ML20323A018
| ML20323A018 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Beaver Valley |
| Issue date: | 11/18/2020 |
| From: | Gaydosik T First Energy Services |
| To: | David Silk NRC Region 1 |
| D Jackson | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18296A422 | List: |
| References | |
| CAC 000500 IR 2019301 | |
| Download: ML20323A018 (65) | |
Text
Note: Correction for the ADAMS record.
This file was added to ADAMS after a self-assessment determined that the pages for the final scenario guides were mis-ordered when they were entered into ADAMS.
Below are the final scenario guide pages in their proper order for Scenarios 1, 2, and 3.
Appendix D Scenario Outline Facility: BVPS Unit 2 Scenario No. 1 Op Test No.: 2LOT19 NRC Examiners: Candidates: SRO ATC BOP Initial IC 173 (17): 75% power, MOL, Equ. XE Conditions, CB D @ 185 steps, RCS boron -
Conditions: 980 ppm.
Turnover: Maintain 75% power.
Critical Tasks: 1. CT-13 (E-0.Q) Manually trip the turbine.
Event Malf. No. Event Type Event Description No.
2RCS-LK459F demand drifts to 0% in automatic, reducing 1 CNH-PCS09B (C,A) ATC, SRO charging flow, requires manual PRZR level control.
(C,A) BOP, SRO 21C steam generator Feed flow transmitter 2FWS*FT496 2 XMT-MSS055A (TS) SRO drifts low.
(C,A) ATC, SRO 3 FLX-LDS04 25 gpm RCS letdown line leak. (isolable)
(TS) SRO (R) ATC Management directed Emergency S/D at 2%/min, IAW AOP 4 N/A (N) BOP, SRO 2.51.1 520 gpm LOCA on RCS loop B cold leg requiring a reactor 5 RCS02B (M) ALL trip and safety injection.
6 EHC08A (C) BOP, SRO Automatic turbine trip failure, manual trip successful.
Terry turbine and 23A motor driven AFW pumps trip on start.
PMP-AFW001, 2, 7 (M) ALL 23B motor driven AFW pump shaft sheared. Crew enters LOA-AFW022 FR-H.1 to restore feedwater via a main feed pump.
After re-entry into E-0, MPC fails high, PORV 455C opens CNH-PCS10B 8 (C) ATC, SRO and sticks, requires manual closure of block valve and spray VLV-RCS034A valves.
9 PMP-MSC011 (C) BOP, SRO EDG 2-1 ventilation fan fails to auto start on SI/EDG start.
(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor, (A)bnormal E-0 FR-H.1 E-0 E-1 NUREG-1021, Revision 11 FENOC Facsimile Rev. AG
Appendix D Scenario Outline 2L19N1 After taking the shift at 75% power, MOL, the pressurizer master level controller will fail to zero. The crew will diagnose the indications and IAW AOP 2.4.1 part C, the ATC will manually control PRZR level.
The C SG feed flow transmitter, 2FWS*FT496, will then drift low. IAW AOP 2.4.1 part A, the BOP will take manual control of feedwater flow and stabilize the plant. The SRO will enter the instrument failure procedure, 2OM-24.4.IF, Attachment 2 and direct the crew to place the alternate channel in service. SRO will address applicable Tech Spec.
A 25 gpm leak will develop on the letdown line outside of CNMT in A penetrations area. First indication will be an ALERT on the SLCRS ventilation rad monitor. The crew will then recognize VCT level is decreasing and enter AOP 2.6.7, Excessive Primary Plant Leakage, when the ATC isolates letdown, the leak will be isolated. The crew determines that the leak has been isolated and begins efforts to place excess letdown in service.
After the crew has determined that the leak is isolated, Management will direct the crew to S/D at 2%/minute IAW AOP 2.51.1.
After the Reactor power has been lowered to <68%, a 520 gpm LOCA will occur on the B loop cold leg.
The crew will identify degrading plant parameters and the SRO will direct a pre-emptive reactor trip and enter E-0. The turbine will fail to automatically trip due to the reactor trip, the BOP will manually trip the turbine.
When Verifying AFW Status in E-0, the crew will identify that all auxiliary feedwater pumps have failed, the SRO will transition to FR-H.1. IAW FR-H.1 direction the crew will restore feedwater flow by starting a main feedwater pump. After feed flow is verified, the SRO will return to E-0.
After the crew returns to E-0, the Master Pressure controller will fail high causing PORV 455C and the PRZR spray valves to open. The ATC will identify the failure, unsuccessfully attempt to close the PORV and close the motor operated block valve then close both spray valves.
After returning to E-0, the SRO will determine that the RCS is not intact and transition to E-1. The scenario will be terminated at the lead evaluators discretion after the crew exits E-1.
Expected procedure flow path is E-0 FR-H.1 E-0 E-1 NUREG-1021, Revision 11 FENOC Facsimile Rev. AG
BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION INITIAL CONDITIONS: (IC-173) 75% Power, MOL, Bank D @ 185 steps, Equilibrium XE, 980 PPM Boron, ADDITIONAL LINEUP CHANGES STICKERS MONITOR SETUP High power splash EQUIPMENT STATUS DATE/TIME OOS TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION(S)
SHIFT TURNOVER INFORMATION
- 1. Maintain 75% power.
2.
3.
SCENARIO SUPPORT MATERIAL REQUIRED PROCEDURES NEEDED
- 1. Reactivity plan - provide MOL Rapid Power Reduction reactivity plan. E-0
- 2. E-1 FR-H.1 Attachment A-0.6 Attachment A-0.11 Attachment A-1.8 AOP 2.4.1 AOP 2.6.7 AOP 2.51.1 24 IF, Attachment 1 24 IF, Attachment 2 Insert preloads per the simulator preload section of the HTML file for this scenario:
BVPS - 2L19 NRC Scenario 1, rev AG 3 of 25
BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES PLANT STATUS / PROCEDURAL GUIDANCE EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE EVENT 1:
Pressurizer level controller, VCT level rises ATC reports unexpected PRZR level deviation alarm.
2RCS*LK459F, drifts to 0% in Charging flow reduces to minimum. ATC identifies 2RCS*LK459F is failing low.
automatic. IAW AOP 2.41 part C, ATC places 2RCS*LK459F in A4-1C, PRZR Control Lvl Dev High/Low, Manual and controls PRZR level IMF CNH-PCS09B (0 0) 0 60 2RCS*LI459A, 460 and 461 all indicate a If necessary ATC places 2CHS*FCV122 in manual downscale trend. and restores PRZR level.
SRO enters AOP 2.4.1, Process Control Failure.
SRO provides a control band and Rx trip criteria of 5% low/90% high for manual PRZR level control.
Insert next malfunction at LE discretion.
BVPS - 2L19 NRC Scenario 1, rev AG 4 of 25
BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES PLANT STATUS / PROCEDURAL GUIDANCE EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE EVENT 2:
"C" SG Feed flow channel Controlling feed flow channel for 21C steam BOP acknowledges and reports alarms, diagnoses feed 2FWS-FT496 drifts low. generator level control drifts low, main feed flow channel failure, IAW AOP 2.4.1 part A, regulating valve opens in response. Actual feed establishes manual control of C MFRV to stabilize IMF XMT-CFW055A (0 0) 0 120 flow and level rise. 21C SG level.
A6-11F, Loop C feed flow > steam flow (valid SRO establishes a control band of 44% +/-5%, and NOTE: for actual flow parameters). Rx trip criteria of 25% low and 85% high for manual Both ARPs direct manual MFRV SG level control.
control (2FWS-FCV498) and IF procedure implementation. ATC reviews ARPs.
NOTE: IAW the IF procedure, the SRO transitions to the Feedwater Instrument crew will place the alternate CH in Failure procedure, 2OM-24.4.IF, Attachment 2, service within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> or request a section G. BOP places 2FWS-FR498, 21C SG Feedwater Flow BCO be written. Signal Selector, in Position FT 497, CH 3. (BB-C)
NOTE: There is no applicable TS for the Feedwater flow channel itself, however, when the alternate steam flow channel is placed in service, TS is now applicable to level ch, 2FWS-LT496.
NOTE:TS is not applicable until the crew places alternate channel in service in the process racks. If the crew delays in sending an operator to perform this action, the TS evaluation may need to be performed as a followup.
NOTE:
For purposes of scenario progression, time compression is used for Operator response during event 2 BVPS - 2L19 NRC Scenario 1, rev AG 5 of 25
BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES PLANT STATUS / PROCEDURAL GUIDANCE EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE EVENT 2: (continued)
Crew dispatches an operator to place 2FWS-FR498, ROLE PLAY OPERATIONS Annunciator A1-4E, Main Steam Flow CH 21C SG Steam Flow Signal Selector, in position F494.
After 1 minute, contact control room Selected Trouble alarms when CH is selected. (primary process rack RK-2PRI-PROC-8, Control and report as an operator that you are Bldg, 707')
ready to place 2FWS-FR498, 21C SG Steam Flow Signal Selector, in position SRO declares 2FWS-LT496 INOPERABLE.
F494.
IOR XC1I088F (0 0) 0 BOP returns 2FWS*FCV498, 21C SG Main Feedwater Reg Vlv, to AUTO.
SRO references Tech. Specs for 2FWS-LT496. Tech Spec 3.3.1, function 14, Lo-Lo lvl Rx trip, Condition E, trip B/S w/in 72 hrs.
Tech Spec 3.3.2, function 5b, Hi-Hi lvl Turb trip, Condition D, trip B/S w/in 72 hrs.
Tech Spec 3.3.2, function 6b, SG Lo-Lo AFW start, Condition D, trip B/S w/in 72 hrs.
SRO identifies from Attachment 1 of 24IF procedure that bi-stables that require tripping for this failure are the Lo-Lo Level Rx Trip and the Hi-Hi Level Turbine NOTE: After the SRO determines Trip & FW Isolation bi-stables.
which bi-stables are to be tripped, Insert next event at LE discretion. SRO contacts I&C to trip applicable bi-stables.
BVPS - 2L19 NRC Scenario 1, rev AG 6 of 25
BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES PLANT STATUS / PROCEDURAL GUIDANCE EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE EVENT 3:
25 gpm letdown line leak outside A4-5A, Rad Monitor trouble. BOP reviews ARPs.
CNMT (isolable, downstream of Alert alarm on SLCRS ventilation Rad monitor, BOP verifies valid Rad monitor indication using ARP.
2CHS*AOV204 in "A" penetrations) 2RMR-RQ301A (1042) and 2RMR-RQ301B (2042)
IMF FLX-LDS04 (0 0) 25 VCT level slowly decreasing ATC checks if PRZR level can be maintained by:
SRO enters 2.6.7, Excessive Primary Plant
- Controlling charging flow to maintain Leakage programmed PRZR level
- Checking CNMT, PAB and safeguards conditions are consistent with pre-event.
BOP verifies Primary auxiliary bldg (PAB) radiation levels are not NORMAL.
Crew recognizes that SLCRS ventilation radiation monitor has been verified as having a valid radiation signal and therefore radiation levels are NOT normal.
BOP makes plant announcement, requests all non-essential personnel stand clear of PAB.
BOP requests Rad Pro support to locally identify leak.
Crew determines conditions are NOT consistent with pre-event based upon rising radiation levels in PAB.
SRO transitions from AOP 2.6.7, step 2 to step 6 Crew verifies RCS temperature is stable.
BVPS - 2L19 NRC Scenario 1, rev AG 7 of 25
BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES PLANT STATUS / PROCEDURAL GUIDANCE EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE EVENT 3: (continued) ATC verifies 2CHS*FCV122 is maintaining constant PRZR level in AUTO, if not, ATC places NOTE: The Master Level Controller 2CHS*FCV122 in Manual and controls PRZR level failed in Event 1, therefore, MLC or using 2CHS*FCV122 and/or 2CHS*HCV186.
FCV122 would be in MANUAL now.
Crew checks VCT level trend and determines that VCT level is DROPPING at >0.7%/min. and reports to SRO that leakrate is >10 gpm but may be isolable.
NOTE: Due to dynamic nature of event, a followup question regarding SRO recognizes TS 3.4.13 Condition A, is applicable applicable TS may be necessary. for unidentified leakage.
ATC quantifies leakage & checks for CVCS leakage:
- Isolates charging/letdown by closing valves:
- 2CHS*AOV200A & B Letdown orifice isol.
- 2CHS*LCV460A & B Regen Ht Ex inlet.
- 2CHS*FCV122, charging flow control vlv.
Crew recognizes auxiliary bldg radiation levels begin reducing with letdown isolated.
- Crew determines PRZR level is rising.
- Crew determines that with PRZR level rising, the leak has been isolated.
BVPS - 2L19 NRC Scenario 1, rev AG 8 of 25
BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES PLANT STATUS / PROCEDURAL GUIDANCE EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE EVENT 3: (continued) ATC determines VCT level can be maintained >5%
with normal makeup.
ATC controls 2CHS*FCV122 and 2CHS*HCV186 as necessary to maintain at approximately programmed PRZR level.
ROLE PLAY: When the crew makes Crew determines it is NOT desirable to restore preparations to place excess letdown in charging and letdown to service.
service, report as Shift Manager, that due to the leak, management has SRO directs the crew to place EXCESS letdown in requested that crew shutdown the plant service.
to mode 3 at 2%/minute IAW AOP 2.51.1.
EVENT 4:
Unplanned Power Reduction IAW AOP SRO enters AOP 2.51.1, Unplanned Power SRO directs ATC and BOP to reduce power to take 2.51.1. Reduction. the plant offline IAW AOP 2.51.1.
BOP initiates turbine load reduction:
- Depress 1st STG IN pushbutton.
- Set EHC SETTER to desired load.
- Set LOAD RATE thumbwheel to 2%.
- Depress GO.
BVPS - 2L19 NRC Scenario 1, rev AG 9 of 25
BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES PLANT STATUS / PROCEDURAL GUIDANCE EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE EVENT 4: (continued) ATC initiates boration IAW Attachment 1; (2% per minute power reduction).
- Places boric acid makeup blender control switch to STOP.
- Places mode selector switch to BORATE.
- Sets 2CHS*FCV113A to flow rate desired.
- Sets 2CHS-FQIS113, BA totalizer, to total volume of BA to be added per reactivity plan.
- Resets 2CHS*FQIS113
- Ensures 2CHS*FQIS168 is set to zero, then depresses reset.
- Places boric acid makeup blender control switch to START, then verifies inservice BA pump starts, 2CHS*FCV113B opens and boric acid flow is indicated on 2CHS-FR113.
- Adjusts 2CHS*FCV113A setpoint as desired to control boration flowrate.
BOP maintains power factor within limits.
Crew sounds the standby alarms and announces a Unit 2 rapid power reduction.
ATC places all PRZR heaters to ON.
ATC verifies rod control in AUTO and maintaining Tavg within +/- 5F of Tref.
NOTE: Event 5 will automatically BOP references and performs Attachment 4 to transfer initiate when reactor power is reduced busses to the offsite sources.
to <68% (approx. 7% power reduction).
BVPS - 2L19 NRC Scenario 1, rev AG 10 of 25
BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES PLANT STATUS / PROCEDURAL GUIDANCE EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE EVENT 5:
520 gpm SBLOCA on B RCS Loop PRZR level and pressure decreases. ATC reports degrading primary plant conditions.
TRGSET 4 FNISPR(2)<=68 A2-2B, Unidentified Leakage system trouble.
IMF RCS02B (4 0) 520 0 ASIS A1-2G, Incore Instrument/CNMT sump lvl Hi. SRO directs ATC to manually trip the reactor.
(preloaded) A4-5C, Rad Mon High - 2RMR-RQ303 SRO directs the crew to perform IOAs for E-0.
EVENTS 6, 7, & 9: Auto main turbine trip failure.
(all preloaded to occur on the Rx trip) Loss of all AFW 2-1 EDG ventilation fan fails to auto start on NOTE: Event 8 will be manually EDG start.
inserted when the crew returns to E-0 following restoration of feed water flow SRO enters E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety ATC and BOP commence IOAs of E-0.
Injection.
ATC verifies reactor trip:
- A5-6D - LIT.
- Power range indication is < 5%.
- Neutron flux is dropping.
BVPS - 2L19 NRC Scenario 1, rev AG 11 of 25
BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES PLANT STATUS / PROCEDURAL GUIDANCE EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE EVENTS 6, 7, & 9: (continued) Automatic turbine trip failure. BOP verifies Turbine trip did NOT occur:
- Throttle OR Governor valves NOT closed.
Critical Task: CT-13 (E-0.Q)
- Main Generator output brks - Not open.
Crew manually trips the main turbine
- Exciter Circuit breaker - not open.
before a Severe (orange path) challenge develops to either the Sub-criticality or BOP manually trips the turbine, then verifies:
the Integrity CSF or before transition to
- Throttle OR Governor valves ALL closed.
ECA-2.1, whichever occurs first.
- Main Generator output brks - open.
- Exciter Circuit breaker - open.
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE -- Failure to trip the main turbine under the postulated plant conditions causes challenges to CSFs beyond those irreparably introduced by the postulated conditions. Additionally, such an omission constitutes a demonstrated inability by the crew to "take an action...that would prevent a challenge to plant safety."
BOP verifies power to AC emergency busses:
- Using VB-C voltmeters, verifies both 2AE and 2DF busses have voltage indicated.
NOTE: Due to the degrading SI automatically actuated Check SI status:
conditions, the crew may pre-emptively ATC reports SI automatically actuated and manually actuate SI. manually actuates SI by turning both trains control switches.
ATC/BOP, sounds standby alarm, announces Unit 2 reactor trip and safety injection.
BVPS - 2L19 NRC Scenario 1, rev AG 12 of 25
BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES PLANT STATUS / PROCEDURAL GUIDANCE EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE EVENTS 6, 7, & 9: (continued) Check if HHSI flow should be secured by checking the following:
- CNMT & Secondary radiation
- SG - pressures and levels
- RCS subcooling
- Secondary heat sink exists
- RCS pressure - stable or rising
- PRZR level - >17%
- SI occurred automatically Due to CNMT parameters not being consistent with pre-event, crew determines SI is required; SI flow should not be secured at this time.
ATC verifies SI System status:
- 2CHS*P21A & 2CHS*P21B running.
- 2SIS*P21A & 2SIS*P21B running.
- HHSI Flow indicated on 2SIS-FI943.
BOP verifies AFW System status
- Motor-driven AFW Pumps - NONE RUNNING and wont start from CR.
- Turb driven AFW Pump Stm Supply Isol Valves - OPEN but turbine is tripped.
- AFW Throttle Vlvs - FULL OPEN
- Total AFW Flow - < 340 GPM BOP reports no Aux Feedwater pumps running and no aux feed water flow exists.
SRO recognizes that AFW flow cannot be established and enters FR-H.1, Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink.
BVPS - 2L19 NRC Scenario 1, rev AG 13 of 25
BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES PLANT STATUS / PROCEDURAL GUIDANCE EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE EVENTS 6, 7 & 9: (continued) ATC checks if secondary heat sink is required by:
- RCS hot leg temperatures >350°F.
Crew determines a secondary heat sink is required.
NOTE:
PORVs may lift several times during Crew checks SG WR levels and determines if RCS this transient due to natural circulation bleed and feed should be initiated.
being established while Safety Injection
flow is occurring. Crew determines bleed and feed is not required at this time and continues to monitor WR level.
With WR levels >14%, PORVs opening are not due to loss of heat sink; bleed and feed is not required.
BOP checks primary plant demineralized water storage tank, 2WTD-TK210, level is >85 inches.
BVPS - 2L19 NRC Scenario 1, rev AG 14 of 25
BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES PLANT STATUS / PROCEDURAL GUIDANCE EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE EVENTS 6, 7, & 9: (continued) Crew tries to establish AFW flow to at least 1 SG.
ATC verifies SG blowdown and blowdown sample ROLE PLAY: lines are isolated.
When directed to investigate AFW pump status locally, wait 3 minutes Crew confirms then report as appropriate:
- A motor-driven pump has tripped.
2FWE*P23A, is not running, nothing
- B motor-driven pump running with no flow.
obvious at the pump.
- Turbine-driven pump tripped on startup.
2FWE*P23B, motor is running, pump
- All AFW throttle valves are open.
is not turning.
2FWE*P22 is not running due to the SRO continues to try to restore AFW flow while trip throttle valve linkage rod being continuing in procedure.
broken. BOP confirms AFW flow is not >340 gpm.
If dispatched to AE switchgear, wait 2 minutes then report that overcurrent Crew dispatches an operator to locally establish AFW relay 51-VE218 is tripped on ACB flow via Attachment A-1.8.
2E18 for 2FWE*P23A.
Try to establish main feedwater flow:
BOP verifies 2 condensate pumps are running.
ATC reports CNMT FWI valves are closed.
SRO directs ATC/BOP to reset SI and FWI signals.
- SI signal - both trains.
- FWI signal - both trains.
NOTE: Valves have long stroke time, ATC opens all feedwater CMNT isol valves, once valve is dual indication the crew 2FWS*HYV157A, B, C.
may continue in the procedure.
BOP starts either main feed pump, 2FWS-P21A or NOTE: Either main feed pump will 2FWS-P21B.
start if attempted.
BVPS - 2L19 NRC Scenario 1, rev AG 15 of 25
BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES PLANT STATUS / PROCEDURAL GUIDANCE EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE EVENTS 6, 7, & 9: (continued) BOP feeds intact SGs using the feedwater bypass control valves.
Critical Task: CT-43 (FR-H.1.A) BOP feeds intact SGs using the feedwater bypass Crew establishes feedwater flow into at control valves and verifies that either:
least one SG before RCS feed and
- Core Exit TCs are dropping.
bleed is required. OR
- SG Wide Range levels are rising.
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE -- Failure to establish feedwater flow to any SG BOP verifies CETC are dropping and WR SG levels results in the crew's having to rely upon are rising.
the lower priority action of establishing RCS bleed and feed to minimize core uncovery. This constitutes incorrect performance that "leads to degradation of any barrier to fission product release."
SRO returns to E-0, step 10 IAW FR-H-1, step Feedwater flow now verified.
8.b.
EVENT 8: Master Pressure Controller (MPC) fails high After return to E-0, enter Event 8. causing pressurizer spray valves to open and (Master Pressure Controller (MPC) 2RCS*PCV455C to open and stick - block fails high) valve can be closed to stop leak.
IMF CNH-PCS10B (0 10) 100 0 ASIS SRO directs BOP to verify automatic actions by performing Attachment A-0.11 in a timely manner.
BVPS - 2L19 NRC Scenario 1, rev AG 16 of 25
BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES PLANT STATUS / PROCEDURAL GUIDANCE EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE EVENTS 6, 7, 8, & 9: (continued) List of Attachment A-0.11 discrepancies: BOP performs Attachment A-0.11.
NOTE: 2-1 EDG ventilation failed to auto start, Evaluation of BOP performing 2HVD-FN270A required manual start.
Attachment A-0.11 begins on page 23. Additionally, may note that AFW did not function on SIS actuation and that FWI was reset and CNMT FWI valves have been opened.
NOTE: ATC checks RCS Tcold stable at or trending to 547F.
RCPs should have been tripped previously in FR-H.1 due to loss of heat ATC reports RCS cold leg temperature and cooldown sink, therefore, ATC needs to check caused by LOCA/ SI flow.
Tcolds VS. Tavg. Crew stops any steam release, reheat steam is isolated and reduces feedwater flow to minimize cooldown.
BVPS - 2L19 NRC Scenario 1, rev AG 17 of 25
BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES PLANT STATUS / PROCEDURAL GUIDANCE EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE EVENTS 6, 7, 8, & 9: (continued) ATC verifies PRZR isolated:
ATC closes block valve, 2RCS*MOV535, to isolate stuck open PORV.
ATC continues verifying PRZR isolated:
- Spray Valves - BOTH OPEN, require closing.
- Safety relief valves - CLOSED (use PSMS).
- PRT conditions - CONSISTENT WITH EXPECTED VALUES.
- Power to at least one block valve -
AVAILABLE (all).
- Block valves - AT LEAST ONE OPEN, (2 are open.)
NOTE: ATC checks if RCPs should be stopped:
RCPs were previously S/D in FR-H.1
- D/P between RCS pressure and highest SG due to loss of heat sink. pressure - LESS THAN 205 PSID [220 PSID]
ATC reports all RCPs previously stopped.
BVPS - 2L19 NRC Scenario 1, rev AG 18 of 25
BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES PLANT STATUS / PROCEDURAL GUIDANCE EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE EVENTS 6, 7, 8, & 9: (continued) ATC/BOP checks if any SGs are faulted:
Crew checks if SG tubes are intact:
- Check all SG levels - NONE RISING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER
- Check Secondary Radiation - CONSISTENT WITH PRE-EVENT VALUES Crew determines no SG levels are rising in an uncontrolled manner and secondary radiation is consistent with pre-event values, therefore all SG tubes are intact.
Hi radiation alarm is in due to containment Crew checks if RCS is intact by checking CNMT radiation levels. conditions consistent with pre-event values:
- CNMT radiation Incore room and containment radiation monitors
- CNMT pressure in Hi alarm.
Containment sump level is rising. Crew determines the RCS is not intact, based on CNMT conditions.
Crew verifies 2SIS*MOV867A,B,C & D all are open and determines transition to E-1 is appropriate.
BVPS - 2L19 NRC Scenario 1, rev AG 19 of 25
BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES PLANT STATUS / PROCEDURAL GUIDANCE EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE EVENTS 6, 7, 8, & 9: (continued) SRO transitions to E-1, Loss of Reactor or ATC checks if CREVS should be actuated:
Secondary Coolant.
Checks EITHER of the following:
- Control Room radiation monitor, 2RMC*RQ201,202, - NOT IN HIGH ALARM
- CIB - HAS NOT OCCURRED Crew determines CREVs should not be actuated for given conditions.
ATC checks if RCPs should be stopped.
ATC reports RCPs were previously stopped.
ROLE PLAY: ATC/BOP dispatches an operator to energize valves When dispatched to energize valves IAW Attachment A-0.6, Cold Leg Recirculation IAW Attachment A-0.6, wait 5 Component Verification.
minutes, insert following commands then report complete.
IRF LOA-LOV093 (0 0) RACKIN IRF LOA-LOV102 (0 0) RACKIN IRF LOA-LOV094 (0 0) RACKIN IRF LOA-LOV103 (0 0) RACKIN IRF LOA-LOV095 (0 0) RACKIN IRF LOA-LOV104 (0 0) RACKIN IRF LOA-LOV096 (0 0) RACKIN IRF LOA-LOV105 (0 0) RACKIN ATC checks CIB - NOT ACTUATED.
BVPS - 2L19 NRC Scenario 1, rev AG 20 of 25
BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES PLANT STATUS / PROCEDURAL GUIDANCE EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE EVENTS 6, 7, 8, & 9: (continued) ATC/BOP checks if any SGs are faulted:
- NR levels - >12%.
Controls feed flow to maintain NR level between 12%
and 50%.
Crew checks if SG tubes are intact:
- Check all SG levels - NONE RISING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER.
- Check secondary radiation - CONSISTENT WITH PRE-EVENT VALUES.
Crew determines no SG levels are rising in an uncontrolled manner and secondary radiation is consistent with pre-event values, therefore all SG tubes are intact.
. ATC checks PORVs and block valves:
- Power to block valves - AVAILABLE.
- PORVs - CLOSED.
- Block valves - Two open.
BVPS - 2L19 NRC Scenario 1, rev AG 21 of 25
BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES PLANT STATUS / PROCEDURAL GUIDANCE EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE EVENTS 6, 7, 8, & 9: (continued) Crew checks if SI Flow should be reduced.
- BOP confirms secondary heat sink available by
>340 gpm of feed flow available OR NR level in at least 1 SG > 12%.
- ATC confirms PRZR level is >17%.
Crew determines that current plant conditions support SI reduction.
NOTE: Due to crew timing and SRO transitions to ES-1.1.
procedure progression, the plant conditions may not support transition to ES-1.1 at this time.
Terminate scenario after the crew evaluates transition to ES-1.1 as appropriate.
BVPS - 2L19 NRC Scenario 1, rev AG 22 of 25
BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES PLANT STATUS / PROCEDURAL GUIDANCE EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE Attachment A-0.11 Verification of BOP performs Attachment A-0.11, Verification of Automatic Actions performed as time Automatic Actions as follows:
& manpower permit.
Checks both EDGs running with SWS valve EVENT 9: alignment and ventilation in service.
2HVD*FN270A auto start failure 2HVD*FN270A is not running, starts fan by turning IMF PMP-MSC011 (0 0) 1 CS to OFF then to AUTO or ON.
(preloaded)
Verifies power to both AC emergency busses.
Checks 2HVS*FN204A or 2HVS*FN204B running.
Ensure Reheat Steam Isolation. Ensure reheat steam isolation:
- Verify 2MSS-MOV100A and B - closed.
- Reset reheater controller.
- Verify 2GSS-MOV204, spillover vlv, closed.
Steamline isolation not required. Check if main steamline isolation required:
-OR-
- Steamline pressure - < 500 PSIG
-OR-
- Steamline pressure high rate of change - 100 PSIG DROP IN 50 SECONDS.
If steamline isolation is required, verifies SLI by checking all YELLOW SLI marks - LIT.
If steamline isolation is not required continues on.
BVPS - 2L19 NRC Scenario 1, rev AG 23 of 25
BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES PLANT STATUS / PROCEDURAL GUIDANCE EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE Attachment A-0.11 - (continued) Establish domestic water system cooling to station air NOTE: compressors; BOP may have already pre-emptively
- Opens 2CCS-AOV118.
opened 2CCS-AOV118 to provide
- Verifies at least 1 air compressor is running.
cooling to the Station Air compressors.
Verifies at least 1 CCP pump is running unless a CIB CIB has not occurred. has occurred.
Align neutron flux monitoring for shutdown:
- Verifies SR CHs energized when IR <1E-10.
Check CIB and CNMT spray status:
CIB has not occurred.
If not - Actuate CIB if required by:
- Manually initiating CIB - BOTH SWITCHES FOR BOTH TRAINS.
- Manually align equipment as required.
- Verify all RCPs - STOPPED.
- BV-1 operator verifies CREVS actuation.
- Service water flow established to RSS HX(s).
Verify service water system in service:
- SWS pumps - TWO RUNNING.
Verify both CNMT hydrogen analyzers running:
2HCS*SOV100A1, B1 - CNMT sample amber lights
- LIT.
BVPS - 2L19 NRC Scenario 1, rev AG 24 of 25
BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES PLANT STATUS / PROCEDURAL GUIDANCE EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE Attachment A-0.11 - (continued) Verify ESF equipment status:
required, no discrepancies.
- Verify CIA by checking all ORANGE CIA marks - LIT.
- Verify FWI by checking all GREEN FWI marks - LIT.
Verify source range channels energized with audible indication functioning properly, adjusts multiplier switch and volume as necessary.
Attachment A-0.11 - COMPLETE Discrepancies: Upon completion, report any discrepancies to SRO.
BVPS - 2L19 NRC Scenario 1, rev AG 25 of 25
Appendix D Scenario Outline 2L19N2 Facility: BVPS Unit 2 Scenario No. 2 Op Test No.: 2LOT19 NRC Examiners: Candidates: SRO ATC BOP Initial IC-59 (18): 100% power, MOL, Equ. XE Conditions, CB D @ 230 steps, RCS boron -
Conditions: 890 ppm.
Turnover: Maintain 100% power.
Critical Tasks: 1. CT-2 (E-0.D) Actuate SIS.
- 2. CT-12 (E-0.P) Actuate Main steam line isolation.
- 3. CT-17 (E-2.A) Isolate Faulted SG.
Event Malf. No. Event Type Event Description No.
1 XMT-LDS003A (C,A) ATC, SRO VCT level transmitter, 2CHS-LT115 fails low.
(C,A) BOP, SRO N-36, Instrument power fuse blows, requires removal from 2 NIS07B (TS) SRO service and compensatory actions.
(C,A) ALL 3 CRF03-F6 Control Bank D, Rod F06 drops.
(TS) SRO 4 FLX-CFW33 (M) ALL C SG feedwater leak inside Containment.
Condenser steam dump valve 2MSS-PCV106A stuck open, 5 VLV-MSS013 (C) BOP, SRO manual main steamline isolation required.
6 PPL05A, PPL05B (C) ATC, SRO Automatic safety injection actuation failure.
Charging/HHSI pump, 2CHS*P21A auto start failure upon SI 7 PPL07A (C) ATC, SRO actuation.
2FWE*HCV100B fails to 100%, requires securing AFW 8 CNH-AFW02A (C) BOP, SRO pump.
Leak Collection Filtered Exhaust Fans, 2HVS*FN204A and PMP-MSC036 9 (C) BOP, SRO B, trip on Rx trip, requires manual starting of PMP-MSC037 2HVS*FN204B.
10 11 (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor, (A)bnormal E-0 E-2 ES-1.1 NUREG-1021, Revision 11 FENOC Facsimile Rev. AG
Appendix D Scenario Outline 2L19N2 2L19N2 After taking the shift at 100% power, MOL, VCT level transmitter, 2CHS-LT115 will fail low causing an auto makeup to occur. The ATC will identify the LT failure and stop the auto makeup IAW AOP 2.4.1 (Process Control Failure), the crew will then respond to the LT failure IAW the Instrument Failure procedure, 2OM-7.4.IF, Attachment 1.
Intermediate Range channel, N-36, instrument power fuse will blow, the crew will enter AOP 2.1.2B, and take the channel out of service, the SRO will evaluate technical specifications.
Bank D control rod, F06 will then drop, the crew will identify the rod drop, IAW AOP 2.1.8 IOAs, the ATC will verify only one rod has dropped. The SRO will direct the BOP to lower turbine load to raise RCS temperature while the SRO reviews applicable technical specifications.
A feedwater leak will occur on the C main feedline inside CNMT, the BOP will identify C SG feedflow increasing while level is decreasing, the ATC will identify CNMT pressure rising. The SRO will direct the ATC to manually trip the Rx.
While stabilizing the plant in E-0, the crew will identify that a condenser steam dump valve is failed open requiring a manual mainsteam line isolation to be initiated to stop the RCS cooldown.
The crew will identify that SI is required and did not actuate automatically, the ATC will manually initiate safety injection.
The ATC will identify that the A HHSI pump failed to auto start on the SI signal and manually start 2CHS*P21A.
The crew will identify the C SG as faulted and the SRO will transition to E-2.
The BOP will attempt to pre-emptively isolate feedwater to the C SG and identify that the B header AFW valve, 2FWE*HCV100B AFW valve is failed open. The SRO will direct the BOP to take compensatory actions IAW EOP attachment A-1.24, step 8.
While the BOP is performing Attachment A-0.11, they will identify that both Leak Collection Filtered Exhaust Fans have tripped and manually starts 2HVS*FN204B.
After completing isolation of the C SG IAW E-2, the SRO will transition to ES-1.1.
The scenario will be terminated following SI termination in ES-1.1.
Expected procedure flow path is E-0 E-2 ES-1.1.
NUREG-1021, Revision 11 FENOC Facsimile Rev. AG
BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION INITIAL CONDITIONS: IC-59 (18) 100 % Power, MOL, Bank D @ 230 steps, Equilibrium XE, 890 PPM Boron, ADDITIONAL LINEUP CHANGES STICKERS MONITOR SETUP 100% power splash EQUIPMENT STATUS DATE/TIME OOS TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION(S)
SHIFT TURNOVER INFORMATION
- 1. Maintain 100% power.
2.
3.
SCENARIO SUPPORT MATERIAL REQUIRED PROCEDURES NEEDED
- 1. Reactivity plan - provide MOL Rapid Power Reduction reactivity plan. E-0
- 2. E-2 ES-1.1 AOP 2.1.8 AOP 2.2.1B AOP 2.4.1 7 IF, Attach 1 Attachment A-0.11 Attachment A-1.24 Insert preloads per the simulator preload section of the HTML file for this scenario:
BVPS - 2L19 NRC Scenario 2, rev AG 3 of 18
BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES PLANT STATUS / PROCEDURAL GUIDANCE EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE EVENT 1:
IMMEDIATE PLANT RESPONSE: Crew recognizes 2CHS*LT115 failed low.
2CHS*LT115 fails low. Automatic makeup initiates. Crew confirms actual VCT level is rising.
IMF XMT-LDS003A 2CHS*LI115 VCT level indication decreases (computer trend for 2CHS*LT112 increases) IAW AOP 2.4.1, ATC recognizes failure and stops the A2-2G: VCT Trouble, will annunciate for Low Automatic makeup.
VCT level.
2CHS*LCV112 goes to full divert to the coolant SRO enters AOP 2.4.1, verifies plant stability and recovery tanks. transitions to CVCS Instrument failure procedure, 2OM-7.4.IF, Attachment 1 to address VCT level channel failure.
SRO directs ATC to place the VCT Level Control Selector Switch to the VCT position.
ATC verifies 2CHS*LCV112 and 2CHS*LCV115A both in the VCT position.
ATC manually initiates VCT makeup as necessary and maintains VCT level at program range of 20-60%.
Proceed with next event at LE discretion BVPS - 2L19 NRC Scenario 2, rev AG 4 of 18
BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES PLANT STATUS / PROCEDURAL GUIDANCE EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE EVENT 2: ATC performs:
- Check reactor power - > P-10 NIS07B: N36 Intermediate Range A4-4E: NIS Compensator Comparator Trouble
- Momentarily Place Intermediate Range Block instrument fuse blows Train A and Train B switches to IMF NIS07B (0 0) 0 SRO enters AOP 2.2.1B, Intermediate Range INTERRANGE BLOCK position.
Channel Malfunction.
- Place caution tags on Source Range Trip NOTE: May have already blocked IR Block/Reset Train A and Train B switches, train A & B. Manually unblock source range during plant shutdown.
- Verify NR-45 recorder selected to OPERABLE channels SRO evaluates Technical Specifications TS 3.3.3, Condition A, Restore required channel to OPERABLE status within 30 days.
TS 3.3.1, Condition F (1 or 2) INFO ONLY BOP removes failed channel from service:
- Places Level Trip switch for N36 to BYPASS.
o Verify Annunciator A4-5E, NIS Source/Int Range High Flux Trip Bypass in alarm due to failed channel.
o Verify status light Level Trip Bypass on drawer - LIT.
Continue with next event at LE discretion.
BVPS - 2L19 NRC Scenario 2, rev AG 5 of 18
BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES PLANT STATUS / PROCEDURAL GUIDANCE EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE EVENT 3:
Dropped rod. IMF CRF03-F6 (2 0) 0 A4-9F, Rod at Bottom ATC reports numerous primary alarms related to A4-8G, Rod Position Deviation power and control rods.
A4-4F, NIS Power Range Comparator Deviation DRPI for rod F06 indicates ZERO steps with rod ATC recognizes a dropped rod, IAW IOA's of AOP at bottom light lit 2.1.8, verifies only one rod dropped.
SRO enters AOP 2.1.8, Rod Inoperability, SRO directs the crew to perform IOA's of AOP 2.1.8 Part A for dropped or misaligned rod. for a dropped rod.
ATC responds to dropped rod:
- reports to crew, a single dropped rod, F06.
- places Control Rods in MANUAL.
- verifies Rx remains critical with Tavg >541F.
- reports Tavg is > 4F of Tref.
SRO directs BOP to adjust turbine load as necessary to maintain Tavg within +/- 4F of Tref.
BOP adjusts turbine load as follows:
- depresses 1st STG IN PB.
- adjusts turbine control to desired load.
- adjusts load reduction rate as desired.
- depresses GO.
- reduces power incrementally until Tavg is
+/-4F of Tref.
ATC verifies RCS temperature, Tavg, is stable.
BVPS - 2L19 NRC Scenario 2, rev AG 6 of 18
BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES PLANT STATUS / PROCEDURAL GUIDANCE EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE EVENT 3: continued SRO reviews Tech Specs. T.S. 3.1.4.2, Condition B; Within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />, verify SDM within limits OR Initiate boration to restore SDM within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> AND Reduce thermal power to <=75%
within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.
T.S. 3.4.1 DNB Condition A; Restore DNB parameters to within limits within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.
Continue with next event at LE discretion EVENT 4:
ALARMS:
C SG feedwater leak inside CNMT. A1-2G, Incore Instr Rm/CNMT Sump Lvl high BOP reports C SG feedflow is increasing but actual IMF FLX-CFW33 (0 0) 7000 0 0 A2-2B, UIL Trouble NR level is decreasing.
FIRST OUT ALARM ATC reports CNMT pressure, sump level and A5-4C, SG 21C Lvl Lo-lo Rx trip humidity are all rising.
SRO directs ATC to trip the reactor.
EVENTS 5 - 9: (all preloaded) SRO enters E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety ATC and BOP commence IOAs of E-0.
Injection.
Condenser stm dump failure ATC verifies reactor trip:
Automatic Safety injection failure
- A5-6D - LIT.
HHSI pump auto start failure
- Power range indication is < 5%.
AFW valve failed open
- Neutron flux is dropping.
Leak collection filtered exhaust fan trip BOP verifies Turbine trip:
- Throttle OR Governor valves ALL closed.
- Main Generator output brks - open.
- Exciter Circuit breaker - open.
BVPS - 2L19 NRC Scenario 2, rev AG 7 of 18
BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES PLANT STATUS / PROCEDURAL GUIDANCE EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE EVENTS 6, 7, 8 & 9: (continued) BOP verifies power to AC emergency busses:
- Using VB-C voltmeters, verifies both 2AE and 2DF busses have voltage indicated.
Critical Task CT-2 (E-0.D) Check SI Status.
Crew manually actuates at least one ATC checks if SI is required:
train of SIS-actuated safeguards before
transition to any ORP.
- ATC verifies PRZR press is not > 1860 psig.
- ATC/BOP verifies Steamline press > 500 psig.
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE -- Failure to manually actuate SI under the Crew determines SI is required; ATC manually postulated conditions constitutes actuates SI by actuating both trainscontrol switches.
"misoperation or incorrect crew performance that leads to degraded ECCS capacity."
ATC/BOP, sounds standby alarm, announces Unit 2 reactor trip and safety injection.
Check if HHSI flow should be secured by checking the following:
- CNMT & Secondary radiation
- SG - pressures and levels
- RCS subcooling
- Secondary heat sink exists
- RCS pressure - stable or rising
- PRZR level - >17%
- SI occurred automatically Due to SG pressures and CNMT parameters not being consistent with pre-event, crew determines SI is required; SI flow should not be secured at this time.
BVPS - 2L19 NRC Scenario 2, rev AG 8 of 18
BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES PLANT STATUS / PROCEDURAL GUIDANCE EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE EVENTS 6, 7, 8 & 9: (continued) ATC verifies SI System status:
- 2CHS*P21A & 2CHS*P21B running, IMF PPL07A (preloaded identifies only 2CHS*P21B running and manually starts 2CHS*P21A.
- 2SIS*P21A & 2SIS*P21B running.
- HHSI Flow indicated on 2SIS-FI943.
NOTE: BOP verifies AFW status:
BOP may have pre-emptively isolated
- Both motor-driven pumps running.
- Turb driven pump, all stm supply SOVs open.
- AFW throttle valves all FULL OPEN.
- Total AFW flow is >340 gpm.
SRO directs BOP to verify automatic actions by performing Attachment A-0.11 in a timely manner.
NOTE: List of Attachment A-0.11 discrepancies: BOP performs Attachment A-0.11.
Evaluation of BOP performing 2CHS*P21A auto start failure.
Attachment A-0.11 begins on page 16. 2HVS*FN204A & B not running.
BVPS - 2L19 NRC Scenario 2, rev AG 9 of 18
BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES PLANT STATUS / PROCEDURAL GUIDANCE EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE EVENTS 6, 7, 8 & 9: (continued) ATC checks RCS Tavg stable at or trending to 547F.
NOTE:
If the feed break was not diagnosed RCS temperature <547°F and dropping due to ATC reports RCS Tavg is <547F and dropping.
prior to the trip, steam pressures will safety injection flow and steam break flow. SRO directs ATC to:
begin to diverge following steamline
- Stop dumping steam & verify steam dumps isolation, allowing for diagnosis of the closed. ATC reports 2MSS-PCV106A is stuck faulted SG. NOTE: open and will not close.
If the feed break was diagnosed quickly, the
- SRO directs ATC to initiate a SLI by Critical Task: E-0.P BOP may have preemptively performed a MSLI depressing 4 of 4 PB.
Crew manually actuates main steam after performing E-0 IOA's.
- Verify 2MSS-MOV100A, B are closed.
line isolation before a Severe (orange
- Depress the reheater controller RESET PB.
path) challenge develops to either the
- Minimize total feedflow while maintaining >
Sub-criticality or Integrity CSF or 340 gpm until 1 NR level is >31% (adverse).
before transition to ECA-2.1, whichever occurs first.
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE - Failure to close the MSIVs under these conditions causes challenges to CSFs beyond those irreparably introduced by these conditions. Additionally, such an omission constitutes a failure by the crew to demonstrate the ability to recognize a failure or an incorrect automatic actuation of an ESF system or component, and to take one or more actions that would prevent a challenge to plant safety.
NOTE: To solidify this Critical Task, all automatic Main Steam Line Isolation signals have been inhibited, including Intermediate High CNMT pressure.
BVPS - 2L19 NRC Scenario 2, rev AG 10 of 18
BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES PLANT STATUS / PROCEDURAL GUIDANCE EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE EVENTS 6, 7, 8, & 9: (continued) ATC verifies PRZR isolated:
- PORVs - CLOSED.
- Spray Valves - CLOSED.
- Safety relief valves - CLOSED (use PSMS)
- Power to at least one block valve -
AVAILABLE.
- Block valves - AT LEAST ONE OPEN.
(all block valves are open)
ATC checks if RCPs should be stopped:
RCP trip criteria is not likely to be met at this point in the scenario, if so, RCP's ATC reports RCP trip criteria is not met, all RCPs left will be tripped at this time. in service at this time.
ATC/BOP checks if any SGs are faulted:
- ANY SG COMPLETELY DEPRESSURIZED Crew determines there is a faulted SG, verifies HHSI flow is indicated and transition to E-2 is required.
BVPS - 2L19 NRC Scenario 2, rev AG 11 of 18
BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES PLANT STATUS / PROCEDURAL GUIDANCE EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE EVENTS 6, 7, 8 & 9: (continued) SRO transitions to E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Verify CREVS actuated.
Isolation. ATC/BOP reports CREVS not actuated.
SRO directs ATC/BOP to actuate both trains of CREVS using the CONTROL ROOM EMERG AIR SUP ACTUATION pushbuttons,
- Verifies the control room air intake and exhaust dampers are CLOSED.
- Verifies 2HVC*FN241A running after time delay.
SRO requests a BV-1 operator to verify proper CREVS actuation and place CR air intake and exhaust dampers control switches in CLOSE.
SRO directs STA to commence Control Room ventilation actions. Refer to Attachment A-2.4.
NOTE:
Main steamline isolation should have ATC/BOP verifies steamline isolation has occurred by already occurred and verified via checking all YELLOW SLI identified components are attachment A-0.11 by this time, crew in the designated position. (previously verified) not likely to verify again at this time.
C SG pressure is lower than A & B. Crew checks for any non-faulted SGs:
A & B may be slowly lowering as expected
- BOP identifies A & B steam generator due to the cooldown. Crew should respond with pressures are stable or rising.
stable for A & B SGs.
C SG pressure & level lowering. Crew identifies C SG as faulted.
BVPS - 2L19 NRC Scenario 2, rev AG 12 of 18
BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES PLANT STATUS / PROCEDURAL GUIDANCE EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE EVENTS 6, 7, 8 & 9: (continued)
Critical Task: CT-17 (E-2.A) BOP isolates the faulted, C SG as follows:
Crew isolates the faulted SG & directs
- Verifies FWI. (previously verified) operator to close isolation valves NOTE:
- Closes AFW throttle valves on C SG operated from outside of the control Crew may have pre-emptively isolated AFW 2FWE*HCV100A, B.
room before transition out of E-2. flow to the C SG after fault was recognized. BOP reports 2FWE*HCV100B will not close.
SRO directs BOP to respond IAW Attachment A-1.24, SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE -- Failure to AFW Throttle Valve Failure, step 8.
isolate a faulted SG that can be isolated NOTE:
- Verifies 2FWE*P22 or 23A running with flow.
causes challenges to CSFs beyond The items underlined in the right column are the
- Resets SI signal, both trains.
those irreparably introduced by the components that are required to be
postulated conditions. Also, depending verified/manipulated to confirm isolation of a
- Dispatches an operator to locally de-energize upon the plant conditions, it could faulted SG. and close 2FWE*HCV100B.
constitute a demonstrated inability by
the crew to recognize a failure of the automatic actuation of an ESF system
- Verifies residual heat release valve is closed.
or component.
- Directs field operator to close 2SVS-29.
ROLE PLAYS:
- Verifies 2MSS-SOV105C and F closed.
When requested to isolate 2SVS-29,
- Verifies, C SG Atmospheric steam dump wait 10 minutes then insert: valve is closed, 2SVS*PCV101C.
IRF LOA-MSS011 (0 0) 0 60 report to
isolated.
- Verifies SG blowdown sample valves closed, 2SSR*AOV117A, B, C.
When requested to de-energize and close 2FWE*HCV100B, wait 10 minutes then insert:
IMF VLV-AFW014A (0 0) 0 60 report to the control room actions complete.
BOP verifies 2FWE-TK210, PPDWST level is >150 inches.
BVPS - 2L19 NRC Scenario 2, rev AG 13 of 18
BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES PLANT STATUS / PROCEDURAL GUIDANCE EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE Crew checks if SG tubes are intact:
- Checks all SG levels - NONE RISING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER.
- Check secondary radiation is CONSISTENT WITH PRE-EVENT VALUES.
Determines no SG levels are rising in an uncontrolled manner and secondary radiation is CONSISTENT WITH PRE-EVENT VALUES.
Crew determines SG tubes ARE INTACT.
Crew checks if SI flow should be reduced by:
- BOP confirms secondary heat sink available by
>340 gpm of feed flow available OR NR level in at least 1 SG >12% [31% ADVERSE CNMT].
- ATC confirms PRZR level is >17% [38%
ADVERSE CNMT]
Crew determines that current plant conditions support SI reduction.
SRO transitions to ES-1.1, SI Termination ATC/BOP resets SI - both trains.
ATC/BOP resets CIA and CIB - both trains.
ATC stops 1 charging pump.
BVPS - 2L19 NRC Scenario 2, rev AG 14 of 18
BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES PLANT STATUS / PROCEDURAL GUIDANCE EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE ATC confirms RCS pressure is stable or rising.
SRO directs ATC to isolate HHSI flow:
- ATC closes 2SIS*MOV867A,B,C, D.
Indicated HHSI flow decreases to zero.
ATC verifies HHSI flow is secured.
Terminate scenario when the crew terminates HHSI flow in ES-1.1.
BVPS - 2L19 NRC Scenario 2, rev AG 15 of 18
BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES PLANT STATUS / PROCEDURAL GUIDANCE EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE Attachment A-0.11 Verification of BOP performs Attachment A-0.11, Verification of Automatic Actions performed as time Automatic Actions as follows:
& manpower permit.
Checks both EDGs running with SWS valve alignment and ventilation in service.
Verifies power to both AC emergency busses.
EVENT 9:
2HVS*FN204A and B trip Checks 2HVS*FN204A or 2HVS*FN204B running.
IMF PMP-MSC0036 (0 0) 1 Identified no fans running, only 2HVS*FN204B IMF PMP-MSC0037 (0 0) 1 would start manually.
(preloaded)
Ensure Reheat Steam Isolation Ensure reheat steam isolation:
- Verify 2MSS-MOV100A and B - closed.
- Reset reheater controller.
- Verify 2GSS-MOV204, spillover vlv, closed Steamline isolation required. Check if main steamline isolation required:
-OR-
- Steamline pressure - < 500 PSIG
-OR-
- Steamline pressure high rate of change - 100 PSIG DROP IN 50 SECONDS.
If steamline isolation is required, verifies SLI by checking all YELLOW SLI marks - LIT.
BVPS - 2L19 NRC Scenario 2, rev AG 16 of 18
BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES PLANT STATUS / PROCEDURAL GUIDANCE EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE Attachment A-0.11 - (continued) Establish domestic water system cooling to station air NOTE: compressors; BOP may have already pre-emptively
- Opens 2CCS-AOV118.
opened 2CCS-AOV118 to provide
- Verifies at least 1 air compressor is running.
cooling to the Station Air compressors.
Verifies at least 1 CCP pump is running unless a CIB CIB has occurred. has occurred.
Align neutron flux monitoring for shutdown:
- Verifies SR CHs energized when IR <1E-10.
Check CIB and CNMT spray status:
CIB has occurred.
If not - Actuate CIB if required by:
- Manually initiating CIB - BOTH SWITCHES FOR BOTH TRAINS.
- Manually align equipment as required.
- Verify all RCPs - STOPPED.
- BV-1 operator verifies CREVS actuation.
- Service water flow established to RSS HX(s).
Verify service water system in service:
- SWS pumps - TWO RUNNING.
Verify both CNMT hydrogen analyzers running:
2HCS*SOV100A1, B1 - CNMT sample amber lights
- LIT.
BVPS - 2L19 NRC Scenario 2, rev AG 17 of 18
BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES PLANT STATUS / PROCEDURAL GUIDANCE EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE Attachment A-0.11 - (continued) Verify ESF equipment status:
signal, manual start SAT.
- Verify CIA by checking all ORANGE CIA marks - LIT.
- Verify FWI by checking all GREEN FWI marks - LIT.
Verify source range channels energized with audible indication functioning properly, adjusts multiplier switch and volume as necessary.
Attachment A-0.11 - COMPLETE Discrepancies: Upon completion, report any discrepancies to SRO.
2CHS*P21A auto start failure, manual start SAT.
2HVS*FN204A & B not running, Only 2HVS*FN204B would manually start.
BVPS - 2L19 NRC Scenario 2, rev AG 18 of 18
Appendix D Scenario Outline Facility: BVPS Unit 2 Scenario No. 3 Op Test No.: 2LOT19 NRC Examiners: Candidates: SRO ATC BOP Initial IC-87 (29): 100% power, EOL, Equ. XE Conditions, CB D @ 230 steps, RCS boron -
Conditions: 100 ppm.
Turnover: Maintain 100% power.
Critical Tasks: 1. CT-11 (E-0.O) Close CNMT isolation valves.
- 2. CT-18 (E-3.A) Isolate ruptured SG.
- 3. CT-19 (E-3.B) Establish/maintain RCS temperature.
Event Malf. No. Event Type Event Description No.
(C,A) ATC, SRO 1 XMT-RCS019A Pressurizer Level Channel, 2RCS*LT459 drifts high.
(TS) SRO (C,A) ALL Load rejection - VPL failure, Auto Rod insertion failure -
2 XMT-MSS043A (TS) SRO requires manual rod insertion 2OM-26.4.X 2FWS*FCV488 fails ASIS in Auto during Load rejection -
3 CNH-CFW12 (C,A) BOP, SRO requires manual control.
Pressurizer pressure transmitter 2RCS*PT445 fails high in (C,A) ATC, SRO automatic, 2 PORVs open. 2RCS*PCV455D requires manual 4 XMT-RCS031A (TS) SRO closure, 2RCS*PCV456 sticks open, PORV block valve 2RCS*MOV536 fails to close.
5 RCS04A (M) ALL Reactor trip causes a 650 gpm 21A SG tube rupture.
VLV-MSS011 Reheat steam fails to auto isolate on trip - requires closing 6 (C) BOP, SRO VLV-MSS012 2MSS-MOV100A and B.
Automatic CIA actuation does not occur; manual initiation is 7 PPL08A, PPL08B (C) ATC, SRO required.
Condenser steam dump controller failed to 0%, ASDVs 8 CNH-PCS07 (C) BOP, SRO required for RCS cooldown.
9 10 11 (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor, (A)bnormal E-0 E-1 E-3 ECA-3.1 NUREG-1021, Revision 11 FENOC Facsimile Rev. AG
Appendix D Scenario Outline 2L19N3 After taking the shift at 100% power, EOL, 2RCS*LT459 will drift high. The ATC will recognize the failure and respond IAW AOP 2.4.1 IOA's to remove the failed channel from service. The SRO will transition to the Instrument Failure procedure, 2OM-6.4.IF and direct the ATC complete the removal of the 459 channel from service. and then review applicable Technical Specifications in effect for the failed level transmitter.
The valve position limiter will fail to 70% causing a load rejection. The control rods will fail to step in automatically in response to the load rejection. The crew will identify the load rejection and enter AOP 2.35.2, Load Rejection. The crew will stabilize the plant after which the BOP will be directed to use procedure 2OM-26.4.X, Recovering Turbine Governor Valves from the Valve Position Limiter, to remove the turbine from the valve position limiter. The SRO will evaluate technical specifications.
When the load rejection occurs, the A main feed regulating valve, 2FWS-FCV488 will fail ASIS in AUTO, requiring the BOP to manually control the A SG level.
Pressurizer pressure transmitter 2RCS*PT445 then fails high in automatic, 2 PORVs open. 2RCS*PCV455D requires manual closure, 2RCS*PCV456 sticks open, PORV block valve, 2RCS*MOV536, fails to close.
The SRO will direct the ATC to manually trip the Rx, the Rx trip will cause a 650 gpm SGTR to occur on the A SG.
Reheat steam will fail to automatically isolate on the trip along with CIA failing to automatically initiate on the SI signal. The BOP will isolate the reheat steam supply and the ATC will manually initiate CIA.
The SRO will progress thru E-0 then transition to E-1 due to the stuck open/unisolated PORV. Due to the SGTR, the SRO will then transition to E-3, then to ECA-3.1 due to the stuck open/unisolated PORV.
The crew will progress through ECA-3.1 to the point of initiating a cooldown, the steam dump controller will fail to zero requiring the crew to utilize the atmospheric steam dumps to perform the RCS cooldown.
The scenario will be terminated when the crew has initiated a RCS cooldown utilizing the atmospheric steam dumps at < 100 degrees F/hour.
Expected procedure flow path is E-0 E-1 E-3 ECA-3.1.
NUREG-1021, Revision 11 FENOC Facsimile Rev. AG
BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION INITIAL CONDITIONS: (IC-29) 100 % Power, EOL, Bank D @ 230 steps, Equilibrium XE, 100 PPM Boron, ADDITIONAL LINEUP CHANGES STICKERS MONITOR SETUP 100% power splash EQUIPMENT STATUS DATE/TIME OOS TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION(S)
SHIFT TURNOVER INFORMATION
- 1. Maintain 100% power.
2.
3.
SCENARIO SUPPORT MATERIAL REQUIRED PROCEDURES NEEDED
- 1. Reactivity plan - provide EOL Rapid Power Reduction reactivity plan. E-0
- 2. E-1 E-3 ECA-3.1 Attachment A-0.6 Attachment A-0.11 Attachment A-4.1 AOP 2.4.1 AOP 2.35.2 6 IF, Attach 1 2OM -26.4.X Insert preloads per the simulator preload section of the HTML file for this scenario:
BVPS - 2L19 NRC Scenario 3, rev AG 3 of 21
BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES PLANT STATUS / PROCEDURAL GUIDANCE EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE EVENT 1:
Pressurizer level transmitter 2RCS*LI459A indicates upscale. ATC reports unexpected PRZR level deviation alarm.
2RCS*LT459 drifts high. ALARM: ATC identifies 2RCS*LT459 is failing high.
A4-2, PRZR Control High Low Level Dev. IAW AOP 2.4.1, Part C, ATC removes 2RCS*LT459 IMF XMT-RCS019A (0 0) 100 60 from service by placing PRZR level control channel selector to POS 3 (461/460).
If necessary ATC places 2CHS*FCV122 in manual and restores PRZR level.
NOTE: SRO enters AOP 2.4.1, Process Control Failure, SRO provides a control band and Rx trip criteria of A control band and Rx trip criteria are Part "C". 5% low/90% high for manual PRZR level control.
not applicable if the PRZR level controls remained in AUTO. BOP refers to ARP.
SRO enters the Reactor Coolant System SRO transitions to Reactor Coolant System Instrument Instrument failure procedure, 2OM-6.4.IF, failure procedure, 2OM-6.4.IF, attachment 1.
attachment 1.
3.3.1 (RTS Instrumentation) Condition A; SRO evaluates Technical Specifications: immediately enter the Condition referenced in Table 3.3.1-1 function 9 (PRZR level high) Condition K; trip channel in 72 hrs. or reduce power to < P-7 in 78 hrs.
SRO determines following TS are for tracking only 3.3.3 (PAM instrumentation) Table 3.3.3-1 function 11 is met if LT460 and LT461 are operable.
3.3.4 (Remote Shutdown System) Table B.3.3.4-1 function 4.a requirement is met if LT460 is operable.
Continue with next event at LE discretion BVPS - 2L19 NRC Scenario 3, rev AG 4 of 21
BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES PLANT STATUS / PROCEDURAL GUIDANCE EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE EVENTS 2 & 3:
IMMEDIATE PLANT RESPONSE:
Turbine Runback due to Valve Position Megawatts decrease, ATC recognizes megawatts decreasing and announces limiter failure, Control rods fail to auto RCS temperature and pressure rise accordingly. load rejection has occurred.
step in. Rods fail to auto step in.
Main Feed regulating valve, 2FWS*FCV488 fails asis in auto ALARM:
during load rejection. A4-3C, Tavg Deviation from Tref IMF EHC06 (9 0) 70 0 ASIS IMF CNH-CFW12 (9 0) 1 SRO enters AOP-2.35.2, Load Rejection. ATC checks control rod system.
ATC reports control rods failed to insert automatically, after verifying Tavg was not matched with Tref, ATC placed rods in manual and continued inserting to match Tavg and Tref.
ATC reviews reactivity plan to determine required boration.
Crew sounds the standby alarm, announces a Unit 2 load rejection and informs the SM to evaluate EPP.
NOTE:
If DNB Tech Spec entry not identified SRO evaluates Technical Specifications: TS 3.4.1, (RCS DNB Parameters, RCS press < 2214 by the crew at this time, ask as a psia) Condition A: restore RCS pressure within 2 follow-up question. hours.
EVENT 3: B SG level increases due to increased feeding BOP recognizes B SG level increasing.
Malfunction for event 3 is preloaded to rate at higher power and constant valve position. IAW Process Control Failure procedure, AOP 2.4.1, insert when the load rejection occurs, it BOP places controller for 2FWS*FCV488 in manual will become evident following the load A6-10E will alarm for SG level dev. if the crew and restores SG level to program.
rejection. doesnt notice 2FWS*FCV488 malfunction.
BOP verifies normal EHC system operation by:
- Verifying valve position limit is not consistent with pre-event.
BVPS - 2L19 NRC Scenario 3, rev AG 5 of 21
BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES PLANT STATUS / PROCEDURAL GUIDANCE EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE ROLE PLAY SM: SRO directs BOP to perform 2OM-26.4.X, If necessary, as SM, direct the crew to Recovering Turbine Governor Valves from the Valve remove the turbine from the limiter. Position Limiter, to remove the turbine from the limiter.
NOTE: IAW 2OM-26.4.X, step 2, BOP recovers the turbine It is not the intent to recover completely governor valves from the limiter as follows:
from the limiter, next event can be
- Adjusts the setter below the present reference entered at the LE discretion. setting.
- Sets the load rate thumbwheel to 1%/minute.
- Presses the GO pushbutton.
- Adjusts the load rate thumbwheel as directed by SRO.
- Presses the HOLD pushbutton when the VALVE POS LIMIT light extinguishes.
Proceed to next event at LE discretion.
(see note above)
EVENT 4:
2RCS*PT445 fails high, 2 PORVs 2 PORVs initially open, 456 sticks at 15% open, ATC reports multiple unexpected pressurizer alarms.
open, 2RCS*PCV456 fails to 15% PORV 455D will close manually when CS is ATC identifies 2RCS*PT445 has failed high and that open with Block valve failed open, taken to close. 2 PORVs have opened.
requiring crew to manually trip the RCS pressure continues to decrease. ATC reports that PORV, 2RCS*PCV455D and 456 reactor. both failed to automatically close on low pressure.
IMF XMT-RCS031A (0 0) 2500 0 ATC closes 2RCS*PCV455D.
ATC attempts to close 2RCS*PCV456, PORV ROLE PLAY: remains at dual position.
If dispatched to investigate MCC ATC attempts to close block valve, 2RCS*MOV536.
breaker for 2RCS*MOV536, wait 5 ATC reports 2RCS*MOV536 will not close.
minutes then report breaker 10C on MCC-2-E05 is tripped and won't reset.
BVPS - 2L19 NRC Scenario 3, rev AG 6 of 21
BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES PLANT STATUS / PROCEDURAL GUIDANCE EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE NOTE: SRO recognizes TS applicability for an TS 3.4.11, Conditions B and C.
Due to dynamic nature of event, a inoperable PORV and Block valve.
followup question regarding applicable TS may be necessary.
Crew determines failure will not support normal plant operations.
SRO directs crew to manually trip and perform IOAs for E-0.
EVENTS 5, 6, 7, & 8 650 gpm SGTR on "A" SG when Rx is tripped Reheat steam isolation failure.
Automatic CIA actuation failure.
Condenser steam dump controller failure, will require ASDV's for cooldown.
(all commands preloaded)
SRO enters E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety ATC and BOP commence IOAs of E-0.
Injection.
ATC verifies reactor trip:
- A5-6D - LIT.
- Power range indication is < 5%.
- Neutron flux is dropping.
BOP verifies Turbine trip:
- Throttle OR Governor valves ALL closed.
- Main Generator output brks - open.
- Exciter Circuit breaker - open.
BOP verifies power to AC emergency busses:
- Using VB-C voltmeters, verifies both 2AE and 2DF busses have voltage indicated.
BVPS - 2L19 NRC Scenario 3, rev AG 7 of 21
BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES PLANT STATUS / PROCEDURAL GUIDANCE EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE EVENTS 5, 6, 7, & 8: (continued) SI automatically actuated Check SI status:
ATC reports SI automatically actuated and manually actuates SI by turning both trains control switches.
ATC/BOP, sounds standby alarm, announces Unit 2 reactor trip and safety injection.
Check if HHSI flow should be secured by checking the following:
- CNMT & Secondary radiation
- SG - pressures and levels
- RCS subcooling
- Secondary heat sink exists
- RCS pressure - stable or rising
- PRZR level - >17%
- SI occurred automatically Due to SG parameters not being consistent with pre-event, crew determines SI is required; SI flow should not be secured at this time.
ATC verifies SI System status:
- 2CHS*P21A & 2CHS*P21B running.
- 2SIS*P21A & 2SIS*P21B running.
- HHSI Flow indicated on 2SIS-FI943.
BVPS - 2L19 NRC Scenario 3, rev AG 8 of 21
BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES PLANT STATUS / PROCEDURAL GUIDANCE EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE EVENTS 5, 6, 7, & 8: (continued) BOP verifies AFW status:
NOTE:
- Both motor-driven pumps running.
BOP may have pre-emptively isolated
- Turb driven pump, all stm supply SOVs open.
- AFW throttle valves all FULL OPEN.
level rose to > 12%.
- Total AFW flow is >340 gpm.
SRO directs BOP to verify automatic actions by performing Attachment A-0.11 in a timely manner.
NOTE: List of Attachment A-0.11 discrepancies: BOP performs Attachment A-0.11.
Evaluation of BOP performing Reheat steam auto isolation failure.
Attachment A-0.11 begins on page 19. Automatic CIA actuation failure.
Manual actuation SAT for both malfunctions.
ATC checks RCS Tavg stable at or trending to 547F.
RCS temperature <547°F and dropping due to ATC reports RCS Tavg is <547F and dropping.
safety injection flow and reheat steam auto SRO directs ATC to:
EVENT 6: isolation failure.
- Stop dumping steam 2MSS-MOV100A/B auto close failure
- Verify 2MSS-MOV100A, B are closed.
IMF VLV-MSS011 (0 0) 1 BOP reports to SRO that 2MSS-MOV100A & B IMF VLV-MSS012 (0 0) 1 failed to automatically close on the turbine trip, both (preloaded) valves did manually close successfully.
- Depress the reheater controller RESET PB.
- Minimize total feedflow while maintaining >
340 gpm until 1 NR level is >12% [31%
ADVERSE CNMT].
BVPS - 2L19 NRC Scenario 3, rev AG 9 of 21
BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES PLANT STATUS / PROCEDURAL GUIDANCE EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE EVENTS 5, 6, 7, & 8: (continued) ATC verifies PRZR isolated:
- PORVs - CLOSED ATC reports PORV 2RCS*PCV456 wont close and block valve 2RCS*MOV536 also has failed to close.
ATC verifies HHSI flowpath, 2SIS*MOV867A,B,C,D all open.
NOTE: SRO transitions to E-1, Loss of Reactor or ATC checks if CREVS should be actuated:
Crew may transition to E-3 Secondary Coolant.
immediately after entering E-1 based Checks EITHER of the following:
on E-1 LHP criteria, otherwise
- Control Room radiation monitor, transition to E-3 will occur at the 2RMC*RQ201,202, - NOT IN HIGH ALARM Check for a Ruptured SG step of E-1.
- CIB - HAS NOT OCCURRED Crew determines CREVs should not be actuated for given conditions.
ATC checks if RCPs should be stopped:
Crew determines criteria for stopping RCPs is not met.
BVPS - 2L19 NRC Scenario 3, rev AG 10 of 21
BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES PLANT STATUS / PROCEDURAL GUIDANCE EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE EVENTS 5, 6, 7, & 8: (continued) ATC/BOP dispatches an operator to energize valves ROLE PLAY: IAW Attachment A-0.6, Cold Leg Recirculation When dispatched to energize valves Component Verification.
IAW Attachment A-0.6, wait 5 minutes, insert following commands then report complete.
IRF LOA-LOV093 (0 0) RACKIN IRF LOA-LOV102 (0 0) RACKIN IRF LOA-LOV094 (0 0) RACKIN IRF LOA-LOV103 (0 0) RACKIN IRF LOA-LOV095 (0 0) RACKIN IRF LOA-LOV104 (0 0) RACKIN IRF LOA-LOV096 (0 0) RACKIN IRF LOA-LOV105 (0 0) RACKIN ATC checks CIB - NOT ACTUATED.
ATC/BOP checks if any SGs are faulted:
- NR levels - >12%.
Controls feed flow to maintain NR level between 12%
and 50%.
BVPS - 2L19 NRC Scenario 3, rev AG 11 of 21
BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES PLANT STATUS / PROCEDURAL GUIDANCE EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE EVENTS 5, 6, 7, & 8: (continued) Crew checks if SG tubes are intact:
NOTE:
- Check all SG levels - NONE RISING IN AN Crew may have previously transitioned UNCONTROLLED MANNER.
to E-3 based on E-1 LHP criteria.
- Check secondary radiation - CONSISTENT WITH PRE-EVENT VALUES.
Crew determines A SG level is rising in an uncontrolled manner and verifies HHSI valves, 2SIS*MOV867A,B,C,D all open & transition to E-3 is appropriate.
SRO transitions to E-3, Steam Generator Tube SRO directs STA to commence control room Rupture. ventilation actions. Refer to Attachment A-2.5.
ATC checks if RCPs should be stopped:
Crew determines criteria for stopping RCPs is not met.
A SG ruptured Crew notes that A SG was previously identified as NOTE: the ruptured SG based upon unexpected NR level rise.
Crew may have pre-emptively isolated
AFW flow to the "A" SG when rupture
BVPS - 2L19 NRC Scenario 3, rev AG 12 of 21
BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES PLANT STATUS / PROCEDURAL GUIDANCE EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE EVENTS 5, 6, 7, & 8: (continued) ATC/BOP isolates flow from the ruptured SG.
NOTE:
Critical Task: CT-18 (E-3.A) The items underlined in the right column are the BOP verifies A SG atmospheric steam dump, Crew isolates feed flow into and steam components that are required to be 2SVS*PCV101A, closed and raises setpoint to 100%.
flow from the ruptured SG and directs verified/manipulated to confirm isolation of a operator to close isolation valve(s) ruptured SG. SRO dispatches operator to locally close 2SVS*27.
operated from outside of the control BOP verifies residual heat removal valve - CLOSED.
room before a transition to ECA-3.1 occurs. Isolate ruptured SG to turbine driven AFW pump.
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE -- Failure to
- BOP closes 2MSS*SOV105A and 105D.
isolate the ruptured SG causes a loss of differential pressure between the Verify closed ruptured SG blowdown isolation valve.
ruptured SG and the intact SGs. Upon
- ATC verifies 2BDG*AOV100A1 is closed.
a loss of differential pressure, the crew must transition to a contingency Close main steamline drain from ruptured SG.
procedure that constitutes an incorrect
- ATC closes 2SDS*AOV111A1.
performance that necessitates the crew taking compensating action which Close 2SDS*AOV129A, RHR piping drain isolation.
complicates the event mitigation
- BOP closes 2SDS*AOV129A.
strategy.
Close ruptured SG main steam isol & bypass vlvs.
ROLE PLAY:
- BOP closes 2MSS*AOV101A.
5 minutes after being dispatched to
- BOP verifies 2MSS*AOV102A closed.
locally isolate 2SVS*27, insert IRF LOA-MSS009 (0 0) 0 60 BOP checks ruptured SG pressure - >240 PSIG.
then report back that 2SVS*27 has been closed.
BVPS - 2L19 NRC Scenario 3, rev AG 13 of 21
BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES PLANT STATUS / PROCEDURAL GUIDANCE EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE EVENTS 5, 6, 7, & 8: (continued) Condenser available Crew initiates RCS cooldown:
SRO determines required core exit temperature as a function of ruptured SG pressure:
SRO directs ATC to block low steamline pressure SI when PRZR pressure <2000 psig.
BOP dumps steam to condenser from B & C SGs at maximum rate by:
- Checking MSIVs - AT LEAST ONE OPEN.
- Checking condenser available.
- Placing condenser steam dump controller in MANUAL.
EVENT 8:
- Place steam dumps in STM PRESS Mode IMF CNH-PCS07 (4 0) 0 Steam pressure controller failed asis in AUTO
- Checks TAVG >541°F by Status light D-11, (preloaded) and MANUAL. "2/3 Lo-Lo Tavg" (Panel 622) - LIT
- Defeats TAVG interlock until status light A-12, "Stm Dump Defeat Interlock" (Panel 622) - LIT
- Gradually raises steam dump rate to maximum rate (~25% demand)
Crew reports steam dump controller demand remains at 0% and that the condenser steam dump valves are not effectively reducing CETCs.
NOTE:
Before using 2SVS*HCV104, crew SRO directs BOP to manually dump steam at must recognize that they must have maximum rate using atmospheric steam dumps.
dispatched an operator to locally isolate BOP opens 2SVS*PCV101B from the A SG and received a report BOP opens 2SVS*PCV101C that it was isolated. BOP opens 2SVS*HCV104 BVPS - 2L19 NRC Scenario 3, rev AG 14 of 21
BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES PLANT STATUS / PROCEDURAL GUIDANCE EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE EVENT 8 :(continued) BOP checks if RCS cooldown should be stopped:
- When core exit TCs (average of hottest Critical Task: CT-19 (E-3.B) trisector) - < REQUIRED TEMPERATURE.
Crew establishes/maintains an RCS temperature so that transition from E-3 BOP stops RCS cooldown and maintains core exit does not occur because the RCS TCs - LESS THAN REQUIRED TEMPERATURE.
temperature is in either of the following conditions: BOP checks intact SG levels:
- B & C NR levels - >12%.
Too high to maintain minimum required subcooling for subsequent BOP controls feed flow to maintain narrow range level RCS depressurization between 26% and 50%.
OR ATC checks PRZR PORVs and block valves:
- Power to block valves -2 AVAILABLE.
Below the RCS temperature that
- PORVs - ALL CLOSED. (PCV-456 open) causes a red or orange path challenge
- Block valves - AT LEAST ONE OPEN. (all) to Sub-criticality or Integrity CSF ATC reports that PORV 2RCS*PCV456 remains SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE -- Failure to partially open and the associated MOV block valve is establish and maintain the correct RCS de-energized and can NOT be closed.
temperature during a SGTR leads to a transition from E-3 to a contingency SRO determines transition to ECA-3.1 is required.
procedure, which constitutes an incorrect performance that necessitates the crew taking compensating action which complicates the event mitigation strategy.
SRO transitions to ECA-3.1 ATC resets SI - both trains.
ATC resets CIA and CIB - both trains.
BVPS - 2L19 NRC Scenario 3, rev AG 15 of 21
BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES PLANT STATUS / PROCEDURAL GUIDANCE EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE NOTE: BOP opens 2CCS-AOV118 to establish domestic BOP may have already pre-emptively water cooling to the SAS compressors.
opened 2CCS-AOV118 to provide cooling to the Station Air compressors. BOP verifies station instrument air press >90 psig.
BOP establishes Instrument air to CNMT by:
- Verifying 2IAC-MOV131 is open.
- Opening 2IAC*MOV130.
BOP verifies CNMT instrument air press >85 psig.
BOP verifies all AC busses energized by offsite.
ATC places all PRZR heaters in PTL.
ATC checks any quench or recirc spray pump running.
ATC reports that no quench or recirc spray pumps are running.
NOTE: BOP verifies NR level in A SG >12% then closes BOP may have already pre-emptively AFW valves to A SG:
isolated AFW flow after NR level was
- 2FWE*HCV100E and 2FWE*HCV100F.
>12%.
BOP confirms that FWI was previously verified.
ATC checks if LHSI pumps should be stopped:
ATC stops both LHSI pumps and places CSs in AUTO.
BVPS - 2L19 NRC Scenario 3, rev AG 16 of 21
BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES PLANT STATUS / PROCEDURAL GUIDANCE EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE BOP evaluates radiation monitors, determines Auxiliary building and Safeguards radiation is consistent with pre-event values.
SRO determines TSC is not activated.
SRO directs ATC to monitor nuclear instrumentation to ensure adequate shutdown margin.
ATC/BOP checks if any SGs are faulted
BOP checks B & C NR levels >12% (intact SGs) and controls feed flow to maintain NR level between 26% and 50%.
SRO determines TSC is not activated.
SRO directs ATC to monitor nuclear instrumentation to ensure adequate shutdown margin.
BOP initiates RCS cooldown to cold shutdown:
- Maintain RCS cold leg C/D rate <100F/HR.
- Initiate a trend of RCS cold leg temp/pressure.
- Initial every half hour.
- Refer to Attachment A-4.1.
BVPS - 2L19 NRC Scenario 3, rev AG 17 of 21
BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES PLANT STATUS / PROCEDURAL GUIDANCE EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE SRO instructs ATC to block low steam line pressure SI when PRZR pressure is <2000 psig.
Crew verifies instrument air press >90 psig and at least 1 MSIV is open with the condenser available.
Crew recognizes that the steam dump controller was previously identified as failed.
SRO directs BOP to manually dump steam using atmospheric steam dumps.
BOP opens 2SVS*PCV101B BOP opens 2SVS*PCV101C OR BOP opens 2SVS*HCV104 BOP gradually raises steam dump rate to initiate RCS cooldown and not exceed cooldown rate of 100F/HR.
Terminate scenario when the crew establishes RCS cooldown in ECA-3.1 and demonstrates the intent to limit C/D rate to < 100 °F/Hr.
BVPS - 2L19 NRC Scenario 3, rev AG 18 of 21
BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES PLANT STATUS / PROCEDURAL GUIDANCE EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE Attachment A-0.11 Verification of BOP performs Attachment A-0.11, Verification of Automatic Actions performed as time Automatic Actions as follows:
& manpower permit.
Checks both EDGs running with SWS valve alignment and ventilation in service.
Verifies power to both AC emergency busses.
Checks 2HVS*FN204A or 2HVS*FN204B running.
EVENT 6: Ensure Reheat Steam Isolation Ensure reheat steam isolation:
2MSS-MOV100A/B auto close failure
- Verify 2MSS-MOV100A and B - closed.
IMF VLV-MSS011 (0 0) 1 Valves not closed - required manual closure.
IMF VLV-MSS012 (0 0) 1
- Reset reheater controller.
(preloaded)
- Verify 2GSS-MOV204, spillover vlv, closed Steamline isolation not required. Check if main steamline isolation required:
-OR-
- Steamline pressure - < 500 PSIG
-OR-
- Steamline pressure high rate of change - 100 PSIG DROP IN 50 SECONDS.
If steamline isolation is required, verifies SLI by checking all YELLOW SLI marks - LIT.
If steamline isolation is not required continues on.
BVPS - 2L19 NRC Scenario 3, rev AG 19 of 21
BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES PLANT STATUS / PROCEDURAL GUIDANCE EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE Attachment A-0.11 - (continued) Establish domestic water system cooling to station air NOTE: compressors; BOP may have already pre-emptively
- Opens 2CCS-AOV118.
opened 2CCS-AOV118 to provide
- Verifies at least 1 air compressor is running.
cooling to the Station Air compressors.
Verifies at least 1 CCP pump is running unless a CIB CIB has not occurred. has occurred.
Align neutron flux monitoring for shutdown:
- Verifies SR CHs energized when IR <1E-10.
Check CIB and CNMT spray status:
CIB has not occurred.
If not - Actuate CIB if required by:
- Manually initiating CIB - BOTH SWITCHES FOR BOTH TRAINS.
- Manually align equipment as required.
- Verify all RCPs - STOPPED.
- BV-1 operator verifies CREVS actuation.
- Service water flow established to RSS HX(s).
Verify service water system in service:
- SWS pumps - TWO RUNNING.
Verify both CNMT hydrogen analyzers running:
2HCS*SOV100A1, B1 - CNMT sample amber lights
- LIT.
BVPS - 2L19 NRC Scenario 3, rev AG 20 of 21
BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES PLANT STATUS / PROCEDURAL GUIDANCE EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE Attachment A-0.11 - (continued) Verify ESF equipment status:
EVENT 7:
- Verify CIA by checking all ORANGE CIA Critical Task CT-11 (E-0.O) marks - LIT. IDENTIFIES CIA failed to Crew closes CNMT isolation valves automatically actuate and actuates both trains such that at least one valve is closed on CIA.
each critical phase A penetration at the
- Verify FWI by checking all GREEN FWI completion of Attachment 1-K. marks - LIT.
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE -- Closing at least one containment isolation valve on each critical Phase A penetration, under these conditions and when it is possible to do so, constitutes a task that is essential to safety, because its improper performance or omission by an operator will result in direct adverse consequences or significant degradation in the mitigative capability of the plant. In particular, the crew has failed to prevent degradation of any barrier to fission product release. In this case, the containment barrier is needlessly left in a degraded condition Verify source range channels energized with audible indication functioning properly, adjusts multiplier switch and volume as necessary.
Attachment A-0.11 - COMPLETE Discrepancies:
- Reheat steam auto isolation failure. Upon completion, report any discrepancies to SRO.
- Automatic CIA actuation failure.
Manual actuation SAT for both malfunctions.
BVPS - 2L19 NRC Scenario 3, rev AG 21 of 21