Text

Stl 2021301 1A Retake SRO Final Applicant Exam with Key
	ML21162A372
Person / Time
Issue date:	06/11/2021
From:	; NRC/RGN-II
To:	;
References
	Download: ML21162A372 (42)
	v • d • e

1.

Given the following conditions:

Unit 2 is at 100% power when the 2B MFW pump trips The following annunciators have alarmed:

o L-3, S/G Level Low Channel Trip (Red) o L-11, S/G Level Low Channel Pre-trip Control Room Reactor Trip breaker indications indicate WHITE Subsequently:

The BRCO depresses the manual reactor trip pushbuttons Control Room Reactor Trip breaker indications indicate WHITE Which ONE of the following completes the statements below?

In accordance with 2-EOP-01, SPTAs, Step 1, Verify Reactor Trip, the NEXT required action the crew is required to take is ____(1)____.

In accordance with UFSAR 7.6.3.11, the basis for ATWS worst case result in a / an

____(2)____ event.

A.

(1)

INITIATE Emergency Boration (2)

Core Melt B.

(1)

INITIATE Emergency Boration (2)

RCS Over pressurization C.

(1) open CEDM MG breakers locally at 2A2 and 2B2 Load Centers (2)

Core Melt D.

(1) open CEDM MG breakers locally at 2A2 and 2B2 Load Centers (2)

RCS Over pressurization ML21162A372

2.

Given the following conditions:

Unit 2 has tripped due to a LOCA

2-EOP-03, LOCA is in progress

Pressurizer pressure is 200 psia and LOWERING

REP CET temperature is 400 °F and LOWERING

Thot temperature is 390 °F and LOWERING

Containment pressure is 4.2 psig and LOWERING

All available Charging pumps are running

BOTH HPSI Pumps are running

This Event has been in progress FOR 3 HOURS Subsequently:

RAS has actuated Which ONE of the following completes the statements below?

Core Heat Removal Safety Function for maximum number of degrees superheat ____(1)____ met.

The NEXT required action is to ____(2)____.

A.

(1) is (2) verify EACH running HPSI pump flow between 114 and 685 gpm B.

(1) is (2) establish simultaneous hot and cold leg injection per 2-EOP-99, Appendix O C.

(1) is NOT (2) verify EACH running HPSI pump flow between 114 and 685 gpm D.

(1) is NOT (2) establish simultaneous hot and cold leg injection per 2-EOP-99, Appendix O

3.

Given the following conditions:

12:00:00 Unit 1 is at 100% power 12:07:00 TE-1151, 1A1 RCP Lower Seal temperature is 220 °F and RISING 12:07:11 Annunciator J-19, 1A1 RCP Seal Trouble, Cooling Wtr Flow Low alarms 12:07:15 1-AOP-01.09A1, 1A1 Reactor Coolant Pump was entered 12:07:30 DRCO reports R-26-56/57 CCW Rad Monitor Recorders have stable trends since the beginning of the shift Which ONE of the following completes the statements below?

In accordance with 1-AOP-01.09A1 MINIMUM action times, the crew will be required to trip the Reactor ____(1)____ and secure the RCP.

Once the crew completes 1-EOP-01, SPTAs, Diagnostic Flow Chart, the crew will transition to ____(2)____.

A.

(1) immediately (2) 1-EOP-02, Reactor Trip Recovery B.

(1) immediately (2) 1-EOP-09, Loss of off-site power/Loss of Forced Circulation C.

(1) within 10 minutes (2) 1-EOP-02, Reactor Trip Recovery D.

(1) within 10 minutes (2) 1-EOP-09, Loss of off-site power/Loss of Forced Circulation

4.

Given the following conditions:

Unit 1 is in Mode 3 NOP/NOT

1A and 1B AFW pumps are supplying BOTH S/Gs Subsequently:

LOOP occurs Which one the following completes the statements below?

The 1A and 1B AFW pumps ____(1)____ AUTOMATICALLY restart following the EDGs restoring the bus.

IAW ADM-11.16, Transient Procedure Use and Adherence, IF Steam Generator level is below 31% NR, then initial AFW feedwater flow should be controlled to less than 150 gpm for the first 5 minutes or until an increase in S/G WR level is observed to minimize the potential for water hammer and thermal shock to the ____(2)____.

A.

(1) will (2)

S/G tubes B.

(1) will (2)

Feedwater Ring C.

(1) will NOT (2)

S/G tubes D.

(1) will NOT (2)

Feedwater Ring

5.

Given the following timeline:

12:00:00 Unit 1 is in Mode 5 RCS level is 33 ft The 1A train of SDC is in service the 1B train is in Standby 12:03:00 RCS Level is 32 ft and LOWERING 1-AOP-01.08, RCS Leakage is entered 12:05:00 The LPSI Pump Trip Criteria on RCS Level is MET Which ONE of the following completes the statements below?

1-AOP-01.08 requires the LPSI Pumps to be secured at a MINIMUM level of

____(1)____.

IF at 12:20:00, the crew has NOT restored RCS Level and SDC flow; the Crew is required to

____(2)____.

Note: 1-ONP-01.04, Plant Condition 4 SDC in Operation with Reduced Inventory A.

(1) 31 ft 3 inches (2)

GO TO 1-ONP-01.04 B.

(1) 31 ft 3 inches (2) remain in 1-AOP-01.08 and Initiate Safety Function status checks of 1-ONP-01.04 C.

(1) 29 ft 9.5 inches (2)

GO TO 1-ONP-01.04 D.

(1) 29 ft 9.5 inches (2) remain in 1-AOP-01.08 and Initiate Safety Function status checks of 1-ONP-01.04

6.

Given the following conditions:

Unit 2 is at 100% power 2A and 2B ICW pumps are in service The AB Bus Electrics are aligned to A train per 2-NOP-52.02, Alignment of 2AB Buses and Components Subsequently:

2B ICW Pump tripped.

2-AOP-21.03B, 2B Intake Cooling Water System Header was entered The crew performs the following actions per Attachment 1 of 2-AOP-21.03B o

mechanically realigns the 2C ICW pump to the B Header o

aligns only the 4.16 Kv AB bus to the 2B3 4.16 Kv Bus o

starts the 2C ICW pump and fully opens its discharge valve o

NO Additional Operator Actions are taken Which ONE of the following completes the statements below?

Based on conditions when the 2B ICW pump tripped, ____(1)____ Intake Cooling Water (ICW) header pressure(s) will LOWER.

In accordance with ADM-11.16, Transient Procedure Use and Adherence, entry into Tech Spec LCO 3.7.4.1, Intake Cooling Water System, ____(2)____ required.

A.

(1)

ONLY the B (2) is B.

(1)

ONLY the B (2) is NOT C.

(1)

BOTH the A and the B (2) is D.

(1)

BOTH the A and the B (2) is NOT

7.

Given the following conditions:

Unit 2 is performing a Reactor Startup in accordance with 2-GOP-302, Reactor Plant Startup - Mode 3 to Mode 2 at Step 4.5.2, Critical Approach Unit 2 reactor was just announced CRITICAL Below is the listed initial power levels prior to commencing the approach to criticality and the power when the reactor was announced critical SU Channel BF3 (CPS)

A B

INITIAL 50 100 CRITICAL 3200 800 Which ONE of the following completes the statements below?

SU Channel ____(1)____ is indicating INCORRECTLY.

Given that 1 Source NI has failed for the CURRENT condition of reactor critical, in accordance with UFSAR, 13.7.2.4, Backup Boron Dilution Detection Sampling, the US

____(2)____ required to direct chemistry to sample the RCS for boron concentration.

A.

(1)

A (2)

IS B.

(1)

A (2)

IS NOT C.

(1)

B (2)

IS D.

(1)

B (2)

IS NOT

8.

Given the following conditions:

Unit 2 is at 100% power 2-OSP-02.07, Borated Water Sources, was completed with the following results:

2A Boric Acid Makeup Tank SAT 2B Boric Acid Makeup Tank SAT Refueling Water Tank SAT Subsequently:

Annunciator M-42, Emergency Borate V2514 Open/Ovrld/SS Isol Alarms SNPO reports V2514, Emergency Borate Valve is tripped Which ONE of the following completes the statements below?

In accordance with Unit 2 Technical Specifications, TS 3.5.2, ECCS Subsystems -

Operating ____(2)____ met.

If an event occurred requiring Emergency Boration, in accordance with 2-AOP-02.02, Emergency Boration, the next procedurally directed emergency boration flow path would be from the ____(2)____.

REFERENCE PROVIDED A.

(1) is (2)

BAMT B.

(1) is (2)

RWT C.

(1) is NOT (2)

BAMT D.

(1) is NOT (2)

RWT

9.

Given the following conditions:

Unit 2 is performing Refueling Operations in accordance with 0-NOP-67.05, Refueling Operation An IRRADIATED fuel assembly has been dropped in the Spent Fuel Pool 2-AOP-67.01, Accidents Involving New or Spent Fuel has been entered ONLY A Train of the Fuel Handling Radiation Monitors go into HIGH alarm Which ONE of the following completes the statements below?

The Spent Fuel Pool exhaust realigns to ____(1)____ train(s) of the Shield Building Ventilation System.

The Technical Specification 3.9.11, Spent Fuel Storage Pool, basis for the MINIMUM Spent Fuel Pool water level is to ensure that sufficient water depth ____(2)____ from the rupture of an IRRADIATED fuel assembly.

A.

(1)

BOTH (2) to maintain the radiation dose levels to less than 2.5 mrem/hour B.

(1)

BOTH (2) is available to remove 99% of the assumed 10% iodine gap activity released C.

(1)

ONLY ONE (2) to maintain the radiation dose levels to less than 2.5 mrem/hour D.

(1)

ONLY ONE (2) is available to remove 99% of the assumed 10% iodine gap activity released

10.

Given the following conditions:

Unit 1 is performing a plant cooldown per 1-GOP-305, Reactor Plant Cooldwn -

Hot Standby to Cold Shutdown using S/G ADVs RCS Tcold is 480 °F Pressurizer Pressure is 1300 psia 1A1, 1B1, and 1B2 RCPs are running 1A and 1B Charging Pumps are running Subsequently:

An RCS leak develops and the crew enters 1-AOP-01.08, RCS Leakage Pressurizer level 28% and slowly lowering 1% every 3 minutes Letdown is isolated Which ONE of the following completes the statements below?

The crew will initiate RCS make up per Attachment 7, Adding Emergency Makeup to the RCS with ____(1)____.

If Pressurizer level can NOT be maintained, the crew will transition to ____(2)____.

A.

(1)

Charging Pumps ONLY (2) 1-EOP-03, LOCA B.

(1)

Charging Pumps ONLY (2) 1-ONP-01.01, Plant Condition 1 S/G Heat Removal-LTOP not in effect C.

(1)

Either HPSI or Charging Pumps (2) 1-EOP-03, LOCA D.

(1)

Either HPSI or Charging Pumps (2) 1-ONP-01.01, Plant Condition 1 S/G Heat Removal-LTOP not in effect

11.

Given the following conditions:

Unit 1 is at 100% power

An RCP Control Bleedoff Line leak occurred in the Pipe Penetration Room of the RAB between V2505, RCP Bleedoff Cntmt Isol and V2198, RCP Bleedoff to VCT Throttle Subsequently:

V2505 and V2198 were CLOSED and the leak was NOT isolated

SE-01-1, RCP Bleedoff Containment Isolation was CLOSED and the leak WAS isolated

1-AOP-01.09A1, 1A1 Reactor Coolant Pump Abnormal was entered

V2507, RCP Bleedoff Relief Stop Valve, was opened for a control bleedoff flowpath Which ONE of the following completes the statements below?

RCP control bleedoff flow will be specifically directed to the ____(1)____.

In accordance with Tech Spec 3.6.3.1, Containment Isolation Valves, the MINIMUM requirement is to deactivate ____(2)____ within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months .

REFERENCE PROVIDED A.

(1)

Quench Tank (2)

SE-01-1 ONLY B.

(1)

Quench Tank (2)

SE-01-1 and V2505 C.

(1)

Reactor Coolant Drain Tank (2)

SE-01-1 ONLY D.

(1)

Reactor Coolant Drain Tank (2)

SE-01-1 and V2505

12.

Given the following conditions:

Unit 2 is performing 2-EOP-15, Functional Recovery, due to an ESD and TLOF events The crew is at the PRESSURE CONTROL safety function performing safety functions not currently met by Success Path 1 Core Exit Temperature is 380 °F RCS Pressure is 1250 psia Pressurizer Level is 55%

2-EOP-99 Figure 2 Safety Injection vs RCS Pressure is MET Containment Pressure is 12 psig and slowly lowering Containment Temperature is 195 °F and slowly lowering A Containment Spray Header Flow is 2900 gpm C and D Containment Fan Coolers are running 2A S/G level is 32% NR and slowly rising 2B S/G level is 0% WR Which ONE of the following completes the following?

In accordance with 2-EOP-15, the crew is directed to use ____(1)____ to control pressurizer pressure.

Following completion of PC-1, Subcooled Control, the NEXT safety function success path that is required to be performed is ____(2)____.

REFERENCE PROVIDED A.

(1)

Pzr PORVs (2)

HR-2 (S/G With SIAS)

B.

(1)

Pzr PORVs (2)

CTPC-3 (Containment Spray)

C.

(1)

Auxiliary Spray (2)

HR-2 (S/G With SIAS)

D.

(1)

Auxiliary Spray (2)

CTPC-3 (Containment Spray)

13.

Given the following conditions:

Unit 2 is at 100% power

JI-006A, Axial Power Shape (ASI) indicates FULL Scale MAXIMUM Negative

Beacon is in service with ALL In-Core detectors OPERABLE The following Annunciators are LIT:

L-9, Reactor Power High Channel Trip

L-22, Local Power Density Channel Trip

L-34, Nuclear/T Power Channel Deviation

L-36, TM/LP Channel Trip Which ONE of the following completes the statements below?

The ____(1)____ detector has failed HIGH.

Azimuthal Power Tilt per TS 3.2.4, Azimuthal Power Tilt - Tq ____(2)____ required to be determined at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

A.

(1)

UPPER (2) is B.

(1)

UPPER (2) is NOT C.

(1)

LOWER (2) is D.

(1)

LOWER (2) is NOT

14.

Given the following conditions:

Unit 2 is in Mode 3 performing an RCS cooldown per 2-GOP-305, Reactor Plant Cooldown - Hot Standby to Cold Shutdown

2A and 2B AFW pumps are running feeding the 2A and 2B Steam Generators Subsequently:

A loss of precise AFW control occurred

The crew entered 2-AOP-09.02, Auxiliary Feedwater

LOWEST S/G NR levels were reported as follows TIME:

0100 0105 0110 S/G A:

18%

30%

S/G B:

21%

30%

Which ONE of the following completes the statements below?

At time 0110, AFAS-1 ____(1)___ have actuated.

In accordance with LI-AA-102-1001, Regulatory Reporting, the MOST LIMITING NRC reporting time is ____(2)____ hour(s).

REFERENCE PROVIDED A.

(1)

ONLY (2) 4 B.

(1)

ONLY (2) 8 C.

(1) and AFAS-2 (2) 4 D.

(1) and AFAS-2 (2) 8

15.

Given the following conditions:

Unit 2 is at 100% power

2B instrument Bus has been placed on the Isolimiter per 2-NOP-49.05B, 120 VAC Instrument Bus 2MB Normal Operation Subsequently:

The following annunciators are LIT o A-14, 4.16KV SWGR 2B3 CURRENT TRIP - RED Annunciator o A-28, 480V LC 2B2 UV/UV TEST/GROUND o A-35, 480V LC 2B5 UV/UV TEST/GROUND o A-46, 4.16KV EMERG SWGR 2B3 UV/UV TEST

2B Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) automatically started with its output breaker currently OPEN Which ONE of the following completes the statement below?

The 2B EDG output breaker ____(1)____ have AUTOMATICALLY closed.

In accordance with Tech Spec 3.8.3.1, Onsite Power Distribution Operating, the most limiting Tech Spec time limit is ____(2)____ hours.

REFERENCE PROVIDED A.

(1) should (2) 2 B.

(1) should (2) 8 C.

(1) should NOT (2) 2 D.

(1) should NOT (2) 8

16.

Given the following conditions:

Unit 1 is at 100% power PORV Block Valve V1405, PORV Block Valve for PORV V1404, is out of service on an Equipment Clearance Order PORV Block Valve V1403, PORV Block Valve for PORV V1402, is closed due to excessive leakage by PORV 1402 Subsequently:

Unit 1 has experienced a Total Loss of Feedwater (TLOF) 1-EOP-06, TLOF is in progress at Step 12, Verify RCS Heat Removal Which ONE of the following completes the statements below?

1-EOP-06, requires the operators to establish OTC based on Plant Parameters for S/G Wide Range Levels OR uncontrolled rise in RCS ____(1)____.

Based upon PORV status, the Unit Supervisor is required to ____(2)____.

A.

(1)

Tcold (2)

Establish OTC per 1-EOP-06, Step 12 Contingency Steps B.

(1)

Tcold (2) transition to 1-EOP-15, Functional Recovery, Step 1 C.

(1)

Pressure (2)

Establish OTC per 1-EOP-06, Step 12 Contingency Steps D.

(1)

Pressure (2) transition to 1-EOP-15, Functional Recovery, Step 1

17.

Given the following conditions:

Unit 2 is at 45% power due to repair of 2B MFW pump

2B AFW Pump is out of service Subsequently:

The reactor was manually tripped due to a loss of the 2A MFW pump

A SGTR event occurs on the 2A S/G

AFAS-2 has actuated

AFW was throttled per 2-NOP-99.07, Hard Cards

The crew is at Step 10, Initiate Lowering RCS Thot of 2-EOP-04, SGTR Which ONE of the following completes the statements below?

To ensure the SBCS valves remain open during the entire cooldown, the SBCS Permissive Switch must be in the ____(1)____ position.

After the RCS cooldown to <510 °F, was completed an EPLAN classification was declared. As the EC, per Step 10 of the Florida State Notification form (below) the

____(2)____ block is required to be checked.

A.

(1)

Auto (2)

A. None B.

(1)

Auto (2)

C. Has occurred, but stopped C.

(1)

Manual (2)

A. None D.

(1)

Manual (2)

C. Has occurred, but stopped

18.

Given the following conditions:

Unit 1 is at 100% power

1B Gas Decay Tank (GDT) is in service at 160 psig per 1-NOP-06.19, Waste Gas System Operation

The crew is venting the Volume Control Tank per 1-NOP-02.24, Boron Concentration Control Subsequently:

The SNPO reports the 1B GDT pressure is 150 psig and that the relief valve is lifting Which ONE of the following completes the statements below?

The 1B GDT relief valve discharges to the ____(1)____.

In accordance with C-200, Offsite Dose Calculation Manual, this ____(2)____

considered an UNPLANNED release.

A.

(1)

Hold Up Tank (2) is B.

(1)

Hold Up Tank (2) is NOT C.

(1)

Gas Surge Tank (2) is D.

(1)

Gas Surge Tank (2) is NOT

19.

Which ONE of the following completes the statements below in accordance with OP-AA-100-1000, Conduct of Operations, Attachment 6, Equipment Manipulation and Status Control.

Peer Checking ____(1)____ be waived during implementation of Abnormal Operating Procedures by the Unit Supervisor.

Peer Checks for critical steps of high risk tasks ____(2)___ be waived by the Unit Supervisor.

A.

(1) can (2) can B.

(1) can (2) can NOT C.

(1) can NOT (2) can D.

(1) can NOT (2) can NOT

20.

Given the following conditions:

Unit 1 is at 100% power

At 0800, I&C is to perform a calibration on RSC-26-2, A ECCS Rad Monitor

The calibration is scheduled to be completed by 1530 today Which ONE of the following describes the requirement to place RSC-26-2 into the Equipment Out of Service (EOOS) Log, in accordance with ADM-09.22, Equipment Out of Service?

In accordance with ADM-09.22, RSC-26-2, A ECCS Rad Monitor, is ________.

A.

NOT a Tech Spec Rad Monitor, therefore NO EOOS Log entry is required B.

always required to be entered into the EOOS Log if removed from service C.

required to be entered into the EOOS Log if it is NOT back in service within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months of being out of service D.

expected to be back in service before the end of the current shift, entry into the EOOS Log is at the discretion of the SM/US/WCCS

21.

Which ONE of the following completes the statements below?

In accordance with Tech Spec 3.0.4, when an LCO is NOT met, entry into a HIGHER MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability SHALL ONLY be made when the associated ACTIONS to be entered permit continued operation for ________.

A.

2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months B.

8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months C.

until the end of current shift D.

an unlimited amount of time

22.

Given the following:

Unit 2 has declared a GENERAL EMERGENCY due to a LOCA

The Shift Manager has turned over the EC duties and the EC is in the TSC

The TSC and OSC ARE operational and in operation

The SNPO needs to enter an RAB room during EOP implementation

The survey map shows the following on radiation readings:

o Point 1 is 100 mr/hr at 30 cm o Point 2 is 5000 mr/hr at 30 cm o Point 3 is 10200 mr/hr at 30 cm Which ONE of the following correctly completes the statements below?

Based on the plant indications, the radiological posting required is ____ (1) ____.

In accordance with RP-SL-101-2001, Personnel Access Control during Emergencies, the Shift Manager ____(2)____ authorize access to this area.

A.

(1)

Very High Radiation Area (2) can B.

(1)

Very High Radiation Area (2) can NOT C.

(1)

Locked High Radiation Area (2) can D.

(1)

Locked High Radiation Area (2) can NOT

23.

In accordance with EPIP-02, Duties and Responsibilities of the Emergency Coordinator,, Exposure Limits for Emergency Response Personnel.

Which ONE of the following completes the statement below?

The MAXIMUM Total Dose (TEDE) that CAN be approved for performance of actions that mitigate the escalation to the event and to rescue a person from a non-life threatening situation is ____(1)____.

A.

5 REM B.

10 REM C.

25 REM D.

50 REM

24.

In accordance with ADM-11.16, Transient Procedure Use and Adherence, and OP-AA-100-1000, Conduct of Operations.

Which ONE of the following completes the statements below?

When multiple alarms occur upon entry into an abnormal operating condition, the operators ____(1)____ expected to announce each alarm.

If during performance of EOPs, it is determined that guidance from an AOP would help recover a Safety Functions or achieve cold shutdown, THEN the AOP may be implemented ____(2)____ the EOPs.

A.

(1) are (2) with priority over B.

(1) are (2)

In parallel with C.

(1) are NOT (2) with priority over D.

(1) are NOT (2)

In parallel with

25.

Given the following conditions:

Unit 2 has declared a General Emergency due to multiple NON-SECURITY related events

The Tech Support Center (TSC), Operational Support Center (OSC) and Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) are FULLY OPERATIONAL Subsequently:

A condition has occurred in the plant that requires the implementation of 10CFR-50-54(x) to protect the health and safety of the public.

Adequate time for approval exists before the action is required to be taken In accordance ADM-17.09, INVOKING 10CFR 50.54(x), whose approval is required to implement the deviation?

A.

Shift Manager B.

Emergency Coordinator C.

Recovery Manager D.

Site Director

ST. LUCIE - UNIT 2 3/4 1-8 Amendment No. 8, 25, 40, 105, 163, 199 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS FLOW PATHS - OPERATING LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.2.2 At least two of the following three boron injection flow paths shall be OPERABLE:

a.

One flow path from the boric acid makeup tank(s) with the tank meeting Specification 3.1.2.8 part a) or b), via a boric acid makeup pump through a charging pump to the Reactor Coolant System.

b.

One flow path from the boric acid makeup tank(s) with the tank meeting Specification 3.1.2.8 part a) or b), via a gravity feed valve through a charging pump to the Reactor Coolant System.

c.

The flow path from the refueling water tank via a charging pump to the Reactor Coolant System.

OR At least two of the following three boron injection flow paths shall be OPERABLE:

d.

One flow path from each boric acid makeup tank with the combined tank contents meeting Specification 3.1.2.8 c), via both boric acid makeup pumps through a charging pump to the Reactor Coolant System.

e.

One flow path from each boric acid makeup tank with the combined tank contents meeting Specification 3.1.2.8 c), via both gravity feed valves through a charging pump to the Reactor Coolant System.

f.

The flow path from the refueling water tank, via a charging pump to the Reactor Coolant System.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

With only one of the above required boron injection flow paths to the Reactor Coolant System OPERABLE, restore at least two boron injection flow paths to the Reactor Coolant System to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or be in at least HOT STANDBY and borated to a SHUTDOWN MARGIN equivalent to its COLR limit at 200 F within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months ; restore at least two flow paths to OPERABLE status within the next 7 days or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

ST. LUCIE - UNIT 2 3/4 1-14 Amendment No. 8, 25, 40, 105, 157, 163, 173 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS BORATED WATER SOURCES - OPERATING LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.2.8 At least two of the following four borated water sources shall be OPERABLE:

a.

Boric Acid Makeup Tank 2A in accordance with Figure 3.1-1.

b.

Boric Acid Makeup Tank 2B in accordance with Figure 3.1-1.

c.

Boric Acid Makeup Tanks 2A and 2B with a minimum combined contained borated water volume in accordance with Figure 3.1-1.

d.

The refueling water tank with:

1.

A minimum contained borated water volume of 477,360 gallons,

2.

A boron concentration of between 1900 and 2200 ppm of boron, and

3.

A solution temperature of between 55F and 100F.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

a.

With the above required boric acid makeup tank(s) inoperable, restore the tank(s) to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and borated to a SHUTDOWN MARGIN equivalent to its COLR limit at 200F; restore the above required boric acid makeup tank(s) to OPERABLE status within the next 7 days or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

b.

With the refueling water tank inoperable, restore the tank to OPERABLE status within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.1.2.8 At least two required borated water sources shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program by:

1.

Verifying the boron concentration in the water and

2.

Verifying the contained borated water volume of the water source.

b.

At least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months by verifying the RWT temperature when the outside air temperature is outside the range of 55F and 100F.

c.

At least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months when the Reactor Auxiliary Building air temperature is less than 55F, by verifying that the boric acid makeup tank solution is greater than 55F.

ST. LUCIE - UNIT 2 3/4 5-3 Amendment No. 106, 119, 163, 199 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS 3/4.5.2 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS - OPERATING LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.5.2 Two independent Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) subsystems shall be OPERABLE with each subsystem comprised of:

a.

One OPERABLE high pressure safety injection pump,

b.

One OPERABLE low pressure safety injection pump, and

c.

An independent OPERABLE flow path capable of taking suction from the refueling water tank on a Safety Injection Actuation Signal and automatically transferring suction to the containment sump on a Recirculation Actuation Signal, and NOTE One ECCS subsystem charging pump shall satisfy the flow path requirements of Specification 3.1.2.2.a or 3.1.2.2.d. The second ECCS subsystem charging pump shall satisfy the flow path requirements of Specification 3.1.2.2.b or 3.1.2.2.e.

d.

One OPERABLE charging pump.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3 with pressurizer pressure 1750 psia.

ACTION:

a.

1.

With one ECCS subsystem inoperable only because its associated LPSI train is inoperable, restore the inoperable subsystem to OPERABLE status within 7 days or in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program, or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

2.

With one ECCS subsystem inoperable for reasons other than condition a.1., restore the inoperable subsystem to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program, or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

b.

In the event the ECCS is actuated and injects water into the Reactor Coolant System, a Special Report shall be prepared and submitted to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 90 days describing the circumstances of the actuation and the total accumulated actuation cycles to date. The current value of the usage factor for each affected safety injection nozzle shall be provided in this Special Report whenever its value exceeds 0.70.

REVISION NO.:

PROCEDURE TITLE:

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65 APPENDICES / FIGURES / TABLES / DATA 133 of 179 PROCEDURE NO.:

SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 FIGURE 1A RCS PRESSURE TEMPERATURE (Page 2 of 2)

(Containment Temperature Less Than or Equal to 200F)

CAUTION The RCP NPSH curve assumes one pump is operating in each loop. RCP instrumentation should be monitored for seal and pump performance in accordance with 2-EOP-99, Table 13.

RCS Pressure Range Required QSPDS Subcooled Margin Reading (Rep CET) 2250 psia to 1000 psia 40 to 180°F 1000 psia to 500 psia 50 to 170°F Less than 500 psia 80 to 160°F

REVISION NO.:

PROCEDURE TITLE:

PAGE:

65 APPENDICES / FIGURES / TABLES / DATA 135 of 179 PROCEDURE NO.:

SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 FIGURE 1B RCS PRESSURE TEMPERATURE (Page 2 of 2)

(Containment Temperature Greater Than 200F)

CAUTION The RCP NPSH curve assumes one pump is operating in each loop. RCP instrumentation should be monitored for seal and pump performance in accordance with 2-EOP-99, Table 13.

REVISION NO.:

PROCEDURE TITLE:

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31 REGULATORY REPORTING 16 of 113 PROCEDURE NO.:

LI-AA-102-1001 NUCLEAR FLEET ADMINISTRATIVE ATTACHMENT 1 REPORTABLE EVENTS (Page 1 of 8)

Declaration of an Emergency Class (See NUREG-1022 Section 3.1.1) 1 Hour Report § 50.72(a)(1)(i) The declaration of any of the Emergency Classes specified in the licensees approved Emergency Plan.

Plant Shutdown Required by Technical Specifications (See NUREG-1022 Section 3.2.1) 4 Hour Report § 50.72(b)(2)(i) The initiation of any nuclear plant shutdown required by the plants Technical Specifications.

60 Day LER § 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A) The completion of any nuclear plant shutdown required by the plants Technical Specifications.

Operation or Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications (See NUREG-1022 Section 3.2.2) 60 Day LER § 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) Any operation or condition which was prohibited by the plants Technical Specifications except when:

(1) The Technical Specification is administrative in nature; (2) The event consisted solely of a case of a late surveillance test where the oversight was corrected, the test was performed, and the equipment was found to be capable of performing its specified safety functions; or (3) The Technical Specification was revised prior to discovery of the event such that the operation or condition was no longer prohibited at the time of discovery of the event.

REVISION NO.:

PROCEDURE TITLE:

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31 REGULATORY REPORTING 17 of 113 PROCEDURE NO.:

LI-AA-102-1001 NUCLEAR FLEET ADMINISTRATIVE ATTACHMENT 1 REPORTABLE EVENTS (Page 2 of 8)

Deviation from Technical Specifications Authorized under § 50.54(x)

(See NUREG-1022 Section 3.2.3) 1 Hour Report§ 50.72(b)(1)... any deviation from the plants Technical Specifications authorized pursuant to § 50.54(x) of this part.

60 Day LER § 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C) Any deviation from the plants Technical Specifications authorized pursuant to § 50.54(x) of this part.

Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition (See NUREG-1022 Section 3.2.4) 8 Hour Report § 50.72(b)(3)(ii) Any event or condition that results in:

60 Day LER 50.73(a)(2)(ii) Any event or condition that resulted in:

(A) The condition of the nuclear power plant, including its principal safety barriers, being seriously degraded; or (B) The nuclear power plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety.

(A) The condition of the nuclear power plant, including its principal safety barriers, being seriously degraded; or (B) The nuclear power plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degraded plant safety.

External Threat or Hampering (See NUREG-1022 Section 3.2.5) 60 Day LER § 50.73(a)(2)(iii) Any natural phenomenon or other external condition that posed an actual threat to the safety of the nuclear power plant or significantly hampered site personnel in the performance of duties necessary for the safe operation of the nuclear power plant.

REVISION NO.:

PROCEDURE TITLE:

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31 REGULATORY REPORTING 18 of 113 PROCEDURE NO.:

LI-AA-102-1001 NUCLEAR FLEET ADMINISTRATIVE ATTACHMENT 1 REPORTABLE EVENTS (Page 3 of 8)

System Actuation (See NUREG-1022 Section 3.2.6) 4 Hour Report § 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(A) Any event that results or should have resulted in emergency core cooling system (ECCS) discharge into the reactor coolant system as a result of a valid signal except when the actuation results from and is part of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation.

4 Hour Report § 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) Any event or condition that results in actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) when the reactor is critical except when the actuation results from and is part of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation.

8 Hour Report § 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) Any event or condition that results in valid actuation of any of the systems listed in paragraph (b)(3)(iv)(B) of this section, except when the actuation results from and is part of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation.

60 Day LER § 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) Any event or condition that resulted in manual or automatic actuation of any of the systems listed in paragraph (a)(2)(iv)(B) of this section, except when:

(1) The actuation resulted from and was part of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation; or (2) The actuation was invalid and; (i) Occurred while the system was properly removed from service; or (ii) Occurred after the safety function had been already completed.

As indicated in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), in the case of an invalid actuation reported under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) other than actuation of the RPS when the reactor is critical, the licensee may, at its option, provide a telephone notification to the NRC Operations Center within 60 days after discovery of the event instead of submitting a written LER.

REVISION NO.:

PROCEDURE TITLE:

PAGE:

31 REGULATORY REPORTING 19 of 113 PROCEDURE NO.:

LI-AA-102-1001 NUCLEAR FLEET ADMINISTRATIVE ATTACHMENT 1 REPORTABLE EVENTS (Page 4 of 8) 8 Hour Report § 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(B) The systems to which the requirements of paragraph (b)(3)(iv)(A) of this section apply are:

(1) Reactor protection system (RPS) including:

reactor scram and reactor trip. 5 (2) General containment isolation signals affecting containment isolation valves in more than one system or multiple main steam isolation valves (MSIVs).

(3) Emergency core cooling systems (ECCS) for pressurized water reactors (PWRs) including: high-head, intermediate-head, and low-head injection systems and the low pressure injection function of residual (decay) heat removal systems.

(4) ECCS for boiling water reactors (BWRs) including:

high-pressure and low-pressure core spray systems; high-pressure coolant injection system; low pressure injection function of the residual heat removal system.

(5) BWR reactor core isolation cooling system; isolation condenser system; and feedwater coolant injection system.

(6) PWR auxiliary or emergency feedwater system.

(7) Containment heat removal and depressurization systems, including containment spray and fan cooler systems (8) Emergency ac electrical power systems, including:

emergency diesel generators (EDGs); hydroelectric facilities used in lieu of EDGs at the Oconee Station; and BWR dedicated Division 3 EDGs.

5 Actuation of the RPS when the reactor is critical is reportable under § 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B)

§ 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B) The systems to which the requirements of paragraph (a)(2)(iv)(A) of this section apply are:

(1) Reactor protection system (RPS) including:

reactor scram or reactor trip.

(2) General containment isolation signals affecting containment isolation valves in more than one system or multiple main steam isolation valves (MSIVs).

(3) Emergency core cooling systems (ECCS) for pressurized water reactors (PWRs) including: high-head, intermediate-head, and low-head injection systems and the low pressure injection function of residual (decay) heat removal systems.

(4) ECCS for boiling water reactors (BWRs) including: high-pressure and low-pressure core spray systems; high-pressure coolant injection system; low pressure injection function of the residual heat removal system.

(5) BWR reactor core isolation cooling system; isolation condenser system; and feedwater coolant injection system.

(6) PWR auxiliary or emergency feedwater system.

(7) Containment heat removal and depressurization systems, including containment spray and fan cooler systems.

(8) Emergency ac electrical power systems, including: emergency diesel generators (EDGs);

hydroelectric facilities used in lieu of EDGs at the Oconee Station; and BWR dedicated Division 3 EDGs.

(9) Emergency service water systems that do not normally run and that serve as ultimate heat sinks.

REVISION NO.:

PROCEDURE TITLE:

PAGE:

31 REGULATORY REPORTING 20 of 113 PROCEDURE NO.:

LI-AA-102-1001 NUCLEAR FLEET ADMINISTRATIVE ATTACHMENT 1 REPORTABLE EVENTS (Page 5 of 8)

Event or Condition that Could Have Prevented Fulfillment of a Safety Function (See NUREG-1022 Section 3.2.7) 8 Hour Report § 50.72(b)(3)(v) Any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to:

(A) Shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition; (B) Remove residual heat; (C) Control the release of radioactive material; or (D) Mitigate the consequences of an accident.

8 Hour Report § 50.72(b)(3)(vi) Events covered in paragraph (b)(3)(v) of this section may include one or more procedural errors, equipment failures, and/or discovery of design, analysis, fabrication, construction, and/or procedural inadequacies. However, individual component failures need not be reported pursuant to paragraph (b)(3)(v) of this section if redundant equipment in the same system was operable and available to perform the required safety function.

60 Day LER § 50.73(a)(2)(v) Any event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to:

(A) Shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition; (B) Remove residual heat; (C) Control the release of radioactive material; or (D) Mitigate the consequences of an accident.

§ 50.73(a)(2)(vi) Events covered in paragraph (a)(2)(v) of this section may include one or more procedural errors, equipment failures, and/or discovery of design, analysis, fabrication, construction, and/or procedural inadequacies.

However, individual component failures need not be reported pursuant to paragraph (a)(2)(v) of this section if redundant equipment in the same system was operable and available to perform the required safety function.

Common Cause Inoperability of Independent Trains or Channels (See NUREG-1022 Section 3.2.8) 60 Day LER § 50.73(a)(2)(vii) Any event where a single cause or condition caused at least one independent train or channel to become inoperable in multiple systems or two independent trains or channels to become inoperable in a single system designed to:

(A) Shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition; (B) Remove residual heat; (C) Control the release of radioactive material; or (D) Mitigate the consequences of an accident.

REVISION NO.:

PROCEDURE TITLE:

PAGE:

31 REGULATORY REPORTING 21 of 113 PROCEDURE NO.:

LI-AA-102-1001 NUCLEAR FLEET ADMINISTRATIVE ATTACHMENT 1 REPORTABLE EVENTS (Page 6 of 8)

Radioactive Release (See NUREG-1022 Section 3.2.9) 60 Day LER § 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) Any airborne radioactive release that, when averaged over a time period of 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months , resulted in airborne radionuclide concentrations in an unrestricted area that exceeded 20 times the applicable concentration limits specified in appendix B to part 20, table 2, column 1.

60 Day LER § 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) Any liquid effluent release that, when averaged over a time period of 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months , exceeds 20 times the applicable concentrations specified in appendix B to part 20, table 2, column 2, at the point of entry into the receiving waters (i.e.,

unrestricted area) for all radionuclides except tritium and dissolved noble gases.

Internal Threat or Hampering (See NUREG-1022 Section 3.2.10) 60 Day LER § 50.73(a)(2)(x) Any event that posed an actual threat to the safety of the nuclear power plant or significantly hampered site personnel in the performance of duties necessary for the safe operation of the nuclear power plant including fires, toxic gas releases, or radioactive releases.

Transport of a Contaminated Person Offsite (See NUREG-1022 Section 3.2.11) 8 Hour Report § 50.72(b)(3)(xii) Any event requiring the transport of a radioactively contaminated person to an offsite medical facility for treatment.

REVISION NO.:

PROCEDURE TITLE:

PAGE:

31 REGULATORY REPORTING 22 of 113 PROCEDURE NO.:

LI-AA-102-1001 NUCLEAR FLEET ADMINISTRATIVE ATTACHMENT 1 REPORTABLE EVENTS (Page 7 of 8)

News Release or Notification of Other Government Agency (See NUREG-1022 Section 3.2.12) 4 Hour Report § 50.72(b)(2)(xi) Any event or situation, related to the health and safety of the public or onsite personnel, or protection of the environment, for which a news release is planned or notification to other government agencies has been or will be made.

Such an event may include an onsite fatality or inadvertent release of radioactively contaminated materials.

Loss of Emergency Preparedness Capabilities (See NUREG-1022 Section 3.2.13) 8 Hour Report § 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) Any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability, offsite response capability, or offsite communications capability (e.g., significant portion of control room indication, emergency notification system, or offsite notification system).

REVISION NO.:

PROCEDURE TITLE:

PAGE:

31 REGULATORY REPORTING 23 of 113 PROCEDURE NO.:

LI-AA-102-1001 NUCLEAR FLEET ADMINISTRATIVE ATTACHMENT 1 REPORTABLE EVENTS (Page 8 of 8)

Single Cause that Could Have Prevented Fulfillment of the Safety Functions of Trains or Channels in Different Systems (See NUREG-1022 Section 3.2.14) 60 Day LER § 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A) Any event or condition that as a result of a single cause could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function for two or more trains or channels in different systems that are needed to:

(1) Shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition; (2) Remove residual heat; (3) Control the release of radioactive material; or (4) Mitigate the consequences of an accident.

§ 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(B) Events covered in paragraph (ix)(A) of this section may include cases of procedural error, equipment failure, and/or discovery of a design, analysis, fabrication, construction, and/or procedural inadequacy. However, licensees are not required to report an event pursuant to paragraph (ix)(A) of this section if the event results from:

(1) A shared dependency among trains or channels that is a natural or expected consequence of the approved plant design; or (2) Normal and expected wear or degradation.

ST. LUCIE - UNIT 2 3/4 8-14 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3/4.8.3 ONSITE POWER DISTRIBUTION OPERATING LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.8.3.1 The following electrical busses shall be energized in the specified manner with both tie breakers open between redundant busses and between St. Lucie Unit 1 and Unit 2.

a. Train A A.C. Emergency Busses consisting of:

1.

4160 volt Emergency Bus

2A3 2.

480 volt Emergency Bus

2A2 3.

480 volt Emergency Bus

2A5 4.

480 volt MCC Emergency Bus

2A5 5.

480 volt MCC Emergency Bus

2A6 6.

480 volt MCC Emergency Bus

2A7 7.

480 volt MCC Emergency Bus

2A8 8.

480 volt MCC Emergency Bus

2A9

b. Train B A.C. Emergency Busses consisting of:

1.

4160 volt Emergency Bus

2B3 2.

480 volt Emergency Bus

2B2 3.

480 volt Emergency Bus

2B5 4.

480 volt MCC Emergency Bus

2B5 5.

480 volt MCC Emergency Bus

2B6 6.

480 volt MCC Emergency Bus

2B7 7.

480 volt MCC Emergency Bus

2B8 8.

480 volt MCC Emergency Bus

2B9 c.

120 volt A.C. Instrument Bus # 2MA energized from its associated inverter connected to D.C. Bus # 2A*.

d. 120 volt A.C. Instrument Bus # 2MB energized from its associated inverter connected to D.C. Bus # 2B*.

e. 120 volt A.C. Instrument Bus # 2MC energized from its associated inverter connected to D.C. Bus # 2A*.

f.

120 volt A.C. Instrument Bus # 2MD energized from its associated inverter connected to D.C. Bus # 2B*.

g. 125 volt D.C. Bus # 2A energized from Battery Bank # 2A.

h. 125 volt D.C. Bus # 2B energized from Battery Bank # 2B.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

Two inverters may be disconnected from their D.C. Bus for up to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months , as necessary, for the purpose of performing an equalizing charge on their associ-ated battery bank provided (1) their vital busses are energized, and (2) the vital busses associated with the other battery bank are energized from their associated inverters and connected to their associated D.C. Bus.

ST. LUCIE - UNIT 2 3/4 8-15 Amendment No. 173, 184, 200 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS ACTION:

NOTE Enter applicable ACTIONS of LCO 3.8.2.1, D.C. Sources - Operating, for DC trains made inoperable by inoperable AC distribution system.

a.

With one of the required trains of A.C. Emergency busses not fully energized, re-energize the train within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

b.

With one A.C. Instrument Bus either not energized from its associated inverter, or with the inverter not connected to its associated D.C. Bus: (1) re-energize the A.C. Instrument Bus within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months and (2) re-energize the A.C. Instrument Bus from its associated inverter connected to its associated D.C. Bus within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicable when entering HOT SHUTDOWN.

c.

With one D.C. Bus not energized from its associated Battery Bank, re-energize the D.C. Bus from its associated Battery Bank within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.8.3.1 The specified busses shall be determined energized in the required manner in accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program by verifying correct breaker alignment and indicated voltage on the busses.

ANSWER KEY

1.

D

2.

A

3.

C

4.

B

5.

C

6.

A

7.

D

8.

C

9.

B

10.

B

11.

A

12.

C

13.

A

14.

B

15.

C

16.

A

17.

D

18.

D

19.

B

20.

D

21.

D

22.

D

23.

B

24.

D

25.

A

ML21162A372

Text

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