ML21168A165

Fire Hazards Analysis, E-1F9915, Rev 14, Design Basis Document for Procedure Ofn RP-017

ML21168A165
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Issue date:	06/07/2021
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APF 05-013-01, REV. 04 E-1F9915 DESIGN BASIS DOCUMENT FOR OFN RP-017, CONTROL ROOM EVACUATION ENGINEERING REVIEW:

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Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Page 2 of 106 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page 1.0 Purpose .............................................................................................................................................. 3 2.0 Scope and Assumptions .................................................................................................................... 3 2.1 Scope .............................................................................................................................................. 3 2.2 Assumptions ................................................................................................................................... 3 3.0 Methodology ....................................................................................................................................... 4 4.0 References ......................................................................................................................................... 5 4.1 Wolf Creek Documents ................................................................................................................... 5 4.2 Nuclear Regulatory Commission Documents ................................................................................. 6 4.3 Other Documents............................................................................................................................ 6 5.0 Background ........................................................................................................................................ 7 6.0 Summary of Timing Basis .................................................................................................................. 7 6.1 Reactivity Control............................................................................................................................ 7 6.2 Reactor Coolant Makeup/Inventory Control ................................................................................... 8 6.3 Decay Heat Removal ...................................................................................................................... 9 6.4 Process Monitoring ....................................................................................................................... 10 6.5 Support ......................................................................................................................................... 10 7.0 Section-by-Section Review .............................................................................................................. 13 7.1 OFN RP-017, Section 1.0 - Purpose ............................................................................................ 13 7.2 OFN RP-017, Section 2.0 - Symptoms or Entry Conditions ......................................................... 14 7.3 OFN RP-017, Section 3.0 - References and Commitments ........................................................ 14 7.4 Step-by-Step Review .................................................................................................................... 20

1. of Pages Appendix 1 - OFN RP-017 Credited Component Evaluation ..................................................................... 31 Appendix 2 - Control Room Fire Consequence Evaluation for Motor Operated Valves ............................ 51 Appendix 3 - Control Room Multiple Spurious Operation (MSO) Review .................................................. 58

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Page 3 of 106 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 1.0 Purpose The purpose of this document is to provide a technical basis for procedure OFN RP-017, Control Room Evacuation (due to fire) and define the timing basis for each action step within OFN RP-017.

2.0 Scope and Assumptions 2.1 Scope This document applies to procedure OFN RP-017.

2.2 Assumptions The following assumptions are applied when developing the Wolf Creek strategy for shutting down and maintaining hot standby using procedure OFN RP-017.

2.2.1 Only fire-induced failures are postulated to occur and all equipment is in normal operating state at the time of the fire.

2.2.2 Response Not Obtained (RNO) actions are included as operator aids and exceeds the procedural guidance required by regulation. It is not expected that the RNO actions will be necessary unless the primary action is affected by the fire.

2.2.3 Before transfer of control is achieved by the alternative and dedicated shutdown system only a single spurious actuation is assumed to occur, except in the case of two redundant valves in a high/low pressure interface line. All potential spurious actuations are mitigated or prevented using procedure OFN RP-017 but timing is based on one spurious actuation occurring prior to transfer of control to the alternative and dedicated shutdown system, or two spurious actuations in the case of high/low pressure interface lines.

2.2.4 The Wolf Creek Fire Protection licensing basis, as described in USAR, Section 9.5.1, requires that a loss of off-site power be assumed in conjunction with a control room fire. However, a loss of offsite power may not be the most conservative assumption for every fire scenario. Therefore, the thermal hydraulic calculations were performed assuming off-site power is available and off-site power is not available to determine the most conservative outcome. The results of the thermal hydraulic calculation are presented in evaluation SA-08-006.

2.2.5 Automatic functions capable of mitigating spurious actuations are assumed to be defeated by damage to cables located in the area associated with the automatic function.

2.2.6 The reactor is tripped prior to evacuation of the control room. This is the only action assumed to work prior to evacuation. Tripping the reactor is considered to be t = 0 seconds for the purpose of timing subsequent steps.

2.2.7 Transfer of control to the alternative or dedicated shutdown system is assumed to occur when all isolation and transfer switches have been manipulated per procedure OFN RP-017. These switches are either located at the Auxiliary Shutdown Panel or at the local equipment.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Page 4 of 106 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 3.0 Methodology The methodology for completing this document is described in this section.

Each section and step within OFN RP-017 was reviewed and a technical basis for the section or step was documented.

Section 1.0 describes the purpose of E-1F9915. Section 2.0 identifies the scope. Section 4.0 lists the references used to compile E-1F9915.

Section 5.0 provides background information on OFN RP-017.

Section 6.0 is a summary of each PFSSD function and the major equipment associated with the function.

In addition, Section 6.0 summarizes the timing requirement to ensure the function is satisfied per the times justified in Section 7.0.

Section 7.0 provides a technical review of each section in OFN RP-017. First, the front-end sections are discussed and a technical basis provided. These front-end sections include the Purpose, Symptoms or Entry Conditions, and References and Commitments.

Next, each Action/Expected Response and Response Not Obtained step within OFN RP-017 is tabulated in Table 7.1. The columns and the information provided in each column are described below.

Step Number - The step number identified in OFN RP-017.

Step Description - The Step wording taken verbatim from the procedure.

PFSSD Function - This column describes the PFSSD function that is satisfied by performing the Step. Functions are as follows: R - Reactivity Control; M - Reactor Coolant Makeup and Inventory Control; D - Decay Heat Removal; P - Process Monitoring; S - Support. If the step does not satisfy a specific function, then N/A is placed in the column.

Basis - This column provides useful information about the step and why it is included in the procedure.

Required Time to Complete - This column describes the maximum time that the operator has to complete the step to ensure the function supported by the step is satisfied. Completion of a step after the time indicated does not necessarily mean unrecoverable conditions would be reached but it would be beyond that which has been analyzed. Further analysis would be needed to determine the impact of not meeting a time limit identified in this document.

Timing Basis - This column describes the basis for the maximum allowed operator response time given in the previous column. The basis is derived from a number of calculations and evaluations as described in the column.

Control Room Fire Impact - This column describes whether a fire in the control room could cause the component to spuriously operate after the Step and any identified pre-requisite Steps are complete. If yes, then further discussion is provided for why it is acceptable.

Prerequisite Steps - This column identifies the Step(s) that are required to be completed prior to completing the Step. Prerequisites are steps that must be completed before the current step to prevent potential damage to equipment or prevent spurious operation of the equipment after the step is completed and the Operator moves on. A step that restores power to a component is not considered a prerequisite. These pre-requisites are listed to provide reasonable assurance that future procedure changes will not improperly re-order the steps.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Page 5 of 106 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 4.0 References 4.1 Wolf Creek Documents 4.1.1 Procedure OFN RP-017, Control Room Evacuation, Rev. 54 4.1.2 Wolf Creek Operating License NPF-42 4.1.3 Wolf Creek Safety Evaluation Report including Supplements 1 through 5 4.1.4 Wolf Creek Technical Requirements Manual (TRM), Revision 55 4.1.5 SNUPPS Letter SLNRC 84-0109 - Fire Protection Review 4.1.6 Memo from NRC to KG&E dated August 31, 1984 - Minutes of August 22, 1984 Meeting with Kansas Gas and Electric and Union Electric Company 4.1.7 Calculation XX-E-013, Rev. 4 - Post-Fire Safe Shutdown Analysis 4.1.8 Safety Analysis Evaluation SA-08-006, Rev. 3 - Retran-3D Post-Fire Safe Shutdown (PFSSD)

Consequence Evaluation for a Postulated Control Room Fire 4.1.9 Calculation Change Notice AN-02-10-000 EDG Room Temperature at Various Outside Air Temperatures for the NRC Triennial Fire Protection Inspection 4.1.10 M-11EF01, Rev 12 - System Flow Diagram ESW 4.1.11 Drawing M-018-00155, Rev. 2 - Operation of Diesel Engine without Cooling Water 4.1.12 Drawing J-14001, Rev. 10 - Control Room Equipment Arrangement 4.1.13 Drawing E-13EF06A, Rev. 5 - Schematic Diagram ESW to Ultimate Heat Sink Isolation Valves 4.1.14 Drawing E-025-00007, Sheet 185, Rev. W15 - EFHV0038 Design Configuration Document 4.1.15 Document E-10NK, Rev. 6 - Class 1E 125 VDC System Description 4.1.16 Specification M-018, Rev. 14 - Standby Diesel Generator 4.1.17 PIR 2005-3314/CR2007-003037 - Issues involving NRC Information Notice 92-18 4.1.18 CR 00012368 - Timing Basis for Re-Establishing Room Cooling 4.1.19 CR 00016481 - Guidance for Control Room Re-Entry After Fire 4.1.20 CR 00019239 - Time to Close Valve BNHV8812A 4.1.21 CR 00019242 - Train B Emergency Diesel Generator Potential Failure to Start 4.1.22 CR 00020612 - Amphenol Connectors for MSIVs cannot be Removed by Hand 4.1.23 CR 00023410 - Issues with the Train B Emergency Diesel Generator Voltage Regulator 4.1.24 CR 00030350 - Post-Fire Safe Shutdown Concern with Train B Diesel Generator Field Flashing 4.1.25 CR 00030376 - Revise E-1F9915 to Document Time to Establish Diesel Engine Cooling 4.1.26 CR 2008-004708 - Determine Time to Establish Diesel Engine Cooling 4.1.27 CR 00041746 - Spurious Operation of Valve EFHV0060 4.1.28 Calculation KJ-M-017, Rev. 1 - Emergency Diesel Standby Generator (KKJ01B) Runtime Without

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Page 6 of 106 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 ESW Flow 4.1.29 CR 00041746 - Potential for EFHV0060 to Open Due to Control Room Fire 4.1.30 CR 00044460 - Add OFN RP-017 Component Evaluation to E-1F9915 4.1.31 CR 00046634-02 Add MSO Evaluation to E-1F9915 4.1.32 CR 00046642 - RCP Seal Return Valves 4.1.33 CR 00046702 - Auxiliary Shutdown Panel Controls for B Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 4.1.34 CR 00046707 - Review Reactor Trip Switch Circuits for Alternative Shutdown 4.1.35 CR 00072102 - Operator Time Sensitive Action in OFN RP-017 Not Met 4.1.36 CR 00116831 - 2017 NRC Triennial Fire Protection Green NCV 4.2 Nuclear Regulatory Commission Documents 4.2.1 10 CFR 50.48 - Fire Protection 4.2.2 10 CFR 50, Appendix R - Fire Protection Program for Nuclear Power Facilities Operating Prior to January 1, 1979 4.2.3 NRC Generic Letter 86 Implementation of Fire Protection Requirements 4.2.4 NRC Information Notice 2005 Fire Protection Findings on Loss of Seal Cooling to Westinghouse Reactor Coolant Pumps 4.2.5 Regulatory Guide 1.189, Rev. 2 - Fire Protection for Nuclear Power Plants 4.3 Other Documents 4.3.1 Westinghouse WCAP-16396-NP, Westinghouse Owners Group Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Performance for Appendix R Assessments.

4.3.2 Westinghouse Technical Bulletin TB-04-22, Rev. 1, Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Performance -

Appendix R Compliance and Loss of All Seal Cooling.

4.3.3 NEI 00-01, Rev. 2 - Guidance for Post-Fire Safe Shutdown Circuit Analysis 4.3.4 Westinghouse Letter LTR-RAM-I-10-053 dated October 15, 2010.

Subject:

White Paper Westinghouse Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Behavior For Fire Scenarios, Revision 2.

4.3.5 Westinghouse WCAP-17541-P, Revision 0 - Implementation Guide for the Westinghouse Reactor Coolant Pump SHIELD Passive Thermal Shutdown Seal, dated March 2012.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Page 7 of 106 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 5.0 Background The Control Room evacuation and plant shutdown procedure is documented in OFN RP-017 (power operation to hot standby) and OFN RP-017A (hot standby to cold shutdown). The original basis for procedure OFN RP-017 is SLNRC 84-0109, which documents a phased approach to shutting down the plant and maintaining it in a safe hot standby condition if control room evacuation is required following a fire. This phased approach was approved by the NRC in Supplement 5 of the Wolf Creek Safety Evaluation Report.

Although SLNRC 84-0109 formed the original licensing basis for hot shutdown from outside the control room at SNUPPS facilities, its basis is not clearly defined nor understood. Some of the step sequences and actions are questionable by todays operational and regulatory standards. Over the years, changes have been made to OFN RP-017, which were not in literal compliance with the letter. The changes were subsequently determined to not have an adverse impact on the health and safety of the public. However, because of the confusing nature of the letter, it was decided that a design basis document that clearly describes the basis for OFN RP-017 is needed.

License Amendment 214 approved superseding letter SLNRC 84-0109 with document E-1F9915 as the basis for alternative shutdown in the event of a fire in the control room. Therefore, letter SLNRC 84-0109 is considered historical and is no longer part of the approved fire protection program.

6.0 Summary of Timing Basis This Section includes a summary of the major equipment credited in OFN RP-017 for satisfying each PFSSD function (Reactivity Control, Reactor Coolant Makeup and Inventory Control, Decay Heat Removal, Process Monitoring and Support). In addition, operator response timing, to ensure the function is satisfied prior to reaching unrecoverable conditions, is discussed.

6.1 Reactivity Control Reactivity control is achieved by tripping the reactor prior to leaving the control room. Tripping the reactor is considered to be t = 0 seconds for the OFN RP-017 timeline. (Assumption 2.2.6)

The main steam isolation valves (MSIVs) and steam generator (SG) blowdown valves are isolated to prevent return to criticality due to uncontrolled cooldown. The MSIVs are assumed to remain open until action is taken outside the control room within 3 minutes to close them. Prior to evacuating the control room, operators attempt to close the MSIVs using the all-close hand switches, but this action is assumed to fail. In these cases, the steam dumps are assumed to operate properly to control temperature to 557°F, then the steam dumps are isolated within 7 minutes by de-energizing power to the valves, at which time the ARVs are used for temperature control. All components located downstream of the MSIVs are assumed to be unaffected by the fire.

Plant cooldown is controlled using SGs B and D atmospheric relief valves (ARVs) while SGs A and C ARVs are closed. Based on Calculation SA-08-006, a single SG ARV can remain open for 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> with no adverse impact on safe shutdown. Otherwise, all SG ARVs are assumed to function normally at time 0, controlling pressure less than 1184.7 psia. Steam generators B & D ARVs are assumed to close at 7 minutes then control as necessary at 561 degrees F after the operator takes manual control of the B & D ARVs from the auxiliary shutdown panel (ASP). Steam generators A & C ARVs are assumed to close at 7 minutes, then stay closed after the operator at the ASP closes them per procedure.

The MSIVs are assumed to remain open until operator action outside the control room closes them, despite operation of the control room all-close hand switches prior to evacuation. In all scenarios the MSIVs are assumed closed in 3 minutes when power is removed from MSFIS cabinet SA075A in Step C2.

The MSIV bypass valves are failed closed by pulling the control power fuse block in Step B12. This will fail power to the Train A solenoid valve and fail the bypass valves closed. The bypass lines are 2 inches in diameter. A failed open bypass line is bounded by a single failed open steam generator ARV, which has an 8-inch line on the discharge side of the ARV. Calculation SA-08-006 shows that a single ARV can

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Page 8 of 106 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 remain open for at least 60 minutes with no adverse consequence. Therefore, the time allowed to isolate a failed open MSIV bypass line is 60 minutes.

The main turbine trips in response to a reactor trip through an interlock from the reactor trip breakers that is unaffected by a fire in the control room. Therefore, steam loss through the turbine is prevented.

The Train B Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS) is used to provide borated water to the RCS to maintain negative reactivity conditions. This is accomplished using the Train B centrifugal charging pump (CCP) taking suction from the borated refueling water storage tank (RWST) and injecting to the RCS through the boron injection tank (BIT). Calculation SA-08-006 assumes the Train B CVCS is lined up and injecting through the BIT within 28 minutes.

6.2 Reactor Coolant Makeup/Inventory Control Reactor coolant makeup and inventory control is achieved by first isolating all potential RCS leakage and inventory reduction paths including pressurizer power operated relief valves (PORVs), normal letdown, excess letdown, reactor vessel head vents, reactor coolant pump seals, MSIVs, steam generator blowdown, steam generator ARVs, and residual heat removal (RHR) suction from the RCS. Leakage through the RHR system is not credible since the RHR pump suction valves are normally closed and de-energized. The reactor coolant pumps (RCPs) are stopped to prevent loss of inventory through the RCP seals.

Based on Calculation SA-08-006, pressurizer PORVs are assumed isolated within 3 minutes and normal letdown is assumed isolated within 7 minutes. Charging flow to the reactor coolant pump seals is assumed to be isolated within 10 minutes. The reactor coolant pumps are assumed to be stopped within 7 minutes. Steam generator ARVs and MSIVs are isolated as discussed in Section 6.1.

Letdown flow is assumed to be isolated within 7 minutes. In all scenarios where letdown is unaffected, initial flow is 120 gpm until isolated. The 120 gpm flow rate is based on normal letdown of 75 gpm plus an additional 45 gpm that could be flowing for Chemistry concerns (this rarely occurs). In the scenarios where letdown valves fail open, letdown flow goes to 195 gpm for 7 minutes, which is the maximum letdown flow. The automatic letdown isolation signal on low pressurizer water level (17%) is assumed to fail.

Pressurizer heater backup group B is cycled to maintain pressurizer pressure within 2000 to 2300 psig.

In the loss of off-site power scenarios, Calculation SA-08-006 assumes pressurizer heaters fail to operate at time zero. At 11.5 minutes, backup group B is controlled at the ASP. In the non loss of off-site power scenarios, all three heater groups operate normally but power to backup group B is lost by procedure within 7 minutes. Power is restored within 11.5 minutes and control on backup group B is available from the ASP.

Calculation SA-08-006 assumes the pressurizer and auxiliary pressurizer spray valves operate normally except in those scenarios where the pressurizer spray is assumed to fail. In those scenarios, the pressurizer spray valves are assumed to open at time zero and pressurizer spray stops at 7 minutes when the RCPs are stopped. Auxiliary spray is assumed to operate at time zero and stops in 7 minutes when PK5117 is opened in Step D1.

The Train B CVCS is used for makeup and inventory control by taking suction from the RWST and injecting through the BIT. Calculation SA-08-006 assumes the Train B CVCS is lined up and injecting through the boron injection tank (BIT) within 28 minutes. Pressurizer overfill can occur if a spurious Safety Injection Signal (SIS) causes both CCPs to start and inject into the RCS through the BIT flowpath prior to establishing control of the BIT injection valves and normal charging flowpath. Calculation SA 006 shows that if one CCP is stopped within 10 minutes following a spurious SIS, pressurizer overfill will not occur. OFN RP-017 stops the Train B CCP within 10 minutes by opening breaker NB00201. The Train A CCP could continue to operate past the 10-minute time, but based on SA-08-006 this will not cause the pressurizer to overfill. At 28 minutes charging flow is controlled by isolating all injection paths and throttling the BIT outlet valve. Therefore, there is reasonable assurance that pressurizer overfill will not occur.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Page 9 of 106 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 Valve EGHV0102 is normally closed and controls CCW flow to the RHR heat exchanger. If valve EGHV0102 spuriously opens sufficient flow may not be available to the PFSSD loads (CCP oil cooler and seal water heat exchanger). Per drawings M-11EG01 and M-11EG02 the total CCW flow with valve EGHV0102 open is approximately 14,000 gpm. Each CCW pump is rated at 11,025 gpm at 195 feet of head. Per drawing M-082-029, the discharge head at 14,000 gpm is 155 feet and the required net positive suction head (NPSH) is 31 feet. Minimum available NPSH for normal shutdown occurs at 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> per Calculation M-EG-05 and is equal to 37.5 feet. Therefore, with 14,000 gpm flowing, sufficient NPSH is available and there is reasonable assurance that the Train B CCP oil cooler and seal water heat exchanger will receive sufficient flow. However, as a precaution, EGHV0102 is closed in OFN RP-017 to prevent flow diversion during long term hot standby. This action should be completed within 28 minutes and prior to starting the B Train CCP to support CCP functionality.

A potential concern with inventory control is that a control room fire could cause the number 1 seal return valves (BBHV8141A, B, C and D) to close, which could cause excessive RCS leakage. OFN RP-017 isolates RCP seal cooling, contributing to this event. OFN RP-017 also trips the RCPs, which minimizes the impact of this event.

A white paper prepared by Westinghouse and distributed as letter number LTR-RAM-I-10-053 (Reference 4.3.4) summarizes RCP seal behavior for fire scenarios. This white paper is a compilation of several WCAPs and Technical Bulletins on the subject.

Table 1 in the letter is a scenario matrix that identifies the number 1 and number 2 RCP seal behavior and resultant leakage given RCPs running or not running and seal cooling available or not available. For the scenario postulated here (Number 1 seal return line isolated, RCPs not running and no seal cooling),

the resultant leakage is 21 gpm per seal or 84 gpm total. This leakage is well within the makeup capability of the charging pump, which has a design flow rate of 150 gpm at 2800 psi and a runout flow of 550 gpm at 606 psi. Therefore, this condition does not pose a concern for PFSSD at Wolf Creek.

Wolf Creek has replaced the number one seal insert with the Westinghouse SHIELD Passive Thermal Shutdown Seal (SDS) on all four reactor coolant pumps (RCPs). The SDS is designed to restrict reactor coolant system (RCS) leakage for plant events that result in a loss of all seal cooling (Reference 4.3.5).

No credit is taken in the Wolf Creek post-fire safe shutdown analyses for the reduced leakage rates from the new seal following a loss of all seal cooling. The Wolf Creek analyses use the leakage rates from the previous seal design, which are conservative compared to the new seal design.

6.3 Decay Heat Removal Hot standby decay heat removal is achieved using Train B motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump (MDAFP), taking suction from the condensate storage tank (CST), to supply feedwater to steam generator D and the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump (TDAFP), taking suction from the condensate storage tank (CST), to supply feedwater to steam generator B.

Calculation SA-08-006 assumes the Train B MDAFP is lined up and supplying steam generator D within 15 minutes and the TDAFP is lined up and supplying steam generator B within 35 minutes. Steam generators B and D atmospheric relief valves are used to control reactor coolant system (RCS) temperature. When the Train B MDAFP is started in 15 minutes, valve ALV0032 may still be open.

Therefore, approximately 250 gpm will flow from the B MDAFP to the A SG due to failed open valve ALHV0007 until valve ALV0032 is manually closed in Step E6 in 35 minutes. Therefore, the B MDAFP could be injecting into the A SG for 20 minutes. SA-08-006, Rev. 3 (Scenario 1A) shows that the A SG reaches 100% WR indication in about 1800 seconds (30 minutes), which occurs prior to closing valve ALV0032. This has no adverse impact since the A SG is not used as a heat sink in OFN RP-017 and steam for the TDAFP turbine is not supplied by the A SG. The MSIVs are closed in 3 minutes, which is prior to the A SG reaching 100% WR, so water will not enter the TDAFP turbine. Steam generators A and C atmospheric relief valves are isolated. See Section 6.1 for discussion about steam generator ARVs.

The reactor is tripped at t = 0s when operators actuate the reactor trip push buttons prior to evacuating the control room. The reactor trip causes a low Tavg signal within 5 seconds and initiates a feedwater

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Page 10 of 106 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 isolation signal, which stops main feedwater flow and prevents steam generator overfill from main feedwater.

To prevent steam generator overfill in cases where the fire causes a spurious auxiliary feedwater actuation signal (AFAS), the Train A MDAFP is stopped by operator action within 15 minutes. The TDAFP is taken to minimum output within 15 minutes and remains there until valves in the AFW discharge line are closed, which takes 35 minutes. At that point, the TDAFP is started to supply SG B.

Main steam isolation valves are required to be closed for decay heat removal to control cooldown. See Section 6.1 for discussion about MSIVs.

Calculation SA-08-006 assumes the steam generator blowdown valves remain closed in all scenarios.

The calculation focused on steam generator overfill as a bounding worse-case scenario because an overfilled steam generator could affect operation of the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump, which is required to be functional in the event of a control room fire. Open blowdown valves help the SG overfill cases, which would cause the results to be non-conservative. Therefore, modeling of spurious open SG blowdown was not performed in the current revision of SA-08-006. Failed open blowdown valves are modeled in Calculation WCNOC-CP-002 where it was determined that the blowdown valves can fail open for at least 5.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> (the modeled duration) with no adverse impact on PFSSD.

Cold shutdown decay heat removal is not included in OFN RP-017.

6.4 Process Monitoring Process monitoring ensures RCS variables are within specified limits. The ASP contains all the required process monitoring instruments to verify reactivity conditions, pressurizer level, pressurizer pressure, RCS temperature and steam generator level. Source range indicator SENI0061X indicates reactivity level. Pressurizer level is verified using BBLI0460B. Pressurizer pressure is verified using reactor vessel pressure instrument BBPI0406X. RCS temperature is verified using RCS loop 2 cold leg temperature indicator BBTI0423X and loop 4 hot leg temperature indicator BBTI0443A. Steam generator level is verified using steam generators B and D narrow range level indicators AELI0502A and AELI0504A, respectively. These process monitors are unaffected by a fire in the control room.

6.5 Support The post fire safe shutdown support function provides the necessary cooling, ventilation and electrical power required by the reactivity control, reactor makeup, decay heat removal and process monitoring functions. The support function supports all the other post fire safe shutdown functions and includes component cooling water (CCW), essential service water (ESW), room cooling and ventilation, control room isolation and electrical power distribution.

Component cooling water is required for OFN RP-017 to supply cooling to the Train B charging pump oil cooler and the seal water heat exchanger. Both of these components support centrifugal charging pump (CCP) operability. Therefore, CCW is required to be operable prior to the need for charging. Based on Calculation SA-08-006, charging needs to be lined up and injecting within 28 minutes.

Essential service water is required to provide cooling to the CCW heat exchanger, emergency diesel engine coolers and various room coolers. In addition, ESW is a backup source of auxiliary feedwater.

One potential concern with ESW is that in extreme cold weather the ESW trash racks and intake screens could freeze, preventing proper flow of ESW to essential equipment. Warming lines have been installed to prevent freezing, and are placed in service during winter lineup per SYS EF-205. Procedure SYS EF-205 requires the warming lines to be placed in service when lake temperature is 40F. OFN RP-017 does not have any actions to operate the warming lines or verify operation of the lines. This is acceptable because the warming line valves are manually operated and are not subject to spurious operation. If the fire occurs in these extreme cold temperatures, winter lineup of the warming lines would have already taken place prior to the fire. Therefore, no operator actions would be required as a part of OFN RP-017 to line up or verify lineup of the warming lines.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Page 11 of 106 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 Emergency diesel engine cooling is required to maintain the engine jacket water temperature below the trip setpoint of 195°F. The engine is started in Step C7 when the offsite power feeder breakers are opened, which provides an automatic start signal to the engine. Step C9.d closes the Train B emergency diesel generator (EDG) output breaker and step C10 starts the ESW pump. The combined generator loading of the non-shed loads and the ESW pump is 3,615.9 kW per calculation KJ-M-017, which is 58.3% of the EDG rating of 6,201 kW. Check valve EFV0471 will prevent flow diversion to the service water system, so as soon as the ESW pump is started in Step C10, EDG cooling will be provided.

Table 1 in Calculation KJ-M-017 identifies the allowable time to establish EDG cooling given various values of unloaded times from 1 minute to 5 minutes in 30 second increments. The table shows that, as the time to complete steps C7 through C9.d increases, the time to complete Step C10 decreases. For example, if step C9.d is completed in 2.5 minutes after step C7, operators have 3.49 minutes to complete Step C10 and start the ESW pump. However, if the operator takes 3.5 minutes to complete Step C9.d after Step C7 is completed, then they only have 3.17 minutes to complete Step C10 and start the ESW pump. Table 1 from Calculation KJ-M-017 follows.

Time Allowable Unloaded Time Loaded (Minutes) (Minutes) 1 3.96 1.5 3.80 2 3.65 2.5 3.49 3 3.33 3.5 3.17 4 3.01 4.5 2.85 5 2.69 Room coolers and ventilation fans are used to maintain a suitable environment for the equipment within the room to ensure long term operation of the equipment. Room coolers credited in the event of a control room fire are as follows:

1. Train B Class 1E Electrical Equipment Room A/C Unit (SGK05B)

2. Train B Electrical Penetration Room Cooler (SGL15B)

3. Train B Component Cooling Water Pump Room Cooler (SGL11B)

4. Train B Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Room Cooler (SGF02B)

5. Train B Centrifugal Charging Pump Room Cooler (SGL12B)

6. Train B Containment Coolers (SGN01B and SGN01D)

7. Train B ESW Pump Room Supply Fan (CGD01B) and Dampers (GDTZ11A and GDTZ11C)

Procedure SYS GK-200 provided instructions to compensate for loss of a Class 1E Electrical Equipment A/C Unit (SGK05A or SGK05B) and temporarily maintain the operability of equipment in the Class 1E Electrical Component Rooms on the 2000' and 2016' elevations of the Control Building. The procedure required within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> several doors on the 2000 and 2016 elevation of the Control Building opened and fans placed in service on the 2000 elevation. Fans on the 2016 elevation must be put in service within 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />. SYS GK-200 is now voided and replaced by SYS GK-201 and additional calculation GK-M-016 issued with the implementation of the permanent compensatory cooling modification CP 14269. The bases for these times remain contained in Calculation GK-06-W as a means to maintain both trains functional. GK-M-016 also includes bases for actions to start within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> for powering the permanent compensatory cooling modification. OFN RP-017 does not attempt to maintain Train A functional. The doors between rooms will be maintained closed to provide maximum cooling to the Train B equipment.

Since Calculation GK-06-W and GK-M-016 show 60 minutes is acceptable to initiate compensatory measures for loss of one train of Class 1E electrical equipment room cooling, there is reasonable assurance that restoration of SGK05B in 60 minutes in the event of a control room fire will maintain the Train B electrical equipment functional.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Page 12 of 106 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 The timing basis for establishing electrical penetration room cooling is documented in CR 012638. Based on the evaluation in this CR, 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> is reasonable for the maximum time to restore cooling to the electrical penetration rooms. This time is based on the Wolf Creek Technical Requirements Manual (TRM), TR 3.7.22-1 which states that operators have 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> to restore room temperatures to within allowable limits given in Table TR 3.7.22-1. (Note that the TRM revision in effect when the CR was evaluated (Revision

35) required equipment to be declared inoperable if temperatures were not restored within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. The current revision of the TRM (55) does not require equipment to be declared inoperable). For conservatism, 1-hour is used as the timing basis in E-1F9915. The allowable temperature limit for the electrical penetration rooms is 101 degrees F per Table TR 3.7.22-1. Based on operator timing, the electrical penetration room cooler is started within 13 minutes. Therefore, the time to restore electrical penetration room cooling is well within the 1-hour limit established in E-1F9915.

The pump room coolers (SGL11B, SGF02B and SGL12B) automatically start when the pump starts.

Procedure OFN RP-017 lines up power and ESW flow to the pump room coolers prior to starting the pumps. Therefore, pump room cooling will be provided as soon as each pump starts.

The containment coolers maintain containment temperature within acceptable limits but are not directly required for safe shutdown after a fire in the control room. There are no post-fire safe shutdown components in containment that will adversely impact the ability to achieve safe shutdown if the coolers are not started. Therefore, the timing for this step is not critical and, therefore, no time limit has been established.

The timing basis for establishing ESW pump room ventilation is documented in CR 012638. Based on the evaluation in CR 012638, 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> should be used as the maximum time to restore cooling to the ESW pump room. This time is based on the Wolf Creek Technical Requirements Manual (TRM), TR 3.7.22-1 which states that operators have 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> to restore room temperatures to within allowable limits given in Table TR 3.7.22-1. (Note that the TRM revision in effect when the CR was evaluated (Revision 35) required equipment to be declared inoperable if temperatures were not restored within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. The current revision of the TRM (55) does not require equipment to be declared inoperable). For conservatism, 1-hour is used as the timing basis in E-1F9915. The allowable temperature limit for the ESW pump rooms is 119 degrees F per Table TR 3.7.22-1. Based on operator timing, the ESW pump room supply fan is started approximately 12 to 15 minutes after the ESW pump is started. DCP 13800 moved the Train B ESW pump room temperature controls from the control room (RP053B) to the Train B ESF switchgear room (RP147B). This ensures proper temperature control within the room by allowing the supply and recirculation dampers to modulate based on room temperature. A control room fire will not affect the operation of these dampers.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Page 13 of 106 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 7.0 Section-by-Section Review 7.1 OFN RP-017, Section 1.0 - Purpose 7.1.1 OFN RP-017, Section 1.1 1.1 To provide operator actions for evacuating the Control Room due to fire, establishing plant control from the Auxiliary Shutdown Panel (ASP), and reactor shutdown to Hot Standby conditions.

Basis - 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section III.L.3 requires procedures to be in effect to implement the alternative and dedicated shutdown capability for any fire area utilizing the provisions in Appendix R,Section III.G.3. Wolf Creek took no exception to this requirement in the Appendix R comparison documented in the USAR, Table 9.5E. Letter SLNRC 84-0109 (August 23, 1984), Section 2.0 Response Plan Summary states, in part, Procedures will be developed to implement this plan at Callaway and Wolf Creek. The Wolf Creek SER, Supplement 5, Page 9-12 states, in part, (1) The applicant will revise the procedures for a fire in the control room in accordance with the SNUPPS letter of August 23, 1984 .

Subsequently, License Amendment 214 approved superseding letter SLNRC 84-0109 with document E-1F9915 as the basis for alternative shutdown in the event of a fire in the control room. Therefore, Wolf Creek is committed to maintain in effect procedure OFN RP-017 to achieve hot standby conditions. Cold shutdown is achieved from outside the control room using OFN RP-017A.

7.1.2 OFN RP-017, Section 1.2 1.2 This procedure should only be used when the Control Room is uninhabitable and damage to controls or Control Room equipment has occurred or is imminent.

Basis - This statement emphasizes that control room evacuation should only take place when control from the control room is lost or will be lost. Shutting down from outside the control room is not desired and evacuation should only be done when the plant cannot be controlled from inside the control room.

7.1.3 OFN RP-017, Section 1.3 1.3 Since the Control Room is uninhabitable, this procedure includes actions to:

Prevent subsequent fire/physical damage to Control Room circuits from adversely affecting systems needed to maintain Hot Standby Transfer critical Train B controls to the ASP Maintain the plant in Hot Standby from the ASP Basis - This step identifies the objectives for OFN RP-017. It clearly states that the procedure is only intended to maintain hot standby from outside the control room using Train B components. Cold shutdown is achieved using procedure OFN RP-017A.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Page 14 of 106 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 7.2 OFN RP-017, Section 2.0 - Symptoms or Entry Conditions Section 2.0 provides conditions in which operators may deem entering OFN RP-017 to be necessary. These entry conditions are not licensing commitments but rather guidance for operators to use when determining the need to enter OFN RP-017. The decision is a judgment call made by operating staff with the final decision made by the Shift Manager. Step 1 in the procedure provides additional conditions to be considered prior to evacuating the control room. There are no NRC criteria for establishing the point at which operators evacuate the control room. Therefore, there is no licensing basis for when control room evacuation takes place.

7.3 OFN RP-017, Section 3.0 - References and Commitments 7.3.1 OFN RP-017, Section 3.1 - References

a. Nuclear Safety Engineering Surveillance Report No. 1991-005 Basis - This surveillance report, designated SSR 91-005, was performed by Wolf Creek Nuclear Safety department and was issued on 4/26/1991. The purpose of the surveillance was to determine the adequacy of 10CFR50.59 screenings on Operations procedures.

OFN 00-017, Control Room Evacuation, Revision 13 was chosen for review. The review concluded that the 50.59 screenings were appropriate but made 12 recommendations for improvement of the procedure. Most of the recommendations were incorporated into revision 14 of OFN 00-017 and some were not with justification. The changes made to OFN 00-017 as a result of this surveillance that are still in effect today in OFN RP-017 are listed below:

1. NK4101 is no longer opened to remove control power from Train A bus NB01 breakers.

The observer stated that by opening the switch, the Train A AFW pump would not be able to be controlled from the ASP. Operations removed the step due to there being no requirement to open the switch. Train A equipment is not required for OFN RP-017.

However, it may be practical to open NK4101 to support Step C15 (Stopping the Train A Containment Spray Pump).

2. Fuse #46 in panel RP209 is pulled to fail close the MSIV bypass valves. The observer noted that opening the breaker would remove power from other equipment and felt that this is not a good idea. He also noted that Callaway pulls fuses to close the MSIV bypass valves. Step B12 pulls fuse #46 in RP209.

3. NK4411 is used to isolate steam generator blowdown. This differs from SLNRC 84-0109, which says to use the switches in the Radwaste Control Room. Use of NK4411 will achieve the desired result faster than sending an operator to the Radwaste Control Room. See Step C27.

4. As a result of recommendation 12, an attachment was added to give operators instruction to protect Train A equipment after all other critical steps are completed.

Attachment F provides guidance based on this recommendation.

b. USAR 7.4.6, Safe Shutdown From Outside The Control Room Basis - USAR Section 7.4.6 describes the capability of Wolf Creek to shutdown from outside the control room using the Auxiliary Shutdown Panel (ASP), switchgear and motor control centers. The mitigating actions for a fire in the control room use Train B ASP and equipment. Train B was selected because instrumentation and controls for the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump are located on the Train B ASP.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Page 15 of 106 E-1F9915, Rev. 14

c. USAR Appendix 9.5B, Fire Hazards Analyses Basis - The Fire Hazards Analysis is now located in document E-1F9905, which is incorporated into the USAR, Appendix 9.5B by reference.

d. PIR 1997-2819, EDG Master Transfer Switch In Auto With Fire In The Control Room Basis - PIR 1997-2819 identified a concern where OFN RP-017 did not previously require placing master transfer Switch KJHS0109 in Local/Manual position. The initiator stated that if the switch were left in Auto position, a control room fire could affect the circuits and shut down the diesel generator. After review of the circuits, OFN RP-017 was revised to require operators to place KJHS0109 in Local/Manual. Step C.8.a proceduralizes this action. Also see PIR 2006-000860 discussion below.

e. PIR 1997-2453, Enter OFN RP-013 At 2 mR/hr Submersion Dose Rate Basis - PIR 1997-2453 identified a concern where OFN RP-017 previously required evacuation of the control room if radiation reached certain levels. As a result, OFN RP-017 was revised to allow Health Physics and Shift Supervisor discretion on whether to evacuate. PIR 1997-3376 was also written to evaluate the need to evacuate the control room at all for radiation levels. OFN RP-017 was revised to remove the specific radiation levels and allow the Shift Supervisor to enter OFN RP-013 at his discretion.

f. OP 1988-0190, Replacing BG HV-8105 with local valves within the NCP room Basis - This is an inter-office correspondence that requested a procedure change to OFN 00-017 (now OFN RP-017) to reduce the time to complete certain actions. The procedure required an operator to first open BGFCV0121 locally in the positive displacement pump (PDP) room (now the normal charging pump (NCP) room) on the 1974 elevation then the same operator had to ascend to the north pipe penetration room on the 2000 elevation to locally close BGHV8105. The memo requested that instead of closing BGHV8105, valves BG8402B and BGV0017 be manually closed or verified closed. These valves are located in the NCP room along with BGFCV0121. The change was made as requested and OFN RP-017 uses BG8402B and BGV0017.

g. PIR 1999-109, Removing control power prior to rotating ESF bus #2 isolate switch Basis - This PIR identified 3 issues where OFN RP-017, Revision 11 was not consistent with the original response strategy for control room fires documented in SLNRC 84-0109 (Superseded by E-1F9915). These issues are discussed below:

Issue 1 - Note 10 in SLNRC 84-0109 states that FCHV0312 and ABHV0005 will not be opened until it is verified that ALHV0036 is open. There are two loop steam supply valves to the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump (TDAFP) (ABHV0005 (loop 2) and ABHV0006 (loop 3)). SLNRC 84-0109 only credited ABHV0005 to provide a steam supply to the TDAFP. OFN RP-017, Rev. 11 Step A9 required the operator at the ASP to open steam supply valve ABHV0006 using ABHIS0006B prior to verifying that suction valve ALHV0036 is open. However, OFN RP-017, Rev. 11 Steps A6 and A8 had the same operator at the ASP close the turbine trip and throttle valve (FCHV0312) using FCHIS0312B and the turbine governor valve (FCHV0313) using FCHS0313 and FCHIK0313. Step A7 required the operator at the ASP to isolate ABHV0005 using ABHIS0005B. The requirement in SLNRC 84-0109 has been met in that FCHV0312 and ABHV0005 are maintained closed until ALHV0036 is opened. However, ABHV0006 was added to the procedure at some later time. Since FCHV0312 is maintained closed, the TDAFP will not operate even with ABHV0006 open.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Page 16 of 106 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 Issue 2 - This issue involves performing steps in the procedure in a different sequence than what was approved in SLNRC 84-0109. Note 2 in SLNRC 84-0109 states that DC power should be tripped after Action 9 [assure MCC and load center breakers are closed]

in room 3302 so that breakers can be electrically tripped by hand to the desired position.

OFN RP-017, Rev 11 had operators open the control power breakers to the NB02 bus and then rotate switch NBHS0014 to the isolate position. By opening the control power breaker before rotating NBHS0014, relay 195 will not energize and the control room will not be isolated.

Revision 18 of OFN RP-017 deleted NBHS0014 from the procedure. The hand switch would not have completely isolated the control room from the control circuit on the affected components. Also, a control room fire could have opened the control power fuse due to a hot short, thereby isolating control power prior to operation of the hand switch.

The current revision of OFN RP-017 requires operators to remove control power from the NB02 bus and not use NBHS0014. Isolating control power will prevent spurious operation of any of the breakers associated with NB02. The possibility still exists for the NB02 breakers to close prior to isolating control power. Therefore, to ensure the NB02 bus loads are shed, each pump breaker, except for the ESW pump, is verified open prior to opening the NB02 feeder breakers to simulate a LOSP and start EDG-B. Verifying each of these breakers is open also ensures the diesel will not fail to start due to overload.

On the basis of the above discussion, the concern raised in Issue 2 of this PIR is no longer valid. The use of NBHS0014 would never have fully isolated the control room and, therefore, its use was never required. Isolation of control power to NB02 ensures spurious operation of the breakers will not occur. All revisions of OFN RP-017 (OFN 00-017) required isolation of control power to NB02 in Phase A. The intent of SLNRC 84-0109 is met since isolation of control power effectively prevents spurious operation due to cable failures in the control room.

Issue 3 - The third issue involves the closure of the MSIVs using a portable air supply versus an electrical source, as delineated in SLNRC 84-0109. The MSIVs are closed prior to leaving the control room using ABHS0079 or ABHS0080. However, their closure cannot be guaranteed due to possible fire damage. Therefore, OFN RP-017 has steps to close the valves if they failed to close in response to the fast close signal.

SLNRC 84-0109, Note 6 states that the MSIVs will be closed with a portable 125 VDC source. Wires to the valves will then be cut to leave the valves in the closed position. Prior to revision 27, OFN RP-017 used a portable air source to close the MSIVs. This change was made in MA 93-0181 with insufficient documentation for the change. The PIR evaluation provides adequate justification for the change and RCMS 1985-118 documents the change in commitment. Since the use of air versus power to close the MSIVs is a more reliable and safe method, it met the intent of SLNRC 84-0109 and was therefore acceptable.

The MSIVs were replaced in refuel outage 16 (DCPs 09952 and 11608) with solenoid actuated system medium operated valves. These valves do not require an accumulator or external air supply so the portable air source and associated air hoses and fittings are not required. The new MSIVs are held open by six normally energized solenoid valves, three associated with Train A and three associated with Train B. Either train of solenoid valves can operate the associated valve, independent of the opposite train solenoids which provides for diversity and electrical independence. De-energizing either train of solenoids will cause the MSIVs to close. Step C2 has an operator open switch NK5119 to de-energize SA075A and fail the MSIVs closed. Furthermore, Amphenol connectors, 3 per MSIV per train, have been provided near each MSIV to provide a way for operators to

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Page 17 of 106 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 disconnect power to the solenoids and close the MSIVs. These methods for closing the MSIVs are utilized in the current version of OFN RP-017.

h. PIR 1999-107, Concerns with meeting required time frame Basis - This PIR was written to document whether changes made in revision 12 of OFN RP-017 meet the commitments made in SLNRC 84-0109. The PIR concluded that commitments were met and no changes were required.

i. PIR 1999-3648 Procedure not matching plant labels Basis - This PIR addressed labeling inconsistencies between OFN RP-017 and the plant labels. The procedure was revised to match plant labeling.

j. PIR 2002-1956, Failure to properly track and implement actions specified within Regulatory Correspondence SLNRC 84-0109 as referenced in USAR Appendix 9.5B.

Basis - This PIR identifies concerns with OFN RP-017, Rev. 16 not meeting commitments in SLNRC 84-0109. The evaluation shows a step-by-step comparison of OFN RP-017, Rev. 16 with SLNRC 84-0109 and provides justification for any deviations. The PIR evaluation found that the deviations would not have prevented the safe shutdown of the plant. The deviations were historical with no documented evaluation in some cases. In many cases, the deviations were a result of alternative methods to produce the desired result. The alternative methods were determined to be faster and/or safer than that specified by SLNRC 84-0109. Note that the contents of USAR Appendix 9.5B are now contained in E-1F9905.

k. PIR 2003-3479, Revisions to procedures need fire protection review Basis - This PIR identified problems associated with emergency lighting for equipment required to implement OFN RP-017. Changes have been made to the procedure over the years with no consideration given to emergency lighting requirements. As components were added or deleted from the procedure, consideration was not always given to emergency lighting requirements. As a result of the PIR, a number of emergency lighting changes were made to ensure each OFN RP-017 action has sufficient lighting in accordance with Wolf Creek commitments.

l. Westinghouse Tech Bulletin TB-04-22, Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Performance - App R Compliance and Loss of All Seal Cooling and WCAP 10541, Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Performance Following A Loss of All AC Power, NRC IN 2005-14, FP Findings on Loss of Seal Cooling to Westinghouse RCPs.

Basis - These documents describe industry positions on reactor coolant pump seal cooling. Because of the uncertainty of where the NRC may go in the future with RCP seal cooling issues, Wolf Creek decided to deviate from SLNRC 84-0109 and not restore seal cooling in response to a control room fire. Rather, Wolf Creek will use a natural circulation cooldown and provide RCS makeup and boration through the Boron Injection Tank (BIT) flow path, rather than the seal injection flow path. Revision 22 of OFN RP-017 made this change. The use of natural circulation to cooldown will not adversely impact the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown.

m/n. PIR 2005-3314 (later converted to PIR 2007-003037 in PILOT), Failure to Address NRC Information Notice 92-18.

Basis - This PIR was written to address URI 2005008-06, which was given to Wolf Creek during the Fall, 2005, NRC Triennial Fire Protection Inspection. Wolf Creek has responded

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Page 18 of 106 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 to this issue by modifying the control circuit on 36 motor operated valves so a hot short from a fire in the control room will not bypass the valve protective features and prevent operation of the valve.

NRC IN 92-18 identified a concern where a control room fire could cause the spurious operation of motor operated valves due to hot shorts that bypass the valve protective features. The hot short, if sustained, could cause valve damage in a manner that prevents the valve from being manually operated to its desired position. Therefore, the ability to achieve safe shutdown after a control room fire could be compromised.

Wolf Creek initially responded to the IN by crediting the modifications that were done prior to startup in which the NRC required the installation of a number of isolation switches.

However, these modifications did not address the concerns raised in IN 92-18. In April 1999 the NRC conducted an inspection at Callaway and questioned their response to IN 92-18, which was the same response given by Wolf Creek. As a result, Wolf Creek initiated PIR 1999-1245 to take another look at the issue. The PIR was closed in March 2001 with no actions taken due to the ongoing industry discussions with the NRC on the issue of hot shorts, as well as a moratorium placed on circuit inspections by the NRC. The PIR closure statement said that a new PIR will be generated when the industry initiative to address the issue is completed.

The NEI and EPRI conducted testing in 2001 to gain a better understanding of the issue of hot shorts causing spurious actuations. The testing found that under certain fire conditions, spurious actuations could occur due to hot shorts. In January 2005 the NRC resumed inspections of fire-induced safe shutdown circuits. However, the IN 92-18 issue remained unresolved at Wolf Creek and, until PIR 2005-3314 was written, a new PIR was not written as stated in PIR 1999-1245.

o. PIR 2007-003003, Potential Loss of Field Flashing on Train B Emergency Diesel Generator Basis - This PIR (originally PIR 2005-3333) was written to identify a condition where field flashing could be lost on the Train B EDG due to a fire in the control room. Since Train B is the protected train in the event of a control room fire, this could have an adverse impact on the ability to achieve safe shutdown. Change Package 12097 was prepared and implemented to modify the control circuit and add control room isolation switch (KJHS0110) and redundant fuses on the circuit to ensure the availability of field flashing.

p. PIR 2006-000860, Potential Loss of Train B Emergency Diesel Generator during Control Room Fire Basis - This PIR was written after it was discovered that a control room fire could cause a hot short in the EDG shutdown circuit that could stop the EDG during the event. Since Train B is the protected train in the event of a control room fire, this could have an adverse impact on the ability to achieve safe shutdown. The control room portion of the circuit was only partially isolated by hand switch KJHS0109, which left it vulnerable to a control room fire. Change Package 12097 was prepared and implemented to modify the circuit to provide full isolation from the control room.

q. PIR 1998-3012, VCT Outlet Valve Did Not Have Redundant Control Power Fusing. LER 98-004-00, Verifying BG LCV 112C Closed Basis - This PIR identifies a concern where OFN RP-017 directed operators to close BGLCV0112C using local hand switch BGHS0112C. However, because the control power circuitry does not contain redundant fusing, control power could be lost, resulting in failure of the valve to close.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Page 19 of 106 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 Prior to revision 27, OFN RP-017 had operators try the hand switch then open the breaker once sufficient time has passed for the valve to close. Another operator then followed up and verified the valve was closed and manually closed it if it was not closed.

DCP 12131 was implemented to add a redundant fuse to the circuit so that operation of BGHS0112C will close the valve. Therefore, the actions to open the breaker and manually close the valve have been removed from OFN RP-017.

r. E-1F9915, Design Basis Document for OFN RP-017, Control Room Evacuation This document describes the basis for OFN RP-017.

s. Engineering Disposition, PFSSD Issue With Voltage Regulator (CR 00023410)

Basis - This CR identifies a concern where a fire in the control room could have affected the Train B EDG voltage regulator and could have energized the unit parallel relay, placing the EDG in droop mode of operation. The control circuitry was found to not have sufficient isolation capability to ensure the Train B EDG will be available in the event of a control room fire. A temporary modification (TMO 10-004-NE) was implemented and OFN RP-017 was revised to address the issue. The temporary modification was changed to a permanent modification in DCP 13095.

The modification installed jumper in panel NE0106 to bypass the control room circuitry for the null meter and the Auto/Manual voltage regulator selector switch. This ensures a control room fire will not damage the voltage regulator.

The procedure change added Step C8 to remove the break glass cover from the emergency start pushbutton (KJ HS-101D) to energize the ESA and ESB relays to de-energize the UPR relay. This action will also energize relay 90 VEP which disables the control room auto/manual raise/lower voltage control switches and ensures a control room fire will not cause a hot short that sends a raise or lower signal to the voltage regulator.

t. Calculation SA-08-006, Rev. 3, Retran 3D Post-Fire Safe Shutdown (PFSSD)

Consequence Evaluation for a Postulated Control Room Fire.

Basis - This calculation demonstrates the thermal-hydraulic performance of the plant during a postulated control room fire that causes spurious operation of equipment. The results of the calculation are used to determine the maximum allowed time to mitigate a spurious operation. These times are utilized throughout Table 7.1.

u. DCP 13898, EFHV060 Isolation Switch Basis -This DCP modified the control circuit for valve EFHV0060 to address NRC Information Notice 92-18 and add an ISO/CLOSE switch to provide operators the ability to close the valve and prevent flow imbalance in the Train B ESW system.

v. DCP 13513, EDG Train B Field Flashing Issue Basis -This DCP added several redundant fuses and isolation switch contacts in the Train B EDG control circuit to ensure operation of the EDG following a control room fire. The DCP also modified the NB0211 control circuit to ensure a fire in the control room will not spuriously close the output breaker out of synch or when the EDG is not operating.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Page 20 of 106 E-1F9915, Rev. 14

w. DCP 13800, Train B EDG and ESW Ventilation Issues due to Fire in the Control Room Basis -This DCP modified the control circuit for the Train B EDG and Train B ESW ventilation controls to ensure proper operation of these systems following a control room fire.

7.3.2 OFN RP-017, Section 3.2 - Commitments

a. Letter SLNRC 84-0109 superseded by E-1F9915 as the licensing basis document for OFN RP-017 , Fire Protection Review RCMS #1985-118 [Entire Procedure]

Basis - SLNRC 84-0109 provides the original licensing basis for response to a control room fire and shutdown from outside the control room. The letter assigned 6 phases to the time critical actions within the letter. Procedure OFN RP-017 no longer uses phases. The timing is now based on thermal hydraulic calculations, which provide more realistic time response criteria to the potential spurious operations that could occur in the event of a fire in the control room. Therefore, all mention of phases has been removed from the procedure. The new timing requirements are described in Table 7.1.

License Amendment 214 approved E-1F9915 as licensing basis document for alternative shutdown following a control room fire in lieu of letter SLNRC 84-0109.

b. SLNRC 84-0109 change to commitment RCMS #1988-201 Basis - See 3.1.f above.

c. PIR 2005-3209, and LER 2005-006, Unanalyzed Condition Related To Loss Of RCP Seal Cooling During A Postulated Appendix R Fire Event. (Removes steps from procedure for RCP seal restoration)

Basis - An Apparent Violation (AV) issued by the NRC during the 2005 Triennial Fire Protection Inspection identified a concern where Revision 21 of OFN RP-017 may not have been able to restore seal cooling prior to seal damage occurring. The current procedure does not restore seal cooling in response to a control room fire. Rather, the RCPs are stopped, the seal injection flow path is isolated, RCP thermal barrier is isolated from the CCW system, RCS makeup and boration is accomplished through the BIT flow path and natural circulation cooldown is used. The thermal hydraulic calculations show that stable hot standby conditions are achieved using OFN RP-017.

7.4 Step-by-Step Review Table 7.1 provides a detailed evaluation for each Step in OFN RP-017 per the Methodology in Section 3.0.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Page 21 of 106 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 TABLE 7.1 DETAILED EVALUATION OF EACH ACTION STEP IN OFN RP-017 Reqd Time PFSSD CR Fire To Prereq STEP DESCRIPTION Function BASIS TIMING BASIS Impact?

Complete Steps (Note 1) (Note 2)

(min)

Wolf Creek USAR, Appendix 9.5E, Response to Section III.L states, in part: ...Adequate Operations shift staffing is provided to achieve and maintain post-fire safe shutdown...

10CFR50, Appendix R, Section III.L.4 states, in part, The fire brigade is ...The number of operating shift personnel, exclusive dedicated to fighting of fire brigade members, required to operate such the control room fire. equipment and systems shall be on site at all times.

They are not NOTE responsible for N/A The Wolf Creek Technical Requirements Manual N/A N/A N/A N/A performing any of the (TRM), TR 5.2.1.b states in part: A site Fire Brigade operator actions of at least 5 members shall be onsite at all times ...

described in this The Fire Brigade shall not include the Shift Manager procedure. (SM), and the two other members of the minimum shift crew necessary for safe shutdown of the Unit and any personnel required for other essential function during an emergency.

Note that four operators, besides the SM, are required to complete OFN RP-017.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Page 22 of 106 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 TABLE 7.1 DETAILED EVALUATION OF EACH ACTION STEP IN OFN RP-017 Reqd Time PFSSD CR Fire To Prereq STEP DESCRIPTION Function BASIS TIMING BASIS Impact?

Complete Steps (Note 1) (Note 2)

(min)

Check Control Room The decision to evacuate is made by the Shift Evacuation Due To Fire Manager based on environmental conditions and/or

- REQUIRED the ability to control the plant from the control room

• Annunciators and (CR). There is no regulatory basis for when the CR status panels - NOT should be evacuated.

READABLE FROM The Wolf Creek SER, Supplement 5, page 9-10 states AT THE 1 N/A in part: The new procedures assume that evacuation N/A N/A N/A N/A CONTROLS of the control room takes place when the fire starts...

• Spurious equipment It is not realistic to assume the control room operators actuations - will evacuate as soon as a fire starts. Only the control OBSERVED room staff can make the decision to evacuate based on conditions. Therefore, OFN RP-017 provides

• Loss of Control guidelines that the Shift Manager can use for deciding Room controls -

when to evacuate.

IMMINENT Generic letter 86-10, response to question 3.8.4 states, in part: ...Note that the only manual action in the control room prior to evacuation usually given credit for is the reactor trip. For any additional control room actions deemed necessary prior to evacuation, a demonstration of the capability of performing such Trip The Reactor actions would have to be provided... The reactor is 2 SB HS-1 R 0 assumed tripped at No N/A In a memo from the NRC to KG&E dated August 31, t=0.

SB HS-42 1984, which documents the minutes of an August 22, 1984 meeting with KG&E and UEC, the NRC provided clarifications of staff positions discussed during the meeting. One of those positions is as follows:

Credit can be taken only for a manual scram before leaving the control room.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Page 23 of 106 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 TABLE 7.1 DETAILED EVALUATION OF EACH ACTION STEP IN OFN RP-017 Reqd Time PFSSD CR Fire To Prereq STEP DESCRIPTION Function BASIS TIMING BASIS Impact?

Complete Steps (Note 1) (Note 2)

(min)

Based on this staff position, the NRC acknowledged that the reactor will trip when the switches are depressed prior to evacuating the control room.

Hand switches SB HS-1 and SB HS-42 are located on separate panels. SB HS-1 is located on RL003 while SB HS-42 is located on RL006. There is a 2-foot air gap between the panels as well as metal outer covers that will restrict the spread of fire between panels.

Automatic smoke detection is present in each panel, which will provide early warning of a fire. In addition, the control room is constantly attended. A fire in one panel is unlikely to spread to the other due to the physical separation present.

Drawing E-13SB12A shows a schematic diagram of the reactor trip switch wiring. Each switch has two normally open contacts per train. Two out of four contact closures on one out of two trains actuates the reactor trip function at panel SB102A or SB102B, located outside the control room. Two contacts on each switch are on separation group 1 and two contacts are on separation group 4. Physical separation between each group is maintained in accordance with IEEE 384 to ensure a fire that affects one group will not affect the other.

The positioning of the reactor trip switches on separate panels and the arrangement of the switch contacts and wiring provides reasonable assurance that one of the switches will successfully trip the reactor.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Page 24 of 106 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 TABLE 7.1 DETAILED EVALUATION OF EACH ACTION STEP IN OFN RP-017 Reqd Time PFSSD CR Fire To Prereq STEP DESCRIPTION Function BASIS TIMING BASIS Impact?

Complete Steps (Note 1) (Note 2)

(min)

Generic letter 86-10, response to question 3.8.4 states, in part: ...Note that the only manual action in the control room prior to evacuation usually given credit for is the reactor trip. For any additional control room actions deemed necessary prior to evacuation, a demonstration of the capability of performing such Yes. The actions would have to be provided. Additionally, MSIVs assurance would have to be provided that such could actions could not be negated by subsequent spurious SA-08-006 does not spuriously Close MSIVs actuation signals resulting from the postulated fire. credit closure of the open or AB HS-79 MSIVs in this step. remain Hand switches AB HS-79 and AB HS-80 are located 3 R, M, D N/A See Section 6.1 for open after N/A AND on RL006, which also has one of the two reactor trip discussion on the the hand switches (SB HS-42). Therefore, due to the AB HS-80 timing basis for switches close proximity between the reactor trip hand switch MSIV closure. have been and the MSIV close hand switches, it is reasonable to actuated.

conclude that actuating both hand switches is possible See Step prior to exiting the control room.

C2.

Credit is not given for actual MSIV closure since spurious actuation could occur as a result of the control room fire. Step C2 provides instructions to close them if not already closed by opening switch NK5119, which fails the MSIVs closed.

Shift Manager proceed The Shift Manager (SM) proceeds directly to the ASP 4 to ASP and direct N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A to direct performance of OFN RP-017.

personnel.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Page 25 of 106 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 TABLE 7.1 DETAILED EVALUATION OF EACH ACTION STEP IN OFN RP-017 Reqd Time PFSSD CR Fire To Prereq STEP DESCRIPTION Function BASIS TIMING BASIS Impact?

Complete Steps (Note 1) (Note 2)

(min)

The Gaitronics system is the preferred method to

a. Make the following announce the fire and call out the fire brigade. The announcement Gaitronics control panel is located in the back panel using Plant area of the control room on the far South wall, remote Gaitronics handset: from the main control room area. A fire in the main o Fire Fire Fire. Fire control room area, in the absence of a loss of offsite in Control Room. power, will not affect the ability of the Gaitronics 4.a N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A ALL Personnel system to announce the fire and call out the fire Commence OFN brigade due to the physical separation of the control RP-017, panel (QF076) and power cables. However, a loss of CONTROL ROOM offsite power to NG01, NG02, PG19 and PG20 will EVACUATION prevent operation of the system. Therefore, an RNO Duties. is provided to ensure timely callout of the fire brigade and notification of control room evacuation.

IF Gaitronics is NOT working, THEN perform the following:

1) Announce This RNO provides instructions to ensure all available Evacuation using the means are used to call out the fire brigade and 4.a RNO public address system. N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A commence OFN RP-017 actions if the Gaitronics

2) IF announcement system is unavailable.

cannot be made, THEN dispatch runners to notify OFN RP-017 personnel.

The Operator repeats the announcement to ensure it 4.b Repeat announcement. N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A is heard.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Page 26 of 106 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 TABLE 7.1 DETAILED EVALUATION OF EACH ACTION STEP IN OFN RP-017 Reqd Time PFSSD CR Fire To Prereq STEP DESCRIPTION Function BASIS TIMING BASIS Impact?

Complete Steps (Note 1) (Note 2)

(min)

Check Fire Brigade - The Operator ensures the fire brigade has been called 4.c N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A CALLED OUT out successfully and, if not, performs the RNO actions.

Perform the following:

1) Make the following announcement using the Public Address System Fire Fire Fire.

Fire in Control Room. Fire Brigade members assemble at turnout lockers This RNO provides alternative methods to notify the fire brigade and provides instructions to ensure the 4.c RNO 2) Repeat Public N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A off-site fire department is called out if the fire brigade Address System is delayed or cannot be contacted.

Announcement.

3) IF Fire Brigade cannot be contacted, THEN dispatch runners to alert FB members.

4) Request assistance from Coffey County Fire Department.

Telephone number 911

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Page 27 of 106 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 TABLE 7.1 DETAILED EVALUATION OF EACH ACTION STEP IN OFN RP-017 Reqd Time PFSSD CR Fire To Prereq STEP DESCRIPTION Function BASIS TIMING BASIS Impact?

Complete Steps (Note 1) (Note 2)

(min)

Classify the event using EPP 06-005, The SMs duty at this point is to classify the event and 4.d N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A EMERGENCY initiate the emergency plan.

CLASSIFICATION.

Supervise performance After the emergency plan has been initiated, the SM 4.e N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A of this procedure. supervises performance of OFN RP-017.

SRO (CRS) proceed to The Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) is responsible for 5 ASP via CAS and direct N/A performing the actions of Attachment A in OFN RP- N/A N/A N/A N/A personnel. 017.

Obtain the following equipment from Control Room emergency locker for personnel entering the RCA:

Low-Range PIC 0 This step ensures those exiting the CR through CAS

- 1000 mR obtain the proper radiation monitoring and safety gear.

5.a N/A The SRO is required to operate 480 VAC breakers on N/A N/A N/A N/A High-Range PIC his/her way to the ASP so it will be necessary to don 0-5 R an arc flash suit.

Record Dose Dosimeter (RDD)

Bag labeled OFN RP-017 Arc Flash Protection

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Page 28 of 106 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 TABLE 7.1 DETAILED EVALUATION OF EACH ACTION STEP IN OFN RP-017 Reqd Time PFSSD CR Fire To Prereq STEP DESCRIPTION Function BASIS TIMING BASIS Impact?

Complete Steps (Note 1) (Note 2)

(min)

Direct CAS personnel to:

CAS is evacuated to prevent security personnel from 5.b 1. Transfer control to N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A being overcome by smoke.

SAS

2. Evacuate CAS The SRO proceeds to the ASP through CAS and enters room 1512, where NG03C is located.

On NG03C, place the Therefore, it is feasible for the SRO to perform these following breakers to actions before proceeding to the ASP.

off:

These breakers are placed in the OFF position to See Section 6.3 for NG03CEF4 for AL discussion of timing ensure power is disconnected to the associated Train HV-36, Supply basis for aligning A valves. This will prevent the valves from spuriously From Cond Stor auxiliary feedwater.

operating prior to and after the valve is manually Tk Water operated in another step.

5.c NG03CHF3 for EG D, S N/A No N/A If, prior to performing this step, the valve spuriously See Section 6.5 for HV-15, CCW operates to the undesired position, the valve can still discussion of timing Return From be manually operated. Valve damage will not occur basis for aligning Nuclear Aux due to circuit modifications completed per change component cooling Components packages 12130 (EG HV-61) and 12170 (AL HV-36 water.

NG03CKF3 for EG and EG HV-15) in response to NRC IN 92-18 (PIR HV-61, CCW 2007-003037).

CTMT ISO VLV For additional information on these specific valves see Steps B7, B10 and D6.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Page 29 of 106 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 TABLE 7.1 DETAILED EVALUATION OF EACH ACTION STEP IN OFN RP-017 Reqd Time PFSSD CR Fire To Prereq STEP DESCRIPTION Function BASIS TIMING BASIS Impact?

Complete Steps (Note 1) (Note 2)

(min)

Operators will generally communicate via radio.

Therefore, the SRO obtains a radio from the emergency locker.

The radio system is unaffected by a fire in the control Pick up radio from room. A postulated short of the microphone circuit in emergency locker the control room would effectively simulate a keyed 5.d outside ASP and select N/A mike. However, the control station interface (located N/A N/A N/A N/A Zone 2, Operations in the radio room on 2061 elevation of the channel. communications corridor) will time out any continuously keyed mike at 60 seconds. Therefore, the radio system is a reliable means of communication. Zone 2, Operations channel is used because it is the designated Operations channel.

Perform actions of The SRO is responsible for performing the actions of 5.e ATTACHMENT A, SRO N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Attachment A in OFN RP-017.

ACTIONS On-Shift Personnel 6 Perform Designated N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Actions:

Operator performing Turbine Building actions, proceed to PA01/PA02 and 6.a N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A perform ATTACHMENT B, TURBINE BUILDING ACTIONS

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Page 30 of 106 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 TABLE 7.1 DETAILED EVALUATION OF EACH ACTION STEP IN OFN RP-017 Reqd Time PFSSD CR Fire To Prereq STEP DESCRIPTION Function BASIS TIMING BASIS Impact?

Complete Steps (Note 1) (Note 2)

(min)

Reactor Operator proceed to NK switchgear rooms and 6.b perform N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A ATTACHMENT C, REACTOR OPERATOR ACTIONS Operator performing Aux Building actions, proceed to 2026' Aux Bldg, RDMG set room 6.c N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A and perform ATTACHMENT D, AUXILIARY BUILDING ACTIONS ENS/Offsite The Wolf Creek emergency plan requires an 6.d Communicator proceed N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A ENS/Offsite communicator.

to the TSC ENS/Offsite Communicator establish and maintain communications with The Wolf Creek emergency plan requires ENS/Offsite 6.e the NRC via the ENS N/A Communicator to establish and maintain continuous N/A N/A N/A N/A Emergency communications with the NRC Telecommunications System (ETS) telephone.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Page 31 of 106 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 TABLE 7.1 DETAILED EVALUATION OF EACH ACTION STEP IN OFN RP-017 Reqd Time PFSSD CR Fire To Prereq STEP DESCRIPTION Function BASIS TIMING BASIS Impact?

Complete Steps (Note 1) (Note 2)

(min)

Calculation SA-08-006 identified that steam generator overfill could occur if the auxiliary feedwater (AFW) pumps are not secured and certain AFW valves are not closed in a timely manner. Furthermore, CR Operator closing BN 00019239 identified an issue involving the time to HV-8812A, RWST TO close valve BN HV-8812A to mitigate RWST RHR PUMP A draindown. The valve requires approximately 600 SUCTION ISOLATION turns of the handwheel to close. Operations Standing VALVE proceed to ESF Order #1 limits the handwheel speed to 60 revolutions 6.f Switchgear Room B R, M, D per minute. Therefore, the minimum time to close is N/A N/A N/A N/A and perform 10 minutes, but due to the location of the handwheel ATTACHMENT E, BN and potential fatigue of the operator, it will likely take HV-8812A AND AUX longer. Therefore, it was decided to add an extra FEEDWATER VALVE operator to this procedure to perform these actions.

CLOSURE. See Attachment E actions for further discussion.

This step Place Following These hand switches are used to isolate certain establishes control Switches In ISOLATE:

components from the control room. The switches, of the isolated when placed in ISO. CTRL. ROOM position, energize components from RP HIS-1 CTRL R, M, D, lockout relays (LORs) and change the position on a the auxiliary A1 ROOM ISO XFR N/A No N/A P, S number of contacts located in the control circuit for shutdown panel SWITCH -

these components. This ensures a fire in the control (ASP). The timing ISOLATE room will not affect the isolated components after the basis depends on RP HIS-2 CTRL hand switch is actuated. when the isolated ROOM ISO XFR components are

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Page 32 of 106 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 TABLE 7.1 DETAILED EVALUATION OF EACH ACTION STEP IN OFN RP-017 Reqd Time PFSSD CR Fire To Prereq STEP DESCRIPTION Function BASIS TIMING BASIS Impact?

Complete Steps (Note 1) (Note 2)

(min)

SWITCH - The LORs are powered from DC batteries (NK). The required to be ISOLATE batteries are sized to supply power to all emergency operable, which is RP HIS-3 CTRL loads for 200 minutes following loss of ac power per discussed in the ROOM ISO XFR E-10NK. Loss of offsite power will not affect the steps that follow.

SWITCH - LORs. Therefore, there is ISOLATE no timing basis for RP HIS-1 performs the following functions:

this step.

Isolates valve FC HV-312 (TDAFP Trip and Throttle Valve) from the control room.

Isolates main steam to TDAFP supply valves AB HV-5 and AB HV-6 from the control room.

Isolates AB PV-2 indication from the control room. AB PV-2 position indication at the ASP is independent of the control room. RP HIS-1 isolation is not required. ARV position indication is not credited for PFSSD. ARV position is determined by controlling the ARV using the controller at the ASP and monitoring RCS temperature.

Isolates FC FV-313 (TDAFP Speed Governing Valve) position indication from the control room.

RP HIS-2 performs the following functions:

Isolates BG HV-8152 (Letdown Isolation Valve) from the control room.

Isolates the trip portion of NB0208 handswitch PG HIS-21. However, NB0208 could trip and the control power fuses could blow before RP HIS-2 is operated. This would prevent operation of pressurizer backup heater group B from the ASP.

If this occurs, operators will need to manually

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Page 33 of 106 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 TABLE 7.1 DETAILED EVALUATION OF EACH ACTION STEP IN OFN RP-017 Reqd Time PFSSD CR Fire To Prereq STEP DESCRIPTION Function BASIS TIMING BASIS Impact?

Complete Steps (Note 1) (Note 2)

(min) close NB0208 to energize PG22. NB0208 is closed in Step C11.

Isolates valves AL HV-30, AL HV-33 and AL HV-34 from the control room and adds a redundant fuse in the circuit.

Isolates AB PV-4 indication from the control room. AB PV-4 position indication at the ASP is independent of the control room. RP HIS-2 isolation is not required. ARV position indication is not credited for PFSSD. ARV position is determined by controlling the ARV using the controller at the ASP and monitoring RCS temperature.

Isolates MDAFP B from the control room and adds redundant fuses in the circuit. However, this method of controlling the Train B motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump is not credited in OFN RP-017. Rather, the B MDAFP is started by closing breaker NB0205 in Step C14.

RP HIS-3 performs the following functions:

Isolates PG2201 control circuit from the control room. PG2201 supplies power to pressurizer heater backup group B. Isolation of the PG2201 control circuit using RP HIS-3 allows operation of the heater group using BB HIS-52B at RP118B.

The heaters are used in Step A.7 RNO to maintain pressurizer pressure. Isolation of the heaters prevents spurious operation and ensures availability when needed. PG2201 is powered from NB0208 which is closed in Step C11.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Page 34 of 106 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 TABLE 7.1 DETAILED EVALUATION OF EACH ACTION STEP IN OFN RP-017 Reqd Time PFSSD CR Fire To Prereq STEP DESCRIPTION Function BASIS TIMING BASIS Impact?

Complete Steps (Note 1) (Note 2)

(min)

SA-08-006 assumes this step will be completed within 7 minutes if a single failure occurs Close S/G A And C The control circuit for these valves is not isolated from that does not ARVs: the control room by operation of AB HS-1 and AB HS-involve an ARV

3. Therefore, AB PV-1 and AB PV-3 could remain circuit. Therefore, it

a. AB HS-1 SG A open. Steps D17 and D18 direct operators to isolate is assumed that Yes. A ATMS RELIEF VALVE air and nitrogen to the valves then bleed air from the ARVs 1 and 3 will control CTRL XFR - LOCAL regulator to fail the valves closed. If this method fails, be closed in 7 room fire operators are directed to close AB-V018 and AB-minutes in this step could

b. AB HS-3 SG C V029. Isolating air and nitrogen provide a faster and that the control prevent ATMS RELIEF VALVE method of closing the valves.

A2 R, M, D 7 room fire will not closure or N/A CTRL XFR - LOCAL Control power to AB PIC-1B originates from NN0116, impact the ability to cause the which is powered from the NK011 batteries. close the ARVs re-opening

c. AB PIC-1B SG A Therefore, power will be available to perform this from the ASP. SA- of ABPV1 ATMS RELIEF VALVE action.08-006 also shows and

- CLOSED that a single failed ABPV3.

Control power to AB PIC-3B originates from NN0303 open ARV can go

d. AB PIC-3B SG C which is powered from the NK013 batteries.

unmitigated for at ATMS RELIEF VALVE Therefore, power will be available to perform this least 1-hour. See

- CLOSED action.

Section 6.1 for discussion of timing basis for controlling the steam generator ARVs.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Page 35 of 106 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 TABLE 7.1 DETAILED EVALUATION OF EACH ACTION STEP IN OFN RP-017 Reqd Time PFSSD CR Fire To Prereq STEP DESCRIPTION Function BASIS TIMING BASIS Impact?

Complete Steps (Note 1) (Note 2)

(min)

Check RCS Cold Leg The steam generator ARVs, if unaffected by a fire, Temperatures:

control temperature to 561 F. Temperature instrument BB TI-423X is used to monitor cold leg A3 STABLE AT OR D N/A N/A N/A N/A temperature on loop 2. The circuits for this TRENDING TO 561 F temperature indicator are independent of the control room.

BB TI-423X

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Page 36 of 106 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 TABLE 7.1 DETAILED EVALUATION OF EACH ACTION STEP IN OFN RP-017 Reqd Time PFSSD CR Fire To Prereq STEP DESCRIPTION Function BASIS TIMING BASIS Impact?

Complete Steps (Note 1) (Note 2)

(min)

Perform the following:

a. IF temperature greater than 561 °F, THEN dump steam using S/G B and S/G D ARV's:

ARVs AB PV-2 and AB PV-4 are isolated from the

1) AB HS-2 SG B control room by placing AB HS-2 and AB HS-4 in ATMS RELIEF LOCAL position. Auxiliary feedwater is assured to SA-08-006 VALVE CTRL steam generators B and D using the Train B MDAFP assumes XFR - LOCAL and the TDAFP. The Train B MDAFP is started in atmospheric steam Step C14. The TDAFP is started in Step A14. dump control on

2) AB HS-4 SG D steam generators B ATMS RELIEF Control power for AB PIC-2B originates from NN0203 and D is VALVE CTRL which is powered from NK02. Therefore, power will A3 RNO D 7 established at the No N/A XFR - LOCAL remain available from the NK012 batteries.

ASP within 7 Redundant power is available from NG02A which is minutes. See

3) AB PIC-2B - energized in Step C12.

Section 6.1 for THROTTLED Control power for AB PIC-3B originates from NN0404 discussion about OPEN which is powered from NK04. Therefore, power will steam generator remain available from the NK014 batteries. ARVs.

4) AB PIC-4B -

Redundant power is available from NG02A which is THROTTLED energized in Step C12.

OPEN

b. IF temperature less than 561 °F AND temperature decreasing, THEN stop dumping steam.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Page 37 of 106 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 TABLE 7.1 DETAILED EVALUATION OF EACH ACTION STEP IN OFN RP-017 Reqd Time PFSSD CR Fire To Prereq STEP DESCRIPTION Function BASIS TIMING BASIS Impact?

Complete Steps (Note 1) (Note 2)

(min)

The control circuit for this valve is isolated from the control room by operating RP HIS-2 in Step A1. The 15 minutes See Section 6.3 for Ensure CST to MD control circuit has been modified to address NRC IN to start the timing basis for AFP B Is OPEN 92-18 (PIR 2005-3314). pump and establishing A4 D No A1 MDAFP B is lined up to supply feedwater to steam inject into auxiliary feedwater AL HIS-34B -

generator D. Step C13 restores power to AL HV-34 steam using Train B OPEN MCC cubicle NG04CNF1. The valve may not open generator D MDAFP.

until Step C13 is completed.

Ensure AFW Valve Lineup For MD AFP B: Operation of AL HS-5 to the LOCAL position allows control of valve ALHV0005 from the ASP.

a. SG D AUX FW XFR Power to valve AL HV-5 is from NG04CCF2. The 15 minutes See Section 6.3 for CTRL VLV valve is normally full open and can be throttled to to start the timing basis for control flow into the steam generator. Loss of power pump and establishing A5 o AL HS D No N/A will fail the valve as is and will prevent control of the inject into auxiliary feedwater LOCAL valve from the ASP until power is restored to NG04C. steam using Train B Power is restored in step C13. This will have no generator D MDAFP.

b. SG D MD AFP AFW REG VLV CTRL adverse impact since the Train B MDAFP is not started until Step C14.

o AL HK-5B -

OPEN Notify Reactor The Reactor Operator, in Step C14, ensures Steps A4 15 minutes See Section 6.3 for Operator That Motor and A5 are complete before starting the Train B motor to start the timing basis for Driven AFW Pump B driven auxiliary feedwater pump. Valve lineups in pump and establishing A6 D N/A N/A Valve Lineup Steps Steps A4 and A5 establish a suction source from the inject into auxiliary feedwater A4 Through A5 Are CST and a discharge path to SG D and need to be steam using Train B Complete complete before Step C14 is complete. generator D MDAFP.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Page 38 of 106 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 TABLE 7.1 DETAILED EVALUATION OF EACH ACTION STEP IN OFN RP-017 Reqd Time PFSSD CR Fire To Prereq STEP DESCRIPTION Function BASIS TIMING BASIS Impact?

Complete Steps (Note 1) (Note 2)

(min)

Maintain Stable Plant Conditions:

Hot standby is maintained using procedure OFN RP-

a. PZR pressure - 017 by ensuring parameters are within the ranges BETWEEN 2000 PSIG listed. Diagnostic instrumentation is available as AND 2300 PSIG described below.

a. The only pressurizer pressure indicator at the ASP BB PI-406X is on the Train A side (BB PI-455B), which is not protected from a control room fire. RCS pressure

b. PZR level -

indicator BB PI-406X is located on the Train B ASP BETWEEN 25% AND and is unaffected by a control room fire. Therefore, 70%

BB PI-406X is used in this step to verify RCS pressure.

BB LI-460B R, M, D, A7 N/A N/A No N/A P b. Pressurizer level is indicated by BB LI-460B on the

c. S/G Wide Range Train B ASP and is unaffected by a control room fire.

Levels BETWEEN 60%

c. OFN RP-017 uses steam generators B and D for AND 62%

shutdown from outside the control room. Wide range level indicators AE LI-502A (SG B) and AE LI-504A AE LI-502A (SG D) are located on the Train B ASP and are AE LI-504A unaffected by a control room fire.

d. RCS cold leg d. RCS cold leg temperature is monitored at the Train temperatures - B ASP using temperature indicator BB TI-423X (Loop BETWEEN 551°F AND 2 cold leg). This TI is unaffected by a fire in the 561°F control room.

BB TI-423X

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Page 39 of 106 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 TABLE 7.1 DETAILED EVALUATION OF EACH ACTION STEP IN OFN RP-017 Reqd Time PFSSD CR Fire To Prereq STEP DESCRIPTION Function BASIS TIMING BASIS Impact?

Complete Steps (Note 1) (Note 2)

(min)

a. Per SA-08-006, pressurizer heater backup group B is

a. Cycle PZR HTR B/U assumed to be GROUP B, as controlled within necessary to restore 11.5 minutes.

PZR pressure. b. SA-08-006 shows that the most BB HIS-52B a. If pressurizer pressure is below 2000 psig, the challenging backup group B pressurizer heaters are cycled to scenario for

b. WHEN BIT is restore pressure. Step C11 restores power to the pressurizer level is aligned, THEN heaters and will need to be complete before this step a single steam

a. 11.5 direct Operator can be completed. generator ARV a. N/A A7 RNO performing Turbine R, M opening coincident No Building actions to b. 10 CFR 50, Appendix R requires pressurizer level b. D4

b. 28 with an immediate control level locally: to remain on-scale. To maintain pressurizer level on automatic AFAS(T) scale, an operator needs to throttle the BIT outlet and a loss of offsite Throttle BIT outlet valve to control flow. The valve is throttled in Step power. Pressurizer valve B13.

level does not drop off scale low as o EM HV-8801B long as the CCP is (2000 AUX BLDG started and BIT NORTH PIPE injection is lined up PEN ROOM) in 28 minutes. See Sections 6.1 and 6.2 for discussion about charging.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Page 40 of 106 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 TABLE 7.1 DETAILED EVALUATION OF EACH ACTION STEP IN OFN RP-017 Reqd Time PFSSD CR Fire To Prereq STEP DESCRIPTION Function BASIS TIMING BASIS Impact?

Complete Steps (Note 1) (Note 2)

(min)

As stated earlier, AL HV-33 is isolated from the control room using RP HIS-2. Step C13 energizes valve cubicle NG04CCF4, so the valve may not close until This action is not Ensure ESW To TD Step C13 is completed. time critical. As AFP Is CLOSED stated in the Basis, A8 D A failed open valve will not impact PFSSD. The N/A No A1 if the valve opens o AL HIS-33B - preferred source of auxiliary feedwater is the CST. PFSSD is still CLOSED However, ESW is the safety-related source. This assured.

action is for commercial concerns to ensure raw untreated ESW water does not enter the SGs.

Contact Operator 35 minutes Performing The SRO ensures a suction supply from the CST is to start the Attachment B Turbine See Section 6.3 for available before starting the TDAFP. Step B7 opens pump and A9 Building Actions To D timing basis for the No N/A the valve after ensuring control power is de-energized inject into Verify AL HV-36 Open TDAFP.

in Step 5.c. steam generator B AL HV OPEN

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Page 41 of 106 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 TABLE 7.1 DETAILED EVALUATION OF EACH ACTION STEP IN OFN RP-017 Reqd Time PFSSD CR Fire To Prereq STEP DESCRIPTION Function BASIS TIMING BASIS Impact?

Complete Steps (Note 1) (Note 2)

(min)

Perform the following:

a. Close AFW Pump Turbine Mechanical Trip/Throttle Valve.

FC HIS-312B

b. Close Loop 2 and If the TDAFP is Loop 3 Steam to running with no AFP Turb. If AL HV-36 is not open, this RNO directs the operator suction source, to ensure the steam supply to the TDAFP is isolated damage to the AB HIS-5B to protect the TDAFP. pump could occur.

A9 RNO D N/A No A1 AB HIS-6B If the pump has no Valves AB HV-5, AB HV-6 and FC HIS-312B are suction this RNO

c. WHEN CST Supply isolated from the control room in Step A1. needs to be To TD AFW Pump is completed before open, THEN damage occurs.

perform Steps A10 through A16.

d. OBSERVE NOTE PRIOR TO STEP A17 and continue with step A17.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Page 42 of 106 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 TABLE 7.1 DETAILED EVALUATION OF EACH ACTION STEP IN OFN RP-017 Reqd Time PFSSD CR Fire To Prereq STEP DESCRIPTION Function BASIS TIMING BASIS Impact?

Complete Steps (Note 1) (Note 2)

(min)

Place TD AFP GOV FC HS-313 transfers control of the TDAFP speed CTRL To Local And governing valve to the ASP. After the switch is Minimum Output: manipulated, controller FC HIS-313B can be used to 35 minutes control the TDAFP. to start the See Section 6.3 for FC HS-313 - pump and A10 D Control power originates from NN0203, which is timing basis for the No N/A LOCAL inject into powered from NK02. Therefore, power will remain TDAFP.

steam Adjust FC HIS- available from the NK012 batteries. Redundant power generator B 313B to Minimum is available from NG02A, which is energized in Step Output C12.

Ensure AFW Valve Lineup For TD AFP:

a. Place SG B AUX AL HS-10 transfers control of AL HV-10 to the ASP, FW XFR CTRL VLV where AL HK-10B can be used to control valve in LOCAL position. This valve controls TDAFP flow to SG B, 35 minutes which is one of the credited AFW flowpaths. to start the See Section 6.3 for AL HS pump and A11 D Control power originates from NN0404 which is timing basis for the No N/A LOCAL inject into powered from NK04. Therefore, power will remain TDAFP.

steam

b. Ensure SG B TD available from the NK014 batteries. Redundant power generator B AFP AFW REG VLV is available from NG02A which is energized in Step CTRL is open. C12.

AL HK-10B -

OPEN

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Page 43 of 106 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 TABLE 7.1 DETAILED EVALUATION OF EACH ACTION STEP IN OFN RP-017 Reqd Time PFSSD CR Fire To Prereq STEP DESCRIPTION Function BASIS TIMING BASIS Impact?

Complete Steps (Note 1) (Note 2)

(min)

Ensure LOOP 2 35 minutes Valve AB HV-5 is opened to ensure adequate steam STEAM TO AFP TURB to start the supply to the TDAFP. RP HIS-1 isolates the valve See Section 6.3 for Is OPEN pump and A12 D from the control room and inserts a redundant fuse in timing basis for the No A1 inject into the circuit. Therefore, the hand switch can be relied TDAFP.

AB HIS-5B - steam on to function.

OPEN generator B Valve AB HV-6 is closed because steam generator C is not credited for a control room fire. Continued steaming of this steam generator with no feedwater Ensure LOOP 3 flow could result in the steam generator going dry.

STEAM TO AFP TURB Valve AB HV-5 is opened in Step A12 to provide the Is CLOSED A13 D required steam flow to the Turbine Driven Auxiliary N/A N/A No A1 Feedwater Pump. RP HIS-1 isolates the valve from AB HIS-6B -

the control room and inserts a redundant fuse in the CLOSED circuit. The alternate power supply to the valve does not run through the control room. Therefore, the hand switch can be relied on to function.

Ensure AFP TURB 35 minutes MECH TRIP/THROT to start the See Section 6.3 for VLV is Open. Valve is isolated from the control room and redundant pump and A14 D timing basis for the No A1, A9 fuses are added using RP HIS-1 in Step A1. inject into TDAFP.

o FC HIS-312B - steam OPEN generator B

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Page 44 of 106 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 TABLE 7.1 DETAILED EVALUATION OF EACH ACTION STEP IN OFN RP-017 Reqd Time PFSSD CR Fire To Prereq STEP DESCRIPTION Function BASIS TIMING BASIS Impact?

Complete Steps (Note 1) (Note 2)

(min)

Contact Operator Performing Attachment E, BN HV-Calculation SA 8812A AND AUX Auxiliary feedwater valves AL-V032, AL-V056, AL- 006 shows that the FEEDWATER VALVE V061 and AL-V071 are closed to prevent overfilling steam generators CLOSURE To Ensure A15 D the steam generators. This step has the operator 35 could overfill if the No N/A AFW Valves Are verify the valves are closed before starting the valves are not closed.

TDAFP. closed within 35 AL-V056 minutes.

AL-V061 AL-V032 AL-V071 Perform the following:

Calculation SA a. WHEN AFW 006 shows that the Valves are closed, If the AFW valves are not closed, The RNO directs the steam generators THEN perform A16 A15 RNO D operator to not continue to Step A16 until the valves 35 could overfill if the No N/A are closed. valves are not

b. OBSERVE NOTE closed within 35 PRIOR TO STEP minutes.

A17 and continue with step A17

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Page 45 of 106 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 TABLE 7.1 DETAILED EVALUATION OF EACH ACTION STEP IN OFN RP-017 Reqd Time PFSSD CR Fire To Prereq STEP DESCRIPTION Function BASIS TIMING BASIS Impact?

Complete Steps (Note 1) (Note 2)

(min)

Establish Turbine Driven AFW Pump Control:

a. Adjust AFP TURB The TDAFP is credited for supplying AFW to SG B. 35 minutes SPEED GOV CTRL FC HIS-313B is used to control TDAFP speed from to start the Output to 2900 to 3100 See Section 6.3 for the ASP. Step A10 transfers control of FC FV-313 to pump and A1, A9, A16 RPM. D timing basis for the No the ASP. Step E4 closes TDAFP to SGs A, C and D inject into A10, E4 TDAFP.

valves AL-V056, AL-V071 and AL-V061, respectively, steam o FC HIS-313B to prevent overfill of these steam generators. generator B

b. Adjust AFW pump speed, as necessary, to establish desired AFW flow.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Page 46 of 106 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 TABLE 7.1 DETAILED EVALUATION OF EACH ACTION STEP IN OFN RP-017 Reqd Time PFSSD CR Fire To Prereq STEP DESCRIPTION Function BASIS TIMING BASIS Impact?

Complete Steps (Note 1) (Note 2)

(min)

Align Alternate AFW Pump Water Source:

This step aligns the ESW system to the AFW pumps in the event the CST reaches low level. RP HIS-2

a. Check CST below isolates both AL HV-30 and AL HV-33 from the control minimum level:

room and adds redundant fuses to the control circuit for each valve.

o AFW Pump Suction Pressure - LESS No. AFW Step C13 needs to be complete to restore power to AL THAN 15.1 PSIA The CST contains Pump HV-30 and AL HV-33 MCC cubicles.

(14% CST LEVEL) sufficient inventory Suction for PFSSD. This Pressure 14% CST level corresponds to AL PI-24B & 26B

• AL PI-24B step is entered only AL PI-24B indication of 15.1 PSIA (Plant elevation corresponding A17 D N/A when the CST and AL PI- A1 to AP LI-4B 14% indication determined to be

• AL PI-26B reaches low level. 26B are 2006.263 from review of WCRE-01, WCRE-03 & M-There is no timing isolated 13AL01. Elevation 2006.263 corresponds to 15.1

b. Open ESW To MD basis associated from the PSIA using the ALPSL-24, 25, 26 methodology from AFW Pump B. with this step. control calculation AL-30-WC R/3). Applicable cable routing room.

and instrument loop assets AL PT-24, AL PT-26, o AL HIS-30B -

RP147B, & RP147A associated with AL PI-24B & AL OPEN PI-26B are unaffected by a control room fire.

c. Open ESW To TD AFP o AL HIS-33B

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Page 47 of 106 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 TABLE 7.1 DETAILED EVALUATION OF EACH ACTION STEP IN OFN RP-017 Reqd Time PFSSD CR Fire To Prereq STEP DESCRIPTION Function BASIS TIMING BASIS Impact?

Complete Steps (Note 1) (Note 2)

(min)

a. Perform the The RNO is entered when the CST is above minimum following:

level. This is a continuous action step which means

1) WHEN CST level the operator at the ASP will continue to monitor CST decreases to less than level and initiate swapover to ESW when required.

minimum level, THEN A17 RNO do Steps A17.b and D Per TS 3.7.6, the CST is required to contain 281,000 N/A N/A No N/A A17.c. gallons of water, which is sufficient to provide water to the steam generators for 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> at hot standby

2) OBSERVE NOTE followed by plant cooldown to RHR entry conditions.

PRIOR TO STEP A18 Therefore, it is not expected that ESW will be needed and continue with Step until several hours into the event.

A18.

Direct Available Operators To Perform This step is used whenever extra operators are Actions Of available to minimize damage to Train A and non-train A18 ATTACHMENT F, N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A equipment. Attachment F is not required by ACTIONS TO regulation, so its steps are not evaluated in this DBD.

PROTECT EQUIPMENT The purpose of OFN RP-017 is to maintain hot standby conditions until the fire is under control and Check plant operations can be resumed from the control room. If A19 cooldown - NOT N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A the event duration does not allow the plant to be DESIRED maintained in hot standby, then OFN RP-017A is entered, per the RNO.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Page 48 of 106 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 TABLE 7.1 DETAILED EVALUATION OF EACH ACTION STEP IN OFN RP-017 Reqd Time PFSSD CR Fire To Prereq STEP DESCRIPTION Function BASIS TIMING BASIS Impact?

Complete Steps (Note 1) (Note 2)

(min)

Go to OFN RP-017A, HOT STANDBY TO If necessary, OFN RP-017A is entered to bring the A19 RNO COLD SHUTDOWN N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A plant to safe cold shutdown.

FROM OUTSIDE THE CONTROL ROOM NRC Draft Regulatory Guide DG-1214 dated April 2009, which is a proposed revision to RG 1.189, Section 5.5.2 has guidance for re-entering and re-Check Fire Has Been establishing control from the Control Room. Steps A20 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Extinguished. A20 & A22 through A25 were added to OFN RP-017 to identify this guidance. CR 00016481 identified the need to add guidance for re-entry into the Control Room.

Do not continue until Continuation in the procedure is not allowed until the A20 RNO N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A fire is extinguished. fire is extinguished.

These MOVs are susceptible to Control Room fire damage where excessive MOV thrust could damage the valve body pressure boundary and adversely Dispatch Operators To affect PFSSD capability.

Reference:

CR 00116831-Perform 02-03 Extent of Condition. Plant modifications will be N/A - This is no ATTACHMENT H, implemented to prevent damage (IN 92-18 modified to timing basis for this A21 N/A N/A N/A N/A MOV BODY prevent hot short torque switch bypass). Attachment H compensatory PRESSURE is a compensatory measure until mods are complete. measure BOUNDARY CHECK. Appendix 2, Table 2 includes the compromised pressure boundary impact for each MOV susceptible to damage from hot short spurious operation not currently IN 92-18 modified.

Check Control Room A22 N/A See Step A20 Basis N/A N/A N/A N/A Habitable

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Page 49 of 106 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 TABLE 7.1 DETAILED EVALUATION OF EACH ACTION STEP IN OFN RP-017 Reqd Time PFSSD CR Fire To Prereq STEP DESCRIPTION Function BASIS TIMING BASIS Impact?

Complete Steps (Note 1) (Note 2)

(min)

Do not continue until Habitability must be established prior to allowing A22 RNO Control Room is N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A unprotected operators back into the control room.

habitable.

Assess Control Room A23 N/A See Step A20 Basis N/A N/A N/A N/A Damage.

Perform Corrective Actions To Restore A24 Necessary Safety, N/A See Step A20 Basis N/A N/A N/A N/A Control And Information Systems To Functional Contact TSC To Develop Procedures To Transfer Control From Aux Shutdown Panel To The Main Control A25 Room And To Restore N/A See Step A20 Basis N/A N/A N/A N/A From Any Local Actions Taken Based On Review Of Actions Taken In The Procedures Performed.

Contact Chemistry To Perform SYS CI-009, This step was added in Revision 44 of OFN RP-017 CHEMICAL ADDITION A26 N/A per CR 75758-01-03. This step is not required for N/A N/A N/A N/A TO THE PFSSD.

CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Page 50 of 106 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 TABLE 7.1 DETAILED EVALUATION OF EACH ACTION STEP IN OFN RP-017 Reqd Time PFSSD CR Fire To Prereq STEP DESCRIPTION Function BASIS TIMING BASIS Impact?

Complete Steps (Note 1) (Note 2)

(min)

Proceed As Directed A27 By Station N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Management.

The RCPs are tripped to prevent damage to the seals upon loss of all seal cooling. Natural circulation is used to circulate coolant and to cooldown.

Locally Trip RCPs:

Yes. The The breakers are tripped by rotating the local hand breakers o PA0107 for RCP A switch to the STOP position. For this to work, control Based on SA could

- TRIPPED power needs to be available to each of the breaker 006, the RCPs are spuriously o PA0108 for RCP B B1 M control circuits. Control power is removed in Steps B4 7 assumed to be close until N/A

- TRIPPED and B5 after this step is completed. tripped within 7 Steps B4 o PA0205 for RCP C minutes. and B5

- TRIPPED A fire in the control room could cause a loss of control are o PA0204 for RCP D power and prevent opening the breakers with the local complete.

- TRIPPED hand switch. The fire would have to be located in either panel RL021, SB030A or SB033A for this to occur.

Proceed To 2033 After the RCPs are tripped, the operator proceeds to Turbine And Obtain A B2 N/A the emergency equipment locker and obtains a copy N/A N/A N/A N/A Copy Of This of OFN RP-017.

Procedure.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Page 51 of 106 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 TABLE 7.1 DETAILED EVALUATION OF EACH ACTION STEP IN OFN RP-017 Reqd Time PFSSD CR Fire To Prereq STEP DESCRIPTION Function BASIS TIMING BASIS Impact?

Complete Steps (Note 1) (Note 2)

(min)

Perform the following:

a. Obtain the following from emergency locker:

Radio Flashlight A radio is required to ensure communication with the

b. Obtain pocket ion SRO at the ASP. Zone 2, Operations channel is used chambers and an RDD by Operations for communication. A flashlight will from the emergency B3 N/A supplement fixed Appendix R emergency lighting in N/A N/A N/A N/A locker for personnel the event of a loss of off-site power.

entering the RCA:

Dosimetry is required for personnel entering the RCA.

Low-Range PIC 0-1000 mR High-Range PIC 0-5R RDD

c. Select Zone 2, Operations channel on radio On PK41, Open Isolating DC control power to PA01 ensures cable disconnect for DC damage will not cause the spurious closure of PA0107 See Section 6.2 control power to or PA0108, causing the RCPs to start. Isolating B4 M 7 discussion about No N/A PA01 control power before step B1 is complete will prevent stopping the RCPs.

opening the breakers using the local hand switch.

PK4103 - OFF Therefore, Step B4 shall be performed after Step B1.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Page 52 of 106 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 TABLE 7.1 DETAILED EVALUATION OF EACH ACTION STEP IN OFN RP-017 Reqd Time PFSSD CR Fire To Prereq STEP DESCRIPTION Function BASIS TIMING BASIS Impact?

Complete Steps (Note 1) (Note 2)

(min)

On PK62 Open Isolating DC control power to PA02 ensures cable disconnect for DC damage will not cause the spurious closure of PA0204 See Section 6.2 control power to or PA0205, causing the RCPs to start. Isolating B5 M 7 discussion about No N/A PA02 control power before step B1 is complete will prevent stopping the RCPs.

opening the breakers using the local hand switch.

PK6204 - OFF Therefore, Step B5 shall be performed after Step B1.

Ensure RCP Breakers Are Tripped:

PA0107 for RCP A - TRIPPED See Section 6.2 This step ensures the RCP breakers remain tripped B6 PA0108 for RCP M 7 discussion about No N/A after control power has been removed.

B - TRIPPED stopping the RCPs.

PA0205 for RCP C - TRIPPED PA0204 for RCP D - TRIPPED Step 5.c opens the breaker associated with AL HV-36.

After the breaker is open, control power is lost and the Check AL HV-36 CST valve cannot spuriously actuate. If the breaker is to Turbine Driven AFP confirmed open and the valve is open, then it is in the Suction Isolation desired position and will remain there throughout the 35 minutes Valve Open: event. If the valve is verified open prior to ensuring to start the Step 5.c is complete and the operator moves on to the See Section 6.3 for pump and B7 a. Verify with SRO at D next step, the valve could spuriously operate. Also timing basis for the No 5.c inject into ASP that Step 5.c is see the discussion for Step 5.c. TDAFP.

steam complete.

generator B Valve AL HV-36 is required to be open to ensure

b. Ensure AL HV suction to the TDAFP from the CST. DCP 12170 OPEN modified the control circuit to ensure a control room fire will not damage the valve and prevent manual opening.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Page 53 of 106 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 TABLE 7.1 DETAILED EVALUATION OF EACH ACTION STEP IN OFN RP-017 Reqd Time PFSSD CR Fire To Prereq STEP DESCRIPTION Function BASIS TIMING BASIS Impact?

Complete Steps (Note 1) (Note 2)

(min) 35 minutes The operator completing step B7 RNO will not to start the See Section 6.3 for

a. Do not continue until manually open AL HV-36 until it is verified that the pump and B7 RNO D timing basis for the No 5.c step 5.c is complete. breaker is off. With the breaker on, a spurious signal inject into TDAFP.

can close the valve after it has been opened. steam generator B Descend To 1974' This step provides the operator with the most efficient Elevation Via Ladders B8 N/A path to get to the Auxiliary Building. Dosimetry for N/A N/A N/A N/A In AFW Valve Room entering the RCA is obtained in Step B3.

And Enter The RCA.

In NCP Room, Close CCP To Regen Hx Valves

a. Close CHARGING HDR BG HCV-182 INLET ISO.

See Section 6.2 for This step is required to prevent uncontrolled charging.

timing basis for B9 BG-8402B - M Closing the valves ensures charging to the RCS 14 No N/A isolating normal CLOSED through the Regen Hx is isolated.

charging.

b. Close CHARGING HDR BG HCV-182 BYPASS VLV.

BG-V017 -

CLOSED

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Page 54 of 106 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 TABLE 7.1 DETAILED EVALUATION OF EACH ACTION STEP IN OFN RP-017 Reqd Time PFSSD CR Fire To Prereq STEP DESCRIPTION Function BASIS TIMING BASIS Impact?

Complete Steps (Note 1) (Note 2)

(min)

These valves are closed to prevent a steam bubble from migrating to the CCW piping when the CCW pumps are started. The valves are also closed to prevent cold CCW from being injected to the RCP thermal barrier when the CCW pump is started, which could cause damage to the RCP seals. The CCW pumps are not started until these valves are closed.

In North Mechanical As long as the valves are closed before starting the Pen Room, close CCW pumps, then there is no possibility of water CCW FROM RCS hammer or seal damage.

OUTER CTMT ISO VLVs to Isolate CCW Step 5.c is verified complete in Step B7. Step 5.c From RCP Thermal opens the breaker associated with EG HV-61. After Barriers: the breaker is open, control power is lost and the Prior to the valve cannot spuriously actuate. If the breaker is See Section 6.5 for a. 5.c need for B10 a. Ensure EG HV S confirmed open and the valve is closed, then it is in discussion about No supported CLOSED the desired position and will remain there throughout support systems. c. D9 systems.

the event. If the valve is verified closed prior to

b. Verify with Aux Bldg ensuring Step 5.c is complete and the operator moves Operator that Step D9 on to the next step, the valve could spuriously is complete. operate. Also see the discussion for Step 5.c.

c. Ensure EG HV-133 - c. Step D9 opens the breaker associated with EG HV-CLOSED 133. After the breaker is open, control power is lost and the valve cannot spuriously actuate. If the breaker is confirmed open and the valve is closed, then it is in the desired position and will remain there throughout the event. If the valve is verified closed prior to ensuring Step D9 is complete and the operator moves on, the valve could spuriously operate. Also see the discussion for Step D9.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Page 55 of 106 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 TABLE 7.1 DETAILED EVALUATION OF EACH ACTION STEP IN OFN RP-017 Reqd Time PFSSD CR Fire To Prereq STEP DESCRIPTION Function BASIS TIMING BASIS Impact?

Complete Steps (Note 1) (Note 2)

(min)

The RNO ensures the operator does not continue until B10 RNO S N/A N/A No D9

b. Do not continue until power is disconnected.

Step D9 is complete.

In Aux Bldg Demin Alley, Close Valves To Isolate RCP Seals:

a. Seal Water Injection Filters Inlet Isolations.

Manual valves BG-V101 and BG-V105 isolate the seal BG-V101 - injection lines and ensure spurious valve actuation will CLOSED (Rx not restore seal injection. These valves are required 28 minutes Coolant/Seal Inj to be closed before charging is restored to prevent to start the See Section 6.2 for Filter A valve RCP seal damage and loss of RCS inventory. The charging B11 M timing basis for No N/A Room) PFSSD strategy for a control room fire is to not restore pump and charging.

BG-V105 - seal cooling in order to prevent a seal LOCA if seal inject to the CLOSED (Rx cooling is not restored promptly. Only one of these RCS.

Coolant/Seal Inj valves is open at a time but both are included because Filter B valve either one could be open at the time of the fire.

Room)

b. Inform Reactor Operator that Steps B10 and B11 are complete.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Page 56 of 106 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 TABLE 7.1 DETAILED EVALUATION OF EACH ACTION STEP IN OFN RP-017 Reqd Time PFSSD CR Fire To Prereq STEP DESCRIPTION Function BASIS TIMING BASIS Impact?

Complete Steps (Note 1) (Note 2)

(min)

At RP209, Across From North Mechanical The action to pull this fuse was part of the original Penetration Room, licensing basis strategy for control room fire. The See Section 6.1 for Fail MSIV Bypass strategy was approved by the NRC in Supplement 5 of discussion about B12 Valves Closed. R, M, D 60 No N/A the SER. Pulling the fuse removes control power from MSIV bypass the MSIV bypass valve circuit and fails the valves valves.

Fuse #46 -

closed. See Section 7.3.1 for more information.

OFF/REMOVED Verify BIT Isolation Step D4 opens the breaker for valve EM HV-8801B, Valves open:

ensuring the valve will not change position after it has been throttled.

a. Verify with person performing Aux Bldg Step D5 opens the breaker for valve EM HV-8801A, actions Steps D4 ensuring the valve will not spuriously open after it has through D5 are been closed.

complete. 28 minutes to start the Valve EM HV-8801B is throttled manually to prevent

b. In the North Piping charging See Section 6.2 for overfilling the pressurizer. If the valve were to fully B13 Penetration Room, M pump and timing basis for No D4, D5 open with no letdown, the pressurizer would go solid locally Close A BIT control charging.

and water would be lost to the PRT and eventually the OUTLET VALVE. charging floor of the reactor building. Therefore, the valve is flow.

manually throttled to control pressurizer level. The EM HV-8801A valve control circuit has been modified by DCP 12130 CLOSED to address NRC IN 92-18

c. In the North Piping Valve EM HV-8801A is closed to prevent overfilling Penetration Room the pressurizer. DCP 13614 modified the valve locally throttle open BIT control circuit to address NRC IN 92-18. Closing outlet isolation valve.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Page 57 of 106 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 TABLE 7.1 DETAILED EVALUATION OF EACH ACTION STEP IN OFN RP-017 Reqd Time PFSSD CR Fire To Prereq STEP DESCRIPTION Function BASIS TIMING BASIS Impact?

Complete Steps (Note 1) (Note 2)

(min) valve EM HV-8801A or ensuring it is closed will EM HV-8801B prevent the pressurizer from going water solid.

THROTTLED OPEN

d. Notify the SRO that BIT is lined up for injection.

e. Throttle EM HV-8801B as directed by the SRO to control PZR level.

28 minutes to start the

a. Do not continue until charging See Section 6.2 for The RNO ensures the operator does not continue until B13 RNO Steps D4 through D5 M pump and timing basis for No D4 power is disconnected to both valves.

are complete. control charging.

charging flow.

Contact SRO At ASP B14 For Further Direction N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Page 58 of 106 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 TABLE 7.1 DETAILED EVALUATION OF EACH ACTION STEP IN OFN RP-017 Reqd Time PFSSD CR Fire To Prereq STEP DESCRIPTION Function BASIS TIMING BASIS Impact?

Complete Steps (Note 1) (Note 2)

(min)

Evacuate Control Room:

a. Exit Control Room using north door

b. Ensure Control The operator exits through the north door and Room outer doors - AT retrieves his/her hard hat and proceeds to the NK LEAST ONE CLOSED: switchgear room.

C1 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A

• Normal outer door Ensuring one of the control room doors is closed prevents the fire from spreading beyond the control OR room.

• Missile door

c. Proceed to NK switchgear rooms.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Page 59 of 106 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 TABLE 7.1 DETAILED EVALUATION OF EACH ACTION STEP IN OFN RP-017 PFSSD Reqd Time CR Fire Prereq STEP DESCRIPTION Function BASIS To Complete TIMING BASIS Impact?

Steps (Note 1) (min) (Note 2)

One pressurizer PORV is assumed to fail open.

Turn Off The Both PORVs are failed closed by opening NK5108 Based on SA Following NK and NK4421 to prevent loss of RCS inventory. 006, the pressurizer disconnects: PORVs need to be NK5108 PORV BB NK5109 and NK4414 supply power to portions of closed within 3 PCV-455A Control RL021/RL022. Panel RL021/RL022 supplies power minutes following Power - OFF to a number of loads including the reactor head reactor trip. This solenoid vent valves. Placing these switches in the assumes a single NK5109 MCB OFF position will fail the solenoid valves closed, PORV opens and CONTROL thereby preventing loss of inventory through the no other spurious PANELS RL021 reactor head vents. Loss of power to the remaining actuations.

AND RL022 loads supplied by these breakers will have no Therefore, NK5108, (Reactor Head Vent adverse impact on safe shutdown. Switches NK5109, NK4414 Valves) - OFF NK4414 and NK5109 are also opened to de-energize and NK4421 need NK5119 MSFIS other potential Separation Group 1 and 4 125VDC to be opened within Cab SA075A - OFF power sources that could cause the pressurizer 3 minutes.

C2 M, D PORVs to open in the event of multiple proper 3 No N/A NK4401 BUS NB02 polarity hot shorts within RL021/RL022. SA-08-006 requires BRKR CONTROL the MSIVs to be POWER - OFF NK5119 supplies power to Train A MSFIS cabinet closed within 3 NK4413 MCB SA075A. Isolation of power to SA075A will close the minutes.

CONTROL main steam and main feedwater isolation valves.

PANELS RL019 The action is required to ensure the MSIVs can be The time required AND RL020 - OFF closed in 3 minutes. The action is not required to to open the close the main feedwater isolation valves. The remaining switches NK4414 MCB reactor is tripped at t = 0s when operators actuate in this step is CONTROL the reactor trip push buttons prior to evacuating the greater than 3 PANELS RL021 control room. The reactor trip causes a low Tavg minutes so opening AND RL022 signal within 5 seconds and initiates a feedwater them within 3 (Reactor Head Vent isolation signal, which stops main feedwater flow and minutes will ensure Valves) - OFF prevents steam generator overfill from main PFSSD.

feedwater (reference License Amendment 214).

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Page 60 of 106 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 TABLE 7.1 DETAILED EVALUATION OF EACH ACTION STEP IN OFN RP-017 PFSSD Reqd Time CR Fire Prereq STEP DESCRIPTION Function BASIS To Complete TIMING BASIS Impact?

Steps (Note 1) (min) (Note 2)

Control power for NB02 needs to be isolated before NK4416 S.S.

the NB02 breakers are manipulated in Step C6.

PROTECTION Therefore, it makes sense to open the breaker in this SYSTEM OUT 2 step.

CABINET SB032D (Steam Dumps) -

NK4413 supplies power to the following PFSSD OFF components: 1) Train B diesel generator room NK4421 BB PCV- exhaust damper actuator GM HZ-19; 2) Solenoid 456A PORV (PORV actuators for radwaste building CCW supply/return Control Power) - header supply valves EG HV-70A and EG HV-70B; OFF and, 3) Train B CCW temperature control valve EG TV-30. Loss of power to GM HZ-19 will fail the damper open, which is the desired position. Loss of power to EG HV-70A/B will fail the valves closed, which will not affect PFSSD. Loss of power to EG TV-30 will fail the valve closed, allowing maximum cooling in the CCW system which will not adversely impact PFSSD. Loss of power to other components supplied by NK4413 will not adversely impact PFSSD.

NK4416 supplies power to the steam dumps.

Placing NK4416 in OFF isolates the steam dumps and prevents uncontrolled cooldown and return to criticality if the MSIVs fail to close.

Proceed to NB02 Prior to performing remaining steps, the Operator Switchgear Room C3 N/A proceeds to the emergency locker and obtains a N/A N/A N/A N/A And Obtain A Copy Of copy of OFN RP-017.

This Procedure.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Page 61 of 106 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 TABLE 7.1 DETAILED EVALUATION OF EACH ACTION STEP IN OFN RP-017 PFSSD Reqd Time CR Fire Prereq STEP DESCRIPTION Function BASIS To Complete TIMING BASIS Impact?

Steps (Note 1) (min) (Note 2)

Perform the following:

a. Obtain the following from the emergency locker: A radio is required to ensure communication with the SRO at the ASP and other operators. Zone 2, C4 Radio N/A Operations channel is used by Operations for N/A N/A N/A N/A Flashlight communication. A flashlight supplements fixed Arc Flash battery powered emergency lights.

Protection

b. Select Zone 2, Operations channel on radio.

Yes, EDG may spurious-No timing basis for ly start this step. The EDG after step.

is assumed not to EDG start This step is included for the possibility that a CR fire start based on Check B EDG - without C5 S has caused a loss of off-site power and the EDG has N/A Assumption Section N/A SECURED ESW automatically started. 2.2.5, consistent cooling is with Generic Letter an MSO 86-10, response to contrary question 3.8.4.

to Assump-tion 2.2.3

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Page 62 of 106 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 TABLE 7.1 DETAILED EVALUATION OF EACH ACTION STEP IN OFN RP-017 PFSSD Reqd Time CR Fire Prereq STEP DESCRIPTION Function BASIS To Complete TIMING BASIS Impact?

Steps (Note 1) (min) (Note 2)

Perform the Following:

a. Check ESW Pump B Breaker -

CLOSED This step ensures required ESW cooling is in place NB0215 -CLOSED for automatic EDG start on loss of offsite power.

This step is added based on NEI 00-01 Appendix D

b. IF NB0215, ESW guidance to prevent damage to EDG due to lack of PMP DPEF01B is cooling. Note that spurious start of EDG in NOT closed, THEN C5 RNO S combination with loss of ESW Cooling represents N/A N/A No N/A perform the two spurious actuations as a result of a CR fire.

following:

Assumption 2.2.3 clarifies only a single spurious

1) Place KJ HS-109 actuation is assumed before transfer of control is in LOC/MAN achieved by the alternate and dedicated shutdown

2) Secure B EDG by system.

momentarily depressing KJ HS-108B The timing for this step is based on Ensure Train B Pump the need for the Breakers - OPEN This step sheds large loads from the NB02 bus and supported PFSSD is required prior to starting the Train B diesel equipment.

NB0207 - OPEN generator in Step C7.

NB0206 - OPEN Based on SA C6 NB0205 - OPEN S Step C2 isolates control power to the NB02 bus and 10 No C2 006, the Train B NB0204 - OPEN ensures the breakers do not spuriously close.

CCP needs to be NB0203 - OPEN stopped within 10 NB0202 - OPEN NB0201 (Train B CCP) needs to be opened within 10 minutes to prevent NB0201 - OPEN minutes to prevent overfilling the pressurizer.

pressurizer overfill following a spurious SIS.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Page 63 of 106 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 TABLE 7.1 DETAILED EVALUATION OF EACH ACTION STEP IN OFN RP-017 PFSSD Reqd Time CR Fire Prereq STEP DESCRIPTION Function BASIS To Complete TIMING BASIS Impact?

Steps (Note 1) (min) (Note 2)

This action isolates off site power to the NB02 bus The timing for this and causes the diesel generator to automatically step is based on start on bus under voltage. The emergency Ensure Feeder the need for the generator is started to energize PFSSD equipment Breakers To NB02 - Prior to the supported PFSSD needed throughout this procedure.

OPEN need for equipment. The C7 S No C2, C6 diesel most limiting time is Step C2 isolates control power to the NB02 bus and NB0209 - OPEN generator restoring ensures the breakers do not spuriously close.

NB0212 - OPEN pressurizer backup group B heaters in Step C6 needs to be completed to prevent Step A7 RNO.

overloading the diesel generator.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Page 64 of 106 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 TABLE 7.1 DETAILED EVALUATION OF EACH ACTION STEP IN OFN RP-017 PFSSD Reqd Time CR Fire Prereq STEP DESCRIPTION Function BASIS To Complete TIMING BASIS Impact?

Steps (Note 1) (min) (Note 2)

This step energizes relays ESA and ESB on the Train B diesel generator engine control circuit (E-13KJ03A). The Wolf Creek licensing basis for control room fires assumes only a single spurious actuation occurs as a result of the fire. Therefore, it Ensure ESA And ESB can be assumed that one of the two relays will Relays - Energized energize. Also, DCP 13513 added control room isolation contacts and redundant fuses for the ESB The timing for this

a. Remove the break circuit, which ensures the ESB relay will be step is based on glass cover from energized following completion of Step C9.b. the need for the the EMERGENCY Prior to the supported PFSSD START With at least one relay (ESB) energized, the unit need for equipment. The C8 pushbutton, to S No C2, C6 parallel relay (UPR) will be de-energized (E- diesel most limiting time is energize the ESA 13NE13). Therefore, the diesel generator will not be generator restoring and ESB relays.

in droop mode and will function properly as PFSSD pressurizer backup loads are added. group B heaters in KJ HS-101D - Step A7 RNO.

BREAK GLASS Also, with one relay (ESB) energized, relay 90 VEP COVER will be energized which will switch the electronic REMOVED voltage adjuster to a pre-determined setpoint and ignores signals from the control room auto/manual raise/lower switches. This ensures a fire in the control room will not affect the output voltage of the EDG during the event.

Align EDG B To Bus The caution before this step alerts operators that KJ Yes. A HS-109 must be placed in LOC/MAN before placing control

a. Ensure Master KJ HS-110 in ISO position. This will prevent blowing room fire Prior to the See Section 6.5 for Transfer Switch is in some of the redundant fuses. could need for timing basis C9 LOC/MAN S prevent N/A diesel associated with After loads are shed from the NB02 bus, and the an generator EDG cooling.

KJ HS-109 - NB02 feeder breakers are opened, the Train B diesel automatic LOC/MAN generator will automatically start and load to the bus start of when NB0211 is closed. Placing KJ HS-109 in the Train

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Page 65 of 106 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 TABLE 7.1 DETAILED EVALUATION OF EACH ACTION STEP IN OFN RP-017 PFSSD Reqd Time CR Fire Prereq STEP DESCRIPTION Function BASIS To Complete TIMING BASIS Impact?

Steps (Note 1) (min) (Note 2)

b. At panel KJ122, LOC/MAN allows for local voltage regulation and B EDG.

place CR Fire Iso also isolates portions of the control circuit from the The RNO Switch in isolate. control room. Local voltage regulation is not credited provides a for PFSSD and is disabled by actuation of the method to KJ HS-110 - ISO emergency start switch in Step C8. start the engine if it

c. Check Diesel - DCP 12097 was implemented to add another KJ HS- does not STARTED 109 contact to the control room stop circuit to ensure auto start.

a control room fire will not shut the EDG down during

d. Ensure EDG Output the event. In addition, DCP 12097 added KJ HS-110 Breaker - CLOSED and redundant fuses to ensure power is available to the field flashing circuit. DCP 13513 added more NB0211 - CLOSED redundant fuses and isolation contacts to the EDG control circuit after CR 30350 identified an issue

e. Check NB02 voltage where fuses located in NE106 could blow, preventing on breaker NB0201 field flashing. Additional reviews performed during normal 3.95 - 4.32 kV.

preparation of DCP 13513 found that a number of other control room circuits were not isolated. As a result, several more isolation contacts and fuses were added.

Closing the EDG output breaker after the EDG is started energizes the NB02 bus. Step C9.e ensures the proper voltage is present on the bus.

c. Perform the This RNO provides another method for starting the following: Train B diesel engine if it does not automatically start. Step C8 uses the emergency start switch The timing for this Prior to the

1) Obtain handle from which will start the EDG after KJ HS-109 and KJ HS- step is based on need for C9 RNO emergency locker S 110 are placed in the proper position in Step C9. the need for the No N/A diesel Based on the modifications performed per DCP supported PFSSD generator

2) Place handle on 13513, there is reasonable assurance that Step C9 equipment.

either Air Start Valve: will start the diesel engine and energize the NB02 bus and it is not likely that this RNO will be required.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Page 66 of 106 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 TABLE 7.1 DETAILED EVALUATION OF EACH ACTION STEP IN OFN RP-017 PFSSD Reqd Time CR Fire Prereq STEP DESCRIPTION Function BASIS To Complete TIMING BASIS Impact?

Steps (Note 1) (min) (Note 2)

• Northeast end, East side of engine between cylinders and turbocharger OR

• Southwest end between cylinders and generator

3) Pull handle down until diesel starts The ESW system supplies cooling water to the emergency diesel engine cooler, the component This step starts the cooling water heat exchanger and various room ESW pump. Check Ensure ESW Pump B coolers. The ESW system is also a backup source valve EFV0471 Prior to the Breaker - CLOSED of auxiliary feedwater. prevents flow need for C10 S diversion to service No C2 supported NB0215 - NB0215 is normally open. Breaker control power is water. See Section components CLOSED isolated in Step C2. If the breaker did not close in 6.5 for timing basis response to the load sequencer signal, Operators associated with can close the breaker by pushing the manual close EDG cooling.

push button.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Page 67 of 106 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 TABLE 7.1 DETAILED EVALUATION OF EACH ACTION STEP IN OFN RP-017 PFSSD Reqd Time CR Fire Prereq STEP DESCRIPTION Function BASIS To Complete TIMING BASIS Impact?

Steps (Note 1) (min) (Note 2)

This step starts the ESW pump. Check valve EFV0471 Perform Attachment G Attachment G is included to provide instructions to prevents flow to charge the closing operators to charge the closing springs if the breaker C10 RNO S N/A diversion to service N/A N/A springs and manually does not close. See the discussion regarding water. See Section close NB0215. Attachment G basis at the end of this table.

6.5 for timing basis associated with EDG cooling.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Page 68 of 106 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 TABLE 7.1 DETAILED EVALUATION OF EACH ACTION STEP IN OFN RP-017 PFSSD Reqd Time CR Fire Prereq STEP DESCRIPTION Function BASIS To Complete TIMING BASIS Impact?

Steps (Note 1) (min) (Note 2)

The Train B 480 VAC load centers and MCC breakers are not shed from the NB02 bus.

Therefore, the listed breakers could remain closed.

If the breakers open as a result of a control room fire, this step ensures they are closed.

Step C2 disconnects control power from the NB02 bus and ensures the breakers do not spuriously open after they have been closed.

Ensure Load Center and ESW Pumphouse NB0208 powers XPG022. PG2201 is cycled in Step MCC Breakers -

A7 (RNO) to operate the pressurizer heater backup The required time CLOSED:

group B. See Step A7 RNO discussion for more to complete this information. Prior to the step is based on NB0208 -

need for the time to place C11 CLOSED S No C2 NB0210 powers XNG04. NG0401 is closed in Step supported the supported NB0210 -

C13 to energize NG04. See Step C13 discussion for components systems in service.

CLOSED more information on NG04. See Steps A7 RNO, NB0213 -

C12, C13 and C16.

CLOSED NB0213 powers XNG02. NG0201 is closed in Step NB0216 -

C12 to energize NG02. See Step C12 discussion for CLOSED more information on NG02.

NB0216 powers XNG06, which energizes Train B ESW pumphouse MCC NG006E. MCC NG006E powers a number of components required to ensure Train B ESW pump operability. The Train B ESW pump is directly powered from NB0215 and does not require NG006E to be energized.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Page 69 of 106 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 TABLE 7.1 DETAILED EVALUATION OF EACH ACTION STEP IN OFN RP-017 PFSSD Reqd Time CR Fire Prereq STEP DESCRIPTION Function BASIS To Complete TIMING BASIS Impact?

Steps (Note 1) (min) (Note 2)

Perform Attachment G Attachment G is included to provide instructions to to charge the closing operators to charge the closing springs if the breaker C11 RNO S N/A N/A N/A N/A springs and manually does not close. See discussion regarding close the breakers. Attachment G basis at the end of this table.

This step is performed to ensure power is available to PFSSD components supplied by NG02. Power is provided to NG02 by NB0213. NB0213 is verified closed in Step C11. NG02 supplies power to a number of PFSSD components, but only a few are needed for OFN RP-017. These include:

Isolate NG0201 Trip Circuit On NG0201 EF HV-32 and Close Breaker:

EF HV-34 EF HV-46 The required time

a. Position NORMAL EF HV-50 to complete this ISOLATE switch to SGK05B step is based on isolate.

DSGL12B the time to place Prior to the NN12, NN14 and NN16 the supported NG HIS need for C12 S BN HV-8812B systems in service. No N/A ISOLATE supported BG LCV-112C See Steps C17, systems EF HV-26 C18, C19, C20,

b. On NG02, Ensure EF HV-38 C21, C23, , C29, Load Center NG02 BG HV-8111 D9, D11, D12, Main Breaker -

BN LCV-112E D13, D14, D21.

CLOSED DSGN01B DSGL15B NG0201 -

CLOSED Placing NG HIS-15 in isolate position will isolate the trip circuit and prevent a spurious breaker trip after the breaker has been closed. The hand switch needs to be operated first before manually closing the breaker to ensure a trip does not occur.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Page 70 of 106 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 TABLE 7.1 DETAILED EVALUATION OF EACH ACTION STEP IN OFN RP-017 PFSSD Reqd Time CR Fire Prereq STEP DESCRIPTION Function BASIS To Complete TIMING BASIS Impact?

Steps (Note 1) (min) (Note 2)

EF HV-32, EF HV-34, EF HV-46 and EF HV-50 are opened in Steps D11 through D13 to provide a flow path to/from ESW to the Train B containment coolers.

SGK05B is required to provide cooling to Class 1E electrical equipment rooms. The unit is started in Step D21 after all required lineups are made.

DSGL12B is the Train B CCP room cooler fan motor.

The pump room cooler provides a suitable ambient air temperature for the CCP motor. The cooler starts automatically when the pump motor starts. Failure of the room cooler to start does not prevent operation of the pump. The CCP is started in Step C23. ESW is lined up in Step C17. See C17 Basis for discussion.

Inverters NN12, NN14 and NN16 are required to energize NN02 and NN04 to provide long-term power to panels RP147A and RP147B. 125 VDC battery sets NK012 and NK014 provide the short-term power needs for these panels. The batteries are sized to supply power to all emergency loads for 200 minutes following loss of AC power per E-10NK, at which time the alternate power source will need to be lined up.

BN HV-8812B is closed in Step C18 using BN HS-8812B. Step C12 is performed prior to C18, so power will be available when the operator performs Step C18.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Page 71 of 106 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 TABLE 7.1 DETAILED EVALUATION OF EACH ACTION STEP IN OFN RP-017 PFSSD Reqd Time CR Fire Prereq STEP DESCRIPTION Function BASIS To Complete TIMING BASIS Impact?

Steps (Note 1) (min) (Note 2)

BG LCV-112C needs to be closed prior to starting Train B CCP to ensure hydrogen is not introduced into the CCP suction. The valve is closed in Step C20 using BG HS-112C. Train B CCP is started in Step C23.

EF HV-26 is closed in Step C29 using ISO/CLOSE switch EF HS-26A.

EF HV-38 needs to be open to ensure a full flow return path from ESW to the UHS. EF HV-38 is fully opened in Step C17 by placing EF HS-38A in ISO/OPEN position. Power needs to be restored prior to the need for this valve to be fully open.

BG HV-8111 is required to be open to prevent Train B CCP damage during low flow conditions. BG HV-8111 is opened in Step C21 by placing BG HS-8111A in ISO/OPEN position.

BN LCV-112E is required to be open to provide a suction source from the RWST to the Train B CCP.

BN LCV-112E is open in Step C19 by placing BN HS-112E in ISO/OPEN position.

DSGN01B needs to be energized for containment cooling. The coolers are started in Step D14.

DSGL15B is the Train B electrical penetration room cooler and is started in Step D9.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Page 72 of 106 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 TABLE 7.1 DETAILED EVALUATION OF EACH ACTION STEP IN OFN RP-017 PFSSD Reqd Time CR Fire Prereq STEP DESCRIPTION Function BASIS To Complete TIMING BASIS Impact?

Steps (Note 1) (min) (Note 2)

This step is performed to ensure power is available to PFSSD components supplied by NG04. NG04 supplies power to a number of PFSSD components, but only a few are required to be energized for OFN RP-017. These include:

AL HV-5 Isolate NG0401 Trip AL HV-30 Circuit On NG0401 AL HV-33 and Close Breaker: AL HV-34 DSGF2B

a. Position NORMAL EM HV-8803B The required time ISOLATE switch to DSGL11B to complete this isolate. EF HV-52 step is based on EF HV-60 Prior to the the time to place NG HIS EG HV-16 need for C13 S the supported No N/A ISOLATE EG HV-54 supported systems in service.

DSGN01D systems See Steps A4, A5,

b. On NG04, Ensure DPJE01B A17, C14, C22, Load Center NG04 C28, D4 and D14.

Main Breaker - Placing NG HIS-16 in isolate position will isolate the CLOSED trip circuit and prevent a spurious breaker trip after the breaker has been closed. The hand switch NG0401 - needs to be operated first before manually closing CLOSED the breaker to ensure a trip does not occur.

AL HV-5 needs to be opened to supply auxiliary feedwater to steam generator D. The valve is opened in Step A5 by placing AL HS-5 in LOCAL and AL HK-5B in OPEN. Power needs to be restored before the valve will operate.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Page 73 of 106 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 TABLE 7.1 DETAILED EVALUATION OF EACH ACTION STEP IN OFN RP-017 PFSSD Reqd Time CR Fire Prereq STEP DESCRIPTION Function BASIS To Complete TIMING BASIS Impact?

Steps (Note 1) (min) (Note 2)

AL HV-30 needs to be opened to supply suction to the Train B MDAFP when the CST reaches low level.

This is not a time critical step since the CST has sufficient volume for PFSSD. See Step A15 discussion.

AL HV-33 needs to be opened to supply suction to the TDAFP when the CST reaches low level. This is not a time critical step since the CST has sufficient volume for PFSSD. See Step A15 discussion.

AL HV-34 needs to be opened to ensure a suction supply from the CST to the Train B MDAFP. The valve is opened in Step A4 by placing AL HIS-34B in OPEN position. Step C13 needs to be completed before the valve will open.

DSGF2B is the Train B MDAFP room cooler. The room cooler provides a suitable ambient air temperature for the equipment in the room. The cooler starts automatically when the pump starts as long as power is available to the cooler motor.

Power is established in Step C13. See Section 6.5 for discussion about room cooling.

EM HV-8803B is opened in Step D4. Step C13 needs to be performed prior to the need for charging.

DSGL11B is the Train B CCW pump room cooler.

The room cooler provides a suitable ambient air temperature for the equipment in the room. The cooler starts automatically when either Train B CCW pump starts as long as power is available to the

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Page 74 of 106 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 TABLE 7.1 DETAILED EVALUATION OF EACH ACTION STEP IN OFN RP-017 PFSSD Reqd Time CR Fire Prereq STEP DESCRIPTION Function BASIS To Complete TIMING BASIS Impact?

Steps (Note 1) (min) (Note 2) cooler motor. The CCW pumps are started in Step C22.

EF HV-52 is opened in Step D4 by placing EF HS-52 in ISO/OPEN position. EF HV-52 needs to be open prior to the need for CCW. The CCW system is needed for CCP oil cooling and provides cooling water to the seal water heat exchanger. The Train B CCP is started in Step C23.

EG HV-16 and EG HV-54 are opened in Step D4 by placing EG HS-16A and EG HS-54 in ISO/OPEN position. EG HV-16 and EG HS-54 need to be open to ensure CCW to the seal water heat exchanger prior to starting the Train B CCP. The seal water heat exchanger provides cooling for CCP recirc flow and is needed to ensure operability of the CCP. The Train B CCP is started in Step C23.

DSGN01D needs to be energized for containment cooling. The coolers are started in Step D14.

DPJE01B needs to be energized to ensure Train B fuel oil transfer pump operability. The transfer pump is started in Step C28.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Page 75 of 106 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 TABLE 7.1 DETAILED EVALUATION OF EACH ACTION STEP IN OFN RP-017 PFSSD Reqd Time CR Fire Prereq STEP DESCRIPTION Function BASIS To Complete TIMING BASIS Impact?

Steps (Note 1) (min) (Note 2)

a. Step A4 is required to be completed to ensure an Start Motor Driven adequate suction source to the AFW pump prior to AFW Pump B.

starting the pump. Step A5 is required to be performed to ensure AFW flow from Train B MDAFP

a. Verify SRO to steam generator D. If Step A5 is not complete performing Attachment SA-08-006 shows before performing this step, there is no adverse A has completed steps that PFSSD is impact since water will recirculate back to the CST.

A4 through A5. assured if AFW is established to

b. The MDAFP B is started by pushing the manual C14 b. Start Motor Driven D 15 steam generator D No C2, A4 close push button at NB0205. Although control AFW pump B. within 15 minutes.

power is isolated, the springs are charged and ready See Section 6.3 for to operate.

NB0205 - discussion about CLOSED AFW.

Step C2 isolates control power to the NB02 bus and prevents a fire in the control room from spuriously

c. Notify SRO that opening NB0205 after it has been closed.

Motor Driven AFW Pump B is running.

a. This RNO ensures the operator does not continue SA-08-006 shows

a. DO not continue until AFW Pump B valve alignment is complete in that PFSSD is until steps A4 through Steps A4 and A5.

assured if AFW is A5 are complete.

established to

b. If the breaker re-opens after it has been closed or C14 RNO D 15 steam generator D No C2, A4

b. Perform Attachment the springs are not charged, manual charging will be within 15 minutes.

G to charge the closing required to get the breaker to close. Attachment G See Section 6.3 for springs and manually provides the method to manually charge the springs.

discussion about close NB0205 See discussion regarding Attachment G basis at the AFW.

end of this table.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Page 76 of 106 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 TABLE 7.1 DETAILED EVALUATION OF EACH ACTION STEP IN OFN RP-017 PFSSD Reqd Time CR Fire Prereq STEP DESCRIPTION Function BASIS To Complete TIMING BASIS Impact?

Steps (Note 1) (min) (Note 2)

It is assumed that the Train A containment spray Ensure Containment pump is operating Spray Pump A is and valve stopped: ENHV0006 is open This step ensures the Train A containment spray to cause pump is not running and depleting the RWST

a. Remove CLOSE containment spray.

inventory. The Train B containment spray pump is control power fuse E-1F9910 (see Fire isolated in Step C6.

(UC). Area C-22) shows C15 M 67 that with 1 No N/A Pulling the fuse isolates control power from the NB0102/UC FUSE containment spray circuit to prevent a control room fire from closing the

- OFF/REMOVED pump operating and breaker. This action was approved by the NRC flowing water to the based on its inclusion in SLNRC-84-0109 (See

b. Stop Containment header, operators Phase E action 18 and Note 20 in SLNRC 84-0109)

Spray Pump A. have 67 minutes to stop the pump NB0102 - OPEN before the RWST level falls below that required for safe shutdown.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Page 77 of 106 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 TABLE 7.1 DETAILED EVALUATION OF EACH ACTION STEP IN OFN RP-017 PFSSD Reqd Time CR Fire Prereq STEP DESCRIPTION Function BASIS To Complete TIMING BASIS Impact?

Steps (Note 1) (min) (Note 2)

ESW pump room ventilation maintains the ESW pump room temperature within required limits.

Based on the Wolf Creek TRM, Table TR 3.7.22-1 the maximum allowable sustained temperature in the room is 119 F. Step C10 starts the ESW pump.

Step C11 energizes the Train B ESW pump room MCC.

East Of NG02A, Align ESW Pump Room GD HS-11 starts the supply fan, isolates the control The timing basis Ventilation: room circuits and inserts a redundant fuse. depends on the time for the room to

a. Position NORMAL DCP 13800 re-located the control cards for the Train Prior to room heat up to a point ISO/RUN switch for B ESW pump room supply and recirculation dampers reaching where the ESW C16 S No N/A ESW Pump Room from the control room panel RP053B to panel undesirable pump will not Supply Fan to RP147B in the Train B ESF switchgear room. The temperature operate. See ISO/RUN controls and wiring for the dampers are completely Section 6.5 for independent of the control room and will discussion about GD HS automatically operate to control room temperature. room cooling.

ISO/RUN Hand switch GD HS-11A was removed because the hand switch was used to fail the supply damper full open. This is not desired because in extreme cold temperatures pipes within the pump room could freeze. The new configuration allows the supply and recirculation dampers to operate as necessary to control room temperature within the required set points.

Return flow from the ESW system to the UHS is The timing basis At NG02AHF3, required for diesel generator cooling, class 1E depends on the position NORMAL Prior to the electrical equipment room cooling, auxiliary limiting time to ISO/OPEN Switch For need for full C17 S feedwater pump room cooler, centrifugal charging establish full flow in No N/A ESW To UHS Isolation flow in the pump room cooler, electrical penetration room the ESW system.

Valve To ISO/OPEN. ESW system cooler, containment air coolers, component cooling The valve needs to water heat exchanger and component cooling water be fully open prior

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Page 78 of 106 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 TABLE 7.1 DETAILED EVALUATION OF EACH ACTION STEP IN OFN RP-017 PFSSD Reqd Time CR Fire Prereq STEP DESCRIPTION Function BASIS To Complete TIMING BASIS Impact?

Steps (Note 1) (min) (Note 2)

EF HS-38A - pump room cooler. EF HS-38A isolates the control to establishing ISO/OPEN room, adds a redundant fuse in the circuit and fully CCW heat opens valve EF HV-38. Valve EF HV-38 is exchanger and maintained partially open (66%) during normal containment air operation and fully opens on SIS or LOOP. A fire in cooler flow, since the control room could cause a short that bypasses the total flow to the control room handswitch and signals the valve to these systems is close. However, based on drawing E-13EF06A and 9,200 gpm per M-E-025-00007, Sheet 185, the valve will not fully close 11EF01.

because limit switch contact ZS/16 prevents the valve from closing past the 66% setpoint. See Section 6.5 for discussion about The ESW loads that are necessary shortly after the CCW and diesel generator is started in Step C9 are diesel containment generator cooling, class 1E electrical equipment cooling.

room cooling, auxiliary feedwater pump room cooler and electrical penetration room cooler. Based on M-11EF01, the flow rates for each of these components are: diesel generator cooling (1,200 gpm), class 1E electrical equipment room cooling (74 gpm), auxiliary feedwater pump room cooler (100 gpm) and electrical penetration room cooler (100 gpm). The total flow to these loads is 1,474 gpm. As stated above, valve EF HV-38 will be approximately 66%

open which is more than adequate to flow 1,494 gpm through this 30-inch valve. Therefore, Step C17 does not have to be performed to establish ESW flow to these loads.

Step C17 will need to be completed before the remaining loads are needed to ensure full flow in the ESW system is available.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Page 79 of 106 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 TABLE 7.1 DETAILED EVALUATION OF EACH ACTION STEP IN OFN RP-017 PFSSD Reqd Time CR Fire Prereq STEP DESCRIPTION Function BASIS To Complete TIMING BASIS Impact?

Steps (Note 1) (min) (Note 2)

At NG02AFF4, Calculation XX-E-Position NORMAL 013 shows there is ISO/CLOSE Switch This action prevents or mitigates a loss of RWST 28 minutes For RWST To RHR inventory to the containment sump. The hand switch available before the C18 Pump B ISO Valve To R, M isolates the control room, inserts a redundant fuse in 28 No N/A RWST drains to a ISO/CLOSE. the control circuit and closes the valve. Step C12 level below that restores power to the MCC cubicle for this valve.

required for cold BN HS-8812B -

shutdown.

ISO/CLOSE This step aligns the RWST to the Train B CCP. DCP On NG02AHR3, Open 12175 added a control room isolation switch and RWST To CCP B See Sections 6.1 redundant fuse at NG02AHR3 for this valve. This Prior to the Suction Valve: and 6.2 for C19 R, M ensures valve BN HV-112E will open (if closed) and need for No N/A discussion about remain open throughout the event when BN HS- charging BN HS-112E - charging.

112E is placed in the ISO/OPEN position and power ISO/OPEN is restored in Step C12.

This valve is isolated before starting the charging At NG02AFR2, Close pump to prevent hydrogen gas intrusion into the VCT OUTLET ISO pump. DCP 12131 added a redundant fuse in the See Sections 6.1 Prior to the Valve. control circuit to ensure control power is available and 6.2 for C20 R, M need for No N/A when the hand switch is placed in ISO/CLOSE. This discussion about charging BG HS-112C - ensures the valve will close in response to hand charging.

ISO/CLOSE switch actuation after NG02 is energized in Step C12.

This valve is required to be open to protect the Train At NG02AHR1, open B CCP from overheating during low flow conditions.

BG HV-8111 Charging DCP 12175 added a control room isolation switch See Sections 6.1 Pump Mini Flow Prior to the and redundant fuse at NG02AHR1 for this valve. and 6.2 for C21 Isolation Valve. M need for No N/A This ensures valve BG HV-8111 will open (if closed) discussion about charging and remain open throughout the event when BG HS- charging.

BG HS-8111A -

8111A is placed in the ISO/OPEN position and ISO/OPEN power is restored in Step C12.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Page 80 of 106 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 TABLE 7.1 DETAILED EVALUATION OF EACH ACTION STEP IN OFN RP-017 PFSSD Reqd Time CR Fire Prereq STEP DESCRIPTION Function BASIS To Complete TIMING BASIS Impact?

Steps (Note 1) (min) (Note 2)

The CCW system is required to provide cooling to the Train B CCP oil cooler and the seal water heat exchanger. Both of these components support operation of the Train B CCP.

On NB02, Start One Step B10 closes the CCW outlet valves from the CCW Pump. thermal barrier. This protects the CCW piping against water hammer and prevents inventory loss through Prior to the See Section 6.5 for

a. Ensure Turbine the RCP seals. See Step B10 basis. need for C22 S discussion about No B10, C2 Building Step B10 is supported CCW.

complete Step C2 isolates control power to NB02 and ensures components NB0206 does not spuriously open after it has been

b. NB0206 - CLOSED closed.

Step C13 establishes power to the CCW pump room cooler. Step C17 completes lineup of ESW.

Therefore, room cooling will be available prior to starting the pump.

a. Perform the

a. The RNO ensures the operator does not continue following:

until the prerequisite steps are complete.

1) WHEN Step B10 is b.1 The RNO has the operator start CCW pump D if complete, THEN the B pump did not start. This RNO is included as an perform Step C22.b. Prior to the enhancement since the control room fire will not See Section 6.5 for need for C22 RNO S prevent an operator from manually closing NB0206. discussion about No B10, C2

2) Do not continue until supported CCW.

Step C22.b is components b.2 This RNO provides instructions for manually complete.

charging the springs and closing the breaker if it failed to close or did not remain closed. See

b. Perform the discussion regarding Attachment G basis at the end following:

of this table.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Page 81 of 106 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 TABLE 7.1 DETAILED EVALUATION OF EACH ACTION STEP IN OFN RP-017 PFSSD Reqd Time CR Fire Prereq STEP DESCRIPTION Function BASIS To Complete TIMING BASIS Impact?

Steps (Note 1) (min) (Note 2)

1) IF NB0206 can NOT be closed, THEN close NB0207 to start CCW pump D.

2) IF no CCW pump can be started, THEN perform Attachment G to charge the closing springs and manually close breakers, as necessary, to establish one CCW pump running.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Page 82 of 106 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 TABLE 7.1 DETAILED EVALUATION OF EACH ACTION STEP IN OFN RP-017 PFSSD Reqd Time CR Fire Prereq STEP DESCRIPTION Function BASIS To Complete TIMING BASIS Impact?

Steps (Note 1) (min) (Note 2)

Start CCP B:

Seal cooling is no longer restored in OFN RP-017

a. Check RCP seal due to the uncertainty in the time before seal failure injection isolated and can occur. Therefore, prior to starting the CCP, CCW service loop operators verify seal injection is isolated. Seal aligned injection is isolated in Step B11.

Ensure Turbine The CCP oil cooler and seal water heat exchanger Building Step SA-08-006 shows B11, require CCW. Therefore, the CCW system needs to B11, RCP seal the CCP needs to C19, be aligned prior to starting the CCP. Step C22 starts isolation is be started within 28 C20, the CCW pumps. Steps D4 through D9 align the C23 complete M 28 minutes. See No C21, CCW service loop to ensure adequate CCW flow to Sections 6.1 and C22, the CCP components. Step B13 closes CCW to AND 6.2 for discussion RHR heat exchanger valve EG HV-102 if it about charging. D4, D5 spuriously opened.

Ensure Auxiliary Building steps D4 Other required alignments are made by this operator through D9, CCW prior to performing Step C23. These alignments are service loop made in steps C12, C19, C20 and C21. After all alignment are alignments are made, the CCP breaker is closed to complete start the pump.

b. NB0201 - CLOSED

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Page 83 of 106 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 TABLE 7.1 DETAILED EVALUATION OF EACH ACTION STEP IN OFN RP-017 PFSSD Reqd Time CR Fire Prereq STEP DESCRIPTION Function BASIS To Complete TIMING BASIS Impact?

Steps (Note 1) (min) (Note 2)

a. Perform the following:

1) WHEN RCP seal injection is isolated AND CCW

a. The RNO ensures the operator does not continue alignment is SA-08-006 shows until the prerequisite steps are complete.

complete, THEN the CCP needs to perform Step be started within 28

b. The RNO provides instructions for manually C23 RNO C23.b. M 28 minutes. See No N/A charging the springs and closing the breaker, if it Sections 6.1 and failed to close or did not remain closed. See

2) Do Not continue 6.2 for discussion discussion regarding Attachment G basis at the end until Step C23.b. is about charging.

of this table.

complete.

b. Perform Attachment G to charge the closing springs and manually close NB0201 Inform SRO That This step ensures the SRO is informed that the C24 CCW and CCP Pumps N/A pumps are operating. N/A N/A N/A N/A Have Been Started

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Page 84 of 106 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 TABLE 7.1 DETAILED EVALUATION OF EACH ACTION STEP IN OFN RP-017 PFSSD Reqd Time CR Fire Prereq STEP DESCRIPTION Function BASIS To Complete TIMING BASIS Impact?

Steps (Note 1) (min) (Note 2)

Calculation change notice AN-02-010-This step ensures adequate Train B diesel generator 000-02 documents room ventilation. The diesel generator room exhaust an analysis of the damper is failed open in Step C2 to ensure adequate diesel generator diesel engine combustion air. The supply fan and room temperatures outside air intake damper are not required for without supply fan combustion air but are required for room cooling. operation. The calculation was GM HS-11B is an ISO/RUN switch that operates the performed using 3 Right Of NG04D, Train B diesel generator room supply fan CGM01B. different outside air Align Diesel The switch isolates the control room, adds a temperatures (97, Generator Building redundant fuse in the circuit and starts the fan. The 100 and 105 F) and Ventilation:

fan is powered from NG04DBF6 which is energized assumed the in Step C13. starting room Position DG VENT temperature equals C25 SUPPLY FAN B S 155 No N/A DCP 13800 re-located the control cards for the Train the outside room ISOLATION B EDG room supply and recirculation dampers from temperature (very SWITCH to the control room panel RP053B to panel RP147B in conservative). The ISO/RUN the Train B ESF switchgear room. The controls and calculation shows wiring for the dampers are completely independent of that even at a o GM HS-11B -

the control room and will operate to control room starting room ISO/RUN temperature. The action to open NG04DEF111 is no temperature of 105 longer required to fail the supply damper open. This F, it takes 155 is not desired because in extreme cold temperatures minutes to reach pipes within the pump room could freeze. The new the diesel generator configuration allows the supply (GM TZ-11A) and design temperature recirculation (GM TZ-11B) dampers to operate as of 122 F.

necessary to control room temperature within the required set points.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Page 85 of 106 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 TABLE 7.1 DETAILED EVALUATION OF EACH ACTION STEP IN OFN RP-017 PFSSD Reqd Time CR Fire Prereq STEP DESCRIPTION Function BASIS To Complete TIMING BASIS Impact?

Steps (Note 1) (min) (Note 2)

For the excess letdown flow path to open, it would take spurious operation of at least 3 valves.

Isolate Possible RCS Flow would be Leakage Paths: limited to the volume that can

a. On NK41, open flow through the 1 NK4119, MCB excess letdown CONTROL PANELS pipe. The RL001 AND RL002 to pressurizer level is NK4119 and NK4407 supply power to portions of close Excess Letdown typically held at 55 RL001/RL002. Panel RL001/RL002 supplies power Heat Exchanger Valves to 60%. After a trip, to a number of loads, including the excess letdown the volume will heat exchanger valves. Loss of power to these NK4119 - OFF shrink due to RCS valves will fail them closed, preventing inventory loss C26 M 37 cooldown to 561F. No N/A through this path.

b. On NK44, open Based on SA NK4407, MCB 006, initial Loss of power to the remaining loads supplied by CONTROL PANELS shrinkage is these breakers in RL001/RL002 will have no adverse RL001 AND RL002 to typically to 30%

impact.

close Excess Letdown NR. Per WCRE-03, Heat Exchanger 30% equates to Valves. 4,373 gallons. The volume of water NK4407 - OFF below the lowest level transmitter is 637 gallons.

Therefore, the inventory that can be lost before going off scale low is 3,736 gallons.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Page 86 of 106 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 TABLE 7.1 DETAILED EVALUATION OF EACH ACTION STEP IN OFN RP-017 PFSSD Reqd Time CR Fire Prereq STEP DESCRIPTION Function BASIS To Complete TIMING BASIS Impact?

Steps (Note 1) (min) (Note 2)

Assuming a maximum of 100 gpm lost through the excess letdown flow path, there is at least 37 minutes available to mitigate a failed open excess letdown flow path.

NK4411 supplies power to Separation Group 4 125 On NK44, Open vdc loads in RL023/RL024. These loads include NK4411, MCB blowdown valves BM HV-1 thru BM HV-4. Calculation CONTROL PANELS Disconnecting power to these valves will fail them WCNOC-CP-002 RL023 AND RL024 closed, which is the desired position. shows the C27 R, M, D 60 No N/A For S/G Blowdown blowdown valves Isolation Valves. Loss of power to the remaining loads supplied by this can remain open for breaker will have no adverse impact. over 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />.

NK4411 - OFF Also see discussion in Section 7.3.1.a.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Page 87 of 106 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 TABLE 7.1 DETAILED EVALUATION OF EACH ACTION STEP IN OFN RP-017 PFSSD Reqd Time CR Fire Prereq STEP DESCRIPTION Function BASIS To Complete TIMING BASIS Impact?

Steps (Note 1) (min) (Note 2)

Start EDG Fuel Oil Xfer Pump:

The diesel engine

a. At NG04DDF3, can run for at least place Emergency FO 60 minutes using Change package 12176 added hand switch JE HS-Transfer Pump the fuel in the day 21C to isolate the pump control circuit from the Isolation Switch in tank, given the Control Room. In addition, operation of the switch Isolate. reduced loading C28 S will insert a new fuse in the circuit in case the main 60 No N/A imposed on the fuse opened as a result of the fire. This ensures the JE HS-21C - ISO engine during transfer pump will start when JE HS-21B is placed in PFSSD. Therefore, the RUN position. NG04 is energized in Step C13.

b. At panel KJ122, this action should start Emergency Fuel be completed within Oil Transfer Pump. 60 minutes.

JE HS-21B - RUN At NG02AHF2, Place Check valve EFV0471 was added to the service NORMAL ISO/CLOSE water cross connect piping in DCP 14750. Valve EF Switch For ESW HV-26 is no longer required to be closed to prevent B/Service Water flow diversion. The action to close EF HV-26 will C29 Cross- Connect Valve S remain in the procedure as a precaution. Step C12 N/A N/A No N/A To ISO/CLOSE restores power to the MCC cubicle for this valve.

EF HS-26A - DCP 12170 modified the control circuit for EF HV-26 ISO/CLOSE to address NRC IN 92-18 concerns.

Contact SRO at ASP C30 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A For Further Direction

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Page 88 of 106 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 TABLE 7.1 DETAILED EVALUATION OF EACH ACTION STEP IN OFN RP-017 PFSSD Reqd Time CR Fire Prereq STEP DESCRIPTION Function BASIS To Complete TIMING BASIS Impact?

Steps (Note 1) (min) (Note 2)

The PFSSD strategy is to use BG LCV-459 and BG In Rod Drive M/G SA-08-006 LCV-460 to isolate normal letdown. In order to Room Isolate Normal assumes the isolate BG LCV-459 and BG LCV-460, PK5117 is Letdown and Aux letdown isolation placed in the OFF position to disrupt power to these Spray PK5117, RC & valves are closed valves and fail them closed. This will also disrupt D1 SUPPORT SYS. M 7 within 7 minutes No N/A power to auxiliary pressurizer spray valve CONTROL PNL. and the auxiliary BGHV8145 and fail the valve closed. This action will RL001 & RL002. spray valve is also disrupt power to a number of other separation closed within 7 group 5 125 vdc loads in RL001/RL002, but this will PK5117 - OFF minutes.

have no adverse impact on PFSSD.

Proceed to Emergency Locker Procedure is required to complete remaining D2 2026' Level And N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Attachment D steps.

Obtain A Copy Of This Procedure.

Perform The Following:

a. Obtain the following from emergency locker:

A radio is required to ensure communication with the Radio SRO at the ASP and other operators. Zone 2, Flashlight Operations channel is used by Operations for Circular soft jawed D3 N/A communication. A flashlight supplements fixed N/A N/A N/A N/A pliers battery powered emergency lights. The soft-jawed Arc Flash pliers are required to disconnect the Amphenol Protection connectors for the main steam isolation valves.

b. Select Zone 2, Operations channel on radio

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Page 89 of 106 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 TABLE 7.1 DETAILED EVALUATION OF EACH ACTION STEP IN OFN RP-017 PFSSD Reqd Time CR Fire Prereq STEP DESCRIPTION Function BASIS To Complete TIMING BASIS Impact?

Steps (Note 1) (min) (Note 2)

EF HS-60 is placed in ISO/CLOSE to close EF HV-On NG04C, Perform 60 and prevent flow imbalance in the Train B ESW the Following: system. This valve is required to be closed since manual valve EF V-090 is throttled to provide the At NG04CHF2, correct cooling flow from Train B ESW through the place EF HS-60 to Train B CCW heat exchanger. With EF HV-60 open, ISO/CLOSE the flow balance will be affected, possibly drawing Turn off ESW from other essential components. The valve NG04CHF3, will close when power is restored to NG04 in Step EGHV102 CCW C13. Placing the switch in ISO/CLOSE before power SUPPLY TO RHR is restored will have no adverse impact.

HEAT EXCHANGER Bkr NG04CHF3 is placed in OFF position to prevent At NG04CJF3, spurious opening of EGHV102 and to allow an See Sections 6.1 place EG HS-16A to operator to close the valve if it did spuriously open. Prior to the and 6.2 for timing ISO/OPEN The valve needs to be closed to ensure sufficient need for basis for charging.

D4 At NG04CKF1, M, S CCW flow to the CCP oil cooler and seal water heat charging and No N/A place EG HS-54 to exchanger to support Train B CCP functionality. This supported See Section 6.5 for ISO/OPEN action needs to be completed before Step D7. equipment timing basis for At NG04CKF2, CCW and ESW.

place EM HS- EG HS-16A is placed in ISO/OPEN to open EG HV-8803B to 16 and provide a return flow path from the service ISO/OPEN loop to the Train B CCW pump suction. The valve is Turn off required to be open to ensure CCW flow to the seal NG04CKF3, water heat exchanger, which is required to ensure EMHV8801B BIT Train B CCP operability. The valve will open when DISCHARGE power is restored to NG04 in Step C13. Placing the ISOLATION VALVE switch in ISO/OPEN before power is restored will Bkr have no adverse impact.

At NG04CNF3, place EF HS-52 to EG HS-54 is placed in ISO/OPEN to open EG HV-54 ISO/OPEN and provide a supply flow path from the Train B CCW pump to the service loop. The valve is

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Page 90 of 106 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 TABLE 7.1 DETAILED EVALUATION OF EACH ACTION STEP IN OFN RP-017 PFSSD Reqd Time CR Fire Prereq STEP DESCRIPTION Function BASIS To Complete TIMING BASIS Impact?

Steps (Note 1) (min) (Note 2) required to be open to ensure CCW flow to the seal water heat exchanger, which is required to ensure Train B CCP operability. The valve will not actually open until power is restored to NG04 in Step C13.

Placing the switch in ISO/OPEN before power is restored will have no adverse impact.

EM HS-8803B is placed in ISO/OPEN to ensure Train B CCP flow to the RCS through the BIT. This is the only boration and inventory control flow path credited. The valve will not actually open until power is restored to NG04 in Step C13. Placing the switch in ISO/OPEN before power is restored will have no adverse impact.

NG04CKF3 is placed in OFF to prevent spurious operation of EM HV-8801B. DCP 12130 modified the control circuit for EM HV-8801B to address NRC IN 92-18 concerns. Step B13 throttles EM HV-8801B.

EF HS-52 is placed in ISO/OPEN to ensure a flow path from Train B ESW to the Train B CCW heat exchanger. The Train B CCW heat exchanger is required for CCP B oil cooler and the seal water heat exchanger, which are both required for CCP operability. The valve will not actually open until power is restored to NG04 in Step C13. Placing the switch in ISO/OPEN before power is restored will have no adverse impact.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Page 91 of 106 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 TABLE 7.1 DETAILED EVALUATION OF EACH ACTION STEP IN OFN RP-017 PFSSD Reqd Time CR Fire Prereq STEP DESCRIPTION Function BASIS To Complete TIMING BASIS Impact?

Steps (Note 1) (min) (Note 2)

Valve EM HV-8801A is closed in Step B13 to prevent On NG01B, Perform overfilling the pressurizer. Step D5 needs to be the following:

completed prior to Step B13 to prevent the valve from re-opening. This step was added as a At NG01BER2, compensatory measure per CR 00045442, which place NG01BER2, identified the potential to overfill the pressurizer if this EM HV-8801A valve were to spuriously open as a result of a safety BORON injection signal. The step is no longer considered a INJECTION TK Based on SA compensatory measure, but rather a permanent part DISCHARGE ISO 006, operators have of the procedure. Valve EM HV-8801A was modified VLV off. 28 minutes to in DCP 13614 to address NRC IN 92-18. Closing control charging valve EM HV-8801A or ensuring it is closed will o NG01BER2 - 28 minutes to flow through the prevent the pressurizer from going water solid.

D5 OFF M control BIT. Train B CCP No N/A charging flow is stopped in 10 Cold shutdown procedure OFN RP-017A requires a At NG01BBR3, minutes, reducing vent path through the pressurizer PORVs to the PRT place BB HS- the flow to the RCS for pressure control. The PORV block valves were 8000C, PORV following a spurious not modified to address NRC IN 92-18, making them BLOCK VALVE SIS.

susceptible to being damaged in the closed position ISOLATION such that they cannot be re-opened. Both block SWITCH to valves were originally provided with an ISO/CLOSE.

isolation/close switch. Only one spurious operation is required to be assumed until transfer of control to o BB HS-the ASP. Both block valve isolation switches are 8000C -

operated in this procedure, thereby ensuring at least ISO/CLOSE one valve will be available for cold shutdown actions.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Page 92 of 106 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 TABLE 7.1 DETAILED EVALUATION OF EACH ACTION STEP IN OFN RP-017 PFSSD Reqd Time CR Fire Prereq STEP DESCRIPTION Function BASIS To Complete TIMING BASIS Impact?

Steps (Note 1) (min) (Note 2)

Locally Ensure CCW Return From Nuclear Auxiliary Components to Train EG HV-15 is closed to ensure flow is not diverted to A CCW Is Closed: the Train A CCW surge tank. The CCW lineup in OFN RP-017 maintains water flow from CCW to the Prior to the a) Verify with SRO at excess letdown heat exchanger. Therefore, Train B See Section 6.5 for need for D6 ASP, that Step 5.c S return flow could potentially flow into the Train A timing basis for No 5.c supported is complete. CCW piping if EG HV-15 is open. CCW.

equipment b) Ensure EG HV-15 (2026 AUX BLDG, Step 5.c opens the MCC breaker for EG HV-15 and ABOUT 30 needs to be completed before Step D6.

SOUTH OF CCW HX A, BY WEST WALL) is closed.

Prior to the See Section 6.5 for

a. Do not continue until The RNO ensures the operator does not continue need for D6 RNO S timing basis for No 5.c Step 5.c is complete. until the prerequisite step is complete. supported CCW.

equipment In the 2026 Aux Bldg Hallway (outside the MG Set Room), locally Step D4 opens the breaker for EG HV-102, ensuring 28 minutes to close EG HV-102 the valve will not change position after it has been start the CCW SUPPLY TO closed. Valve EG HV-102 needs to be closed to See Section 6.2 for charging D7 RHR HX B. ensure sufficient CCW flow to the CCP oil cooler and timing basis for No D4 pump and seal water heat exchanger to support Train B CCP charging.

control EG HV-102 functionality. This action needs to be completed charging flow.

CLOSED before the Train B CCP is started.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Page 93 of 106 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 TABLE 7.1 DETAILED EVALUATION OF EACH ACTION STEP IN OFN RP-017 PFSSD Reqd Time CR Fire Prereq STEP DESCRIPTION Function BASIS To Complete TIMING BASIS Impact?

Steps (Note 1) (min) (Note 2)

With the SIS flow path open, it would take a considerable This step ensures one of the two SIS test lines is amount of time to isolated to prevent flow diversion through the test reduce RWST In South Electrical line. Step D15 isolates the second line. Both valves volume to below Penetration Room, are normally closed and fail closed on loss of power. that needed for safe place EM HS-8843, Switch EM HS-8843 will isolate power to the valve shutdown. Per XX-BORON INJ and fail it closed. E-013, 214,260 UPSTREAM TEST gallons can be lost D8 LINE ISOLATION M 71 hours8.217593e-4 days <br />0.0197 hours <br />1.173942e-4 weeks <br />2.70155e-5 months <br /> No N/A The SIS test lines discharge into a common 3/4 inch from the RWST.

SWITCH to line. Flow would then pass two normally closed 3/4 Assuming 50 gpm ISO/CLOSE.

inch air operated valves before returning to the lost through the 3/4 RWST or the RHUT. For the failure to occur, there SIS test line, it EM HS-8843 -

would have to be 3 spurious actuations, which is would take 71 ISO/CLOSED extremely unlikely and is not postulated for a control hours to reduce room fire. RWST volume to a level below that required for safe shutdown.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Page 94 of 106 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 On NG02B, Perform the following:

o At NG02BAF2, start the Electrical Based on the Wolf Creek TRM, Table TR 3.7.22-1, Penetration Room the allowable temperature in the Train B electrical Cooler. penetration room is 101 F.

a. At NG02BAF2, place GL HS-35, Switch GL HS-35, when placed in ISO/RUN position, PENETRATION will isolate the control room circuit and insert a ROOM COOLER redundant fuse. However, the unit will not start until B ISOLATION the start push button is depressed, which will SWITCH to energize the 42 coil, close the seal in contact and ISO/RUN. start the unit. Therefore, both GL HS-35 and the The timing of this o GL HS push button need to be actuated to start the cooler. Prior to room step is based on ISO-RUN Step C13 establishes power to the cooler. reaching the time for the

b. At NG02BAF2, unacceptable room to reach depress start Cold shutdown procedure OFN RP-017A requires a temperature temperatures pushbutton. vent path through the pressurizer PORVs to the PRT and prior to beyond operability D9 S No N/A o At NG02BDF1, for pressure control. The PORV block valves were need for limits of the place BB HB HS- not modified to address NRC IN 92-18, making them supported equipment and 8000D, PORV susceptible to being damaged in the closed position systems need for CCW.

BLOCK VALVE such that they cannot be re-opened. Both block See Section 6.5 for ISOLATION valves were originally provided with an discussion on room SWITCH to isolation/close switch. Only one spurious operation cooling and CCW.

ISO/CLOSE. is required to be assumed until transfer of control to o BB HS-8000D - the ASP. Both block valve isolation switches are ISO/CLOSE operated in this procedure, thereby ensuring at least o At NG02BHF1, one valve will be available for cold shutdown actions.

place NG02BHF1, EG HV-133 CCW Step B10 verifies EG HV-133 is closed after this step CONTAINMENT is complete. This valve is closed for the same ISOLATION VALVE reason that EG HV-61 is closed. See the discussion to off. for Step 5.c.

o NG02BHF1 -

OFF This step provides confirmation to the RO that CCW Inform the Reactor alignment has been completed. See Step C22 for Operator that CCW D10 S 28 timing basis for N/A N/A Alignment is Step C22.a requires the RO to confirm Step B10 is CCW.

Completed complete. Step B10 cannot be completed until Steps

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Page 95 of 106 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 TABLE 7.1 DETAILED EVALUATION OF EACH ACTION STEP IN OFN RP-017 PFSSD Reqd Time CR Fire Prereq STEP DESCRIPTION Function BASIS To Complete TIMING BASIS Impact?

Steps (Note 1) (min) (Note 2) 5.c and D9 are complete. When Steps 5.c, D9 and B10 are complete, the RO can start the CCW pump in Step C22.b.

DCP 11086 added a control room isolation switch and redundant fusing at MCC cubicle NG02BHF3 for On NG02BHF3, place valve EF HV-34. This ensures the valve will open (if EF HS-34, ESW TRN B closed) and remain open throughout the event when TO CTMT AIR EF HS-34 is placed in the ISO/OPEN position and See Section 6.5 for COOLERS power is restored to NG02B. This valve is required discussion about D11 ISOLATION SWITCH S to be open to ensure ESW flow to the Train B N/A No N/A containment to ISO/OPEN. containment coolers.

cooling.

EF HS Step C12 establishes power to load center NG02, ISO/OPEN which supplies power to cubicle NG02BHF3. If Step D11 is performed prior to Step C12, there will be no adverse impact.

DCP 11086 added a control room isolation switch and redundant fusing at MCC cubicle NG02BHR2 for On NG02BHR2, place valve EF HV-46. This ensures the valve will open (if EF HS-46, ESW TRN closed) and remain open throughout the event when B FROM CTMT AIR EF HS-46 is placed in the ISO/OPEN position and See Section 6.5 for COOLERS power is restored to NG02B. This valve is required discussion about D12 ISOLATION SWITCH S to be open to ensure ESW flow from the Train B N/A No N/A containment to ISO/OPEN. containment coolers.

cooling.

EF HS Step C12 establishes power to load center NG02, ISO/OPEN which supplies power to cubicle NG02BHR2. If Step D12 is performed prior to Step C12, there will be no adverse impact.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Page 96 of 106 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 TABLE 7.1 DETAILED EVALUATION OF EACH ACTION STEP IN OFN RP-017 PFSSD Reqd Time CR Fire Prereq STEP DESCRIPTION Function BASIS To Complete TIMING BASIS Impact?

Steps (Note 1) (min) (Note 2)

On NG02B, Open ESW To/From CTMT Air Cooler Valves:

DCP 12131 added control room isolation switches

a. At NG02BDR1, and redundant fuses at MCC cubicles NG02BDR1 place EF HS-32, ESW (EF HV-32) and NG02BDR2 (EF HV-50) for these TRN B TO CTMT AIR valves. This ensures valves EF HV-32 and EF HV-COOLERS ISOLATION 50 will open (if closed) and remain open throughout SWITCH to ISO/OPEN.

the event when EF HS-32 and EF HS-50 are placed See Section 6.5 for in the ISO/OPEN position and power is restored to EF HS discussion about D13 S NG02B. These valves are required to be open to N/A No N/A ISO/OPEN containment ensure ESW flow to/from the Train B containment cooling.

coolers.

b. At NG02BDR2, place EF HS-50, ESW Step C12 establishes power to load center NG02, TRN B FROM CTMT which supplies power to cubicles NG02BDR1 and AIR COOLERS NG02BDR2. If Step D13 is performed prior to Step ISOLATION SWITCH C12, there will be no adverse impact.

to ISO/OPEN.

EF HS ISO/OPEN

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Page 97 of 106 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 TABLE 7.1 DETAILED EVALUATION OF EACH ACTION STEP IN OFN RP-017 PFSSD Reqd Time CR Fire Prereq STEP DESCRIPTION Function BASIS To Complete TIMING BASIS Impact?

Steps (Note 1) (min) (Note 2)

Start Containment Cooler Fans B and D:

a. At NG02TAF1, place GN HS-9A, DCP 12177 installed a redundant fuse in the control CONTAINMENT circuit for each fan so that, in the event of a fire in the COOLER FAN B control room, the fans will start when GN HS-9A and ISOLATION SWITCH GN HS-17A are placed in ISO/RUN position and to ISO/RUN. power is restored to NG02T and NG04T.

See Section 6.5 for GN HS-9A - Step C12 establishes power to load center NG02, discussion about D14 ISO/RUN S which supplies power to NG02TAF1. If Step D14 is N/A No N/A containment performed prior to Step C12, there will be no adverse cooling.

b. At NG04TAF1, impact.

place GN HS-17A, CONTAINMENT Step C13 establishes power to load center NG04, COOLER FAN D which supplies power to NG04TAF1. If Step D14 is ISOLATION SWITCH performed prior to Step C13, there will be no adverse to ISO/RUN. impact.

GN HS-17A -

ISO/RUN

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Page 98 of 106 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 TABLE 7.1 DETAILED EVALUATION OF EACH ACTION STEP IN OFN RP-017 PFSSD Reqd Time CR Fire Prereq STEP DESCRIPTION Function BASIS To Complete TIMING BASIS Impact?

Steps (Note 1) (min) (Note 2)

This step ensures one of the two SIS test lines is isolated to prevent flow diversion through the test In the North Electrical line. Step D8 isolates the second line. Both valves Penetration Room, are normally closed and fail closed on loss of power.

place EM HS-8882, Switch EM HS-8882 will isolate power to the valve BORON INJ and fail it closed.

DOWNSTREAM TEST D15 LINE ISOLATION M 71 hours8.217593e-4 days <br />0.0197 hours <br />1.173942e-4 weeks <br />2.70155e-5 months <br /> See D8 discussion. No N/A The SIS test lines discharge into a common 3/4 inch SWITCH to line. Flow would then pass two normally closed 3/4 ISO/CLOSE.

inch air operated valves before returning to the RWST or the RHUT. For the failure to occur, there EM HS-8882 -

would have to be 3 spurious actuations, which is ISO/CLOSED extremely unlikely and is not postulated for a control room fire.

Request SRO At ASP To Ensure S/G A And C ARVs - CLOSED See Section 6.1 for AB PV-1 and AB PV-3 are closed by the SRO at the discussion about D16 R, M, D ASP. AB PV-2 and AB PV-4 are isolated from the 60 No N/A AB PV steam generator control room and controlled from the ASP.

CLOSED ARVs.

AB PV CLOSED

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Page 99 of 106 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 TABLE 7.1 DETAILED EVALUATION OF EACH ACTION STEP IN OFN RP-017 PFSSD Reqd Time CR Fire Prereq STEP DESCRIPTION Function BASIS To Complete TIMING BASIS Impact?

Steps (Note 1) (min) (Note 2)

Isolate air and N2 to AB PV-3, SG C ATMOSPHERIC RELIEF VLV:

a. KAV1445 -

See Section 6.1 for CLOSED This step isolates air and nitrogen and bleeds air discussion about D17 R, M, D 60 No N/A from the regulator to prevent the valve from opening. steam generator

b. KAV1366 -

ARVs.

CLOSED

c. Vent both regulators

d. Verify AB PV-3 closed See Section 6.1 for

d. Close AB-V029, SG If AB PV-3 cannot be closed, then manual valve AB-discussion about D17 RNO C ATMOSPHERIC R, M, D V029 can be closed to isolate steam generator C 60 No N/A steam generator RELIEF VLV ISO ARV.

ARVs.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Page 100 of 106 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 TABLE 7.1 DETAILED EVALUATION OF EACH ACTION STEP IN OFN RP-017 PFSSD Reqd Time CR Fire Prereq STEP DESCRIPTION Function BASIS To Complete TIMING BASIS Impact?

Steps (Note 1) (min) (Note 2)

Isolate air and N2 to AB PV-1, SG A ATMOSPHERIC RELIEF VALVE

a. KAV1435 -

See Section 6.1 for CLOSED This step isolates air and nitrogen and bleeds air discussion about D18 R, M, D 60 No N/A from the regulator to prevent the valve from opening. steam generator

b. KAV1364 -

ARVs.

CLOSED

c. Vent both regulators

d. Verify AB PV-1 closed See Section 6.1 for

d. Close AB-V018, SG If AB PV-1 cannot be closed, then manual valve AB-discussion about D18 RNO A ATMOSPHERIC R, M, D V018 can be closed to isolate steam generator A 60 No N/A steam generator RELIEF VLV ISO ARV.

ARVs.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Page 101 of 106 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 TABLE 7.1 DETAILED EVALUATION OF EACH ACTION STEP IN OFN RP-017 PFSSD Reqd Time CR Fire Prereq STEP DESCRIPTION Function BASIS To Complete TIMING BASIS Impact?

Steps (Note 1) (min) (Note 2)

Ensure MSIVs Are Closed By Unplugging All This step is a precaution to ensure the MSIVs remain Amphenol closed for the duration of the event. Step C2 de-Connectors At The This step can be energizes the MSIVs by opening NK5119, which fails Listed Terminal completed when all them closed. There is reasonable assurance that the Boxes: other steps are MSIVs will not re-open because it would take complete. See D19 R, M, D multiple proper polarity hot shorts to re-energize the N/A No N/A o AB HV A Train Section 6.1 for MSIV solenoids. Multiple proper polarity hot shorts TB14540 additional are not credible for non-high/low pressure interface o AB HV A Train discussion (Reference XX-E-013, Assumption 3-A-17). MSIV TB14533 regarding MSIVs.

are not high/low pressure interface (Reference XX-E-o AB HV A Train 013, Appendix 1).

TB14538 o AB HV A Train TB14535 This step ensures the SRO knows the Amphenol Notify SRO At The connectors have been pulled. The new MSIVs have See D19 D20 Aux Shutdown Panel, N/A no external position indication so the operator at the N/A N/A N/A discussion.

Status of MSIVs ASP will have to rely on available instrumentation to determine position.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Page 102 of 106 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 TABLE 7.1 DETAILED EVALUATION OF EACH ACTION STEP IN OFN RP-017 PFSSD Reqd Time CR Fire Prereq STEP DESCRIPTION Function BASIS To Complete TIMING BASIS Impact?

Steps (Note 1) (min) (Note 2)

In SGK04B Room, Start Class 1E Calculations GK Electrical Equipment W and GK-M-16 This step ensures room cooling to the Class 1E A/C Unit: allow for 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> to switchgear rooms. The cooler needs to be started initiate before the rooms reach a temperature beyond Place GK HS-103, compensatory operating limits for the equipment. In order for the CLASS IE ELEC measures upon C10, D21 S unit to operate, there needs to be power to NG02A 60 No EQUIP A/C UNIT loss of either train C12 and ESW flow to the cooler. Power is restored in 5B ISOLATION of class IE room Step C12. ESW pump is started in step C10. Steps SWITCH to cooler. See C10 and C12 should be completed well before Step ISO/RUN. Section 6.5 for D21.

additional o GK HS-103 - discussion.

ISO/RUN Proceed As Directed Attachment D is complete and the SRO will direct the D22 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A By SRO at ASP. operator at this point.

Proceed To NB02 Switchgear Room And Obtain The Following:

Items are required to complete remaining Attachment E1 o Copy of this N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A E steps.

procedure o Flashlight o Arc Flash Protection

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Page 103 of 106 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 TABLE 7.1 DETAILED EVALUATION OF EACH ACTION STEP IN OFN RP-017 PFSSD Reqd Time CR Fire Prereq STEP DESCRIPTION Function BASIS To Complete TIMING BASIS Impact?

Steps (Note 1) (min) (Note 2)

Ensure Motor Driven AFW Pump A Is Stopped:

SA-08-006 shows The Train A MDAFP breaker is opened to stop the

a. Remove CLOSE that if the pump is pump and prevent uncontrolled AFW flow to steam control power fuse stopped within 15 generators B and C which could result in overfilling (UC). minutes and other the steam generators. Although A Train equipment actions in the E2 D is not credited, spurious actuation of A Train 15 No N/A NB0105/FUSE - procedure are equipment needs to be mitigated if it could lead to OFF/REMOVED taken, overfilling of unwanted consequences. In this case, overfilling of steam generators B the steam generators is not desired and is, therefore,

b. Stop Motor Driven and C will not being prevented in OFN RP-017.

AFW Pump A occur.

NB0105 - OPEN Calculation XX-E-Place BN HV-8812A, 013 shows there is RWST TO RHR PUMP 28 minutes A SUCTION This Step ensures BN HV-8812A is de-energized available before the E3 ISOLATION VALVE M and will not spuriously operate after it has been 28 No N/A RWST drains to a Breaker To Off manually closed in the next step.

level below that required for cold NG01ACR2 - OFF shutdown.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Page 104 of 106 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 TABLE 7.1 DETAILED EVALUATION OF EACH ACTION STEP IN OFN RP-017 PFSSD Reqd Time CR Fire Prereq STEP DESCRIPTION Function BASIS To Complete TIMING BASIS Impact?

Steps (Note 1) (min) (Note 2)

Valve BN HV-8812A is normally open and is manually closed in OFN RP-017 to prevent the In RHR Pump Room RWST from draining to the containment sump in the Based on XX-E-A, Close RWST To event EJ HV-8811A spuriously opens. Valve BN HV- 013, operators have RHR Pump A 8812A is a Train A valve so power may not be 28 minutes to close E4 Isolation Valve. M available, which is why manual operation is required. 28 the valve and No E2 Step E2 isolates power to the control circuit to prevent the RWST BN HV-8812A - prevent spurious operation after the valve is closed. from draining to the CLOSED DCP 12173 modified the control circuit to ensure a containment sump.

control room fire will not damage the valve and prevent manual closure.

Inform The SRO That This step notifies the SRO and the ASP that BN HV-E5 BN HV-8812A Is M N/A N/A N/A N/A 8812A is closed.

Closed

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Page 105 of 106 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 TABLE 7.1 DETAILED EVALUATION OF EACH ACTION STEP IN OFN RP-017 PFSSD Reqd Time CR Fire Prereq STEP DESCRIPTION Function BASIS To Complete TIMING BASIS Impact?

Steps (Note 1) (min) (Note 2)

Ascend Ladders To 2000 Elevation Aux Feedwater Pump Room Area And Close The Following Valves:

o TD AFWP DISCHARGE TO SG A HV-8 INLET ISO.

o AL-V056 -

CLOSED o TD AFWP DISCHARGE TO SG D HV-6 INLET This step isolates possible AFW flow diversion paths ISO. See Section 6.3 for E6 D to prevent overfilling the steam generators when 35 No N/A o AL-V061 - timing basis.

operating the TDAFP and the B MDAFP.

CLOSED o MD AFWP DISCHARGE TO SG A HV-7 INLET ISO.

o AL-V032 -

CLOSED o TD AFWP DISCHARGE TO SG C HV-12 INLET ISO.

o AL-V071 -

CLOSED

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Page 106 of 106 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 TABLE 7.1 DETAILED EVALUATION OF EACH ACTION STEP IN OFN RP-017 PFSSD Reqd Time CR Fire Prereq STEP DESCRIPTION Function BASIS To Complete TIMING BASIS Impact?

Steps (Note 1) (min) (Note 2)

Notify RP that a non- This step notifies RP that the operator entered the E7 RCA area was entered N/A auxiliary feedwater area from the RCA and the area N/A N/A N/A N/A into from the RCA. may be contaminated.

Inform The SRO That the Aux Feedwater This step notifies the SRO that the Aux Feedwater E8 Valves Are Closed, Go N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A valves are closed.

Back Down The Ladder And Proceed To ASP This attachment was added based on Reference Actions to Protect Att F N/A 3.1.a. See discussion under Reference 3.1.a and N/A N/A N/A N/A Equipment Step A18.

This attachment is included to provide instructions to operators on how to manually charge the Siemens Manual Charging of circuit breakers. This attachment is used for some Att G Siemens Circuit N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A RNO actions throughout the procedure. The springs Breakers are charged for one cycle of operation so entering the attachment will not normally be necessary.

MOV BODY Att H PRESSURE N/A See Basis discussion for Step A21. N/A N/A N/A N/A BOUNDARY CHECK.

Table Notes:

1. PFSSD Functions are as follows: R - Reactivity Control; M - Reactor Coolant Makeup and Inventory Control; D - Decay Heat Removal; P -

Process Monitoring; S - Support; N/A - Not Applicable

2. The column labeled CR Fire Impact? identifies if a fire in the control room could potentially cause the component to mis-position after the step has been completed. Yes means the component can mis-position and No means the component cannot mis-position. N/A means the question is not applicable to the step.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Appendix 1 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 Page 1 of 31 Appendix 1 OFN RP-017 Credited Component Evaluation

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Appendix 1 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 Page 2 of 31 Table A1 documents whether the components credited for hot standby following a control room fire are properly protected against hot shorts, open circuits or shorts to ground that could occur due to a fire in the control room. Also, the evaluation documents whether adequate isolation capability is provided to ensure the credited components remain functional and unaffected by the fire after control room isolation is completed.

This evaluation was performed to satisfy an NRC commitment made in Licensee Event Report 2010-003-00. This evaluation was originally performed as a corrective action for CR 00023410-02-01 and is being added to E-1F9915 per CR 00044460-02-01 to ensure the information is maintained in a controlled document. The evaluation has been updated since the original evaluation in CR 00023410-02-01 to reflect the current configuration in OFN RP-017.

Table A1 OFN RP-017 Credited Component Evaluation Component Evaluation ABHS0079 and The main steam isolation valves (MSIVs) are closed in OFN RP-017 to prevent rapid cooldown and return to ABHS0080 criticality. Operators, upon exiting the control room, actuate All Close hand switches ABHS0079 and ABHS0080 to close the MSIVs. The Wolf Creek fire protection licensing basis does not allow us to credit this action. Therefore, later steps have operators remove power from the MSIV solenoids to fail them closed. The circuit is shown on drawings E-13AB26, E-13AB27, E-13AB28 and E-13AB29.

Power is removed from the A Train solenoids by placing NK5119 in the OFF position. This isolates separation group 1 power from MSFIS cabinet SA075A and fails the MSIVs closed.

Power is also removed from the A Train solenoids by removing the Amphenol connectors at the associated terminal box. This is done as a precaution to prevent the unlikely spurious re-opening of the MSIVs due to the control room fire. Loss of power to either train of solenoids will fail the MSIVs closed. A Train was chosen for convenience.

Based on the above discussion, the MSIVs are protected.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Appendix 1 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 Page 3 of 31 Table A1 OFN RP-017 Credited Component Evaluation Component Evaluation ABHV0005 Valve ABHV0005 controls steam to the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump (TDAFP) from Steam Generator B and opens upon loss of 125 VDC power to the solenoid valve. Redundant control power originates from NK4201 through relay panel RP334 (Dwg E-13RP14) which does not run in the control room. Placing ABHIS0005B in the open position drops power to the solenoid and opens the valve. Upon arrival at the ASP, Operators place hand switch RPHIS0001 in the ISOLATE position per OFN RP-017. This energizes lockout relay 86XRP3 (Dwgs E-13RP11 and E-13RP15), isolates the control room portions of the circuit and inserts redundant fuses to ensure the remaining portions of the circuit are energized. Hand switch ABHIS0005B is placed in the open position at the ASP to open the valve and allow a steam supply to the TDAFP. The control circuit is isolated from the control room when RPHIS0001 is placed in the isolate position. Drawing E-13AB01A shows the control circuit. Based on a review of this drawing, the lockout relay contacts will isolate all portions of the circuit that run to the control room. A fire in the control room will not adversely impact valve ABHV0005 after the isolation switch is operated.

Based on the above discussion, hand switch RPHIS0001 will isolate the control room and insert redundant fuses into the circuit so that hand switch ABHIS0005B will function. Therefore, ABHV0005 is protected.

ABHV0006 Valve ABHV0006 controls steam to the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump (TDAFP) from Steam Generator C and opens upon loss of 125 VDC power to the solenoid valve. Hand switch ABHIS0006B is placed in the closed position at the ASP to close the valve and prevent steaming steam generator C, which is not being provided with feedwater flow in procedure OFN RP-017. Upon arrival at the ASP, Operators place hand switch RPHIS0001 in the ISOLATE position per OFN RP-017. This energizes lockout relay 86XRP2 (Dwgs E-13RP11 and E-13RP15),

isolates the control room portions of the circuit and inserts redundant fuses to ensure the remaining portions of the circuit are energized. Drawing E-13AB01 shows the control circuit. The valve opens upon loss of 125 VDC power to the solenoid valve and closes when the solenoid valve is energized. Redundant control power originates from NK4201 through relay panel RP334 (Dwg E-13RP14), which does not run in the control room. Placing RPHIS0001 in the ISOLATE position maintains power to the ABHV0006 control circuit and allows operators to maintain the valve in the closed position from the ASP. A fire in the control room will not affect operation of the valve after RPHIS0001 is placed in the isolate position. In the unlikely event valve ABHV0006 opens, PFSSD is assured because steam flow to the TDAFP remains available.

Based on the above discussion, hand switch RPHIS0001 will isolate the control room and insert redundant fuses into the circuit so that hand switch ABHIS0006B will function. Therefore, valve ABHV0006 is protected.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Appendix 1 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 Page 4 of 31 Table A1 OFN RP-017 Credited Component Evaluation Component Evaluation ABHV0012, MSIV Bypass valves ABHV0012, ABHV0015, ABHV0018 and ABHV0021 are failed closed in OFN RP-017 by ABHV0015, removing 125 VDC control power from the control circuit. Control power is removed by pulling fuse #46 in panel ABHV0018 and RP209. This de-energizes auxiliary relay 94XAB05 and subsequently de-energizes solenoid valves associated with ABHV0021 the MSIV bypass valves and causes them to close. The valve circuit is shown on drawing E-13AB23A. Panel RP209 wiring for fuse block 46 is shown on drawing E-093-00048. Based on drawing E-093-00048 fuse block 46 does supply power to auxiliary relay 94XAB05. Therefore, removal of fuse block 46 will cause the MSIV bypass valves to close. The MSIV bypass valves are not considered high/low pressure interfaces so consideration of multiple proper polarity hot shorts is not required. The negative side of the circuit shown on drawing E-13AB23A does not run in the control room. Therefore, after the fuse is pulled there is no possibility that the bypass valves can spuriously open as a result of a fire in the control room.

Based on the above discussion, the MSIV bypass valves are adequately protected in the event of a control room fire.

ABPV0001 and Steam generator ARVs ABPV0001 and ABPV0003 are closed in OFN RP-017 by isolating air and nitrogen to the ABPV0003 valves and venting air from the regulators. The ARVs are not isolated from the control room. The Train A ASP has hand switches (ABHS0001 and ABHS0003) that transfer control of ABPV0001 and ABPV0003 to the ASP but the circuits run in the control room. Drawings J-110-00216 and J-110-00220 show the loop diagram for these circuits.

For PFSSD, only two steam generators are needed to maintain hot standby. The control room fire strategy uses steam generator B and D ARVs (ABPV0002 and ABPV0004) for temperature control and closes steam generators A and C ARVs (ABPV0001 and ABPV0003) to prevent uncontrolled cooldown.

Loss of air and nitrogen to the ARVs will fail the valves closed. A fire in the control room will not cause the valves to open in the absence of air and nitrogen. Therefore, ARVs ABPV0001 and ABPV0003 are protected.

ABPV0002 and Steam generator ARVs ABPV0002 and ABPV0004 are controlled in OFN RP-017 at the ASP to control RCS ABPV0004 temperature. Hand switches ABHS0002 and ABHS0004 at the ASP are placed in the LOCAL position to transfer control from the control room to the controller at the Train B ASP. The LOOP diagrams for ABPV0002 are shown on drawings J-110-00218, J-110-00219 and J-110-00933. The LOOP diagrams for ABPV0004 are shown on drawings J-110-00222, J-110-00223 and J-110-00934.

Based on a review of these drawings and discussion with the Instrumentation and Control group, ABHS0002 and ABHS0004 will transfer control to the ASP and the control room circuit is isolated after these switches are placed in local position. Therefore, ABPV0002 and ABPV0004 are protected.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Appendix 1 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 Page 5 of 31 Table A1 OFN RP-017 Credited Component Evaluation Component Evaluation AELI0502A This level indicator is used to verify steam generator B level. Drawings E-13AE08 and M-761-02303 show the circuit arrangement. Level transmitter AELT0502 sends a signal to SB148A in the Train B ESF switchgear room. From SB148A the signal is split and sent to the main control room indicator AELI0502 and ASP indicator AELI0502A. A fire in the control room that affects AELI0502 and associated cable will not affect AELI0502A because the signal converter will isolate any effects from a short occurring in the control room. Therefore, AELI0502A is protected.

AELI0504A This level indicator is used to verify steam generator D level. Drawings E-13AE08 and M-761-02310 show the circuit arrangement. Level transmitter AELT0504 sends a signal to SB148B in the Train B ESF switchgear room.

From SB148B the signal is split and sent to the main control room indicator AELI0504 and ASP indicator AELI0504A. A fire in the control room that affects AELI0504 and associated cable will not affect AELI0504A because the signal converter will isolate any effects from a short occurring in the control room. Therefore, AELI0504A is protected.

ALHV0005 Valve ALHV0005 is controlled at the ASP by placing hand switch ALHS0005 in the local position and controlling the valve using ALHK0005B. The AL HV-5 circuit is shown on drawings J-110-00349, J-110-00871 and J-110-00939.

Technical data sheets for the Foxboro 200 system are provided in vendor manual J-110-00388. These drawings and data sheets were reviewed to determine the circuit configuration and operation of the local hand switch and local valve controller.

When the local hand switch (ALHS0005) is placed in the LOCAL position, relay coils on a relay logic card are energized and the contacts change state. The change of state selects the output from the controller at the ASP and de-selects the control room controller. A fire in the control room could affect the control room controller but any spurious signal would not affect the valve controller. This is because spurious signals or hot shorts originating in the control room are isolated in RP147B by either contact output isolators or isolated current to voltage converters.

Based on vendor manual J-110-00388, these devices will prevent spurious signals or hot shorts originating in the control room from affecting the ability to control ALHV0005 from the ASP.

The physical makeup of the relay contacts allows only one possible state for each set of contacts. Therefore, the contact pair cannot be both open or both closed. One contact will be open and the other will be closed. Since the test procedure provides positive confirmation that the controller at the ASP does work, this provides reasonable assurance that the controller in the control room is completely isolated from the circuit when the local hand switch is placed in the LOCAL position.

Based on the above discussion, there is reasonable assurance that AL HV-5 is isolated from the control room by demonstration that the controller at the ASP operates the valve. Therefore, ALHV0005 is protected.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Appendix 1 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 Page 6 of 31 Table A1 OFN RP-017 Credited Component Evaluation Component Evaluation ALHV0010 Valve ALHV0010 is controlled at the ASP by placing hand switch ALHS0010 in the local position and controlling the valve using ALHK0010B. The AL HV-10 circuit is shown on drawings J-110-00354, J-110-00940 and J-110-00941.

Technical data sheets for the Foxboro 200 system are provided in vendor manual J-110-00388. These drawings and data sheets were reviewed to determine the circuit configuration and operation of the local hand switch and local valve controller.

When the local hand switch (ALHS0010) is placed in the LOCAL position, relay coils on a relay logic card are energized and the contacts change state. The change of state selects the output from the controller at the ASP and de-selects the control room controller. A fire in the control room could affect the control room controller but any spurious signal would not affect the valve controller. This is because spurious signals or hot shorts originating in the control room are isolated in RP147B by either contact output isolators or isolated current to voltage converters.

Based on vendor manual J-110-00388, these devices will prevent spurious signals or hot shorts originating in the control room from affecting the ability to control ALHV0010 from the ASP.

The physical makeup of the relay contacts allows only one possible state for each set of contacts. Therefore, the contact pair cannot be both open or both closed. One contact will be open and the other will be closed. Test procedure STS RP-004 provides positive confirmation that the controller at the ASP does work, so this provides reasonable assurance that the controller in the control room is completely isolated from the circuit when the local hand switch is placed in the LOCAL position.

Based on the above discussion, there is reasonable assurance that ALHV0010 is isolated from the control room.

Therefore, ALHV0010 is protected.

ALHV0030 Valve ALHV0030 is opened when necessary using ALHIS0030B to supply the Train B MDAFP with ESW. Upon arrival at the ASP, Operators place hand switch RPHIS0002 in the ISOLATE position per OFN RP-017. This energizes lockout relay 86XRP5 (Dwgs E-13RP12 and E-13RP15), isolates the control room portions of the circuit and inserts redundant fuses to ensure the remaining portions of the circuit are energized. Drawing E-13AL04B shows the control circuit for this valve. Based on a review of this drawing, the lockout relay contacts will isolate all portions of the circuit that run to the control room. A fire in the control room will not adversely impact valve ALHV0030 after the isolation switch is operated.

Based on the above discussion, hand switch RPHIS0002 will isolate the control room and insert redundant fuses into the circuit so that hand switch ALHIS0030B will function. Therefore, valve ALHV0030 is protected.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Appendix 1 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 Page 7 of 31 Table A1 OFN RP-017 Credited Component Evaluation Component Evaluation ALHV0033 OFN RP-017 places ALHIS0033B in the close position to ensure valve ALHV0033 is closed. The valve is opened when it is necessary to swap to ESW to supply the TDAFW pump. Upon arrival at the ASP, Operators place hand switch RPHIS0002 in the ISOLATE position per OFN RP-017. This energizes lockout relay 86XRP6 (Dwgs E-13RP12 and E-13RP15), isolates the control room portions of the circuit and inserts redundant fuses to ensure the remaining portions of the circuit are energized. The control circuit is shown on drawing E-13AL04B. Based on a review of this drawing, the lockout relay contacts will isolate all portions of the circuit that run to the control room. A fire in the control room will not adversely impact valve ALHV0033 after the isolation switch is operated.

Based on the above discussion, hand switch RPHIS0002 will isolate the control room and insert redundant fuses into the circuit so that hand switch ALHIS0033B will function. Therefore, ALHV0033 is protected.

ALHV0034 OFN RP-017 places ALHIS0034B in the open position to open valve ALHV0034. The ALHV0034 circuit is isolated from the control room when RPHIS0002 is placed in the isolate position. Upon arrival at the ASP, Operators place hand switch RPHIS0002 in the ISOLATE position per OFN RP-017. This energizes lockout relay 86XRP5 (Dwgs E-13RP12 and E-13RP15), isolates the control room portions of the circuit and inserts redundant fuses to ensure the remaining portions of the circuit are energized. The control circuit is shown on drawing E-13AL02B. Based on a review of this drawing, the lockout relay contacts will isolate all portions of the circuit that run to the control room. A fire in the control room will not adversely impact valve ALHV0034 after the isolation switch is operated. The valve may not readily open when ALHIS0034B is placed in the open position because power is not restored to the MCC until NG0401 is closed. This is acceptable because AFW is not needed until 15 minutes into the event and NG0401 is closed prior to 15 minutes.

Based on the above discussion, hand switch RPHIS0002 will isolate the control room and insert redundant fuses into the circuit so that hand switch ALHIS0034B will function. Therefore, ALHV0034 is protected.

ALHV0036 Valve ALHV0036 is manually operated in OFN RP-017 because this valve is powered from Train A MCC cubicle NG03CEF4. Power is disconnected from the valve by opening Train A MCC cubicle breaker NG03CEF4. Train A components are not protected against faults occurring as a result of a control room fire. The control circuit for valve ALHV0036 is shown on drawing E-13AL02C. Change package 12170 modified the control circuit to address NRC IN 92-18 concerns. The concern in NRC IN 92-18 was that a hot short on the motor operator valve circuit could bypass the valves torque and limit devices and drive the valve to damage in the undesired position. The modification ensures a control room fire will not damage the valve and prevent it from being opened manually.

Therefore, ALHV0036 is protected.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Appendix 1 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 Page 8 of 31 Table A1 OFN RP-017 Credited Component Evaluation Component Evaluation ALPI0024B or ALPI0024B or ALPI0026B is used by operators in OFN RP-017 to verify level in the CST. When level drops to 14%

ALPI0026B (15.1 PSIA indication on ALPI0024B & 26B), the procedure directs operators to swap to the ESW source.

Drawings E-13AL07B, J-110-000346, J-110-00348, J-110-00937, and J-110-00938 show the circuit arrangement.

Refer to J-110 Section 6.4.14 for isolation requirement and J-110-00388 p 518-528 for applicable signal converter vendor manual. Pressure transmitter ALPT0024 sends a signal to RP147B in the Train B ESF switchgear room.

From RP147B the signal is split and sent to the main control room indicator ALPI0024A and ASP indicator ALPI0024B. A fire in the control room that affects ALPI0024A and associated cable will not affect ALPI0024B because the signal converter will isolate any effects from a short occurring in the control room. Pressure transmitter ALPT0026 sends a signal to RP147A in the Train B ESF switchgear room. From RP147A the signal is split and sent to the main control room indicator ALPI0026A and ASP indicator ALPI0026B. A fire in the control room that affects ALPI0026A and associated cable will not affect ALPI0026B because the signal converter will isolate any effects from a short occurring in the control room. Therefore, ALPI0024B and ALPI0026B are protected. Level in the CST is not a concern initially since sufficient volume exists to supply the steam generators for at least 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.

BBLI0460B This level indicator is used to verify pressurizer level. Drawings E-13BB16 and M-761-02304 show the circuit arrangement. Level transmitter BBLT0460 sends a signal to SB148A in the Train B ESF switchgear room. From SB148A the signal is split and sent to the main control room indicator BBLI0460A and ASP indicator BBLI0460B. A fire in the control room that affects BBLI0460A and associated cable will not affect BBLI0460B because the signal converter will isolate any effects from a short occurring in the control room. Therefore, BBLI0460B is protected.

BBPI0406X This pressure indicator is used to verify RCS pressure is being maintained between 2000 and 2300 psig. The circuit arrangement is shown on drawings E-13BB16 and M-761-02311. Pressure transmitter BBPT0406 sends a signal to SB148B in the Train B ESF switchgear room. From SB148B the signal is split and sent to the main control room indicator BBPI0406 and ASP indicator BBPI0406X. A fire in the control room that affects BBPI0406 and associated cable will not affect BBTPI0406X because the signal converter will isolate any effects from a short occurring in the control room. Therefore, BBPI0406X is protected.

BBTI0423X This temperature indicator is used to verify RCS Loop 2 cold leg temperature. Drawings E-13BB15 and M-761-02301 show the circuit arrangement. Loop 2 cold leg temperature element BBTE0423B sends a signal to Cabinet 2A which is SB148A located in the Train B ESF switchgear room (Fire Area C-10). From SB148A the signal is split and sent to the main control room indicator BBTI0423B and ASP indicator BBTI0423X. A fire in the control room that affects BBTI0423B and associated cable will not affect BBTI0423X because the signal converter will isolate any effects from a short occurring in the control room. Therefore, BBTI0423X is protected.

BG8402B Valve BG8402B is a manual valve. A control room fire will not affect operation of the valve. Therefore, BG8402B is protected.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Appendix 1 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 Page 9 of 31 Table A1 OFN RP-017 Credited Component Evaluation Component Evaluation BGHV8111 Valve BGHV8111 is opened in OFN RP-017 to ensure adequate minimum flow through the Train B charging pump.

This prevents heatup and damage to the pump. Hand switch BGHS8111A, located at MCC cubicle NG02AHR1, is used to isolate the control room, insert a redundant fuse on the secondary side of the control power transformer, and open the valve. The circuit is shown on drawing E-13BG11C. The circuit was modified in DCP 12175 to address NRC IN 92-18 concerns. The concern in NRC IN 92-18 was that a hot short on the motor operator valve circuit could bypass the valves torque and limit devices and drive the valve to damage in the undesired position. The modification ensures the valve will open when the hand switch is actuated. Based on a review of the drawing, the hand switch will isolate all portions of the control room and open the valve. Power to the valve is from MCC cubicle NG02AHR1. A previous step restores power to the MCC so that when the switch is actuated, the valve will open.

Based on the above discussion, valve BGHV8111 is protected.

BGLCV0112C Valve BGLCV0112C is closed in OFN RP-017 to isolate the VCT from the charging header. Hand switch BGHS0112C is used to isolate the control room, insert a redundant fuse on the secondary side of the control power transformer, and close the valve. The circuit is shown on drawing E-13BG12A. The circuit was modified in DCP 12131 to address NRC IN 92-18 concerns. The concern in NRC IN 92-18 was that a hot short on the motor operator valve circuit could bypass the valves torque and limit devices and drive the valve to damage in the undesired position. The modification ensures the valve will close when the hand switch is actuated. Based on a review of the drawing, the hand switch will isolate all portions of the control room and close the valve. Power to the valve is from MCC cubicle NG02AFR2. A previous step restores power to the MCC so that when the switch is actuated, the valve will close.

Based on the above discussion, valve BGLCV0112C is protected.

BGV0017 Valve BGV0017 is a manual valve. A control room fire will not affect operation of the valve. Therefore, BGV0017 is protected.

BGV0101 Valve BGV0101 is a manual valve. A control room fire will not affect operation of the valve. Therefore, BGV0101 is protected.

BGV0105 Valve BGV0105 is a manual valve. A control room fire will not affect operation of the valve. Therefore, BGV0105 is protected.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Appendix 1 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 Page 10 of 31 Table A1 OFN RP-017 Credited Component Evaluation Component Evaluation BNHV8812A Valve BNHV8812A is manually closed in OFN RP-017 to prevent draindown of the RWST to the containment sump.

This valve is powered from Train A MCC cubicle NG01ACR2. The operator removes power from the valve by opening NG01ACR2 before manually closing the valve. The control circuit is shown on drawing E-13BN03. The circuit is not isolated from the control room. Removal of power will prevent spurious operation of the valve in the event of a control room fire. DCP 12173 modified the control circuit to address NRC IN 92-18 concerns. The concern in NRC IN 92-18 was that a hot short on the motor operator valve circuit could bypass the valves torque and limit devices and drive the valve to damage in the undesired position. The modification ensures the valve can be manually closed when needed. Therefore, valve BNHV8812A is protected.

BNHV8812B Valve BNHV8812B is closed in OFN RP-017 to prevent flow diversion from the RWST to the containment sump.

Hand switch BNHS8812B is used to isolate the control room, insert a redundant fuse on the secondary side of the control power transformer, and close the valve. The circuit is shown on drawing E-13BN03A. The circuit was modified in DCP 12173 to address NRC IN 92-18 concerns. The concern in NRC IN 92-18 was that a hot short on the motor operator valve circuit could bypass the valves torque and limit devices and drive the valve to damage in the undesired position. The modification ensures the valve will close when the hand switch is actuated. Based on a review of the drawing, the hand switch will isolate all portions of the control room and close the valve. Power to the valve is from MCC cubicle NG02AFF4. A previous step restores power to the MCC so that when the switch is actuated, the valve will close.

Based on the above discussion, valve BNHV8812B is protected.

BNLCV0112E Valve BNLCV0112E is opened in OFN RP-017 to establish a suction source from the RWST to the Train B CCP.

Hand switch BNHS0112E, located at MCC cubicle NG02AHR3, is used to isolate the control room, insert a redundant fuse on the secondary side of the control power transformer, and open the valve. The circuit is shown on drawing E-13BN01A. The circuit was modified in DCP 12175 to address NRC IN 92-18 concerns. The concern in NRC IN 92-18 was that a hot short on the motor operator valve circuit could bypass the valves torque and limit devices and drive the valve to damage in the undesired position. The modification ensures the valve will open when the hand switch is actuated. Based on a review of the drawing, the hand switch will isolate all portions of the control room and open the valve. Power to the valve is from MCC cubicle NG02AHR3. A previous step restores power to the MCC so that when the switch is actuated, the valve will open.

Based on the above discussion, valve BNLCV0112E is protected.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Appendix 1 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 Page 11 of 31 Table A1 OFN RP-017 Credited Component Evaluation Component Evaluation EFHV0026 Valve EFHV0026 is closed in OFN RP-017 to prevent flow diversion from ESW to the service water piping.

However, check valve EFV0471 was added to the service water cross connect piping in DCP 14750, making valve EFHV0026 no longer required to be closed to prevent flow diversion.

The action to close EFHV0026 will remain in procedure OFN RP-017 as a safeguard in the event the check valve does not hold. Hand switch EFHS0026A is used to isolate the control room, insert a redundant fuse on the secondary side of the control power transformer, and close the valve. The circuit is shown on drawing E-13EF02A.

The circuit was modified in DCP 12170 to address NRC IN 92-18 concerns. The concern in NRC IN 92-18 was that a hot short on the motor operator valve circuit could bypass the valves torque and limit devices and drive the valve to damage in the undesired position. The modification ensures the valve will close when the hand switch is actuated. Based on a review of the drawing, the hand switch will isolate all portions of the control room and close the valve. Power to the valve is from MCC cubicle NG02AHF2. A previous step restores power to the MCC so that when the switch is actuated, the valve will close.

Based on the above discussion, valve EFHV0026 is protected.

EFHV0032 Valve EFHV0032 is opened in OFN RP-017 to establish Train B ESW flow to the Train B containment coolers.

Hand switch EFHS0032, located at MCC cubicle NG02BDR1, is used to isolate the control room, insert a redundant fuse on the secondary side of the control power transformer, and open the valve. The circuit is shown on drawing E-13EF07A. The circuit was modified in DCP 12131 to address NRC IN 92-18 concerns. The concern in NRC IN 92-18 was that a hot short on the motor operator valve circuit could bypass the valves torque and limit devices and drive the valve to damage in the undesired position. The modification ensures the valve will open when the hand switch is actuated. Based on a review of the drawing, the hand switch will isolate all portions of the control room and open the valve. Power to the valve is from MCC cubicle NG02BDR1. If the hand switch is actuated before power is restored to the MCC, there will be no adverse impact. The valve will move to the open position when power is restored.

Based on the above discussion, valve EFHV0032 is protected.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Appendix 1 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 Page 12 of 31 Table A1 OFN RP-017 Credited Component Evaluation Component Evaluation EFHV0034 Valve EFHV0034 is opened in OFN RP-017 to establish Train B ESW flow to the Train B containment coolers.

Hand switch EFHS0034, located at MCC cubicle NG02BHF3, is used to isolate the control room, insert a redundant fuse on the secondary side of the control power transformer, and open the valve. The circuit is shown on drawing E-13EF09A. The circuit was modified in DCP 11086 to address NRC IN 92-18 concerns. The concern in NRC IN 92-18 was that a hot short on the motor operator valve circuit could bypass the valves torque and limit devices and drive the valve to damage in the undesired position. The modification ensures the valve will open when the hand switch is actuated. Based on a review of the drawing, the hand switch will isolate all portions of the control room and open the valve. Power to the valve is from MCC cubicle NG02BHF3. If the hand switch is actuated before power is restored to the MCC, there will be no adverse impact. The valve will move to the open position when power is restored.

Based on the above discussion, valve EFHV0034 is protected.

EFHV0038 Valve EFHV0038 is opened in OFN RP-017 to establish Train B ESW flow to the UHS. Hand switch EFHS0038A, located at MCC cubicle NG02AHF3, is used to isolate the control room, insert a redundant fuse on the secondary side of the control power transformer, and open the valve. The circuit is shown on drawing E-13EF06A. The circuit was modified in DCP 12170 to address NRC IN 92-18 concerns. The concern in NRC IN 92-18 was that a hot short on the motor operator valve circuit could bypass the valves torque and limit devices and drive the valve to damage in the undesired position. The modification ensures the valve will open when the hand switch is actuated. Based on a review of the drawing, the hand switch will isolate all portions of the control room and open the valve. Power to the valve is from MCC cubicle NG02AHF3. A previous step restores power to the MCC so that when the switch is actuated, the valve will open.

Valve EF HV-38 is maintained partially open (66%) during normal operation and fully opens on SIS or LOOP. A fire in the control room could cause a short that bypasses the control room handswitch and signals the valve to close.

However, based on drawing E-13EF06A and E-025-00007, Sheet 185, the valve will not fully close because limit switch contact ZS/16 prevents the valve from closing past the 66% setpoint.

Based on the above discussion, valve EFHV0038 is protected.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Appendix 1 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 Page 13 of 31 Table A1 OFN RP-017 Credited Component Evaluation Component Evaluation EFHV0046 Valve EFHV0046 is opened in OFN RP-017 to establish Train B ESW flow to the Train B containment coolers.

Hand switch EFHS0046, located at MCC cubicle NG02BHR2, is used to isolate the control room, insert a redundant fuse on the secondary side of the control power transformer, and open the valve. The circuit is shown on drawing E-13EF09A. The circuit was modified in DCP 11086 to address NRC IN 92-18 concerns. The concern in NRC IN 92-18 was that a hot short on the motor operator valve circuit could bypass the valves torque and limit devices and drive the valve to damage in the undesired position. The modification ensures the valve will open when the hand switch is actuated. Based on a review of the drawing, the hand switch will isolate all portions of the control room and open the valve. Power to the valve is from MCC cubicle NG02BHR2. If the hand switch is actuated before power is restored to the MCC, there will be no adverse impact. The valve will move to the open position when power is restored.

Based on the above discussion, valve EFHV0046 is protected.

EFHV0050 Valve EFHV0050 is opened in OFN RP-017 to establish Train B ESW flow to the Train B containment coolers.

Hand switch EFHS0050, located at MCC cubicle NG02BDR2, is used to isolate the control room, insert a redundant fuse on the secondary side of the control power transformer, and open the valve. The circuit is shown on drawing E-13EF08A. The circuit was modified in DCP 12131 to address NRC IN 92-18 concerns. The concern in NRC IN 92-18 was that a hot short on the motor operator valve circuit could bypass the valves torque and limit devices and drive the valve to damage in the undesired position. The modification ensures the valve will open when the hand switch is actuated. Based on a review of the drawing, the hand switch will isolate all portions of the control room and open the valve. Power to the valve is from MCC cubicle NG02BDR2. If the hand switch is actuated before power is restored to the MCC, there will be no adverse impact. The valve will move to the open position when power is restored.

Based on the above discussion, valve EFHV0050 is protected.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Appendix 1 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 Page 14 of 31 Table A1 OFN RP-017 Credited Component Evaluation Component Evaluation EFHV0052 Valve EFHV0052 is opened in OFN RP-017 to establish Train B ESW flow to the Train B CCW heat exchanger.

Hand switch EFHS0052, located at MCC cubicle NG04CNF3, is used to isolate the control room, insert a redundant fuse on the secondary side of the control power transformer, and open the valve. The circuit is shown on drawing E-13EF05A. The circuit was modified in DCP 12172 to address NRC IN 92-18 concerns. The concern in NRC IN 92-18 was that a hot short on the motor operator valve circuit could bypass the valves torque and limit devices and drive the valve to damage in the undesired position. The modification ensures the valve will open when the hand switch is actuated. Based on a review of the drawing, the hand switch will isolate all portions of the control room and open the valve. Power to the valve is from MCC cubicle NG04CNF3. If the hand switch is actuated before power is restored to the MCC, there will be no adverse impact. The valve will move to the open position when power is restored.

Based on the above discussion, valve EFHV0052 is protected.

EFHV0060 Valve EFHV0060 is closed in OFN RP-017 to prevent a flow imbalance in the essential service water (ESW) system.

Hand switch EFHS0060 is used to isolate the control room, insert a redundant fuse on the secondary side of the control power transformer, and close the valve. The circuit is shown on drawing E-13EF04A. The circuit was modified in DCP 13898 to address NRC IN 92-18 concerns and to add the isolation switch and redundant fuse after condition report 00041746 identified the potential flow balance concern. The concern in NRC IN 92-18 was that a hot short on the motor operator valve circuit could bypass the valves torque and limit devices and drive the valve to damage in the undesired position. The modification ensures the valve will close when the hand switch is actuated.

Based on a review of the drawing, the hand switch will isolate all portions of the control room and close the valve.

Power to the valve is from MCC cubicle NG04CHF2. A different step restores power to the MCC so that when the switch is actuated and/or power is restored, the valve will close.

Based on the above discussion, valve EFHV0060 is protected.

EGHV0015 Valve EGHV0015 is manually closed in OFN RP-017 to prevent flow diversion from Train B CCW to Train A CCW.

Breaker NG03CHF3 is opened in an earlier step to remove power from the circuit. The circuit is shown on drawing E-13EG05C. The circuit was modified in DCP 12170 to address NRC IN 92-18 concerns. The concern in NRC IN 92-18 was that a hot short on the motor operator valve circuit could bypass the valves torque and limit devices and drive the valve to damage in the undesired position. The modification ensures the valve can be manually closed when necessary.

A fire in the control room could damage the control circuit for the valve but the damage will not cause the valve to spuriously operate after the breaker is opened. Therefore, valve EGHV0015 is protected.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Appendix 1 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 Page 15 of 31 Table A1 OFN RP-017 Credited Component Evaluation Component Evaluation EGHV0016 Valve EGHV0016 is opened in OFN RP-017 to establish Train B CCW flow from the service loop. Hand switch EGHS0016A, located at MCC cubicle NG04CJF3, is used to isolate the control room, insert a redundant fuse on the secondary side of the control power transformer, and open the valve. The circuit is shown on drawing E-13EG05A.

The circuit was modified in DCP 12172 to address NRC IN 92-18 concerns. The concern in NRC IN 92-18 was that a hot short on the motor operator valve circuit could bypass the valves torque and limit devices and drive the valve to damage in the undesired position. The modification ensures the valve will open when the hand switch is actuated. Based on a review of the drawing, the hand switch will isolate all portions of the control room and open the valve. Power to the valve is from MCC cubicle NG04CJF3. If the hand switch is actuated before power is restored to the MCC, there will be no adverse impact. The valve will move to the open position when power is restored.

Based on the above discussion, valve EGHV0016 is protected.

EGHV0054 Valve EGHV0054 is opened in OFN RP-017 to establish Train B CCW flow to the service loop. Hand switch EGHS0054, located at MCC cubicle NG04CKF1, is used to isolate the control room, insert a redundant fuse on the secondary side of the control power transformer, and open the valve. The circuit is shown on drawing E-13EG05D.

The circuit was modified in DCP 12172 to address NRC IN 92-18 concerns. The concern in NRC IN 92-18 was that a hot short on the motor operator valve circuit could bypass the valves torque and limit devices and drive the valve to damage in the undesired position. The modification ensures the valve will open when the hand switch is actuated. Based on a review of the drawing, the hand switch will isolate all portions of the control room and open the valve. Power to the valve is from MCC cubicle NG04CKF1. If the hand switch is actuated before power is restored to the MCC, there will be no adverse impact. The valve will move to the open position when power is restored.

Based on the above discussion, valve EGHV0054 is protected.

EGHV0061 Valve EGHV0061 is manually closed in OFN RP-017 because this valve is powered from Train A MCC cubicle NG03CKF3. Train A components are not protected against faults occurring as a result of a control room fire. An operator removes 480 VAC power from the valve by opening NG03CKF3 before another operator manually closes the valve in another step. The control circuit is shown on drawing E-13EG09A. The circuit is not isolated from the control room, nor is it required to be isolated. Removal of power will prevent spurious operation of the valve in the event of a control room fire. A 120 VAC hot short on the control room portion of the circuit will not cause the valve to spuriously operate because 480 VAC power has been removed from the valves power circuit. DCP 12130 modified the control circuit to address NRC IN 92-18 concerns. The concern in NRC IN 92-18 was that a hot short on the motor operator valve circuit could bypass the valves torque and limit devices and drive the valve to damage in the undesired position. The modification ensures this does not occur so the valve can be manually operated when needed. Therefore, valve EGHV0061 is protected.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Appendix 1 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 Page 16 of 31 Table A1 OFN RP-017 Credited Component Evaluation Component Evaluation EGHV0133 Valve EGHV0133 is manually closed in OFN RP-017. This valve is powered from Train B MCC cubicle NG02BHF1.

An operator removes 480 VAC power from the valve by opening NG02BHF1 before another operator manually closes the valve in another step. The control circuit is shown on drawing E-13EG18A. The circuit is not isolated from the control room, nor is it required to be isolated. Removal of power will prevent spurious operation of the valve in the event of a control room fire. A 120 VAC hot short on the control room portion of the circuit will not cause the valve to spuriously operate because 480 VAC power has been removed from the valves power circuit. DCP 12130 modified the control circuit to address NRC IN 92-18 concerns. The concern in NRC IN 92-18 was that a hot short on the motor operator valve circuit could bypass the valves torque and limit devices and drive the valve to damage in the undesired position. The modification ensures this does not occur so the valve can be manually operated when needed. Therefore, valve EGHV0133 is protected.

EMHV8801A / Valve EMHV8801A is closed in OFN RP-017 to prevent overfill of the pressurizer. This valve is powered from Train NG01BER2 A MCC cubicle NG01BER2. An operator removes 480 VAC power from the valve by opening NG01BER2 before another operator manually closes the valve in another step. The control circuit is shown on drawing E-13EM02C.

The circuit is not isolated from the control room, nor is it required to be isolated. Removal of power will prevent spurious operation of the valve in the event of a control room fire. A 120 VAC hot short on the control room portion of the circuit will not cause the valve to spuriously operate because 480 VAC power has been removed from the valves power circuit. Change package 13614 modified the valve control circuit to address NRC IN 92-18 to ensure the valve can be manually closed. The pressurizer overfill concern was identified in CR 00045442.

EMHV8801B / Valve EMHV8801B is throttled in OFN RP-017 to control charging injection flow. This valve is powered from Train B NG04CKF3 MCC cubicle NG04CKF3. An operator removes 480 VAC power from the valve by opening NG04CKF3 before another operator manually throttles the valve in another step. The control circuit is shown on drawing E-13EM02A.

The circuit is not isolated from the control room, nor is it required to be isolated. Removal of power will prevent spurious operation of the valve in the event of a control room fire. A 120 VAC hot short on the control room portion of the circuit will not cause the valve to spuriously operate because 480 VAC power has been removed from the valves power circuit. DCP 12130 modified the control circuit to address NRC IN 92-18 concerns. The concern in NRC IN 92-18 was that a hot short on the motor operator valve circuit could bypass the valves torque and limit devices and drive the valve to damage in the undesired position. The modification ensures the valve can be manually throttled when needed. Therefore, valve EMHV8801B is protected.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Appendix 1 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 Page 17 of 31 Table A1 OFN RP-017 Credited Component Evaluation Component Evaluation EMHV8803B Valve EMHV8803B is opened in OFN RP-017 to establish Train B CCP flow to the boron injection tank (BIT). Hand switch EMHS8803B, located at MCC cubicle NG04CKF2, is used to isolate the control room, insert a redundant fuse on the secondary side of the control power transformer, and open the valve. The circuit is shown on drawing E-13EM02B. The circuit was modified in DCP 12175 to address NRC IN 92-18 concerns. The concern in NRC IN 92-18 was that a hot short on the motor operator valve circuit could bypass the valves torque and limit devices and drive the valve to damage in the undesired position. The modification ensures the valve will open when the hand switch is actuated. Based on a review of the drawing, the hand switch will isolate all portions of the control room and open the valve. Power to the valve is from MCC cubicle NG04CKF2. If the hand switch is actuated before power is restored to the MCC, there will be no adverse impact. The valve will move to the open position when power is restored.

Based on the above discussion, valve EMHV8803B is protected.

EMHV8843 Valve EMHV8843 is closed in OFN RP-017 to prevent flow diversion from charging through the SIS test line which discharges to the RWST or the RHUT. Hand switch EMHS8843 is used to close the valve but does not completely isolate the control room. The circuit is shown on drawing E-13EM04A.

The valve is a solenoid operated valve that requires 125 VDC to open. Actuation of hand switch EMHS8843 to the ISO/CLOSE position will open contacts on the positive side of the circuit and de-energize the solenoid. The negative side of the circuit is not isolated. Based on a review of the drawing, a positive hot short in the control room affecting this circuit will not cause the valve to open because the isolation contacts on the hand switch will be open, preventing the re-energization of the solenoid.

Based on the above discussion, valve EMHV8843 is protected.

EMHV8882 Valve EMHV8882 is closed in OFN RP-017 to prevent flow diversion from charging through the SIS test line which discharges to the RWST or the RHUT. Hand switch EMHS8882 is used to close the valve but does not completely isolate the control room. The circuit is shown on drawing E-13EM05A.

The valve is a solenoid operated valve that requires 125 VDC to open. Actuation of hand switch EMHS8882 to the ISO/CLOSE position will open a contact on the positive side of the circuit and de-energize the solenoid. The negative side of the circuit is not isolated. Based on a review of the drawing, a positive hot short in the control room affecting this circuit will not cause the valve to open because the isolation contacts on the hand switch will be open, preventing the re-energization of the solenoid.

Based on the above discussion, valve EMHV8882 is protected.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Appendix 1 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 Page 18 of 31 Table A1 OFN RP-017 Credited Component Evaluation Component Evaluation FCHV0312 Valve FCHV0312 is opened using FCHIS0312B at the ASP. This allows steam to flow to the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump. Upon arrival at the ASP, Operators place hand switch RPHIS0001 in the ISOLATE position per OFN RP-017. This energizes lockout relay 86XRP1 (Dwgs E-13RP11 and E-13RP15), isolates the control room portions of the circuit and inserts redundant fuses to ensure the remaining portions of the circuit are energized. The control circuit for FCHV0312 is shown on drawing E-13FC23. Based on a review of this drawing, the lockout relay contacts will isolate all portions of the circuit that run to the control room. A fire in the control room will not adversely impact valve FCHV0312 after the isolation switch is operated.

Based on the above discussion, hand switch RPHIS0001 will isolate the control room and insert redundant fuses into the circuit so that hand switch FCHIS0312B will function. Therefore, valve FCHV0312 is protected.

FCHV0313 DCP 12958 replaced the analog governor control system for valve FCHV0313 with a Westinghouse Ovation digital control system. The control circuit is shown on drawing E-13FC24.

Hand switch FCHS0313 is placed in LOCAL position at the ASP to transfer speed control to the ASP. A hot short that occurs on this circuit prior to placing the switch in LOCAL will be cleared by the surge protection device (FCIB0313) so that the remaining portions of the control circuit are unaffected.

A fire in the control room could affect the circuit for the turbine speed indicator and speed setpoint indicator (FCSI0313A). These circuits are isolated from the control room by signal isolators located in panel FC219 (See drawing M-021A-00019, Sheet 3).

Based on the above discussion, there is reasonable assurance that valve FCHV0313 can be controlled at the ASP when FCHS0313 is placed in LOCAL position. Therefore, valve FCHV0313 is protected.

GDHS0011 Hand switch GDHS0011 isolates the Train B ESW pump room supply fan from the control room, inserts a redundant fuse on the secondary side of the control power transformer, and starts the fan. The circuit is shown on drawing E-K3GD01A. Based on a review of the schematic, the hand switch will isolate all portions of the control room and start the fan. Therefore, the fan will operate during the event.

Exhaust damper GDTZ0011C opens when supply fan CGD01B starts. The exhaust damper circuit is shown on drawing E-K3GD03. When hand switch GDHS0011 is placed in the ISO/RUN position, auxiliary relay 3XGD2 is energized, which closes a contact and energizes the contactor relay 42 and starts the fan. Relay 42, when energized, opens a contact in the exhaust damper circuit, which de-energizes the exhaust damper and fails it in the full open position. None of the circuits associated with the exhaust damper are run in the control room. Therefore, the control room fire will not affect the exhaust damper.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Appendix 1 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 Page 19 of 31 Table A1 OFN RP-017 Credited Component Evaluation Component Evaluation During normal operation, the outside air intake damper and recirculation damper operate as necessary to maintain the ESW pump room within design limits. In the winter months, most of the air flow is recirculated with minimal outside air makeup. In the summer months, most of the air flow is exhausted with minimal or no recirculation.

DCP 13800 moved the controls for outside air supply damper GDTZ0011A and recirculation damper GDTZ0011B from the control room panel RP053B to Train B ESF switchgear room panel RP147B. The controls and circuits are completely independent of the control room, so a control room fire will not adversely impact the operation of these dampers. The circuit is shown on drawings E-K3GD04A and J-110-00569.

Supply damper GDTZ0011A and recirculation damper GDTZ0011B modulate based on Train B ESW pump room temperature input from GDTE0011. Power to RP147B is from NN0404 which is available in the event of a fire in the control room.

Based on the above discussion, the Train B ESW pump room supply fan, exhaust damper, recirculation damper and outside air supply damper are protected.

GKHS0103 Class 1E electrical equipment A/C unit SGK05B is started in OFN RP-017 to provide cooling to the Train B Class 1E electrical equipment rooms. Hand switch GKHS0103 is placed in the ISO/RUN position to isolate the control room, insert a redundant fuse on the secondary side of the control power transformer, and start the unit. The circuit is shown on drawings E-13GK13A, M-622.1A-00002 and M-622.1A-00003.

Based on a review of these drawings, hand switch GKHS0103 will isolate all portions of the control room and start the unit. After the switch is placed in the ISO/RUN position, a fire in the control room will not affect the unit.

Therefore, SGK05B is protected.

GLHS0035 Train B electrical penetration room cooler SGL15B is started in OFN RP-017 to ensure adequate cooling to the equipment in the room. The circuit is shown on drawing E-13GL12A. Hand switch GLHS0035 is placed in the ISO/RUN position to isolate the control room and insert a redundant fuse in the control circuit. Then the operator depresses the start pushbutton on the MCC cubicle to start the unit. The unit is powered from MCC cubicle NG02BAF2.

Based on a review of the drawing, hand switch GLHS0035 will isolate all portions of the control room. The pushbutton will energize the 42 relay, close the seal-in contact and start the unit. Therefore, SGL15B is protected.

GMHS0011B Train B diesel generator room supply fan CGM01B is started in OFN RP-017 using hand switch GMHS0011B. The hand switch isolates the control room, inserts a redundant fuse on the secondary side of the control power transformer, and starts the fan. The circuit is shown on drawing E-13GM01A. Based on a review of the drawing, the hand switch will isolate all portions of the control room and start the fan. Power to the fan is from MCC cubicle

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Appendix 1 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 Page 20 of 31 Table A1 OFN RP-017 Credited Component Evaluation Component Evaluation NG04DBF6. A previous step restores power to the MCC so that when the switch is actuated, the fan will start.

Exhaust damper GMHZ0019 fails open when NK4413 is opened in an earlier step in OFN RP-017. The control circuit for GMHZ0019 is shown on drawing E-13GM04A. Hand switch GMHS0019B is no longer used in OFN RP-017 since disconnecting control power will open the damper. Therefore, exhaust damper GMHZ0019 is protected.

During normal operation, the outside air intake damper and recirculation damper operate as necessary to maintain the Train B EDG room within design limits. In the winter months, most of the air flow is recirculated with minimal outside air makeup. In the summer months, most of the air flow is exhausted with minimal or no recirculation.

DCP 13800 moved the controls for outside air supply damper GMTZ0011A and recirculation damper GMTZ0011B from the control room panel RP053B to Train B ESF switchgear room panel RP147B. The controls and circuits are completely independent of the control room, so a control room fire will not adversely impact the operation of these dampers. The circuit is shown on drawings E-13GM02 and J-110-00565.

Supply damper GMTZ0011A and recirculation damper GMTZ0011B modulate based on Train B EDG room temperature input from GMTE0011. Power to RP147B is from NN0404 which is available in the event of a fire in the control room.

Based on the above discussion, the Train B EDG room supply fan, exhaust damper, recirculation damper and outside air supply damper are protected.

GNHS0009A Containment cooler SGN01B is started in OFN RP-017 to maintain the containment temperature within acceptable limits. Hand switch GNHS0009A is placed in ISO/RUN position to start the cooler from MCC NG02TAF1. The circuit is shown on drawing E-13GN02A. Based on a review of the drawing, the hand switch will isolate all portions of the control room, insert a redundant fuse on the secondary side of the control power transformer, and start the cooler. Therefore, a fire in the control room will not affect the cooler after the hand switch is placed in the ISO/RUN position.

Based on the above discussion, containment cooler SGN01B is protected.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Appendix 1 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 Page 21 of 31 Table A1 OFN RP-017 Credited Component Evaluation Component Evaluation GNHS0017A Containment cooler SGN01D is started in OFN RP-017 to maintain the containment temperature within acceptable limits. Hand switch GNHS0017A is placed in ISO/RUN position to start the cooler from MCC NG04TAF1. The circuit is shown on drawing E-13GN02A. Based on a review of the drawing, the hand switch will isolate all portions of the control room, insert a redundant fuse on the secondary side of the control power transformer, and start the cooler. Therefore, a fire in the control room will not affect the cooler after the hand switch is placed in the ISO/RUN position.

Based on the above discussion, containment cooler SGN01D is protected.

JEHS0021C Pump PJE01B is the Train B emergency diesel generator fuel oil transfer pump. The pump is started in OFN RP-017 by first placing hand switch JEHS0021C in the ISOLATE position then placing hand switch JEHS0021B in the RUN position. The circuit is shown on drawing E-13JE01A.

Based on a review of the drawing, hand switch JEHS0021C will isolate all portions of the control room from the circuit and insert a redundant fuse in the secondary side of the control power transformer. Hand switch JEHS0021B will start the pump and maintain it running until the hand switch is placed in the STOP position.

Based on the above discussion, pump PJE01B is protected.

KJHS0101D Procedure OFN RP-017 has operators remove the break glass from switch KJHS0101D to actuate the switch. This step energizes relays ESA and ESB on the Train B diesel generator engine control circuit (Dwg E-13KJ03A). DCP 13513 added redundant fuses and control room isolation contacts on the ESB circuit so that when KJHS0110 is placed in the ISO position, the ESB circuit is energized.

With ESB energized, the unit parallel relay (UPR) will be de-energized (Dwg E-13NE13). Therefore, the diesel generator will not be in droop mode and will function properly as PFSSD loads are added.

Also, with ESB energized, relay 90 VEP will be energized which will switch the electronic voltage adjuster to a pre-determined setpoint and the voltage adjuster will ignore signals from the control room auto/manual raise/lower switches. This ensures a fire in the control room will not affect the output voltage of the EDG during the event.

Based on the above discussion, actuation of KJHS0101D will achieve the desired outcome, which is to maintain relay ESB energized.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Appendix 1 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 Page 22 of 31 Table A1 OFN RP-017 Credited Component Evaluation Component Evaluation KJHS0109 Hand switch KJHS0109 is placed in the LOC/MAN position to isolate portions of the Train B diesel generator start/stop circuit from the control room. The switch also transfers control of the Train B diesel generator to the local panel in the diesel generator room.

Based on drawing E-13KJ03A, KJHS0109 will isolate the control room stop portion of the circuit. This will ensure a fire in the control room will not inadvertently cause the diesel engine to shut down. KJHS0109 also isolates the control room voltage control and inserts redundant fuses on the local voltage control circuit as shown on drawing E-13NE13.

KJHS0110 Hand switch KJHS0110 is placed in the ISO position to isolate the Train B diesel generator control circuit from the control room and insert redundant fuses in portions of the circuit.

DCP 12097 added KJHS0110 and redundant fuses to ensure power is available to the field flashing circuit. DCP 13513 added redundant fuses and isolation contacts to the control circuit from KJHS0110. These additional contacts and fuses isolate the remaining control room portions of the B EDG control circuit that were not isolated by DCP 12097.

Based on a review of drawing E-13KJ03A, KJHS0110 and KJHS0109 will isolate the control room so that the B EDG will operate following a control room fire.

NB0102 Breaker NB0102 is opened to prevent operation of the Train A containment spray pump. The close control power fuse is first removed to ensure the breaker does not close as a result of the control room fire. The circuit is shown on drawing E-13EN01.

The fuses that are removed are the two 15 amp fuses that protect the close circuit. The remainder of the circuit stays energized. A hot short from a fire in the control room could re-energize the positive polarity of the close circuit.

However, the negative polarity will remain de-energized because the negative side of the close circuit does not run to the control room. Therefore, a fire in the control room will not cause a hot short that closes the breaker.

Based on the above discussion, breaker NB0102 is protected.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Appendix 1 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 Page 23 of 31 Table A1 OFN RP-017 Credited Component Evaluation Component Evaluation NB0201 through OFN RP-017 opens breakers NB0201 through NB0207, NB0209 and NB0212 to shed most of the major loads from NB0207, NB0209 NB02. NB0209 and NB0212 are opened to fail off-site power to NB02 and cause an automatic start of the Train B and NB0212 emergency diesel generator. Some of the loads are added by OFN RP-017 after the Train B emergency diesel generator is started. Control power to the breakers is de-energized in a previous step. The breakers are opened by pushing the manual trip push button on the breakers. The breakers are closed when needed by pushing the manual close push button. The charging springs allow 1 cycle of operation without control power. The discussion for NK4401 / NB02 shows that the breakers are protected from the effects of a control room fire and will not spuriously operate after control power is removed. Therefore, the breakers are protected.

NB0208, NB0210, These breakers are closed to energize various load centers and motor control centers. The discussion for NK4401 /

NB0213 and NB02 shows that the breakers are protected from the effects of a control room fire and will not spuriously operate NB0216 after control power is removed. Therefore, the breakers will remain closed for the duration of the event.

NB0211 NB0211 is closed to energize the NB02 bus from the Train B diesel generator. A previous step removes control power from the breaker, so spurious opening of the breaker caused by the control room fire will not occur. The control circuit for NB0211 is shown on drawing E-13NE11. The discussion for NK4401 / NB02 shows that the breaker is protected from the effects of a control room fire and will not spuriously operate after control power is removed. Therefore, NB0211 is protected.

NB0215 NB0215 is closed to energize the Train B ESW pump. A previous step removed control power from the breaker, so spurious opening of the breaker caused by the control room fire will not occur. The control circuit for NB0215 is shown on drawing E-K3EF01A. The discussion for NK4401 / NB02 shows that the breaker is protected from the effects of a control room fire and will not spuriously operate after control power is removed. Therefore, NB0215 will remain closed for the duration of the event.

NGHIS0015 / Breaker NG0201 is verified to be closed (or manually closed if not) in OFN RP-017 to ensure power is available to NG0201 required loads fed from bus NG02. All PFSSD loads that are powered from NG02 are shown on drawing E-1F9424B. Not all of these loads are required after a control room fire. The control circuit for NG0201 is shown on drawing E-13NG11B. Prior to closing (or verifying closed) NG0201, hand switch NGHIS0015 is placed in the ISOLATE position to isolate the trip portion of the NG0201 control circuit from the control room. Based on a review of drawing E-13NG11B, placing NGHIS0015 in the ISOLATE position will isolate the trip circuit and prevent NG0201 from tripping. If the breaker has tripped prior to placing NGHIS0015 in the ISOLATE position, and the close control power fuse has blown as a result of the fire, the breaker can be re-closed because the close springs will be charged. Therefore, the configuration is acceptable.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Appendix 1 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 Page 24 of 31 Table A1 OFN RP-017 Credited Component Evaluation Component Evaluation NGHIS0016 / Breaker NG0401 is verified to be closed (or manually closed if not) in OFN RP-017 to ensure power is available to NG0401 required loads fed from bus NG04. All PFSSD loads that are powered from NG02 are shown on drawing E-1F9424D. Not all of these loads are required after a control room fire. The control circuit for NG0401 is shown on drawing E-13NG11A. Prior to closing (or verifying closed) NG0201, hand switch NGHIS0016 is placed in the ISOLATE position to isolate the trip portion of the NG0201 control circuit from the control room. Based on a review of drawing E-13NG11A, placing NGHIS0016 in the ISOLATE position will isolate the trip circuit and prevent NG0401 from tripping. If the breaker has tripped prior to placing NGHIS0016 in the ISOLATE position, and the close control power fuse has blown as a result of the fire, the breaker can be re-closed because the close springs will be charged.

Therefore, the configuration is acceptable.

NK4119 and The excess letdown isolation valves are failed closed in OFN RP-017 by placing 125 VDC disconnect switches NK4407 NK4119 and NK4407 in the OFF position. This de-energizes power to the valves and fails them closed. The circuit is shown on drawing E-13BG48. The power distribution arrangement is shown on drawing E-13RL02. The excess letdown valves are considered high/low pressure interfaces so consideration of multiple spurious actuations is required.

Based on a review of drawing E-13BG48, loss of power to the circuit will fail the valves closed. In order for both series valves to re-open, it would take four independent proper polarity hot shorts. Opening NK4119 and NK4407 will de-energize any potential separation group 4, 125 VDC sources in RL001/RL002. Switch PK5117 is opened in an earlier step, which removes 125 VDC from the separation group 5 source to RL001/RL002. Switch PK5211, which provides separation group 6 125 VDC power to RL001/RL002, is not opened in OFN RP-017. However, separation group 6 cables cannot come in contact with separation group 4 cables because of the physical separation requirements of IEEE 384, which are discussed in drawing E-11013 (5.8.1.B). Therefore, the excess letdown isolation valves will not spuriously open after power has been removed using NK4119 and NK4407.

Based on the above discussion, the excess letdown isolation valves are protected.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Appendix 1 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 Page 25 of 31 Table A1 OFN RP-017 Credited Component Evaluation Component Evaluation NK4401 Disconnect switch NK4401 is placed in the OFF position to de-energize breaker control power for bus NB02. There are no control room circuits that would prevent operation or cause spurious operation of this switch. Therefore, NK4401 is protected. Removing breaker control power from the NB02 bus in this manner prevents spurious operation of equipment supplied by NB02. The schematic diagram for each NB02 breaker is identified in the following table.

Breaker Schematic NB0201 E-13BG01A NB0202 E-13EM01 NB0203 E-13EN01 NB0204 E-13EJ01 NB0205 E-13AL01B NB0206 E-13EG01C NB0207 E-13EG01D NB0208 E-13PG12A NB0209 E-13NB14 NB0210 E-13NG10A NB0211 E-13NE11 NB0212 E-13NB15 NB0213 E-13NG10A NB0214 Spare NB0215 E-K3EF01A NB0216 E-K3NG10A NB0217 Spare A review of each schematic diagram shows that a single hot short from an energized source conductor in the control room will not cause the control circuit on any of the equipment to become re-energized after control power has been removed. Two simultaneous hot shorts would be needed to re-energize the control circuit. Two or more proper polarity hot shorts are not assumed except for high/low pressure interface components. The equipment fed from NB02 is not considered high/low pressure interface so the potential to re-energize the control circuit is not credible.

Therefore, the NB02 bus is protected.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Appendix 1 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 Page 26 of 31 Table A1 OFN RP-017 Credited Component Evaluation Component Evaluation NK4411 The steam generator blowdown valves are failed closed in OFN RP-017 by placing 125 VDC disconnect switch NK4411 in the OFF position. The blowdown valves are not high/low pressure interfaces so consideration of multiple spurious actuations is not required. Switch NK4411 will not spuriously actuate in the event of a control room fire.

Therefore, switch NK4411 is protected. The circuit for the blowdown valves is shown on drawings E-13BM06A through E-13BM06D. The power distribution is shown on drawing E-13RL07.

When NK4411 is placed in the OFF position, the blowdown valves will fail closed. It would take multiple proper polarity hot shorts to re-energize the valves, which is not postulated in the case of non-high/low pressure interfaces.

Therefore, opening NK4411 will effectively close the blowdown valves and maintain them closed for the duration of the event.

Based on the above discussion, the steam generator blowdown valves are protected.

NK4413 Disconnect switch NK4413 is placed in the OFF position to remove 125 VDC control power from certain components fed from control room panel RL019 and RL020. There are no control room circuits that would prevent operation or cause spurious operation of this switch. Therefore, NK4413 is protected. The power distribution circuit for NK4413 is shown on drawing E-13RL05. The PFSSD equipment supplied by NK4413 includes GMHZ0019, EGHV0070A, EGHV0070B and EGTV0030. Loss of 125 VDC control power to these components will fail the components in their desired position. None of these components are high/low pressure interfaces so multiple proper polarity hot shorts do not need to be considered. The control circuit for these components is shown on drawings E-13GM04A, E-13EG08 and E-13EG16. Based on a review of these drawings it would take two proper polarity hot shorts to re-energize the control circuit for these components to fail them in an undesired position after switch NK4413 is placed in the OFF position. A single hot short will not cause the control circuit to re-energize. Therefore, these components are protected.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Appendix 1 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 Page 27 of 31 Table A1 OFN RP-017 Credited Component Evaluation Component Evaluation NK4414 and The reactor head vent valves are failed closed in OFN RP-017 by placing 125 VDC disconnect switches NK4414 NK5109 and NK5109 in the OFF position. This de-energizes power to the head vent valves and closes the valves. The circuit is shown on drawing E-13BB30. The power distribution arrangement is shown on drawing E-13RL06. The head vent valves are considered high/low pressure interfaces so consideration of multiple spurious actuations is required.

Based on a review of drawing E-13BB30, loss of power to the circuit will fail the valves closed. In order for both series valves to re-open, it would take four independent proper polarity hot shorts. Opening NK4414 and NK5109 as well as NK5108 and NK4419 in earlier steps will de-energize any potential 125 VDC sources in RL021/RL022 and make this failure mode non-credible. Switch PK6117, which provides separation group 5 125 VDC power to RL021/RL022 and switch PK5205, which provides separation group 6 125 VDC power to RL021/RL022, is not opened in OFN RP-017. However, separation group 5 and 6 cables cannot come in contact with separation group 1 and 4 cables because of the physical separation requirements of IEEE 384, which are discussed in drawing E-11013 (5.8.1.B). Therefore, the reactor head vent valves will not spuriously open after power has been removed using NK4414 and NK5109.

Based on the above discussion, the reactor head vent valves are protected.

NK4416 Disconnect switch NK4416 is placed in the OFF position to remove 125 VDC control power from SB032D. This action is taken to fail the steam dumps and cooldown valves closed. The steam dumps are not high/low pressure interfaces so multiple proper polarity hot shorts do not need to be considered. The control circuits for the steam dumps and cooldown valves are shown on schematic diagrams E-13AB08, E-13AB09, E-13AB11A, E-13AB11B, E-13AB11C, E-13AB12 and E-13AB31. Based on a review of these drawings it would take two proper polarity hot shorts to re-energize the control circuit for the steam dumps and cooldown valves to fail them in an undesired position after switch NK4416 is placed in the OFF position. A single hot short will not cause the control circuit to re-energize. Therefore, the steam dumps and cooldown valves are protected.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Appendix 1 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 Page 28 of 31 Table A1 OFN RP-017 Credited Component Evaluation Component Evaluation NK4421 Disconnect switch NK4421 is placed in the OFF position to de-energize pressurizer PORV BBPCV0456A and fail it closed. There are no control room circuits that would prevent operation or cause spurious operation of this switch.

Therefore, NK4421 is protected. De-energizing the PORV circuit in this manner prevents spurious opening of the PORV. The PORV circuit is shown on drawing E-13BB40. Based on a review of this drawing, a single hot short from an energized source conductor in the control room will not cause the PORV to open. It would take multiple simultaneous negative and positive hot shorts to re-energize the PORV circuit. Two or more proper polarity hot shorts are not assumed except for high/low pressure interface components. The following paragraph discusses the combination of circuit failures necessary to cause the PORVs to open.

Based on a review of drawing E-13BB40, in order for the PORV to open, the hot shorts would have to occur in control room panel RL021. A minimum of three smart hot shorts would have to occur to open a PORV. These hot shorts include one external positive hot short, one external negative hot short and a conductor-to-conductor hot short. The external 125 VDC power source would have to be from the same separation group because IEEE-384 and E-11013 (5.8.1) do not allow cables of different separation groups to touch. Setroute was reviewed for all the separation group 4 cables with a 125 VDC potential (designated by a letter K after the system designation in the cable scheme) running to panel RL021. Based on this review the only other 125 VDC source that could energize the PORV is NK4414, which is a Separation Group 4 power supply. This switch is opened in OFN RP-017.

Based on the above discussion, pressurizer PORV BBPCV0456A will not spuriously open after switches NK4421 and NK4414 are opened.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Appendix 1 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 Page 29 of 31 Table A1 OFN RP-017 Credited Component Evaluation Component Evaluation NK5108 Disconnect switch NK5108 is placed in the OFF position to de-energize pressurizer PORV BBPCV0455A and fail it closed. There are no control room circuits that would prevent operation or cause spurious operation of this switch.

Therefore, NK5108 is protected. De-energizing the PORV circuit in this manner prevents spurious opening of the PORV. The PORV circuit is shown on drawing E-13BB40. Based on a review of this drawing, a single hot short from an energized source conductor in the control room will not cause the PORV to open. It would take multiple simultaneous negative and positive hot shorts to re-energize the PORV circuit. Two or more proper polarity hot shorts are not assumed except for high/low pressure interface components. The pressurizer PORVs are not considered high/low pressure interfaces per License Amendment 193. The following paragraph discusses the combination of circuit failures necessary to cause the PORVs to open.

Based on a review of drawing E-13BB40, in order for the PORV to open, the hot shorts would have to occur in control room panel RL021. A minimum of three smart hot shorts would have to occur to open a PORV. These hot shorts include one external positive hot short, one external negative hot short and a conductor-to-conductor hot short. The external 125 VDC power source would have to be from the same separation group because IEEE-384 and E-11013 (5.8.1) do not allow cables of different separation groups to touch. Setroute was reviewed for all the separation group 1 cables with a 125 VDC potential (designated by a letter K after the system designation in the cable scheme) running to panel RL021. Based on this review the only other 125 VDC source that could energize the PORV is NK5109, which is a Separation Group 1 power supply. This switch is opened in OFN RP-017.

Based on the above discussion, pressurizer PORV BBPCV0455A will not spuriously open after switches NK5108 and NK5109 are opened.

NK5119 Disconnect switch NK5119 supplies power to main steam and feedwater isolation cabinet SA075A. Opening this disconnect switch removes power from the Train A solenoids on the Main Steam Isolation Valves and Main Feedwater Isolation Valves. This will fail the valves in the closed position, which is the desired position for PFSSD.

Opening NK5119 is not required to fail the MFIVs to the closed position. Feedwater isolation is automatic upon initiation of reactor trip (reference License Amendment 214).

PA0107, PA0108, These breakers are manually tripped to stop the RCPs. The control circuit is not isolated from the control room, nor PA0204 and is it required to be isolated. Per OFN RP-017, operators first trip the breaker, remove control power, then verify that PA0205 the breaker is still tripped. Control power is removed by opening disconnect switches PK4103 and PK6204.

Removal of control power ensures control room fire damage will not inadvertently re-start the pump. Verification ensures the pump did not re-start prior to control power being removed. The circuit for all four RCPs is shown on drawing E-13BB01. The procedure adequately addresses tripping the RCP breakers and includes necessary steps to ensure the pumps do not re-start. Therefore, the configuration is acceptable.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Appendix 1 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 Page 30 of 31 Table A1 OFN RP-017 Credited Component Evaluation Component Evaluation PK4103 Disconnect switch PK4103 is placed in the OFF position to remove control power from PA01. For a control room fire, this is required to remove control power from breakers PA0107 and PA0108 for RCPs PBB01A and PBB01B, respectively, to ensure the RCPs do not re-start after they have been stopped. Other breakers on PA01 are not required for PFSSD following a control room fire. There are no control room circuits that would prevent operation or cause spurious operation of this switch. Therefore, PK4103 is protected.

The control circuit for PA0107 and PA0108 is shown on drawing E-13BB01. Based on a review of this drawing it would take two proper polarity hot shorts to re-energize the control circuit for these breakers to start the pumps after switch PK4103 is placed in the OFF position. A single hot short will not cause the control circuit to re-energize. The RCPs are not considered high low pressure interfaces so consideration of two proper polarity hot shorts is not required. Therefore, there is reasonable assurance that the RCPs will not spuriously start after they have been stopped.

Based on the above discussion, removal of control power from PA01 in this manner will prevent spurious operation of RCPs PBB01A and PBB01B. Therefore, the configuration is acceptable.

PK5117 Disconnect switch PK5117 is opened in OFN RP-017 to fail normal letdown valves BGLCV0459 and BGLCV0460 closed and fail auxiliary pressurizer spray valve BGHV8145 closed. The letdown valve circuit is shown on drawing E-13BG10. The auxiliary spray circuit is shown on drawing E-13BG19. The power distribution arrangement for PK5117 is shown on drawing E-13RL02. The letdown isolation valves are considered high/low pressure interfaces so consideration of multiple spurious actuations is required. The spray valve is not considered a high/low pressure interface so multiple proper polarity hot shorts do not need to be considered.

Letdown Valves Based on a review of drawing E-13BG10, loss of power to the circuit will fail the letdown valves closed. In order for both series valves to re-open, it would take four independent proper polarity hot shorts. Opening PK5117 as well as NK4119 and NK4407 in another step will de-energize these potential 125 VDC sources in RL001/RL002. The separation group 6 source of 125 VDC power remains available from switch PK5211. Based on E-11013 (5.8.3) separation groups 5 and 6 cables could be bundled together within the control room cabinets. Therefore, a source of 125 VDC power is available in RL001/RL002 to re-energize and open the valves.

When PK5117 is opened, the two series letdown isolation valves (BGLCV0459 and BGLCV0460) fail closed and all three parallel letdown orifice isolation valves (BGHV8149A, BGHV8149B and BGHV8149C) fail closed. To re-establish a letdown flow path, three valves would need to re-open (both letdown isolation valves and one letdown orifice isolation valve). This would require six independent proper polarity hot shorts (3 negative and 3 positive)

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Appendix 1 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 Page 31 of 31 Table A1 OFN RP-017 Credited Component Evaluation Component Evaluation which is not credible.

Based on the above discussion, there is reasonable assurance that the letdown isolation valves will not re-open after PK5117 is placed in the OFF position.

Auxiliary Pressurizer Spray Valve Based on a review of drawing E-13BG19, loss of power to the circuit will fail the spray valve closed. In order for the valve to re-open, it would two independent proper polarity hot shorts which is not postulated for non-high/low pressure interfaces.

Based on the above discussion, there is reasonable assurance that the auxiliary pressurizer spray valve will not re-open after PK5117 is placed in the OFF position.

PK6204 Disconnect switch PK6204 is placed in the OFF position to remove control power from PA02. For a control room fire, this is required to remove control power from breakers PA0204 and PA0205 for RCPs PBB01D and PBB01C, respectively, to ensure the RCPs do not re-start after they have been stopped. Other breakers on PA02 are not required for PFSSD following a control room fire. There are no control room circuits that would prevent operation or cause spurious operation of this switch. Therefore, PK6204 is protected.

The control circuit for PA0204 and PA0205 is shown on drawing E-13BB01. Based on a review of this drawing it would take two proper polarity hot shorts to re-energize the control circuit for these breakers to start the pumps after switch PK6204 is placed in the OFF position. A single hot short will not cause the control circuit to re-energize. The RCPs are not considered high low pressure interfaces so consideration of two proper polarity hot shorts is not required. Therefore, there is reasonable assurance that the RCPs will not spuriously start after they have been stopped.

Based on the above discussion, removal of control power from PA02 in this manner will prevent spurious operation of RCPs PBB01C and PBB01D. Therefore, the configuration is acceptable.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Appendix 2 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 Page 1 of 51 Appendix 2 Control Room Fire Consequence Evaluation for Motor Operated Valves

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Appendix 2 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 Page 2 of 51 Table A2 documents an evaluation of the impact on post-fire safe shutdown if a fire occurs in the control room and affects motor operated valve circuits. The evaluation was originally performed per a corrective action for CR 041746-02-02. The evaluation has been added to E-1F9915 to ensure the information is maintained in a controlled document.

Table A2 Control Room Fire Consequence Evaluation for Motor Operated Valves Control Room Instrument P&ID Drawing Associated Description Consequence if Impact on PFSSD in the Event of a Control Room Instrument Location MOV(s) Damaged Fire BGHIS8109 RL001 M-12BG03 (E-6) BGHV8109 Normal Charging Valve could open The NCP is not used for PFSSD. If loss of flow occurs Pmp Recirc or remain closed. in the charging header and this valve fails closed, the NCP could be damaged. This will have no adverse impact on PFSSD since the Train B CCP is available in the event of a control room fire. Valve damage causing loss of pressure boundary is potentially PFSSD adverse due to RWST flow diversion. Valve is tracked for resolution as part of CR 00116831-02-03 Extent of Condition.

BGHIS0112C RL001 M-12BG03 (E-7) BGLCV0112C VCT Outlet Valve Valve can fail Valve is closed in OFN RP-017 by placing BGHS0112C closed or remain in the ISO/CLOSE position. Valve has been modified to open address NRC IN 92-18. If the valve fails closed before lining up the RWST, the operating charging pump will lose suction and will be damaged. If RCP seal cooling flowpath remains available, then the pumps would have 12 gpm on the suction side, which is not sufficient to protect the running pump. If the seal flowpath is affected, which is possible for a fire in this cabinet, there will be no flow in the system. Prior to restoring power to the valve and operating ISO/CLOSE switch BGHS0112C there is a possibility of H2 intrusion into the charging pump suction. Since the NCP is the normally operating pump and is not credited for PFSSD, damage to it will not adversely affect PFSSD.

A SIS would provide a permissive for the valve to close but the valve would not close until the RWST to charging valve is open. Therefore, a SIS would not cause a loss of suction to the pump.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Appendix 2 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 Page 3 of 51 Table A2 Control Room Fire Consequence Evaluation for Motor Operated Valves Control Room Instrument P&ID Drawing Associated Description Consequence if Impact on PFSSD in the Event of a Control Room Instrument Location MOV(s) Damaged Fire BGHIS0112B RL001 M-12BG03 (F-7) BGLCV0112B VCT Outlet Valve Valve could close Valve is not relied upon for PFSSD following a control or remain open. room fire. Valve BGLCV0112C is credited in OFN RP-017. See discussion for BGHIS0112C for PFSSD impact if the valve spuriously closes. Valve damage causing loss of pressure boundary will potentially cause VCT flow diversion but is not adverse to PFSSD as it does not impact the credited BGLCV0112C VCT isolation function to support lining up RWST.

BGHIS8112 RL001 M-12BG01 (E-3) BGHV8112 Seal Water Ret Cont Valve could close See discussion for BGHIS8100.

Iso Valve or remain open.

BGHIS8100 RL001 M-12BG01 (E-2) BGHV8100 Seal Water Ret Cont Valve could close If the valve closes, seal leakoff flow would be directed to Iso Valve or remain open. the reactor coolant drain tank rather than the seal water heat exchanger. There is no adverse impact on PFSSD if this occurs. Valve damage causing loss of pressure boundary and potential loss of seal leakoff is inconsequential to PFSSD. RCP seal damage will not occur because OFN RP-017 stops the RCPs and isolates seal injection.

BGHIS8104 RL001 M-12BG05 (B-4) BGHV8104 Immediate Borate to Valve could open The valve can fail in any position with no impact on CCP Suction or remain closed. PFSSD. If the valve fails open with the boric acid transfer pumps running, boron will be added to the RCS, causing a reduction in reactivity. If the valve fails closed, it is in the correct PFSSD position. Valve has been modified to address NRC IN 92-18 to support cold shutdown per E-1F9920 Section 6.1, and Table 7.1 step 5 & 5 RN0.

BGHIS8110 RL001 M-12BG03 (E-3) BGHV8110 CCP A Recirc Valve could close If the A CCP is running at the time of the fire and this or remain open. valve closes with little or no flow in the system, the pump could be damaged. The NCP is normally operating, so this is not a concern under normal operating conditions. The B CCP is credited for a control room fire so damage to the A CCP due to a control room fire will not adversely impact PFSSD.

Valve damage causing loss of pressure boundary is potentially PFSSD adverse due to RWST flow diversion.

Valve is tracked for resolution as part of CR 00116831-02-03 Extent of Condition.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Appendix 2 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 Page 4 of 51 Table A2 Control Room Fire Consequence Evaluation for Motor Operated Valves Control Room Instrument P&ID Drawing Associated Description Consequence if Impact on PFSSD in the Event of a Control Room Instrument Location MOV(s) Damaged Fire BNHIS0112D RL001 M-12BN01 (B-5) BNLCV0112D RWST to CCP Valve could open If the valve opens, there is no adverse impact on or remain closed. PFSSD since it would provide a suction source to the charging pump header. If the valve remains closed, CCP suction would be available from the VCT unless the VCT outlet valves close. OFN RP-017 lines the RWST up to the charging header by opening BNLCV0112E before starting the B CCP. Therefore, failure of this valve to open will not affect PFSSD in the event of a control room fire. Valve damage causing loss of pressure boundary is potentially PFSSD adverse due to RWST flow diversion. Valve is tracked for resolution as part of CR 00116831-02-03 Extent of Condition.

BNHIS0112E RL001 M-12BN01 (F-3) BNLCV0112E RWST to CCP Valve could open If the valve opens, there is no adverse impact on or remain closed. PFSSD since it would provide a suction source to the charging pump header. If the valve remains closed, CCP suction would be available from the VCT unless the VCT outlet valves close. OFN RP-017 lines up the RWST up to the charging header before starting the B CCP. The valve is opened by placing BNHS0112E in the ISO/OPEN position. Valve has been modified to address NRC IN 92-18.

BGHIS8111 RL001 M-12BG03 (E-4) BGHV8111 CCP B Recirc Valve could close, If the B CCP is running at the time of the fire and this causing a loss of valve closes with little or no flow in the system, the CCP B mini flow. pump could be damaged. The NCP is normally operating, so this is not a concern under normal operating conditions. Procedure OFN RP-017 opens this valve by placing BGHS8111A in the ISO/OPEN position. Valve has been modified to address NRC IN 92-18.

BGHIS8106 RL001 M-12BG03 (E-3) BGHV8106 CCP to Regen Hx Valve could open If this valve closes, it is in the desired PFSSD position.

Iso or close If it remains open, charging flow would continue until manual valve BG8402B is closed. Valve damage causing loss of pressure boundary is not adverse to PFSSD as BGHV8106 is downstream of BG8402B &

BGV0017 that are manually closed in OFN RP-017 to isolate charging flow path and check valve BG8381 prevents flow back from regen heat exchanger (M-12BG01)

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Appendix 2 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 Page 5 of 51 Table A2 Control Room Fire Consequence Evaluation for Motor Operated Valves Control Room Instrument P&ID Drawing Associated Description Consequence if Impact on PFSSD in the Event of a Control Room Instrument Location MOV(s) Damaged Fire BGHIS8105 RL001 M-12BG03 (E-3) BGHV8105 CCP to Regen Hx Valve could open If this valve closes, it is in the desired PFSSD position.

Iso or close If it remains open, charging flow would continue until manual valve BG8402B is closed. Valve damage causing loss of pressure boundary is not adverse to PFSSD as BGHV8105 is downstream of BG8402B &

BGV0017 that are manually closed in OFN RP-017 to isolate charging flow path and check valve BG8381 prevents flow back from regen heat exchanger (M-12BG01).

BGHS8110 RL001 M-12BG03 (E-3) BGHV8110 CCP A Recirc Iso Could cause a Switch is used to reset a safety injection signal. Based Reset spurious reset or on a review of drawing E-13BG11B, fire damage to the prevent a reset. switch will not cause the valve to open or close.

Therefore, the valve cannot be damaged in a manner described in IN 92-18. Furthermore, the valve is not credited for PFSSD following a control room fire so the position of the valve will not affect PFSSD.

BGHS8111 RL001 M-12BG03 (E-5) BGHV8111 CCP B Recirc Iso Could cause a Switch is used to reset a safety injection signal. Based Reset spurious reset or on a review of drawing E-13BG11C, fire damage to the prevent a reset. switch will not cause the valve to open or close.

Therefore, the valve cannot be damaged in a manner described in IN 92-18. Therefore, there is no adverse impact on PFSSD. Procedure OFN RP-017 opens this valve by placing BGHS8111A in the ISO/OPEN position. Damage to the switch and associated cables will not prevent BGHS8111A from performing this function.

BGHIS8357A RL001 M-12BG03 (C-4) BGHV8357A CCP A to RCP SealsValve could open None. Seal injection is isolated by closing BGV0101 or remain closed. and BGV0105 in procedure OFN RP-017. With the valve open or closed, there is no adverse impact on PFSSD. Valve damage causing loss of pressure boundary is potentially PFSSD adverse due to RWST flow diversion. Valve is tracked for resolution as part of CR 00116831-02-03 Extent of Condition.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Appendix 2 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 Page 6 of 51 Table A2 Control Room Fire Consequence Evaluation for Motor Operated Valves Control Room Instrument P&ID Drawing Associated Description Consequence if Impact on PFSSD in the Event of a Control Room Instrument Location MOV(s) Damaged Fire BGHIS8357B RL001 M-12BG03 (B-4) BGHV8357B CCP B to RCP SealsValve could open None. Seal injection is isolated by closing BGV0101 or remain closed. and BGV0105 in procedure OFN RP-017. With the valve open or closed, there is no adverse impact on PFSSD. Valve damage causing loss of pressure boundary is potentially PFSSD adverse due to CCP B flow diversion. Valve is tracked for resolution as part of CR 00116831-02-03 Extent of Condition.

BBHIS8157A RL001 M-12BB02 (E-1) BBHV8157A Excess Letdown to Could allow excess Could potentially lose ~50 gpm to the PRT if one excess PRT letdown flow to the letdown heat exchanger inlet flowpath (2 valves) also PRT if 2 other open. The excess letdown heat exchanger inlet valves valves to the are also controlled from RL001, so this condition could excess letdown occur but it would require multiple spurious operations.

heat exchanger Wolf Creek is not required to consider multiple spurious also open. operations in the event of a control room fire.

Furthermore, excess letdown is isolated in OFN RP-017 by opening breakers NK4119 and NK4407 to fail the excess letdown valves closed. Based on E-1F9915, operators have 37 minutes to mitigate a failed open excess letdown flowpath assuming 100 gpm loss. OFN RP-017A opens BBHV8157A to re-establish a letdown flowpath for cold shutdown. Valve BBHV8157A has been modified to address IN 92-18 concerns and is therefore available.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Appendix 2 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 Page 7 of 51 Table A2 Control Room Fire Consequence Evaluation for Motor Operated Valves Control Room Instrument P&ID Drawing Associated Description Consequence if Impact on PFSSD in the Event of a Control Room Instrument Location MOV(s) Damaged Fire BBHIS8157B RL001 M-12BB02 (D-1) BBHV8157B Excess Letdown to Could allow excess Could potentially lose ~50 gpm to the PRT if one excess PRT letdown flow to the letdown heat exchanger inlet flowpath (2 valves) also PRT if 2 other opens. The excess letdown heat exchanger inlet valves valves to the are also controlled from RL001, so this condition could excess letdown occur, but it would require multiple spurious operations.

heat exchanger Wolf Creek is not required to consider multiple spurious also open. operations in the event of a control room fire.

Furthermore, excess letdown is isolated in OFN RP-017 by opening breakers NK4119 and NK4407 to fail the excess letdown valves closed. Based on E-1F9915, operators have 37 minutes to mitigate a failed open excess letdown flowpath assuming 100 gpm loss. OFN RP-017A opens BBHV8157B to re-establish a letdown flowpath for cold shutdown. Valve BBHV8157B has been modified to address IN 92-18 concerns and is therefore available.

AEHIS0016 RL005 M-12AE01 (E-5) AEHV0016 SG Feed Pump A Could cause the The main feedwater pumps are not used for PFSSD.

FW Disch Valve valve to close or PFSSD is achieved using auxiliary feedwater. Steam remain open. generator overfill is prevented by automatic feedwater isolation (FWIS) upon initiation of reactor trip (reference License Amendment 214). Therefore, damage to this switch will not adversely impact PFSSD. Valve damage causing loss of pressure boundary may result in main feedwater flow diversion but is not adverse to PFSSD due to credited FWIS.

AEHIS0015 RL005 M-12AE01 (C-5) AEHV0015 SG Feed Pump B Could cause the The main feedwater pumps are not used for PFSSD.

FW Disch Valve valve to close or PFSSD is achieved using auxiliary feedwater. Steam remain open. generator overfill is prevented by automatic feedwater isolation (FWIS) upon initiation of reactor trip (reference License Amendment 214). Therefore, damage to this switch will not adversely impact PFSSD. Valve damage causing loss of pressure boundary may result in main feedwater flow diversion but is not adverse to PFSSD due to credited FWIS.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Appendix 2 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 Page 8 of 51 Table A2 Control Room Fire Consequence Evaluation for Motor Operated Valves Control Room Instrument P&ID Drawing Associated Description Consequence if Impact on PFSSD in the Event of a Control Room Instrument Location MOV(s) Damaged Fire ALHIS0036A RL005 M-12AL01 (B-4) ALHV0036 CST to TDAFP Valve could This valve is required to be open in OFN RP-017 to Suction spuriously close. provide a suction source from the CST to the TDAFP.

The valve is verified open in Step B7 and opened if it is not. This is a Train A valve so it is not isolated from the control room. Rather, the power is de-energized in Step 5.c to prevent spurious operation. If the valve spuriously closes before opening the breaker, an operator can locally open the valve. The valve was modified in DCP 12170 to address IN 92-18. Therefore, damage to this switch will not adversely impact PFSSD.

ALHIS0032A RL005 M-12AL01 (C-3) ALHV0032 ESW A to TDAFP Valve could This valve is normally closed and is not used in OFN Suction spuriously open or RP-017. Train A ESW is not used in OFN RP-017. The remain closed. valve can fail in any position with no adverse impact on PFSSD. Valve damage causing loss of pressure boundary is not adverse to PFSSD as potential feedwater diversion is prevented by check valve ALV0012.

ALHIS0035A RL005 M-12AL01 (D-3) ALHV0035 CST to MDAFP A Valve could Valve is normally open to provide a suction source from spuriously close. the CST to the Train A MDAFP. The Train A MDAFP is not used in OFN RP-017 and therefore this valve can fail closed with no adverse impact on PFSSD. Valve damage causing loss of pressure boundary is potentially PFSSD adverse due to CST flow diversion. Valve is tracked for resolution as part of CR 00116831-02-03 Extent of Condition.

ALHIS0031A RL005 M-12AL01 (E-3) ALHV0031 ESW to MDAFP A Valve could Valve is normally closed and opens on LSP signal to spuriously open or provide a suction source from Train A ESW to the Train remain closed. A MDAFP. The Train A MDAFP is not used in OFN RP-017. This valve can fail in any position with no adverse impact on PFSSD. Valve damage causing loss of pressure boundary is not adverse to PFSSD as potential feedwater diversion is prevented by check valve ALV0009.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Appendix 2 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 Page 9 of 51 Table A2 Control Room Fire Consequence Evaluation for Motor Operated Valves Control Room Instrument P&ID Drawing Associated Description Consequence if Impact on PFSSD in the Event of a Control Room Instrument Location MOV(s) Damaged Fire ALHIS0033A RL005 M-12AL01 (C-3) ALHV0033 ESW to TDAFP Valve could This valve is opened in OFN RP-017 when aligning the spuriously open or alternate AFW source. The valve is isolated from the remain closed. control room using RP HIS-2 in Step A-1. If the valve fails open it is possible that ESW would enter the TDAFP suction, which would allow raw water to enter the steam generators. This will not adversely affect PFSSD. If the valve fails closed, it can be lined up to the TDAFP after it is isolated in Step A1. The valve was modified to address IN 92-18 in DCP 12170. In either case, there is no adverse impact on PFSSD.

ALHIS0034A RL005 M-12AL01 (H-4) ALHV0034 CST to MDAFP B Valve could Valve is required to be open to provide the primary spuriously close. source of AFW from the CST to the Train B MDAFP.

The valve is isolated from the control room in Step A1 using RP HIS-2 and opened using AL HIS-34B at the ASP. The valve was modified in DCP 12170 to address IN 92-18. Therefore, spurious operation of the valve will not adversely impact PFSSD.

ALHIS0030A RL005 M-12AL01 (G-3) ALHV0030 ESW to MDAFP B Valve could This valve is opened in OFN RP-017 when aligning the spuriously open or alternate AFW source. The valve is isolated from the remain closed. control room using RP HIS-2 in Step A-1. If the valve fails open it is possible that ESW would enter the MDAFP B suction, which would allow raw water to enter the steam generators. This will not adversely affect PFSSD. If the valve fails closed, it can be lined up to the B MDAFP after it is isolated in Step A1. In either case, there is no adverse impact on PFSSD. The valve was modified in DCP 12170 to address IN 92-18.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Appendix 2 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 Page 10 of 51 Table A2 Control Room Fire Consequence Evaluation for Motor Operated Valves Control Room Instrument P&ID Drawing Associated Description Consequence if Impact on PFSSD in the Event of a Control Room Instrument Location MOV(s) Damaged Fire FCHIS0312A RL005 M-12FC02 (G-3) FCHV0312 TDAFP Trip and Could prevent This valve is required in OFN RP-017 to provide steam Throttle Valve operation of the to the TDAFP. The valve is isolated from the control valve. room in Step A1 and opened in Step A14. If the valve goes full open, steam would flow only if either valve ABHV0005 or ABHV0006 and valve FCFV0313 also open. Valve FCFV0313 is normally open with the controller in manual and set to 3850 RPM. Therefore, with the proper valve lineup there could be steam release through the TDAFP. Excessive steam flow would likely result in FCHV0312 tripping on high speed.

The valve was not modified to address NRC IN 92-18 because control relays in the circuit prevent the concern identified in NRC IN 92-18.

ALHK0007A RL006 M-12AL01 (F-8) ALHV0007 SG A MD Aux FW B Could prevent flow Damage to this switch could cause a loss of auxiliary Control Valve control from feedwater flow control from the Train B MDAFP to SG MDAFP B to SG A. A. The Train B MDAFP is used in OFN RP-017 to supply SG D only. SG A is not credited in OFN RP-017 since the dump valve is on Train A. If this valve were to open while running the Train B MDAFP, auxiliary feedwater would flow to SG A but with possibly no steam dump capability the SG would overfill. Manual valve ALV0032 is closed in OFN RP-017 to prevent overfilling SG A. IN 92-18 valve damage not possible due to circuit design that prevents torque switch bypass, same as ALHK0005A.

ALHK0009A RL006 M-12AL01 (E-8) ALHV0009 SG B MD Aux FW A Could prevent flow Damage to this switch could cause a loss of auxiliary Control Valve control from feedwater flow control from the Train A MDAFP to SG MDAFP A to SG B. B. The Train A MDAFP is not used in OFN RP-017.

The pump is secured in OFN RP-017 to prevent overfilling SGs B and C. IN 92-18 valve damage not possible due to circuit design that prevents torque switch bypass, same as ALHK0005A.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Appendix 2 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 Page 11 of 51 Table A2 Control Room Fire Consequence Evaluation for Motor Operated Valves Control Room Instrument P&ID Drawing Associated Description Consequence if Impact on PFSSD in the Event of a Control Room Instrument Location MOV(s) Damaged Fire ALHK0011A RL006 M-12AL01 (C-8) ALHV0011 SG C MD Aux FW A Could prevent flow Damage to this switch could cause a loss of auxiliary Control Valve control from feedwater flow control from the Train A MDAFP to SG MDAFP A to SG C. C. The Train A MDAFP is not used in OFN RP-017.

The pump is secured in OFN RP-017 to prevent overfilling SGs B and C. IN 92-18 valve damage not possible due to circuit design that prevents torque switch bypass, same as ALHK0005A.

ALHK0005A RL006 M-12AL01 (H-8) ALHV0005 SG D MD Aux FW B Could prevent flow Damage to this switch could cause a loss of auxiliary Control Valve control from feedwater flow control from the Train B MDAFP to SG MDAFP B to SG D. D. This valve is credited in OFN RP-017 to ensure a flow path from MDAFP B to SG D. The valve is controlled in Step A5. Prior to Step A5 the valve could either fail open, fail closed or fail somewhere in-between. There is no adverse impact on PFSSD prior to controlling the valve. The design of the valve would not allow it to be damaged per IN 92-18 so the valve was not modified to address this concern. This is because the valve is a positionable MOV using hand controller ALHK0005A. Fire damage to the controller or circuits will not bypass the torque and limit switches at the valve. Therefore, the valve cannot be damaged in a manner described in IN 92-18.

0HS-WL025A RL013 M-0024, Sh. 2 0WL0014 Low Level Iso Vlv Could prevent The makeup water system is not required for PFSSD.

(H-6) Ctrl Sw operation of the Spurious operation of the valve will not adversely impact valve. safe shutdown. Valve damage causing loss of pressure boundary and potentially makeup water flow diversion is inconsequential to PFSSD.

0HS-WL026A RL013 M-0024, Sh. 2 0WL0015 Dewater Iso Vlv Ctrl Could prevent The makeup water system is not required for PFSSD.

(H-5) Sw operation of the Spurious operation of the valve will not adversely impact valve. safe shutdown. Valve damage causing loss of pressure boundary and potentially makeup water flow diversion is inconsequential to PFSSD.

0HS-WL028A RL013 M-0024, Sh. 2 0WL0017 Dewater Disch Vlv Could prevent The makeup water system is not required for PFSSD.

(H-3) Ctrl Sw operation of the Spurious operation of the valve will not adversely impact valve. safe shutdown. Valve damage causing loss of pressure boundary and potentially makeup water flow diversion is inconsequential to PFSSD.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Appendix 2 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 Page 12 of 51 Table A2 Control Room Fire Consequence Evaluation for Motor Operated Valves Control Room Instrument P&ID Drawing Associated Description Consequence if Impact on PFSSD in the Event of a Control Room Instrument Location MOV(s) Damaged Fire 0HS-WL027A RL013 M-0024, Sh. 2 0WL0016 Blowdown Iso Vlv Could prevent The makeup water system is not required for PFSSD.

(D-6) Ctrl Sw operation of the Spurious operation of the valve will not adversely impact valve. safe shutdown. Valve damage causing loss of pressure boundary and potentially makeup water flow diversion is inconsequential to PFSSD.

0HS-WL029AA, RL013 M-0024, Sh. 2 (F- 0WL0018 Blowdown Disch Vlv Could prevent The makeup water system is not required for PFSSD.

0HS-WL029AB 3) Ctrl Sw operation of the Spurious operation of the valve will not adversely impact valve. safe shutdown. Valve damage causing loss of pressure boundary and potentially makeup water flow diversion is inconsequential to PFSSD.

BNHIS0003 RL017 M-12BN01 (C-3) BNHV0003 RWST to Could close or If the valve remains in its normally open position with no Containment Spray remain open. other spurious actuations, there would be no adverse Pump B impact on PFSSD. However, if the CS B pump starts and the containment spray isolation valve opens then Train B containment spray would occur and RWST inventory will be depleted until containment spray is stopped. The flow in the containment spray system with one pump operating is approximately 3,000 gpm.

Based on calculation XX-E-013, Appendix 1, a maximum of 214,260 gallons of water can be lost from the RWST to maintain sufficient volume to achieve cold shutdown. Therefore, operators have approximately 71 minutes to stop the containment spray pump. The Train B pump is stopped in OFN RP-017 prior to 71 minutes.

Therefore, the pump will be stopped within the required time period to prevent unacceptable RWST draindown.

Valve damage causing loss of pressure boundary is potentially PFSSD adverse due to RWST flow diversion.

Valve is tracked for resolution as part of CR 00116831-02-03 Extent of Condition.

ENHIS0007 RL017 M-12EN01 (B-7) ENHV0007 Containment Recirc Could spuriously This valve is not credited for PFSSD. If it spuriously Sump to open or remain opens or remains closed there is no adverse impact on Containment Spray closed. PFSSD. Valve damage causing loss of pressure Pump B boundary is not adverse to PFSSD. Check valve ENV0008 will prevent the RWST from draining to the containment sump if the valve opens or is breached from damage.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Appendix 2 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 Page 13 of 51 Table A2 Control Room Fire Consequence Evaluation for Motor Operated Valves Control Room Instrument P&ID Drawing Associated Description Consequence if Impact on PFSSD in the Event of a Control Room Instrument Location MOV(s) Damaged Fire ENHIS0016 RL017 M-12EN01 (D-6) ENHV0016 Spray Additive Tank Could open or This valve is not credited for PFSSD. If it spuriously Isolation Valve remain closed. opens or remains closed there is no adverse impact on PFSSD. Valve damage causing loss of pressure boundary is not adverse to PFSSD. Normally closed manual valves BNV0013 and BNV0014 prevent RWST drain path.

ENHIS0012 RL017 M-12EN01 (B-4) ENHV0012 Containment Spray Could spuriously If this valve opens with no other spurious actuations, Isolation Valve open or remain there would be no adverse impact on PFSSD.

closed. However, if the CS B pump starts then containment spray would occur, taking suction from the RWST. 71 minutes are available to mitigate this condition before the RWST reaches a level below that required for cold shutdown. Operators stop the CS B pump in OFN RP-017 prior to 71 minutes. Therefore, the pump would be stopped within the required time period to prevent unacceptable RWST draindown. Valve closure is beneficial to PFSSD as this would prevent RWST draindown. Valve damage causing loss of pressure boundary is potentially PFSSD adverse due to RWST flow diversion. Valve is tracked for resolution as part of CR 00116831-02-03 Extent of Condition.

BNHIS8806B RL017 M-12BN01 (E-3) BNHV8806B RWST to SI Pumps Could close or If this valve remains in its normally open position, then Suction remain open. there would be no adverse impact on PFSSD. If a spurious SIS occurs, there is no adverse impact because the SI pumps will not inject if RCS pressure is above 1565 psi. The SI pumps are not credited for PFSSD so if the valve closes, there would be no adverse impact. Valve damage causing loss of pressure boundary is potentially PFSSD adverse due to RWST flow diversion. Valve is tracked for resolution as part of CR 00116831-02-03 Extent of Condition.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Appendix 2 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 Page 14 of 51 Table A2 Control Room Fire Consequence Evaluation for Motor Operated Valves Control Room Instrument P&ID Drawing Associated Description Consequence if Impact on PFSSD in the Event of a Control Room Instrument Location MOV(s) Damaged Fire EMHIS8923B RL017 M-12EM01 (D-7) EMHV8923B SI Pump B Suction Could close or If this valve remains in its normally open position, then Isolation Valve remain open. there would be no adverse impact on PFSSD. If a spurious SIS occurs, there is no adverse impact because the SI pumps will not inject if RCS pressure is above 1565 psi. If the valve spuriously closes, there is no adverse impact since the Train B SI pump is not credited for PFSSD. Valve damage causing loss of pressure boundary is potentially PFSSD adverse due to RWST flow diversion. Valve is tracked for resolution as part of CR 00116831-02-03 Extent of Condition.

EMHIS8924 RL017 M-12EM01 (G-8) EMHV8924 CVCS to SI pump Could close or This normally open valve, along with normally closed Suction remain open. parallel valves EMHV8807A and EMHV8807B provide an alternate SI pump suction path from the CVCS suction header. The SI system is not used for PFSSD.

This valve can fail in any position with no adverse impact on PFSSD. Valve damage causing loss of pressure boundary is potentially PFSSD adverse due to RWST flow diversion. Valve is tracked for resolution as part of CR 00116831-02-03 Extent of Condition.

EMHIS8807B RL017 M-12EM01 (F-7) EMHV8807B CVCS to SI pump Could open or If this normally closed valve opens with the SI pumps Suction remain closed. off, there is no adverse impact on PFSSD. If the pumps start there will be no flow in the system and RWST inventory will be maintained. Valve damage causing loss of pressure boundary is potentially PFSSD adverse due to RWST flow diversion. Valve is tracked for resolution as part of CR 00116831-02-03 Extent of Condition.

BNHIS8813 RL017 M-12BN01 (C-7) BNHV8813 SI Return to RWST Could close or This normally open valve provides a return flowpath remain open. from the SI pumps to the RWST. If the valve closes with SI pumps running, damage could occur to the pumps if there is no flow in the system. The SI pumps are not credited for PFSSD so there would be no adverse impact. Valve damage causing loss of pressure boundary is potentially PFSSD adverse due to RWST flow diversion. Valve is tracked for resolution as part of CR 00116831-02-03 Extent of Condition.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Appendix 2 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 Page 15 of 51 Table A2 Control Room Fire Consequence Evaluation for Motor Operated Valves Control Room Instrument P&ID Drawing Associated Description Consequence if Impact on PFSSD in the Event of a Control Room Instrument Location MOV(s) Damaged Fire BNHIS8813A RL017 M-12BN01 (C-7) BNHV8813 Valve BNHV8813 Could close or This switch is a power lockout for valve BNHV8813 and Power Lockout remain open. is normally in the ISO position, which maintains the valve in the open position. There is no adverse impact on PFSSD if this switch is affected. Valve damage causing loss of pressure boundary is potentially PFSSD adverse due to RWST flow diversion. Valve is tracked for resolution as part of CR 00116831-02-03 Extent of Condition.

EJHIS8804B RL017 M-12EJ01 (B-4) EJHV8804B RHR HX B to SI Could open or The valve is required to remain closed for PFSSD when Pump B remain closed. operating Train B RHR for cold shutdown. If the valve opens prior to reaching RHR entry conditions, there would be no adverse impact on PFSSD. Valve was modified to address IN 92-18 and is closed in OFN RP-017A to support cold shutdown.

EMHIS8814B RL017 M-12EM01 (B-5) EMHV8814B SI Pump B Return to Could close or This normally open valve provides a return flowpath RWST remain open. from the Train B SI pump to the RWST. If the valve closes with Train B SI pump running, damage could occur to the pump if there is no flow in the system. The Train B SI pump is not credited for PFSSD so there would be no adverse impact. Valve damage causing loss of pressure boundary is potentially PFSSD adverse due to RWST flow diversion. Valve is tracked for resolution as part of CR 00116831-02-03 Extent of Condition.

EMHIS8821B RL017 M-12EM01 (D-4) EMHV8821B SI Pump B to RCS Could close or The position of this valve (open or closed) has no Cold Leg Injection remain open. adverse impact on PFSSD. If the SI pumps are running, injection will not occur until the RCS pressure drops below 1565 psig. Valve damage causing loss of pressure boundary is potentially PFSSD adverse due to RWST flow diversion. Valve is tracked for resolution as part of CR 00116831-02-03 Extent of Condition.

EMHIS8802B RL017 M-12EM01 (D-4) EMHV8802B SI Pump B Could open or The position of this valve (open or closed) has no Discharge Valve remain closed. adverse impact on PFSSD. If the SI pumps are running, injection will not occur until the RCS pressure drops below 1565 psig. Valve damage causing loss of pressure boundary is potentially PFSSD adverse due to RWST flow diversion. Valve is tracked for resolution as part of CR 00116831-02-03 Extent of Condition.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Appendix 2 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 Page 16 of 51 Table A2 Control Room Fire Consequence Evaluation for Motor Operated Valves Control Room Instrument P&ID Drawing Associated Description Consequence if Impact on PFSSD in the Event of a Control Room Instrument Location MOV(s) Damaged Fire EMHIS8802BA RL017 M-12EM01 (D-4) EMHV8802B Valve EMHV8802B Could open or The position of this valve (open or closed) has no Power Lockout remain closed. adverse impact on PFSSD. If the SI pumps are running, injection will not occur until the RCS pressure drops below 1565 psig. Valve damage causing loss of pressure boundary is potentially PFSSD adverse due to RWST flow diversion. Valve is tracked for resolution as part of CR 00116831-02-03 Extent of Condition.

EMHIS8835 RL017 M-12EM01 (C-4) EMHV8835 SI Cold Leg Injection Could close or The position of this valve (open or closed) has no Valve remain open. adverse impact on PFSSD. If the SI pumps are running, injection will not occur until the RCS pressure drops below 1565 psig. Valve damage causing loss of pressure boundary is potentially PFSSD adverse due to RWST flow diversion. Valve is tracked for resolution as part of CR 00116831-02-03 Extent of Condition.

EMHIS8835A RL017 M-12EM01 (C-4) EMHV8835 Valve EMHV8835 Could close or The position of this valve (open or closed) has no Power Lockout remain open. adverse impact on PFSSD. If the SI pumps are running, injection will not occur until the RCS pressure drops below 1565 psig. Valve damage causing loss of pressure boundary is potentially PFSSD adverse due to RWST flow diversion. Valve is tracked for resolution as part of CR 00116831-02-03 Extent of Condition.

EMHIS8821A RL017 M-12EM01 (E-4) EMHV8821A SI Pump A to RCS Could close or The position of this valve (open or closed) has no Cold Leg Injection remain open. adverse impact on PFSSD. If the SI pumps are running, injection will not occur until the RCS pressure drops below 1565 psig. Valve damage causing loss of pressure boundary is potentially PFSSD adverse due to RWST flow diversion. Valve is tracked for resolution as part of CR 00116831-02-03 Extent of Condition.

EMHIS8802A RL017 M-12EM01 (F-4) EMHV8802A SI Pump A Could open or The position of this valve (open or closed) has no Discharge Valve remain closed. adverse impact on PFSSD. If the SI pumps are running, injection will not occur until the RCS pressure drops below 1565 psig. Valve damage causing loss of pressure boundary is potentially PFSSD adverse due to RWST flow diversion. Valve is tracked for resolution as part of CR 00116831-02-03 Extent of Condition.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Appendix 2 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 Page 17 of 51 Table A2 Control Room Fire Consequence Evaluation for Motor Operated Valves Control Room Instrument P&ID Drawing Associated Description Consequence if Impact on PFSSD in the Event of a Control Room Instrument Location MOV(s) Damaged Fire EMHIS8802AA RL017 M-12EM01 (F-4) EMHV8802A Valve EMHV8802A Could open or The position of this valve (open or closed) has no Power Lockout remain closed. adverse impact on PFSSD. If the SI pumps are running, injection will not occur until the RCS pressure drops below 1565 psig. Valve damage causing loss of pressure boundary is potentially PFSSD adverse due to RWST flow diversion. Valve is tracked for resolution as part of CR 00116831-02-03 Extent of Condition.

EMHIS8923A RL017 M-12EM01 (F-7) EMHV8923A SI Pump A Suction Could close or If this valve remains in its normally open position with no Isolation Valve remain open. other spurious actuations, then there would be no adverse impact on PFSSD. If the valve spuriously closes, there is no adverse impact since the Train A SI pump is not credited for PFSSD. Valve damage causing loss of pressure boundary is potentially PFSSD adverse due to RWST flow diversion. Valve is tracked for resolution as part of CR 00116831-02-03 Extent of Condition.

EMHIS8814A RL017 M-12EM01 (B-6) EMHV8814A SI Pump A Return to Could close or This normally open valve provides a return flowpath RWST remain open. from the Train A SI pump to the RWST. If the valve closes with Train A SI pump running, damage could occur to the pump if there is no flow in the system. The Train A SI pump is not credited for PFSSD so there would be no adverse impact. Valve damage causing loss of pressure boundary is potentially PFSSD adverse due to RWST flow diversion. Valve is tracked for resolution as part of CR 00116831-02-03 Extent of Condition.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Appendix 2 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 Page 18 of 51 Table A2 Control Room Fire Consequence Evaluation for Motor Operated Valves Control Room Instrument P&ID Drawing Associated Description Consequence if Impact on PFSSD in the Event of a Control Room Instrument Location MOV(s) Damaged Fire ENHIS0006 RL017 M-12EN01 (H-4) ENHV0006 Train A Containment Could spuriously If this valve opens with no other spurious actuations, Spray Isolation open or remain there would be no adverse impact on PFSSD.

Valve closed. However, if the A CS pump starts then containment spray would occur, taking suction from the RWST. 71 minutes are available to mitigate this condition before the RWST reaches a level below that required for cold shutdown. The CS A pump is stopped in OFN RP-017 prior to 71 minutes. Therefore, the pump will be stopped within the required 71 minutes. Valve closure is beneficial to PFSSD as this would prevent RWST draindown. Valve damage causing loss of pressure boundary is potentially PFSSD adverse due to RWST flow diversion. Valve is tracked for resolution as part of CR 00116831-02-03 Extent of Condition.

BNHIS0004 RL017 M-12BN01 (B-3) BNHV0004 RWST to Could close or If the valve remains in its normally open position with no Containment Spray remain open. other spurious actuations, there would be no adverse Pump A impact on PFSSD. However, if the A CS pump starts and the containment spray isolation valve opens, Train A containment spray would occur and RWST inventory will be depleted until containment spray is stopped. The flow in the containment spray system with one pump operating is approximately 3,000 gpm. Based on calculation XX-E-013, Appendix 1, a maximum of 214,260 gallons of water can be lost from the RWST to maintain sufficient volume to achieve cold shutdown.

Therefore, operators have approximately 71 minutes to stop the containment spray pump. The A CS pump is stopped in OFN RP-017 prior to 71 minutes. Therefore, RWST inventory will be maintained. Valve damage causing loss of pressure boundary is potentially PFSSD adverse due to RWST flow diversion. Valve is tracked for resolution as part of CR 00116831-02-03 Extent of Condition.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Appendix 2 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 Page 19 of 51 Table A2 Control Room Fire Consequence Evaluation for Motor Operated Valves Control Room Instrument P&ID Drawing Associated Description Consequence if Impact on PFSSD in the Event of a Control Room Instrument Location MOV(s) Damaged Fire ENHIS0015 RL017 M-12EN01 (E-6) ENHV0015 Spray Additive Tank Could open or This valve is not credited for PFSSD. If it spuriously Isolation Valve remain closed. opens or remains closed there is no adverse impact on PFSSD. Valve damage causing loss of pressure boundary is not adverse to PFSSD. Normally closed manual valves BNV0013 and BNV0014 prevent RWST drain path.

ENHIS0001 RL017 M-12EN01 (G-7) ENHV0001 Containment Recirc Could spuriously This valve is not credited for PFSSD. If it spuriously Sump to open or remain opens or remains closed there is no adverse impact on Containment Spray closed. PFSSD. Valve damage causing loss of pressure Pump A boundary is not adverse to PFSSD. Check valve ENV0002 will prevent the RWST from draining to the containment sump if the valve opens or is breached from damage.

BBHIS8702A RL017 M-12BB01 (F-4) BBPV8702A RCS Hot Leg to None This valve is normally deenergized and is maintained RHR Pump A closed. Damage to the hand switch will have no adverse impact on PFSSD since the valve cannot move from the closed position. Therefore, the valve cannot be damaged in a manner described in IN 92-18. Prior to lining up RHR for shutdown cooling, the valve is lined up in OFN RP-017A.

EJHIS8701A RL017 M-12EJ01 (G-8) EJHV8701A RCS Hot Leg to None This valve is normally deenergized and is maintained RHR Pump A closed. Damage to the hand switch will have no adverse impact on PFSSD since the valve cannot move from the closed position. Therefore, the valve cannot be damaged in a manner described in IN 92-18. Prior to lining up RHR for shutdown cooling, the valve is lined up in OFN RP-017A.

BNHIS8812A RL017 M-12BN01 (B-3) BNHV8812A RWST to RHR Valve could close If the valve closes there is no adverse impact on Pump A Suction or remain open. PFSSD. If the valve remains open and valve EJHV8811A opens, then the RWST would drain to the containment sump. OFN RP-017 closes BNHV8812A to prevent draindown via this path. BNHV8812A has been modified to address IN 92-18 per DCP 12173.

Calculation XX-E-013, Appendix 1 has determined there is 28 minutes to mitigate RWST draindown to the sump if one RWST to sump flowpath fails open. This condition will be mitigated before the RWST drops below minimum level needed for cold shutdown.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Appendix 2 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 Page 20 of 51 Table A2 Control Room Fire Consequence Evaluation for Motor Operated Valves Control Room Instrument P&ID Drawing Associated Description Consequence if Impact on PFSSD in the Event of a Control Room Instrument Location MOV(s) Damaged Fire EJHIS8811A RL017 M-12EJ01 (E-7) EJHV8811A Ctmt Recirc Sump to Valve could Damage to this switch could cause the valve to open.

RHR A Suction spuriously open or In addition, valve BNHV8812A may not automatically remain closed. close as designed, causing the RWST to drain to the sump. This condition is mitigated in OFN RP-017 by manually closing BNHV8812A within the required time period of 28 minutes. The valve BNHV8812A was modified to address NRC IN 92-18. EJHV8811A valve damage causing loss of pressure boundary is not adverse to PFSSD due to BNHV8812A prevention of RWST draindown.

EJHIS0610 RL017 M-12EJ01 (H-6) EJFCV0610 RHR Pump A Valve could close Damage to this switch has no adverse impact on Miniflow Valve or remain open. PFSSD since the Train A RHR system is not credited for a control room fire. The position of this valve (open or closed) will have no adverse impact on hot standby.

Valve damage causing loss of pressure boundary is not adverse to PFSSD. Check valves EJ8969A &,

EJ8730A, ISO valve EJV0001 closed and MOV EJHV8701A maintained closed prevent RHR flow diversion. BNHV8812A closed prevents RWST draindown.

EJHIS8804A RL017 M-12EJ01 (H-4) EJHV8804A RHR A to CVCS Iso Valve could open Valve is required to remain closed when operating Train Valve or remain closed. A RHR to prevent flow diversion to the charging header.

The position of this valve (open or closed) will have no adverse impact on hot standby. The Train A RHR system is not credited for a control room fire so spurious operation of this valve will have no adverse impact on PFSSD. Valve damage causing loss of pressure boundary is not adverse to PFSSD. Check valves EJ8969A & EJ8730A, ISO valve EJV0001 closed and MOV EJHV8701A maintained closed prevent RHR flow diversion. BNHV8812A closed prevents RWST draindown.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Appendix 2 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 Page 21 of 51 Table A2 Control Room Fire Consequence Evaluation for Motor Operated Valves Control Room Instrument P&ID Drawing Associated Description Consequence if Impact on PFSSD in the Event of a Control Room Instrument Location MOV(s) Damaged Fire EJHIS8716A RL017 M-12EJ01 (E-3) EJHV8716A RHR Pump A Hot Valve could close Damage to this switch could cause the valve to close or Leg Recirc or remain open. prevent it from closing. The Train A RHR system is not credited for PFSSD following a control room fire so damage to this switch will have no adverse impact on the ability to achieve cold shutdown. The position of this valve (open or closed) will have no adverse impact on hot standby. OFN RP-017A closes EJHV8840 to prevent hot leg recirculation when lining up RHR for cold shutdown. Valve damage causing loss of pressure boundary is potentially PFSSD adverse due to RHR flow diversion. Valve is tracked for resolution as part of CR 00116831-02-03 Extent of Condition.

EJHIS8809A RL017 M-12EJ01 (G-3) EJHV8809A RHR A to Cold Leg Valve could close The Train A RHR system is not credited for a fire in the Injection Loops 1 or remain open. control room. The position of this valve (open or closed) and 2. will have no adverse impact on safe shutdown. Valve damage causing loss of pressure boundary is potentially PFSSD adverse due to RHR flow diversion. Valve is tracked for resolution as part of CR 00116831-02-03 Extent of Condition.

EJHIS8809AA RL017 M-12EJ01 (G-3) EJHV8809A Valve EJHV8809A Valve could close The Train A RHR system is not credited for a fire in the power lockout. or remain open. control room. The position of this valve (open or closed) will have no adverse impact on safe shutdown. Valve damage causing loss of pressure boundary is potentially PFSSD adverse due to RHR flow diversion. Valve is tracked for resolution as part of CR 00116831-02-03 Extent of Condition.

EMHIS8807A RL017 M-12EM01 (G-7) EMHV8807A CVCS to SI pump Valve could open If this normally closed valve opens with no other Suction or remain closed. spurious actuations, there is no adverse impact on PFSSD. If the pumps start there will be no flow in the system and RWST inventory will be maintained. Valve damage causing loss of pressure boundary is potentially PFSSD adverse due to RWST flow diversion. Valve is tracked for resolution as part of CR 00116831-02-03 Extent of Condition.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Appendix 2 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 Page 22 of 51 Table A2 Control Room Fire Consequence Evaluation for Motor Operated Valves Control Room Instrument P&ID Drawing Associated Description Consequence if Impact on PFSSD in the Event of a Control Room Instrument Location MOV(s) Damaged Fire EJHIS8809B RL017 M-12EJ01 (C-3) EJHV8809B RHR B to Cold Leg Valve could close This valve is credited for a fire in the control room when Inj Loops 3 and 4 or remain open. lining up Train B RHR in OFN RP-017A for cold shutdown. Spurious operation of the valve during hot standby will not impact PFSSD. The valve was modified to address IN 92-18.

EJHIS8809BA RL017 M-12EJ01 (C-3) EJHV8809B RHR B to Cold Leg Valve could close This valve is credited for a fire in the control room when Inj Loops 3 and 4 or remain open. lining up Train B RHR in OFN RP-017A for cold shutdown. Spurious operation of the valve during hot standby will not impact PFSSD. The valve was modified to address IN 92-18.

EJHIS8840 RL017 M-12EJ01 (E-3) EJHV8840 RHR Hot Leg Recirc Valve could open This valve is closed in OFN RP-017A to prevent hot leg Valve or remain closed. recirculation. The position of this valve (open or closed) will have no adverse impact on hot standby. The valve was modified to address IN 92-18.

EJHIS8840A RL017 M-12EJ01 (E-3) EJHV8840 RHR Hot Leg Recirc Valve could open This valve is closed in OFN RP-014 to prevent hot leg Valve or remain closed. recirculation. The position of this valve (open or closed) will have no adverse impact on hot standby. The valve was modified to address IN 92-18.

EJHIS8716B RL017 M-12EJ01 (C-3) EJHV8716B RHR Pump B Hot Valve could close Damage to this switch could cause the valve to close or Leg Recirc or remain open. prevent it from closing. The position of this valve (open or closed) will have no adverse impact on hot standby.

OFN RP-017A closes EJHV8840 to prevent hot leg recirculation when lining up RHR for cold shutdown.

Valve damage causing loss of pressure boundary is potentially PFSSD adverse due to RHR flow diversion.

Valve is tracked for resolution as part of CR 00116831-02-03 Extent of Condition.

EJHIS0611 RL017 M-12EJ01 (B-6) EJFCV0611 RHR B Miniflow Valve could close. If the valve closes there will be no adverse impact Valve unless the Train B RHR pump starts in which case the pump would have no recirc flow. The pump is stopped (or prevented from starting) in OFN RP-017. Valve EJFCV0611 is lined up in OFN RP-017A when placing RHR in service. The valve was modified to address IN 92-18.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Appendix 2 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 Page 23 of 51 Table A2 Control Room Fire Consequence Evaluation for Motor Operated Valves Control Room Instrument P&ID Drawing Associated Description Consequence if Impact on PFSSD in the Event of a Control Room Instrument Location MOV(s) Damaged Fire EJHIS8701B RL017 M-12EJ01 (C-8) EJHV8701B RCS Hot Leg to None This valve is normally deenergized and is maintained RHR Pump B closed. Damage to the hand switch will have no adverse impact on PFSSD since the valve cannot move from the closed position. Therefore, the valve cannot be damaged in a manner described in IN 92-18. Prior to lining up RHR for shutdown cooling, the valve is lined up in OFN RP-017A.

BBHIS8702B RL017 M-12BB01 (H-5) BBPV8702B RCS Hot Leg to None This valve is normally deenergized and is maintained RHR Pump B closed. Damage to the hand switch will have no adverse impact on PFSSD since the valve cannot move from the closed position. Therefore, the valve cannot be damaged in a manner described in IN 92-18. Prior to lining up RHR for shutdown cooling, the valve is lined up in OFN RP-017A.

BNHIS8812B RL017 M-12BN01 (D-3) BNHV8812B RWST to RHR B Valve could close If the valve closes there is no adverse impact on Suction or remain open. PFSSD. If the valve remains open and valve EJHV8811B opens, then the RWST would drain to the containment sump. OFN RP-017 closes BNHV8812B using BNHS8812B. Calculation XX-E-013, Appendix 1 has determined there is 28 minutes to mitigate RWST draindown to the sump if one RWST to sump flowpath fails open. This condition will be mitigated before the RWST drops below minimum level needed for cold shutdown. The valve has been modified to address NRC IN 92-18.

EJHIS8811B RL017 M-12EJ01 (D-7) EJHV8811B Ctmt Recirc Sump to Valve could Valve EJHV8811B is required to be closed for hot RHR B Suction spuriously open. standby (OFN RP-017) and cold shutdown (OFN RP-017A). Damage to this switch could cause the valve to open. In addition, valve BNHV8812B may not automatically close as designed, causing the RWST to drain to the sump. This condition is mitigated in OFN RP-017 using switch BNHS8812B. Procedure OFN RP-017A provides guidance to locally close this valve prior to lining up RHR for shutdown cooling. The valve has been modified to address NRC IN 92-18.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Appendix 2 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 Page 24 of 51 Table A2 Control Room Fire Consequence Evaluation for Motor Operated Valves Control Room Instrument P&ID Drawing Associated Description Consequence if Impact on PFSSD in the Event of a Control Room Instrument Location MOV(s) Damaged Fire BNHIS8806A RL017 M-12BN01 (B-5) BNHV8806A RWST to SI Pumps Could close or If this valve remains in its normally open position, then Suction remain open. there would be no adverse impact on PFSSD. If a spurious SIS occurs, there is no adverse impact because the SI pumps will not inject if RCS pressure is above 1565 psi. The SI pumps are not credited for PFSSD so if the valve closes, there would be no adverse impact. Valve damage causing loss of pressure boundary is potentially PFSSD adverse due to RWST flow diversion. Valve is tracked for resolution as part of CR 00116831-02-03 Extent of Condition.

EGHIS0101 RL017 M-12EG02 (G-4) EGHV0101 CCW to RHR HX A Valve could open If the valve opens, there is no adverse impact. If the or close valve closes, CCW flow to the Train A RHR heat exchanger would be prevented. The Train A RHR system is not credited for safe shutdown following a fire in the control room. The valve can fail in any position with no adverse impact on PFSSD. Valve damage causing loss of pressure boundary and CCW A flow diversion is not adverse to PFSSD. CCW B surge tank level may be impacted due to the common makeup line between train A & B surge tanks. However, level in tank would drop no lower than the common line exiting the B surge tank at 2057' - 9" (M-13EG08, 01, & 05). B train CCW pumps are at 2028' - 10" (M-13EG03). The more than 28' of head pressure is greater than the NPSH required minimum of 18.5' (calculation M-EG-5 R/1).

EGHIS0102 RL017 M-12EG02 (C-4) EGHV0102 CCW to RHR HX B Valve could open If the valve opens, there is no adverse impact. If the or close valve closes, CCW flow to the Train B RHR heat exchanger would be prevented. The Train B RHR system is credited for safe shutdown following a fire in the control room. The system is lined up in OFN RP-017A. The valve has been modified to address NRC IN 92-18.

BNHIS8812AA RL017 M-12BN01 (B-3) BNHV8812A RWST to RHR Valve could close See discussion for BNHIS8812A. The valve has been Pump A Suction or remain open. modified to address IN 92-18.

BNHIS8812BA RL017 M-12BN01 (D-3) BNHV8812B RWST to RHR B Valve could close See discussion for BNHIS8812B. The valve has been Suction or remain open. modified to address IN 92-18.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Appendix 2 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 Page 25 of 51 Table A2 Control Room Fire Consequence Evaluation for Motor Operated Valves Control Room Instrument P&ID Drawing Associated Description Consequence if Impact on PFSSD in the Event of a Control Room Instrument Location MOV(s) Damaged Fire EMHIS8803B RL018 M-12EM02 (B-7) EMHV8803B CCP B to BIT Valve could remain Valve is required to be open in OFN RP-017. The valve closed or open. is manually opened in OFN RP-017 Step B12. If the valve spuriously opens, it is in the desired position and PFSSD is unaffected. The valve has been modified to address NRC IN 92-18.

EMHIS8803A RL018 M-12EM02 (C-7) EMHV8803A CCP A to BIT Valve could remain Valve is not used in OFN RP-017. If it spuriously opens closed or open. or fails in the closed position, there is no impact on PFSSD. Valve damage causing loss of pressure boundary is potentially PFSSD adverse due to RWST flow diversion. Valve is tracked for resolution as part of CR 00116831-02-03 Extent of Condition.

EPHIS8808B RL018 M-12EP01 (F-5) EPHV8808B Accum Tank B .None Valve breaker is padlocked open per CKL EP-120.

Outlet Iso Valve Therefore, this valve cannot be subject to spurious operation or damage described in IN 92-18. The position of this valve (open or closed) has no impact on PFSSD. The valve is used to control lineup of the accumulator to the RCS. The accumulator tanks are not used for PFSSD. During shutdown, the accumulators are prevented from injecting in OFN RP-017A by manually isolating the outlet valves.

EPHIS8808A RL018 M-12EP01 (G-5) EPHV8808A Accum Tank A None Valve breaker is padlocked open per CKL EP-120.

Outlet Iso Valve Therefore, this valve cannot be subject to spurious operation or damage described in IN 92-18. The position of this valve (open or closed) has no impact on PFSSD. The valve is used to control lineup of the accumulator to the RCS. The accumulator tanks are not used for PFSSD. During shutdown, the accumulators are prevented from injecting in OFN RP-017A by manually isolating the outlet valves.

EPHIS8808C RL018 M-12EP01 (D-5) EPHV8808C Accum Tank C None Valve breaker is padlocked open per CKL EP-120.

Outlet Iso Valve Therefore, this valve cannot be subject to spurious operation or damage described in IN 92-18. The position of this valve (open or closed) has no impact on PFSSD. The valve is used to control lineup of the accumulator to the RCS. The accumulator tanks are not used for PFSSD. During shutdown, the accumulators are prevented from injecting in OFN RP-017A by manually isolating the outlet valves.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Appendix 2 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 Page 26 of 51 Table A2 Control Room Fire Consequence Evaluation for Motor Operated Valves Control Room Instrument P&ID Drawing Associated Description Consequence if Impact on PFSSD in the Event of a Control Room Instrument Location MOV(s) Damaged Fire EPHIS8808D RL018 M-12EP01 (B-5) EPHV8808D Accum Tank D None Valve breaker is padlocked open per CKL EP-120.

Outlet Iso Valve Therefore, this valve cannot be subject to spurious operation or damage described in IN 92-18. The position of this valve (open or closed) has no impact on PFSSD. The valve is used to control lineup of the accumulator to the RCS. The accumulator tanks are not used for PFSSD. During shutdown, the accumulators are prevented from injecting in OFN RP-017A by manually isolating the outlet valves.

EMHIS8801B RL018 M-12EM02 (D-4) EMHV8801B BIT Discharge Iso Could cause the This valve is required to be open in OFN RP-017 to Valve valve to open or provide a charging path to the RCS. Step B18 opens remain closed the valve locally manually. If the valve opens as a result of the fire, it is in the desired PFSSD position. The valve has been modified to address NRC IN 92-18.

EMHIS8801A RL018 M-12EM02 (E-4) EMHV8801A BIT Discharge Iso Could cause the This valve is not used in OFN RP-017. If the valve Valve valve to open or opens as a result of the fire, then a flow path from remain closed charging to the RCS will be established as required. If the valve fails to open, valve EMHV8801B is opened in Step B18. Therefore, spurious operation of the valve will not affect PFSSD. Valve damage causing loss of pressure boundary is potentially PFSSD adverse due to BIT flow diversion. Valve is tracked for resolution as part of CR 00116831-02-03 Extent of Condition.

KCHIS0253B RL018 M-12KC02 (B-6) KCHV0253 Fire Protection Could prevent A fire in the control room does not require operation of Header Outer Ctmt operation of the the containment fire suppression system. Damage to Iso Valve valve this switch has no adverse impact on PFSSD. Valve damage causing loss of pressure boundary and fire protection flow diversion is not adverse to PFSSD.

Furthermore, KCV0427 is normally maintained closed and check valve KCV0478 mitigate impact to KC fire protection system.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Appendix 2 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 Page 27 of 51 Table A2 Control Room Fire Consequence Evaluation for Motor Operated Valves Control Room Instrument P&ID Drawing Associated Description Consequence if Impact on PFSSD in the Event of a Control Room Instrument Location MOV(s) Damaged Fire EGHIS0014 RL019 M-12EG01 (C-7) EGHV0014 ESW to CCW Train Could cause the Valve is normally closed. If the valve opens, valve B Makeup valve to open or EGHV0012 will prevent ESW water from entering the remain closed. CCW system. If both valves open, the CCW surge tank would fill solid, however this would not impact the ability of the CCW system to perform its intended function. If necessary, manual valve EGV0185 could be closed to isolate the makeup. Valve damage causing loss of pressure boundary is potentially PFSSD adverse due to CCW flow diversion. Valve is tracked for resolution as part of CR 00116831-02-03 Extent of Condition.

EGHIS0012 RL019 M-12EG01 (C-8) EGHV0012 ESW to CCW Train Could cause the Valve is normally closed. If the valve opens, valve B Makeup valve to open or EGHV0014 will prevent ESW water from entering the remain closed. CCW system. If both valves open, the CCW surge tank would fill solid, however this would not impact the ability of the CCW system to perform its intended function. If necessary, manual valve EGV0185 could be closed to isolate the makeup. Valve damage causing loss of pressure boundary is potentially PFSSD adverse due to CCW flow diversion. Valve is tracked for resolution as part of CR 00116831-02-03 Extent of Condition.

EGHS0016 RL019 M-12EG01 (C-7) EGHV0016, CCW Train B to/from Could cause the Valves are closed when operating the Train A CCW EGHV0054 Service Loop valves to close or system and opened when operating the Train B CCW open. system. If the valves spuriously open, they are in the desired PFSSD position for OFN RP-017. If the valves are closed, OFN RP-017 opens them using switches EGHS0016A and EGHS0054. The valves were modified to address IN 92-18.

EGHIS0071 RL019 M-12EG03 (H-6) EGHV0071 CCW to RCS Iso Could cause the Valve is normally open and can be in any position for Valve valve to close or OFN RP-017. This valve, or bypass valve EGHV0126, remain open. needs to be open for cold shutdown when using the excess letdown heat exchanger. If the valve fails closed, it will be manually open in OFN RP-017A. If the valve fails open, the CCW system is protected from a steam bubble by closing EGHV0061 and EGHV0133 in OFN RP-017. Valve was modified to address IN 92-18.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Appendix 2 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 Page 28 of 51 Table A2 Control Room Fire Consequence Evaluation for Motor Operated Valves Control Room Instrument P&ID Drawing Associated Description Consequence if Impact on PFSSD in the Event of a Control Room Instrument Location MOV(s) Damaged Fire EGHIS0058 RL019 M-12EG03 (H-6) EGHV0058 CCW to RCS Iso Could cause the Valve is normally open and can be in any position for Valve valve to close or OFN RP-017. This valve, or bypass valve EGHV0127, remain open. needs to be open for cold shutdown when using the excess letdown heat exchanger. If the valve fails closed, it will be manually open in OFN RP-017A. If the valve fails open, the CCW system is protected from a steam bubble by closing EGHV0061 and EGHV0133 in OFN RP-017. Valve was modified to address IN 92-18.

EGHIS0062 RL019 M-12EG03 (A-5) EGHV0062 CCW Return from Could cause the Valve is normally open and can be in any position for RCS Iso Valve valve to close or OFN RP-017. This valve is not required for cold remain open. shutdown. If the valve fails closed, it is in the desired PFSSD position. If the valve fails open, the CCW system is protected from a steam bubble by closing EGHV0061 and EGHV0133 in OFN RP-017. Valve damage causing loss of pressure boundary is potentially PFSSD adverse due to CCW flow diversion. Valve is tracked for resolution as part of CR 00116831-02-03 Extent of Condition.

EGHIS0060 RL019 M-12EG03 (A-5) EGHV0060 CCW Return from Could cause the Valve is normally open and can be in any position for RCS Iso Valve valve to close or OFN RP-017. This valve, or bypass valve EGHV0130, remain open. needs to be open for cold shutdown when using the excess letdown heat exchanger. If the valve fails closed, it will be manually open in OFN RP-017A. If the valve fails open, there is no adverse impact with CCW continuing to flow through the RCP bearing coolers, motor air coolers, excess letdown heat exchanger and RCDT heat exchanger. Valve was modified to address IN 92-18.

EGHIS0061 RL019 M-12EG03 (B-5) EGHV0061 CCW Return from Could cause the Valve is normally open and is required to be closed in RCS Iso Valve valve to close or OFN RP-017 to prevent a postulated steam bubble from remain open. forming in the CCW piping, potentially causing a water hammer. The valve is manually closed in OFN RP-017.

Valve was modified to address IN 92-18.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Appendix 2 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 Page 29 of 51 Table A2 Control Room Fire Consequence Evaluation for Motor Operated Valves Control Room Instrument P&ID Drawing Associated Description Consequence if Impact on PFSSD in the Event of a Control Room Instrument Location MOV(s) Damaged Fire EGHIS0059 RL019 M-12EG03 (B-5) EGHV0059 CCW Return from Could cause the Valve is normally open and can be in any position for RCS Iso Valve valve to close or OFN RP-017. This valve, or bypass valve EGHV0131, remain open. needs to be open for cold shutdown when using the excess letdown heat exchanger. If the valve fails closed, it will be manually open in OFN RP-017A. If the valve fails open, there is no adverse impact with CCW continuing to flow through the RCP bearing coolers, motor air coolers, excess letdown heat exchanger and RCDT heat exchanger. Valve was modified to address IN 92-18.

EFHIS0042 RL019 M-12EF02 (D-2) EFHV0042 ESW B to Service Could cause the Valve is normally open and can be in any position for Water valve to close or PFSSD. If the valve closes, ESW return to the UHS is remain open. controlled by EFHV0038 in OFN RP-017. If this valve and EFHV0040 remains open, there is no adverse impact because proper ESW flow is ensured.

Therefore, spurious operation of this valve will not affect PFSSD. Calculation EF-M-079 addresses the concern for B-ESW pump runout due to not isolating B-ESW to service water. EF-M-079 conservatively assumes EFHV0040 valve damage causing loss of pressure boundary and full ESW flow at the EFHV0040 location to provide the lowest possible head pressure seen by the B-ESW pump. EFHV0042 is downstream of EFHV0040 and therefore position and valve damage causing loss of pressure boundary is not adverse to PFSSD.

EFHIS0038 RL019 M-12EF02 (D-2) EFHV0038 ESW B to UHS Could cause the Valve is normally throttled and is required to be fully valve to close or open in OFN RP-017. If the valve fails open, it is in the remain open. desired PFSSD position. If it fails closed, it will be opened in OFN RP-017 using the isolation handswitch at the MCC. Valve has been modified to address IN 92-18.

EFHIS0041 RL019 M-12EF02 (E-2) EFHV0041 ESW A to Service Could cause the Valve is normally open and can be in any position for Water valve to close or PFSSD. Train A ESW is not credited for PFSSD in remain open. OFN RP-017. Valve damage causing loss of pressure boundary and ESW A flow diversion is not adverse to PFSSD. Therefore, spurious operation of this valve will not adversely impact PFSSD.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Appendix 2 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 Page 30 of 51 Table A2 Control Room Fire Consequence Evaluation for Motor Operated Valves Control Room Instrument P&ID Drawing Associated Description Consequence if Impact on PFSSD in the Event of a Control Room Instrument Location MOV(s) Damaged Fire EFHIS0060 RL019 M-12EF02 (D-3) EFHV0060 ESW B Return from Could cause the This valve is normally closed with manual valve CCW Hx B valve to open or EFV0090 throttled to provide the proper flow for SIS or remain closed. LOSP. If the valve opens, flow balance in the ESW system will be affected. If the valve closes, ESW flow through the CCW heat exchanger is ensured via normally throttled manual valve EFV0090. The valve is closed in OFN RP-017 using EFHS0060. Valve has been modified to address IN 92-18.

EFHIS0046 RL019 M-12EF02 (C-6) EFHV0046 ESW B from Ctmt Could cause the Valve is required to be open in OFN RP-017 to ensure Air Coolers valve to close or proper operation of the containment air coolers. The remain open. valve is opened in OFN RP-017 when lining up the containment coolers. Valve has been modified to address IN 92-18.

EFHIS0050 RL019 M-12EF02 (C-6) EFHV0050 ESW B from Ctmt Could cause the Valve is required to be open in OFN RP-017 to ensure Air Coolers valve to close or proper operation of the containment air coolers. The remain open. valve is opened in OFN RP-017 when lining up the containment coolers. Valve has been modified to address IN 92-18.

EFHIS0024 RL019 M-12EF01 (E-6) EFHV0024 ESW B from Service Could cause the This flowpath is required to be isolated in OFN RP-017 Water Cross valve to close or to prevent flow diversion from ESW to the service water Connect remain open. system. Valve EFHV0026, which is installed in series with this valve, is isolated in OFN RP-017. EFHV0026 is no longer required to prevent flow diversion with the installation of check valve EFV0471. If EFHV0024 closes, then it is in the desired PFSSD position. If EFHV0024 remains open, valve EFV0471 is credited to isolate this flowpath. Valve damage causing loss of pressure boundary is not adverse to PFSSD due to EFV0471 preventing ESW flow diversion.

EFHIS0052 RL019 M-12EF02 (D-5) EFHV0052 ESW B to CCW Hx Could cause the Valve is normally open and is required to be open for B valve to close or OFN RP-017. If the valve spuriously closes, it is remain open. opened in OFN RP-017 using EFHS0052. Valve has been modified to address IN 92-18.

EFHIS0032 RL019 M-12EF02 (C-8) EFHV0032 ESW B to Ctmt Air Could cause the Valve is required to be open in OFN RP-017 to ensure Coolers valve to close or proper operation of the containment air coolers. The remain open. valve is opened in OFN RP-017 using EFHS0032.

Valve has been modified to address IN 92-18.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Appendix 2 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 Page 31 of 51 Table A2 Control Room Fire Consequence Evaluation for Motor Operated Valves Control Room Instrument P&ID Drawing Associated Description Consequence if Impact on PFSSD in the Event of a Control Room Instrument Location MOV(s) Damaged Fire EFHIS0034 RL019 M-12EF02 (C-7) EFHV0034 ESW B to Ctmt Air Could cause the Valve is required to be open in OFN RP-017 to ensure Coolers valve to close or proper operation of the containment air coolers. The remain open. valve is opened in OFN RP-017 using EFHS0034.

Valve has been modified to address IN 92-18.

EFHIS0023 RL019 M-12EF01 (F-6) EFHV0023 ESW A from Service Could cause the Train A ESW is not used in OFN RP-017. Spurious Water Cross valve to close or operation of this valve will not adversely impact PFSSD.

Connect remain open. Valve damage causing loss of pressure boundary and ESW A flow diversion is not adverse to PFSSD.

EFHIS0051 RL019 M-12EF02 (H-5) EFHV0051 ESW A to CCW Hx Could cause the Train A ESW is not credited in OFN RP-017. Spurious A valve to close or operation will not adversely impact PFSSD. Valve remain open. damage causing loss of pressure boundary and ESW A flow diversion is not adverse to PFSSD.

EFHIS0031 RL019 M-12EF02 (G-8) EFHV0031 ESW A to Could cause the Train A ESW is not credited in OFN RP-017. Spurious Containment Air valve to close or operation will not adversely impact PFSSD. Valve Coolers remain open. damage causing loss of pressure boundary and ESW A flow diversion is not adverse to PFSSD.

EFHIS0033 RL019 M-12EF02 (G-7) EFHV0033 ESW A to Could cause the Train A ESW is not credited in OFN RP-017. Spurious Containment Air valve to close or operation will not adversely impact PFSSD. Valve Coolers remain open. damage causing loss of pressure boundary and ESW A flow diversion is not adverse to PFSSD.

EFHIS0025 RL019 M-12EF01 (F-7) EFHV0025 ESW A from Service Could cause the Train A ESW is not used in OFN RP-017. Spurious Water Cross valve to close or operation of this valve will not adversely impact PFSSD.

Connect remain open. Valve damage causing loss of pressure boundary and ESW A flow diversion is not adverse to PFSSD.

EFHIS0040 RL019 M-12EF02 (D-2) EFHV0040 ESW B to Service Could cause the Valve is normally open and can be in any position for Water valve to close or PFSSD. If the valve closes, ESW return to the UHS is remain open. controlled by EFHV0038 in OFN RP-017. If this valve and EFHV0042 remains open, there is no adverse impact because proper ESW flow is ensured.

Therefore, spurious operation of this valve will not affect PFSSD. Calculation EF-M-079 determined there is no concern with B-ESW pump runout from EFHV0040 valve damage causing loss of pressure boundary using a conservative assumption of full ESW flow at the EFHV0040 location to provide the lowest possible head pressure seen by the B-ESW pump.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Appendix 2 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 Page 32 of 51 Table A2 Control Room Fire Consequence Evaluation for Motor Operated Valves Control Room Instrument P&ID Drawing Associated Description Consequence if Impact on PFSSD in the Event of a Control Room Instrument Location MOV(s) Damaged Fire EFHIS0059 RL019 M-12EF02 (H-3) EFHV0059 ESW A Return from Could cause the Train A ESW is not used in OFN RP-017. Spurious CCW Hx B valve to close or operation of this valve will not adversely impact PFSSD.

remain open. Valve damage causing loss of pressure boundary and ESW A flow diversion is not adverse to PFSSD.

EFHIS0045 RL019 M-12EF02 (G-6) EFHV0045 ESW A from Could cause the Train A ESW is not credited in OFN RP-017. Spurious Containment Air valve to close or operation will not adversely impact PFSSD. Valve Coolers remain open. damage causing loss of pressure boundary and ESW A flow diversion is not adverse to PFSSD.

EFHIS0026 RL019 M-12EF01 (E-7) EFHV0026 ESW B from Service Could cause the This flowpath is required to be isolated in OFN RP-017 Water Cross valve to close or to prevent flow diversion from ESW to the service water Connect remain open. system. The valve is isolated in OFN RP-017 using EFHS0026A. If it spuriously closes, it is in the desired PFSSD position. Valve has been modified to address IN 92-18.

EFHIS0049 RL019 M-12EF02 (G-6) EFHV0049 ESW A from Could cause the Train A ESW is not credited in OFN RP-017. Spurious Containment Air valve to close or operation will not adversely impact PFSSD. Valve Coolers remain open. damage causing loss of pressure boundary and ESW A flow diversion is not adverse to PFSSD.

EFHIS0037 RL019 M-12EF02 (G-3) EFHV0037 ESW A to UHS Could cause the Train A ESW is not credited in OFN RP-017. Spurious valve to close or operation will not adversely impact PFSSD. Valve remain open. damage causing loss of pressure boundary and ESW A flow diversion is not adverse to PFSSD.

EFHIS0039 RL019 M-12EF02 (F-2) EFHV0039 ESW A to Service Could cause the Valve is normally open and can be in any position for Water valve to close or PFSSD. Train A ESW is not credited for PFSSD in remain open. OFN RP-017. Therefore, spurious operation of this valve will not adversely impact PFSSD. Valve damage causing loss of pressure boundary and ESW A flow diversion is not adverse to PFSSD.

EGHS0015 RL019 M-12EG01 (D-6) EGHV0015, CCW Train A to/from Could cause the These valves are open when operating the Train A EGHV0053 Service Loop valves to close or CCW system. Valve EGHV0015 is manually closed in remain open. OFN RP-017 to prevent flow diversion from Train B CCW to Train A CCW system. Valve EGHV0015 has been modified to address IN 92-18. Valve EGHV0053 is not used in OFN RP-017 because check valve EGV0036 will prevent flow from the train B CCW system to the train A CCW system.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Appendix 2 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 Page 33 of 51 Table A2 Control Room Fire Consequence Evaluation for Motor Operated Valves Control Room Instrument P&ID Drawing Associated Description Consequence if Impact on PFSSD in the Event of a Control Room Instrument Location MOV(s) Damaged Fire EGHIS0011 RL019 M-12EG01 (F-8) EGHV0011 ESW to CCW Pump Could cause the Train A CCW is not credited in OFN RP-017. Spurious A valve to open or operation will not adversely impact PFSSD. Valve remain closed. damage causing loss of pressure boundary and CCW A flow diversion is not adverse to PFSSD. CCW B surge tank level may be impacted due to the common line between train A & B surge tanks. However, level in tank would drop no lower the common line exiting the B surge tank at 2057' - 9" (M-13EG08, 01, & 05). B train CCW pumps are at 2028' - 10" (M-13EG03). The more than 28' of head pressure is greater than the NPSH required minimum of 18.5' (calculation M-EG-5 R/1).

EGHIS0013 RL019 M-12EG01 (F-7) EGHV0013 ESW to CCW Pump Could cause the Train A CCW is not credited in OFN RP-017. Spurious A valve to open or operation will not adversely impact PFSSD. Valve remain closed. damage causing loss of pressure boundary and CCW A flow diversion is not adverse to PFSSD. CCW B surge tank level may be impacted due to the common line between train A & B surge tanks. However, level in tank would drop no lower the common line exiting the B surge tank at 2057' - 9" (M-13EG08, 01, & 05). B train CCW pumps are at 2028' - 10" (M-13EG03). The more than 28' of head pressure is greater than the NPSH required minimum of 18.5' (calculation M-EG-5 R/1).

EGHIS0131 RL020 M-12EG03 (C-5) EGHV0131 CCW Return Ctmt Could prevent Valve is normally closed and can be in any position for Iso Valve operation of the OFN RP-017. This valve, or valve EGHV0059, needs to valve. be open for cold shutdown when using the excess letdown heat exchanger. Damage to the switch could prevent opening the valve but will not cause the valve to spuriously open since switch EGHIS0131A is normally in the ISO position. If the valve fails closed there is no PFSSD impact because valve EGHV0059 will be manually opened in OFN RP-017A. Valve damage causing loss of pressure boundary is potentially PFSSD adverse due to CCW flow diversion. Valve is tracked for resolution as part of CR 00116831-02-03 Extent of Condition.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Appendix 2 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 Page 34 of 51 Table A2 Control Room Fire Consequence Evaluation for Motor Operated Valves Control Room Instrument P&ID Drawing Associated Description Consequence if Impact on PFSSD in the Event of a Control Room Instrument Location MOV(s) Damaged Fire EGHIS0127 RL020 M-12EG03 (G-4) EGHV0127 CCW Supply Ctmt Could prevent Valve is normally closed and can be in any position for Iso Valve operation of the OFN RP-017. This valve, or valve EGHV0058, needs to valve. be open for cold shutdown when using the excess letdown heat exchanger. Damage to the switch could prevent opening the valve but will not cause the valve to spuriously open since switch EGHIS0127A is normally in the ISO position. If the valve fails closed there is no PFSSD impact because valve EGHV0058 will be manually opened in OFN RP-017A. Valve damage causing loss of pressure boundary is potentially PFSSD adverse due to CCW flow diversion. Valve is tracked for resolution as part of CR 00116831-02-03 Extent of Condition.

EGHIS0131A RL020 M-12EG03 (C-5) EGHV0131 CCW Return Ctmt Could prevent Valve is normally closed with this hand switch in the ISO Iso Valve operation of the position, preventing accidental opening of the valve.

power lockout This valve, or valve EGHV0059, needs to be open for feature and could cold shutdown when using the excess letdown heat cause spurious exchanger. If the valve fails closed, valve EGHV0059 operation of valve. will be manually opened in OFN RP-017A. Valve damage causing loss of pressure boundary is potentially PFSSD adverse due to CCW flow diversion. Valve is tracked for resolution as part of CR 00116831-02-03 Extent of Condition.

EGHIS0133 RL020 M-12EG03 (D-5) EGHV0133 CCW Return Ctmt Could prevent Valve is normally open and is required to be closed in Iso Valve operation of the OFN RP-017 to prevent a postulated steam bubble from valve. forming in the CCW piping, potentially causing a water hammer. Damage to the switch could prevent operation of the valve but will not cause the valve to spuriously open since switch EGHIS0133A is normally in the ISO position. The valve is manually closed in OFN RP-017.

Valve has been modified to address IN 92-18.

EGHIS0133A RL020 M-12EG03 (D-5) EGHV0133 CCW Return Ctmt Could prevent Valve is normally open and is required to be closed in Iso Valve operation of the OFN RP-017 to prevent a postulated steam bubble from power lockout forming in the CCW piping, potentially causing a water feature and could hammer. If the valve spuriously opens it will be cause spurious manually closed in OFN RP-017. Valve has been operation of valve. modified to address IN 92-18.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Appendix 2 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 Page 35 of 51 Table A2 Control Room Fire Consequence Evaluation for Motor Operated Valves Control Room Instrument P&ID Drawing Associated Description Consequence if Impact on PFSSD in the Event of a Control Room Instrument Location MOV(s) Damaged Fire GSHIS0021 RL020 M-12GS01 (G-4) GSHV0021 Hyd Purge Outer Valve could open If the valve opens, there is no adverse impact on Ctmt Iso Vlv or remain closed. PFSSD. Valve GSHV0020 will remain closed or, if GSHV0020 also opens, the Aux Building ESF filters will prevent release of radioactivity. In either case, PFSSD is assured. Valve damage causing loss of pressure boundary is not adverse as containment isolation is not required for PFSSD. Reference Appendix 3, Expert Panel 14 Scenario Loss of Containment Isolation.

EGHIS0130 RL020 M-12EG03 (B-5) EGHV0130 CCW Return Ctmt Could prevent Valve is normally closed and can be in any position for Iso Valve operation of the OFN RP-017. This valve, or valve EGHV0060, needs to valve. be open for cold shutdown when using the excess letdown heat exchanger. Damage to the switch could prevent opening the valve but will not cause the valve to spuriously open since switch EGHIS0130A is normally in the ISO position. If the valve fails closed there is no PFSSD impact because valve EGHV0060 will be manually opened in OFN RP-017A. Valve damage causing loss of pressure boundary is potentially PFSSD adverse due to CCW flow diversion. Valve is tracked for resolution as part of CR 00116831-02-03 Extent of Condition.

EGHIS0126 RL020 M-12EG03 (G-5) EGHV0126 CCW Supply Ctmt Could prevent Valve is normally closed and can be in any position for Iso Valve operation of the OFN RP-017. This valve, or valve EGHV0071, needs to valve. be open for cold shutdown when using the excess letdown heat exchanger. Damage to the switch could prevent opening the valve but will not cause the valve to spuriously open since switch EGHIS0126A is normally in the ISO position. If the valve fails closed there is no PFSSD impact because valve EGHV0071 will be manually opened in OFN RP-017A. Valve damage causing loss of pressure boundary is potentially PFSSD adverse due to CCW flow diversion. Valve is tracked for resolution as part of CR 00116831-02-03 Extent of Condition.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Appendix 2 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 Page 36 of 51 Table A2 Control Room Fire Consequence Evaluation for Motor Operated Valves Control Room Instrument P&ID Drawing Associated Description Consequence if Impact on PFSSD in the Event of a Control Room Instrument Location MOV(s) Damaged Fire EGHIS0126A RL020 M-12EG03 (G-5) EGHV0126 CCW Supply Ctmt Could prevent Valve is normally closed with this hand switch in the ISO Iso Valve operation of the position, preventing accidental opening of the valve.

power lockout This valve, or valve EGHV0071, needs to be open for feature and could cold shutdown when using the excess letdown heat cause spurious exchanger. If the valve fails closed, valve EGHV0071 operation of valve. will be manually opened in OFN RP-017A. If the valve fails open, the CCW system is protected from a steam bubble by closing EGHV0061 and EGHV0133 in OFN RP-017. Valve damage causing loss of pressure boundary is potentially PFSSD adverse due to CCW flow diversion. Valve is tracked for resolution as part of CR 00116831-02-03 Extent of Condition.

EGHIS0130A RL020 M-12EG03 (B-5) EGHV0130 CCW Return Ctmt Could prevent Valve is normally closed with this hand switch in the ISO Iso Valve operation of the position, preventing accidental opening of the valve.

power lockout This valve, or valve EGHV0060, needs to be open for feature and could cold shutdown when using the excess letdown heat cause spurious exchanger. If the valve fails closed, valve EGHV0060 operation of valve. will be manually opened in OFN RP-017A. Valve damage causing loss of pressure boundary is potentially PFSSD adverse due to CCW flow diversion. Valve is tracked for resolution as part of CR 00116831-02-03 Extent of Condition.

EGHIS0132 RL020 M-12EG03 (B-4) EGHV0132 CCW Return Ctmt Could prevent Valve is normally closed and can be in any position for Iso Valve operation of the OFN RP-017. This valve is not required for cold valve. shutdown. Damage to the switch could prevent opening the valve but will not cause the valve to spuriously open since switch EGHIS0132A is normally in the ISO position. If the valve fails closed there is no PFSSD impact. Valve damage causing loss of pressure boundary is potentially PFSSD adverse due to CCW flow diversion. Valve is tracked for resolution as part of CR 00116831-02-03 Extent of Condition.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Appendix 2 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 Page 37 of 51 Table A2 Control Room Fire Consequence Evaluation for Motor Operated Valves Control Room Instrument P&ID Drawing Associated Description Consequence if Impact on PFSSD in the Event of a Control Room Instrument Location MOV(s) Damaged Fire EGHIS0132A RL020 M-12EG03 (B-4) EGHV0132 CCW Return Ctmt Could prevent Valve is normally closed and can be in any position for Iso Valve operation of the OFN RP-017. This valve is not required for cold power lockout shutdown. If the valve fails closed, it is in the desired feature and could PFSSD position. If the valve fails open, the CCW cause spurious system is protected from a steam bubble by closing operation of valve. EGHV0061 and EGHV0133 in OFN RP-017. Valve damage causing loss of pressure boundary is potentially PFSSD adverse due to CCW flow diversion. Valve is tracked for resolution as part of CR 00116831-02-03 Extent of Condition.

GSHIS0020 RL020 M-12GS01 (G-5) GSHV0020 Hyd Purge Inner Valve could open If the valve opens, there is no adverse impact on Ctmt Iso Vlv or remain closed. PFSSD. Valve GSHV0021 will remain closed or, if GSHV0021 also opens, the Aux Building ESF filters will prevent release of radioactivity. In either case, PFSSD is assured. Valve damage causing loss of pressure boundary is not adverse as containment isolation not required for PFSSD. Reference Appendix 3, Expert Panel 14 Scenario Loss of Containment Isolation.

EGHIS0127A RL020 M-12EG03 (G-4) EGHV0127 CCW Supply Ctmt Could prevent Valve is normally closed with this hand switch in the ISO Iso Valve operation of the position, preventing accidental opening of the valve.

power lockout This valve, or valve EGHV0058, needs to be open for feature but will not cold shutdown when using the excess letdown heat cause the valve to exchanger. If the valve fails closed, valve EGHV0058 open will be manually open in OFN RP-017A. If the valve fails open, the CCW system is protected from a steam bubble by closing EGHV0061 and EGHV0133 in OFN RP-017. Valve damage causing loss of pressure boundary is potentially PFSSD adverse due to CCW flow diversion. Valve is tracked for resolution as part of CR 00116831-02-03 Extent of Condition.

BBHIS8037A RL021 M-12BB02 (D-3) BBHV8037A PRT Drain to Ctmt Could cause the Spurious opening of the valve will not cause a loss of Norm Sump valve to spuriously inventory in the RCS. The valve is used to drain the open or remain contents of the PRT to the sump. Valve damage closed. causing loss of pressure boundary is not adverse as PRT inventory not required for PFSSD.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Appendix 2 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 Page 38 of 51 Table A2 Control Room Fire Consequence Evaluation for Motor Operated Valves Control Room Instrument P&ID Drawing Associated Description Consequence if Impact on PFSSD in the Event of a Control Room Instrument Location MOV(s) Damaged Fire BBHIS8037B RL021 M-12BB02 (D-3) BBHV8037B PRT Drain to Ctmt Could cause the Spurious opening of the valve will not cause a loss of Norm Sump valve to spuriously inventory in the RCS. The valve is used to drain the open. contents of the PRT to the sump. Valve damage causing loss of pressure boundary is not adverse as PRT inventory not required for PFSSD.

BBHS8000A RL021 M-12BB02 (E-7) BBHV8000A Cold O/P Arm Sw Could prevent The pressurizer PORVs are closed in OFN RP-017 by closing the valve. disconnecting power to the circuit. This will fail the valves closed. Therefore, failure of this valve to close will have no adverse impact on PFSSD. Valve damage causing loss of pressure boundary is potentially PFSSD adverse due to RCS inventory control impact. Valve is tracked for resolution as part of CR 00116831-02-03 Extent of Condition, reference CP 20191.

BBHS8000B RL021 M-12BB02 (F-8) BBHV8000B Cold O/P Arm Sw Could prevent The pressurizer PORVs are closed in OFN RP-017 by closing the valve. disconnecting power to the circuit. This will fail the valves closed. Therefore, failure of this valve to close will have no adverse impact on PFSSD. Valve damage causing loss of pressure boundary is potentially PFSSD adverse due to RCS inventory control impact. Valve is tracked for resolution as part of CR 00116831-02-03 Extent of Condition, reference CP 20191.

BBHIS0013 RL021 M-12BB03 (C-3) BBHV0013 CCW from RCP A Could cause RCP thermal barrier cooling is not credited in OFN RP-spurious operation 017. The CCW service loop is isolated in OFN RP-017 of the valve. so there will be no flow to the thermal barrier. Spurious operation of this valve will have no adverse impact.

Valve damage causing loss of pressure boundary is potentially PFSSD adverse due to CCW flow diversion.

Valve is tracked for resolution as part of CR 00116831-02-03 Extent of Condition.

BBHIS0014 RL021 M-12BB03 (C-3) BBHV0014 CCW from RCP B Could cause RCP thermal barrier cooling is not credited in OFN RP-spurious operation 017. The CCW service loop is isolated in OFN RP-017 of the valve. so there will be no flow to the thermal barrier. Spurious operation of this valve will have no adverse impact.

Valve damage causing loss of pressure boundary is potentially PFSSD adverse due to CCW flow diversion.

Valve is tracked for resolution as part of CR 00116831-02-03 Extent of Condition.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Appendix 2 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 Page 39 of 51 Table A2 Control Room Fire Consequence Evaluation for Motor Operated Valves Control Room Instrument P&ID Drawing Associated Description Consequence if Impact on PFSSD in the Event of a Control Room Instrument Location MOV(s) Damaged Fire BBHIS0015 RL021 M-12BB03 (C-3) BBHV0015 CCW from RCP C Could cause RCP thermal barrier cooling is not credited in OFN RP-spurious operation 017. The CCW service loop is isolated in OFN RP-017 of the valve. so there will be no flow to the thermal barrier. Spurious operation of this valve will have no adverse impact.

Valve damage causing loss of pressure boundary is potentially PFSSD adverse due to CCW flow diversion.

Valve is tracked for resolution as part of CR 00116831-02-03 Extent of Condition.

BBHIS0016 RL021 M-12BB03 (C-3) BBHV0016 CCW from RCP D Could cause RCP thermal barrier cooling is not credited in OFN RP-spurious operation 017. The CCW service loop is isolated in OFN RP-017 of the valve. so there will be no flow to the thermal barrier. Spurious operation of this valve will have no adverse impact.

Valve damage causing loss of pressure boundary is potentially PFSSD adverse due to CCW flow diversion.

Valve is tracked for resolution as part of CR 00116831-02-03 Extent of Condition.

BBHIS8351A RL021 M-12BB03 (D-6) BBHV8351A Seal Wtr Supply to Could cause the Seal injection is not required for OFN RP-017. Seal RCP A valve to close or injection is isolated in OFN RP-017 using valves remain open. BGV0101 and BGV0105. Spurious closure of this valve will have no adverse impact on PFSSD. Valve damage causing loss of pressure boundary is not adverse as there is no RCS flow diversion with closure of BGV0101 and BGV0105.

BBHIS8351B RL021 M-12BB03 (D-6) BBHV8351B Seal Wtr Supply to Could cause the Seal injection is not required for OFN RP-017. Seal RCP B valve to close or injection is isolated in OFN RP-017 using valves remain open. BGV0101 and BGV0105. Spurious closure of this valve will have no adverse impact on PFSSD. Valve damage causing loss of pressure boundary is not adverse as there is no RCS flow diversion with closure of BGV0101 and BGV0105 (and check valve BBV0118).

BBHIS8351C RL021 M-12BB03 (D-6) BBHV8351C Seal Wtr Supply to Could cause the Seal injection is not required for OFN RP-017. Seal RCP C valve to close or injection is isolated in OFN RP-017 using valves remain open. BGV0101 and BGV0105. Spurious closure of this valve will have no adverse impact on PFSSD. Valve damage causing loss of pressure boundary is not adverse as there is no RCS flow diversion with closure of BGV0101 and BGV0105.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Appendix 2 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 Page 40 of 51 Table A2 Control Room Fire Consequence Evaluation for Motor Operated Valves Control Room Instrument P&ID Drawing Associated Description Consequence if Impact on PFSSD in the Event of a Control Room Instrument Location MOV(s) Damaged Fire BBHIS8351D RL021 M-12BB03 (D-6) BBHV8351D Seal Wtr Supply to Could cause the Seal injection is not required for OFN RP-017. Seal RCP D valve to close or injection is isolated in OFN RP-017 using valves remain open. BGV0101 and BGV0105. Spurious closure of this valve will have no adverse impact on PFSSD. Valve damage causing loss of pressure boundary is not adverse as there is no RCS flow diversion with closure of BGV0101 and BGV0105.

BBHIS8000A RL021 M-12BB02 (E-7) BBHV8000A PORV Isolation Could prevent The pressurizer PORVs are closed in OFN RP-017 by Valve A closing the valve. disconnecting power to the circuit. This will fail the valves closed. Therefore, failure of this valve to close will have no adverse impact on PFSSD. One PORV flow path is required for cold shutdown. Valve is not modified to address IN 92-18 so it could be damaged in the closed position. Both block valves have isolation switches mounted at the MCC. Operation of both block valve isolation switches in OFN RP-017 will ensure one PORV flow path is available for cold shutdown. Valve damage causing loss of pressure boundary is potentially PFSSD adverse due to RCS inventory control impact.

Valve is tracked for resolution as part of CR 00116831-02-03 Extent of Condition, reference CP 20191 .

BBHIS8000B RL021 M-12BB02 (F-7) BBHV8000B PORV Isolation Could prevent The pressurizer PORVs are closed in OFN RP-017 by Valve B closing the valve. disconnecting power to the circuit. This will fail the valves closed. Therefore, failure of this valve to close will have no adverse impact on PFSSD. One PORV flow path is required for cold shutdown. Valve is not modified to address IN 92-18 so it could be damaged in the closed position. Both block valves have isolation switches mounted at the MCC. Operation of both block valve isolation switches in OFN RP-017 will ensure one PORV flow path is available for cold shutdown. Valve damage causing loss of pressure boundary is potentially PFSSD adverse due to RCS inventory control impact.

Valve is tracked for resolution as part of CR 00116831-02-03 Extent of Condition, reference CP 20191 .

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Appendix 2 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 Page 41 of 51 Table A2 Control Room Fire Consequence Evaluation for Motor Operated Valves Control Room Instrument P&ID Drawing Associated Description Consequence if Impact on PFSSD in the Event of a Control Room Instrument Location MOV(s) Damaged Fire ECHIS0011 RL021 M-12EC01 (H-5) ECHV0011 Fuel Pool Hx CCW Could cause Valve controls CCW flow to the Fuel Pool Hx. The fuel Disch Iso A spurious operation pool cooling system is not required for PFSSD.

of the valve. Spurious operation of the valve will not adversely impact safe shutdown. Valve damage causing loss of pressure boundary is not adverse due to CCW flow diversion.

CCW B surge tank level may be impacted due to the common line between train A & B surge tanks.

However, level in tank would drop no lower than the common line exiting the B surge tank at 2057' - 9" (M-13EG08, 01, 05). B train CCW pumps are at 2028' - 10" (M-13EG03). The more than 28' of head pressure is greater than the NPSH required minimum of 18.5' (calculation M-EG-5 R/1).

ECHIS0012 RL021 M-12EC01 (E-5) ECHV0012 Fuel Pool Hx CCW Could cause Valve controls CCW flow to the Fuel Pool Hx. The fuel Disch Iso B spurious operation pool cooling system is not required for PFSSD.

of the valve. Spurious operation of the valve will not adversely impact safe shutdown. Valve damage causing loss of pressure boundary is potentially PFSSD adverse due to CCW flow diversion. Valve is tracked for resolution as part of CR 00116831-02-03 Extent of Condition.

LFHIS0105 RL023 M-12LF03 (C-5) LFHV0105 Control/Aux Bldg Could cause the The auxiliary building drainage system is not relied on Sump Iso Vlv valve to close or for PFSSD. Spurious operation of this valve will not open. adversely impact PFSSD. Valve damage causing loss of pressure boundary and possible drainage system flow diversion is not adverse to PFSSD.

LFHIS0106 RL023 M-12LF03 (C-4) LFHV0106 Control/Aux Bldg Could cause the The auxiliary building drainage system is not relied on Sump Iso Vlv valve to close or for PFSSD. Spurious operation of this valve will not open. adversely impact PFSSD. Valve damage causing loss of pressure boundary and possible drainage system flow diversion is not adverse to PFSSD.

AFHIS0113 RL023 M-12AF02 (C-7) AFLV0113C Feed Wtr Htr 4A Iso Could cause the The feed water heaters are not required for PFSSD.

Vlv valve to close or Spurious operation of the valve will not adversely impact open. safe shutdown. Valve damage causing loss of pressure boundary is not adverse to PFSSD as MSIVs are closed in OFN RP-017 to isolate main steam.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Appendix 2 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 Page 42 of 51 Table A2 Control Room Fire Consequence Evaluation for Motor Operated Valves Control Room Instrument P&ID Drawing Associated Description Consequence if Impact on PFSSD in the Event of a Control Room Instrument Location MOV(s) Damaged Fire AFHS0106 RL023 M-12AF02 (E-7) AFLV0106C Feed Wtr Htr 3A Could cause the The feed water heaters are not required for PFSSD.

Drain Iso Vlvs valve to close or Spurious operation of the valve will not adversely impact open. safe shutdown. Valve damage causing loss of pressure boundary is not adverse to PFSSD as MSIVs are closed in OFN RP-017 to isolate main steam.

AFHIS0144 RL023 M-12AF02 (C-5) AFLV0144C Feed Wtr Htr 4B Iso Could cause the The feed water heaters are not required for PFSSD.

Vlv valve to close or Spurious operation of the valve will not adversely impact open. safe shutdown. Valve damage causing loss of pressure boundary is not adverse to PFSSD as MSIVs are closed in OFN RP-017 to isolate main steam.

AFHS0136 RL023 M-12AF02 (E-5) AFLV0136C Feed Wtr Htr 3B Could cause the The feed water heaters are not required for PFSSD.

Drain Iso Vlvs valve to close or Spurious operation of the valve will not adversely impact open. safe shutdown. Valve damage causing loss of pressure boundary is not adverse to PFSSD as MSIVs are closed in OFN RP-017 to isolate main steam.

AFHIS0173 RL023 M-12AF02 (C-3) AFLV0173C Feed Wtr Htr 4C Iso Could cause the The feed water heaters are not required for PFSSD.

Vlv valve to close or Spurious operation of the valve will not adversely impact open. safe shutdown. Valve damage causing loss of pressure boundary is not adverse to PFSSD as MSIVs are closed in OFN RP-017 to isolate main steam.

AFHS0165 RL023 M-12AF02 (E-3) AFLV0165C Feed Wtr Htr 3C Could cause the The feed water heaters are not required for PFSSD.

Drain Iso Vlvs valve to close or Spurious operation of the valve will not adversely impact open. safe shutdown. Valve damage causing loss of pressure boundary is not adverse to PFSSD as MSIVs are closed in OFN RP-017 to isolate main steam.

AFHS0007 RL023 M-12AF01 (G-8) AFLV0007C Feed Wtr Htr 7A Could cause the The feed water heaters are not required for PFSSD.

AFLV0007D Drain Iso Vlvs valve to close or Spurious operation of the valve will not adversely impact AFLV0007E open. safe shutdown. Valve damage causing loss of pressure boundary is not adverse to PFSSD as MSIVs are closed in OFN RP-017 to isolate main steam.

AFHS0012 RL023 M-12AF01 (E-7) AFLV0012C Feed Wtr Htr 6A Could cause the The feed water heaters are not required for PFSSD.

Drain Iso Vlvs valve to close or Spurious operation of the valve will not adversely impact open. safe shutdown. Valve damage causing loss of pressure boundary is not adverse to PFSSD as MSIVs are closed in OFN RP-017 to isolate main steam.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Appendix 2 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 Page 43 of 51 Table A2 Control Room Fire Consequence Evaluation for Motor Operated Valves Control Room Instrument P&ID Drawing Associated Description Consequence if Impact on PFSSD in the Event of a Control Room Instrument Location MOV(s) Damaged Fire AFHS0012 RL023 M-12AF01 (E-7) AFLV0012D MSR C Scavenging Could cause the The feed water heaters are not required for PFSSD.

Steam to HP Htr 6A valve to close or Spurious operation of the valve will not adversely impact open. safe shutdown. Valve damage causing loss of pressure boundary is not adverse to PFSSD as MSIVs are closed in OFN RP-017 to isolate main steam.

AFHS0012 RL023 M-12AF01 (E-7) AFLV0012E MSR A Scavenging Could cause the The feed water heaters are not required for PFSSD.

Steam to HP Htr 6A valve to close or Spurious operation of the valve will not adversely impact open. safe shutdown. Valve damage causing loss of pressure boundary is not adverse to PFSSD as MSIVs are closed in OFN RP-017 to isolate main steam.

AFHIS0024 RL023 M-12AF01 (D-7) AFLV0024C Feed Wtr Htr 5A Iso Could cause the The feed water heaters are not required for PFSSD.

Vlv valve to close or Spurious operation of the valve will not adversely impact open. safe shutdown. Valve damage causing loss of pressure boundary is not adverse to PFSSD as MSIVs are closed in OFN RP-017 to isolate main steam.

AFHS0058 RL023 M-12AF01 (F-2) AFLV0058C Feed Wtr Htr 7B Could cause the The feed water heaters are not required for PFSSD.

Drain Iso Vlvs valve to close or Spurious operation of the valve will not adversely impact open. safe shutdown. Valve damage causing loss of pressure boundary is not adverse to PFSSD as MSIVs are closed in OFN RP-017 to isolate main steam.

AFHS0058 RL023 M-12AF01 (F-2) AFLV0058D Feed Wtr Htr 7B Could cause the The feed water heaters are not required for PFSSD.

Drain Iso Vlvs valve to close or Spurious operation of the valve will not adversely impact open. safe shutdown. Valve damage causing loss of pressure boundary is not adverse to PFSSD as MSIVs are closed in OFN RP-017 to isolate main steam.

AFHS0058 RL023 M-12AF01 (F-2) AFLV0058E Feed Wtr Htr 7B Could cause the The feed water heaters are not required for PFSSD.

Drain Iso Vlvs valve to close or Spurious operation of the valve will not adversely impact open. safe shutdown. Valve damage causing loss of pressure boundary is not adverse to PFSSD as MSIVs are closed in OFN RP-017 to isolate main steam.

AFHS0044 RL023 M-12AF01 (E-3) AFLV0044C Feed Wtr Htr 6B Could cause the The feed water heaters are not required for PFSSD.

Drain Iso Vlvs valve to close or Spurious operation of the valve will not adversely impact open. safe shutdown. Valve damage causing loss of pressure boundary is not adverse to PFSSD as MSIVs are closed in OFN RP-017 to isolate main steam.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Appendix 2 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 Page 44 of 51 Table A2 Control Room Fire Consequence Evaluation for Motor Operated Valves Control Room Instrument P&ID Drawing Associated Description Consequence if Impact on PFSSD in the Event of a Control Room Instrument Location MOV(s) Damaged Fire AFHS0044 RL023 M-12AF01 (E-3) AFLV0044D Feed Wtr Htr 6B Could cause the The feed water heaters are not required for PFSSD.

Drain Iso Vlvs valve to close or Spurious operation of the valve will not adversely impact open. safe shutdown. Valve damage causing loss of pressure boundary is not adverse to PFSSD as MSIVs are closed in OFN RP-017 to isolate main steam.

AFHS0044 RL023 M-12AF01 (E-3) AFLV0044E Feed Wtr Htr 6B Could cause the The feed water heaters are not required for PFSSD.

Drain Iso Vlvs valve to close or Spurious operation of the valve will not adversely impact open. safe shutdown. Valve damage causing loss of pressure boundary is not adverse to PFSSD as MSIVs are closed in OFN RP-017 to isolate main steam.

AFHIS0064 RL023 M-12AF01 (D-3) AFLV0064B Feed Wtr Htr 5B Iso Could cause the The feed water heaters are not required for PFSSD.

Vlv valve to close or Spurious operation of the valve will not adversely impact open. safe shutdown. Valve damage causing loss of pressure boundary is not adverse to PFSSD as MSIVs are closed in OFN RP-017 to isolate main steam.

AFHIS0210 RL023 M-12AF01 (C-3) AFHV0210 Htr Drn Tk Start Up Could cause the The heater drain tank is not required for PFSSD.

Drn to Cond valve to close or Spurious operation will not impact safe shutdown.

open. Valve damage causing loss of pressure boundary is not adverse to PFSSD as MSIVs are closed in OFN RP-017 to isolate main steam.

ADHIS0008 RL023 M-12AD02 (C-3) ADHV0008 Cond Pump A Disch Could prevent The condensate pumps are not required for PFSSD.

Iso operation of the Spurious operation of the valve will not adversely impact valve. safe shutdown. Valve damage causing loss of pressure boundary and potential CST flow diversion is not adverse as impact is enveloped by PWROG 32 for CST flow diversion to condenser.

ADHIS0017 RL023 M-12AD02 (C-5) ADHV0017 Cond Pump B Disch Could prevent The condensate pumps are not required for PFSSD.

Iso operation of the Spurious operation of the valve will not adversely impact valve. safe shutdown. Valve damage causing loss of pressure boundary and potential CST flow diversion is not adverse as impact is enveloped by PWROG 32 for CST flow diversion to condenser.

ADHIS0024 RL023 M-12AD02 (C-7) ADHV0024 Cond Pump C Disch Could prevent The condensate pumps are not required for PFSSD.

Iso operation of the Spurious operation of the valve will not adversely impact valve. safe shutdown. Valve damage causing loss of pressure boundary and potential CST flow diversion is not adverse as impact is enveloped by PWROG 32 for CST flow diversion to condenser.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Appendix 2 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 Page 45 of 51 Table A2 Control Room Fire Consequence Evaluation for Motor Operated Valves Control Room Instrument P&ID Drawing Associated Description Consequence if Impact on PFSSD in the Event of a Control Room Instrument Location MOV(s) Damaged Fire ADHIS0028 RL023 M-12AD02 (C-2) ADHV0028 Cond Demin Bypass Could prevent The valve is not required for PFSSD. Spurious operation of the operation of the valve will not adversely impact safe valve. shutdown. Valve damage causing loss of pressure boundary and potential CST flow diversion is not adverse as impact is enveloped by PWROG 32 for CST flow diversion to condenser.

LFHIS0095 RL023 M-12LF09 (F-2) LFFV0095 Cont Sump Iso Vlv Could cause the The reactor building drainage system is not relied on for valve to close or PFSSD. Spurious operation of this valve will not open. adversely impact PFSSD. Valve damage causing loss of pressure boundary and possible drainage system flow diversion is not adverse to PFSSD.

FCHIS0004 RL023 M-12FC03 (H-3) FCHV0004 SGFP Turb A Above Could cause the The SGFP is not required for PFSSD. Damage to the Seat Drain valve to close or switch will have no adverse impact on PFSSD. Valve open. damage causing loss of pressure boundary is not adverse due to closure of MSIVs in OFN RP-017 and credited FWIS discussed in PWROG 33.

FCHIS0104 RL023 M-12FC04 (H-3) FCHV0104 SGFP Turb B Above Could cause the The SGFP is not required for PFSSD. Damage to the Seat Drain valve to close or switch will have no adverse impact on PFSSD. Valve open. damage causing loss of pressure boundary is not adverse due to closure of MSIVs in OFN RP-017 and credited FWIS discussed in PWROG 33.

FCHIS0007 RL023 M-12FC03 (H-3) FCHV0007 SGFP Turb A Below Could cause the The SGFP is not required for PFSSD. Damage to the Seat Drain valve to close or switch will have no adverse impact on PFSSD. Valve open. damage causing loss of pressure boundary is not adverse due to closure of MSIVs in OFN RP-017 and credited FWIS discussed in PWROG 33.

FCHIS0107 RL023 M-12FC04 (H-3) FCHV0107 SGFP Turb B Below Could cause the The SGFP is not required for PFSSD. Damage to the Seat Drain valve to close or switch will have no adverse impact on PFSSD. Valve open. damage causing loss of pressure boundary is not adverse due to closure of MSIVs in OFN RP-017 and credited FWIS discussed in PWROG 33.

FCHIS0012 RL023 M-12FC03 (F-3) FCHV0012 SGFP Turb A Above Could cause the The SGFP is not required for PFSSD. Damage to the Seat Drain valve to close or switch will have no adverse impact on PFSSD. Valve open. damage causing loss of pressure boundary is not adverse due to closure of MSIVs in OFN RP-017 and credited FWIS discussed in PWROG 33.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Appendix 2 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 Page 46 of 51 Table A2 Control Room Fire Consequence Evaluation for Motor Operated Valves Control Room Instrument P&ID Drawing Associated Description Consequence if Impact on PFSSD in the Event of a Control Room Instrument Location MOV(s) Damaged Fire FCHIS0112 RL023 M-12FC04 (F-3) FCHV0112 SGFP Turb B Above Could cause the The SGFP is not required for PFSSD. Damage to the Seat Drain valve to close or switch will have no adverse impact on PFSSD. Valve open. damage causing loss of pressure boundary is not adverse due to closure of MSIVs in OFN RP-017 and credited FWIS discussed in PWROG 33.

FCHIS0013 RL023 M-12FC03 (F-3) FCHV0013 SGFP Turb A Below Could cause the The SGFP is not required for PFSSD. Damage to the Seat Drain valve to close or switch will have no adverse impact on PFSSD. Valve open. damage causing loss of pressure boundary is not adverse due to closure of MSIVs in OFN RP-017 and credited FWIS discussed in PWROG 33.

FCHIS0113 RL023 M-12FC04 (F-3) FCHV0113 SGFP Turb B Below Could cause the The SGFP is not required for PFSSD. Damage to the Seat Drain valve to close or switch will have no adverse impact on PFSSD. Valve open. damage causing loss of pressure boundary is not adverse due to closure of MSIVs in OFN RP-017 and credited FWIS discussed in PWROG 33.

FCHIS0071 RL023 M-12FC03 (A-4) FCHV0071 SGFP Turb A Could cause the The SGFP is not required for PFSSD. Damage to the Startup Drain valve to close or switch will have no adverse impact on PFSSD. Valve open. damage causing loss of pressure boundary is not adverse due to closure of MSIVs in OFN RP-017 and credited FWIS discussed in PWROG 33.

FCHIS0171 RL023 M-12FC04 (A-4) FCHV0171 SGFP Turb B Could cause the The SGFP is not required for PFSSD. Damage to the Startup Drain valve to close or switch will have no adverse impact on PFSSD. Valve open. damage causing loss of pressure boundary is not adverse due to closure of MSIVs in OFN RP-017 and credited FWIS discussed in PWROG 33.

ADHIS0113 RL023 M-12AD01 (F-4) ADHV0113A, Vacuum Breaker Could cause the The condenser vacuum breaker valves are not required ADHV0113B, Valves valve to close or for PFSSD. Spurious operation will not adversely ADHV0113C, open. impact PFSSD. Valve damage causing loss of pressure ADHV0113D boundary is not adverse due to no CST inventory impact.

KAHIS0030 RL024 M-12KA01 (C-1) KAHV0030 Inst Air Supply to H2 Could cause the The H2 control system is not credited for PFSSD.

Ctrl System valve to close or Damage to this switch will not adversely impact safe remain open. shutdown. Valve damage causing loss of pressure boundary and potential loss of instrument air to H2 system is not adverse to PFSSD.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Appendix 2 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 Page 47 of 51 Table A2 Control Room Fire Consequence Evaluation for Motor Operated Valves Control Room Instrument P&ID Drawing Associated Description Consequence if Impact on PFSSD in the Event of a Control Room Instrument Location MOV(s) Damaged Fire ACHIS0251 RL024 M-12AC02 (G-6) ACHV0251, 2nd Stage Reheater Could cause the The moisture separator reheater is not required for ACHV0252, Steam Drains valves to close or PFSSD. Spurious operation of the valves will have no ACHV0261, open. adverse impact on safe shutdown. Valve damage ACHV0263 causing loss of pressure boundary is not adverse due to MSIVs closure in OFN RP-017.

ACHIS0189 RL024 M-12AC02 (G-7) ACHV0189A, 1st Stage Reheater Could cause the The moisture separator reheater is not required for ACHV0189B, Steam Supply valve to close or PFSSD. Spurious operation of the valve will have no ACHV0189C, open. adverse impact on safe shutdown. Valve damage ACHV0189D causing loss of pressure boundary is not adverse due to MSIVs closure in OFN RP-017.

ABHIS0032 RL024 M-12AB03 (H-5) ABHV0031, 2nd Stage Reheater Could cause the Valve is required to be closed if the MSIVs cannot be ABHV0032 Steam Supply valve to close or closed to prevent uncontrolled steam release. OFN RP-open. 017 closes the MSIVs so spurious operation of this valve will not adversely impact PFSSD. Valve damage causing loss of pressure boundary is not adverse due to MSIVs closure in OFN RP-017.

ACHIS0131 RL024 M-12AC02 (F-2) ACHV0118, Cold Reheat Line Could cause the The MSR drains are not required for PFSSD. Damage ACHV0120, Drains valves to close or to the switch will have no adverse impact on safe ACHV0121, open. shutdown. Valve damage causing loss of pressure ACHV0122, boundary is not adverse due to MSIVs closure in OFN ACHV0123, RP-017.

ACHV0124, ACHV0125, ACHV0126, ACHV0144, ACHV0145, ACHV0152, ACHV0153, ACHV0255 ACHIS0253 RL024 M-12AC02 (F-6) ACHV0253, 1st Stage Reheater Could cause the The MSR drains are not required for PFSSD. Damage ACHV0254, Steam Drains valves to close or to the switch will have no adverse impact on safe ACHV0262, open. shutdown. Valve damage causing loss of pressure ACHV0264 boundary is not adverse due to MSIVs closure in OFN RP-017.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Appendix 2 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 Page 48 of 51 Table A2 Control Room Fire Consequence Evaluation for Motor Operated Valves Control Room Instrument P&ID Drawing Associated Description Consequence if Impact on PFSSD in the Event of a Control Room Instrument Location MOV(s) Damaged Fire ADHS0055 RL024 M-12AD02 (G-6) ADHV0055, LP Htr 1A to 4A Isol Could cause the The low pressure heaters are not required for PFSSD.

ADHV0066 Valves valves to close or Damage to the switch will have no adverse impact on open. safe shutdown. Valve damage causing loss of pressure boundary and potential CST flow diversion is not adverse as impact is enveloped by PWROG 32 for CST flow diversion to condenser.

ADHS0043 RL024 M-12AD02 (G-4) ADHV0043, LP Htr 1B to 4B Isol Could cause the The low pressure heaters are not required for PFSSD.

ADHV0054 Valves valves to close or Damage to the switch will have no adverse impact on open. safe shutdown. Valve damage causing loss of pressure boundary and potential CST flow diversion is not adverse as impact is enveloped by PWROG 32 for CST flow diversion to condenser.

ADHS0030 RL024 M-12AD02 (G-2) ADHV0030, LP Htr 1C to 4C Isol Could cause the The low pressure heaters are not required for PFSSD.

ADHV0041 Valves valves to close or Damage to the switch will have no adverse impact on open. safe shutdown. Valve damage causing loss of pressure boundary and potential CST flow diversion is not adverse as impact is enveloped by PWROG 32 for CST flow diversion to condenser.

ADHIS0042 RL024 M-12AD02 (G-3) ADHV0042 LP Htr Bypass Could cause the The low pressure heaters are not required for PFSSD.

Valves valve to close or Damage to the switch will have no adverse impact on open. safe shutdown. Valve damage causing loss of pressure boundary and potential CST flow diversion is not adverse as impact is enveloped by PWROG 32 for CST flow diversion to condenser.

AEHIS0017 RL024 M-12AE01 (E-5) AEHV0017, HP Htr 5B, 6B and Could cause the The heaters are not required for PFSSD. Spurious AEHV0034 7B Isol Vlvs valves to close or operation of the valves will have no adverse impact on open. safe shutdown. Valve damage causing loss of pressure boundary is not adverse due to credited FWIS as discussed in PWROG 33.

AEHIS0018 RL024 M-12AE01 (E-4) AEHV0018, HP Htr 5A, 6A and Could cause the The heaters are not required for PFSSD. Spurious AEHV0033 7A Isol Vlvs valves to close or operation of the valves will have no adverse impact on open. safe shutdown. Valve damage causing loss of pressure boundary is not adverse due to credited FWIS as discussed in PWROG 33.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Appendix 2 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 Page 49 of 51 Table A2 Control Room Fire Consequence Evaluation for Motor Operated Valves Control Room Instrument P&ID Drawing Associated Description Consequence if Impact on PFSSD in the Event of a Control Room Instrument Location MOV(s) Damaged Fire AEHIS0038 RL024 M-12AE01 (G-4) AEHV0038 HP Htrs Bypass Could cause the The heaters are not required for PFSSD. Spurious Valves valve to close or operation of the valves will have no adverse impact on open. safe shutdown. Valve damage causing loss of pressure boundary is not adverse due to credited FWIS as discussed in PWROG 33.

EAHIS0005 RL024 M-12EA02 (G-3) EAHV0005 Serv Wtr Return to Could cause the The service water system is not credited for PFSSD.

CW System valve to close or The ESW system is the credited service water supply.

open. Spurious operation of this valve will not adversely impact safe shutdown. Valve damage causing loss of pressure boundary is not adverse due to service water (AE) and circulating water (AD) not credited for PFSSD.

EAHIS0006 RL024 M-12EA02 (H-3) EAHV0006 Serv Wtr Return to Could cause the The service water system is not credited for PFSSD.

CW System valve to close or The ESW system is the credited service water supply.

open. Spurious operation of this valve will not adversely impact safe shutdown. Valve damage causing loss of pressure boundary is not adverse due to service water (AE) and circulating water (AD) not credited for PFSSD.

ACHIS0119 RL024 M-12AC02 (F-2) ACHV0119, MSR Shell Drain Jog Could cause the The MSR drains are not required for PFSSD. Damage ACHV0127, Control valves to close or to the switch will have no adverse impact on safe ACHV0129, open. shutdown. Valve damage causing loss of pressure ACHV0148, boundary is not adverse due to MSIVs closure in OFN ACHV0149, RP-017.

ACHV0150, ACHV0151, ACHV0225 ACHIS0072 RL024 M-12AC01 (C-6) ACHV0071, Startup Drain Valve Could cause the The startup drains are not required for PFSSD.

ACHV0072 valves to close or Damage to the switch will have no adverse impact on open. safe shutdown. Valve damage causing loss of pressure boundary is not adverse due to MSIVs closure in OFN RP-017.

ACHS0181A RL024 M-12AC02 (H-7) ACPV0181A, Reheater Steam Could cause the The MSR's are not required for PFSSD. Damage to the ACPV0181B, High Load Valves valves to close or switch will have no adverse impact on safe shutdown.

ACPV0181C, open. Valve damage causing loss of pressure boundary is not ACPV0181D adverse due to MSIVs closure in OFN RP-017.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Appendix 2 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 Page 50 of 51 Table A2 Control Room Fire Consequence Evaluation for Motor Operated Valves Control Room Instrument P&ID Drawing Associated Description Consequence if Impact on PFSSD in the Event of a Control Room Instrument Location MOV(s) Damaged Fire ACHIS0134 RL024 M-12AC01 (H-7) ACHV0130, Main Stop and Could cause the The drains are not required for PFSSD. Damage to the ACHV0134, Control Vlv Startup valves to close or switch will have no adverse impact on safe shutdown.

ACHV0135, Drains open. Valve damage causing loss of pressure boundary is not ACHV0136, adverse due to MSIVs closure in OFN RP-017.

ACHV0137, ACHV0256, ACHV0260, ACHV0261, ACHV0263 ACHS0181B RL024 M-12AC02 (H-7) ACPV0181A Main Steam Supply Could cause the The MSR's are not required for PFSSD. Damage to the to 2nd Stage valve to close or switch will have no adverse impact on safe shutdown.

Reheater open. Valve damage causing loss of pressure boundary is not adverse due to MSIVs closure in OFN RP-017.

CAHIS0001 RL026 M-12CA01 (G-8) CAHV0001 Main Steam Seal Valve could fail The main steam seal system is not required for PFSSD.

Feed Valve open or closed. Steam flow is isolated when the MSIVs are closed.

Therefore, spurious operation of this valve will not adversely impact safe shutdown. Valve damage causing loss of pressure boundary is not adverse due to MSIVs closure in OFN RP-017.

CAHIS0002 RL026 M-12CA01 (G-8) CAHV0002 Main Steam Seal Valve could fail The main steam seal system is not required for PFSSD.

Feed Valve open or closed. Steam flow is isolated when the MSIVs are closed.

Therefore, spurious operation of this valve will not adversely impact safe shutdown. Valve damage causing loss of pressure boundary is not adverse due to MSIVs closure in OFN RP-017.

CAHIS0004 RL026 M-12CA01 (H-8) CAHV0004 Aux Steam Seal Valve could fail The auxiliary steam seal system is not required for Feed Valve open or closed. PFSSD. Steam flow through this line originates from the auxiliary boiler, not the main steam system.

Therefore, spurious operation of this valve will not adversely impact safe shutdown. Valve damage causing loss of pressure boundary is not adverse due to MSIVs closure in OFN RP-017.

CAHIS0003 RL026 M-12CA01 (G-7) CAHV0003 Steam Seal Man Valve could fail The steam seal system is not required for PFSSD.

Unloading Vlv open or closed. Steam flow is isolated when the MSIVs are closed.

Therefore, spurious operation of this valve will not adversely impact safe shutdown. Valve damage causing loss of pressure boundary is not adverse due to MSIVs closure in OFN RP-017.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Appendix 2 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 Page 51 of 51 Table A2 Control Room Fire Consequence Evaluation for Motor Operated Valves Control Room Instrument P&ID Drawing Associated Description Consequence if Impact on PFSSD in the Event of a Control Room Instrument Location MOV(s) Damaged Fire ABHIS0046 RL026 M-12AB03 (B-8) ABHV0046 Main Stm Hdr to Stm Valve could fail The main steam seal system is not required for PFSSD.

Seal System open or closed. Steam flow is isolated when the MSIVs are closed.

Therefore, spurious operation of this valve will not adversely impact safe shutdown. Valve damage causing loss of pressure boundary is not adverse due to MSIVs closure in OFN RP-017.

FBHS0082 RL027 M-12FB01 (F-7) FBHV0080, Htr's 6A and 6B Mn Could prevent The auxiliary steam system is not required for PFSSD.

FBHV0081 Stm Alignment operation of the Damage to the switch will not adversely impact safe valves. shutdown. Valve damage causing loss of pressure boundary is not adverse due to auxiliary steam flow not required for PFSSD.

BMHS0100 RL027 M-12BM01 (G-2) BMHV0100, Htr's 5A and 5B Could cause the Valves are not used for PFSSD. Damage to the switch BMHV0101 Bldwn Stm valves to open or will have no adverse impact on PFSSD. Steam Alignment close. generator blowdown is isolated in OFN RP-017 by opening breaker NK4411. Valve damage causing loss of pressure boundary is not adverse due to SG blowdown isolation.

AEHS0103 RL027 M-12AE01 (G-2) AEHV0102, FWP PAE02 Inlet Could prevent The motor driven feedwater pump is not required for AEHV0103 and Outlet Iso operation of the PFSSD. Damage to the switch will have no adverse Valves valves. impact on safe shutdown. Valve damage causing loss of pressure boundary is not adverse due to credited FWIS and SG blowdown isolation.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Appendix 3 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 Page 1 of 58 Appendix 3 Control Room Multiple Spurious Operation (MSO) Review

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Appendix 3 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 Page 2 of 58 This evaluation addresses multiple spurious operations in the event of a control room fire. For control room fires, it is not required to consider MSOs as an initial consequence of the fire. However, per RG 1.189, MSOs should be considered after control is transferred to the alternate shutdown capability. (See RG 1.189, Section 5.4.1)

Table A3 identifies the NEI 00-01, Rev. 3 MSO list and provides a comparison of how Wolf Creek addresses each scenario for control room fires.

Table A3 Control Room Fire MSO Evaluation Scenario Included Scenario Scenario Description Notes Control Room Fire Discussion ID Equipment RCS Inventory Control PWROG Loss of all Spurious isolation of Scenario causes BBHV8351A, OFN RP-017 has operators stop the RCPs and isolate seal 1 RCP Seal seal injection header loss of all RCP seal BBHV8351B, injection and thermal barrier cooling. Therefore, this scenario is Cooling flow cooling and BBHV8351C not applicable to a control room fire because the procedure subsequent RCP and/or actually causes the scenario.

AND seal LOCA, BBHV8351D challenging the Based on Revision 2 of a White Paper prepared by Spurious isolation of RCS Inventory AND Westinghouse dated October 15, 2012, maximum leakage CCW flow to thermal Control Function. through each seal is 21 gpm with the RCPs stopped and no seal barrier heat exchanger BBHV0013 cooling. Therefore, the maximum leakage is 84 gpm, which is (BBFT0017), well within the makeup capability of the charging pump.

BBHV0014 (BBFT0018), Calculation SA-08-006 uses a leakage of 3 gpm per pump (12 BBHV0015 gpm total) for 10 minutes then increases to 21 gpm per pump (84 (BBFT0019), gpm total) for the duration of the event. This is consistent with and/or NRC IN 2005-14, which indicates modeling 21 gpm per pump BBHV0016 after 13 minutes is appropriate. The value of 3 gpm per pump is (BBFT0020) normal seal leakage. SA-08-006 uses 10 minutes instead of 13 minutes for increasing the seal leakage for conservatism.

OR Based on the above discussion, this MSO scenario is adequately EGHV0058, addressed.

EGHV0061, EGHV0062 (EGFT0062) or EGHV0071

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Appendix 3 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 Page 3 of 58 Table A3 Control Room Fire MSO Evaluation Scenario Included Scenario Scenario Description Notes Control Room Fire Discussion ID Equipment RCS Inventory Control PWROG Loss of all Spurious opening of Scenario causes EMHV8801A OFN RP-017 has operators stop the RCPs and isolate seal 2 RCP Seal charging injection loss of all RCP seal or injection and thermal barrier cooling. OFN RP-017 also lines up Cooling valve(s) causing cooling and EMHV8801B the B Train BIT flowpath for injection. Therefore, this scenario is diversion flow away subsequent RCP not applicable to a control room fire because the procedure from seals, seal LOCA, AND actually causes this scenario.

challenging the AND RCS Inventory EMHV8803A Based on Revision 2 of a White Paper prepared by Control Function. or Westinghouse dated October 15, 2012, maximum leakage Spurious isolation of EMHV8803B through each seal is 21 gpm with the RCPs stopped and no seal CCW flow to thermal cooling. Therefore, the maximum leakage is 84 gpm, which is barrier heat exchanger AND well within the makeup capability of the charging pump.

BBHV0013 Calculation SA-08-006 uses a leakage of 3 gpm per pump (12 (BBFT0017), gpm total) for 10 minutes then increases to 21 gpm per pump (84 BBHV0014 gpm total) for the duration of the event. This is consistent with (BBFT0018), NRC IN 2005-14, which indicates modeling 21 gpm per pump BBHV0015 after 13 minutes is appropriate. The value of 3 gpm per pump is (BBFT0019), normal seal leakage. SA-08-006 uses 10 minutes instead of 13 and/or minutes for increasing the seal leakage for conservatism.

BBHV0016 (BBFT0020) Based on the above discussion, this MSO scenario is adequately addressed.

OR EGHV0058, EGHV0061, EGHV0062 (EGFT0062) or EGHV0071

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Appendix 3 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 Page 4 of 58 Table A3 Control Room Fire MSO Evaluation Scenario Included Scenario Scenario Description Notes Control Room Fire Discussion ID Equipment RCS Inventory Control PWROG Thermal Loss of all Seal Cooling Thermal shock of Same as OFN RP-017 has operators stop the RCPs and isolate seal 3 Shock of to any RCP(s). See seals causes PWROG 1 or 2 injection and thermal barrier cooling. Spurious re-initiation of RCP Scenarios 1 & 2, catastrophic RCP seal injection is prevented by closing manual valves BGV0101 Seals seal failure and AND and BGV0105. Spurious re-initiation of thermal barrier cooling is AND subsequent RCP prevented by de-energizing and closing valves EGHV0061 and seal LOCA, EGHV0058 EGHV0133. Therefore, this scenario is not applicable to a Spurious re-initiation of challenging the AND control room fire because the procedure prevents this scenario seal cooling (i.e., seal RCS Inventory EGHV0071 or from occurring.

injection or CCW to Control Function. EGHV0126 TBHX) AND Based on Revision 2 of a White Paper prepared by EGHV0127 Westinghouse dated October 15, 2012, maximum leakage through each seal is 21 gpm with the RCPs stopped and no seal AND cooling. Therefore, the maximum leakage is 84 gpm, which is well within the makeup capability of the charging pump.

EGHV0062 or EGHV0132 Calculation SA-08-006 uses a leakage of 3 gpm per pump (12 gpm total) for 10 minutes then increases to 21 gpm per pump (84 AND gpm total) for the duration of the event. This is consistent with NRC IN 2005-14, which indicates modeling 21 gpm per pump EGHV0061 or after 13 minutes is appropriate. The value of 3 gpm per pump is EGHV0133 normal seal leakage. SA-08-006 uses 10 minutes instead of 13 minutes for increasing the seal leakage for conservatism.

Based on the above discussion, this MSO scenario is adequately addressed.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Appendix 3 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 Page 5 of 58 Table A3 Control Room Fire MSO Evaluation Scenario Included Scenario Scenario Description Notes Control Room Fire Discussion ID Equipment RCS Inventory Control PWROG Catastrop Loss of all Seal Cooling Scenario causes Same as OFN RP-017 has operators stop the RCPs and isolate seal 4 hic RCP to any RCP(s). See catastrophic RCP PWROG 1 or 2 injection and thermal barrier cooling. Therefore, this scenario is Seal Scenarios 1 & 2, seal failure and not applicable to a control room fire because the procedure Failure subsequent RCP AND prevents spurious re-start of the RCPs.

AND seal LOCA, challenging the PBB01A, Based on Revision 2 of a White Paper prepared by Fire prevents tripping, RCS Inventory PBB01B, Westinghouse dated October 15, 2012, maximum leakage or spuriously starts, Control Function. PBB01C or through each seal is 21 gpm with the RCPs stopped and no seal RCP(s) PBB01D cooling. Therefore, the maximum leakage is 84 gpm, which is well within the makeup capability of the charging pump.

Calculation SA-08-006 uses a leakage of 3 gpm per pump (12 gpm total) for 10 minutes then increases to 21 gpm per pump (84 gpm total) for the duration of the event. This is consistent with NRC IN 2005-14, which indicates modeling 21 gpm per pump after 13 minutes is appropriate. The value of 3 gpm per pump is normal seal leakage. SA-08-006 uses 10 minutes instead of 13 minutes for increasing the seal leakage for conservatism.

Based on the above discussion, this MSO scenario is adequately addressed.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Appendix 3 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 Page 6 of 58 Table A3 Control Room Fire MSO Evaluation Scenario Included Scenario Scenario Description Notes Control Room Fire Discussion ID Equipment RCS Inventory Control PWROG RCP Seal Loss of all Seal Cooling Isolation of the No. Same as OFN RP-017 has operators stop the RCPs and isolate seal 5 No. 2 to any RCP(s). See 1 seal leakoff line PWROG 1 or 2 injection and thermal barrier cooling. OFN RP-017 does not Failure Scenarios 1 & 2, during a loss of all ensure the No. 1 seal leakoff valves remain open. These valves seal cooling event AND are normally open and fail open.

AND would force the No.

2 RCP seal into a BBHV8141A, Based on Revision 2 of a White Paper prepared by Spurious isolation of high pressure BBHV8141B, Westinghouse dated October 15, 2012, with the No. 1 seal return No. 1 seal leakoff mode of operation BBHV8141C line spuriously closed the maximum leakage through each seal is valve(s) at high or 21 gpm with the RCPs stopped and no seal cooling. Therefore, temperature, which BBHV8141D the maximum leakage is 84 gpm, which is well within the is beyond the makeup capability of the charging pump.

design basis of the No. 2 seal. This Calculation SA-08-006 uses a leakage of 3 gpm per pump (12 could cause gpm total) for 10 minutes then increases to 21 gpm per pump (84 catastrophic failure gpm total) for the duration of the event. This is consistent with of the No. 2 seal NRC IN 2005-14, which indicates modeling 21 gpm per pump and increase RCS after 13 minutes is appropriate. The value of 3 gpm per pump is leakage. normal seal leakage. SA-08-006 uses 10 minutes instead of 13 minutes for increasing the seal leakage for conservatism.

Based on the above discussion, this MSO scenario is adequately addressed.

PWROG Letdown Spurious opening of (or Letdown Fails to BGLCV0459 OFN RP-017 fails the letdown valves and letdown orifice valves 6 Fails to failure to close) letdown Isolate and and closed by opening switch PK5117. Calculation SA-08-006 uses Isolate isolation valve(s), AND Inventory Lost to BGLCV0460 a value of 120 gpm or 195 gpm, depending on the scenario, for 7 and CVCS causes loss minutes. Based on drawing E-13RL02, the two letdown valves Inventory Spurious opening of (or of RCS inventory, AND and three letdown orifice valves are powered from PK5117.

Lost to failure to close) letdown challenging the Based on drawings E-13BG10 and E-13BG35, de-energizing the CVCS orifice valve(s) RCS Inventory BGHV0149A, control circuit will close the valves.

Control Function. BGHV0149B or To spuriously re-energize the circuit and re-open the valves, it BGHV0149C would take two proper polarity inter-cable hot shorts on at least three valves. Therefore, six proper polarity inter-cable hot shorts would have to occur, which is extremely unlikely.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Appendix 3 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 Page 7 of 58 Table A3 Control Room Fire MSO Evaluation Scenario Included Scenario Scenario Description Notes Control Room Fire Discussion ID Equipment RCS Inventory Control De-energizing PK5117 will de-energize all other sources of separation group 5 - 125 VDC power from RL001/RL002 that could re-energize the letdown valves. Cable 15RLK01AA is the power cable from PK5117 to distribution bus DB1 in RL001/RL002. The cable enters RL001/RL002 from the lower cable spreading room in cable tray 135C8B45. All 125 VDC cables in tray 135C8B45 are fed from PK5117, so opening PK5117 will de-energize these cables.

Separation group 1 (Train A) 125 VDC power source to RL001/RL002 from NK4119 and separation group 4 (Train B) power source from NK4407 to RL001/RL002 are de-energized in OFN RP-017. By design, these sources should never come into contact with separation group 5 circuits. However, in the unlikely event they do, the sources are eliminated in the procedure.

Separation group 6 125 VDC power source from PK5211 is not de-energized in OFN RP-017. The separation group 6 cables could come in contact with the separation group 5 cables because there are no design restrictions to keep them separated within the control panels. The cables are separated in raceway.

As stated above, it would take a minimum of six proper polarity inter-cable hot shorts to cause the two letdown isolation valves and one letdown orifice valve to spuriously open. Since the letdown valves are considered high/low pressure interfaces, consideration of two or more proper polarity hot shorts is required. However, based on testing of DC circuits documented in NUREG/CR-7100 and NUREG-2128, multiple proper polarity inter-cable hot shorts causing multiple spurious operations is not credible.

Based on the above discussion, this MSO scenario is adequately addressed.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Appendix 3 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 Page 8 of 58 Table A3 Control Room Fire MSO Evaluation Scenario Included Scenario Scenario Description Notes Control Room Fire Discussion ID Equipment RCS Inventory Control PWROG Letdown Letdown fails to isolate Scenario causes Same as See response to PWROG 6.

7 Fails to (see Scenario 6), AND letdown flow to PWROG 6 Isolate PRT through relief Based on the above discussion, this MSO scenario is adequately and Spurious closure of valve. This letdown AND addressed.

Inventory downstream flow is assumed Lost to containment isolation unavailable for BGHV8152, PRT valve RCS makeup. BGHV8160, or BGPCV0131 PWROG Excess Spurious opening of (or Scenario causes BGHV8153A Excess letdown is isolated in OFN RP-017 by opening switches 8 Letdown failure to close) multiple loss of RCS and NK4119 and NK4407. These actions de-energize all separation Fails to series excess letdown inventory to the BGHV8154A group 1 and 4 sources of 125 VDC power within panel Isolate isolation valves CVCS system, RL001/RL002 and ensure the excess letdown valves do not challenging the OR spuriously open as a result of a control room fire.

RCS Inventory Control Function. BGHV8153B In the unlikely event a 125 VDC source comes into contact with The RCS inventory and the control circuit for the excess letdown valves, it would take at (letdown) is BGHV8154B least 4 proper polarity hot shorts to cause two series valves to assumed lost and open. Then it would take additional hot shorts to open valve unavailable for AND BBHV8157A or BBHV8157B to cause excess letdown to flow to makeup. In reality, the PRT or valve BGHCV0123 to cause excess letdown to flow additional failures BBHV8157A, to the reactor coolant drain tank. Based on industry testing of downstream of the BBHV8157B or DC circuits documented in NUREG/CR-7100 and NUREG-2128, excess letdown BGHCV0123 this combination of smart hot shorts is not credible. Therefore, isolation valves the actions taken in OFN RP-017 to close the excess letdown would have to flowpath are acceptable.

occur for this RCS inventory to be Based on the above discussion, this MSO scenario is adequately unavailable for addressed.

makeup.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Appendix 3 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 Page 9 of 58 Table A3 Control Room Fire MSO Evaluation Scenario Included Scenario Scenario Description Notes Control Room Fire Discussion ID Equipment RCS Inventory Control PWROG RCS Spurious isolation of Scenario isolates BGFCV0462, OFN RP-017 isolates seal injection and normal charging by 9 Makeup seal injection flow path, all high head RCS BGHCV0182, closing valves BGV0101, BGV0105 and BG8402B. Charging is Isolation AND/OR makeup flow paths, BGHV8105 or lined up through the BIT by lining up the Train B charging pump challenging the BGHV8106 and valves EMHV8803B and EMHV8801B. Valve EMHV8801B Spurious isolation of RCS Inventory is throttled, by procedure, to achieve the correct charging flow.

normal charging flow Control Function. AND path, AND/OR Calculation SA-08-006 assumes 28 minutes to line up charging BGFCV0121 through the BIT. Due to the isolation and redundant fusing Spurious isolation of or provided for the Train B equipment, this flowpath provides a charging injection flow reliable means of charging following a control room fire.

path BBHV8351A, BBHV8351B, Based on the above discussion, this MSO scenario is adequately BBHV8351C addressed.

and/or BBHV8351D AND BGHV8357A or BGHV8357B

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Appendix 3 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 Page 10 of 58 Table A3 Control Room Fire MSO Evaluation Scenario Included Scenario Scenario Description Notes Control Room Fire Discussion ID Equipment RCS Inventory Control PWROG Charging Initial condition is Scenario causes BGLCV112B The normal charging pump (NCP) is normally operating. If this 10 Pump charging pump running charging pump (BGLT0112) or pump is damaged due to a spuriously closed VCT outlet valve, Failure with normal lineup inoperability, BGLCV112C there is no adverse impact on PFSSD because the Train B taking suction from challenging the (BGLT0185) centrifugal charging pump (CCP) is the credited charging pump VCT. RCS Inventory for a control room fire.

Control Function. AND Spurious isolation of This is especially If the Train B CCP is operating at the time of the fire, and one of suction from VCT to challenging if the BNLCV112D the VCT outlet valves closes, the Train B CCP would be running charging pump, credited charging (BGLT0112) damaged. This scenario would only require a single spurious AND pump is running at and operation because it would only take spurious closure of one the time of the fire. BNLCV112E valve to cause it to happen. The RWST to charging pump Spurious isolation of (or (BGLT0185) suction valve does not automatically open when the VCT valve failure to open) suction closes. The RWST valve opens on a low-low VCT level or SIS, from RWST to running neither of which would occur per this scenario.

charging pump Procedure OFN RP-017 lines up the RWST to the Train B CCP.

Valve BNLCV0112E is opened using BNHS0112E. This switch isolates the control room and inserts a redundant fuse in the circuit, ensuring the valve opens and remains open.

This MSO scenario represents a vulnerability of low likelihood because the B CCP is not normally operated. Also, a control room fire that is severe enough to cause evacuation is not likely because the control room is constantly attended and smoke detectors are provided in the control room cabinets.

Based on the above discussion, this MSO scenario is adequately addressed.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Appendix 3 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 Page 11 of 58 Table A3 Control Room Fire MSO Evaluation Scenario Included Scenario Scenario Description Notes Control Room Fire Discussion ID Equipment RCS Inventory Control PWROG Charging Initial condition is Scenario causes BNLCV112D Procedure OFN RP-017 lines up the RWST to the Train B CCP.

11 Pump charging pump running loss of charging and Valve BNLCV0112E is opened using BNHS0112E. This switch Failure and drawing suction pump suction, BNLCV112E isolates the control room, inserts a redundant fuse in the circuit from RWST. causing and opens the valve, ensuring the valve remains open for the subsequent pump duration of the event.

Spurious isolation of cavitation and two parallel RWST inoperability. This Based on the above discussion, this MSO scenario is adequately outlet valves. challenges the addressed.

RCS Inventory Control Function.

PWROG Charging Spurious opening (or Scenario causes BGLCV112B Procedure OFN RP-017 isolates valve BGLCV0112C using 12 Pump failure to close) of VCT drain down and BGHS0112C. This switch isolates the control room, inserts a Failure multiple series VCT and hydrogen BGLCV112C redundant fuse in the circuit and closes the valve, ensuring the outlet valves cover gas valve remains closed for the duration of the event.

entrainment into charging pump Based on the above discussion, this MSO scenario is adequately suction, ultimately addressed.

causing charging pump inoperability and challenging the RCS Inventory Control Function.

This is especially challenging if the credited charging pump is running at the time of the fire.

Note this scenario assumes that VCT makeup has been isolated (i.e.,

letdown isolated).

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Appendix 3 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 Page 12 of 58 Table A3 Control Room Fire MSO Evaluation Scenario Included Scenario Scenario Description Notes Control Room Fire Discussion ID Equipment RCS Inventory Control PWROG Charging Letdown fails to isolate Scenario causes PWROG 6 See scenario PWROG 6 for discussion about letdown.

13 Pump (see Scenario 6), AND elevated charging Failure pump suction AND The VCT is isolated as discussed in scenario PWROG 12.

Spurious isolation of temperature and CCW cooling to the subsequent pump BGTV0130 Since letdown and the VCT is isolated per procedure OFN RP-letdown heat exchanger inoperability. 017, spurious isolation of CCW cooling to the letdown heat Charging pump exchanger is not a concern.

inoperability challenges the Based on the above discussion, this MSO scenario is adequately RCS Inventory addressed.

Control Function.

This is especially challenging if the credited charging pump is running at the time of the fire.

PWROG Charging Charging pump runout Scenario causes PBG05A Procedure OFN RP-017 lines up the Train B CCP to inject 14 Pump when RCS is charging pump PBG05B through the BIT. The BIT outlet valve is throttled by operator Failure depressurized runout and failure. action to maintain inventory. Therefore, pump runout is Pump(s) must be AND prevented in OFN RP-017 by an operator throttling the discharge running when RCS valve to control pressurizer level.

is at a BBPCV0455A depressurized And/or Based on the above discussion, this MSO scenario is adequately condition. RCS BBPCV0456A addressed.

depressurization could occur due to spurious opening of pressurizer PORV(s), for example.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Appendix 3 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 Page 13 of 58 Table A3 Control Room Fire MSO Evaluation Scenario Included Scenario Scenario Description Notes Control Room Fire Discussion ID Equipment RCS Inventory Control PWROG RWST Spurious opening of Scenario causes BNHV8812A OFN RP-017 isolates BNHV8812A and BNHV8812B prior to the 15 Drain multiple series RWST drain down and RWST draining to an insufficient level. Containment sump Down via containment sump to the containment EJHV8811A valves EJHV8811A and EJHV8811B are not operated in OFN Containm valves sump. Since RP-017. As long as valves BNHV8812A and BNHV8812B are ent Sump typical PFSS OR closed, spurious operation of EJHV8811A and EJHV8811B will analyses do not have no adverse impact on RWST inventory.

credit alignment of BNHV8812B containment sump, and Valve BNHV8812A is de-energized and manually closed per the RWST EJHV8811B procedure. The valve has been modified to address NRC IN 92-inventory becomes 18, so the valve can be manually closed when needed.

unavailable for RCS makeup, Valve BNHV8812B is closed using hand switch BNHS8812B.

challenging the The hand switch isolates the control room and inserts a RCS Inventory redundant fuse in the control circuit. The valve was modified to Control Function. address NRC IN 92-18. Therefore, the valve will close when hand switch BNHS8812B is actuated and the valve will not re-open because the control circuit is isolated from the control room.

Based on the above discussion, this MSO scenario is adequately addressed.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Appendix 3 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 Page 14 of 58 Table A3 Control Room Fire MSO Evaluation Scenario Included Scenario Scenario Description Notes Control Room Fire Discussion ID Equipment RCS Inventory Control PWROG RWST Spurious opening of Scenario causes a ENHV0006 Containment spray pumps PEN01A and PEN01B are stopped or 16 Drain containment spray pumped RWST prevented from starting in OFN RP-017 by opening the pump Down via header valve(s), draindown via the AND motor breakers. Control power is removed from PEN01A by Containm containment spray removing the close control power fuse in NB0102. Control ent Spray AND ring. The RWST PEN01A power is removed from PEN01B by opening switch NK4401, inventory ultimately which removes control power from the entire NB02 bus.

Spurious starting of settles to the OR Removal of control power prevents a control room fire from containment spray containment sump. closing the breakers and spuriously starting the pumps.

pump(s) and/or RHR Since typical PFSS ENHV0012 pump(s). analyses do not Based on the above discussion, this MSO scenario is adequately credit alignment of AND addressed.

the containment sump, the RWST PEN01B inventory is assumed unavailable for RCS makeup, challenging the RCS Inventory Control Function.

PWROG Interfacing Spurious opening of Scenario causes BBPV8702A During normal operation, these valves are de-energized and 17 System multiple series RHR interfacing system and locked in the closed position. A fire in the control room cannot LOCA suction valves from LOCA, challenging EJHV8701A open these valves because it would take multiple proper phase RCS the RCS Inventory hot shorts to re-energize the valves. Power circuits for these Control Function. OR valves do not run through the control room so this circuit failure cannot occur due to a fire in the control room.

BBPV8702B and Based on the above discussion, this MSO scenario is adequately EJHV8701B addressed.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Appendix 3 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 Page 15 of 58 Table A3 Control Room Fire MSO Evaluation Scenario Included Scenario Scenario Description Notes Control Room Fire Discussion ID Equipment RCS Inventory Control PWROG Multiple Spurious opening of Scenario causes BBPCV0455A Spurious opening of both pressurizer PORVs would result in 18 Pressurize multiple (two or three) loss of RCS and conditions that do not meet the performance criteria of 10 CFR r PORVs Pressurizer PORVs with inventory through BBHV8000A 50, Appendix R,Section III.L. Calculation SA-08-006 assumes a corresponding block the pressurizer single PORV is open for no more than 3 minutes. Procedure valves in normal, open PORVs, AND OFN RP-017 closes or ensures the pressurizer PORVs do not position challenging the open by removing 125 VDC control power. This is done by RCS Inventory BBPCV0456A opening switches NK5108 for BBPCV0455A and NK4421 for Control Function. and BBPCV0456A. Timing has shown that these switches are Scenario also BBHV8000B opened in less than 3 minutes.

causes pressurizer depressurization, Isolation of control power ensures a single proper polarity hot challenging the short will not energize the PORVs. License Amendment 193 RCS Pressure approved the re-classification of the PORVs and block valves as Control Function. non-high/low pressure interface, which allows Wolf Creek to consider only a single proper polarity hot short when performing circuit analysis on the PORVs and associated block valves.

Calculation SA-08-006, Scenario 1 was run with two pressurizer PORVs open for 3 minutes. The results show that, although significant voiding occurs in the upper core and steam generators, there is sufficient natural circulation to maintain core inlet and outlet temperature between 560 and 570 F.

Pressurizer level momentarily goes off scale high but then stabilizes at about 55% and pressurizer pressure stabilizes at about 1200 psi. The core remains covered and no fuel damage is indicated.

Based on the above discussion, this MSO scenario is adequately addressed.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Appendix 3 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 Page 16 of 58 Table A3 Control Room Fire MSO Evaluation Scenario Included Scenario Scenario Description Notes Control Room Fire Discussion ID Equipment RCS Inventory Control PWROG Pressurize Spurious opening of Scenario causes BBPCV0455A See scenario PWROG 18 for discussion about the pressurizer 19 r PORV Pressurizer PORV(s), loss of RCS AND PORVs.

and Block AND inventory through BBHV8000A Valve the pressurizer Based on the above discussion, this MSO scenario is adequately Spurious opening of PORV(s), OR addressed.

block valve(s) after it challenging the has been closed. RCS Inventory BBPCV0456A Control Function. AND Scenario also BBHV8000B causes pressurizer depressurization, challenging the RCS Pressure Control Function.

PWROG Reactor Spurious opening of Scenario causes BBHV8001A The reactor head vent valves are closed in OFN RP-017 by 20 Head Vent multiple series reactor loss of RCS and opening switches NK5109 and NK4414. This de-energizes the Valves head vent valves inventory through BBHV8002A valves and fails them closed. In order for two valves in the same open reactor head flowpath to re-open, it would take at least four proper polarity hot vent flowpath(s), OR shorts, which is not credible based on testing of DC circuits challenging the documented in NUREG/CR-7100 and NUREG-2128 RCS Inventory BBHV8001B Control Function. and Based on the above discussion, this MSO scenario is adequately BBHV8002B addressed.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Appendix 3 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 Page 17 of 58 Table A3 Control Room Fire MSO Evaluation Scenario Included Scenario Scenario Description Notes Control Room Fire Discussion ID Equipment RCS Inventory Control PWROG Excess Spurious starting of Scenario causes PBG04, Procedure OFN RP-017 lines up Train B CCP to inject through 21 RCS additional high head increasing RCS PBG05A or the BIT using valves EMHV8801B and EMHV8803B. Normal Makeup charging pump(s), AND inventory, leading PBG05B charging is isolated by procedure by closing valve BG8402B.

to a water solid Seal injection is isolated by closing BGV0101 and BGV0105.

Spurious opening of pressurizer and AND additional RCS makeup PORV or safety The Train A CCP is not secured in OFN RP-017. The BIT flow paths (i.e., valve opening. EMHV8801A flowpath is controlled in OFN RP-017, so spurious operation of charging injection) This scenario or the Train A CCP is not a concern because the flow is controlled.

challenges both EMHV8801B RCS Inventory and BIT outlet valve EMHV8801A is closed in OFN RP-017 by first RCS Pressure AND opening the breaker then manually closing the valve to prevent Control Functions. excess flow to the RCS. The valve has been modified by DCP EMHV8803A 13614 to address NRC IN 92-18.

or EMHV8803B Based on the above discussion, this MSO scenario is adequately addressed.

PWROG Primary Spurious opening of Scenario causes SJHV0003 Procedure OFN RP-017 does not isolate the primary sample 22 Sample RCS sample valve(s) loss of reactor SJHV0004 system. Normally closed manual valves downstream of the System (i.e., hot leg, PZR liquid coolant through the SJHV0005 sample coolers prevents loss of inventory through this flowpath.

space, PZR steam primary sample SJHV0006 See drawing M-12SJ01.

space, etc.), AND system, challenging SJHV0012 the RCS Inventory SJHV0013 Based on the above discussion, this MSO scenario is adequately Spurious opening of Control Function. SJHV0020 addressed.

inside containment SJHV0127 isolation valve, AND SJHV0128 SJHV0129 Spurious opening of SJHV0130 outside containment SJHV0133 isolation valve, AND Spurious opening of downstream sample valve(s)

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Appendix 3 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 Page 18 of 58 Table A3 Control Room Fire MSO Evaluation Scenario Included Scenario Scenario Description Notes Control Room Fire Discussion ID Equipment RCS Inventory Control Expert Letdown Letdown fails to isolate Scenario causes Same as See scenario PWROG 6 for discussion of letdown.

Panel 1 Fails to (see Scenario 6), AND letdown flow to PWROG 6 Isolate RHT through divert Based on the above discussion, this MSO scenario is adequately and Spurious diversion of valve. This letdown AND addressed.

Inventory letdown flow to recycle flow is assumed Lost to hold-up tank unavailable for BGLCV0112A RHT RCS makeup. (BGLT0149)

Expert Injection Scenario assumes high Scenario causes EMHV8843 or Procedure OFN RP-017 closes test line EMHV8843 using hand Panel 2 Flow head injection is in diversion of high EMHV8882 switch EMHS8843. The hand switch isolates the control room Diverted operation. head injection and and inserts a redundant fuse in the circuit. The valve has been to RWST loss of RCS AND modified to address NRC IN 92-18. This ensures the valve will or RHT BIT test line opens to makeup. close when the hand switch is placed in the ISO/CLOSED divert injection flow to EMHV8871 position. It also ensures the valve will not spuriously open in the the RWST or RHT event of cable damage.

AND Based on the above discussion, this MSO scenario is adequately EMHV8964 addressed.

Expert Isolation Spurious closure of Scenario causes BGFCV0462 Procedure OFN RP-017 lines up the Train B CCP and opens Panel 3 of normal charging overheating and and miniflow valve BGHV8111 using hand switch BGHS8111A.

Charging isolation valve eventual failure of BGHV8109 Hand switch BGHS8111A isolates the control room, inserts a Pump affected pump. redundant fuse in the control circuit and opens the valve. Valve Miniflow AND OR BGHS8111 has been modified to address NRC IN 92-18.

Therefore, placing BGHS8111A in ISO/OPEN will open the valve Spurious closure of BGFCV0121 and prevent it from closing due to a control room fire.

pump miniflow valve and BGHV8110 or Based on the above discussion, this MSO scenario is adequately BGHV8111 addressed.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Appendix 3 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 Page 19 of 58 Table A3 Control Room Fire MSO Evaluation Scenario Included Scenario Scenario Description Notes Control Room Fire Discussion ID Equipment RCS Inventory Control Expert Loss of Spurious RWST Low Scenario causes 2/4 Low-Low Procedure OFN RP-017 lines up the RWST to the Train B CCP.

Panel 4 Low Head Level indication failure of low head on Valve BNLCV0112E is opened using BNHS0112E. This switch SI Pump resulting in: SI pumps when BNLT0930, isolates the control room, inserts a redundant fuse in the circuit Suction required for BNLT0931, and opens the valve, ensuring the valve remains open for the Closure of RWST to recirculation. BNLT0932, duration of the event.

high head pumps and BNLT0933 Spurious signals on the level transmitters will not adversely AND affect PFSSD after a control room fire because all required valves are manually aligned. The Train B intermediate head SI Containment Sump pump and low head RHR pump is prevented from starting in Suction valves open OFN RP-017 by opening the breaker and removing control with insufficient water power. Therefore, these pumps are protected from damage due level in sump to a control room fire and remain available if needed.

Based on the above discussion, this MSO scenario is adequately addressed.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Appendix 3 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 Page 20 of 58 Table A3 Control Room Fire MSO Evaluation Scenario Included Scenario Scenario Description Notes Control Room Fire Discussion ID Equipment RCS Inventory Control Expert Failure of Spurious RWST High Scenario causes SIAS Procedure OFN RP-017 lines up the RWST to the Train B CCP.

Panel 5 ECCS Level indication damage to CCPs Valve BNLCV0112E is opened using BNHS0112E. This switch Sump resulting in: and/or low head SI AND isolates the control room, inserts a redundant fuse in the circuit Alignment pumps due to loss and opens the valve, ensuring the valve remains open for the Exhaustion of RWST of suction source. BNLT0930, duration of the event.

inventory BNLT0931, BNLT0932, Spurious signals on the level transmitters will not adversely AND and BNLT0933 affect PFSSD after a control room fire because all required valves are manually aligned. The Train B intermediate head SI Failure of automatic pump and low head RHR pump is prevented from starting in transfer to ECCS Sump OFN RP-017 by opening the breaker and removing control suction source. power. Therefore, these pumps are protected from damage due to a control room fire and remain available if needed.

Following a control room fire, all lineups are performed manually.

If necessary to line up the containment sump to the RHR pump, valve EJHV8811B can be opened. This valve has been modified to address NRC IN 92-18.

Based on the above discussion, this MSO scenario is adequately addressed.

Expert RCP Seal Spurious closure of Scenario causes BGHV8100 RCP seal injection is isolated in OFN RP-017 by closing valves Panel 6 Return RCP seal return line loss of RCS BGV0101 and BGV0105. Therefore, with no seal injection there Diverted isolation valve. inventory to the OR will be no seal return to divert to the PRT.

to PRT PRT challenging the RCS Inventory BGHV8112 Based on the above discussion, this MSO scenario is adequately Control function. addressed.

Expert Loss of all Loss of Letdown Flow to Scenario causes BGLCV0459, OFN RP-017 has operators stop the RCPs and isolate seal Panel 7 RCP Seal VCT AND loss of all charging BGLCV0460, injection and thermal barrier cooling. OFN RP-017 also lines up Cooling pumps due to loss BGHV8152, the B Train BIT flowpath for injection. Therefore, this scenario is Failure of RWST supply of suction sources, BGHV8160, not applicable to a control room fire because the procedure to high head pumps loss of RCP BGPCV0131, actually causes this scenario.

AND Thermal Barrier or cooling and BGLCV0112A Based on Revision 2 of a White Paper prepared by Spurious isolation of subsequent RCP Westinghouse dated October 15, 2012, maximum leakage

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Appendix 3 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 Page 21 of 58 Table A3 Control Room Fire MSO Evaluation Scenario Included Scenario Scenario Description Notes Control Room Fire Discussion ID Equipment RCS Inventory Control CCW flow to thermal seal LOCA, OR through each seal is 21 gpm with the RCPs stopped and no seal barrier heat exchanger challenging the cooling. Therefore, the maximum leakage is 84 gpm, which is RCS Inventory BGHV0149A, well within the makeup capability of the charging pump.

Control Function. BGHV0149B and Calculation SA-08-006 uses a leakage of 3 gpm per pump (12 BGHV0149C gpm total) for 10 minutes then increases to 21 gpm per pump (84 gpm total) for the duration of the event. This is consistent with AND NRC IN 2005-14, which states that modeling 21 gpm per pump after 13 minutes is appropriate. The value of 3 gpm per pump is BNLCV0112D normal seal leakage. SA-08-006 uses 10 minutes instead of 13 and minutes for increasing the seal leakage for conservatism.

BNLCV0112E Based on the above discussion, this MSO scenario is adequately AND addressed.

BBHV0013 (BBFT0017),

BBHV0014 (BBFT0018),

BBHV0015 (BBFT0019),

and/or BBHV0016 (BBFT0020)

OR EGHV0058, EGHV0061, EGHV0062 (EGFT0062) or EGHV0071

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Appendix 3 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 Page 22 of 58 Table A3 Control Room Fire MSO Evaluation Scenario Scenario Included Scenario Notes Control Room Fire Discussion ID Description Equipment Decay Heat Removal PWROG Inadvertent Spurious opening of Scenario causes ABPV0001 OFN RP-017 controls all four atmospheric relief valves (ARVs).

23 Steam multiple atmospheric RCS over-cooling. (ABPT0001) Two of the valves are controlled from the auxiliary shutdown Dumping steam dump valves Also, the ABPV0002 panel (ASP) using hand controllers and two are failed closed upstream of MSIV overcooling can (ABPT0002) locally by isolating air and nitrogen. Calculation SA-08-006 cause RCS ABPV0003 shows that a single ARV can be failed open for 60 minutes with shrinkage, causing (ABPT0003) no adverse consequences. All four ARVs are controlled or low pressurizer ABPV0004 closed well within 60 minutes.

level, and (ABPT0004) challenging the Based on the above discussion, this MSO scenario is adequately RCS Inventory addressed.

Control Function.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Appendix 3 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 Page 23 of 58 Table A3 Control Room Fire MSO Evaluation Scenario Scenario Included Scenario Notes Control Room Fire Discussion ID Description Equipment Decay Heat Removal PWROG Inadvertent MSIV(s) spurious Scenario causes ABHV0011, OFN RP-017 closes the MSIVs by removing power from cabinet 24 Steam opening, or failure to RCS over-cooling. ABHV0014, SA075A. This removes 125 VDC power from the Train A Dumping close, AND Also, the ABHV0017 or solenoids for all four MSIVs and fails them closed. This action is overcooling can ABHV0020 taken within 3 minutes into the incident. Calculation SA-08-006 Spurious opening, or cause RCS shows that if the MSIVs are closed in 3 minutes, PFSSD is not failure to close, of shrinkage, causing AND adversely affected.

downstream steam low pressurizer ABUV0034, loads (e.g., level, and ABUV0035, Based on the above discussion, this MSO scenario is adequately condenser steam challenging the ABUV0036, addressed.

dumps, turbine inlet RCS Inventory ABUV0037, valves, etc.) Control Function. ABUV0038, ABUV0039, ABUV0040, ABUV0041, ABUV0042, ABUV0043, ABUV0044 or ABUV0045 OR ACFCV0043 and ACFCV0047 or ACFCV0044 and ACFCV0049 or ACFCV0045 and ACFCV0048 or ACFCV0046 and ACFCV0050

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Appendix 3 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 Page 24 of 58 Table A3 Control Room Fire MSO Evaluation Scenario Scenario Included Scenario Notes Control Room Fire Discussion ID Description Equipment Decay Heat Removal PWROG Inadvertent MSIV bypass valve(s) Scenario causes ABHV0012, See PWROG 24 for discussion about the MSIVs.

25 Steam spurious opening, or RCS over-cooling. ABHV0015, Dumping failure to close, AND Also, the ABHV0018 or OFN RP-017 isolates the MSIV bypass valves by removing the overcooling can ABHV0021 control power fuse. Removing the control power fuse ensures Spurious opening, or cause RCS the bypass valves remain closed. Calculation SA-08-006 failure to close, of shrinkage, causing AND assumes the bypass valves remain open for the duration of the down stream steam low pressurizer ABUV0034, event. Therefore, failure of the bypass valves to close will not loads (e.g., level, and ABUV0035, prevent PFSSD.

condenser steam challenging the ABUV0036, dumps, turbine inlet RCS Inventory ABUV0037, Based on the above discussion, this MSO scenario is adequately valves, etc.) Control Function. ABUV0038, addressed.

ABUV0039, ABUV0040, ABUV0041, ABUV0042, ABUV0043, ABUV0044 or ABUV0045 OR ACFCV0043 and ACFCV0047 or ACFCV0044 and ACFCV0049 or ACFCV0045 and ACFCV0048 or ACFCV0046 and ACFCV0050

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Appendix 3 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 Page 25 of 58 Table A3 Control Room Fire MSO Evaluation Scenario Scenario Included Scenario Notes Control Room Fire Discussion ID Description Equipment Decay Heat Removal PWROG Inadvertent Spurious operation of Scenario may ABLV0007, See PWROG 24 for discussion about the MSIVs.

26 Steam main steam header cause RCS over- ABLV0008, Dumping drain valve(s) cooling. Also, the ABLV0009 Based on the above discussion, this MSO scenario is adequately overcooling can ABLV0010, addressed.

cause RCS ABLV0050, shrinkage, causing ABLV0051, low pressurizer ABLV0052 or level, and ABLV0053 challenging the RCS Inventory Control Function.

PWROG Turbine Spurious isolation of Scenario causes ABHV0005 Steam generator C (loop 3) supplies steam to the TDAFP 27 Driven AFW redundant steam turbine driven AFW and through valve ABHV0006. However, steam generator C is not Pump supply valves to pump inoperability, ABHV0006 provided with feedwater flow in OFN RP-017. Therefore, valve Inoperability turbine driven AFW which challenges ABHV0006 is closed in OFN RP-017 to prevent steam generator pump the Decay Heat C from boiling dry. Hand switch RPHIS0001 is operated in an Removal Function. earlier step to isolate ABHV0006 from the control room and insert redundant fuses in the control circuit. This action ensures ABHIS0006B will work to control the position of ABHV0006.

Steam generator B (loop 2) supplies steam to the TDAFP through valve ABHV0005. Procedure OFN RP-017 controls the position of ABHV0005 (open or closed) from the ASP using ABHIS0005B. Hand switch RPHIS0001 is operated in an earlier step to isolate ABHV0005 from the control room and insert redundant fuses in the control circuit. This action ensures ABHIS0005B will work to control the position of ABHV0005.

Based on the above discussion, this MSO scenario is adequately addressed.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Appendix 3 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 Page 26 of 58 Table A3 Control Room Fire MSO Evaluation Scenario Scenario Included Scenario Notes Control Room Fire Discussion ID Description Equipment Decay Heat Removal PWROG AFW Flow Spurious closure of Scenario isolates ALHV0005 OFN RP-017 lines up auxiliary feedwater to two steam 28 Isolation multiple valves in AFW flow to the (ALFT0001), generators. The TDAFP is lined up to supply steam generator B AFW pump discharge steam generator(s), ALHV0007 and the Train B MDAFP is lined up to supply steam generator D.

flow path(s) challenging the (ALFT0007), The remaining two steam generators are not required for Decay Heat ALHV0009 PFSSD.

Removal Function. (ALFT0009) and/or Valve ALHV0005 is opened to supply AFW from the B MDAFP ALHV0011 to steam generator D. This valve is controlled at the ASP by (ALFT0011) hand controller ALHK0005B. Hand switch ALHS0005 is placed in the LOCAL position to transfer control from the control room to OR the ASP. This also isolates the control room so that fire will not affect the operation of ALHK0005B.

ALHV0006, ALHV0008, Valve ALHV0010 is opened to supply AFW from the TDAFP to ALHV0010 steam generator B. This valve is controlled at the ASP by hand and/or controller ALHK0010B. Hand switch ALHS0010 is placed in the ALHV0012 LOCAL position to transfer control from the control room to the ASP. This also isolates the control room so that fire will not affect the operation of ALHK0010B.

The configuration ensures valves ALHV0005 and ALHV0010 will remain available when needed.

Based on the above discussion, this MSO scenario is adequately addressed.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Appendix 3 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 Page 27 of 58 Table A3 Control Room Fire MSO Evaluation Scenario Scenario Included Scenario Notes Control Room Fire Discussion ID Description Equipment Decay Heat Removal PWROG AFW Flow Spurious closure of Scenario isolates ABHV0005 See PWROG 27 for discussion about the steam supply to the 29 Isolation steam supply valve(s) AFW flow to the and TDAFP.

to turbine driven AFW steam generator(s) ABHV0006 pump, AND and causes turbine See PWROG 28 for discussion about AFW pump discharge flow driven AFW pump AND paths.

Spurious isolation of inoperability, AFW pump discharge challenging the ALHV0005 Based on the above discussion, this MSO scenario is adequately flow path(s) Decay Heat (ALFT0001), addressed.

Removal Function. ALHV0007 (ALFT0007),

ALHV0009 (ALFT0009) and/or ALHV0011 (ALFT0011)

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Appendix 3 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 Page 28 of 58 Table A3 Control Room Fire MSO Evaluation Scenario Scenario Included Scenario Notes Control Room Fire Discussion ID Description Equipment Decay Heat Removal PWROG AFW Flow Combination of Scenario causes ALHV0005 Procedure OFN RP-017 lines up the Train B motor driven 30 Diversion spurious valve AFW flow diversion (ALFT0001), auxiliary feedwater pump to steam generator D and the turbine operations in the to a non-credited ALHV0007 driven auxiliary feedwater pump (TDAFP) to steam generator B.

AFW pump discharge steam generator(s), (ALFT0007), The two motor driven AFW pumps are designed to feed only two flowpaths to the challenging the ALHV0009 steam generators. The TDAFP is designed to feed all four steam generators Decay Heat (ALFT0009) steam generators.

Removal Function. and/or A steam generator ALHV0011 Spurious opening of multiple discharge valves in the AFW may be "non- (ALFT0011) system could cause flow diversion to non-credited steam credited" by the generators. However, check valves are installed in the main SSA for a number OR feedwater line upstream of the auxiliary feedwater tap. The of reasons check valves ensure AFW flows to only the intended steam including ALHV0006, generator.

unavailability of ALHV0008, instrumentation, ALHV0010 Although AFW could be diverted to a non-credited steam inoperability of and/or generator, the credited steam generator will receive adequate steam dumps on ALHV0012 flow. Furthermore, OFN RP-017 has steps to close several that loop, etc. manual valves in the AFW discharge flowpath to stop flow to non-credited steam generators to prevent overfill.

Based on the above discussion, this MSO scenario is adequately addressed.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Appendix 3 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 Page 29 of 58 Table A3 Control Room Fire MSO Evaluation Scenario Scenario Included Scenario Notes Control Room Fire Discussion ID Description Equipment Decay Heat Removal PWROG AFW Pump Spurious full opening Scenario may ALHV0005 Each AFW discharge flowpath has a flow orifice installed. Based 31 Run Out of multiple AFW flow cause AFW pump (ALFT0001), on the Auxiliary Feedwater system description (M-01AL), each control and/or runout and ALHV0007 flow orifice is designed to limit flow to any single steam generator isolation valves inoperability, (ALFT0007), in the event of a main feedwater line break to ensure adequate challenging the ALHV0009 auxiliary feedwater flow to the intact steam generator. Similarly, Decay Heat (ALFT0009) the flow orifices would prevent pump runout in the event of Removal Function. and/or multiple failed open discharge control valves.

ALHV0011 Note that this (ALFT0011) Based on the above discussion, this MSO scenario is adequately scenario may occur addressed.

even without OR spurious operations if the fail-safe ALHV0006, position of relevant ALHV0008, valves is full open. ALHV0010 and/or ALHV0012 PWROG CST Spurious opening of Scenario causes ADLV0079BA Based on drawing M-109-00010, the CST tap for the condenser 32 Diversion to valves between the inadvertent draining or makeup is 20-6 above the bottom of the tank and the tap for Condenser Condensate Storage of CST inventory to ADLV0079BB the AFW supply is 12 inches above the bottom of the tank.

Tank (CST) and the condenser. Therefore, if ADLV0079BA and/or ADLV0079BB were to condenser hotwell This CST inventory spuriously open, there would be approximately 216,720 gallons becomes remaining in the CST for AFW based on tank document WCRE-unavailable as an 03. Therefore, spurious opening of these valves will not affect AFW source, PFSSD.

challenging the Decay Heat Procedure OFN RP-017 has steps to line up ESW to the Removal Function. auxiliary feedwater pumps if the CST level is less than 14%.

Level indication at the ASP is not protected from a control room Other CST fire but local indication is available. See Appendix 1, Table A1, draindown paths APLI0004B evaluation. In the unlikely event the CST drains by may exist. P&ID other drain paths as a result of a fire in the control room, the review required. auxiliary feedwater system will remain available. Based on the above discussion, this MSO scenario is adequately addressed.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Appendix 3 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 Page 30 of 58 Table A3 Control Room Fire MSO Evaluation Scenario Scenario Included Scenario Notes Control Room Fire Discussion ID Description Equipment Decay Heat Removal PWROG Excess Feed Scenario can occur Scenario causes Same as Evaluation SA-08-006, Rev. 3 investigates various scenarios that 33 Flow to due to various RCS over-cooling PWROG 27 could result in steam generator overfilling. One of the Steam combinations of and/or steam and 30 assumptions used in developing some of the scenarios in SA Generator spurious AFW pump generator overfill, 006, Rev. 2 was that the MSIVs close in response to a control starts, spurious both challenging Plus room action. This assumption was determined to be wrong opening (or failure to the Decay Heat during the 2011 NRC Triennial Fire Protection Inspection.

close) of valves in Removal Function. PAL01A, Therefore, all scenarios in SA-08-006 assume the MSIVs remain AFW pump discharge RCS over-cooling PAL01B or open until action is taken outside the control room to close them.

flowpaths, and can cause RCS PAL02 With the MSIVs open, the main feedwater pumps continue to spurious opening of shrinkage and low operate and pump water into the steam generators after the MFW isolation valves PZR level. Steam OR reactor is tripped from the control room. This causes the steam with MFW pump(s) generator overfill generators to overfill in some scenarios prior to operators closing running. can affect PAE01A or the MSIVs and MFIVs from outside the control room.

operability of PAE01B fail to turbine-driven AFW trip An evaluation was performed to determine if the feedwater pump. isolation signal (FWIS) would be affected by a control room fire.

OR It was determined that a credible fire in the control room would Note that the not affect both trains of FWIS and that a FWIS would occur on a spurious pump PAE02 reactor trip with low Tavg. Since automatic functions are not starting can occur spuriously allowed to be credited for control room fires, a license for several reasons, starts and amendment request has been prepared to have this deviation including fire AEHV0102 approved. The LAR was submitted to the NRC on 11/21/2013.

damage to control and License Amendment 214 was approved 9/11/15 to allow credit circuitry or a AEHV0103 for automatic FWIS on reactor trip with low Tavg.

spurious ESFAS spuriously signal. open Based on the results of this evaluation and the actions taken by operators, the steam generators will not overfill. Refer to AND Evaluation SA-08-006 for a detailed discussion of the scenarios and results.

AEFCV0510 or AEFCV0550 Based on the above discussion, this MSO scenario is adequately and AEFV0039 addressed.

or AEFCV0520 or AEFCV0560

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Appendix 3 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 Page 31 of 58 Table A3 Control Room Fire MSO Evaluation Scenario Scenario Included Scenario Notes Control Room Fire Discussion ID Description Equipment Decay Heat Removal and AEFV0040 or AEFCV0530 or AEFCV0570 and AEFV0041 or AEFCV0540 or AEFCV0580 and AEFV0042 PWROG Steam Spurious opening of, Scenario causes BMHV0001, Calculation SA-08-006, Rev. 2 (previous revision) evaluated the 34 Generator or failure to close, drain down of BMHV0002, thermal hydraulic impact of all four steam generator blowdown Blowdown multiple series steam steam generator BMHV0003 or valves failing open and remaining open. The calculation shows generator blowdown inventory through BMHV0004 that the blowdown valves can fail open for 60 minutes with no valves the blowdown adverse consequences. Calculation SA-08-006, Rev. 3 (current system, challenging revision) assumes all four blowdown valves remain closed.

the Decay Heat Calculation WCNOC-CP-002 assumes all four blowdown valves Removal Function. open for the modeled duration of 5.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> in some scenarios.

There was no adverse impact on PFSSD identified with all four Scenario may blowdown valves open for this duration.

screen if available AFW mass flow OFN RP-017 removes power from the blowdown valves to fail rate exceeds steam them closed within 60 minutes. Per SA-08-006, Rev. 2 and the generator inventory current revision of WCNOC-CP-002, this will not adversely mass loss rate impact PFSSD.

through blowdown.

Based on the above discussion, this MSO scenario is adequately addressed.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Appendix 3 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 Page 32 of 58 Table A3 Control Room Fire MSO Evaluation Scenario Scenario Included Scenario Notes Control Room Fire Discussion ID Description Equipment Decay Heat Removal PWROG Secondary Spurious opening of Scenario causes N/A The sample lines are isolated by a normally closed manual 35 Sample steam generator drain down of isolation valve downstream of the sample coolers. Therefore, System sample valve(s) steam generator this scenario is not applicable.

inside containment, inventory through AND the sample system, Based on the above discussion, this MSO scenario is adequately challenging the addressed.

Spurious opening of Decay Heat isolation valve(s) Removal Function.

outside containment, AND Spurious opening of downstream sample valve(s)

Expert AFW Flow 1/2 MDAFW Pumps Scenario results in PAL01A or The feedwater check valves were moved to a location upstream Panel 8 Diversion Fails to Start loss of decay heat PAL01B of the AFW tap in DCP 12792. Therefore, AFW flow cannot removal capability divert to another steam generator.

AND due to flow AND imbalances created Based on the above discussion, this MSO scenario is adequately MFW Isolation Fails by attempting to AEFV0039, addressed.

feed all 4 SGs with AEFV0040, a single MDAFW AEFV0042 or Pump. AEFV0042 AND AEFCV0510 or AEFCV550, AEFCV0520 or AEFCV0560, AEFCV0530 or AEFCV0570, AEFCV0540 or AEFCV0580

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Appendix 3 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 Page 33 of 58 Table A3 Control Room Fire MSO Evaluation Scenario Scenario Included Scenario Notes Control Room Fire Discussion ID Description Equipment RCS Pressure Control PWROG RCS Spurious opening of Scenario causes a PBB01A AND Auxiliary pressurizer spray is prevented in OFN RP-017 by 36 Pressure pressurizer spray RCS pressure BBPCV0455B opening switch PK5117. This action is performed within 7 Decrease valve(s), AND transient, minutes after the reactor is tripped.

challenging the OR Inability to trip, or RCS Pressure Normal pressurizer spray is stopped when operators trip the spurious operation of, Control Function. PBB01B AND RCPs within 7 minutes after the reactor trip. The RCPs are RCP, AND Typical PFSS BBPCV0455C stopped by locally tripping the breaker, so inability to trip is not a analyses address concern for a control room fire. Control power is removed from Inoperability of PZR this issue; PRAs OR the RCP switchgear to prevent spurious re-start.

Heater(s) often consider scenario negligible PBG04, Backup group B heaters are protected from a control room fire since there is no PBG05A, or and can be operated by an operator at the ASP. The remaining real threat of core PBG05B AND heater groups could be affected.

uncovery. BGHV8145 Evaluation SA-08-006 and Calculation WCNOC-CP-002 model AND various combinations of pressurizer heaters and pressurizer spray spurious operation/mal-operation. The results show that Pressurizer PFSSD is assured with any combination of spray/heater spurious Heater Backup operation/maloperation. Therefore, the various potential Groups A and scenarios discussed in this MSO are bounded.

B and Variable Group C Off Based on the above discussion, this MSO scenario is adequately addressed.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Appendix 3 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 Page 34 of 58 Table A3 Control Room Fire MSO Evaluation Scenario Scenario Included Scenario Notes Control Room Fire Discussion ID Description Equipment RCS Pressure Control PWROG RCS Spurious operation of Scenario causes a Same as Procedure OFN RP-017 fails the pressurizer PORVs closed and 37 Pressure multiple PZR heaters, RCS pressure PWROG 36 isolates auxiliary pressurizer spray. The procedure also trips the Increase AND transient, RCPs, causing a loss of pressurizer spray. Pressure is challenging the Plus controlled by reducing temperature using two steam generator Inoperability of RCS Pressure ARVs and auxiliary feedwater. Evaluation SA-08-006 shows that pressurizer spray or Control Function. BBPCV0455A a pressure transient will not occur if procedure OFN RP-017 is auxiliary spray, AND RCS pressure and/or followed.

increase could BBPCV0456A Failure to open cause PORV(s) fail to open Backup group B heaters are protected from a control room fire pressurizer PORVs and/or safety and can be operated by an operator at the ASP. The remaining valve(s) to open. heater groups could be affected. Calculation WCNOC-CP-002 evaluates the impact of multiple heaters spuriously operating and shows there is no adverse impact on PFSSD if this occurs. At worse, the pressurizer safeties will lift to relieve pressure.

Based on the above discussion, this MSO scenario is adequately addressed.

Expert RCS Spurious operation of Scenario causes an BBPC0455A A spurious SI actuation could occur in the event of a control Panel 9 Pressure pressurizer pressure RCS pressure (BBPT0455) room fire. Evaluation SA-08-006 models the effects of a Decrease master controller transient resulting spurious SI signal. Procedure OFN RP-017 has necessary steps in spurious SI to maintain RCS pressure and temperature within required limits.

actuation.

Based on the above discussion, this MSO scenario is adequately addressed.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Appendix 3 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 Page 35 of 58 Table A3 Control Room Fire MSO Evaluation Scenario Scenario Included Scenario Notes Control Room Fire Discussion ID Description Equipment Reactivity Control PWROG Inadvertent Unborated water Scenario BGFCV0111A The reactor makeup pumps supply unborated water to the 38 Boron Dilution supply to the RCS decreases RCS and VCT upstream of the VCT outlet valves. Procedure OFN can occur due to boron BGFCV0110B or RP-017 closes one of the two VCT outlet valves combinations of the concentration, BGFCV0111B (BGLCV0112C). Therefore, unborated water will not reach following: potentially causing the RCS per this scenario when OFN RP-017 is reactivity increase, WITH implemented.

-Spurious start of and challenging the reactor makeup Reactivity Control PBL01A or Based on the above discussion, this MSO scenario is pump(s) Function. PBL01B adequately addressed.

(supplies unborated water to OR the VCT),

BGFCV0110A

-Spurious opening fails closed during of valves between auto makeup reactor makeup pump(s) and VCT,

-Spurious full opening of the reactor makeup flow control valve,

-Spurious closure of the boric acid flow control valve

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Appendix 3 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 Page 36 of 58 Table A3 Control Room Fire MSO Evaluation Scenario Scenario Included Scenario Notes Control Room Fire Discussion ID Description Equipment Reactivity Control PWROG Fire Prevents Fire damage to RPS Scenario results in SB102A and Document E-1F9915, Table 7.1, Step 2 provides an 39 Reactor Trip may prevent reactor insufficient SB102B evaluation that shows the reactor will trip when operators trip. For example, shutdown margin depress the reactor trip push buttons in the control room in hot shorts may and potential need AND the event of a fire in the control room. The presence of prevent tripping of for emergency physical separation, smoke detection and constant RPS MG sets. boration. PG01902 OR attendance in the control room provides reasonable PG02002 and assurance that one of the reactor trip buttons will effectively Note that this PA0207 Fail to trip the reactor.

review may have Open already been Based on the above discussion, this MSO scenario is performed for the AND adequately addressed.

disposition of Information Notice Failure of Manual 2007-07. Rod Insertion (SFHS0002)

AND Failure of Emergency Boration (PBG04, PBG05A, PBG05B, PBG02A, PBG02B, and BGHV8104)

Expert Malfunction of Spurious operation Scenario could AEFC0510 For a control room fire, automatic functions are assumed to Panel 10 SGLCS of SG Water Level cause reactor trip (AELC0519), be defeated. Therefore, credit cannot be given to the steam control resulting in due to positive AEFC0520 generator level control system. See the response to overfeed of SG reactivity insertion. (AELC0529), scenario PWROG 33 for discussion about overfilling the AEFC0530 steam generators.

(AELC0539), and AEFC0540 Based on the above discussion, this MSO scenario is (AELC0549) adequately addressed.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Appendix 3 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 Page 37 of 58 Table A3 Control Room Fire MSO Evaluation Scenario Scenario Included Scenario Notes Control Room Fire Discussion ID Description Equipment Support Functions PWROG CCW Header CCW flow can be Scenarios cause EGHV0053 and OFN RP-017 lines up Train B CCW by opening EGHV0016 40 Isolation isolated via several failure of CCW EGHV0054 and EGHV0054 and closing EGHV0015. All three valves combinations of function to provide were modified to address NRC IN 92-18 concerns. Valves spurious valve cooling to safe OR EGHV0016 and EGHV0054 are opened using a hand switch closures. shutdown loads. at the MCC. Valve EGHV0015 is manually closed by local EGHV0015 and operator action.

Pertinent valves EGHV0016 include: Other valves are manually operated and are maintained in

-pump discharge the correct position. Therefore, these valves can not valves, spuriously operate.

-pump crosstie valves, Based on the above discussion, this MSO scenario is

-CCW heat adequately addressed.

exchanger inlet valves,

-CCW heat exchanger outlet valves,

-CCW heat exchanger crosstie valves,

-Etc.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Appendix 3 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 Page 38 of 58 Table A3 Control Room Fire MSO Evaluation Scenario Scenario Included Scenario Notes Control Room Fire Discussion ID Description Equipment Support Functions PWROG CCW to Spurious isolation of Scenario isolates Loss of CCW to For PFSSD following a control room fire, Train B CCW is 41 Redundant CCW cooling to CCW cooling to redundant RHR required to provide cooling for the B RHR heat exchanger, B Loads redundant loads redundant loads Heat Exchangers: CCP oil cooler, B RHR pump seal cooler and seal water heat (including lube oil causing safe exchanger. Valve EGHV0102 is manually opened in OFN coolers, RHR heat shutdown EGHV0101 AND RP-017A to provide a flow path from the B CCW heat exchangers, etc.) equipment EGHV0102 exchanger to the B RHR heat exchanger when entering inoperability of shutdown cooling mode. The valve was modified to address redundant Trains. NRC IN 92-18 so it will be available when needed. Valve EGHV0054 is opened in OFN RP-017 to provide B CCW All credited CCW flow to the seal water heat exchanger as discussed in loads should be scenario PWROG 40. The remaining flow paths have reviewed. normally open manual valves that are not subject to spurious operation due to a control room fire.

Based on the above discussion, this MSO scenario is adequately addressed.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Appendix 3 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 Page 39 of 58 Table A3 Control Room Fire MSO Evaluation Scenario Scenario Included Scenario Notes Control Room Fire Discussion ID Description Equipment Support Functions PWROG CCW Flow Flow diversion can Scenario causes Potential failure to OFN RP-017 closes EGHV0070A and EGHV0070B by opening 42 Diversion to occur via several CCW flow to be close of non- switch NK4413. However, as discussed in Appendix 1 of Non-Credited combinations of diverted to the non- safety loop Calculation XX-E-013 closure of these valves is not required for PFSSD.

Loop spurious valve credited loop. This isolation operations in the ultimately prevents Under normal operation, the CCW system supplies approximately CCW pump CCW cooling of EGHV0069A, 4,000 gpm to the SFP heat exchanger. The RHR heat exchanger is discharge and CCW credited safe EGHV0069B, not normally supplied with CCW during normal operation. The loop crosstie shutdown loads. EGHV0070A accident flow to the RHR heat exchanger is approximately 7,600 flowpaths. Review and/or gpm per M-11EG01. For hot standby following a control room fire, P&IDs to identify EGHV0070B the B RHR system is not used. The B RHR system is placed in relevant service for shutdown cooling, at which time the SFP heat exchanger can be isolated using a manual valve. Therefore, the 4,000 gpm combinations. Spurious opening flow through the SFP heat exchanger will not adversely affect CCW of SFP HX supply flow to the credited PFSSD components.

ECHV0011 or In the event valve EGHV0102 spuriously opens and allows CCW ECHV0012 flow to the RHR heat exchanger sufficient flow may not be available to the PFSSD loads (CCP oil cooler and seal water heat exchanger). Per drawings M-11EG01 and M-11EG02 the total CCW flow with valve EGHV0102 open is approximately 14,000 gpm. Each CCW pump is rated at 11,025 gpm at 195 feet of head. Per drawing M-082-029, the discharge head at 14,000 gpm is 155 feet and the required net positive suction head (NPSH) is 31 feet. Minimum available NPSH for normal shutdown occurs at 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> per Calculation M-EG-05 and is equal to 37.5 feet. Therefore, with 14,000 gpm flowing, sufficient NPSH is available and there is reasonable assurance that the Train B CCP oil cooler and seal water heat exchanger will receive sufficient flow. However, as a precaution, EGHV0102 is closed in OFN RP-017 to prevent flow diversion during long term hot standby. This action is required to be completed within 28 minutes and prior to starting the B Train CCP to support CCP functionality.

Based on the above discussion, this MSO scenario is adequately addressed.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Appendix 3 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 Page 40 of 58 Table A3 Control Room Fire MSO Evaluation Scenario Scenario Included Scenario Notes Control Room Fire Discussion ID Description Equipment Support Functions PWROG ESW Header ESW flow to Scenario causes EFHV0037, The Train B ESW system is credited for a control room fire.

43 Isolation credited loads can isolation of ESW, EFHV0039 and Valve EFHV0038 is opened in OFN RP-017 by placing hand be isolated via which can fail EFHV0041 switch EFHS0038A in the ISO/OPEN position. The valve several cooling to the CCW was modified to address NRC IN 92-18 concerns.

combinations of system and other OR Therefore, valve EFHV0038 is protected from a control room spurious valve safe shutdown fire.

closures. components EFHV0038, directly cooled by EFHV0040 and Valves EFHV0040 and EFHV0042 are service water return Pertinent valves ESW (e.g., EDG EFHV0042 valves from Train B ESW. The valves close on SIS or LOSP include: cooling). to ensure 100% of the ESW flow returns to the UHS during

-pump discharge accident conditions. For PFSSD these valves can fail in any valves, position with no adverse impact because flow will be

-pump crosstie maintained through EFHV0038.

valves,

-ESW heat Based on the above discussion, this MSO scenario is exchanger inlet adequately addressed.

valves,

-ESW heat exchanger outlet valves,

-ESW heat exchanger crosstie valves,

-Etc.

Review P&IDs to identify relevant combinations.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Appendix 3 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 Page 41 of 58 Table A3 Control Room Fire MSO Evaluation Scenario Scenario Included Scenario Notes Control Room Fire Discussion ID Description Equipment Support Functions PWROG ESW to Spurious isolation of Scenario isolates Component Procedure OFN RP-017 lines up Train B ESW to all required 44 Redundant ESW cooling to ESW cooling to Cooling Water: PFSSD loads. Most of the Train B motor operated valves Loads redundant loads redundant loads have been modified to address NRC IN 92-18 concerns.

(including CCW heat causing safe EFHV0051 or Also, the valves are opened or closed using an isolation exchangers, EDG shutdown EFHV0059 switch at the MCC.

cooling, etc.) equipment inoperability of AND Train B valves included in these modifications are:

redundant Trains.

EFHV0052 or EFHV0032 All credited ESW EFHV0060 EFHV0034 loads should be EFHV0046 reviewed. Instrument Air: EFHV0050 EFHV0052 EFHV0043 AND EFHV0060 EFHV0044 Instrument air is not credited for PFSSD. Therefore, valves Containment EFHV0043 and EFHV0044 are not included in OFN RP-017.

Coolers: See PWROG 45 for discussion of flow diversion if these valves fail open.

EFHV0031, EFHV0032, Based on the above discussion, this MSO scenario is EFHV0033, adequately addressed.

EFHV0034, EFHV0045, EFHV0046, EFHV0049 and/or EFHV0050

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Appendix 3 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 Page 42 of 58 Table A3 Control Room Fire MSO Evaluation Scenario Scenario Included Scenario Notes Control Room Fire Discussion ID Description Equipment Support Functions PWROG ESW Flow Flow diversion can Scenario causes SW Isolation Train B ESW is credited for a control room fire. Valve 45 Diversion to occur via several ESW flow to be Failure: EFHV0026 is isolated in OFN RP-017 by placing Non-Credited combinations of diverted to a non- EFHS0026A in the ISO/CLOSE position. The hand switch Loops/System spurious valve credited loop or EFHV0023 and isolates the control room, inserts a redundant fuse in the s operations in the system. This EFHV0025 secondary side of the CPT and closes the valve. Also, this ESW pump ultimately prevents valve has been modified to address NRC IN 92-18. These discharge and loop ESW cooling of OR modifications ensure the valve will close and remain closed crosstie flowpaths. credited loads. for the duration of the event.

Review P&IDs to EFHV0024 and identify relevant EFHV0026 See PWROG 44 for discussion about EFHV0052 and combinations. EFHV0060.

CCW HX Supply Full Open: Instrument air is not credited for a control room fire, so valves EFHV0043 and EFHV0044 are not included in OFN EFHV0051, RP-017. If these valves remain in the open position, flow will EFHV0052, be diverted to the air compressor and after cooler. Since EFHV0059 or Train A is not used for control room fire, opening of EFHV0060 EFHV0043 will have no adverse impact on PFSSD. If valve EFHV0044 remains open, there is no adverse impact Instrument Air: because the ESW system is designed to supply the required PFSSD loads concurrent with the air compressor and after EFHV0043 AND cooler. Valve EFHV0044 does not automatically close on a EFHV0044 SIS or LOSP, which indicates that ESW flow to the air compressor and after cooler will not affect safe shutdown.

Based on the above discussion, this MSO scenario is adequately addressed.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Appendix 3 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 Page 43 of 58 Table A3 Control Room Fire MSO Evaluation Scenario Scenario Included Scenario Notes Control Room Fire Discussion ID Description Equipment Support Functions PWROG Emergency Additional Scenario causes All large loads The B EDG is credited for a control room fire. Procedure 46 Power components load diesel generator OFN RP-017 identifies the steps to start the EDG in the onto credited diesel overloading and event of a fire in the control room. The procedure first sheds generator inoperability. Note: all large electrical loads from the NB02 bus before starting Scenario very site the EDG. Then, each required load is added in sequence specific. Interlocks with sufficient time between starts to allow the EDG to come may prevent this up to speed prior to adding the next load. Control power is from occurring. removed from the NB02 bus to prevent inadvertent loading of the bus.

Based on the above discussion, this MSO scenario is adequately addressed.

PWROG Emergency Diesel generator Scenario causes NF039A and If a fire occurs in the NF039 cabinets and load sequencing is 47 Power overloading diesel generator NF039B bypassed such that multiple components are loaded overloading and simultaneously, the EDG would continue to operate. There inoperability. Note: are no trip signals that would cause the EDG to trip if this Scenario very site occurs. If the EDG started in emergency mode, the output specific. Interlocks breaker would remain closed because the trip circuits are may prevent this bypassed in emergency mode. Overloading would drop the from occurring. output voltage of the EDG and the current to the individual loads would increase, which could trip the breakers for the In addition to individual loads. However, the EDG and output breaker Scenario 46, would be unaffected.

overloading may also occur if proper OFN RP-017 opens most of the NB02 breakers and load sequencing is manually sequences the loads to the bus after the EDG is bypassed via hot started. The B EDG would remain available to support shorts, causing PFSSD.

simultaneous loading of multiple Based on the above discussion, this MSO scenario is components onto adequately addressed.

the EDG.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Appendix 3 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 Page 44 of 58 Table A3 Control Room Fire MSO Evaluation Scenario Scenario Included Scenario Notes Control Room Fire Discussion ID Description Equipment Support Functions PWROG Emergency Diesel generator The fire causes the KKJ01A and Essential Service Water (ESW) is established in OFN RP-48 Power spuriously starts startup of the PEF01A 017 within the time limits of KJ-M-017 Table 1 (included in without service Emergency Diesel Section 6.5 of E-1F9915) after the EDG is manually started water cooling. Generator and OR to prevent a high temperature trip. Spurious EDG start and spurious isolation ESW affected by fire is an MSO before control is transferred of ESW cooling KKJ01B and to the auxiliary shutdown panel. Only a single spurious (See Scenarios 42 PEF01B operation is assumed before control is transferred to the

& 44). Running the auxiliary shutdown panel.

Emergency Diesel Generator with a Based on the above discussion, this MSO scenario is loss of cooling adequately addressed.

water could trip and/or damage the diesel on high temperature.

PWROG Emergency Non-synchronous Scenario causes NB0109, NB0111 Breaker NB0211 is the Train B EDG output breaker. Under 49 Power paralleling of EDG damage to diesel and NB0112 normal conditions, interlocks prevent this breaker from with on-site and off- generator by closing when NB0209 or NB0212 are closed. This prevents site sources through closing into a live Or non-synchronous paralleling of the EDG to the grid.

spurious breaker bus out-of-phase.

operations Note: Scenario NB0209, NB0211 Non-synchronous paralleling concern was addressed in DCP very site specific. and NB0212 13513. The DCP modified the NB0211 control circuit to Interlocks may prevent a control room fire from closing NB0211 prevent this from prematurely.

occurring.

Based on the above discussion, this MSO scenario has been addressed for a control room fire.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Appendix 3 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 Page 45 of 58 Table A3 Control Room Fire MSO Evaluation Scenario Scenario Included Scenario Notes Control Room Fire Discussion ID Description Equipment Support Functions Expert Loss of CCW Spurious operation Scenario could EGTV0029 AND Procedure OFN RP-017 lines up Train B CCW to provide Panel 11 Cooling of CCW result in loss of EGTV0030 cooling for credited Train B components. Valve EGTV0030 Temperature Control RCP Thermal is the temperature control valve for Train B CCW heat Valve could divert Barrier Cooling, exchanger. Power to EGTV0030 is disconnected in OFN flow around HX loss of RHR RP-017 by opening switch NK4413. This fails EGTV0030 resulting in loss of cooling capability, closed and prevents CCW from bypassing the heat cooling. and loss of exchanger, which would prevent adequate cooling of additional credited PFSSD loads.

equipment dependent on Based on the above discussion, this MSO scenario is CCW. adequately addressed.

Expert Loss of Control Spurious trip of both Scenario could SGK04A AND A fire in the control room would result in evacuation.

Panel 12 Room HVAC Trains or isolation of result in spurious SGK04B Therefore, control room ventilation is not required for a cooling to both operation of control room fire. Loss of SGK04A and SGK04B would not Trains. various instrument adversely affect the ability to achieve safe shutdown from loops due to outside the control room.

overheating of instrument Based on the above discussion, this MSO scenario is cabinets. adequately addressed.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Appendix 3 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 Page 46 of 58 Table A3 Control Room Fire MSO Evaluation Scenario Scenario Included ID Scenario Description Notes Equipment Control Room Fire Discussion Other PWROG Generic - Loss Spurious isolation of Suction flow paths SI Pumps: All suction flow paths to credited pumps have been analyzed 50 of Pump various valves in for all credited and measures have been taken to protect these flow paths Suction pump suction flow pumps should be EMHV8923A, and from spurious operation in the event of a control room fire.

path reviewed for MSO EMHV8807A and These measures include providing control room isolation, scenarios causing EMHV8807B, or redundant fusing and circuit modifications to address NRC IN loss of suction and EMHV8924, or 92-18 where applicable.

pump inoperability. EJHV8804A An example of a Procedure OFN RP-017 lines up the suction flow paths to pump suction MSO AND ensure adequate suction is available to all the pumps credited was previously for PFSSD following a control room fire. One of the first steps identified in which EMHV8923B and in OFN RP-017 is to open the breakers associated with these both the VCT EJHV8804B pumps. Then, steps are taken to establish suction and outlets valve(s) discharge flow paths prior to energizing the pump motors.

and RWST outlet Charging Pumps: These steps provide reasonable assurance that the pumps will valve(s) spuriously not operate without suction and discharge flow paths.

close. See PWROG 10 Based on the above discussion, this MSO scenario is Another example AFW Pumps: adequately addressed.

involves pump suction cross- LSP, and connect valves.

Three pumps may ALHV0030, be supplied from a ALHV0031, common suction ALHV0032, header that and/or includes several ALHV0033 cross-connect valves. If two OR valves spuriously isolate, the pump LSP, and drawing suction from the common ESW Unavailable header between the two isolated

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Appendix 3 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 Page 47 of 58 Table A3 Control Room Fire MSO Evaluation Scenario Scenario Included ID Scenario Description Notes Equipment Control Room Fire Discussion Other valves can lose suction and become inoperable.

The spurious operation of idle pumps after suction has been spuriously isolated should also be considered.

Spurious pump starting can occur for several reasons, including fire damage to control circuitry or a spurious ESAFAS signal.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Appendix 3 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 Page 48 of 58 Table A3 Control Room Fire MSO Evaluation Scenario Scenario Included ID Scenario Description Notes Equipment Control Room Fire Discussion Other PWROG Generic - Spurious isolation of Scenario causes RHR Pumps: All discharge flow paths from credited pumps have been 51 Pump Shutoff pump discharge pump operation at analyzed and measures have been taken to protect these flow Head flow, AND shutoff head and Spurious SIS or paths from spurious operation in the event of a control room subsequent Spurious start of fire. These measures include providing control room isolation, Spurious isolation of inoperability. All pumps redundant fusing and circuit modifications to address NRC IN recirculation credited pumps 92-18 where applicable.

valve(s) should be AND reviewed for this Procedure OFN RP-017 lines up the discharge flow paths to scenario. EJFCV0610 or ensure adequate flow is available from all the pumps credited EJFCV0611 for PFSSD following a control room fire. One of the first steps Note that spurious in OFN RP-017 is to open the breakers associated with these starting of idle pumps. Then, steps are taken to establish suction and pump(s), in discharge flow paths prior to energizing the pump motors.

combination with These steps provide reasonable assurance that the pumps will isolation of not operate without suction and discharge flow paths.

discharge flow and recirculation, may Based on the above discussion, this MSO scenario is cause inoperability adequately addressed.

of additional pumps. Spurious pump starting can occur for several reasons, including fire damage to control circuitry or a spurious ESAFAS signal.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Appendix 3 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 Page 49 of 58 Table A3 Control Room Fire MSO Evaluation Scenario Scenario Included ID Scenario Description Notes Equipment Control Room Fire Discussion Other PWROG Generic - Pump damage from Scenario causes All credited Procedure OFN RP-017 lines up each credited pump to 52 Pump Outside operation outside pump failure. pumps. ensure the pumps are not run dead headed or at run-out Design Flow design flow either at conditions. This is done by first de-energizing all credited shutoff head or Operation at pumps then making the required valve lineups. Once this is pump run-out shutoff head can done, the pumps are started. In some cases, dedicated conditions. occur, for example, operators are staged at valves to throttle the flow as directed if pump discharge by the operator at the ASP. These steps prevent operation of flow spuriously the pumps outside of their design conditions.

isolates with the recirculation valves Based on the above discussion, this MSO scenario is closed. Run-out adequately addressed.

can occur, for example, if the discharge header is at reduced pressure conditions.

Note that spurious starting of idle pump(s), in combination with isolation of discharge flow and recirculation, may cause failure of additional pumps.

Spurious pump starting can occur for several reasons, including fire damage to control circuitry or an inadvertent ESFAS signal.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Appendix 3 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 Page 50 of 58 Table A3 Control Room Fire MSO Evaluation Scenario Scenario Included ID Scenario Description Notes Equipment Control Room Fire Discussion Other PWROG Generic - Spurious operation All credited flow Various Procedure OFN RP-017 lines up Train B valves to prevent flow 53 Flow Diversion of various valves paths should be diversion. All potential flow diversion paths were reviewed to causing flow reviewed for MSO ensure appropriate actions are taken to prevent flow diversion.

diversion. scenarios that can Valves in the paths are either manually closed or closed by divert flow away use of a hand switch. All valves that are closed electrically from desired have been modified to ensure a control room fire will not affect location. the ability to close the valve.

Based on the above discussion, this MSO scenario is adequately addressed.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Appendix 3 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 Page 51 of 58 Table A3 Control Room Fire MSO Evaluation Scenario Scenario Included ID Scenario Description Notes Equipment Control Room Fire Discussion Other Expert Generic - Spurious isolation of Discharge flow SI Pumps: See PWROG 51 for discussion of pump discharge flow path Panel 13 Pump various valves in paths for all isolation.

Discharge pump discharge credited pumps EMHV8821A and Flow Path flow path should be EMHV8802A fails Based on the above discussion, this MSO scenario is Isolation reviewed for MSO to open adequately addressed.

scenarios that isolate those flow AND paths. One example is EMHV8821B and spurious isolation EMHV8802B fails of two parallel to open charging injection valves.

Another example involves pump discharge cross-connect valves.

For example, three pumps may feed a common discharge header that includes several cross-connect valves. If two valves spuriously isolate, pump flow feeding the common header between the two isolated valves will isolate.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Appendix 3 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 Page 52 of 58 Table A3 Control Room Fire MSO Evaluation Scenario Scenario Included ID Scenario Description Notes Equipment Control Room Fire Discussion Other PWROG Loss of HVAC Spurious isolation of Perform review to ESW: Procedure OFN RP-017 lines up HVAC to Train B rooms 54 HVAC to credited identify spurious containing credited PFSSD equipment. This includes Class loads failures that could GDTZ0001A AND 1E electrical equipment rooms, electrical penetration rooms, cause isolation of GDTZ0001C pump rooms, containment and Train B diesel generator room.

HVAC to credited Modifications have been made to ensure a control room fire loads. Credited OR will not affect the ability to provide HVAC to these rooms.

loads may include pump rooms, GDTZ0011A AND Based on the above discussion, this MSO scenario is switchgear rooms, GDTZ0011C adequately addressed.

and rooms containing solid Diesels:

state control systems. GMTZ0001A Examples of AND GMHZ0009 spurious failures include spurious OR damper isolation and spurious GMTZ0011A isolation of cooling AND GMHZ0019 flow to chillers.

PWROG Valve Spurious motor- General scenario All credited motor All credited motor operated valves (MOVs) used to shut down 55 Inoperability operated valve is that fire damage operated valves following a control room fire have been modified to address operation, AND to motor-operated NRC IN 92-18.

valve circuitry Wire-to-wire causes spurious Based on the above discussion, this MSO scenario is short(s) bypass operation. If the adequately addressed.

torque and limit same fire causes switches wire-to-wire short(s) such that the valve torque and limit switches are bypassed, then the valve motor may stall at the end of the valve

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Appendix 3 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 Page 53 of 58 Table A3 Control Room Fire MSO Evaluation Scenario Scenario Included ID Scenario Description Notes Equipment Control Room Fire Discussion Other cycle. This can cause excess current in the valve motor windings as well as valve mechanical damage. This mechanical damage may be sufficient to prevent manual operation of the valve.

Scenario only applies to motor-operated valves.

Note that this generic issue may have already been addressed during disposition of NRC Information Notice 92-18. This disposition should be reviewed in the context of multiple spurious operations and multiple hot shorts.

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Appendix 3 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 Page 54 of 58 Table A3 Control Room Fire MSO Evaluation Scenario Scenario Included ID Scenario Description Notes Equipment Control Room Fire Discussion Other PWROG Fire-Induced Fire-induced spurious ESFAS signals 2/4 Low Spurious ESFAS requires at least two spurious signals, which 56 Spurious (e.g., safety injection, containment Pressurizer is not required to be postulated as an initial condition for ESFAS isolation, etc), combined with other fire- Pressure: control room fires. A spurious ESFAS occurring after control induced failures, can adversely affect safe room isolation is achieved will not affect the ability to maintain shutdown capability. An example of a fire- BBPT0455, the reactor in a safe shutdown condition because all required induced ESFAS signal is a fire causing BBPT0456, Train B equipment is manually aligned per OFN RP-017.

open circuits on 2/3 main steam pressure BBPT0457, and Certain Train A equipment that could cause adverse effects is instruments on one loop resulting in a BBPT0458 also secured in OFN RP-017 to prevent inadvertent operation.

spurious safety injection signal. ESFAS Therefore, a spurious ESFAS will not affect the ability to signals can result from open circuits, Low Steamline achieve and maintain safe shutdown.

shorts to ground, and/or hot shorts. Fire- Pressure (2/3 of induced failure of instrument inverters any of the Based on the above discussion, this MSO scenario is may also cause spurious ESFAS signals. following): adequately addressed.

The plant should perform a systematic review to asses the potential for fire- ABPT0514, induced spurious ESFAS to adversely ABPT0515, affect safe shutdown capability. Below ABPT0516 are some examples.

OR ABPT0524, ABPT0525, ABPT0526 OR ABPT0534, ABPT0535, ABPT0536 OR ABPT0544, ABPT0545, ABPT0546

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Appendix 3 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 Page 55 of 58 Table A3 Control Room Fire MSO Evaluation Scenario Scenario Included ID Scenario Description Notes Equipment Control Room Fire Discussion Other High Containment Pressure (2/3)

SIS:

GNPT0934, GNPT0935, GNPT0936 High Containment Pressure (2/4)

CSAS:

GNPT0934, GNPT0935, GNPT0936, GNPT0937 PWROG RCS Makeup Spurious safety Safety injection RHR Pumps: See PWROG 56 for discussion about spurious ESFAS.

56a Pump injection signal, signal starts Inoperability AND multiple RCS PWROG 56 Based on the above discussion, this MSO scenario is makeup pumps. adequately addressed.

Spurious isolation of Fire causes AND makeup pump makeup pump suction suction valves to BNHV8812A or fail closed. BNHV8812B Scenario results in cavitation / Charging Pumps:

inoperability of multiple RCS PWROG 56 makeup pumps.

AND BGLCV0112B or

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Appendix 3 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 Page 56 of 58 Table A3 Control Room Fire MSO Evaluation Scenario Scenario Included ID Scenario Description Notes Equipment Control Room Fire Discussion Other BGLCV0112C AND BGLCV0112D and BGLCV0112E PWROG Loss of All Spurious Scenario causes 2/4 Containment See PWROG 56 for discussion about spurious ESFAS.

56b Seal Cooling containment loss of all RCP Pressure HI-3 isolation signal seal cooling and from GNPT0934, Based on the above discussion, this MSO scenario is isolates CCW to the subsequent RCP GNPT0935, adequately addressed.

thermal barrier heat Seal LOCA. GNPT0936, and exchangers for all GNPT0937 RCPs, AND AND Spurious isolation of seal injection BGFCV0462 and header flow BGFCV0121 OR BBHV8351A, BBHV8351B, BBHV8351C and/or BBHV8351D

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Appendix 3 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 Page 57 of 58 Table A3 Control Room Fire MSO Evaluation Scenario Scenario Included ID Scenario Description Notes Equipment Control Room Fire Discussion Other PWROG Loss of All Spurious Scenario causes 2/4 Containment See PWROG 56 for discussion about spurious ESFAS.

56c Seal Cooling containment loss of all RCP Pressure HI-3 isolation signal seal cooling and (CISB) from Based on the above discussion, this MSO scenario is isolates CCW to the subsequent RCP GNPT0934, adequately addressed.

thermal barrier heat Seal LOCA. GNPT0935, exchangers for all GNPT0936, and RCPs, AND GNPT0937 Spurious opening of AND charging injection valve(s) causing EMHV8801A or insufficient flow to EMHV8801B seals AND EMHV8803A or EMHV8803B PWROG RWST Drain Spurious high Scenario causes a 2/4 Containment See PWROG 56 for discussion about spurious ESFAS.

56d Down containment pumped RWST Pressure HI-3 pressure on multiple drain down via the from GNPT0934, Based on the above discussion, this MSO scenario is channels causing containment spray GNPT0935, adequately addressed.

spurious pumps and GNPT0936, and containment spray containment spray GNPT0937 signal ring.

PWROG PORV(s) Spurious high Spurious high BBPT0455 AND See PWROG 56 for discussion about spurious ESFAS.

56e Open pressurizer pressurizer BBPT0456 pressure on multiple pressure signal Based on the above discussion, this MSO scenario is channels causes causes PORV(s) to adequately addressed.

high pressurizer open and pressure signal challenges the RCS Inventory and Pressure Control Functions

Design Basis Document for Procedure OFN RP-017 Appendix 3 E-1F9915, Rev. 14 Page 58 of 58 Table A3 Control Room Fire MSO Evaluation Scenario Scenario Included ID Scenario Description Notes Equipment Control Room Fire Discussion Other PWROG RCS Makeup Spurious Spurious RHR Pumps See PWROG 56 for discussion about spurious ESFAS.

56f Pump Failure Recirculation Recirculation Actuation Signal Actuation Signal Containment Based on the above discussion, this MSO scenario is (RAS) causes (RAS) starting and Sump Valves adequately addressed.

pumps to start and aligning pumps to align to dry a dry containment containment sump sump.

Expert Loss of Various Scenario could Penetration 32: Procedure OFN RP-017 ensures no core damage will occur Panel 14 Containment combinations of cause uncontrolled following a fire in the control room. This is demonstrated in Isolation spurious operation release of fission LFFV0095 AND evaluation SA-08-006. Therefore, containment isolation is not of valves credited products following LFFV0096 required for PFSSD following a control room fire.

for containment core damage.

isolation. Penetration 65: Based on the above discussion, this MSO scenario is adequately addressed.

GSHV0020 AND GSHV0021 Penetration 160:

GTHZ0011 AND GTHZ0012 Penetration 161:

GTHZ0004 AND GTHZ0005