ND-21-0973, Vogtie Electric Generating Plant, Unit 3, ITAAC Closure Notification on Completion of Item 2.3.06.05a.i (Index Number 361)

Vogtie Electric Generating Plant, Unit 3, ITAAC Closure Notification on Completion of Item 2.3.06.05a.i (Index Number 361)

ML21302A143
Person / Time
Site:	Vogtle
Issue date:	10/29/2021
From:	Yox M Southern Nuclear Operating Co
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
ND-21-0973
Download: ML21302A143 (12)

Text

Michael J. Yox 7825 River Road Regulatory Affairs Director Waynesboro, GA 30830 Southern Nuclear Vogtie 3 & 4 706-848-6459 tel Docket Nos.: 52-025 ND-21-0973 OCT 2 9 2021 10 CFR 52.99(c)(1)

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001 Southern Nuclear Operating Company Vogtie Electric Generating Plant Unit 3 ITAAC Closure Notification on Completion of Item 2.3.06.05a.i (Index Number 3611 Ladies and Gentlemen:

In accordance with 10 CFR 52.99(c)(1), the purpose of this letter is to notify the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) of the completion of Vogtie Electric Generating Plant(VEGP) Unit 3 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria (ITAAC) Item 2.3.06.05a.i [Index Number 361] to demonstrate that the Normal Residual Heat Removal System (RNS) equipment identified as seismic Category I or Class 1E in the Combined License (COL) Appendix C, Table 2.3.6-1 is designed and constructed in accordance with applicable requirements.

The closure process for this ITAAC is based on the guidance described in NEI 08-01, "Industry Guideline for the ITAAC Closure Process under 10 CFR Part 52," which was endorsed by the NRC in Regulatory Guide 1.215.

This letter contains no new NRC regulatory commitments. Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) requests NRC staff confirmation of this determination and publication of the required notice in the Federal Register per 10 CFR 52.99.

If there are any questions, please contact Kelli Roberts at 706-848-6991.

Respectfully submitted.

Michael J. Yox Regulatory AffairS'Dire^or Vogtie 3 & 4

Enclosure:

Vogtie Electric Generating Plant(VEGP) Unit 3 Completion of ITAAC 2.3.06.05a.i [Index Number 361]

MJY/JMF/sfr

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-21-0973 Page 2 of 3 To:

Southern Nuclear Operating Company/ Georgia Power Company Mr. Peter P. Sena III Mr. D. L. McKinney Mr. H. Nieh Mr. G. Chick Mr. S. Stimac Mr. P. Martino Mr. M. J. Yox Mr. A. S. Parton Ms. K. A. Roberts Ms. J.M. Coleman Mr. C. T. Defnall Mr. C. E. Morrow Mr. K. J. Drudy Mr. J. M. Fisher Mr. R. L. Beiike Mr. S. Leighty Ms. A. C. Chamberlain Mr. J. C. Haswell Document Services RTYPE: VND.LI.L06 File AR.01.02.06 Nuclear Requlatorv Commission Ms. M. Bailey M M. King M G. Bowman Ms. A. Veil M C. P. Patel M G. J. Khouri M C. J. Even M B. J. Kemker Ms. N. C. Coovert M C. Welch M J. Gaslevic M O. Lopez-Santiago M G. Armstrong M M. Webb M T. Fredette M C. Santos M B. Davis M J. Vasquez M J. Eargle M E. Davidson M T. Fanelli Ms. K. McCurry M J. Parent M B. Griman M V. Hall

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-21-0973 Page 3 of 3 Oqlethorpe Power Corporation Mr. R. B. Brinkman Mr. E. Rasmussen Municipal Electric Authority of Georgia Mr. J. E. Fuller Mr. 8. M. Jackson Dalton Utilities Mr. T. Bundros Westinahouse Electric Company. LLC Dr. L. Oriani Mr. D. 0. Durham Mr. M. M. CorlettI Mr. Z. 8. Harper Mr. J. L. Coward Other Mr. 8. W. Kline, Bechtel Power Corporation Ms. L. Matis, Tetra Tech NUS, Inc.

Dr. W. R. Jacobs, Jr., Ph.D., GDS Associates, inc.

Mr. 8. Roetger, Georgia Pubiic Service Commission Mr. R. L. Trokey, Georgia Pubiic Service Commission Mr. K. C. Greene, Troutman Sanders Mr. 8. Blanton, Baich Bingham

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-21-0973 Enclosure Page 1 of 9 Southern Nuclear Operating Company ND-21-0973 Enclosure Vogtle Electric Generating Plant(VEGP) Unit 3 Completion of ITAAC 2.3.06.05a.i [Index Number 361]

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-21-0973 Enclosure Page 2 of 9 ITAAC Statement Design Commitment 5.a) The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.3.6-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.

7.a) The Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.3.6-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.

Inspections. Tests. Analvses i) Inspection will be performed to verify that the seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.3.6-1 is located on the Nuclear Island.

ii) Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses of seismic Category I equipment will be performed.

iii) Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.

i) Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses will be performed on Class 1E equipment located in a harsh environment.

ii) Inspection will be performed of the as-built Class 1E equipment and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations located in a harsh environment.

Acceptance Criteria i) The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.3.6-1 is located on the Nuclear Island.

ii) A report exists and concludes that the seismic Category I equipment can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.

iii) A report exists and concludes that the as-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.

i) A report exists and concludes that the Class IE equipment identified in Table 2.3.6-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.

ii) A report exists and concludes that the as-built Class 1E equipment and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations identified in Table 2.3.6-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment are bounded by type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-21-0973 Enclosure Page 3 of 9 ITAAC Determination Basis This ITAAC requires that Inspections, tests, and analyses were performed and documented to ensure the Normal Residual Heat Removal System (RNS)equipment Identified as seismic Category I or Class 1E In the Combined License(COL) Appendix C, Table 2.3.6-1 (the Table) is designed and constructed In accordance with applicable requirements.

1) The seismic Category I equipment Identified In Table 2.3.6-1 Is located on the Nuclear Island.

To assure that seismic Category I equipment can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function, all the equipment In the Table Is designed to be located on the seismic Category I Nuclear Island. In accordance with Equipment Qualification (EG) Walkdown ITAAC Guideline and the EG ITAAC As-bullt Installation Documentation Guideline (References 1 and 2), an Inspection was conducted of the RNS to confirm the satisfactory Installation of the selsmlcally qualified equipment. The Inspection Includes verification of equipment make/model/serial number and verification of equipment location (Building, Elevation, Room).

The EG As-Bullt Reconciliation Reports(EQRR)(Reference 3) Identified In Attachment A document the results of the Inspection and conclude that the seismic Category I equipment Is located on the Nuclear Island.

in A report exists and concludes that the seismic Category I eouloment can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.

Seismic Category I equipment In the Table requires type tests and/or analyses to demonstrate structural Integrity and operablllty. Structural Integrity of the seismic Category I valves, as well as other passive seismic Category I mechanical equipment. Is demonstrated by analysis In accordance with American Society of Mechanical Engineers(ASME)Code Section III (Reference 4). Functionality of the subset of active safety-related valves under seismic loads Is determined using the guidance of ASME QME-1-2007(Reference 5).

Safety-related (Class IE) electrical equipment In the Table Is selsmlcally qualified by type testing combined with analysis In accordance with Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) Standard 344-1987(Reference 6). This equipment Includes safety-related active valve accessories such as electric actuators, position switches, pilot solenoid valves and electrical connector assemblies. The specific qualification method (I.e., type testing, analysis, or combination) used for each piece of equipment In the Table Is Identified In Attachment A.

Additional Information about the methods used to qualify API000 safety-related equipment Is provided In the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report(UFSAR)Appendix 3D (Reference 7).

The EG Reports (Reference 8) Identified In Attachment A contain applicable test reports and associated documentation and conclude that the Seismic Category I equipment can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.

Ill) A report exists and concludes that the as-bullt eauloment Including anchorage Is selsmlcallv bounded bv the tested or analvzed conditions.

An Inspection (Reference 1 and 2) Is conducted to confirm the satisfactory Installation of the selsmlcally qualified equipment In the Table. The Inspection verified the equipment make/model/serial number, as-designed equipment mounting orientation, anchorage and clearances, and electrical and other Interfaces. The documentation of Installed configuration of

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-21-0973 Enclosure Page 4 of 9 seismically qualified equipment Includes photographs and/or sketches/drawings of equipment/mounting/interfaces.

As part of the seismic qualification program, consideration was given to the definition of the clearances needed around the equipment mounted In the plant to permit the equipment to move during a postulated seismic event without causing Impact between adjacent pieces of safety-related equipment. When required, seismic testing measuring the maximum dynamic relative displacement of the top and bottom of the equipment was performed. EQ Reports (Reference

8) Identify the equipment mounting employed for qualification and establish Interface requirements for assuring that subsequent In-plant Installation does not degrade the established qualification. Interface requirements are defined based on the test configuration and other design requirements.

Attachment A Identifies the EQRR (Reference 3)completed to verify that the as-bullt seismic Category I equipment listed In the Table, Including anchorage. Is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions, IEEE Standard 344-1987(Reference 6) and NRC Regulatory Guide(RG) 1.100 (Reference 9).

I) A report exists and concludes that the Class 1E equipment Identified In Table 2.3.6-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, durlna. and followlno a deslan basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.

The harsh environment Class 1E equipment In the Table was qualified by type testing and/or analyses. Class 1E equipment type testing was performed In accordance with IEEE Standard 323-1974(Reference 10) and RG 1.89 (Reference 11) to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.49. Type testing of safety-related equipment meets the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, General Design Criterion 4. Attachment A Identifies the EQ program and specific qualification method for each piece of safety-related mechanical equipment located In a harsh environment. Additional Information about the methods used to qualify API000 safety-related equipment Is provided In the UFSAR Appendix 3D (Reference 7). EQ Reports (Reference 8)

Identified In Attachment A contain applicable test reports and associated documentation and conclude that the equipment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.

in A report exists and concludes that the as-bullt Class 1E equipment and the associated wirlnq. cables, and terminations Identified In Table 2.3.6-1 as beinq qualified for a harsh environment are bounded bv type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses.

An Inspection (Reference 1 and 2) was conducted of the RNS to confirm the satisfactory Installation of the Class IE equipment In the Table. The Inspection verified the equipment location, make/model/serlal number, as-designed equipment mounting, wiring, cables, and terminations, and confirms that the environmental conditions for the zone (Attachment A) In which the equipment Is mounted are bounded by the tested and/or analyzed conditions. It also documents the Installed configuration with photographs or sketches/drawings of equipment mounting and connections. The EQRR (Reference 3) Identified In Attachment A document this Inspection and conclude that the as-bullt harsh environment Class IE equipment and the

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-21-0973 Enclosure Page 5 of 9 associated wiring, cables, and terminations are bounded by the qualified configuration and IEEE Standard 323-1974(Reference 10).

Together, these reports (References 3 and 8) provide evidence that the ITAAC Acceptance Criteria requirements are met:

• The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.3.6-1 is located on the Nuclear Island;

• A report exists and concludes that the seismic Category I equipment can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function;

• A report exists and concludes that the as-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions;

• A report exists and concludes that the Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.3.6-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function; and

• A report exists and concludes that the as-built Class 1E equipment and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations identified in Table 2.3.6-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment are bounded by type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses.

References 3 and 8 are available for NRC inspection, as part of the Unit 3 ITAAC 2.3.06.05a.i Completion Package (References 12).

ITAAC Finding Review In accordance with plant procedures for ITAAC completion. Southern Nuclear Operating Company(SNC) performed a review of all ITAAC findings pertaining to the subject ITAAC and associated corrective actions. This finding review, which included now-consolidated ITAAC Indexes 362, 363, 366, and 367,found no relevant ITAAC findings associated with this ITAAC.

The ITAAC completion review is documented in the ITAAC Completion Package for ITAAC 2.3.06.05a.i (Reference 12) and is available for NRC review.

ITAAC Completion Statement Based on the above information, SNC hereby notifies the NRC that ITAAC 2.3.06.05a.i was performed for VEGP Unit 3 and that the prescribed acceptance criteria were met.

Systems, structures, and components verified as part of this ITAAC are being maintained in their as-designed, ITAAC compliant condition in accordance with approved plant programs and procedures.

References(available for NRC Inspection)

1. ND-RA-001-014, EQ ITAAC As-built Walkdown Guideline, Version 3.1

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-21-0973 Enclosure Page 6 of 9

2. ND-RA-001-016, EQ ITAAC As-built Installation Documentation Guideline, Version 1.0

3. EQ As-Built Reconciliation Reports(EQRR)as identified in Attachment A for Unit 3

4. American Society of Mechanical Engineers(ASME) Boiler and Pressure Vessel(B&PV)

Code,Section III, "Rules for Construction of Nuclear Power Plant Components," 1998 Edition with 2000 Addenda

5. ASME QME-1-2007,"Qualification of Active Mechanical Equipment Used in Nuclear Power Plants," The American Society of Mechanical Engineers, June 2007

6. IEEE Standard 344-1987,"IEEE Recommended Practices for Seismic Qualification of Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations"

7. Vogtle 3&4 Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Appendix 3D,"Methodology for Qualifying API000 Safety-Related Electrical and Mechanical Equipment"

8. Equipment Qualification (EQ) Reports as identified in Attachment A

9. Regulatory Guide 1.100, Rev. 2,"Seismic Qualification of Electric and Mechanical Equipment for Nuclear Power Plants"

10. IEEE Standard 323-1974,"IEEE Standard for Qualifying Class IE Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations"

11. Regulatory Guide 1.89, Rev 1,"Environmental Qualification of Certain Electric Equipment Important to Safety for Nuclear Power Plants" 12.2.3.06.05a.i-U3-CP-Rev0,"Completion Package for Unit 3 ITAAC 2.3.06.05a.i [Index Number 361]"

13. NEI 08-01,"Industry Guideline for the ITAAC Closure Process Under 10 CFR Part 52"

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-21-0973 Enclosure Page 7 of 9 Attachment A System: Normal Residual Heat Removal System (RNS)

Class 1E/

Seismic Qual. For Envir. Envir Quai Type of EG Reports As-Built EQRR Equipment Name ^ Tag No.

Cat. i + Harsh Zone ^ Program ^ Qual. (Reference 8) (Reference 3)

Envir.+ 3 RNS Pump A (Pressure SV3-MP08-VBR-001 / 2.3.06.05a.i-U3-EORR-RNS-MP-01A Yes -/- NA NA Analysis Boundary) SV3-MP08-VBR-002 PCD002 RNS Pump B (Pressure SV3-MP08-VBR-001 / 2.3.06.05a.i-U3-EQRR-RNS-MP-01B Yes -/- NA NA Analysis Boundary) SV3-MP08-VBR-002 PCD002 RNS Heat Exchanger A 2.3.06.05a.i-U3-EQRR-RNS-ME-01A Yes -/- NA NA Analysis SV3-ME1C-VDR-001 (Tube Side) PCD008 RNS Heat Exchanger B 2.3.06.05a.i-U3-EQRR-RNS-ME-01B Yes -/- NA NA Analysis SV3-ME1C-VDR-001 (Tube Side) PCD008 RCS Inner Hot Leg 2.3.06.05a.i-U3-EQRR-Type Test & SV3-PV01-VBR-012/

Suction Motor-operated RNS-PL-V001A Yes Yes/Yes 1 M E*S PCD006 Analysis SV3-PV01-VBR-011 Isolation Valve RCS Inner Hot Leg Type Test & SV3-PV01-VBR-012/ 2.3.06.05a.i-U3-EQRR-Suction Motor-operated RNS-PL-V001B Yes YesA'es 1 M E*S PCD006 Analysis SV3-PV01-VBR-011 Isolation Valve RCS Outer Hot Leg 2.3.06.05a.i-U3-EQRR-Type Test & SV3-PV01-VBR-012/

Suction Motor-operated RNS-PL-V002A Yes YesA'es 1 M E*S PCD006 Analysis SV3-PV01-VBR-011 Isolation Valve RCS Outer Hot Leg Type Test & SV3-PV01-VBR-012/ 2.3.06.05a.i-U3-EQRR-Suction Motor-operated RNS-PL-V002B Yes YesA'es 1 M E*S PCD006 Analysis SV3-PV01-VBR-011 Isolation Valve RCS Pressure Boundary 2.3.06.05a.i-U3-EQRR-SV3-PV02-VBR-012 /

Thermal Relief Check RNS-PL-V003A Yes -/- NA NA Analysis PCD003a SV3-PV02-VBR-011 Valve RCS Pressure Boundary 2.3.06.05a.i-U3-EQRR-SV3-PV02-VBR-012 /

Thermal Relief Check RNS-PL-V003B Yes -/- NA NA Analysis PCD003a SV3-PV02-VBR-011 Valve RNS Discharge Motor-Type Test & SV3-PV01-VBR-012/ 2.3.06.05a.i-U3-EQRR-operated Containment RNS-PL-V011 Yes Yes/No NA NA PCD006 Isolation Valve Analysis SV3-PV01-VBR-011

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-21-0973 Enclosure Page 8 of 9 Class 1E/

Seismic Qual. For Envir. Envir Qual Type of EG Reports As-Built EQRR Equipment Name ^ Tag No. ^

Cat. 1 + Harsh Zone ^ Program ^ Qual. (Reference 8) (Reference 3)

Envir.+ 3 RNS Discharge Type Test & SV3-PV02-VBR-010/ 2.3.06.05a.i-U3-EQRR-Containment Isolation RNS-PL-V012 Yes -/- NA NA Test Connection Analysis SV3-PV02-VBR-009 PCD007 RNS Discharge Header SV3-PV03-VBR-014/ 2.3.06.05a.i-U3-EQRR-Containment Isolation RNS-PL-V013 Yes -/- NA NA Analysis SV3-PV03-VBR-013 PCD003b Check Valve RNS Discharge RCS Type Test & SV3-PV03-VBR-012 / 2.3.06.05a.i-U3-EQRR-Pressure Boundary RNS-PL-V015A Yes -/- NA NA Analysis SV3-PV03-VBR-011 PCD005 Check Valve RNS Discharge RCS Type Test & SV3-PV03-VBR-012/ 2.3.06.05a.i-U3-EQRR-Pressure Boundary RNS-PL-V015B Yes -/- NA NA Analysis SV3-PV03-VBR-011 PCD005 Check Valve RNS Discharge RCS SV3-PV03-VBR-014/ 2.3.06.05a.i-U3-EQRR-Pressure Boundary RNS-PL-V017A Yes -/- NA NA Analysis SV3-PV03-VBR-013 PCD003b Check Valve RNS Discharge RCS SV3-PV03-VBR-014/ 2.3.06.05a.i-U3-EQRR-Pressure Boundary RNS-PL-V017B Yes -/- NA NA Analysis SV3-PV03-VBR-013 PCD003b Check Valve RNS Hot Leg Suction Type Test & SV3-PV16-VBR-001 / 2.3.06.05a.i-U3-EQRR-RNS-PL-V020 Yes -/- NA NA Pressure Relief Valve Analysis SV3-PV16-VBR-002 PCD004 RNS Hot Leg Suction Type Test & SV3-PV16-VBR-001 / 2.3.06.05a.i-U3-EQRR-RNS-PL-V021 Yes -/- NA NA Pressure Relief Valve Analysis SV3-PV16-VBR-002 PCD004 RNS Suction Header Motor-operated Type Test & SV3-PV01-VBR-012/ 2.3.06.05a.i-U3-EQRR-RNS-PL-V022 Yes Yes/No NA NA Containment Isolation Analysis SV3-PV01-VBR-011 PCD006 Valve RNS Suction from Type Test & SV3-PV01-VBR-012/ 2.3.06.05a.i-U3-EQRR-IRWST Motor-operated RNS-PL-V023 Yes Yes/Yes 1 M E*S Analysis SV3-PV01-VBR-011 PCD006 Isolation Valve RNS Discharge to Type Test & SV3-PV01-VBR-012/ 2.3.06.05a.i-U3-EQRR-IRWST Motor-operated RNS-PL-V024 Yes -/- NA NA Analysis SV3-PV01-VBR-011 PCD006 Isolation Valve

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-21-0973 Enclosure Page 9 of 9 Class 1E/

Seismic Quai. For Envir. Envir Qual Type of EG Reports As-Built EORR Equipment Name ^ Tag No. +

Cat. 1 Harsh Zone ^ Program ^ Quai. (Reference 8) (Reference 3)

Envir.*

RNS Pump Discharge Type Test & SV3-PV16-VBR-001 / 2.3.06.05a.i-U3-EQRR-RNS-PL-V045 Yes -/- NA NA Reiief Analysis SV3-PV16-VBR-002 PCD004 RNS Suction from Cask Type Test & SV3-PV01-VBR-012/ 2.3.06.05a.i-U3-EQRR-Loading Pit Motor- RNS-PL-V055 Yes No/No NA NA Analysis SV3-PV01-VBR-011 PCD006 operated Isolation Valve RNS Suction from Cask SV3-PV03-VBR-014/ 2.3.06.05a.i-U3-EQRR-RNS-PL-V056 Yes -/- NA NA Anaiysis Loading Pit Check Valve SV3-PV03-VBR-013 PCD001 RNS Pump Miniflow Air- Type Test & SV3-PV14-VBR-002/ 2.3.06.05a.i-U3-EQRR-RNS-PL-V057A Yes No/No NA NA Operated Isolation Valve Anaiysis SV3-PV14-VBR-001 PCD009 RNS Pump Miniflow Air- Type Test & SV3-PV14-VBR-002 / 2.3.06.05a.i-U3-EQRR-RNS-PL-V057B Yes No/No NA NA Operated Isolation Valve Anaiysis SV3-PV14-VBR-001 PCD009 RNS Return from Chemical and Volume Type Test & SV3-PV14-VBR-002/ 2.3.06.05a.i-U3-EQRR-Control System (CVS) RNS-PL-V061 Yes YesA'es 1 M E*S Analysis SV3-PV14-VBR-001 PCD009 Containment Isoiation Vaive Notes:

+ Excerpt from COL Appendix C Tabie 2.3.6-1

1. See Tabie 3D.5-1 of UFSAR

2. E - Eiectrical Equipment Program (limit switch and the motor operator, squib operator, soienoid operator)

M - Mechanical Equipment Program (vaive)

S = Quaiified for submergence or operation with spray

• - Harsh Environment

3. Dash (-) indicates not appiicable