Reports IRM 17 failed upscale.

Reports RPS Channel B Partial Half Scram.

Enters DOA 0500-02, Partial Half Scram or Full Scram Actuation.

CRS Directs entry into DOA 0500-02, Partial Half Scram or Full Scram Actuation.

Refers to Tech Spec 3.3.1.1 and determines that RPS Channel B is INOP and that Condition A is not met and that the RPS Channel B must be placed in Trip within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. And condition C1 may apply.

  • Directs B 1/2 scram to be put in manually.

Refers to Tech Spec 3.3.1.1 Condition B and determines that it is met.

Refers to Tech Spec 3.3.1.1 Condition C1 and determines that 3 IRMs are required per channel and that the LCO is met.

  • Directs IRM #17 to be bypassed.

May Refer to TRM 3.3.a Control Rod Block Instrumentation.

ATC Bypasses IRM #17, as directed, per DAN 902-4 C-15.

Inserts B Half Scram manually by depressing the B Manual Scram Button, as directed.

BOP Monitors panels and assists as directed.

Event 5 Completion Criteria:

RPS Channel B Half Scram inserted AND, Tech Specs Have Been Addressed.

-- AND/OR --

At the direction of the Lead Examiner.

Page 12 of 22

Event Six - MR Level Reference Leg Leak, Rise in DW Pressure - Scram Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior SIMULATOR OPERATOR:

7 At the discretion of the Lead Examiner, activate TRIGGER 7, which causes MR Level Indication to start to fail high and drywell pressure to start to increase.

ROLE PLAY:

EO to check U2 CAM, wait 2 min, and then report the following:

U2 Cam is reading 2700 counts and rising.

U3 NSO to check U3 Drywell Pressure, report the following:

U3 Drywell Pressure is 1.2 psig and steady.

ATC Reports failure of 2B MR Level.

Reports Drywell Pressure rise.

Performs Scram Prep actions per DGP 02-03, Scram, when directed.

  • Starts MSP and TGOP.

Performs Manual Scram when drywell pressure approaches 1.5 psig as follows:

  • Presses scram pushbuttons.
  • Places mode switch in shutdown.
  • Check rods inserted.
  • Verifies Recirc Pumps run back.
  • Maintains RPV/L between +25 and +35 inches or as directed by Unit Supervisor.
  • Inserts SRM/IRMs.

CRS Enters and directs actions of DOA 0040-01, Slow Leak.

Set Scram contingency of 1.5 psig DW pressure. (Since DW pressure starts much lower than normal, may set a lower pressure Scram contingency.)

May enter DGP 02-03, REACTOR SCRAM, and direct taking scram preparatory actions.

Prior to reaching the Drywell Pressure scram setpoint, directs a manual scram per DGP 02-03.

After Scram, enters DEOP 100, RPV Control, and directs the following actions:

  • Verification of all isolations, ECCS and EDG starts.
  • Holding RPV/L +8 to +48 inches.
  • Maintaining RPV/P <1060 psig using the BPVs.

BOP Performs the following actions per DOA 0040-01 as directed:

  • Notifies Shift Supervisor and Rad Protection.
  • Directs search for leak.
  • Shutdown H2 Addition. (Simulated)
  • Makes PA announcement.
  • Dispatches EO to verify Crib House inlet temperature is <95oF.

Page 13 of 22

Event Six - MR Level Reference Leg Leak, Rise in DW Pressure - Scram Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior Event 6 Completion Criteria:

Manual Scram performed,

-- AND/OR --

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner.

Page 14 of 22

Event Seven - Failure of RWCU to Isolate Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior NOTE:

When the manual scram occurs, the RWCU will not fully isolate. The 2-1201-1 valve will remain open.

ATC While performing Verification of Isolations and Actuations per DEOP 0100, recognizes that the 2-1201-1 did not close.

Informs CRS of the failure of 2-1201-1.

Manually closes the 2-1201-1 by placing the control switch to CLOSE.

CRS Directs ATC to manually close 2-1201-1.

Event 7 Completion Criteria:

2-1201-1 is manually closed,

-- AND / OR --

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner.

Page 15 of 22

Event Eight - Loss of Level Indication - RPV Flooding Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior SIMULATOR OPERATOR:

Once the BOP manually starts 2A Core Spray Pump, verify TRIGGER 9 actuates to fail the remaining 9 RPV level indications.

WEC to bypass RFP high level trips, wait 3 min, insert TRIGGER 10, and report the following:

10 RFP High Level Trips have been bypassed.

ROLE PLAY:

EO to the 7 and 8 racks, wait 3 min, and report the following:

Level indications are (Use the level indications on the 902-5 and 902-3 panels)

EO to re-install fuse for 2E ERV, wait 30 sec, insert TRIGGER 11, and report the following:

11 The fuse for 2E ERV has been re-installed.

ATC / BOP Notices and reports that RPV levels are diverging, and no valid level indication exists.

CRS Based on diverging RPV level indication, exits DEOP 0100 and enters DEOP 0400-01, RPV Flooding, and performs / directs: (RPV-4.1)

  • Verifying Torus level above 6 feet.
  • Opening all 5 ADSVs (Only 4 will open. May have EO re-insert fuses for 2E ERV). (RPV-4.3)
  • Isolating the following steam lines:

o MSIVs.

o Main Steam line drains.

o IC.

o HPCI. (unless needed for RPV flooding)

  • Directs defeating the RFP trips.

Page 16 of 22

Event Eight - Loss of Level Indication - RPV Flooding Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior ATC / BOP Enters DEOP 0400-01, RPV Flooding, as directed, and performs the following (RPV-4.1):

  • Verifies Torus level above 6 feet.
  • Opens all 5 ADSVs (Only 4 will open. May have EO re-insert fuses for 2E ERV). (RPV-4.3)
  • Isolates the following steam lines:

o MSIVs.

o Main Steam line drains.

o IC.

o HPCI. (unless necessary for RPV flooding)

o Keeps the RPV flooded to the Main Steam lines with injection flow as low as possible.

o Slows down RPV injection once evidence of reaching the main steam lines:

ERV Tail pipe temps decreasing to subcooled values Increasing RPV pressure Actuation of main steam line or HPCI high steam flow logic HPCI steam line drain pot high level alarm Reactor vessel and flange metal temperatures decreasing to subcooled levels Water leakage from HPCI turbine shaft seals Event 8 Completion Criteria:

RPV flooded to Main Steam Lines,

-- AND / OR --

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner.

Page 17 of 22

References PROCEDURE TITLE DAN 902-3 E-12 2E Electromatic Relief Valve Open DAN 902-5 C-15 Channel B IRM HI HI / INOP DAN 923-1 C-2 U2 or U3 TBCCW Pump Trip DAN 923-1 D-2 U2 or U3 TBCCW Press Lo DEOP 100 RPV Control DEOP 200-01 Primary Containment Control DEOP 400-1 RPV Flooding DGA-7 Unexpected Reactivity Change DGP 01-01 Unit Startup DGP 02-03 Reactor Scram DGP 03-01 Power Changes DGP 03-04 Control Rod Movement DOA 0040-01 Slow Leak DOA 0250-01 Relief Valve Failure DOA 0500-02 Partial 1/2 Scram or Full Scram Actuation DOA 3800-01 Loss of Turbine Building Closed Cooling Water DOP 0400-01 Reactor Manual Control System Operation DOP 1200-02 RWCU System Blowdown DOP 1500-02 Torus Water Cooling Mode of Low Pressure Coolant Injection System OP-DR-103-102-1002 Strategies for Successful Transient Mitigation TS 3.3.1.1 Reactor Protection System Instrumentation TS 3.4.3 Safety and Relief Valves TS 3.6.1.8 Suppression Chamber-To-Drywell Vacuum Breaker TRM 3.3.a Control Rod Block Instrumentation Page 18 of 22

Simulator Scenario Review Checklist ILT-N-4 Quantitative Attributes 8 Total malfunctions (5 to 8) 2 Malfunctions after EOP entry (1 to 2) 4 Abnormal events (2 to 4) 2 Major transients (1 to 2) 2 EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1 to 2) 1 EOPs contingency requiring substantive actions (0 to 2) 3 Crew critical tasks (2 to 3)

Page 19 of 22

CAEP Files

  1. CAEP file for ILT-N-4
  1. ILT 2021-301 (20-1) class
  1. Written by DSS
  1. 01/21
        1. INITIAL CONDITIONS ####
  1. Channel B partial half scram (Event 5) imf b15
  1. 2E ERV binding malfunction set to 25%

imf ads3ebn 25.0

  1. Causes incomplete RWCU Isolation imf cirwcuap
        1. EVENT TRIGGERS ####
  1. Event Trigger 1 causes 2E ERV setpoint to drift and fails open trgset 1 "0"l1 imf ads3esd (1) 75.0l1
  1. Event Trigger 2 deletes 2E ERV binding malfunction so valve will close and removes fuses trgset 2 "0"l2 trg 2 "dmf ads3ebn"l2 irf adsrfe (2) pulledl2
  1. Event Trigger 3 degrades the TBCCW pressure to simulate a degraded pump (Event 4) trgset 3 "0"l3 ior wtppdsh1 (3) 35.0 4:00l3
  1. Event Trigger 4 drives up the U2 TBCCW Press Lo alarm when pressure is <40 psig trgset 4 "hwwtppdsh(1) < 40.0"l4 imf ser1747 (4) onl4
  1. Event Trigger 5 will delete the U2 TBCCW Press Lo alarm override trgset 5 "et_array(4) .and. (hwwtppdsh(1) > 43.0) .and. hwwtbpmp(1)"l5 trg 5 "dmf ser1747"l5
  1. Event Trigger 6 fails IRM 17 high (Event 5) trgset 6 "0"l6 imf nii17pot (6) 125.0l6
  1. Event Trigger 7 inserts a small leak on Medium Range reference leg (Event 6) trgset 7 "0"l7 imf nvm100bp (7) 60.0 30:00 30.0l7 imf f43 (7) 0.04 15:00 0.01l7
  1. Event Trigger 9 fails the remaining RPV level indications trgset 9 "0" imf nvm100ap (9) -150 5:00l9 imf nvm100bp (9) 150 5:00l9 imf nvml29ap (9) 75 5:00l9 imf nvm106bp (9) -400 5:00l10 imf nvm106ap (9) 400 5:00l10 imf nvml112p (9) -400 5:00l10
  1. Event Trigger 10 bypasses the RFP high level trips trgset 10 "0"l11 irf fwknife (10) openl11
  1. Event Trigger 11 re-installs fuses for 2E ERV trgset 11 "0"l12 Page 20 of 22

trg 10 "dmf adsrfe"l12

  1. Event Trigger 28 sets gain for all 6 APRMs.

trgset 28 "0"l13 trg 28 "irf niagainf true"l13

  1. Event Trigger 29 activates when the B RPS channel pushbutton is depressed and removes malfunction B13 trgset 29 "rpd301b"l14 trg 29 "dmf b13"l14
  1. END Page 21 of 22

Unit 2 Risk: GREEN Unit 3 Risk: GREEN Unit 2 is in Mode 1 at 8% power, Unit 3 is at 100% power.

Leading Thermal Limit: MFLCPR @ 0.881 Leading Thermal Limit: MFLCPR @ 0.883 Action limit: 0.980 Action Limit: 0.980 Equipment Unavailable: None Equipment Unavailable: None Protected Equipment: None Protected Equipment: None Current Action Statements None LCO Started: None LCO Expires: None Cause: N/A Unit 2 Plant Status Today Unit 2 Activities

        • Shift 1 Activities ****
        • Shift 2 Activities ****

Unit Startup

        • Shift 3 Activities ****

TURNOVER:

Per DGP 01-01, Unit Startup, step G.56, stop rejecting to the Condenser with RWCU. Once complete, continue raising power to 10% per DGP 01-01 in preparation to put the Mode Switch in RUN.

Page 22 of 22

Retrieved from "https://kanterella.com/w/index.php?title=ML22216A189&oldid=3645169"