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Hearing Request and Petition to Intervene by Beyond Nuclear, Sierra Club, and Alliance for Progressive Virginia and Petition for Waiver of 10 C.F.R. 51.53(c)(3)(i), 51.71(d), and 51.95(C)(1) to Allow Consideration of Category 1 NEPA Issues
	ML20349D952
Person / Time
Site:	North Anna
Issue date:	12/14/2020
From:	Curran D; Alliance for Progressive Virginia (APV), Beyond Nuclear, Harmon, Curran, Harmon, Curran, Spielberg & Eisenberg, LLP, Sierra Club
To:	; NRC/SECY
	SECY RAS
References
	50-338-SLR, 50-339-SLR, RAS 55904, Subsequent License Renewal
	Download: ML20349D952 (71)
	v • d • e

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE SECRETARY

)

In the Matter of )

Virginia Electric Power Co. ) Docket Nos. 50-338/339 SLR North Anna Power Station Units 1 & 2 )

___________________________________ )

HEARING REQUEST AND PETITION TO INTERVENE BY BEYOND NUCLEAR, SIERRA CLUB, AND ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESSIVE VIRGINIA AND PETITION FOR WAIVER OF 10 C.F.R. §§ 51.53(c)(3)(i), 51.71(d), AND 51.95(c)(1) TO ALLOW CONSIDERATION OF CATEGORY 1 NEPA ISSUES Submitted by:

Diane Curran Harmon, Curran, Spielberg, & Eisenberg, L.L.P.

1725 DeSales Street N.W., Suite 500 Washington, D.C. 20036 240-393-9285 dcurran@harmoncurran.com Counsel for Petitioners December 14, 2020

TABLE OF CONTENTS Table of Authorities.iii I. INTRODUCTION..1 II. PETITIONERS HAVE STANDING TO REQUEST A HEARING2 A. Standing of Beyond Nuclear..4 B. Standing of the Sierra Club4 C. Standing of Alliance for a Progressive Virginia5 III. LEGAL FRAMEWORK: ATOMIC ENERGY ACT AND NEPA.5 A. Atomic Energy Act and NRC Safety Regulations.6 B. NEPA..8

1. Statutory requirements..8

2. NRC Regulations and Guidance for Implementation of NEPA..10

a. Regulations..10

b. NRC Guidance.10 IV. CONTENTION: FAILURE TO ADDRESS ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS OF REACTOR ACCIDENTS CAUSED OR CONTRIBUTED TO BY EARTHQUAKES.13 A. Statement of Contention..13 B. Basis Statement14

1. Factual basis regarding 2011 earthquake.14

a. 2011 earthquake...14

b. Lack of discussion of 2011 earthquake impacts in Dominions Environmental Report..18

2. Factual basis regarding uncertainties related to aging of passive SSCs..19

a. Uncertainties surrounding aging SSCs19

b. Lack of discussion of uncertainties related to aging of passive SSCs in Dominions Environmental Report..25

3. Legal bases for Contention..26

a. Applicable regulations.26

b. Demonstration that Dominions Environmental Report fails to consider significant environmental impacts as required by 10 C.F.R.

§§ 51.53(c)(2) and 51.45(a).28 C. Demonstration that the Contention is Within the Scope of the Proceeding..29 D. Demonstration that the Contention is Materials to the Findings NRC must Make to Renew Dominions Operating License.29 E. Concise Statement of the Facts or Expert Opinion Supporting the Contention, Along with Appropriate Citations to Supporting Scientific or Factual Materials.30 V. PETITION FOR WAIVER OF 10 C.F.R. §§ 51.53(c)(3)(i), 51.71(d), AND 51.95(c)(1)

TO ALLOW CONSIDERATION OF CATEGORY 1 NEPA ISSUES30 A. Standard for Issuance of Waivers31 B. Petitioners Satisfy the Commissions Four-Part Test for Issuance of a Waiver.32

1. Application of the Category 1 exclusion would not serve the purpose for which it was promulgated32

2. Special circumstances exist that were not previously considered.34

3. The special circumstances raised by this Waiver Petition are unique to North Anna Units 1 and 234

4. Waiver of the regulation is necessary to reach a significant environmental problem..35 VI. CONCLUSION.38 ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Judicial Decisions Citizens for Safe Power v. NRC, 524 F.2d 1291 (D.C. Cir. 1975).5, 36 City of Alexandria, Va. v. Slater, 198 F.3d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1999)..10 Colo. v. Dombeck, 185 F.3d 1162 (10th Cir. 1996).9 Hughes River Watershed Conservancy v. Glickman, 81 F.3d 437 (4th Cir. 1996).9 Limerick Ecology Action v. NRC, 869 F.2d 719 (3rd Cir. 1989).5, 9, 28, 36 National Audubon Society v. Dept of Navy, 422 F.3d 174 (4th Cir. 2005)9 Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332 (1989)...8-9 State of New York v. NRC, 681 F.3d 471 (D.C. Cir. 2012)....9, 28 Van Ee v. EPA, 202 F.3d 296 (D.C. Cir. 2000).10 NRC Decisions Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc. (Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3),

CLI-05-24, 62 N.R.C. 551(2005)..32 Dominion Virginia Power (North Anna Power Station, Unit 3) CLI-17-08, 85 N.R.C. 157 (2017)36 Exelon Generation Co., L.L.C. (Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Units 2 and 3), CLI-20-11, _ N.R.C. _ (Nov. 12, 2020) .....26, 27, 30, 31 Exelon Generation Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2),

CLI-13-07, 78 N.R.C. 199 (2013).32 Florida Power & Light Co. (Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 3 and 4),

LBP-01-06, 53 N.R.C. 138, affd, CLI-01-17, 54 N.R.C. 3 (2001).4 Florida Power & Light Co. (Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 3 & 4),

CLI-01-17, 54 N.R.C. 3 (2001)..37 Florida Power and Light Co. (Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Plant Units 3 and 4),

LBP-19-03, 89 N.R.C. 245 (2019).27 iii

Florida Power and Light Co. (Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Plant Units 3 and 4), CLI-20-03, 91 N.R.C. 33 (2020)..26, 27, 30, 31 Interim Storage Partners LLC (WCS Consolidated Interim Storage Facility),

LBP-19-07, 90 N.R.C. 31 (2019)9, 28-29 Louisiana Energy Services, L.P. (Claiborne Enrichment Center), CLI-98-3, 47 N.R.C. 77 (1998)..8 NextEra Energy Seabrook, LLC (Seabrook Station, Unit 1), LBP-17-07, 86 N.R.C. 59 (2017)..6 Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Power Plant Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), LBP-02-23, 56 N.R.C. 413 (2002), petition for review denied, CLI-03-12, 58 N.R.C. 185 (2003)....3 Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2),

CLI-86-5, 23 N.R.C. 125 (1998), revd, Limerick Ecology Action v. NRC, 869 F.2d 719 (1989)..35 Public Service Electric and Gas Co, et al. (Hope Creek Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-518, 9 N.R.C. 14 (1979)35-36 Statutes Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2011, et seq.3, 5 42 U.S.C. § 2133(d).6 42 U.S.C. § 2201(b).6 NEPA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370h..3, 5, 28, 29, 32 42 U.S.C. § 4331..8 Regulations 10 C.F.R. § 2.3091 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(d)....2 10 C.F.R. § 2.335(b)..31 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix A6 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix A, General Design Criterion 2..6 iv

10 C.F.R. Part 51...28 10 C.F.R. § 51.45...10 10 C.F.R. § 51.45(a)....10, 13, 27, 28 10 C.F.R. § 51.53(c)(2)....10, 13, 26, 27, 28, 30 10 C.F.R. § 51.53(c)(3)..10, 11, 26, 27, 30 10 C.F.R. § 51.53(c)(3)..10, 11, 26, 27, 30 10 C.F.R. § 51.53(c)(3)(i)2 10 C.F.R. § 51.71(d)...2, 30, 31 10 C.F.R. § 51.95(c)(1)....2, 30, 31 10 C.F.R. Part 51, Subpart A, Appendix B, Table B-1..10, 11, 18, 24, 26, 30, 31, 32 40 C.F.R. § 1508.7...9 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14..10 Federal Register Notices Hearing Notice, 85 Fed. Reg. 65,438 (Oct. 15, 2020).1 Final Rule for Environmental Review for Renewal of Nuclear Power Plant Operating Licenses, 61 Fed. Reg. 28,467 (June 5, 1996)....11, 32 Final Rule, Mitigation of Beyond-Design-Basis Events, 84 Fed. Reg. 39,684 (Aug. 9, 2019)....16-17 NRC and Industry Guidance and Miscellaneous Expanded Materials Degradation Assessment (EMDA),

NUREG/CR-7153 (Oct. 2014).14, 21-24, 25 Generic Environmental Impact Statement for License Renewal of Nuclear Plants, NUREG-1437 (May 1996)..11, 26, 37 Generic Environmental Impact Statement for License Renewal of Nuclear Plants, NUREG-1437, Rev. 1 June 2013)..11, 18 v

NEI-12-06, Diverse and Flexible Coping Strategies (FLEX)

Implementation Guide, Rev. 5 (April 2018)15-16 NUREG-1555, Standard Review Plans for Environmental Reviews for Nuclear Power Plants (2000).12, 28 Regulatory Guide, 1.29, Rev. 5, Seismic Design Classification for Nuclear Power Plants (July 2016).6-7 vi

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE SECRETARY

)

In the Matter of )

Virginia Electric Power Co. ) Docket Nos. 50-338/339 SLR North Anna Power Station Units 1 & 2 )

___________________________________ )

HEARING REQUEST AND PETITION TO INTERVENE BY BEYOND NUCLEAR, SIERRA CLUB, AND ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESSIVE VIRGINIA AND PETITION FOR WAIVER OF 10 C.F.R. §§ 51.53(c)(3)(i), 51.71(d), AND 51.95(c)(1) TO ALLOW CONSIDERATION OF CATEGORY 1 NEPA ISSUES I. INTRODUCTION Pursuant to 10 C.F.R. § 2.309, and the hearing notice published at 85 Fed. Reg.

65,438 (Oct. 15, 2020), Petitioners Beyond Nuclear, Inc. (Beyond Nuclear), the Sierra Club, Inc. (Sierra Club), and Alliance for Progressive Virginia, Inc. (APV) hereby request the U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or Commission) to grant a hearing on an application for subsequent license renewal (SLR) of the operating license for the North Anna Units 1 and 2 nuclear power plant. The application was submitted by Virginia Electric Power Co. (also known as Dominion Electric Power Co. or Dominion, and hereinafter referred to as Dominion).1 If Dominions application is granted, it will be allowed to operate North Anna Units 1 and 2 for an additional twenty years beyond its current renewed operating license term, or until 1

The two parts of Dominions SLR application that are relevant to this Hearing Request are North Anna Power Station Units 1 and 2, Application for Subsequent License Renewal (August 2020 (NRC ADAMS Accession No. ML20246G696) (SLR Safety Application) and Appendix E, Applicants Environmental Report Subsequent Operating License Renewal Stage, North Anna Power Station Units 1 and 2 (August 2020) (ML20246G698) (Environmental Report).

2058 (Unit 1) and 2060 (Unit 2), for an aggregate of 80 years. 2 Petitioners contend that the NRC should not approve subsequent renewal of Dominions operating license because Dominions Environmental Report fails to address the environmental significance of a 2011 earthquake within several miles of the North Anna reactors, whose ground motion exceeded the design basis for the reactors and thereby called into question all previous assurances by the NRC that the environmental impacts of operating North Anna Units 1 and 2 are small.

The remainder of this Hearing Request is organized as follows: Section II contains a demonstration that Petitioners Beyond Nuclear, the Sierra Club and APV each has organizational standing to participate in this proceeding.Section III sets forth the legal framework for Petitioners Hearing Request.Section IV presents Petitioners Contention.Section V contains a Petition for Waiver of 10 C.F.R. §§ 51.53(c)(3)(i), 51.71(d), and 51.95(c)(1) to Allow Consideration of Category 1 NEPA Issues.Section VI contains Petitioners Conclusion.

II. PETITIONERS HAVE STANDING TO REQUEST A HEARING.

Pursuant to 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(d), a request for a hearing must address: (1) the nature of the petitioners right under the Atomic Energy Act to be made a party to the proceeding, (2) the nature and extent of the petitioners property, financial, or other interest in the proceeding, and (3) the possible effect of any order that may be entered in the proceeding on the petitioners interest. The Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (ASLB) has summarized these standing requirements as follows:

In determining whether a petitioner has sufficient interest to intervene in a proceeding, the Commission has traditionally applied judicial concepts of standing. Contemporaneous judicial standards for standing require a petitioner to demonstrate that (1) it has suffered 2

The NRC issued original operating licenses for North Anna in 1978 and 1980, with expiration dates of 2018 (Unit 1) and 2020 (Unit 2). In 2003, the NRC renewed both licenses for 20 years, with new expiration dates of 2038 and 2040. If renewed again, the North Anna licenses would expire in 2058 and 2060.

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or will suffer a distinct and palpable harm that constitutes injury-in-fact within the zone of interest arguably protected by the governing statutes (e.g., the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969); (2) the injury can fairly be traced to the challenged actions; and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision. An organization that wishes to intervene in a proceeding may do so either in its own right by demonstrating harm to its organizational interests, or in a representational capacity by demonstrating harm to its members. To intervene in a representational capacity, an organization must show not only that at least one of its members would fulfill the standing requirements, but also that he or she has authorized the organization to represent his or her interests.

Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Power Plant Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), LBP-02-23, 56 N.R.C. 413, 426 (2002), petition for review denied, CLI-03-12, 58 N.R.C. 185 (2003).

As demonstrated below, each of the Petitioners has standing by virtue of organizational interests that fall within the zone of interests protected by the Atomic Energy Act and the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). By intervening in this proceeding, Petitioners seek to protect their members health and safety, as well as protection of the environment. They wish to ensure that Dominions operating license is not approved for a second renewal term unless and until Dominion demonstrates full compliance with NEPAs requirements for protection of public health and the environment.

In addition, as also demonstrated below, each Petitioner organization has members and/or staff who live and/or work within 50 miles of North Anna Units 1 and 2, whose interests in protecting their own health and the health of the environment would be adversely affected by extended operation of North Anna Units 1 and 2 under an additional SLR term, and who have authorized Petitioners to represent their interests in this proceeding. Therefore, Petitioners have presumptive standing by virtue of the location of their members residences and property within 50 miles of the North Anna reactors. Diablo Canyon, 56 N.R.C. at 426-27 (citing Florida Power 3

& Light Co. (Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 3 and 4), LBP-01-06, 53 N.R.C. 138, 146, affd, CLI-01-17, 54 N.R.C. 3 (2001)).

A. Standing of Beyond Nuclear Beyond Nuclear is a nonprofit, nonpartisan membership organization that aims to educate and activate the public about the connections between nuclear power and nuclear weapons and the need to abolish both to protect public health and safety, prevent environmental harms, and safeguard our future. Beyond Nuclear advocates for an end to the production of nuclear waste and for securing the existing reactor waste in hardened on-site storage until it can be permanently disposed of in a safe, sound, and suitable underground repository. For more than thirteen years, Beyond Nuclear has worked toward its mission by regularly intervening in NRC licensing, relicensing, and other proceedings related to nuclear safety matters.

Beyond Nuclears representational standing to participate in this proceeding is demonstrated by the attached declarations of its members: Declaration of Erica Gray (Dec. 4, 2020) (Attachment 1A); Declaration of E. Schuyler Flansburgh (Dec. 7, 2020) (Attachment 1B);

Declaration of Jerry Rosenthal (Dec. 6, 2020) (Attachment 1C); and Declaration of Glen Besa (Dec. 7, 2020) (Attachment 1D).

B. Standing of the Sierra Club Founded in 1892, the Sierra Club is a national environmental organization with 3.8 million members across the United States. The purposes of the Sierra Club are to explore, enjoy, and protect the wild places of the earth; to practice and promote the responsible use of the earths ecosystems and resources; to educate and enlist humanity to protect and restore the quality of the natural and human environment; and to use all lawful means to carry out these objectives.

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The Sierra Clubs representational standing to participate in this proceeding is demonstrated by the attached declarations of its members: Declaration of Barbara J. Cruikshank (Dec. 8, 2020)

(Attachment 1E); Declaration of John A. Cruikshank (Dec. 8, 2020) (Attachment 1F);

Declaration of William J. Johnson (Dec. 8, 2020) (Attachment 1G); Declaration of Steven Carter-Lovejoy (Dec. 9, 2020) (Attachment 1H); and Declaration of Donna Shaunessy (Dec. 9, 2020) (Attachment 1I).

C. Standing of Alliance for a Progressive Virginia Alliance for a Progressive Virginia is an all-volunteer, not-for-profit organization, whose goal is to educate and influence the public, the media and elected officials at the local, state and national levels about important issues of the day. APV is guided in this mission by the basic, common sense progressive values of economic fairness, social justice, and good government.

APVs representational standing to participate in this proceeding is demonstrated by the attached declarations of its members: Declaration of Scott Price (Dec. 9, 2020) (Attachment 1J) and Declaration of Joe Johnson (Dec. 10, 2020) (Attachment 1K).

III. LEGAL FRAMEWORK: ATOMIC ENERGY ACT AND NEPA The NRCs regulation and licensing of reactors is governed by two statutes: the Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2011, et seq.; and NEPA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370h. While the substantive concerns of these statutes overlap, Citizens for Safe Power v. NRC, 524 F.2d 1291, 1299 (D.C. Cir. 1975), they impose independent procedural obligations. Limerick Ecology Action

v. NRC, 869 F.2d 719, 729-31 (3rd Cir. 1989). Even where the NRC purports to have resolved safety issues through its Atomic Energy Act-based regulatory process, it must nevertheless comply with NEPAs procedural obligations for addressing those issues in its decision-making processes. Limerick Ecology Action, 869 F.2d at 729-31.

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A. Atomic Energy Act and NRC Safety Regulations Under § 103(d) of the Atomic Energy Act, the NRC may not issue an operating license for a nuclear plant if it would be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public. 42 U.S.C. § 2133(d). Section 161 of the Atomic Energy Act also empowers the NRC to set standards to protect health or to minimize danger to life or property, inter alia. 42 U.S.C. § 2201(b).

Among the many regulatory standards promulgated by the NRC for the safe construction and operation of nuclear power reactors, the General Design Criteria (GDCs) in Appendix A to 10 C.F.R. Part 50 are fundamentally important, because they establish minimum requirements for the principal design criteria for water-cooled nuclear power plants. Id., Introduction. These principal design criteria, in turn, establish:

the necessary design, fabrication, construction, testing, and performance requirements for structures, systems, and components important to safety; that is, structures, systems, and components that provide reasonable assurance that the facility can be operated without undue risk to the health and safety of the public.

Id. General Design Criterion (GDC) 2, Design Bases for Protection Against Natural Phenomena) requires that [s]tructures, systems, and components important to safety shall be designed to withstand the effects of natural phenomena such as earthquakes, tornadoes, hurricanes, floods, tsunami, and seiches without loss of capability to perform their safety functions. As the NRCs ASLB has recognized, SSCs must be able to withstand an earthquake and other natural disasters within the design basis of the plant. NextEra Energy Seabrook, LLC (Seabrook Station, Unit 1), LBP-17-07, 86 N.R.C. 59, 79 (2017) (citing 10 C.F.R. Part 50, App.

A, GDC 2).

Design-basis structures that must remain functional in the event of a safe shutdown earthquake are referred to as Category I structures. Regulatory Guide, 1.29, Rev. 5, Seismic 6

Design Classification for Nuclear Power Plants at 5 (July 2016) (ML16118A148) (Reg. Guide 1.29). Category I safety structures and components (SSCs) encompass a broad array of equipment and structures. At North Anna, for example, SSCs required to remain functional following a design basis event include, but are not limited to, the reactor vessel, the reactor coolant system pressure boundary, steam generators, the pressurizer, piping, pump casings, valve bodies, the core shroud, component supports, pressure retaining boundaries, heat exchangers, ventilation ducts, the containment, the containment liner, electrical and mechanical penetrations, equipment hatches, seismic Category I structures.). SLR Safety Application at 2-29. In addition, safety-related structures include [t]he Unit 1 and Unit 2 Containments . . . that house the reactor vessel and other nuclear steam supply system components for the respective unit. 3 3

Category I SSCs listed in Reg. Guide 1.29 include the following:

a. the reactor coolant pressure boundary as defined in 10 CFR 50.2;

b. the reactor core and reactor vessel internals;

c. systems or portions thereof that are needed for (1) emergency core cooling, (2) post-accident containment heat removal, or (3) post-accident containment atmosphere cleanup (e.g., hydrogen removal system);

d. systems or portions thereof (including but not limited to systems such as residual heat removal and auxiliary feedwater) that are needed to (1) shutdown the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition, (2) remove residual heat (including heat stored within the spent fuel pool), (3) control the release of radioactive material, or (4) mitigate the consequences of an accident; . . .

e. support systems that are needed to fulfill the functions described in items 1.c and 1.d above, including but not limited to component cooling, service water, Class 1E electrical systems, fuel systems, seal water systems (such as those for reactor coolant pumps), and supporting subsystems (including the auxiliary systems for the onsite electric power supplies), and diesel fuel support systems;

f. systems or portions thereof that are needed for (1) monitoring and (2) actuating systems . . . including all electrical and mechanical devices and circuitry between 7

B. NEPA

1. Statutory requirements NEPA implements a broad national commitment to protecting and promoting environmental quality. Louisiana Energy Services, L.P. (Claiborne Enrichment Center), CLI-98-3, 47 N.R.C.

77, 87 (1998) (quoting Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 348 (1989) and citing 42 U.S.C. § 4331). NEPA has two key purposes: to ensure that the agency will have available, and will carefully consider, detailed information concerning significant environmental impacts before it makes a decision; and to guarantee that the relevant information will be made available to the larger audience that may also play a role in the decision-making process and implementation of that decision. Robertson, 490 U.S. at 349. In fulfilling NEPAs second purpose of public participation, the agencys environmental analysis must be published for public comment to permit the public a role in the agencys decision-making process.

the process and the input terminals of the actuator systems involved in generating signals that initiate protective action;

g. systems, other than radioactive waste management systems, not covered by items 1.a through 1.f above that contain or may contain radioactive material and the postulated failure of which would result in conservatively calculated potential offsite doses that are more than 0.005 Sievert (0.5 rem) to the whole body or its equivalent to any part of the body or total effective dose equivalent (TEDE), as applicable.

h. accident monitoring instrumentation ; and

i. those portions of SSCs of which continued function is not required but of which failure could reduce the functioning of any plant feature included in items 1.a through 1.h above to an unacceptable safety level, or could result in incapacitating injury to occupants of the control room should be designed and constructed so that the SSE [safe shutdown earthquake] would not cause such failure. . . . 3 Id. at 5-6.

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Robertson, 490 U.S. at 349-50; Hughes River Watershed Conservancy v. Glickman, 81 F.3d 437, 443 (4th Cir. 1996).

In fulfilling NEPAs first purpose of evaluating the environmental impacts of its decisions, NEPA requires a federal agency to take a hard look at potential environmental consequences by preparing an EIS prior to any major Federal action[] significantly affecting the quality of the human environment. Robertson, 490 U.S. at 349; 42 U.S.C. § 4332(c). The hallmarks of a hard look are thorough investigation into environmental impacts and forthright acknowledgment of potential environmental harms. National Audubon Society v. Dept of Navy, 422 F.3d 174, 185 (4th Cir. 2005). The analysis must address both the probabilities of potentially harmful events and the consequences if those events come to pass. State of New York

v. NRC, 681 F.3d 471, 479, 482 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (rejecting environmental analysis of spent fuel pool fire risks because it did not consider consequences as well as probability of fires in spent fuel storage pools). Impacts must be quantified if possible, but may be addressed qualitatively, with consideration of uncertainties. Limerick Ecology Action, 869 F.2d at 744 (lack of quantifiability does not necessarily preclude further consideration under NEPA.).

An EIS also must include an evaluation of the cumulative impacts of a proposed action.

Interim Storage Partners LLC (WCS Consolidated Interim Storage Facility), LBP-19-07, 90 N.R.C. 31, 106 (2019) (citing Colo. v. Dombeck, 185 F.3d 1162, 1176 (10th Cir. 1996)). As set forth in the regulations of the Presidents Council on Environmental Quality:

Cumulative Impact is the impact on the environment which results from the incremental impact of the action when added to other past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future actions regardless of what agency (federal or non-Federal) or person undertakes such other actions. Cumulative impacts can result from individually minor but collectively significant actions taking place over a period of time.

40 C.F.R. § 1508.7.

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In addition, the agency must rigorously explore and objectively evaluate the projected environmental impacts of all reasonable alternatives for completing the proposed action.

Van Ee v. EPA, 202 F.3d 296, 309 (D.C. Cir. 2000). The alternatives analysis is the heart of an EIS. City of Alexandria, Va. v. Slater, 198 F.3d 862, 866 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14).

2. NRC Regulations and Guidance for Implementation of NEPA

a. Regulations NRC regulation 10 C.F.R. § 51.45 requires that a reactor license applicant must submit an environmental report with its application. Specific requirements for license renewal applications are set forth in 10 C.F.R. § 51.53(c). Section 51.53(c)(2) establishes general requirements for reactor license renewal applicants, and § 51.53(c)(3) establishes requirements for applicants seeking an initial renewed license.

Section 51.53(c)(2) requires an operating license renewal applicant (other than an applicant for initial license renewal) to describe, inter alia, the affected environment around the plant, the environmental impacts of alternatives, and any other matters described in § 51.45(a). Section 51.45(a), requires, in turn, that the Environmental Report must include the following information:

Analysis. The environmental report must include an analysis that considers and balances the environmental effects of the proposed action, the environmental impacts of alternatives to the proposed action, and alternatives available for reducing or avoiding adverse environmental effects. . . . The analyses for environmental reports shall, to the fullest extent practicable, quantify the various factors considered. To the extent that there are important qualitative considerations or factors that cannot be quantified, those considerations or factors shall be discussed in qualitative terms. The environmental report should contain sufficient data to aid the Commission in its development of an independent analysis.

Section 51.53(c)(3) excuses initial license renewal applicants from addressing environmental impacts that have been classified as Category 1 generic impacts in 10 C.F.R. 10

Part 51, Subpart A, Appendix B, Table B-1. The NRC made these generic impact findings in the Generic Environmental Impact Statement for License Renewal of Nuclear Plants, NUREG-1437, Vols. 1-2 (May 1996) (ML040690705, ML040690738) (1996 License Renewal GEIS). 4 At the same time the NRC issued the 1996 License Renewal GEIS, it codified Table B-1s generic findings and made them applicable in license renewal proceedings via 10 C.F.R. §§ 51.53(c)(3)(i), 51.71(d), and 51.95(a). Final Rule for Environmental Review for Renewal of Nuclear Power Plant Operating Licenses, 61 Fed. Reg. 28,467 (June 5, 1996).

The generic findings in Table B-1 include a finding that the environmental impacts of reactor accidents are small. As explained in the 1996 License Renewal GEIS, this finding is based on the assumption that reactors will operate within their design bases:

All plants have had a previous evaluation of the environmental impacts of design-basis accidents. In addition, the licensee will be required to maintain acceptable design and performance criteria throughout the renewal period. Therefore, the calculated releases from design-basis accidents would not be expected to change. Since the consequences of these events are evaluated for the hypothetical maximally exposed individual at the time of licensing, changes in the plant environment will not affect these evaluations.

Therefore, the staff concludes that the environmental impacts of design-basis accidents are of small significance for all plants.

Id. at xliii-xliv. As the License Renewal GEIS further elaborated:

Many features combine to minimize the risk of accidents at nuclear power plants. These features include high-quality reactivity control and reactor cooling systems and containment and backup safety systems to respond to equipment failure. The incorporation of safety into design, construction, and operation is to a very large extent devoted to minimizing the possibility of the release of radioactive materials from their normal places of confinement within the plant. Descriptions of these safety features are provided in each licensee's final safety analysis report (FSAR) and in the NRC's safety evaluation report.

Id. at 5 5-2 (emphasis added).

4 In 2013, the NRC updated the 1996 License Renewal GEIS in the Generic Environmental Impact Statement for License Renewal of Nuclear Plants, NUREG-1437, Rev. 1 (June 2013)

(ML13106A241) (2013 Revised License Renewal GEIS).

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b. NRC Guidance NRCs principal guidance for Environmental Reports is set forth in NUREG-1555, Standard Review Plans for Environmental Reviews for Nuclear Power Plants (2000)

(ML0032702019). As demonstrated by the NRCs guidance for discussion of severe accident impacts, an environmental analysis must consider both internal events such as equipment failures and external events such as earthquakes:

In-plant accident sequences that can lead to a spectrum of releases shall be discussed and shall include sequences that can result in inadequate cooling of reactor fuel and melting of the reactor core. The events arising from causes external to the plant that are considered possible contributors to the risk associated with the plant should be discussed.

Socioeconomic impacts associated with emergency measures during or following an accident should also be discussed, and the environmental risks compared to and contrasted with radiological risks should be associated with normal and anticipated operational releases.

Id. at 7.2-3 (emphasis added).

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IV. CONTENTION: FAILURE TO ADDRESS ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS OF REACTOR ACCIDENTS CAUSED OR CONTRIBUTED TO BY EARTHQUAKES A. Statement of Contention Dominions Environmental Report fails to satisfy NEPA or NRC implementing regulations 10 C.F.R. §§ 51.53(c)(2) and 51.45(a), because it does not address the environmental impacts of operating North Anna Units 1 and 2 during the extended SLR term under the significant risk of an earthquake that exceeds the design basis for the reactors. The significance of the environmental risk posed by earthquakes to North Anna was conclusively demonstrated by a 2011 earthquake whose epicenter was a short distance from the two reactors and whose ground motion exceeded the design basis levels for both reactors. By exceeding the reactors design basis, the earthquake disproved the assumption underlying the NRCs issuance of operating licenses in 1978 (for Unit 1) and 1980 (for Unit 2) and renewal of those licenses 2003, that the reactors could be operated safely and without significant adverse environmental impacts because their SSCs were built to a design basis of sufficient rigor to protect against likely earthquakes.

Because that assumption has been proven wrong, a new Environmental Impact Statement must be created that analyzes this additional, proven risk.

While the NRC approved restart of the reactors after their post-earthquake shutdown, an operability determination for purposes of enforcing NRC standards is distinct from the review of environmental impacts that must be conducted in the SLR licensing decision that is now before the NRC. Dominion must fully comply with 10 C.F.R. §§ 51.53(c)(2) and 51.45(a) by addressing the probability and consequences of accidents caused or contributed to by earthquakes during a second license renewal term.

13

The analysis in the Environmental Report should include a discussion of the cumulative effects of operation during the SLR term, including the effects of earthquakes on SSCs whose ability to prevent or mitigate earthquake effects may be compromised by the long-term aging effects. Aging problems associated with SSCs, including reactor pressure vessel embrittlement, irradiation-assisted stress corrosion cracking of reactor internals, concrete structures and containment degradation, and electrical cable qualification and condition assessment, were identified in SECY-14-0016, Memorandum from Mark A. Satorius, NRC Executive Director of Operations, to NRC Commissioners, re: Ongoing Staff Activities to Assess Regulatory Considerations for Power Reactor Subsequent License Renewal at 1 (Jan. 31, 2014)

(ML14050A306) and the NRCs five-volume Expanded Materials Degradation Assessment (EMDA), NUREG/CR-7153 (Oct. 2014) (EMDA Report). 5 B. Basis Statement

1. Factual basis regarding 2011 earthquake

a. 2011 earthquake On August 23, 2011, while North Anna Units 1 and 2 were operating at full power, a Magnitude 5.8 earthquake occurred in Mineral Virginia, about ten miles from the reactors.

Technical Evaluation by the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Related to Plant Restart after the Occurrence of an Earthquake Exceeding the Level of the Operating Basis and Design Basis Earthquakes, Virginia Electric and Power Company, North Anna Power Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2 Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-4 and No. NPF-7, Docket Nos. 50-338 and 50-5 The five volumes of the EMDA Report are as follows: Volume 1, Core Internals and Piping (ML14279A321); Volume 2, Core Internals and Piping (ML14279A331); Volume 3, Reactor Vessel Aging (ML14279A349); Volume 4, Concrete Aging (ML14279A430); and Volume 5, Cable Aging (ML14279A461).

14

339, Executive Summary at 1 (November 11, 2011) (ML11308B405). After the earthquake, the North Anna site lost offsite power, both reactors automatically tripped, and four emergency diesel generators were activated. Id. As described by the NRC, the Mineral Earthquake exceeded the reactors design basis in two respects: spectral and peak ground accelerations for the Operating Basis (OBE) and Design Basis Earthquakes (DBE). Id.

Following the 2011 earthquake, Dominion conducted a restart evaluation by inspecting piping, concrete structures and other SSCs affected by the earthquake and found they remained operable. Id. at 31. Dominion also added some measures to improve its earthquake response, such as upgrades to its seismometers. Id. at 15. Based on Dominions evaluation and responsive measures, the NRC Staff approved restart. Id., Executive Summary at 2.

At the same time that Dominion and the NRC were responding to the 2011 earthquake, they were also responding to a catastrophic 2011 accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant complex in Japan, initiated by an earthquake and a tsunami. The Fukushima Daiichi accident led NRC to require further investigations and modifications of all reactors, including North Anna. See, e.g., Order EA-12-049 to All Power Reactor Licensees et al., re: Issuance of Order to Modify Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events (Mar. 12, 2012) (ML12054A735).

Because the Fukushima Daiichi accident was considered beyond the design basis for U.S. reactors, however, the NRC did not require changes to the rigorously qualified design bases to which the reactors had been built; nor did they require upgrades to SSCs or installation of SSCs. Instead, the NRC and the nuclear industry developed plans to install FLEX equipment for the purpose of providing diverse and flexible mitigation capacity. See NEI-12-06, Diverse and Flexible Coping Strategies (FLEX) Implementation Guide, Rev. 5 (April 2018) 15

(ML18120A300). As the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) explained, the FLEX equipment did not have to meet the NRCs strict standards for SSCs:

Plant equipment relied upon to support FLEX implementation does not need to be qualified to all extreme environments that may be posed, but some basis should be provided for the capability of the equipment to continue to function.

Id. at 16. Thus, while FLEX equipment was intended to play a safety role, it need not satisfy the quality standards, environmental qualification, and other measures mandated to assure the reliability of SSCs.6 6

NRC further explained the distinction between SSCs and FLEX equipment in its 2019 rule imposing post-Fukushima mitigation requirements (including FLEX strategies) on reactor licensees to protect against beyond design basis accidents:

The NRC also clarifies the confusion that appears to stem from the application of the reasonable protection standard to safety-related SSCs that have both design-basis and beyond-design-basis functions. Safety-related SSCs that function initially in response to beyond-design-basis external events have two sets of functions: safety-related functions and beyond-design-basis functions. The NRC imposes extensive, special treatment requirements on these SSCs for their safety-related functions for design-basis events.

This framework produces an increased level of assurance that the SSCs will perform those safety-related functions during and/or following the design-basis events as applicable. (See Risk-Informed Categorization and Treatment of Structures, Systems and Components for Nuclear Power Reactors; Final Rule (69 FR 68008; November 22, 2004).)

Through this final rule, the NRC places fewer regulatory requirements associated with the beyond-design-basis functions that dual-function SSCs perform to maintain or restore core cooling, containment, and SFP cooling capabilities, as compared to their safety-related, design-basis functions. The reasonable protection standard is a means for enabling greater flexibility for addressing external hazards, and in the process, enabling a beyond-design-basis regulatory framework that establishes an appropriate level of assurance. The fundamental applicability of the reasonable protection requirement is to equipment that is relied on for the mitigation strategies for beyond-design-basis events without regard to whether the equipment is FLEX equipment as defined in NEI 12-06 or plant equipment as that term is used in NEI 12-06. Accordingly, the set of requirements that are applicable, and by direct extension, the resulting level of regulatory assurance required is directly linked to whether the SSC or equipment is performing a design-basis function or a beyond-design-basis function. The level of assurance is established by the function performed by the SSC, not by the equipment or SSC alone.

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In responding to the NRCs post-Fukushima orders, Dominion noted that the 2011 earthquake was somewhat unique, and undertook a Senior Safety Hazard Analysis Committee (SSHAC) Level 2 evaluation that:

focused on the implications of the Mineral, VA earthquake, an update to the earthquake catalog that is the basis for the estimate of earthquake recurrence rates, and evaluation of new information available in the literature to determine if there was a basis for making revisions to the SSC model or the addition of new, local seismic sources that would contribute to the ground motion hazard at North Anna.

Letter from Daniel G. Stoddard to NRC re: Virginia Electric and Power Company North Anna Power Station Units 1 and 2, Response to March 12, 2012 Information Request: Seismic Probabilistic Risk Assessment for Recommendation 2.1 at 69 (Mar. 28, 2018) (ML13063A182)

(Dominion Letter re SSHAC Review). Dominion found no basis to revise or amend the SSC model for the North Anna PSHA [probabilistic seismic hazard analysis]. Id. at 84. Instead, Dominion provided non-safety-grade FLEX equipment such as a portable diesel generator and a portable RCS pump. Id. at 69.

No North Anna-specific licensing actions were taken by NRC in relation to the 2011 earthquake. Instead, Dominions response to the 2011 earthquake was treated as an operability and enforcement issue for which the NRC granted no rights of public participation in the decision-making process. Therefore, neither Dominion nor the NRC conducted any environmental analyses of the earthquakes environmental impacts and implications under NEPA.7 Final Rule, Mitigation of Beyond-Design-Basis Events, 84 Fed. Reg. 39,684, 39,690 (Aug. 9, 2019) (emphasis added) (Accident Mitigation Rule).

7 In 2019, when NRC promulgated the Accident Mitigation Rule to impose FLEX mitigation measures for severe earthquakes and other beyond-design-basis accidents on North Anna and other reactors, it did not prepare an environmental impact analysis of earthquake impacts, but instead found that the mitigation measures would not have any significant adverse impacts. See Mitigation Rule, 84 Fed. Reg. at 39,713. And the rulemaking did not address the particular 17

b. Lack of discussion of 2011 earthquake impacts in Dominions Environmental Report The Environmental Report provides a description of the 2011 earthquake in its description of the Geologic Environment in Section E-3. See id. at E-3-52. But it contains no discussion of earthquake or other accident impacts. Instead, for design basis accidents, the Environmental Report states:

The GEIS (NRC. 2013a) concluded that because a licensee is required to maintain the plant within acceptable design and performance criteria, including during any license renewal term, impacts from design-basis accidents would not be affected by changes in plant environment because such impacts (1) are based on calculated radioactive releases that are not expected to change, (2) are not affected by plant environment because they are evaluated for the hypothetical maximally exposed individual, and (3) have been previously determined acceptable. The GEIS also observes that additional experience has contributed to improved plant performance as measured by trends in plant-specific performance indicators, a reduction in operating events, and lessons learned that improve the safety of all the operating nuclear power plants. This is also confirmed by analysis which indicates that in many instances, improved plant performance and design features have resulted in reductions in initiating event frequency, core damage frequency, and containment failure frequency.

The NAPS review of new and significant information for the issue of design-basis accidents did not identify any new and significant information, and hence, no additional analysis is needed.

Environmental Report at E-4-85. Design basis accidents are also listed as a Category 1 issue in Table E4.0-2 at E4-7. Dominion incorporates by reference all applicable Category 1 findings in Table B-1, Appendix B to 10 C.F.R. Part 51, including accident impacts.

For beyond-design-basis earthquakes and other accidents, the Environmental Report relies on Table B-1s generic determination that:

The probability-weighted consequences of atmospheric releases, fallout onto open bodies of water, releases to groundwater, and societal and economic impacts from severe accidents are small for all plants.

circumstances of North Anna, where an earthquake exceeding the design basis already had occurred.

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Environmental Report at E-4-86.

And while the Environmental Report mentions a seismic PRA [probabilistic risk assessment] which takes into account the 2011 Mineral, VA, earthquake (id. at E-4-89), it does not provide any risk or consequence analysis from the seismic PRA, but instead summarily states that the seismic PRA showed there was no new and significant information that would call for consideration of new severe accident mitigation alternatives (SAMAs). Id. at 4 4-92.

Thus, the Environmental Report contains no analysis of the probability or consequences of a reactor accident caused by or contributed to by an earthquake -- even though a significant, beyond-design-basis earthquake had in fact unexpectedly occurred nearby.

2. Factual basis regarding uncertainties related to aging of passive SSCs

a. Uncertainties surrounding aging SSCs Going back to at least 2014, the NRC Staff has identified multiple SSCs for which technical gaps in understanding make it difficult to predict the SSCs behavior over an extended period of operation during a subsequent license renewal term. In early 2014, the NRC Staff issued SECY-14-0016, for the purpose of informing the Commission of ongoing staff activities to prepare for the anticipated receipt and review of subsequent license renewal applications that, if approved, could extend operation of power reactors beyond 60 years. SECY-14-0016 at 1.

(SECY-14-0016). The Staff asserted that it was currently performing confirmatory reviews of relevant technical issues for long-term operation and will summarize these efforts in several research reports. Id. at 2-3. The Staff also identified the most significant technical issues for operation beyond 60 years as reactor pressure vessel embrittlement, irradiation-assisted stress corrosion cracking of reactor internals, concrete structures and containment degradation, and electrical cable qualification and condition assessment. Id., Enclosure 1 at 2-3.

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SECY-14-0016 describes a significant feature of the Staffs effort to address the technical challenges posed by operation of certain SSCs during the SLR term: a collaboration with the U.S. Department of Energy on an expanded materials degradation assessment (EMDA).

According to the Staff, the nearly completed EMDA study relied on an expert elicitation process to identify materials and components which could be susceptible to significant degradation during operation beyond 60 years. Id., Encl. 1 at 3. The study would cover the reactor vessel, primary system piping, reactor vessel internals, concrete, and electrical cables and qualification. Id. The Staff committed to using the results of the EMDA study:

to identify any gaps in the current technical knowledge or issues not being addressed by planned industry or DOE research, and to identify AMPs that the staff believes will require enhancements for subsequent license renewal.

Id.

In SRM-SECY-14-0016, the Commission instructed the Staff as follows with respect to the SSCs the Staff had identified as posing significant technical issues:

The staff should keep the Commission informed on the progress in resolving the following technical issues related to SLR: reactor pressure vessel neutron embrittlement at high fluence; irradiation assisted stress corrosion cracking of reactor internals and primary system components; concrete and containment degradation, and electrical cable qualification and condition assessment. The staff should also keep the Commission informed regarding the staff's readiness for accepting an application and any further need for regulatory process changes, rulemaking, or research. The staff should continue to emphasize in communications with industry the need to strive for satisfactory resolution of these issues prior to the NRC beginning a review of any SLR application.

SRM-SECY-14-0016, Memorandum from Annette L. Vietti-Cook, Secretary, to Mark A.

Satorius, Executive Director for Operations, re: Ongoing Staff Activities to Assess Regulatory Considerations for Power Reactor Subsequent License Renewal (Aug. 29, 2014)

(https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/commission/srm/2014/2014-0016srm.pdf).

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A few months after the Commission issued SRM-SECY-14-0016, the NRC Staff published the results of the EMDA study in the five-volume EMDA Report. The EMDAs expert panel confirmed the existence of knowledge gaps relating to the problematic SSCs identified in SECY-14-0016. For instance, with respect to pressure vessel embrittlement, the EMDA Report concluded that:

significant technical issues still need to be addressed to reduce the uncertainties in the data and understanding of the changes in RPV material properties following neutron irradiation. The issues regarding irradiation effects are the most significant issues for RPVs.

Id., Vol. 1 at 17. As the EMDA expert panel further explained:

For reactor pressure vessels, a number of significant issues have been identified for future research. Relatively sparse or nonexistent data at high fluences, for long radiation exposure (duration), and resulting high embrittlement create large uncertainties for embrittlement predictions. The use of test reactors at high fluxes to obtain high fluence data is not the most direct representation of the low flux conditions in RPVs. Late-blooming phases (LBPs), especially for high nickel welds, have been observed and additional experimental data are needed in the high fluence regime where they are expected. Other discussed issues include specific needs regarding application of the fracture toughness master curve, data on long term thermal aging, attenuation of embrittlement through the RPV wall, and the development of an embrittlement trend curve based on fracture toughness measurements.

Id., Vol. 1 at 3 (emphasis added).

With respect to irradiation-assisted stress corrosion cracking [IASCC], the EMDA Report observed:

While all forms of corrosion are important in managing the safe operation of a nuclear reactor, IASCC [irradiation-assisted stress corrosion cracking] has received considerable attention over the last four decades due both to its severity and unpredictability. Despite over thirty years of international study, there does not exist a consensus on the underlying mechanism of IASCC, although more recent work in the open literature has identified several possible causes.

Id., Vol. 1 at 10 (emphasis added).

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For core internal structures, the EMDA expert panel observed that design testing was based on far less operational time than an 80-year operating life, thus calling for re-examination of the assumptions and limits for core internal structures, due to the potential for thermal aging and fatigue damage during extended lifetimes. Id., Vol. 1 at 11. As the report explained:

During the initial plant design, each component was designed with a load to expected and specific lifetimes and operating conditions using established guidelines (typically those in Section III of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code). An 80-year reactor lifetime corresponds to over 600,000 hours0 days 0 hours 0 weeks 0 months of service (at a 90% service factor) while most creep data used in design comes from tests operating much less than 100,000 hours0 days 0 hours 0 weeks 0 months .

Id. (emphasis added) The panel concluded that [t]he extension of lifetimes beyond these initial design considerations should be carefully examined. Id.

Similarly, for degradation of carbon steels and low alloy steels, the EMDA Report raised concerns about the wisdom of extrapolating 35-40 years of operating experience to 80 years of extended operation, including concerns regarding synergistic reactions between different types of degradation:

Engineering judgments may offer some justification for reactor operation up to 60 years, since that judgment is based largely on the extrapolation of known phenomena after operating lives of 35-40 years. There are concerns, however, regarding the potential degradation of carbon steels and low alloy steels if the operating license was extended a further 20 years to 80 years since this may lead to events associated with time-limiting degradation modes (such as fatigue or thermal aging) and synergisms between different degradation modes (such as irradiation and SCC).

Id., Vol. 2 at 103 (emphasis added). Similarly, with respect to sustained stress corrosion cracking (SCC), the EMDA raised questions about how combinations of system variables may compromise the validity of current design and disposition criteria. Id. at 125-26.

Concrete degradation was another example where the EMDA panel noted insufficient data to understand concrete irradiation, the most important degradation mechanism. Id. at 24.

The EMDA expert panel identified concrete irradiation as a knowledge gap, concluding that 22

the gap was due to a lack of sufficient test data to support a clear evaluation of the significance of such mechanism for long-term operations. Id. at 26. And the panel called for further research on concrete aging, another topic of concern that had been raised earlier in SECY-14-0016:

Concrete structures can also suffer undesirable changes in properties with time, including adverse performance of its cement paste matrix or aggregate constituents under environmental influences (e.g., physical or chemical attack). Changes to embedded steel reinforcement as well as its interaction with concrete can also be detrimental to concretes service life. Aging effects can be exacerbated if improper concrete specifications were used at the time of construction. A number of areas of research would help assess the long-term integrity of the reactor concrete structures.

Id., Vol. 1 at 3.

In addition, the EMDA expert panel expressed concern about whether the government would have ongoing capacity to address these unresolved issues:

Finally, it must be recognized that the steady decrease in overall R&D funding over the last ~20 years limits capability to perform another evaluation of this type, or retain expertise for other purposes. Many of the experts involved in this evaluation are retired, and several will no longer remain active as consultants in future years. Others are likely to retire and may not be available to consult or transfer knowledge to their replacements.

The combined experience and judgment represented by this panel may not be replaced in the next decade or two because the gap in expertise is so large. Further, the accumulated knowledge and judgment of the next generation of experts will be dramatically more difficult to acquire when the current leaders are no longer available.

Id., Vol. 2 at 203 (ML14279A331) (emphasis added).

Since the issuance of the EMDA Report in 2014, other government experts and industry consultants have examined possible ways to close the technical knowledge gaps and resolve the uncertainties that were identified by the Staff in SECY-14-0016 and confirmed by the EMDA expert panel in the EMDA Report. One tool that has received significant attention is the harvesting of components from decommissioned nuclear reactors. As NRC has recognized, harvested reactor components [m]ay be the only practical source of representative aged materials; and could be used to validate larger aging data set[s]. M. Hiser, P. Purtscher, A. B.

23

Hull and R. Tregoning, Harvesting of Aged Materials from Operating and Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants at 5 (Oct. 12, 2017) (ML17285A484). Furthermore, [e]x-plant materials offer unique environmental exposure that cannot be entirely replicated by laboratory testing with fresh materials. M. Hiser and A. Hull, Strategic Approach for Obtaining Material and Component Aging Information at 3 (June 2-4, 2015) (ML20332A097). Nevertheless, neither NRC nor the nuclear industry has established a program for systematic harvesting of components from decommissioned reactors. Nor are Petitioners aware of any other NRC Staff program resolving the knowledge gaps identified in SECY-14-0016 and the EMDA Report. These uncertainties persist as a crucial deficiency in the NRCs knowledge regarding the environmental risks posed by subsequent license renewal.

b. Lack of discussion of uncertainties related to aging of passive SSCs in Dominions Environmental Report In reliance on Category 1 of Appendix B to 10 C.F.R. Part 51, Dominions Environmental Report does not address the environmental impacts of operating North Anna Units 1 and 2 with aging equipment. Instead, Dominion simply provides a general description of the Aging Management Program (AMP) and Integrated Plant Assessment (IPA), submitted as part of its safety-related application. SLR Safety Application at E-2-52. According to Dominion:

The NRC requirements for the renewal of OLs for nuclear power plants include preparation of an integrated plant assessment (IPA) [10 CFR 54.21]. The IPA must identify systems, structures, and components (SSCs) subject to an aging management review. The objective of the IPA is to determine whether the detrimental effects of aging could preclude certain SSCs from performing in accordance with the current licensing basis during the additional 20 years of operation requested in the SLR application (SLRA). An example of an SSC subject to aging is the reactor vessel.

The NAPS IPA that Dominion conducted under 10 CFR 54, which is described in the body of the SLRA, has identified no license renewal-related refurbishment or replacement actions needed to maintain the functionality of SSCs, consistent with the 24

current licensing basis, during the period of extended operation. Dominion does not anticipate the continued operations of NAPS to adversely affect the environment.

Dominion also does not anticipate the need for any refurbishment for purposes of SLR as a result of the technical and aging management program information that will be submitted in accordance with the NRC license renewal process.

Environmental Report at E-2-52.

For its part, the SLR Safety Application barely mentions the 2011 earthquake, and does not evaluate its significance for aging equipment at North Anna Unit 1 and 2. It does not mention or address the concerns raised in SECY-14-0016 or the 2014 EMDA Report.

Most significantly, the SLR Application does not reflect consideration of the 2011 earthquakes ground motion values in Dominions aging analysis. To the contrary, instead of using ground motion values for the 2011 earthquake in the IPA, Dominions aging analysis used the design-basis earthquake (DBE) whose inapplicability was conclusively demonstrated by the earthquake. With respect to its evaluation of aging effects on the pressure vessel, for example, Dominion stated:

The loading conditions used to calculate stresses for the fracture mechanics evaluation were deadweight, design basis earthquake accelerations, and thrust forces from pipe ruptures of reactor coolant branch lines. These loading conditions are consistent with the loading conditions used in the current design basis calculations. The design loads were combined consistent with the current design basis calculations and the controlling load combination was as follows:

Design Load = Deadweight + [(DBE Seismic)2 + (LOCA)2]1/2 Notes:

1. DBE Seismic = forces due to design basis earthquake accelerations SLR Safety Application at 3-776.

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3. Legal bases for Contention

a. Applicable regulations In preparing its Environmental Report, Dominion has assumed that the content of the Environmental Report is governed by 10 C.F.R. § 51.53(c)(3), which excuses initial license renewal applicants from addressing a set of Category 1 issues that were evaluated in 1996 License Renewal GEIS. Environmental Report at E-4-2. These excluded environmental impacts include the probability and consequences of design basis accidents and beyond design basis accidents, including accidents caused or contributed to by earthquakes and/or failure of SSCs due to aging effects.

Petitioners respectfully submit that Dominions reliance on 10 C.F.R. § 51.53(c)(3) is legally erroneous, because § 51.53(c)(3) - by its plain language - applies only to applicants for initial license renewal. Nor does the regulatory history of NRCs NEPA regulations or the content of the Commissions generic environmental impact statements support Dominions reading of the regulations. Instead, Dominions Environmental Report is governed by 10 C.F.R.

§ 51.53(c)(2) and the other regulations it cross-references.

Nevertheless, Petitioners recognize that the Commission has upheld Dominions interpretation of NRC NEPA regulations in two other subsequent license renewal cases, Florida Power and Light Co. (Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Plant Units 3 and 4), CLI-20-03, 91 N.R.C. 33, 141-45 (2020) (Turkey Point - CLI-20-03) and Exelon Generation Co., L.L.C.

(Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Units 2 and 3), CLI-20-11, _ N.R.C. _, slip op. at 11-12 26

(Nov. 12, 2020) (Peach Bottom - CLI-20-11). At this time, therefore, those opinions govern this proceeding.8 Accordingly, in order to gain admission of its contention that Dominions Environmental Report fails to satisfy 10 C.F.R. §§ 51.53(c)(2) and 51.45(a), Petitioners seek a waiver of 10 C.F.R. § 51.53(c)(3) and other NRC regulations that would apply Category 1 exclusions to any analysis of reactor accident impacts caused by or contributed to by an earthquake. See Section V below, Petition for Waiver of 10 C.F.R. §§ 51.53(c)(3)(i), 51.71(d), and 51.95(c)(1) to Allow Consideration of Category 1 NEPA Issues (Waiver Petition).

If the Commission grants Petitioners Waiver Petition, it will moot the question of whether Dominions Environmental Report is governed by 10 C.F.R. § 51.53(c)(2) or 10 C.F.R.

§ 51.53(c)(3). If the Waiver Petition is denied, however, Petitioners request a formal ruling on that question in order to preserve it for subsequent judicial appeal. Rather than brief the legal issues here, Petitioners rely on and incorporate by reference the rationale and citations in the dissenting opinion of Commissioner Baran in Turkey Point-CLI-20-03-Turkey Point and the dissenting opinion of Commissioners Baran and Hanson in Peach Bottom CLI-20-11-Peach Bottom. In addition, Petitioners rely on and incorporate by reference the rationale and citations in the concurring and dissenting opinion of ASLB Judge Abreu in Florida Power and Light Co.

(Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Plant Units 3 and 4), LBP-19-03, 89 N.R.C. 245, 303 (2019).

8 Petitioners note that the question of which section of 10 C.F.R. § 51.53(c) applies to environmental reports in SLR proceedings is now before the D.C. Circuit of the U.S. Court of Appeals in Friends of the Earth v. NRC, No. 20-1026, a petition for review of Turkey Point-CLI-20-03. The case has been briefed and is awaiting oral argument.

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b. Demonstration that Dominions Environmental Report fails to consider significant environmental impacts as required by 10 C.F.R. §§ 51.53(c)(2) and 51.45(a).

As discussed above in Section IV.B.1.b, 10 C.F.R. §§ 51.53(c)(2) and 51.45(a) require Dominions Environmental Report to consider significant environmental impacts of reactor accidents, including accidents caused or contributed to by external events such as earthquakes.

See also NUREG-1555 and discussion above in Section III.B.2. As discussed above in Section IV.B.1.b, however, Dominion has completely failed to address the environmental impacts of operating the North Anna reactors during the extended SLR term under the significant risk of an earthquake that exceeds the design basis for the reactors. The significance of the environmental risk is conclusively demonstrated, as a matter of law, by the fact that the earthquake disproved the assumption underlying all previous environmental analyses for North Anna Units 1 and 2 that the reactors design basis ensured they could be operated safely and without significant adverse environmental impacts. See also Section V below.

In order to satisfy NEPA and NRC implementing regulations, Dominion must address the environmental implications of the 2011 earthquake for the long-term operation of North Anna Units 1 and 2, including the viability of previous assumptions by NRC and Dominion that the reactors were protected against likely environmental hazards by the carefully calibrated rigor of their designs. Dominions environmental analysis should include an assessment of both the probability and consequences of reactor accidents. State of New York, 681 F.3d at 479. In addition, Dominion must address any uncertainties that occur in the course of its analysis.

Limerick Ecology Action, 869 F.2d at 744.

Dominions Environmental Report must also include a discussion of the cumulative effects of operation during the SLR term. Interim Storage Partners LLC (WCS Consolidated 28

Interim Storage Facility), 90 N.R.C. at 106. Cumulative impacts reasonably include the effects of earthquakes on SSCs whose reliability to prevent or mitigate earthquake effects may be compromised by long-term aging effects. As discussed above in Section IV.B.2.a, the NRC has identified significant knowledge gaps and uncertainties in predicting long-term aging behavior of a number of SSCs, including reactor pressure vessel embrittlement, irradiation-assisted stress corrosion cracking of reactor internals, concrete structures and containment degradation, and electrical cable qualification and condition assessment. These uncertainties must also be addressed. Limerick Ecology Action, 869 F.2d at 744. In addition, the Environmental Report should address available relevant information regarding the availability of harvested reactor components whose evaluation may reduce uncertainties and knowledge gaps. See discussion above in Section IV.B.2.a.

C. Demonstration that the Contention is Within the Scope of the Proceeding Assuming Petitioners Waiver Petition is granted, this Contention is within the scope of the SLR proceeding for North Anna Units 1 and 2 because it seeks compliance by Dominions Environmental Report with NEPA and NRC implementing regulations.

D. Demonstration that the Contention is Material to the Findings NRC Must Make to Renew Dominions Operating License Assuming Petitioners Waiver Petition is granted, this Contention is material to the findings NRC must make regarding the environmental impacts of re-licensing North Anna Units 1 and 2 for a second renewed license term, because it challenges the adequacy of Dominions Environmental Report to support those findings.

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E. Concise Statement of the Facts or Expert Opinion Supporting the Contention, Along with Appropriate Citations to Supporting Scientific or Factual Materials The facts supporting Petitioners Contention are stated above in Section IV.B, and derive from document prepared by NRC or submitted to NRC by Dominion. Citations to all documents cited in the Basis Statement are provided. In addition, the attached Declaration of Diane Curran attests that these facts are correct to the best of her knowledge, and that the manner in which they are presented is correct to the best of her knowledge. See Declaration of Diane Curran in Support of Petition for Waiver of 10 C.F.R. §§ 51.53(c)(3)(i), 51.71(d), and 51.95(c)(1) to Allow Consideration of Category 1 NEPA Issues (December 14, 2020) (Curran Declaration)

(Attachment 2).

V. PETITION FOR WAIVER OF 10 C.F.R. §§ 51.53(c)(3)(i), 51.71(d), AND 51.95(c)(1) TO ALLOW CONSIDERATION OF CATEGORY 1 NEPA ISSUES Pursuant to 10 C.F.R. § 2.335(b), Petitioners request a waiver of 10 C.F.R. §§ 51.53(c)(3)(i),

51.71(d), and 51.95(c)(1), to the extent they bar consideration of NEPA Category 1 issues in this subsequent license renewal proceeding. See Turkey Point -CLI-20-03 and Peach Bottom -

CLI-20-11. Category 1 issues, which are listed in 10 C.F.R. Part 51, Subpart A, Appendix B, Table B-1, include the environmental impacts of design basis accidents and severe accidents, including accidents caused by or contributed to by earthquakes.

A waiver of 10 C.F.R. §§ 51.53(c)(3)(i) is necessary in order to allow admission of Petitioners Contention, which challenges the adequacy of Dominions Environmental Report to satisfy NEPA and NRC implementing regulation 10 C.F.R. § 51.53(c)(2) on the ground that it fails to consider the environmental implications of an earthquake in 2011 that exceeded the design basis for North Anna Units 1 and 2. See Section IV.A above. In reasonable anticipation that the same issues will arise upon publication by the NRC Staff of the draft and final 30

Supplemental Environmental Impact Statements (SEISs) for subsequent renewal of Dominions operating license, Petitioners also seek a waiver of 10 C.F.R. § 51.71(d) (which would apply the Category 1 exclusion to the Draft SEIS) and 10 C.F.R. § 51.95(c)(1) (which would apply the Category 1 to the Final SEIS). 9 As required by 10 C.F.R. § 2.335(b), this Waiver Petition is supported by the Curran Declaration. See Attachment 2.

A. Standard for Issuance of Waivers NRC regulation 10 C.F.R. § 2.335(b) allows submission of requests to waive or make an exception to the application of a particular regulation, on the sole ground that special circumstances with respect to the subject matter of the particular proceeding are such that the application of the rule or regulation (or a provision of it) would not serve the purposes for which the rule or regulation was adopted. The petition must be supported by an affidavit or declaration that identifies, with particularity, the specific aspect or aspects of the subject matter of the proceeding as to which the application of the rule or regulation (or provision of it) would not serve the purposes for which the rule or regulation was adopted. Id. The Commission has also interpreted § 2.335(b) to require the following four-step demonstration:

1. the rules strict application would not serve the purposes for which it was adopted;

2. special circumstances exist that were not considered, either explicitly or by necessary implication, in the rulemaking proceeding leading to the rule sought to be waived;

3. those circumstances are unique to the facility rather than common to a large class of facilities; and 9

As discussed above in Section 3.a, Petitioners respectfully submit that the Category 1 exclusions do not apply to environmental documents prepared in support of SLR applications, and that the Commissions rulings in CLI-20-03 (Turkey Point) and CLI-20-11 (Peach Bottom) are legally erroneous. Petitioners do not waive that issue by submitting this waiver petition.

Instead, the waiver petition is submitted in the alternative.

31

4. waiver of the regulation is necessary to reach a significant safety or environmental problem.

Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc. (Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3), CLI 24, 62 N.R.C. 551, 559-560 (2005); Exelon Generation Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-13-07, 78 N.R.C. 199, 207-08 (2013).

B. Petitioners Satisfy the Commissions Four-Part Test for Issuance of a Waiver.

As demonstrated below, Petitioners satisfy the NRCs four-part standard for issuance of a waiver.

1. Application of the Category 1 exclusion would not serve the purpose for which it was promulgated.

The Commissions purposes in making and codifying Category 1 environmental impact findings are set forth at the beginning of the preamble to the 1996 License Renewal Rule:

The amendment improves regulatory efficiency in environmental reviews for license renewal by drawing on the considerable experience of operating nuclear power reactors to generically assess many of the environmental impacts that are likely to be associated with license renewal.

The increased regulatory efficiency will result in lower costs to both the applicant in preparing a renewal application and to the NRC for reviewing plant-specific applications and better focus of review resources on significant case specific concerns.

The results should be a more focused and therefore a more effective NEPA review for each license renewal. The amendment will also provide the NRC with the flexibility to address unreviewed impacts at the site-specific stage of review and allow full consideration of the environmental impacts of license renewal.

61 Fed. Reg. at 28,467. Thus, the Commissions purposes in creating and codifying Category 1 generic impacts may be summarized as increasing efficiency, saving costs, and improving the quality of both generic and site-specific environmental analyses. It is important to note that nothing about this statement of purpose suggested that the Commission would sacrifice NEPA compliance to goals of efficiency or cost-savings. To the contrary, the Commission clearly 32

thought that by improving the efficiency of the environmental review process through generic determinations, it would raise the quality of its NEPA review processes across the board.

Application of the Category 1 exclusions in this proceeding would defeat the Commissions purpose of ensuring NEPA compliance and improving the quality of site-specific license renewal reviews, by barring consideration of new and significant information regarding the environmental impacts of operating North Anna Units 1 and 2 in a subsequent license renewal term. The new and significant information consists of the occurrence of an earthquake in 2011 which exceeded the design basis for North Anna Units 1 and 2. This new and significant information should be considered in order to ensure that the NRCs subsequent license renewal decision for North Anna Units 1 and 2 is fully informed and that appropriate alternatives are implemented that would prevent or mitigate adverse environmental impacts from accidents that are caused by or contributed to by earthquakes.

The information is new because the 2011 earthquake is the first earthquake to exceed the North Anna design basis, and it has not been considered in any previous site-specific or generic environmental study. The information is also new in the sense that it is unique to North Anna, and has not been experienced by other reactors; therefore, no applicable generic environmental review exists.

Finally, the environmental implications of the 2011 are significant as a matter of law. As stated in Contention 1, North Annas actual experience of a beyond design basis earthquake fundamentally disproved the assumption underlying the issuance of operating licenses for North Anna Unit 1 (1978) and Unit 2 (1980) and the initial renewal of those licenses in 2003, that the reactors could be operated safely and without significant adverse environmental impacts because their safety systems and components (SSCs) were designed and built with sufficient rigor to 33

protect against likely earthquakes. Therefore, the impacts of an accident involving an earthquake are significant as a matter of law.

These issues are discussed in more detail in Sections 2, 3, and 4 below.

2. Special circumstances exist that were not previously considered.

This Waiver Petition raises special circumstances that were not previously considered, because no previous environmental impact statement has considered the environmental significance of the actual occurrence of a beyond-design basis earthquake at North Anna Units 1 and 2. Simply put, the NRC has prepared no EIS or GEIS relevant to North Anna Units 1 and 2 since before 2011, when the earthquake occurred.

3. The special circumstances raised by this Waiver Petition are unique to North Anna Units 1 and 2.

This Waiver Petition raises circumstances that are both special and unique to North Anna Units 1 and 2 in two respects. First, the circumstances are special and unique because the seismic design of North Anna Units 1 and 2 is based on an assessment of an earthquake whose impacts are unique to the North Anna site. 10 Second, the circumstances are special and unique because the unprecedented occurrence of the 2011 beyond-design-basis earthquake irrefutably disproves, uniquely for North Anna, the 1996 License Renewal GEIS conclusion that environmental impacts of design basis accidents are small because design and performance criteria for all operating reactors are acceptable. Id. at xliii-xliv.11 In light of these special and unique circumstances, Dominion and the NRC lack any rational basis to rely on the 1996 License Renewal GEIS conclusion that earthquake-related 10 Dominion has also stated that the 2011 earthquake was somewhat unique for North Anna.

See Dominion Letter re SSHAC Review and discussion above in Section IV.B.1.a.

11 The 2013 Revised License Renewal GEIS did not revisit or alter this conclusion.

34

accident impacts during a subsequent license renewal term for North Anna will be small because they are encompassed by the reactors design basis.

4. Waiver of the regulation is necessary to reach a significant environmental problem.

Petitioners respectfully submit that the 2011 beyond-design-basis earthquake at North Anna establishes that the environmental impacts of earthquake-related accidents at North Anna Units 1 and 2 must be considered significant as a matter of law, because the occurrence of the earthquake upended the central conclusion of the original EIS for North Anna and the License Renewal 1996 License Renewal GEIS that environmental impacts of most reactor accidents will be small.

The sole basis for the conclusion of insignificant impacts is the NRCs assumption that under its Atomic Energy Act-based licensing scheme, nuclear reactors will operate within their design bases. See License Renewal GEIS at xliii-xliv (All plants have had a previous evaluation of the environmental impacts of design-basis accidents.) Now that this key assumption has been refuted, neither Dominion nor the NRC has a lawful basis to conclude that the environmental impacts of operating North Anna for a second license renewal term are insignificant.

It should be noted that the safety findings made by the NRC under the Atomic Energy Act are a very significant component of the NRCs environmental analysis, because NRC safety regulations are based on the assumption that a reactors design basis will protect against most public safety and environmental threats. In fact, before the Three Mile Island accident demonstrated the potential for severe beyond-design-basis accidents, the NRC took the position that nothing more than completion of the Atomic Energy Act-based safety review was needed in order to achieve NEPA compliance. See Public Service Electric and Gas Co, et al. (Hope Creek Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-518, 9 N.R.C. 14, 39 (1979); Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-86-5, 23 N.R.C. 125, 127 (1998), revd, 35

Limerick Ecology Action v. NRC, 869 F.2d 719 (1989). It is now well-established that NEPA imposes requirements that go beyond compliance with Atomic Energy Act-based regulations, for instance requiring consideration of alternatives to avoid or mitigate the consequences of nuclear accidents. See, e.g., Citizens for Safe Power, 524 F.2d at 1299 and Limerick Ecology Action, 869 F.2d at 729-31. Yet, these decisions have not disturbed the bedrock role of the NRCs Atomic Energy Act-based reasonable assurance findings in supporting its NEPA-based conclusions that the environmental impacts of operating nuclear reactors are acceptable. Citizens for Safe Power, 524 F.2d at 1299-1300.

The environmental significance of the 2011 earthquake is also confirmed by Dominions own NRC-approved actions in response. The earthquake also affected the site of North Anna Unit 3, a new reactor proposed for the North Anna site. After the earthquake, Dominion reviewed the adequacy of its combined license (COL) application and proposed safety-related design changes such as the arrangement of steel reinforcements and shear ties and increasing the size of certain welds, anchor bolts, and a steel girder. The NRC approved those design changes in Dominion Virginia Power (North Anna Power Station, Unit 3) CLI-17-08, 85 N.R.C. 157, 178 (2017). In contrast, as discussed above in Section IV.B.1.b, for North Anna Units 1 and 2, Dominion made no design changes to its reactors, but instead provided some FLEX equipment that is not safety grade, and that therefore may not survive the next earthquake. Moreover, these measures were taken in response to enforcement orders, and thus were not subject to the rigors of a NEPA analysis or public participation. And nothing about Dominions SLR Safety Application indicates that Dominion has taken the 2011 earthquake into account in its safety evaluation of aging equipment. Instead, as also discussed above in in Section IV.B.1.b, Dominions aging 36

analysis assumes the same design-basis earthquake whose inadequacy was conclusively demonstrated by the 2011 earthquake.

Petitioners recognize that in the immediate aftermath of the 2011 earthquake, the NRC may have affirmatively decided not to require Dominion to upgrade the design basis of North Anna Units 1 and 2 to correct for its inadequacy to respond to ground motions now known to be higher than the design basis earthquake; and that if so, the now-outdated design basis earthquake is a part of the current licensing basis (CLB) that may not be challenged in this proceeding.

Florida Power & Light Co. (Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 3 & 4), CLI-01-17, 54 N.R.C. 3, 8-9 (2001). But the prohibition by NRC safety rules against challenges to the CLB does not excuse noncompliance with NRCs separate and independent NEPA obligation to address the environmental significance of the License Renewal GEIS demonstrably false claim that the environmental impacts of accidents during a renewed license term at North Anna will be small by virtue of the rigor of the reactors design basis. The NRC must evaluate the probability that more earthquakes will challenge North Annas design basis, as well as the environmental consequences of accidents involving earthquakes. And it must evaluate the cost-effectiveness of measures to avoid or mitigate those accidents, including upgrading safety equipment to reduce the environmental risks to the level previously assured by the 1996 License Renewal GEIS.

Accordingly, as a matter of law, and based on the facts set forth in this Petition, the environmental impacts of an accident involving an earthquake at North Anna Units 1 and 2 are significant. Therefore, they must be addressed in Dominions Environmental Report.

37

VI. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, Petitioners Hearing Request and Waiver Request should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

__/signed electronically by/___

Diane Curran Harmon, Curran, Spielberg, & Eisenberg, L.L.P.

1725 DeSales Street N.W., Suite 500 Washington, D.C. 20036 240-393-9285 dcurran@harmoncurran.com December 14, 2020 38 A

B C

D E

F G

H I

J UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE SECRETARY

)

In the Matter of )

Virginia Electric Power Co. ) Docket Nos. 50-338/339 SLR North Anna Power Station Units 1 & 2 )

___________________________________ )

DECLARATION OF SCOTT PRICE Under penalty of perjury, Scott Price declares as follows:

1) My name is Scott Price. I am both a member and Public Policy Director of the Alliance for a Progressive Virginia.

2) I live at 2602 Grove Avenue #10, Richmond, Virginia 23220.

3) My home is located within the 50-mile emergency planning zone (EPZ) of the North Anna Nuclear Power Station, for which Virginia Electric Power Company has submitted an application to the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission for the Subsequent License Renewal of its operating license. Both North Anna units have previously received a 20-year license extension on their original 40-year operating licenses, which now expire in 2038 and 2040, respectively.

4) Based on the historical experience of nuclear power stations, I believe that these facilities are inherently dangerous. Continued operations of North Anna Nuclear Power Station Units 1 and 2 for an additional 20 years beyond 2038 and 2040 could cause a severe nuclear accident in the reactor(s) and/or irradiated fuel storage pool(s) thereby causing death, injury, illness, dislocation, and economic damage to me and my family. It could also cause devasting environmental damage.

5) I believe that Virginia Electric Power Companys application to extend operations of North Anna Units 1 and 2 from 60 to 80 years is inadequate to reasonably assure the protection of my health, safety and the environment. Therefore, I have authorized Alliance for a Progressive Virginia to represent my interests in this proceeding.

____________________________________________ ______12/09/2020______________

Date K

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE SECRETARY

)

In the Matter of )

Virginia Electric Power Co. ) Docket Nos. 50-338/339 SLR North Anna Power Station Units 1 & 2 )

___________________________________ )

DECLARATION OF DIANE CURRAN IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR WAIVER OF 10 C.F.R. §§ 51.53(c)(3)(i), 51.71(d), AND 51.95(c)(1) TO ALLOW CONSIDERATION OF CATEGORY 1 NEPA ISSUES Under penalty of perjury, I, Diane Curran state as follows:

1. I am an attorney for Petitioners Beyond Nuclear, Inc., Sierra Club, Inc., and Alliance for a Progressive Virginia in the above-captioned subsequent license renewal proceeding.

2. I am qualified by my legal training and professional experience as an expert on the Atomic Energy Act, the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), judicial opinions interpreting those statutes, and regulations and decisions of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) interpreting those statutes. My expertise extends to NRC regulations and decisions regarding reactor license renewal and subsequent license renewal. I also have a general understanding of technical issues related to nuclear reactor safety and environmental impact analysis, at a level that is sufficient for me to make a reasonable evaluation of NRC technical correspondence and reports on safety and environmental issues.

3. My legal training consists of a Juris Doctor degree from the University of Maryland. My professional experience consists of more than 35 years of providing legal representation to citizen groups and state and local governments in NRC licensing and enforcement proceedings, including license renewal proceedings and subsequent license renewal proceedings.

4. The purpose of my declaration is to support Petitioners Petition for Waiver of 10 C.F.R.

§§ 51.53(c)(3)(i), 51.71(d), and 51.95(c)(1) to Allow Consideration of Category 1 NEPA Issues (Waiver Petition). The Petition is presented in Section V of Hearing Request and Petition to Intervene by Beyond Nuclear, Sierra Club, and Alliance for Progressive Virginia (Dec. 14, 2020) (Hearing Request), which has been submitted to the NRC.

5. I am responsible for the contents of the Waiver Petition, including its assertion that application of the Category 1 exclusions in 10 C.F.R. Part 51, Subpart A, Appendix B, would not serve the purposes for which the rule was adopted. I am also responsible for identifying, with particularity, the specific aspects of the subject matter of this proceeding

that should be considered in a full environmental analysis that is compliant with the procedural requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).

6. The factual assertions in the Waiver Petition and Hearing Request are based on publicly available documents authored by the NRC and Virginia Electric Power Company (also known as Dominion Electric Power Company or Dominion) in this proceeding. All of these documents are posted on the NRCs Agency Wide Document Access and Management System (ADAMS). I have no reason to question the factual veracity of those documents, and my representation of their contents is true and correct to the best of my knowledge.

7. The opinions expressed in the Waiver Petition are based on my best professional judgment, including my expert opinion that the occurrence in 2011 of a beyond-design-basis earthquake at North Anna establishes that the environmental impacts of reactor accidents are significant as a matter of law.

December 14, 2020 Diane Curran 2

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE SECRETARY

)

In the Matter of )

Virginia Electric Power Co. ) Docket Nos. 50-338/339 SLR North Anna Power Station, Units 1 and 2 )

___________________________________ )

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I certify that on December 14, 2020, I posted HEARING REQUEST AND PETITION TO INTERVENE BY BEYOND NUCLEAR, SIERRA CLUB, AND ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESSIVE VIRGINIA AND PETITION FOR WAIVER OF 10 C.F.R. §§ 51.53(c)(3)(i),

51.71(d), AND 51.95(c)(1) TO ALLOW CONSIDERATION OF CATEGORY 1 NEPA ISSUES, including Attachments 1A-1K, and Attachment 2 on the NRCs Electronic Information Exchange.

___/signed electronically by/__

Diane Curran 39

ML20349D952

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