ML20276A152
| ML20276A152 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Callaway |
| Issue date: | 09/09/2020 |
| From: | Greg Werner Operations Branch IV |
| To: | Ameren Missouri |
| References | |
| Download: ML20276A152 (69) | |
Text
ES-401 PWR Examination Outline - RO Form ES-401-2 Facility: Callaway Plant Date of Exam: August 31, 2020 Tier Group RO K/A Category Points SRO-Only Points K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G*
Total A2 G*
Total
- 1.
Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions 1
4 3
4 N/A 2
3 N/A 2
18 6
2 2
2 1
1 1
2 9
4 Tier Totals 6
5 5
3 4
4 27 10
- 2.
Plant Systems 1
3 1
4 3
1 1
3 3
3 3
3 28 5
2 2
1 0
2 1
2 1
1 0
0 0
10 3
Tier Totals 5
2 4
5 2
3 4
4 3
3 3
38 8
- 3. Generic Knowledge and Abilities Categories 1
2 3
4 10 1
2 3
4 7
3 3
2 2
Note: 1.
Ensure that at least two topics from every applicable K/A category are sampled within each tier of the RO and SRO-only outline sections (i.e., except for one category in Tier 3 of the SRO-only section, the Tier Totals in each K/A category shall not be less than two). (One Tier 3 radiation control K/A is allowed if it is replaced by a K/A from another Tier 3 category.)
- 2.
The point total for each group and tier in the proposed outline must match that specified in the table. The final point total for each group and tier may deviate by +/-1 from that specified in the table based on NRC revisions. The final RO exam must total 75 points, and the SRO-only exam must total 25 points.
- 3.
Systems/evolutions within each group are identified on the outline. Systems or evolutions that do not apply at the facility should be deleted with justification. Operationally important, site-specific systems/evolutions that are not included on the outline should be added. Refer to Section D.1.b of ES-401 for guidance regarding the elimination of inappropriate K/A statements.
- 4.
Select topics from as many systems and evolutions as possible. Sample every system or evolution in the group before selecting a second topic for any system or evolution.
- 5.
Absent a plant-specific priority, only those K/As having an importance rating (IR) of 2.5 or higher shall be selected. Use the RO and SRO ratings for the RO and SRO-only portions, respectively.
- 6.
Select SRO topics for Tiers 1 and 2 from the shaded systems and K/A categories.
- 7.
The generic (G) K/As in Tiers 1 and 2 shall be selected from Section 2 of the K/A catalog, but the topics must be relevant to the applicable evolution or system. Refer to Section D.1.b of ES-401 for the applicable K/As.
- 8.
On the following pages, enter the K/A numbers, a brief description of each topic, the topics IRs for the applicable license level, and the point totals (#) for each system and category. Enter the group and tier totals for each category in the table above. If fuel-handling equipment is sampled in a category other than Category A2 or G* on the SRO-only exam, enter it on the left side of Column A2 for Tier 2, Group 2. (Note 1 does not apply). Use duplicate pages for RO and SRO-only exams.
- 9.
For Tier 3, select topics from Section 2 of the K/A catalog and enter the K/A numbers, descriptions, IRs, and point totals (#) on Form ES-401-3. Limit SRO selections to K/As that are linked to 10 CFR 55.43.
G* Generic K/As These systems/evolutions must be included as part of the sample (as applicable to the facility) when Revision 3 of the K/A catalog is used to develop the sample plan. They are not required to be included when using earlier revisions of the K/A catalog.
These systems/evolutions may be eliminated from the sample (as applicable to the facility) when Revision 3 of the K/A catalog is used to develop the sample plan.
ES-401 2
Form ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Emergency and Abnormal Plant EvolutionsTier 1/Group 1 (RO)
E/APE # / Name / Safety Function K1 K2 K3 A1 A2 G*
K/A Topic(s)
IR 000007 (EPE 7; BW E02&E10; CE E02)
Reactor Trip, Stabilization, Recovery / 1 X
EA2.02 Ability to determine or interpret the following as they apply to a reactor trip:
Proper actions to be taken if the automatic safety functions have not taken place (CFR 43.5 / 45.13) 4.3 1
000008 (APE 8) Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident / 3 X
AK3.05 Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident:
ECCS termination or throttling criteria.
(CFR 41.5,41.10 / 45.6 / 45.13) 4.0 2
000009 (EPE 9) Small Break LOCA / 3 000011 (EPE 11) Large Break LOCA / 3 X
EA1.05 Ability to operate and monitor the following as they apply to a Large Break LOCA:
Manual and/or automatic transfer of suction of charging pumps to borated source (CFR 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6).
4.3 3
000015 (APE 15) Reactor Coolant Pump Malfunctions / 4 X
AK1.02 Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to Reactor Coolant Pump Malfunctions (Loss of RC Flow):
Consequences of an RCPS failure (CFR 41.8 / 41.10 / 45.3) 3.7 4
000022 (APE 22) Loss of Reactor Coolant Makeup / 2 X
AK3.02 Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Loss of Reactor Coolant Makeup:
Actions contained in SOPs and EOPs for RCPs, loss of makeup, loss of charging, and abnormal charging (CFR 41.5, 41.10 / 45.6 / 45.13) 3.5 5
000025 (APE 25) Loss of Residual Heat Removal System / 4 X
AK2.01 Knowledge of the interrelations between the Loss of Residual Heat Removal System and the following:
RHR heat exchangers.
(CFR 41.7 / 45.7) 2.9 6
000026 (APE 26) Loss of Component Cooling Water / 8 X
2.1.23 Ability to perform specific system and integrated plant procedures during all modes of plant operation.
(CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.2 / 45.6) 4.3 7
000027 (APE 27) Pressurizer Pressure Control System Malfunction / 3 X
AK3.03 Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Pressurizer Pressure Control Malfunctions:
Actions contained in EOP for PZR PCS malfunctions (CFR 41.5,41.10 / 45.6 / 45.13) 3.7 8
000029 (EPE 29) Anticipated Transient Without Scram / 1 X
EA1.14 Ability to operate and monitor the following as they apply to an ATWS:
Driving of control rods into the core (CFR 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6) 4.2 9
ES-401 3
Form ES-401-2 000038 (EPE 38) Steam Generator Tube Rupture / 3 X
EA2.16 Ability to determine or interpret the following as they apply to a SGTR:
Actions to be taken if S/G goes solid and water enters steam line.
(CFR 43.5 / 45.13) 4.2 10 000040 (APE 40; BW E05; CE E05; W E12)
Steam Line RuptureExcessive Heat Transfer / 4 X
AK1.07 Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to Steam Line Rupture:
Effects of feedwater introduction on dry S/G (CFR 41.8 / 41.10 / 45.3) 3.4 11 000054 (APE 54; CE E06) Loss of Main Feedwater /4 X
2.4.4 Ability to recognize abnormal indications for system operating parameters that are entry-level conditions for emergency and abnormal operating procedures.
(CFR: 41.10 / 43.2 / 45.6) 4.5 12 000055 (EPE 55) Station Blackout / 6 X
EK1.01 Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the Station Blackout:
Effect of battery discharge rates on capacity (CFR 41.8 / 41.10 / 45.3) 3.3 13 000056 (APE 56) Loss of Offsite Power / 6 000057 (APE 57) Loss of Vital AC Instrument Bus / 6 X
AA2.19 Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Vital AC Instrument Bus:
The plant automatic actions that will occur on the loss of a vital ac electrical instrument bus (CFR: 43.5 / 45.13) 4.0 14 000058 (APE 58) Loss of DC Power / 6 000062 (APE 62) Loss of Nuclear Service Water / 4 000065 (APE 65) Loss of Instrument Air / 8 X
AK3.03 Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Loss of Instrument Air:
Knowing effects on plant operation of isolating certain equipment from instrument air (CFR 41.5,41.10 / 45.6 / 45.13) 2.9 15 000077 (APE 77) Generator Voltage and Electric Grid Disturbances / 6 (W E04) LOCA Outside Containment / 3 X
EK2.1 Knowledge of the interrelations between the (LOCA Outside Containment) and the following:
Components, and functions of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features.
(CFR: 41.7 / 45.7) 3.5 16
ES-401 4
Form ES-401-2 (W E11) Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation / 4 X
EK2.2 Knowledge of the interrelations between the (Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation) and the following:
Facilitys heat removal systems, including primary coolant, emergency coolant, the decay heat removal systems, and relations between the proper operation of these systems to the operation of the facility.
(CFR: 41.7 / 45.7) 3.9 17 (BW E04; W E05) Inadequate Heat TransferLoss of Secondary Heat Sink / 4 X
EK1.3 Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the (Loss of Secondary Heat Sink):
Annunciators and conditions indicating signals, and remedial actions associated with the (Loss of Secondary Heat Sink).
(CFR: 41.8 / 41.10, 45.3) 3.9 18 K/A Category Totals:
4 3
4 2
3 2
Group Point Total:
18
ES-401 5
Form ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Emergency and Abnormal Plant EvolutionsTier 1/Group 2 (RO)
E/APE # / Name / Safety Function K1 K2 K3 A1 A2 G*
K/A Topic(s)
IR 000001 (APE 1) Continuous Rod Withdrawal / 1 000003 (APE 3) Dropped Control Rod / 1 000005 (APE 5) Inoperable/Stuck Control Rod / 1 000024 (APE 24) Emergency Boration / 1 000028 (APE 28) Pressurizer (PZR) Level Control Malfunction / 2 X
AK3.03 Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Pressurizer Level Control Malfunctions:
False indication of PZR level when PROV or spray valve is open and RCS saturated (CFR 41.5,41.10 / 45.6 / 45.13) 3.5 19 000032 (APE 32) Loss of Source Range Nuclear Instrumentation / 7 X
AK1.01 Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to Loss of Source Range Nuclear Instrumentation:
Effects of voltage changes on performance (CFR 41.8 / 41.10 / 45.3) 2.5 20 000033 (APE 33) Loss of Intermediate Range Nuclear Instrumentation / 7 000036 (APE 36; BW/A08) Fuel-Handling Incidents / 8 000037 (APE 37) Steam Generator Tube Leak / 3 000051 (APE 51) Loss of Condenser Vacuum / 4 X
AA2.02 Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Condenser Vacuum:
Conditions requiring reactor and/or turbine trip (CFR: 43.5 / 45.13) 3.9 21 000059 (APE 59) Accidental Liquid Radwaste Release / 9 000060 (APE 60) Accidental Gaseous Radwaste Release / 9 000061 (APE 61) Area Radiation Monitoring System Alarms
/ 7 X
2.1.30 Ability to locate and operate components, including local controls.
(CFR: 41.7 / 45.7) 4.4 22 000067 (APE 67) Plant Fire On Site / 8 000068 (APE 68; BW A06) Control Room Evacuation / 8 000069 (APE 69; W E14) Loss of Containment Integrity / 5 000074 (EPE 74; W E06 & E07) Inadequate Core Cooling /
4 000076 (APE 76) High Reactor Coolant Activity / 9 X
AK2.01 Knowledge of the interrelations between the High Reactor Coolant Activity and the following:
Process radiation monitors (CFR 41.7 / 45.7) 2.6 23 000078 (APE 78*) RCS Leak / 3 NA
ES-401 6
Form ES-401-2 (W E01 & E02) Rediagnosis & SI Termination / 3 X
EK1.2 Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the (SI Termination):
Normal, abnormal and emergency operating procedures associated with (SI Termination).
(CFR: 41.8 / 41.10, 45.3) 3.4 24 (W E13) Steam Generator Overpressure / 4 X
2.2.44 Ability to interpret control room indication to verify the status and operations of a system, and understand how operator actions and directives affect plant and system conditions.
(CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.12) 4.2 25 (W E15) Containment Flooding / 5 X
EA1.3 Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the (Containment Flooding):
Desired operating results during abnormal and emergency situations.
(CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6) 2.8 26 (W E16) High Containment Radiation /9 (BW A01) Plant Runback / 1 NA (BW A02 & A03) Loss of NNI-X/Y/7 NA (BW A04) Turbine Trip / 4 NA (BW A05) Emergency Diesel Actuation / 6 NA (BW A07) Flooding / 8 NA (BW E03) Inadequate Subcooling Margin / 4 NA (BW E08; W E03) LOCA CooldownDepressurization / 4 X
EK2.2 Knowledge of the interrelations between the (LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization) and the following:
Facility*s heat removal systems, including primary coolant, emergency coolant, the decay heat removal systems, and relations between the proper operation of these systems to the operation of the facility.
(CFR: 41.7 / 45.7) 3.7 27 (BW E09; CE A13**; W E09 & E10) Natural Circulation/4 (BW E13 & E14) EOP Rules and Enclosures NA (CE A11**; W E08) RCS OvercoolingPressurized Thermal Shock / 4 (CE A16) Excess RCS Leakage / 2 NA (CE E09) Functional Recovery NA (CE E13*) Loss of Forced Circulation/LOOP/Blackout / 4 NA K/A Category Point Totals:
2 2
1 1
1 2
Group Point Total:
9
ES-401 7
Form ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Plant SystemsTier 2/Group 1 (RO)
System # / Name K1 K2 K 3
K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G*
K/A Topic(s)
IR 003 (SF4P RCP) Reactor Coolant Pump ROX2 X
K1.03 Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the RCPS and the following systems:
RCP seal system (CFR: 41.2 to 41.9 / 45.7 to 45.8) 3.3 28 003 (SF4P RCP) Reactor Coolant Pump ROX2 X
A3.05 Ability to monitor automatic operation of the RCPS, including:
RCP lube oil and bearing lift pumps (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5) 2.7 29 004 (SF1; SF2 CVCS) Chemical and Volume Control X
K1.19 Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the CVCS and the following systems:
Primary grade water supply (CFR: 41.2 to 41.9 / 45.7 to 45.8) 2.7 30 005 (SF4P RHR) Residual Heat Removal ROX2 X
K3.07 Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the RHRS will have on the following:
Refueling operations (CFR: 41.7 / 45.6) 3.2 31 005 (SF4P RHR) Residual Heat Removal ROX2 X
A4.02 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room:
Heat exchanger bypass flow control (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8) 3.4 32 006 (SF2; SF3 ECCS) Emergency Core Cooling X
K4.11 Knowledge of ECCS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following:
Reset of SIS (CFR: 41.7) 3.9 33 007 (SF5 PRTS) Pressurizer Relief/Quench Tank X
G2.1.23 Ability to perform specific system and integrated plant procedures during all modes of plant operation (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.2 / 45.6) 4.3 34 008 (SF8 CCW) Component Cooling Water ROX2 X
A2.01 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the CCWS, and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:
Loss of CCW pump (CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13) 3.3 35 008 (SF8 CCW) Component Cooling Water ROX2 X
A1.02 Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the CCWS controls including:
CCW temperature (CFR: 41.5 / 45.5) 2.9 36
ES-401 8
Form ES-401-2 010 (SF3 PZR PCS) Pressurizer Pressure Control X 2.1.32 Ability to explain and apply system limits and precautions.
(CFR: 41.10 / 43.2 / 45.12) 3.8 37 012 (SF7 RPS) Reactor Protection ROX2 X
K4.02 Knowledge of RPS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following:
Automatic reactor trip when RPS Setpoints are exceeded for each RPS function; basis for each (CFR: 41.7) 3.9 38 012 (SF7 RPS) Reactor Protection ROX2 X
A2.07 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the RPS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:
Loss of dc control.
(CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.5) 3.2 39 013 (SF2 ESFAS) Engineered Safety Features Actuation X
K2.01 Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following:
ESFAS/safeguards equipment control (CFR: 41.7) 3.6 40 022 (SF5 CCS) Containment Cooling X
K3.01 Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the CCS will have on the following:
Containment equipment subject to damage by high or low temperature, humidity, and pressure (CFR: 41.7 / 45.6) 2.9 41 025 (SF5 ICE) Ice Condenser NA 026 (SF5 CSS) Containment Spray ROX2 X
A1.01 Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the CSS controls including:
Containment Pressure (CFR: 41.5 / 45.5) 3.9 42 026 (SF5 CSS) Containment Spray ROX2 X
K3.01 Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the CSS will have on the following:
CCS (CFR: 41.7 / 45.6) 3.9 43 039 (SF4S MSS) Main and Reheat Steam ROX2 X
A1.03 Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the MRSS controls including:
Primary system temperature indications, and required values, during main steam system warm-up (CFR: 41.5 / 45.5) 2.6 44
ES-401 9
Form ES-401-2 039 (SF4S MSS) Main and Reheat Steam ROX2 X
K5.01 Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as the apply to the MRSS:
Definition and causes of steam/water hammer (CFR: 41.5 / 45.7) 2.9 45 059 (SF4S MFW) Main Feedwater X
A3.06 Ability to monitor automatic operation of the MFW, including:
Feedwater Isolation (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5) 3.2 46 061 (SF4S AFW)
Auxiliary/Emergency Feedwater X
A3.01 Ability to monitor automatic operation of the AFW, including:
AFW startup and flows (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5) 4.2 47 062 (SF6 ED AC) AC Electrical Distribution X
A4.02 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room:
Remote racking in and out of breakers (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 / to 45.8) 2.5 48 063 (SF6 ED DC) DC Electrical Distribution X 2.4.46 Ability to verify that the alarms are consistent with the plant conditions.
(CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.12) 4.2 49 064 (SF6 EDG) Emergency Diesel Generator X
K6.07 Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction of the following will have on the ED/G system:
Air receivers (CFR: 41.7 / 45.7) 2.7 50 073 (SF7 PRM) Process Radiation Monitoring X
K4.01 Knowledge of PRM system design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following:
Release termination when radiation exceeds setpoint (CFR: 41.7) 4.0 51 076 (SF4S SW) Service Water ROX2 X
A2.01 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the SWS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:
Loss of SWS (CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13) 3.5 52 076 (SF4S SW) Service Water ROX2 X
K1.21 Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the SWS and the following systems:
Auxiliary backup SWS (CFR: 41.2 to 41.9 / 45.7 to 45.8) 2.7 53
ES-401 10 Form ES-401-2 078 (SF8 IAS) Instrument Air X
K3.02 Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the IAS will have on the following:
Systems having pneumatic valves and controls (CFR: 41.7 / 45.6) 3.4 54 103 (SF5 CNT) Containment X
A4.04 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room:
Phase A and phase B resets (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8) 3.5 55 053 (SF1; SF4P ICS*) Integrated Control NA K/A Category Point Totals:
3 1
4 3 1
1 3
3 3
3 3
Group Point Total:
28
ES-401 11 Form ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Plant SystemsTier 2/Group 2 (RO)
System # / Name K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G*
K/A Topic(s)
IR 001 (SF1 CRDS) Control Rod Drive X
K6.11 Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction on the following CRDS components:
Location and operation of CRDS fault detection (trouble alarms) and reset system, including rod control annunciator (CFR: 41.7/45.7) 2.9 56 002 (SF2; SF4P RCS) Reactor Coolant 011 (SF2 PZR LCS) Pressurizer Level Control 014 (SF1 RPI) Rod Position Indication X
K4.06 Knowledge of RPIS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following:
Individual and group misalignment (CFR: 41.5 / 45.7) 3.4 57 015 (SF7 NI) Nuclear Instrumentation X
K2.01 Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following:
NIS channels, components, and interconnections (CFR: 41.7) 3.3 58 016 (SF7 NNI) Nonnuclear Instrumentation 017 (SF7 ITM) In-Core Temperature Monitor X
K6.01 Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction of the following ITM system components:
Sensors and detectors (CFR: 41.7 / 45.7) 2.7 59 027 (SF5 CIRS) Containment Iodine Removal 028 (SF5 HRPS) Hydrogen Recombiner and Purge Control 029 (SF8 CPS) Containment Purge 033 (SF8 SFPCS) Spent Fuel Pool Cooling X
A1.01 Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System operating the controls including:
Spent fuel pool water level (CFR: 41.5 / 45.5) 2.7 60 034 (SF8 FHS) Fuel-Handling Equipment 035 (SF 4P SG) Steam Generator X
K5.03 Knowledge of operational implications of the following concepts as the apply to the S/GS:
Shrink and swell concept (CFR: 41.5 / 45.7) 2.8 61 041 (SF4S SDS) Steam Dump/Turbine Bypass Control X
K4.18 Knowledge of SDS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following:
Turbine trip (CFR: 41.7) 3.4 62 045 (SF 4S MTG) Main Turbine Generator
ES-401 12 Form ES-401-2 055 (SF4S CARS) Condenser Air Removal X
K1.06 Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the CARS and the following systems:
PRM system (CFR: 41.2 to 41.9 / 45.7 to 45.8) 2.6 63 056 (SF4S CDS) Condensate 068 (SF9 LRS) Liquid Radwaste X
K1.07 Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause effect relationships between the Liquid Radwaste System and the following systems:
Sources of liquid wastes for LRS (CFR: 41.2 to 41.9 / 45.7 to 45.8) 2.7 64 071 (SF9 WGS) Waste Gas Disposal 072 (SF7 ARM) Area Radiation Monitoring 075 (SF8 CW) Circulating Water X
A2.01 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the circulating water system; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:
Loss of intake structure (CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13) 3.0 65 079 (SF8 SAS**) Station Air 086 Fire Protection 050 (SF 9 CRV*) Control Room Ventilation NA K/A Category Point Totals:
2 1
0 2
1 2
1 1
0 0
0 Group Point Total:
10
ES-401 Generic Knowledge and Abilities Outline (Tier 3) RO Form ES-401-3 Facility:
Date of Exam:
Category K/A #
Topic RO SRO-only IR IR
- 1. Conduct of Operations 2.1.26 Knowledge of industrial safety procedures (such as rotating equipment, electrical, high temperature, high pressure, caustic, chlorine, oxygen and hydrogen).
(CFR: 41.10 / 45.12) 3.4 66 2.1.37 Knowledge of procedures, guidelines, or limitations associated with reactivity management.
(CFR: 41.1 / 43.6 / 45.6) 4.3 67 2.1.44 Knowledge of RO duties in the control room during fuel handling, such as l responding to alarms from the fuel handling area, communication with the fuel storage facility, systems operated from the control room in support of fueling operations, and supporting instrumentation.
(CFR: 41.10 / 43.7 / 45.12) 3.9 68 Subtotal 3
- 2. Equipment Control 2.2.14 Knowledge of the process for controlling equipment configuration or status.
(CFR: 41.10 / 43.3 / 45.13) 3.9 69 2.2.41 Ability to obtain and interpret station electrical and mechanical drawings.
(CFR: 41.10 / 45.12 / 45.13) 3.5 70 2.2.43 Knowledge of the process used to track inoperable alarms.
(CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13) 3.0 71 Subtotal 3
- 3. Radiation Control 2.3.4 Knowledge of radiation exposure limits under normal or emergency conditions.
(CFR: 41.12 / 43.4 / 45.10) 3.2 72 2.3.15 Knowledge of radiation monitoring systems, such as fixed radiation monitors and alarms, portable survey instruments, personnel monitoring equipment, etc.
(CFR: 41.12 / 43.4 / 45.9) 2.9 73 Subtotal 2
- 4. Emergency Procedures/Plan 2.4.3 Ability to identify post-accident instrumentation.
(CFR: 41.6 / 45.4) 3.7 74 2.4.17 Knowledge of EOP terms and definitions.
(CFR: 41.10 / 45.13) 3.9 75 Subtotal 2
Tier 3 Point Total 10
ES-401 PWR Examination Outline - SRO Form ES-401-2 Facility: Callaway Plant Date of Exam: August 31, 2020 Tier Group RO K/A Category Points SRO-Only Points K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G*
Total A2 G*
Total
- 1.
Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions 1
N/A N/A 18 3
3 6
2 9
2 2
4 Tier Totals 27 5
5 10
- 2.
Plant Systems 1
28 3
2 5
2 10 2
1 3
Tier Totals 38 5
3 8
- 3. Generic Knowledge and Abilities Categories 1
2 3
4 10 1
2 3
4 7
2 2
1 2
Note: 1.
Ensure that at least two topics from every applicable K/A category are sampled within each tier of the RO and SRO-only outline sections (i.e., except for one category in Tier 3 of the SRO-only section, the Tier Totals in each K/A category shall not be less than two). (One Tier 3 radiation control K/A is allowed if it is replaced by a K/A from another Tier 3 category.)
- 2.
The point total for each group and tier in the proposed outline must match that specified in the table. The final point total for each group and tier may deviate by +/-1 from that specified in the table based on NRC revisions. The final RO exam must total 75 points, and the SRO-only exam must total 25 points.
- 3.
Systems/evolutions within each group are identified on the outline. Systems or evolutions that do not apply at the facility should be deleted with justification. Operationally important, site-specific systems/evolutions that are not included on the outline should be added. Refer to Section D.1.b of ES-401 for guidance regarding the elimination of inappropriate K/A statements.
- 4.
Select topics from as many systems and evolutions as possible. Sample every system or evolution in the group before selecting a second topic for any system or evolution.
- 5.
Absent a plant-specific priority, only those K/As having an importance rating (IR) of 2.5 or higher shall be selected. Use the RO and SRO ratings for the RO and SRO-only portions, respectively.
- 6.
Select SRO topics for Tiers 1 and 2 from the shaded systems and K/A categories.
- 7.
The generic (G) K/As in Tiers 1 and 2 shall be selected from Section 2 of the K/A catalog, but the topics must be relevant to the applicable evolution or system. Refer to Section D.1.b of ES-401 for the applicable K/As.
- 8.
On the following pages, enter the K/A numbers, a brief description of each topic, the topics IRs for the applicable license level, and the point totals (#) for each system and category. Enter the group and tier totals for each category in the table above. If fuel-handling equipment is sampled in a category other than Category A2 or G* on the SRO-only exam, enter it on the left side of Column A2 for Tier 2, Group 2. (Note 1 does not apply). Use duplicate pages for RO and SRO-only exams.
- 9.
For Tier 3, select topics from Section 2 of the K/A catalog and enter the K/A numbers, descriptions, IRs, and point totals (#) on Form ES-401-3. Limit SRO selections to K/As that are linked to 10 CFR 55.43.
G* Generic K/As These systems/evolutions must be included as part of the sample (as applicable to the facility) when Revision 3 of the K/A catalog is used to develop the sample plan. They are not required to be included when using earlier revisions of the K/A catalog.
These systems/evolutions may be eliminated from the sample (as applicable to the facility) when Revision 3 of the K/A catalog is used to develop the sample plan.
ES-401 15 Form ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Emergency and Abnormal Plant EvolutionsTier 1/Group 1 (SRO)
E/APE # / Name / Safety Function K1 K2 K3 A1 A2 G*
K/A Topic(s)
IR 000007 (EPE 7; BW E02&E10; CE E02)
Reactor Trip, Stabilization, Recovery / 1 000008 (APE 8) Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident / 3 000009 (EPE 9) Small Break LOCA / 3 X
2.4.30 Knowledge of events related to system operation/status that must be reported to internal organizations or external agencies, such as the State, the NRC, or the transmission system operator.
(CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.11) 4.1 76 000011 (EPE 11) Large Break LOCA / 3 000015 (APE 15) Reactor Coolant Pump Malfunctions / 4 000022 (APE 22) Loss of Reactor Coolant Makeup / 2 000025 (APE 25) Loss of Residual Heat Removal System / 4 000026 (APE 26) Loss of Component Cooling Water / 8 000027 (APE 27) Pressurizer Pressure Control System Malfunction / 3 000029 (EPE 29) Anticipated Transient Without Scram / 1 000038 (EPE 38) Steam Generator Tube Rupture / 3 000040 (APE 40; BW E05; CE E05; W E12)
Steam Line RuptureExcessive Heat Transfer / 4 000054 (APE 54; CE E06) Loss of Main Feedwater /4 000055 (EPE 55) Station Blackout / 6 000056 (APE 56) Loss of Offsite Power / 6 X
2.2.25 Knowledge of the bases in Technical Specifications for limiting conditions for operations and safety limits.
(CFR: 41.5 / 41.7 / 43.2) 4.2 77 000057 (APE 57) Loss of Vital AC Instrument Bus / 6 000058 (APE 58) Loss of DC Power / 6 X
AA2.03 Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of DC Power:
DC loads lost; impact on ability to operate and monitor plant systems (CFR: 43.5 / 45.13) 3.9 78 000062 (APE 62) Loss of Nuclear Service Water / 4 X
2.1.32 Ability to explain and apply system limits and precautions.
(CFR: 41.10 / 43.2 / 45.12) 4.0 80 000065 (APE 65) Loss of Instrument Air / 8
ES-401 16 Form ES-401-2 000077 (APE 77) Generator Voltage and Electric Grid Disturbances / 6 X
AA2.05 Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to Generator Voltage and Electric Grid Disturbances:
Operational status of offsite circuit.
(CFR: 41.5 and 43.5 / 45.5, 45.7, and 45.8) 3.8 79 (W E04) LOCA Outside Containment / 3 (W E11) Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation / 4 X
EA2.1 Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the (Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation):
Facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during abnormal and emergency operations.
(CFR: 43.5 / 45.13) 4.2 81 (BW E04; W E05) Inadequate Heat TransferLoss of Secondary Heat Sink / 4 K/A Category Totals:
3 3
Group Point Total:
6
ES-401 17 Form ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Emergency and Abnormal Plant EvolutionsTier 1/Group 2 (SRO)
E/APE # / Name / Safety Function K1 K2 K3 A1 A2 G*
K/A Topic(s)
IR 000001 (APE 1) Continuous Rod Withdrawal / 1 000003 (APE 3) Dropped Control Rod / 1 000005 (APE 5) Inoperable/Stuck Control Rod / 1 X
2.2.40 Ability to apply Technical Specifications for a system.
(CFR: 41.10/43.2/43.5/45.3) 4.7 82 000024 (APE 24) Emergency Boration / 1 000028 (APE 28) Pressurizer (PZR) Level Control Malfunction / 2 000032 (APE 32) Loss of Source Range Nuclear Instrumentation / 7 000033 (APE 33) Loss of Intermediate Range Nuclear Instrumentation / 7 000036 (APE 36; BW/A08) Fuel-Handling Incidents / 8 000037 (APE 37) Steam Generator Tube Leak / 3 000051 (APE 51) Loss of Condenser Vacuum / 4 000059 (APE 59) Accidental Liquid Radwaste Release / 9 X
2.2.25 Knowledge of the bases in Technical Specifications for limiting conditions for operations and safety limits.
(CFR: 41.5 / 41.7 / 43.2) 4.2 83 000060 (APE 60) Accidental Gaseous Radwaste Release / 9 000061 (APE 61) Area Radiation Monitoring System Alarms
/ 7 000067 (APE 67) Plant Fire On Site / 8 X
AA2.13 Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Plant Fire on Site:
Need for emergency plant shutdown (CFR: 43.5 / 45.13) 4.4 84 000068 (APE 68; BW A06) Control Room Evacuation / 8 000069 (APE 69; W E14) Loss of Containment Integrity / 5 000074 (EPE 74; W E06 & E07) Inadequate Core Cooling /
4 000076 (APE 76) High Reactor Coolant Activity / 9 000078 (APE 78*) RCS Leak / 3 (W E01 & E02) Rediagnosis & SI Termination / 3 (W E13) Steam Generator Overpressure / 4 (W E15) Containment Flooding / 5 (W E16) High Containment Radiation /9 (BW A01) Plant Runback / 1 NA (BW A02 & A03) Loss of NNI-X/Y/7 NA (BW A04) Turbine Trip / 4 NA (BW A05) Emergency Diesel Actuation / 6 NA (BW A07) Flooding / 8 NA (BW E03) Inadequate Subcooling Margin / 4 NA (BW E08; W E03) LOCA CooldownDepressurization / 4 (BW E09; CE A13**; W E09 & E10) Natural Circulation/4 (BW E13 & E14) EOP Rules and Enclosures NA
ES-401 18 Form ES-401-2 (CE A11**; W E08) RCS OvercoolingPressurized Thermal Shock / 4 X
EA2.2 Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the (Pressurized Thermal Shock):
Adherence to appropriate procedures and operation within the limitations in the facilitys license and amendments (CFR: 43.5 / 45.13) 4.1 85 (CE A16) Excess RCS Leakage / 2 NA (CE E09) Functional Recovery NA (CE E13*) Loss of Forced Circulation/LOOP/Blackout / 4 NA K/A Category Point Totals:
2 2
Group Point Total:
4
ES-401 19 Form ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Plant SystemsTier 2/Group 1 (SRO)
System # / Name K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G*
K/A Topic(s)
IR 003 (SF4P RCP) Reactor Coolant Pump ROX2 004 (SF1; SF2 CVCS) Chemical and Volume Control 005 (SF4P RHR) Residual Heat Removal ROX2 006 (SF2; SF3 ECCS) Emergency Core Cooling 007 (SF5 PRTS) Pressurizer Relief/Quench Tank 008 (SF8 CCW) Component Cooling Water ROX2 010 (SF3 PZR PCS) Pressurizer Pressure Control 012 (SF7 RPS) Reactor Protection ROX2 013 (SF2 ESFAS) Engineered Safety Features Actuation X
A2.04 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the ESFAS; and (b) based Ability on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations; Loss of instrument bus (CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13) 4.2 86 022 (SF5 CCS) Containment Cooling X 2.4.21 Knowledge of the parameters and logic used to assess the status of safety functions, such as reactivity control, core cooling and heat removal, reactor coolant system integrity, containment conditions, radioactivity release control, etc.
(CFR: 41.7 / 43.5 / 45.12) 4.6 87 025 (SF5 ICE) Ice Condenser NA 026 (SF5 CSS) Containment Spray ROX2 039 (SF4S MSS) Main and Reheat Steam ROX2 059 (SF4S MFW) Main Feedwater 061 (SF4S AFW)
Auxiliary/Emergency Feedwater 062 (SF6 ED AC) AC Electrical Distribution X 2.2.37 Ability to determine operability and/or availability of safety related equipment.
(CFR: 41.7 / 43.5 / 45.12) 4.6 88 063 (SF6 ED DC) DC Electrical Distribution
ES-401 20 Form ES-401-2 064 (SF6 EDG) Emergency Diesel Generator X
A2.06 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the ED/G system; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:
Operating unloaded, lightly loaded, and highly loaded time limit.
(CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13) 3.3 89 073 (SF7 PRM) Process Radiation Monitoring X
A2.01 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the PRM system; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:
Erratic or failed power supply (CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13) 2.9 90 076 (SF4S SW) Service Water ROX2 078 (SF8 IAS) Instrument Air 103 (SF5 CNT) Containment 053 (SF1; SF4P ICS*) Integrated Control NA K/A Category Point Totals:
3 2
Group Point Total:
5
ES-401 21 Form ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Plant SystemsTier 2/Group 2 (SRO)
System # / Name K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G*
K/A Topic(s)
IR 001 (SF1 CRDS) Control Rod Drive 002 (SF2; SF4P RCS) Reactor Coolant 011 (SF2 PZR LCS) Pressurizer Level Control 014 (SF1 RPI) Rod Position Indication 015 (SF7 NI) Nuclear Instrumentation 016 (SF7 NNI) Nonnuclear Instrumentation 017 (SF7 ITM) In-Core Temperature Monitor 027 (SF5 CIRS) Containment Iodine Removal 028 (SF5 HRPS) Hydrogen Recombiner and Purge Control 029 (SF8 CPS) Containment Purge 033 (SF8 SFPCS) Spent Fuel Pool Cooling 034 (SF8 FHS) Fuel-Handling Equipment X
A2.03 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the Fuel Handling System ; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:
Mispositioned fuel element (CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13) 4.0 91 035 (SF 4P SG) Steam Generator 041 (SF4S SDS) Steam Dump/Turbine Bypass Control 045 (SF 4S MTG) Main Turbine Generator 055 (SF4S CARS) Condenser Air Removal 056 (SF4S CDS) Condensate 068 (SF9 LRS) Liquid Radwaste 071 (SF9 WGS) Waste Gas Disposal 072 (SF7 ARM) Area Radiation Monitoring X
A2.02 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the ARM system-and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:
Detector failure (CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 43.3 / 45.13) 2.9 92 075 (SF8 CW) Circulating Water 079 (SF8 SAS**) Station Air 086 Fire Protection X
2.4.41 Knowledge of the emergency action level thresholds and classifications.
(CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.11) 4.6 93
ES-401 22 Form ES-401-2 050 (SF 9 CRV*) Control Room Ventilation NA K/A Category Point Totals:
2 1
Group Point Total:
3
ES-401 Generic Knowledge and Abilities Outline (Tier 3) SRO Form ES-401-3 Facility: Callaway Plant Date of Exam: August 31, 2020 Category K/A #
Topic RO SRO-only IR IR
- 1. Conduct of Operations 2.1.34 Knowledge of primary and secondary plant chemistry limits.
(CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.12) 3.5 94 2.1.41 Knowledge of the refueling process.
(CFR: 41.2 / 41.10 / 43.6 / 45.13) 3.7 95 Subtotal 2
- 2. Equipment Control 2.2.5 Knowledge of the process for making design or operating changes to the facility.
(CFR: 41.10 / 43.3 / 45.13) 3.2 96 2.2.17 Knowledge of the process for managing maintenance activities during power operations, such as risk assessments, work prioritization, and coordination with the transmission system operator.
(CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13) 3.8 97 Subtotal 2
- 3. Radiation Control 2.3.6 Ability to approve release permits.
(CFR: 41.13 / 43.4 / 45.10) 3.8 98 Subtotal 1
- 4. Emergency Procedures/Plan 2.4.29 Knowledge of the emergency plan.
(CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.11) 4.4 99 2.4.23 Knowledge of the bases for prioritizing emergency procedure implementation l during emergency operations.
(CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13) 4.4 100 Subtotal 2
Tier 3 Point Total 7
ES-401 Record of Rejected K/As Form ES-401-4 Tier /
Group Randomly Selected K/A Reason for Rejection 1 / 1 K/A 027 AK3.01 AK3.03 - Pressurizer Pressure Control System Malfunction:
Actions contained in EOP for PZR PCS malfunctions.
Q#8 00027 AK3.04 - Pressurizer Pressure Control System Malfunction: Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Pressurizer Pressure Control Malfunctions: Why, if PZR level is lost and then restored, that pressure recovers much more slowly.
Randomly replaced due to the inability to write a question with plausible distractors.
AK3.01 Isolation of PZR spray following loss of PZR heaters was reselected as the plant design did not contain the function / isolation supported by the K/A.
1 / 1 K/A 040 AK1.07 -
Steam Line Rupture:
Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to Steam Line Rupture: Effects of feedwater introduction on dry S/G.
Q#11 00040 AK1.04 - Steam Line Rupture: Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to Steam Line Rupture: Nil ductility temperature.
Randomly replaced due to the inability to write a question with plausible distractors.
1 / 2 K/A 028 AK3.03 Pressurizer (PZR)
Level Control Malfunction:
Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Pressurizer Level Control Malfunctions:
False indication of PZR level when PORV or spray valve is open and RCS saturated.
Q#19 00028 AK3.04 - Pressurizer (PZR) Level Control Malfunction: Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Pressurizer Level Control Malfunctions: Change in PZR level with power change, even though RCS T-ave. constant, due to loop size difference.
Plant design does not support this K/A as the loop sizes are effectively the same (27.5" ID vs 29").
ES-401 Record of Rejected K/As Form ES-401-4 1 / 2 K/A 061 G2.1.19 G2.1.30 Area Radiation Monitoring (ARM) System Alarms: Ability to locate and operate components, including local controls.
Q#22 00061 G2.1.31 - Area Radiation Monitoring (ARM) System Alarms: Ability to use plant computers to evaluate system or component status. Ability to locate control room switches, controls, and indications, and to determine that they correctly reflect the desired plant lineup.
While there are some indications on the backpanel that may be used during source checks and alarms, plant lineups of ARMs are performed by the rad protection department. Randomly replaced due to the inability to write a question with plausible distractors applicable to control room operators.
Reselected G2.1.19 (Ability to use plant computers to evaluate system or component status.) due to inability to write question with plausible distractors.
1 / 2 K/A WE E13 G2.2.44 Steam Generator Overpressure: Ability to interpret control room indications to verify the status and operation of a system, and understand how operator actions and directives affect plant and system conditions.
Q#25 WE E13 G2.2.12 - Steam Generator Overpressure:
Knowledge of surveillance procedures. Steam Generator overpressure is a functional restoration yellow path procedure that does not have surveillance procedures associated with it.
Randomly replaced K/A.
2 / 1 K/A 007 G2.1.23:
Pressurizer Relief Tank/Quench Tank System: Ability to perform specific system and integrated plant procedures during all modes of plant operation.
Q#34 007 K5.02 - Pressurizer Relief Tank/Quench Tank System: Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as the apply to PRTS: Method of forming a steam bubble in the PZR.
Unable to write a question with plausible distractors for the associated system as it does not apply to the K/A topic. The method of drawing a steam bubble in the PZR is independent of the PRT operation.
ES-401 Record of Rejected K/As Form ES-401-4 2 / 1 K/A 012 A2.07 -
Reactor Protection System: Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the RPS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Loss of dc control.
Q#39 012 A2.01 - Reactor Protection System: Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the RPS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:
Faulty bistable operation.
Randomly replaced due to the inability to write a question with plausible distractors.
2 / 1 K/A 026 A1.01 -
Containment Spray System (CSS): Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the CSS controls including:
Containment Pressure.
Q#42 026 A1.06 - Containment Spray System (CSS):
Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the CSS controls including: Containment spray pump cooling.
Randomly replaced as plant design did not support this K/A. Callaway's CTMT spray pumps are air cooled.
2 / 1 K/A 026 K3.01 -
Containment Spray System (CSS):
Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the CSS will have on the following: CCS Q#43 026 K3.02 - Containment Spray System (CSS):
Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the CSS will have on the following: Recirculation spray system.
Randomly replaced due to the inability to write a question with plausible distractors.
2 / 1 K/A 059 A3.06 - Main Feedwater (MFW)
System: Ability to monitor automatic operation of the MFW, including: Feedwater isolation.
Q#46 059 A3.02 - Main Feedwater (MFW) System:
Ability to monitor automatic operation of the MFW, including: Programmed levels of the S/G.
Randomly replaced due to the inability to write a question with plausible distractors as programmed SG level is independent of power level i.e. SG level is not a function of reactor power.
ES-401 Record of Rejected K/As Form ES-401-4 2 / 1 K/A 061 A3.01 -
Auxiliary / Emergency Feedwater (AFW)
System: Ability to monitor automatic operation of the AFW, including: AFW startup and flows.
Q#47 061 A3.04 - Auxiliary / Emergency Feedwater (AFW) System: Ability to monitor automatic operation of the AFW, including: Automatic AFW isolation.
Randomly replaced as plant design did not support this K/A. Callaway's AFW system does not have an automatic isolation feature.
2 / 1 K/A 103 A4.04 -
Containment System:
Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room:
Phase A and phase B resets.
Q#55 103 A4.09 - Containment System: Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room:
Containment vacuum system.
Randomly replaced due to the inability to write a question to this K/A in this system. Containment Purge would be the only applicable ventilation system which is covered under its own system topic.
2 / 2 K/A 014 K4.06 - Rod Position Indication System (RPIS):
Knowledge of RPIS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: Individual and group misalignment.
Q#57 014 K4.05 - Rod Position Indication System (RPIS): Knowledge of RPIS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: Zone reference lights.
Plant design does not support this K/A as there are no specific rod hold interlocks, there is rod overlap and rod movement rates and insertions due to runback etc but no hold interlocks.
SRO 1 / 2 K/A 059 G2.4.41 G2.2.25 - Accidental Liquid Radwaste Release: Knowledge of the bases in Technical Specifications for limiting conditions for operations and safety limits.
Q#83 - 059 G2.4.35 Accidental Liquid Radwaste Release: Knowledge of local auxiliary operator tasks during an emergency and the resultant operational effects.
Randomly replaced due to the inability to write a SRO Level question with plausible distractors to this topic as there are few, if any, specific aux operator tasks for this event. A spill response team (which may or may not have Aux operators on it) would address the spill.
Reselected G2.4.41 as there was already one EAL question in order to avoid oversampling EALs for SROs.
ES-401 Record of Rejected K/As Form ES-401-4 SRO 2 / 1 K/A 073 A2.01 -
Process Radiation Monitoring (PRM)
System: Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the PRM system; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Erratic or failed power supply.
Q#90 073 A2.03 - Process Radiation Monitoring (PRM)
System: Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the PRM system; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Calibration drift.
Randomly replaced due to the inability to write a SRO Level question with plausible distractors. If calibration drift is suspected the procedure selection to mitigate would be made by a different department after being notified by the shift.
ES-301 Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-301-1 Facility:
Callaway Date of Examination:
8/31/2020 Examination Level: RO SRO Operating Test Number:
2020-1 Administrative Topic (see Note)
Type Code*
Describe activity to be performed Conduct of Operations RO Admin1 C, S, R N
G2.1.25 (3.9) Ability to interpret reference materials, such as graphs, curves, tables etc.
JPM: Calculate Boron Addition for blocking P-11 with 0 and 1 untrippable control rod.
Conduct of Operations RO Admin2 C, S, R N
G2.1.4 (3.3) Knowledge of individual licensed operator responsibilities related to shift staffing, such as medical requirements, no-solo operation, maintenance of active license status, 10CFR55, etc.
JPM: Select available overtime shifts without violating shift staff limits in APA-ZZ-00905 Equipment Control RO Admin3 S, D G2.2.43 (3.0) Knowledge of the process used to track inoperable alarms.
JPM: Complete CA2557, Computer Point Status Log and delete PPC point from alarm Radiation Control RO Admin4 C, S, R M
G2.3.14 (3.4) Knowledge of radiation or contamination hazards that may arise during normal, abnormal, or emergency conditions or activities.
JPM: Determine if a respirator should be worn NOTE: All items (five total) are required for SROs. RO applicants require only four items unless they are retaking only the administrative topics (which would require all five items).
- Type Codes and Criteria:
(C)ontrol room, (S)imulator, or Class(R)oom (D)irect from bank ( 3 for ROs; 4 for SROs and RO retakes)
(N)ew or (M)odified from bank ( 1)
(P)revious 2 exams ( 1, randomly selected)
ES-301 Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-301-1 RO Administrative JPMs:
RO Admin #1 This is a NEW JPM. At the completion of this JPM, the applicant calculated the volume of borated water addition as 3245 lbm (+/- 1lbm) and 5893 lbm (+/- 1lbm) for the situations of 0 and 1 untrippable rods respectively.
RO Admin #2 This is a NEW JPM. At the completion of this JPM, the applicant determined they are available to fill the Thursday and Friday night shifts without violating the work hour restrictions of APA-ZZ-00905.
RO Admin #3 This is a BANK JPM that has not been used on at least the last 3 initial license exams. At the completion of this JPM, the applicant deleted PPC point AFQ0601 from alarm and correctly completed out a CA2557 column 1 and 5.
RO Admin #4 This is a MODIFIED BANK JPM. The original JPM (URO-ADM A004J) has not been used on at least the last 3 NRC ILT Exams.
This JPM was modified by adjusting the dose rate, internal dose without a respirator, the times to complete the job with and without a respirator, and the overall determination to wear a respirator.
ES-301 Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-301-1 Facility:
Callaway Date of Examination:
8/31/2020 Examination Level: RO SRO Operating Test Number:
2020-1 Administrative Topic (see Note)
Type Code*
Describe activity to be performed Conduct of Operations SRO Admin1 C, S, R N
G2.1.2 (4.4) Knowledge of operator responsibilities during all modes of plant operations.
JPM: Determine risk management actions for NG07 Switchgear OOS.
Conduct of Operations SRO Admin2 C, S, R N
G2.1.1 (4.2) Knowledge of conduct of operatins requirements.
JPM: Determine Shift Manager Communication Requirements.
Equipment Control SRO Admin3 C, S, R N
G2.2.12 (4.1) Knowledge of surveillance procedures.
JPM: Review OSP-EG-P01AC, determine errors and document Operability concerns.
Radiation Control SRO Admin4 C, S, R M
G2.3.14 (3.8) Knowledge of radiation or contamination hazards that may arise during normal, abnormal, or emergency conditions or activities.
JPM: Select individual to exceed dose limit for accident mitigation.
Emergency Plan SRO Admin5 C, S, R N
G2.4.44 (4.4) Knowledge of emergency plan protective action recommendations JPM: Complete CA 2843, PAR Flowchart.
NOTE: All items (five total) are required for SROs. RO applicants require only four items unless they are retaking only the administrative topics (which would require all five items).
- Type Codes and Criteria:
(C)ontrol room, (S)imulator, or Class(R)oom (D)irect from bank ( 3 for ROs; 4 for SROs and RO retakes)
(N)ew or (M)odified from bank ( 1)
(P)revious 2 exams ( 1, randomly selected)
ES-301 Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-301-1 SRO Administrative JPMs:
SRO Admin1 This is a NEW JPM. At the completion of this JPM, the applicant determined that 'B' ESW Train and the TDAFP shall be maintained operable. No work will be allowed on AEPS, Security Diesel, or within 50 feet of the startup transformer. The applicant also determined that 3 areas (NB02, TB 2065' general area, and the condensate polisher area) require a RMA walkdown.
SRO Admin2 This is a NEW JPM. At the completion of this JPM, the applicant listed the 6 individuals/positions that should be notified due to a contaminated, injured person that will be transported via ambulance offsite for medical assistance.
SRO Admin3 This is a NEW JPM. At the completion of this JPM, the applicant determined that the pump differential pressure was incorrectly calculated, Vibration data at position F is in the Alert Range and Vibration data at position J is in the Required Action Range which results in the 'A' CCW pump being declared Inoperable.
SRO Admin4 This is a MODIFIED BANK JPM. The bank JPM was used on the 2016 ILT NRC Exam. That JPM has been modified by changing the reason for the dose in excess of the federal limit along with the list of volunteers. Using HDP-ZZ-01450, the applicant will select 1 individual out of 8 choices (different from the 2016 choice) that meets the guidelines and complete section 1 of CA0276, Authorization To Exceed Federal Occupational Dose Limits, correctly per the included key.
SRO Admin5 This is a NEW TIME CRITICAL JPM. At the completion of this JPM, the applicant identified that sector D is also affected and the Evacuation distance changed from Sectors E, F, G 5 miles to D, E, F, and G 10 miles. The applicant also completed 3 sections (outline, method, reason for type of PA) of CA 2843, PAR Flowchart correctly.
ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 Facility:
Callaway Date of Examination:
8/31/2020 Exam Level: RO SRO-I SRO-U Operating Test Number:
2020-1 Control Room Systems:* 8 for RO, 7 for SRO-I, and 2 or 3 for SRO-U System/JPM Title Type Code*
Safety Function Sim1. 024AA2.01 Emergency Boration / Loss of Shutdown Margin in Mode 4 - Emergency Borate from the RWST using 'B' SI Pump N, S, L, A 1
Sim2. 006A4.02 Emergency Core Cooling System / Open EMHV8802A ('A' SI Pump Discharge to Hot Leg Inj) in Mode 1
,2 or 3 EN, N, S 2
Sim3. 010A4.01 Pressurizer Pressure Control System (BB) /
Respond to a Master Pressure Controller Failure D, S, A 3
Sim4. 002A2.03 Reactor Coolant System / Perform ES-0.2, Natural Circulation Cooldown, Steps #7 and 8 to initiate a RCS cooldown N, S, L, A 4P Sim5. 103A4.04 Containment / Perform OTO-SA-00001, Attachment C, Containment Isolation Phase A Recovery EN, N, S 5
Sim6. 062A4.01 AC Electrical Distribution / Transfer 4160 VAC PB122 to transformer XPB123 (PA02 supplied) from XPB122 (PA01 supplied)
N, S, L 6
Sim7. 073A4.03 Process Radiation Monitoring System / Source Check GH-RE-10B per OSP-SP-00001 M, S 7
Sim8. 008A4.01 CCW System / Alternate CCW pumps in a single train then respond to a loss of both pumps and swap CCW service loop to the other CCW train within 10 minutes.
N, S, A 8
In-Plant Systems:* 3 for RO, 3 for SRO-I, and 3 or 2 for SRO-U RO only SRO-U SRO-U SRO-U
ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 P1. 055EK3.02 Loss of Offsite and Onsite Power / Manually load equipment on to an AC Bus A, D, E, P1 6
P2. 061K1.07 Auxiliary Feedwater System / Emergency Makeup Water to CST per EOP Addendum 23 D, E 4S P3. 033A2.03 Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System / Perform Local actions to fill the SFP with Reactor Makeup Water Per OTN-EC-00001 Addendum 6 N, R 8
All RO and SRO-I control room (and in-plant) systems must be different and serve different safety functions, all five SRO-U systems must serve different safety functions, and in-plant systems and functions may overlap those tested in the control room.
- Type Codes Criteria for R /SRO-I/SRO-U (A)lternate path (C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank (E)mergency or abnormal in-plant (EN)gineered safety feature (L)ow-Power/Shutdown (N)ew or (M)odified from bank including 1(A)
(P)revious 2 exams (R)CA (S)imulator 4-6/4-6 /2-3 9/ 8/ 4 1/ 1/ 1 1/ 1/ 1 (control room system) 1/ 1/ 1 2/ 2/ 1 3/ 3/ 2 (randomly selected) 1/ 1/ 1 Note 1: The JPMs from the 2017 exam were randomly selected by placing 11 slips of paper labeled A through K in a container. No JPMs from the 2019 NRC exam were available for random selection as those JPMs will be used as a part of 2020 Audit Exam.
Simulator JPMs S1 This is a NEW ALTERNATE PATH JPM. The applicant will perform actions of OTO-ZZ-00003, Loss of Shutdown Margin, and borate the RCS using the B SI Pump and associated piping. Both CCPs and the flowpath to the A SI pump are not available and/or successful in establishing emergency boration thereby requiring the use of the B SI Pump and associated flowpath.
S2 This is a NEW JPM. The applicant will perform actions of OTN-EM-00001, section 5.11 to open EMHV8802A, SI Pump A Disch To Hot Leg Inj without affecting RWST or RHUT inventory, starting the 'A' Train SI pump nor affecting the lineup (and therefore operability) of the opposite train which would place the plant in a LCO 3.0.3 condition.
SRO-U SRO-U
ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 S3 This is an ALTERNATE PATH, BANK JPM. The JPM (URO-SBB-04-C166J(A))
was used on the 2016 ILT NRC Exam. The applicant will be directed to equalize RCS and Pressurizer Boron Concentration using OTG-ZZ-00004, Addendum 03.
When the master pressure controller is taken to AUTO the PZR spray valves fail open requiring the applicant to manually close the spray valves. Upon completion of this JPM, the master pressure controller failure has been addressed prior to a Reactor Trip being generated on low pressurizer pressure.
S4 This is a NEW ALTERNATE PATH JPM. The applicant will perform actions of ES-0.2, Natural Circulation Cooldown, steps 7 & 8. Conditions are such that the applicant will have to perform the RNO actions of both steps, starting 4 CRDM fans and using the more than one SG ASDs (as the applicant must diagnosis that the condenser is unavailable) to establish a cooldown rate without generating a Steam Line SI nor exceed the cooldown rate.
S5 This is a NEW JPM. The applicant will perform actions of OTO-SA-00001, Attachment C, CTMT Isolation Phase A Recovery. The applicant will have to reset the Phase A signal, establish RCP seal water return, restore sample flow to CTMT monitors, restore reactor makeup water, and provide a CTMT sump discharge flowpath.
S6 This is a NEW JPM. The applicant will perform actions of OTN-PB-00001, Addendum 3, Energizing and Cross-tying Buses PB121, PB122, and PB123, to transfer 4160 VAC bus PB122 from its normal supply (PA01 via XPB122) to its alternate supply (PA02 via XPB123) without deenergizing the bus.
S7 This is a MODIFIED BANK JPM. This JPM was developed and submitted for use on the 2017 ILT NRC exam but not used due to the final class makeup (No ROs in 2017). It was modified as the original JPM source checked a different monitor, BM-RE-52. The applicant will perform actions of OSP-SP-00001 and have successfully source checked all three channels of GH-RE-10B (105, 108, 109) by selecting each channel and then depressing the source check button on the RM11 console.
S8 This is a NEW ALTERNATE PATH Time Critical JPM. The applicant will perform actions of OTN-EG-00001 section 5.4 to alternate 'B' Train CCW pumps. After the pump swap, malfunctions occur resulting in a loss of all CCW. The applicant will start either 'A' Train CCW pump (EG HIS 21 or 23 to Start), establish service water to the 'A' CCW HX by opening EF HIS 51&59 and shift CCW loads to the
'A' Train by opening EG HS-15 and closing EG HS-16 10 minutes from the loss of both 'B' Train CCW pumps.
ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 In Plant JPMs P1 This is an ALTERNATE PATH, BANK JPM. This original JPM was used on the 2017 NRC ILT Exam. This JPM was modified by the addition of NG breaker status cue sheets and by making one step that was previously not critical a critical step (but this was not considered a significant modification and therefore listed as a BANK JPM). Upon completion of this JPM, the applicant will have closed the following breakers thereby loading equipment onto the NB01 bus:
NG0301 for NG03 bus NG0303 for Battery Chargers NK23 NK51-20 for Control Room emergency lighting P2 This is a BANK JPM that has not been used on at least the last 3 initial license exams. The applicant will perform actions of EOP Addendum 23, Local CST Emergency Fill, connecting a fire hose to the CST emergency fill connector on APV0043 and then unlock and open APV0043 and then open a fire hydrant thereby establishing fire water emergency fill to the CST.
P3 This is a NEW JPM. The applicant will enter the RCA and perform actions of OTN-EC-00001, Addendum 6, Filling the Spent Fuel Pool, Step 5.2.6. To initiate SFP makeup, the applicant will fully open ECV0076 and throttling open ECV0128 to achieve a SFP makeup flow of ~65,000 lbm/hr.
ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 Facility:
Callaway Date of Examination:
8/31/2020 Exam Level: RO SRO-I SRO-U Operating Test Number:
2020-1 Control Room Systems:* 8 for RO, 7 for SRO-I, and 2 or 3 for SRO-U System/JPM Title Type Code*
Safety Function Sim1. 024AA2.01 Emergency Boration / Loss of Shutdown Margin in Mode 4 - Emergency Borate from the RWST using 'B' SI Pump N, S, L, A 1
Sim2. 006A4.02 Emergency Core Cooling System / Open EMHV8802A ('A' SI Pump Discharge to Hot Leg Inj) in Mode 1
,2 or 3 EN, N, S 2
Sim3. 010A4.01 Pressurizer Pressure Control System (BB) /
Respond to a Master Pressure Controller Failure D, S, A 3
Sim4. 002A2.03 Reactor Coolant System / Perform ES-0.2, Natural Circulation Cooldown, Steps #7 and 8 to initiate a RCS cooldown N, S, L, A 4P Sim5. 103A4.04 Containment / Perform OTO-SA-00001, Attachment C, Containment Isolation Phase A Recovery EN, N, S 5
Sim7. 073A4.03 Process Radiation Monitoring System / Source Check BM-RE-52 per OSP-SP-00001 M, S 7
Sim8. 008A4.01 CCW System / Alternate CCW pumps in a single train then respond to a loss of both pumps and swap CCW service loop to the other CCW train within 10 minutes.
N, S, A 8
In-Plant Systems:* 3 for RO, 3 for SRO-I, and 3 or 2 for SRO-U P1. 055EK3.02 Loss of Offsite and Onsite Power / Manually load equipment on to an AC Bus A, D, E, P1 6
ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 P2. 061K1.07 Auxiliary Feedwater System / Emergency Makeup Water to CST per EOP Addendum 23 D, E 4S P3. 033A2.03 Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System / Perform Local actions to fill the SFP with Reactor Makeup Water Per OTN-EC-00001 Addendum 6 N, R 8
All RO and SRO-I control room (and in-plant) systems must be different and serve different safety functions, all five SRO-U systems must serve different safety functions, and in-plant systems and functions may overlap those tested in the control room.
- Type Codes Criteria for R /SRO-I/SRO-U (A)lternate path (C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank (E)mergency or abnormal in-plant (EN)gineered safety feature (L)ow-Power/Shutdown (N)ew or (M)odified from bank including 1(A)
(P)revious 2 exams (R)CA (S)imulator 4-6/4-6 /2-3 9/ 8/ 4 1/ 1/ 1 1/ 1/ 1 (control room system) 1/ 1/ 1 2/ 2/ 1 3/ 3/ 2 (randomly selected) 1/ 1/ 1 Note 1: The JPMs from the 2017 exam were randomly selected by placing 11 slips of paper labeled A through K in a container. No JPMs from the 2019 NRC exam were available for random selection as those JPMs will be used as a part of 2020 Audit Exam.
Simulator JPMs S1 This is a NEW ALTERNATE PATH JPM. The applicant will perform actions of OTO-ZZ-00003, Loss of Shutdown Margin, and borate the RCS using the B SI Pump and associated piping. Both CCPs and the flowpath to the A SI pump are not available and/or successful in establishing emergency boration thereby requiring the use of the B SI Pump and associated flowpath.
S2 This is a NEW JPM. The applicant will perform actions of OTN-EM-00001, section 5.11 to open EMHV8802A, SI Pump A Disch To Hot Leg Inj without affecting RWST or RHUT inventory, starting the 'A' Train SI pump nor affecting the lineup (and therefore operability) of the opposite train which would place the plant in a LCO 3.0.3 condition.
ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 S3 This is an ALTERNATE PATH, BANK JPM. The JPM (URO-SBB-04-C166J(A))
was used on the 2016 ILT NRC Exam. The applicant will be directed to equalize RCS and Pressurizer Boron Concentration using OTG-ZZ-00004, Addendum 03.
When the master pressure controller is taken to AUTO the PZR spray valves fail open requiring the applicant to manually close the spray valves. Upon completion of this JPM, the master pressure controller failure has been addressed prior to a Reactor Trip being generated on low pressurizer pressure.
S4 This is a NEW ALTERNATE PATH JPM. The applicant will perform actions of ES-0.2, Natural Circulation Cooldown, steps 7 & 8. Conditions are such that the applicant will have to perform the RNO actions of both steps, starting 4 CRDM fans and using the more than one SG ASDs (as the applicant must diagnosis that the condenser is unavailable) to establish a cooldown rate without generating a Steam Line SI nor exceed the cooldown rate.
S5 This is a NEW JPM. The applicant will perform actions of OTO-SA-00001, Attachment C, CTMT Isolation Phase A Recovery. The applicant will have to reset the Phase A signal, establish RCP seal water return, restore sample flow to CTMT monitors, restore reactor makeup water, and provide a CTMT sump discharge flowpath.
S7 This is a MODIFIED BANK JPM. This JPM was developed and submitted for use on the 2017 ILT NRC exam but not used due to the final class makeup (No ROs in 2017). It was modified as the original JPM source checked a different monitor, BM-RE-52. The applicant will perform actions of OSP-SP-00001 and have successfully source checked all three channels of GH-RE-10B (105, 108, 109) by selecting each channel and then depressing the source check button on the RM11 console.
S8 This is a NEW ALTERNATE PATH Time Critical JPM. The applicant will perform actions of OTN-EG-00001 section 5.4 to alternate 'B' Train CCW pumps. After the pump swap, malfunctions occur resulting in a loss of all CCW. The applicant will start either 'A' Train CCW pump (EG HIS 21 or 23 to Start), establish service water to the 'A' CCW HX by opening EF HIS 51&59 and shift CCW loads to the
'A' Train by opening EG HS-15 and closing EG HS-16 10 minutes from the loss of both 'B' Train CCW pumps.
ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 In Plant JPMs P1 This is an ALTERNATE PATH, BANK JPM. This original JPM was used on the 2017 NRC ILT Exam. This JPM was modified by the addition of NG breaker status cue sheets and by making one step that was previously not critical a critical step (but this was not considered a significant modification and therefore listed as a BANK JPM). Upon completion of this JPM, the applicant will have closed the following breakers thereby loading equipment onto the NB01 bus:
NG0301 for NG03 bus NG0303 for Battery Chargers NK23 NK51-20 for Control Room emergency lighting P2 This is a BANK JPM that has not been used on at least the last 3 initial license exams. The applicant will perform actions of EOP Addendum 23, Local CST Emergency Fill, connecting a fire hose to the CST emergency fill connector on APV0043 and then unlock and open APV0043 and then open a fire hydrant thereby establishing fire water emergency fill to the CST.
P3 This is a NEW JPM. The applicant will enter the RCA and perform actions of OTN-EC-00001, Addendum 6, Filling the Spent Fuel Pool, Step 5.2.6. To initiate SFP makeup, the applicant will fully open ECV0076 and throttling open ECV0128 to achieve a SFP makeup flow of ~65,000 lbm/hr.
ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 Facility:
Callaway Date of Examination:
8/31/2020 Exam Level: RO SRO-I SRO-U Operating Test Number:
2020-1 Control Room Systems:* 8 for RO, 7 for SRO-I, and 2 or 3 for SRO-U System/JPM Title Type Code*
Safety Function Sim1. 024AA2.01 Emergency Boration / Loss of Shutdown Margin in Mode 4 - Emergency Borate from the RWST using 'B' SI Pump N, S, L, A 1
Sim2. 006A4.02 Emergency Core Cooling System / Open EMHV8802A ('A' SI Pump Discharge to Hot Leg Inj) in Mode 1,2 or 3 EN, N, S 2
Sim4. 002A2.03 Reactor Coolant System / Perform ES-0.2, Natural Circulation Cooldown, Steps #7 and 8 to initiate a RCS cooldown N, S, L, A 4P In-Plant Systems:* 3 for RO, 3 for SRO-I, and 3 or 2 for SRO-U P1. 055EK3.02 Loss of Offsite and Onsite Power / Manually load equipment on to an AC Bus A, D, E, P1 6
P3. 033A2.03 Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System / Perform Local actions to fill the SFP with Reactor Makeup Water Per OTN-EC-00001 Addendum 6 N, R 8
All RO and SRO-I control room (and in-plant) systems must be different and serve different safety functions, all five SRO-U systems must serve different safety functions, and in-plant systems and functions may overlap those tested in the control room.
- Type Codes Criteria for R /SRO-I/SRO-U (A)lternate path (C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank (E)mergency or abnormal in-plant (EN)gineered safety feature (L)ow-Power/Shutdown (N)ew or (M)odified from bank including 1(A)
(P)revious 2 exams (R)CA (S)imulator 4-6/4-6 /2-3 9/ 8/ 4 1/ 1/ 1 1/ 1/ 1 (control room system) 1/ 1/ 1 2/ 2/ 1 3/ 3/ 2 (randomly selected) 1/ 1/ 1
ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 Note 1: The JPMs from the 2017 exam were randomly selected by placing 11 slips of paper labeled A through K in a container. No JPMs from the 2019 NRC exam were available for random selection as those JPMs will be used as a part of 2020 Audit Exam.
Simulator JPMs S1 This is a NEW ALTERNATE PATH JPM. The applicant will perform actions of OTO-ZZ-00003, Loss of Shutdown Margin, and borate the RCS using the B SI Pump and associated piping. Both CCPs and the flowpath to the A SI pump are not available and/or successful in establishing emergency boration thereby requiring the use of the B SI Pump and associated flowpath.
S2 This is a NEW JPM. The applicant will perform actions of OTN-EM-00001, section 5.11 to open EMHV8802A, SI Pump A Disch To Hot Leg Inj without affecting RWST or RHUT inventory, starting the 'A' Train SI pump nor affecting the lineup (and therefore operability) of the opposite train which would place the plant in a LCO 3.0.3 condition.
S4 This is a NEW ALTERNATE PATH JPM. The applicant will perform actions of ES-0.2, Natural Circulation Cooldown, steps 7 & 8. Conditions are such that the applicant will have to perform the RNO actions of both steps, starting 4 CRDM fans and using the more than one SG ASDs (as the applicant must diagnosis that the condenser is unavailable) to establish a cooldown rate without generating a Steam Line SI nor exceed the cooldown rate.
In Plant JPMs P1 This is an ALTERNATE PATH, BANK JPM. This original JPM was used on the 2017 NRC ILT Exam. This JPM was modified by the addition of NG breaker status cue sheets and by making one step that was previously not critical a critical step (but this was not considered a significant modification and therefore listed as a BANK JPM). Upon completion of this JPM, the applicant will have closed the following breakers thereby loading equipment onto the NB01 bus:
NG0301 for NG03 bus NG0303 for Battery Chargers NK23 NK51-20 for Control Room emergency lighting P3 This is a NEW JPM. The applicant will enter the RCA and perform actions of OTN-EC-00001, Addendum 6, Filling the Spent Fuel Pool, Step 5.2.6. To initiate SFP makeup, the applicant will fully open ECV0076 and throttling open ECV0128 to achieve a SFP makeup flow of ~65,000 lbm/hr.
Page 1 of 6 Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: Callaway Scenario No.1, Rev 0 Op-Test No.: 2020-1 Examiners: ____________________________ Operators:
Initial Conditions: 100%, MOC Turnover: No equipment out of service. After the crew takes the watch, park Control Bank A, B, &C at 228 steps per OTG-ZZ-00004, Attachment 3, Parking Control Rods at 228 steps.
Event No.
Malf. No.
Event Type*
Event Description 1
N/A SRO (R)
RO (R)
Park Control Bank A, B, & C at 228 steps per OTG-ZZ-00004,, Parking Control Rods at 228 steps.
EA09PB12104TF_
Open = 1 SRO (C)
BOP (C)
Service Water pump lockout with a failure of the standby pump, Essential Service Water placed in service per Annunciator 12A.
3 X01A103P = 0.8 ramp 180 sec SRO (I)
RO (I)
CVCS Letdown (LTDN) HX Temperature Controls fails upscale causing LTDN temperature to slowly rise requiring manual control to stabilize.
4 AB / ABPT514=0.1 ramp 120 sec SRO (I)
BOP (I)
'A' SG Pressure Instrument, (AB PT514) fails downscale requiring the crew to enter OTO-AE-00002. Technical Specification determination.
5 BB / BB005 = 100, ramp 60 sec BG / BG002 = 30, no ramp SRO (C)
RO (C)
RCS Excessive Leakage (30 gpm) requiring the crew to enter OTO-BB-00003. Technical Specification determination and then the leak grows to over 50 gpm requiring a manual reactor trip. E-0 Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.
6 SA /
SIS_A_Block_Auto
= 0 SIS_B_Block_Auto
= 0 SRO (I)
RO (I)
Safety Injection fails to Automatically Actuate CT-2, Manually actuate SI 7
BB / BB005 = 500, ramp 60 sec EM / PEM01A=1 EF / PEF01B=1 EJ / PEJ01A=1 SRO (M)
RO (M)
BOP (M)
RCS LOCA with 'A' SI pump autostart failure, 'B' ESW Pump trip, 'A' RHR Pump trip, E-1 Loss of Primary or Secondary Coolant.
CT-6, Establish flow from at least one Charging/SI pump CT-16, Manually Trip RCPs (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor
Page 2 of 6 Target Quantitative Attributes (Per Scenario; See Section D.5.d)
Actual Attributes
- 1. Total malfunctions (5-8) 8
- 2. Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) 2
- 3. Abnormal events (2-4) 2
- 4. Major transients (1-2) 1
- 5. EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1-2) 1
- 6. EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2) 0
- 7. Critical tasks (2-3) 3
Scenario #1 Event Description Callaway 2020-1 NRC ES-D-1, Rev. 0 Page 3 of 6 The Plant is stable at 100% with no equipment out of service. Once the crew has taken the watch, they will park Control Bank A, B, & C at 228 steps per OTG-ZZ-00004, Attachment 3, Parking Control Rods at 228 Steps.
After Control Banks A, B, & C are parked at 228 steps, the 'B' Service Water pump trips and the standby service water pump did not auto start and can't be manually started. With only 1 Service Water pump running, the crew should place both trains of Essential Service Water (ESW) in service to restore Service Water pressure per Annunciator 12A, Service Water Pump Lockout.
After ESW is placed in service, Letdown Temperature HX controller, BGTK130, slowly fails causing letdown temperature to slowly rise. The crew should utilize Annunciator 39B to take manual control of BGTK130 and stabilize the plant.
After addressing the LTDN HX controller failure, 'A' SG Pressure Instrument (AB PT-514) will fail downscale. AB-PT-514 compensates AB FT-512 and the crew should utilize OTO-AE-00002, SG Water Level Control Malfunction, to remove the faulted instruments from control. This failure will result in Technical Specification 3.3.1, and 3.3.2 not being met.
Once the Technical Specification for the SG pressure instrument are addressed, a small non isolable leak inside containment (30 gpm) will develop on the letdown line. The crew should respond by entering OTO-BB-00003, RCS Excessive Leakage. This failure will result in Technical Specification 3.4.13, RCS Operational Leakage, not being met. Once this Technical Specification is addressed, a RCS leak on surge line will develop requiring a Reactor Trip and Safety Injection. The automatic Safety Injection (SI) will not work requiring the crew to manually initiate SI.
During the immediate actions of E-0, LOCA increases on the PZR surge line. Additionally, the
'B' ESW pump will trip, the 'A' SI pump will fail to autostart when manual safety injection is initiated and the 'A' RHR pump will trip during the performance of E-0. As the 'B' ESW is the heat sink for the 'B' Train ECCS, this effectively removes the 'B' train from service (Note, if the crew does not secure the 'B' Train ECCS pumps, these pumps begin tripping due to high temperature with various time delays.) While the leak size is relatively small (RCS pressure does not lower to below RHR pump head), the 'A' CCP cannot recover RCS pressure and level, therefore requiring the manual start of the 'A' SI pump to stabilize the plant. RCS pressure does lower far enough to meet the RCP trip criteria. The loss of both RHR pumps will require the crew to transition to ECA-1.1 at E-1 step #12 RNO.
The scenario is complete when the crew has transitioned to ECA-1.1 at step #12 of E-1, secured the RCPs, and started the 'A' SI pump.
Scenario #1 Event Description Callaway 2020-1 NRC ES-D-1, Rev. 0 Page 4 of 6 Critical Tasks:
Critical Tasks Trip all RCPs within 5 minutes of meeting RCP trip criteria. (optional)
Establish RCS Injection flow from 'A' SI pump before completion of E-0 Attachment A EVENT 7
7 Safety significance Failure to trip the RCPs under the postulated plant conditions leads to core uncovery and to fuel cladding temperatures in excess of 2200°F, which is the limit specified in the ECCS acceptance criteria. Thus, failure to perform the task represents misoperation or incorrect crew performance in which the crew has failed to prevent degradation of...{the fuel cladding}...barrier to fission product release and which leads to violation of the facility license condition.
The acceptable results obtained in the FSAR analysis of a small-break LOCA are predicated on the assumption of minimum ECCS pumped injection. The analysis assumes that a minimum pumped ECCS flow rate, which varies with RCS pressure, is injected into the core. The flow rate values assumed for minimum pumped injection are based on operation of one each of the following ECCS pumps: Charging/SI pump (HP plants only), high-head SI pump, and low-head SI pump. Operation of this minimum required complement of ECCS injection pumps is consistent with the FSAR assumption that only minimum safeguards are actuated. Because compliance with the assumptions of the FSAR is part of the facility license condition, failure to perform the critical task (under the postulated plant conditions) constitutes a violation of the license condition.
Cueing Indications of a SBLOCA AND Indication and/or annunciation of safety injection AND Indication and/or annunciation that at least one CCP/SI pump is running AND Indication that the RCP trip criteria are met Indication and/or annunciation that Charging/SI pump injection is required SI actuation RCS pressure below the shutoff head of the Charging/SI pump Indication and/or annunciation that no Charging/SI pump is injecting into the core Control switch indication that the circuit breakers or contactors for both Charging/SI pumps are open All Charging/SI pump discharge pressure indicators read zero All flow rate indicators for Charging/SI pump injection read zero Performance indicator Manipulation of controls as required to trip all RCPs RCP breaker position lights indicate breaker open Starting the 'A' SI pump Performance feedback Indication that all RCPs are stopped RCP breaker position lights RCP flow decreasing RCP motor amps decreasing With the 'B' train of ECCS have lost its cooling water pump and the size of the LOCA, the 'A' CCP will not be able to restore RCS water level while RCS pressure remains greater than the 'A' RHR pump head. As RCS Pressures lowers below the SI pump shutoff head, the 'A' SI pump will be required and once the 'A' SI pump is started, Indication and/or annunciation that the A SI is injecting and Flow rate indication of injection from the A SI pump Justification for the chosen performance limit In a letter to the NRC titled Justification of the Manual RCP Trip for Small Break LOCA Events (OG-117, March 1984) (also known as the Sheppard letter), the WOG provided the required assurance based on the results of the analyses performed in conjunction with WCAP-9584. The WOG showed that for all Westinghouse plants, more than two minutes were available between onset of the trip criteria and depletion of RCS inventory to the critical inventory. In fact, additional analyses sponsored by the WOG in connection with OG-117 conservatively showed that manual RCP trip could be delayed for five minutes beyond the onset of the RCP trip criteria without incurring any adverse consequence.
before completion of Attachment A of E-0 is in accordance with the PWR Owners Group Emergency Response Guidelines. It allows enough time for the crew to take the correct action while at the same time preventing avoidable adverse consequences.
PWR Owners Group Appendix CT-16, Manually Trip RCPs CT-6, Establish flow from at least one Charging/SI pump
Scenario #1 Event Description Callaway 2020-1 NRC ES-D-1, Rev. 0 Page 5 of 6 Critical Tasks Manually actuate at least one train of SIS-actuated safeguards equipment before transition to E-1, E-2 or E-3 series or transition to any FRG.
EVENT 6
Safety significance Failure to manually actuate SI under the postulated conditions constitutes mis-operation or incorrect crew performance in which the crew does not prevent degraded emergency core cooling system (ECCS)capacity.
In this case, SI can be manually actuated from the control room. Therefore, failure to manually actuate SI also represents a failure by the crew to demonstrate the following abilities:
Effectively direct or manipulate engineered safety feature (ESF) controls that would prevent (degraded emergency core cooling system (ECCS)capacity)
Recognize a failure or an incorrect automatic actuation of an ESF system or component Take one or more actions that would prevent a challenge to plant safety Cueing Indication and/or annunciation that that Sl is required PRZR pressure or SG pressure less than SI actuation setpoint Containment pressure greater than SI actuation setpoint Subcooled margin less than the foldout page criterion for SI actuation in ES-0.1 PRZR water level less than the foldout page criterion for SI actuation in ES-0.1 No indication or annunciation that SI is actuated Performance indicator Manipulation of controls as required to actuate at least one train of Sl SB HS-27 SB HS-28 Performance feedback Indication that both Trains of SI - Actuated LOCA Sequencer annunciator 30A - Lit LOCA Sequencer annunciator 30B - Lit SB069 SI Actuate Red Light - Lit SOLID (NOT blinking)
Justification for the chosen performance limit The crew has had ample opportunity to recognize the need for Sl and the fact that Sl has not automatically actuated.
Given the postulated plant conditions, transition from E-0 to ES-0.1 constitutes an error in using the E-0 procedure. The crew is in the wrong procedure; however, the crew is allowed to recover from this error up through Step 3.a of ES-0.1.
The ERG network is designed to "catch" errors in procedure usage. Step 3.a is designed to get the crew back to E-0, if that is in fact where the crew should be. If the crew members pass through Step 3.a and remain in ES-0.1, they have missed the last step that would return them to the correct procedure.
PWR Owners Group Appendix CT-2, Manually actuate SI NOTE: (Per NUREG-1021, Appendix D) If an operator or the Crew significantly deviates from or fails to follow procedures that affect the maintenance of basic safety functions, those actions may form the basis of a CT identified in the post-scenario review.
Scenario #1 Event Description Callaway 2020-1 NRC ES-D-1, Rev. 0 Page 6 of 6 References OTG-ZZ-00004, Power Operations OTA-RK-00014, Addendum 12A, Service Water Pump Lockout OTA-RK-00018, Addendum 39B, Letdown Heat Exchanger Discharge Temperature High OTO-AE-00002, SG Water Level Control Malfunctions OTO-BB-00003, RSC Excessive Leakage E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection E-1, Loss of Primary or Secondary Reactor Coolant Technical Specification 3.4.13, RCS operational Leakage Technical Specification 3.3.1, RTS Instrumentation Technical Specification 3.3.2, ESFAS Instrumentation ODP-ZZ-00025, EOP/OTO User's Guide PRA Systems, Events or Operator Actions:
Page 1 of 6 Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: Callaway Scenario No.2, Rev 0 Op-Test No.: 2020-1 Examiners: ____________________________ Operators:
Initial Conditions: 50 to 55%, BOC Turnover: No equipment out of service. The plant is performing a beginning of Cycle startup. Once the crew has the watch, the crew will start a second feed pump per OTN-AE-00001 and OTG-ZZ-00004.
Event No.
Malf. No.
Event Type*
Event Description 1
N/A SRO (N)
BOP (N)
Start a second feed pump per OTN-AE-00001 Addendum 2.
2 BB / BBLT0460 =
466.1, ramp=60 sec SRO (I)
RO (I)
PZR level instrument (BBLT460) fails downscale isolating letdown. OTO-BG-00001 to remove failed instrument and restore letdown. Technical Specification Determination.
3 EG / EG004=300, ramp = 60sec SRO (C)
BOP (C)
CCW Leak on the supply to Radwaste. OTO-EG-00001, CCW System Malfunction to isolate the leak.
4 EBB01B=20 SRO (R)
RO (R)
BOP (R)
Tube Leak on Steam Generator 'B',
OTO-BB-00001, Steam Generator Tube Leak. Technical Specification Determination.
5 EBB01B=600, ramp = 30sec SRO (M)
RO (M)
BOP (M)
Tube Rupture in Steam Generator 'B' E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture CT-18, Isolate the Ruptured SG CT-19, Control initial RCS cooldown 6
SA /
SAS9XX_2=1 SRO (C)
BOP (C)
Failure of 'B' MSIV (AB HIS-17) to close, fast close all MSIVs 7
BB /
BBPCV0455B_2=
0.1 BB /
BBPCV0455C_2
=0.1 SRO (C)
RO (C)
BOP (C)
Failure of normal PZR Sprays valves during E-3 performance -
requires PZR PORVS to depressurize RCS.
CT 20, Depressurize RCS to E-3 SI termination criteria (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor
Page 2 of 6 Target Quantitative Attributes (Per Scenario; See Section D.5.d)
Actual Attributes
- 1. Total malfunctions (5-8) 6
- 2. Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) 2
- 3. Abnormal events (2-4) 3
- 4. Major transients (1-2) 1
- 5. EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1-2) 1
- 6. EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2) 0
- 7. Critical tasks (2-3) 3
Scenario #2 Event Description Callaway 2020-1 NRC ES-D-1, Rev. 0 Page 3 of 6 The Plant is stable at 50-55% with no equipment out of service. A beginning of cycle startup is in progress per OTG-ZZ-00004, Power Operations. Once the crew has the watch, the crew is to startup a second MFP per OTG-ZZ-00004 step 5.5.1.b and OTN-AE-00001, Addendum 2, MFP Operations.
After the 2nd MFP is placed in service, PZR level instrument (BBLT460) will fail downscale and isolate letdown. (BBLT460 will be the bottom selected PZR level instrument which service an alarm function and letdown isolation; in this initial configuration, it does not input into the PZR level controller.) The crew should enter OTO-BG-00001, remove the failed instrument from control and restore letdown. This failure will result in Technical Specification 3.3.1 not being met.
After letdown is restored, a CCW leak on the header to radwaste occurs causing Annunciator 52F to alarm. The crew should enter OTO-EG-00001 and utilize Attachment B to find the leak and isolate it.
Once the crew has initiated restoration of control rod positions, a 20 gpm tube leak develops in Steam Generator 'B'. The crew should enter OTO-BB-00001, Steam Generator Tube Leak, and quantify the leak to be greater than 150 gpd. The crew should initiate a load reduction to below 50% within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> using OTO-MA-00008, Rapid Load Reduction. This failure will result in Technical Specification 3.4.13 and 3.4.17 not being met.
After a measurable downpower (>2%), the Tube Leak will grow into a tube rupture. The crew should manually trip the reactor and initiate Safety Injection. The crew should implement E-0 and transition to E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture at E-0 step #15. The crew should direct an Operations Technician to locally close ABV0085, Steam Supply to Turbine Driven AFW pump.
During the performance of E-3, the 'B' MSIV will fail to close which will require the crew to fast close all MSIVs at E-3 Step 3.g RNO. This will remove the option to cooldown the RCS by dump steam to the condenser at E-3 step 6 requiring the crew to use 'A', 'C', and 'D' ASDs per step 6.d RNO.
When the crew attempts to depressurize the RCS to minimize break flow at step #16 of E-3, the crew should determine that both normal PZR Spray valves have failed close and will not reopen.
This will result in the crew proceeding to Step #17 (per step 16 RNO) and utilizing the PZR PORVs to depressurize the RCS to E-3 SI termination criteria are met.
The scenario is complete when the crew has completed the initial depressurization using one PORV until conditions are met in E-3 step 17.b to close the PORV and the crew closed the open PORV per E-3 step 17.c.
Scenario #2 Event Description Callaway 2020-1 NRC ES-D-1, Rev. 0 Page 4 of 6 Critical Tasks:
Critical Tasks Isolate feedwater flow into and steam flow from the ruptured SG before a transition to ECA-3.1 occurs.
Establish/maintain an RCS temperature so that transition from E-3 does not occur because the RCS temperature is in either of the following conditions:
Too high to maintain minimum required subcooling OR Below the RCS temperature that causes an extreme (RED path) or a severe (ORANGE path) challenge to the subcriticality and/or the integrity CSF EVENT 5, 6 5
Safety significance Isolating the ruptured SG maintains a differential pressure between the ruptured SG and the intact SGs. The differential pressure (250 psi) ensures that minimum RCS subcooling remains after RCS depressurization.
Failure to establish and maintain the correct RCS temperature during a SGTR leads to a transition from E-3 to a contingency ERG. This failure constitutes an incorrect performance that necessitates the crew taking compensating action that would complicate the event mitigation strategy....
Cueing All of the following:
Indication and/or annunciation of SGTR in one SG o
Increasing SG water level o
Radiation Indication and/or annunciation of reactor trip Indication and/or annunciation of SI All of the following:
Indication and/or annunciation of SGTR in one SG o
Increasing SG water level / Radiation Indication and/or annunciation of reactor trip Indication and/or annunciation of SI Indication of ruptured SG pressure greater than minimum required pressure Performance indicator Manipulation of controls as required to isolate the ruptured 'B' SG Close TDAFP Steam Supply from Main Steam Loop Manual Isolation valve o
ABV0085 (SG B)
Close Steam line low point drain valve from ruptured SG o
Fast Close all remaining MSIVs (A,C & D MSIVs) and Bypass valves:
o AB HS-79 and AB HS-80 Stop Auxiliary feed flow to ruptured SG o
CLOSE AL HK-9A and AL HK-10A Manipulation of controls as required to establish and maintain RCS temperature Steam dump valve position lamps and/or indicators indicate closed SG PORV valve position lamps and/or indicators indicate closed Performance feedback Crew will observe the following:
Indication of stable or increasing pressure in the ruptured SG Indication of decreasing or zero feedwater flow rate in the ruptured SG Indication of steam flow rate greater than zero Indication of RCS temperature decreasing OR Indication of RCS temperature less than target value Justification for the chosen performance limit When the crew cannot maintain the 250 psi differential, the ERGs require a transition to contingency ERG ECA-3.1. This transition unnecessarily delays the sequence of actions leading to RCS depressurization and Sl termination.
Terminating the RCS cooldown before reaching the target temperature prevents achieving the minimum RCS subcooling. Failure to achieve the required RCS subcooling results in a condition that forces the crew to transition to contingency ERG ECA-3.1, thereby delaying the RCS depressurization and SI termination. Such a delay allows the excessive inventory increase of the ruptured SG to continue until the SG overpressure components release water or until SG overfill occurs.
Terminating the cooldown too late challenges either the subcriticality CSF or the integrity CSF. Because the crew is directed to cool down at the maximum rate, late termination of cooldown could force the RCS temperature low enough to challenge the integrity CSF. The crew must then transition to one of the integrity FRGs. The transition also delays RCS depressurization and SI termination.
PWR Owners Group Appendix CT-18, Isolate the Ruptured SG CT-19, Control initial RCS cooldown
Scenario #2 Event Description Callaway 2020-1 NRC ES-D-1, Rev. 0 Page 5 of 6 Critical Tasks Depressurize RCS using one PORV per E-3 step#17 until E-3 SI termination criteria is met.
EVENT 7
Safety significance RCS depressurization decreases the RCS leakage into the SG, helping to mitigate the inventory increase in the ruptured SG. The RCS depressurization also helps the ECCS restore RCS inventory, which in turn allows SI termination. SI termination eliminates the remaining cause of leakage from the RCS into the SG.
Cueing All of the following:
Indication and/or annunciation of SGTR in one SG Indication and/or annunciation of reactor trip and SI Indication that the RCS is cooled down to the target temperature Performance indicator Manipulation of controls as required to depressurize the RCS Valve position lamps show PRZR PORV open Performance feedback Crew will observe the following:
Indication of RCS pressure decreasing Indication of PRZR level increasing Justification for the chosen performance limit The intent is to depressurize to establish and maintain the criteria that allow the crew to terminate SI. Before depressurization, the crew has met most of the criteria for SI termination. The most likely criterion not met is adequate pressurizer level. The depressurization establishes pressurizer level within the range to allow termination.
However, if the crew depressurizes too much, the existing subcooling can be lost, inhibiting termination. In addition, if the crew fails to realign the controls after depressurization, RCS pressure will continue to decrease, also inhibiting termination.
PWR Owners Group Appendix CT-20, Depressurize RCS to E-3 SI termination criteria NOTE: (Per NUREG-1021, Appendix D) If an operator or the Crew significantly deviates from or fails to follow procedures that affect the maintenance of basic safety functions, those actions may form the basis of a CT identified in the post-scenario review.
Scenario #2 Event Description Callaway 2020-1 NRC ES-D-1, Rev. 0 Page 6 of 6 References OTG-ZZ-00004, Power Operations OTN-AE-00001, Feedwater System OTN-AE-00001, Addendum 2, MFP Operations OTO-EG-00001, CCW System Malfunction OTO-BB-00001, Steam Generator Tube Leak OTO-MA-00008, Rapid Load Reduction E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture Technical Specification 3.3.1, RTS Instrumentation Technical Specification 3.4.13, RCS Operational Leakage Technical Specification 3.4.17, SG Tube Integrity ODP-ZZ-00025, EOP/OTO User's Guide PRA Systems, Events or Operator Actions:
Page 1 of 5 Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: Callaway Scenario No.3, Rev 0 Op-Test No.: 2020-1 Examiners: ____________________________ Operators:
Initial Conditions: ~22% MOC Turnover: No equipment out of service. Boron equalization is in service. Once the crew has the watch, the crew will transfer SG Level Control from the MFRV Bypass Valves to the MFRVs per OTN-AE-00001, Feedwater System, Section 5.10.
Event No.
Malf. No.
Event Type*
Event Description 1
N/A SRO (N)
BOP (N)
Transfer SG Level Control from the MFRV Bypass Valves to the MFRVs per OTN-AE-00001 section 5.10 starting at step 5.10.11.
2 PG /
PG2101_OCTF_FAIL=1 SRO (C)
RO (C)
PZR Backup Heater Group 'A' feeder breaker trips and locks out. Technical Specification Determination.
3 BB /
PBB01B_SWZWBRRG=1
, 10 sec ramp BBV0143=1, 120 delay, ramp=120 sec SRO (C)
RO (C)
BOP (C)
'B' RCP develops abnormal motor temperatures, OTO-BB-00002, RCP Off Normal and secure 'B' RCP per Attachment E. Technical Specification Determination.
4 PCB01=0(Fail)
SRO (C)
RO (C)
BOP (C)
Turbine Lube Oil Malfunction which leads to a Turbine Trip below P9, OTO-AC-00001 (Turbine Trip below P-9) 5 NB / NB01_F=1, PB / PB05=1 MD / MDCB1=1 MD / MDLC1=1, delay=1 MD / MT7=1, delay=2 MD / MDMT8=1, delay=5 MD / ESFB=1, delay=5 X06I78T=1, delay=1 CALBLAND1 and CALLC2=OPEN delay=7 MTGYCAL= OPEN delay=6 SRO (C)
BOP (C)
Loss of Offsite AC power and NB01 and PB05 bus fault.
E-0 Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.
6 PKJ06B=1 KJL02=1018.5 SRO (M)
RO (M)
BOP (M)
'B' EDG (NE02) vital trip. Loss of ALL AC power. ECA-0.0, Loss of ALL AC Power.
7 X21I1490=1, delay = 30 X21II1490 (delete)
SRO (C)
BOP (C)
'A' PZR PORV failed open during SBO.
CT-22, Manually close 'A' PZR PORV during SBO.
8 delIA MDCB1 2 delIA CALBLAND1 2 SRO (C)
BOP (C)
Offsite Power becomes available. Restore NB02 with offsite power per EOP Addendum 7.
CT-24, Energize NB02 emergency bus.
(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor
Page 2 of 5 Target Quantitative Attributes (Per Scenario; See Section D.5.d)
Actual Attributes
- 1. Total malfunctions (5-8) 8
- 2. Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) 2
- 3. Abnormal events (2-4) 2
- 4. Major transients (1-2) 1
- 5. EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1-2) 1
- 6. EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2) 1
- 7. Critical tasks (2-3) 2
Scenario #3 Event Description Callaway 2020-1 NRC ES-D-1, Rev. 0 Page 3 of 5 The Plant is stable at ~22% with boron equalization in service and no equipment out of service.
Once the crew has the watch, the crew is to transfer SG Level Control from the MFRV Bypass Valves to the MFRVs per OTN-AE-00001 section 5.10 starting at step 5.10.11 and OTG-ZZ-00003, step 5.4.6.
Once the transfer to MFRVs is complete, the 'A' Backup Pressurizer Heaters trip and lockout.
The crew should response per Annunciator 33E, PZR Heater Group Lockout. This failure will result in Technical Specification 3.4.9 not being met.
Once the plant and PZR have been stabilized, 'B' RCP motor develops high temperatures (due to a partial loss of CCW cooling flow to the motor). The crew should secure the 'B' RCP per OTO-BB-00002, RCP Off Normal, Attachment E. This failure will result in Technical Specification 3.4.4 not being met.
After the 'B' RCP is secured and Technical Specification addressed, a turbine lube oil malfunction leads to a Main Turbine trip. The crew should enter OTO-AC-00001, Turbine Trip below P-9, and stabilize the plant. When the crew has completed transferring Steam Dumps To Steam Pressure per OTO-AC-00001, a loss of offsite power occurs concurrent with a 4160 VAC NB01 bus lockouts due to a bus fault.
After the crew performs the immediate actions of E-0 and transitions to ES-0.1 at E-0 Step#4, the 'B' EDG (NE02) trips and cannot be restarted 4160 VAC NB01 and PB05 buses lockout due to a bus faults. This results in a loss of All AC Power and the crew should enter ECA-0.0, Loss of All AC Power. The PB05 bus fault is solely present to make COOP power unavailable for power restoration.
30 seconds after NB01 locks out, the 'A' PZR PORV fails open. The crew should take manual action to close the open PORV during a station blackout per step #3 of ECA-0.0.
Shortly after entry into ECA-0.0, offsite power (CAL - Bland1) becomes available. The crew should restore power to NB02 using EOP Addendum 7, Restoring Offsite Power per ECA-0.0 step 5.a.
The scenario is complete when NB02 bus is reenergized by offsite power.
Scenario #3 Event Description Callaway 2020-1 NRC ES-D-1, Rev. 0 Page 4 of 5 Critical Tasks:
Critical Tasks Energize NB02 AC Emergency Bus using EOP Addendum 7, Restoring Offsite Power.
Manually close the Open 'A' PORV before completing Step 3 of ECA-0.0.
EVENT 8
7 Safety significance In the scenario, failure to energize at least one ac emergency bus results in the needless continuation of a situation in which the pumped ECCS capacity and the emergency power capacity are both in a completely degraded status, as are all other active safeguards requiring electrical power. Although the completely degraded status is not due to the crew's action (was not initiated by operator error), continuation in the completely degraded status is a result of the crew's failure to energize at least one ac emergency bus.
The open PORV greatly increases the rate at which RCS inventory is depleted, at a time when the lost inventory cannot be replaced by active injection. Thus, failure to close the PORV defeats the basic purpose of ECA-0.0. Additionally, it is critical that the PORV be closed as soon as possible. Hence, manual closure of the PORV (when the PORV is open and RCS pressure is less than [the setpoint for automatic closure]4) is imperative and urgent in order to ensure the effectiveness of subsequent actions in extending the time to core uncovery.
Cueing Indication and/or annunciation that all ac emergency buses are de-energized Bus energized lamps extinguished Circuit Breaker Position Bus Voltage EDG status All of the following:
Indication and/or annunciation of station blackout Valve position indication and/or annunciation that the PRZR PORV is open Indication that RCS pressure is below [the setpoint at which the PRZR PORV should reclose automatically]
Indication and/or annunciation of decreasing RCS pressure Indication and/or annunciation consistent with the discharge of PRZR fluid to the PRT o
PRT temperature, level, pressure o
PZR PORV Tailpipe RTDs Performance indicator Manipulation of controls as required to energize NB02 from offsite power:
o PCB-V45 (BUS B CAL-BLAND-1) o Bus Tie Breaker, PCB-V43 o
Startup Xfmr 1 Bus A, PCB-V41 o
NB HS-11, NB02 Sync Scope Sel o
NB HS-8, NB02 NORM SPLY SYNC TRANSFER o
NB HIS-4, NB02 NORM SPLY BKR NB0209 Manipulation of controls as required to close the 'A' PRZR PORV BB HIS-455A Performance feedback Indication that NB02 is energized:
NB02 Bus energized light NB02 bus voltage Indication that 'A' PZR PORV is closed PRZR pressure stabilizes
'A' PRZR PORV indicates closed Justification for the chosen performance limit Failure to perform the critical task prior to the completion of EOP Addendum 39 results in needless degradation of RCS barrier (and to fission product release, specifically of the RCS barrier at the point of the RCP seals. Failure to perform the critical task means that RCS inventory lost through the RCP seals cannot be replaced. It also means that the RCP seals remain without cooling and gradually deteriorate. As the seals deteriorate the rate of RCS inventory loss increases.
This performance standard is imposed because it is imperative and urgent that the PRZR PORV be closed in order for the strategy of ECA-0.0 to succeed. The PORV constitutes a very large leakage path. Leaving it open causes rapid depletion of RCS inventory at a time when that inventory cannot be replaced.
In step 3 of ECA-0.0, the crew is directed to check the major RCS outflow paths that could contribute to rapid depletion of RCS inventory. The PRZR PORVs offer the largest potential for RCS inventory loss.
Therefore, they are an outflow path that must be checked and, if necessary, closed.
PWR Owners Group Appendix CT - 24, Energize at least one ac emergency bus CT-22, Manually close an open PORV during SBO.
NOTE: (Per NUREG-1021, Appendix D) If an operator or the Crew significantly deviates from or fails to follow procedures that affect the maintenance of basic safety functions, those actions may form the basis of a CT identified in the post-scenario review.
Scenario #3 Event Description Callaway 2020-1 NRC ES-D-1, Rev. 0 Page 5 of 5 References OTG-ZZ-00003, Plant startup Not Zero Power to 30% Power - IPTE OTN-AE-00001, Feedwater system OTA-RK-00018 Addendum 33E, Pressurizer Heater Group Lockout OTO-BB-00002, RCP Off Normal OTO-AC-00001, Turbine Trip below P-9 Technical Specification 3.4.9,Pressurizer Technical Specification 3.4.4, RCS Loops - Modes 1 and 2 E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection ES-0.1, Reactor Trip Response ECA-0.0, Loss of All AC Power EOP Addendum 7, Restoring Offsite Power ODP-ZZ-00025, EOP/OTO User's Guide PRA Systems, Events or Operator Actions:
- 1. Station Blackout (19% contribution to CDF)
Page 1 of 5 Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: Callaway Scenario No.4, Rev 0 Op-Test No.: 2020-1 Examiners: ____________________________ Operators:
Initial Conditions: 80% EOC Turnover: NSAFP (Non Safety Aux Feed Pump) is out of service. The crew is to maintain current plant conditions.
Event No.
Malf. No.
Event Type*
Event Description 1
AC / ACPT505 = 9, ramp =30 SRO (R)
RO (R)
BOP (I)
AC PT 505, HP Turbine 1st Stage Pressure Indicator, fails Low.
Control Rods insertion due to failure and then manual recovery. OTO-AC-00003 entry and Technical Specification Determination.
2 GK /
GK05M1TSVP=1 SRO (C)
BOP (C)
'A' Train Control Room HVAC Fan trips. Place 'B' Train in service per the normal operating procedure. Technical Specification Determination.
3 BG /
BGLT0112=0.1 ramp=60 SRO (I)
RO (I)
VCT Level Channel failure low resulting in a swap over to the RWST. OTO-BG-00004 entry and establish letdown.
4 GN17RELAY_D251 278TVSP=1 GN17RL49TVSP=1 SRO (C)
BOP (C)
CRDM fans trip resulting in only 1 CRDM fan running.
OTO-GN-00002 entry and start 1 CRDM fan.
5 AB / AVV0045 = 100 AB / ABV0065 = 100 AB / ABV0075 = 100 AB001_A = 250 SRO (M)
RO (M)
BOP (M)
Steam Generator Faults, transition to E-2, Faulted SG Isolation, at E-0 step#14.
6 SA / SAS9XX_1=1 SA / SAS9XX_2=1 SA / SAS9XX_3=1 SA / SAS9XX_4=1 SRO (I)
BOP (I)
Failure of the automatic SL isolation, fast close MSIVs and Bypass valves isolates 'A' SG fault.
7 AL / PAL02_1=1 delay =30, condition = rec0009 eq 0 AL / PAL01A_1 condition =
hwx06d55v LE 0.05 AL/ALHV0034_MT VFAILSP = 0.05 AL/ALHV0035_MT VFAILSP = 0.05 SRO (M)
RO (M)
BOP (M)
Loss of Auxiliary Feedwater resulting in a Loss of Secondary Heat Sink, FR-H.1. RCS Bleed and Feed successful.
(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor
Page 2 of 5 Target Quantitative Attributes (Per Scenario; See Section D.5.d)
Actual Attributes
- 1. Total malfunctions (5-8) 7
- 2. Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) 2
- 3. Abnormal events (2-4) 3
- 4. Major transients (1-2) 2
- 5. EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1-2) 2
- 6. EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2) 1
- 7. Critical tasks (2-3) 2
Scenario #4 Event Description Callaway 2020-1 NRC ES-D-1, Rev. 0 Page 3 of 5 The Plant is stable at ~80% End of Cycle. The Non Safety Auxiliary Feed Pump (NSAFP) is out of service for bearing maintenance.
After the crew has taken the watch and at the direction of the lead evaluator, AC PT-505, HP Turbine 1st Stage Pressure Indicator, fails low. This will result in control rods stepping in. The crew may enter OTO-SF-00001 and after verifying no Main Turbine Setback or Runback is in progress, the Reactor Operator will place Control Rods in Manual and then transition to OTO-AC-00003. (Note: the crew may enter OTO-AC-00003 directly and place rod control to manual per step #1: either application of offnormal procedures is correct). The BOP will select away from the failed instrument and the RO will restore Tavg to within band by withdrawing control rods back to their original position. This failure will result in Technical Specification 3.3.1 Condition A and T not being met.
After rods are restored to Auto and Technical Specification addressed, 'A' Train Control Room HVAC fans trips. The crew should place 'B' Train Control Room HVAC in service per OTN-GK-00001. This failure will result in Technical Specification 3.7.11 Condition A not being met.
After the 'B' Train is placed in service and Technical Specification addressed, BG LT-112 fails low resulting in a partial swapover from the VCT to the RWST and a RCS boration. The crew should enter OTO-BG-00004, isolate letdown, reduce charging to seals only, and establish Excess Letdown. I&C is available to place a jumper per OTO-BG-00004 step #A1 to allow the boration to be terminated. Once BNLCV0112D, CCP A suction from RSWT ISO VLV, is closed (which effectively stops the boration event), proceed to the next event.
CRDM fans trip resulting in only 1 CRDM fan running. The crew should enter OTO-GN-00002 and start a CRDM fan to ensure a total of 2 CRDM fans are in service.
After 2 CRDM Fans are verified in service, 'A' SG develops a fault inside containment. The crew should insert a manually reactor trip, enter E-0 and transition to E-2 at step #14.
SLIS will not automatically occur and the crew should fast close all MSIVs and bypass valves per E-2 step #1 RNO. (Note: MSIVs may be fast closed during the performance of E-0 per the foldout page.) This will isolate 'A' SG fault from the other SGs.
After MSIVs and bypass valves are fast closed, a series of malfunctions ('A' & 'B' MDAFP suction clogging, TDAFP trip) occur resulting is a loss of a secondary heat sink. The crew should transition to FR-H.1, Loss of Secondary Heat Sink, due to a RED Path condition. At this point, 'D' SG will maintain pressure and level. 'B' and 'C' will being losing level (due to one faulted SG Safety Valve in each SG; specifically V075, V065, V045). Actions to restore main feedwater or establish condensate flow to 'B', 'C', and 'D' SGs will be unsuccessful. The crew will be in a "do loop" of FR-H.1 step #3 to #11 and when 3 SG Wide Range levels ('A', 'B' and 'C' SGs) are <27% [42%], they should stop all RCPs and implement RCS bleed and feed by actuating or verifying SI, verify a feed path, and open both PZR PORVS, BB HIS-455A/456A.
The scenario is complete once RCS bleed and feed is established.
Scenario #4 Event Description Callaway 2020-1 NRC ES-D-1, Rev. 0 Page 4 of 5 Critical Tasks:
Critical Tasks Establish RCS Bleed Feed by opening both PZR PORVS before SGs 'B', 'C' and 'D' reach dryout conditions (10% WR level).
Isolate the faulted A SG before transition out of E-2 EVENT 7
6 Safety significance For the HP and LP plants, failure to initiate RCS bleed and feed results in significant and sustained core uncovery. If bleed and feed is successfully initiated, then core uncovery is prevented or minimized. For the RCS feed path to be effective, the operator should ensure that at least one charging/SI pump is injecting into the RCS and at least one high-head SI pump is running with valves properly aligned for maximum injection flow.
Failure to isolate a faulted SG that can be isolated causes challenges to CSFs beyond those irreparably introduced by the postulated conditions.
Failure to isolate a faulted SG can result in challenges to the following CSFs:
Integrity Subcriticality Containment (if the break is inside containment)
Cueing Extreme (RED path) challenge to the heat sink CSF AND Indication that RCS pressure is greater than the pressure in any non-faulted SG AND Indication that RCS temperature is greater than the highest temperature at which the RHR system can be placed in service in the shutdown cooling mode AND Indication and/or annunciation that no AFW is available AND SG level is below 7% NR Both of the following:
Steam pressure and flow rate indications that make it possible to identify A SG as faulted AND Valve position and flow rate indication that AFW continues to be delivered to the faulted A SG Performance indicator Manipulation of controls as required to initiate RCS bleed and feed, including stopping of all RCPs
- RCP breaker position lights indicate breaker open
- Circuit breaker position indication (closed) for all available charging/SI pumps
- Flow rate indication of RCS feed from charging/SI pumps
- Circuit breaker position indication (closed) for [all available] high-head ECCS pumps
- Open both PZR PORVs: BB HIS-455A / 456A
CLOSE associated MD AFP Flow Control Valve(s):
CLOSE associated TD AFP Flow Control Valve(s):
CLOSE Steamline Low Point Drain valve from faulted SG(s):
FAST CLOSE all MSIVs and Bypass valves:
o AB HS79 o
AB HS80 Performance feedback Indication that all RCPs are stopped Indication of decreasing RCS pressure Indication of PORV flow to PRT Crew will observe the following:
Any depressurization of intact SGs stops AFW flow rate indication to faulted SG of zero Justification for the chosen performance limit Successful bleed-and-feed cooling of the RCS is that the core-exit vapor temperature not exceed 1200°F on the average fuel rod channel, which is considered appropriate for a beyond-design-basis event. Analysis showed that when this criterion is met, long-term core cooling is sustained through RCS bleed-and-feed heat removal. Before all 3 faulted SG reach dryout (10% WR) is an acceptable limit as it represents a loss of the secondary heat sink.
before transition out of E-2 is in accordance with the PWR Owners Group Emergency Response Guidelines. It allows enough time for the crew to take the correct action while at the same time preventing avoidable adverse consequences.
PWR Owners Group Appendix CT-46, Initiate RCS bleed and feed for successful ECCS injection CT-17 Isolate faulted SG NOTE: (Per NUREG-1021, Appendix D) If an operator or the Crew significantly deviates from or fails to follow procedures that affect the maintenance of basic safety functions, those actions may form the basis of a CT identified in the post-scenario review.
Scenario #4 Event Description Callaway 2020-1 NRC ES-D-1, Rev. 0 Page 5 of 5 References OTO-AC-00003, Turbine Impulse Pressure Channel Failure, Rev 13 OTO-GN-00002, CRDM Cooling Fan Malfunctions, Rev 6 OTN-GK-00001, Control Building HVAC system, Rev 60 OTO-BG-00004, VCT Level Channel Failures, Rev 20 Technical Specification 3.3.1,Reactor Trip System Instrumentation Technical Specification 3.7.11, Control Room Air Conditioning System (CRACS)
E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation, Rev 11 FR-H.1, Respond to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink, Rev 18 CSF-1, Critical Safety Function Status Trees(CSFST), Rev 13 PRA Systems, Events or Operator Actions:
- 1. Secondary Line Breaks (10% contribution to CDF)
Top 10 Callaway Risk Important Systems - #1) Auxiliary Feedwater Top 10 Risk Reduction Operator Actions - #8) Establish RCS Feed and bleed following a loss of secondary heat sink
ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist Form ES-301-5 Facility:
Callaway Date of Exam: 8/31/2020 Operating Test No.:2020-1 A
P P
L I
C A
N T
E V
E N
T T
Y P
E Scenarios - Team 1: U1, R1, R2 1@
2 3
4#
T O
T A
L M
I N
I M
U M(*)
CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION S
R O
A T
C B
O P
S R
O U1 A
T C
R2 B
O P
R1 S
R O
U1 A
T C
R1 B
O P
R2 S
R O
A T
C B
O P
R I
U SRO-U U1 RX 1
1 4
1 1
1 1
1 0 NOR 1
1 1
1 1 1 I/C 2,3,4
,5,6 3,5,6 2,4 2,3,6
,7 2,3,4
,5,7, 8
2,3,4
,6 3
1,2,4
,6 10 4
4 2 MAJ 7
7 7
5 6
5,7 5,7 5,7 2
2 2 1 TS 4,5 2,4 2,3 1,2 4
0 2 2 RO R1 RX 4
1 1
1 0 NOR 1
1 1
1 1 I/C 3,6,7 2,3,4 6
4 4 2 MAJ 5
6 2
2 2 1 TS 0
0 2 2 RO R2 RX 4
1 1
1 0 NOR 1
1 1
1 1 I/C 2,7 3,4,5
,7,8 7
4 4 2 MAJ 5
6 2
2 2 1 TS 0
0 2 2
ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist Form ES-301-5 Facility:
Callaway Date of Exam: 8/31/2020 Operating Test No.:2020-1 A
P P
L I
C A
N T
E V
E N
T T
Y P
E Scenarios - Team 2: I1, I2, R3 1
2 3
4#
T O
T A
L M
I N
I M
U M(*)
CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION S
R O
I1 A
T C
I2 B
O P
R3 S
R O
I2 A
T C
I1 B
O P
R3 S
R O
I1 A
T C
R3 B
O P
I2 S
R O
A T
C B
O P
R I
U SRO-I I1 RX 1
4 1
1 2
1 1 0 NOR 1
1 1
1 1 I/C 2,3,4
,5,6 2,7 2,3,4
,5,7, 8
2,3,4
,6 3
1,2,4
,6 13 4
4 2 MAJ 7
5 6
5,7 5,7 5,7 3
2 2 1 TS 4,5 2,3 1,2 4
0 2 2 SRO I I2 RX 1
4 2
1 1 0 NOR 1
1 1
1 1 1 I/C 3,5,6 2,3,6
,7 3,4,5
,7,8 12 4
4 2 MAJ 7
5 6
3 2
2 1 TS 2,4 2
0 2 2 RO R3 RX 4
1 1
1 0 NOR 1
1 1
1 1 I/C 2,4 3,6,7 2,3,4 8
4 4 2 MAJ 7
5 6
3 2
2 1 TS 0
0 2 2
ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist Form ES-301-5 Facility:
Callaway Date of Exam: 8/31/2020 Operating Test No.:2020-1 A
P P
L I
C A
N T
E V
E N
T T
Y P
E Scenarios - Team 3: I3, R4, R5, U2 1
2 3
4#
T O
T A
L M
I N
I M
U M(*)
CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION S
R O
I3 A
T C
R4 B
O P
R5 S
R O
I3 A
T C
R5 B
O P
R4 S
R O
U2 A
T C
I3 B
O P
R5 S
R O
A T
C B
O P
R I
U SRO-I I3 RX 1
4 1
1 2
1 1 0 NOR 1
1 1
1 1 I/C 2,3,4
,5,6 2,3,6
,7 2,3,4 2,3,4
,6 3
1,2,4
,6 12 4
4 2 MAJ 7
5 6
5,7 5,7 5,7 3
2 2 1 TS 4,5 2,4 1,2 4
0 2 2 SRO-U U2 RX 0
1 1 0 NOR 1
1 1
1 1 I/C 2,3,4
,5,7, 8
6 4
4 2 MAJ 6
1 2
2 1 TS 2,3 2
0 2 2 RO R4 RX 1
4 2
1 1 0 NOR 1
1 1
1 1 I/C 3,5,6 3,6,7 6
4 4 2 MAJ 7
5 2
2 2 1 TS 0
0 2 2 RO R5 RX 4
1 1
1 0 NOR 1
1 1
1 1 I/C 2,4 2,7 3,4,5
,7,8 9
4 4 2 MAJ 7
5 6
3 2
2 1 TS 0
0 2 2
ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist Form ES-301-5 Instructions:
- 1.
Check the applicant level and enter the operating test number and Form ES-D-1 event numbers for each event type; TS are not applicable for RO applicants. ROs must serve in both the at-the-controls (ATC) and balance-of-plant (BOP) positions. Instant SROs (SRO-I) must serve in both the SRO and the ATC positions, including at least two instrument or component (I/C) malfunctions and one major transient, in the ATC position. If an SRO-I additionally serves in the BOP position, one I/C malfunction can be credited toward the two I/C malfunctions required for the ATC position.
- 2.
Reactivity manipulations may be conducted under normal or controlled abnormal conditions (refer to Section D.5.d) but must be significant per Section C.2.a of Appendix D. (*) Reactivity and normal evolutions may be replaced with additional I/C malfunctions on a one-for-one basis.
- 3.
Whenever practical, both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable actions that provide insight to the applicants competence count toward the minimum requirements specified for the applicants license level in the right-hand columns.
- 4.
For new reactor facility licensees that use the ATC operator primarily for monitoring plant parameters, the chief examiner may place SRO-I applicants in either the ATC or BOP position to best evaluate the SRO-I in manipulating plant controls.
NOTES:
- All 4 scenarios and their attributes are listed as they are labeled for ease of comparison. The Total Columns is summed for Scenario #1 through 3 (or 2 as appropriate for Team 1) while Scenario #4 and its attributes are shown as the spare. This in no way means that Callaway Energy Center desires Scenario #4 as the spare; specifically Callaway Energy Center would prefer the Chief Examiner to determine which scenario to designate as the spare based on the ES-D1's provided and on site validation. Callaway Energy Center will then update this ES-301-5 per NRC direction.
@Team 1 will require 2 scenarios. All 4 scenario attributes are listed with the total present for Scenario #2 and #3. This in no way means that Callaway Energy Center desires Team 1 to take Scenarios #2 and #3 and have Scenario#1 or #4 as the spare; specifically Callaway Energy Center would prefer the Chief Examiner to determine which scenarios Team 1 will take based on the ES-D1's provided and on site validation. The number of normal and reactivity events combined with the number of malfunctions will need to be reevaluated for R2. Callaway Energy Center will then update this ES-301-5 per NRC direction.