ML20268A109
| ML20268A109 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palisades  |
| Issue date: | 07/06/2020 |
| From: | Bryan Bergeon Entergy Nuclear Operations |
| To: | NRC/RGN-III/DRS/OLB |
| Bergeon B | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19213A183 | List: |
| References | |
| Download: ML20268A109 (87) | |
Text
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: __Palisades Nuclear Plant Scenario No.: NRC-1 Op-Test No.: NRC-2020 Examiners: _________________________
Operators:
Initial Conditions: The plant is at 100% power, middle of core life. P-66B, High Pressure Safety Injection Pump, is removed from service for motor replacement. The CVCS is in single letdown and charging. The Main Feedwater Pump Combined Speed Controller is in manual for I&C testing of the controller.
Turnover: Shift orders are to return the Main Feedwater Pump Combined Speed Controller to the Cascade Mode per SOP-12.
Critical Tasks:
- 2. Trip 2 Leave 2 PCP strategy - Trip 2 PCPs in less than 3 minutes after reaching 1300 psia in the PCS.
- 3. Remove all PCPs from operation when conditions do not support their operation. - Trip ALL PCPs within 10 minutes of a CIS or outside operating curve.
- 4. Initiate a rapid power reduction prior to Moisture Separator Drain Tank level lowering below 30% to prevent the loss of Heater Drain Pumps. (1)
Event No.
Malf. No.
Event Type*
Event Description 1
N/A BOP (N)
Return MFP Combined Speed Controller to Cascade 2
RX11A BOP (C)
SRO (C)
Feed Reg valve erratic operation. SG manual control available.
3 RP23B ATC (I)
BOP (I)
SRO (I)
SRO (TS)
THOT #2 RTD Fails to 100%- requiring ATC and BOP actions 4
CV06 CV18 ATC (I)
SRO (I)
SRO (TS)
CVCS Backpressure regulator fails closed with failure of RV-2006 to seat.
5 FW163 BOP (N)
ATC (R)
SRO (N)
SRO (TS)
Moisture Separator Drain Tank Outlet Valve, CV-0608, HDP outlet valve fails open. Requires a rapid power reduction before the Heater Drain Pumps trip.
6 RC03 RC04 ALL (M) 100 gpm LOCA inside of Containment. Requires manual reactor trip. LOCA raises to 600 gpm on the trip.
7 SI09A ATC (C)
Failure of A HPSI Pump to auto start - manual start available 8
RC04 All (M)
(from event 6)
LOCA raises to 1100gpm 9
SI16A SI16B SI16C ATC (C)
Failure of P-54A, Containment Spray Pump; AND Failure of P-54B, C to auto start - manual start available (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor (1) Critical Task 4 added post-exam administration
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC-2020 Scenario No.: NRC-1 Event No.: 1 Page 1 of 1 Event
Description:
Return MFP Combined Speed Controller to Cascade Cue:
From Turnover Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO Directs returning MFP Combined Speed Controller to Cascade Mode.
BOP Refers to SOP-12, Step 7.6.4.c.
BOP Determines that HIC-0525, Feedwater Control Mode Selector is not nulled out and must be adjusted to place in Cascade Mode.
BOP LOWERS HIC-0525, Feedwater Control Mode Selector, signal using the manual output button to match signals.
BOP WHEN the setpoint and process signals are matched within 0.5%
AND PF light is flashing, THEN PUSHES AUTO pushbutton on HIC 0525, Feedwater Control Mode Selector, to place in CASCADE.
SRO Provides Oversight for the Feedwater control manipulations and monitors Heat Balance Power on the PPC.
ATC Monitors Heat Balance Power on the PPC during the evolution as well as Core monitoring/ATC duties.
BOP Monitors Main Feedwater System parameters for stability.
SRO Once verified stable, removes CRITICAL PARAMETER and band requirements.
Continue to Event 2
Appendix D 2
Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC-2020 Scenario No.: NRC-1 Event No.: 2 Page 1 of 2 Event
Description:
Erratic A S/G Feedwater Valve Operation Cue:
Heat Balance Power Transient cycling A S/G level cycling CV-0701 position indication cycling Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior At the Lead Examiners discretion, INSERT Trigger 1.
NOTE: Heat Balance Power Transient is not stable from event one.
CREW Identifies a change in Heat Balance Power Transient.
BOP Identifies Main Feedwater perturbation and makes crew UPDATE.
Indications:
Heat Balance Power Transient cycling A S/G level cycling CV-0701 position indication cycling SRO Enters AOP-3, Main Feedwater Transients and provides UPDATE.
SRO Reviews Reactor Trip Criteria with crew with UPDATE.
SRO Diagnoses A Feed Reg Valve affected more than B Feed Reg Valve.
SRO Directs Main Feed Reg Valve, CV-0701 be placed in Manual.
BOP Places CV-0701 in Manual and adjusts to maintain S/G level.
SRO Directs a band for operating with controller in Manual. 65% target with band inclusive of current level and assigns CRITICAL PARAMETER A S/G level to BOP.
Appendix D 3
Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC-2020 Scenario No.: NRC-1 Event No.: 2 Page 2 of 2 Event
Description:
Erratic A S/G Feedwater Valve Operation Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO Calls Duty Station Manager to activate support personnel for the condition.
ATC Monitors Feedwater parameters and Containment parameters.
ATC Contacts NPO to locally investigate CV-0701 operation.
Simulator Operator:
When sent to CV-0701 respond that the valve is cycling if it not in Manual control and steady if it is Manual control.
If asked to monitor CV-0703 report that it is steady.
Report no other abnormalities can be found.
ATC Provides Feedwater trends to the BOP from observation of the PPC parameters.
SRO Briefs crew per Transient Brief, EN-OP-200, Attachment 1.
SRO Directs Shift Engineer to update Phoenix and initiate a Condition Report for the failure.
Continue to Event 3
Appendix D 4
Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC-2020 Scenario No.: NRC-1 Event No.: 3 Page 1 of 3 Event
Description:
THOT #2 Fails to 100%.
Cue:
THOT panel indication failed high Many alarms including EK-0772, Loop 2 Hot Leg Hi temp Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior At the Lead Examiners discretion, INSERT Trigger 2.
SRO Enters Transient Alarm Response using CREW UPDATE if already transitioned out of AOP.
ATC Diagnoses failure of THOT.
Indications:
THOT panel indication failed high Alarms:
EK-0772, Loop 2 Hot Leg Hi temp EK-0924, Group 1 Power Dependent Insertion Limit EK-0967, Loop1 /Loop2 TAVG Deviation EK-0969, Loop2 TREF/TAVE Gross Deviation Rack A K-0601, Variable High Power Level Ch Trip Rack A K-0605, Variable High Power Level CH. Pre-Trip Rack A K-0606, High Power Rate Ch. Pre-Trip ASI Rack C K-0601, TM/LO Pressure Ch. Trip Rack C K-0605, TM/LO Pressure Ch. Pre-trip Rack D-K-0604, Nuclear dT Power Dev. Inlet Off-Normal/Calculator Trouble Channel B ATC Checks ARP-4, ARP-5 and ARP-21 for alarms present:
References SOP-1A, Att 1 for PCS temperature Instrumentation functions.
Checks Delta-T Power for PIP Node and SPI Node/Host Computer on a workstation and compare to actual heat balance power SRO Enters and directs actions of AOP-27, TAVG/TREF Controller Failure and provides CREW UPDATE.
Appendix D 5
Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC-2020 Scenario No.: NRC-1 Event No.: 3 Page 2 of 3 Event
Description:
THOT #2 Fails to 100%.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO Verifies a valid TAVE Signal is available.
Directs SS-TAVE, T-AVE Selector Switch to the channel with a valid TAVE signal Determines PDIL Alarm inoperable for PIP.
Verifies POWER_PIP_DELTA_T is within 4% of actual Reactor Power Verifies POWER_SPI_DELTA T is within 4 of actual Reactor Power ATC Places SS-TAVE, T-AVE Selector Switch to the Loop 1 position and verifies input back to ~560 oF.
BOP Identifies TI-0122HB has failed and uses CREW UPDATE.
(TIA-0121H in alarm due to this failure).
BOP Maintains Main Feedwater control in Manual OR turns this task over to the ATC while addressing this event.
NOTE: The bypassing of reactor trips is not required to have the procedure in hand.
BOP Bypasses TMLP Trips per SOP-36 Section 7.4.2 for KS-RPS-AW5#1 (key #289) Hi Power trip KS-RPS-AW5 #9 (key #297) TM/LO PRS Trip Performs the following to bypass each TMLP trip:
ENSURE the RPS Bypass Key is the correct key for the RPS Trip INSERT bypass key above affected RPS Trip Unit TURN key 90 deg clockwise VERIFY the yellow light above the bypass keyswitch is ON RECORD the evolution in the Ops Log as necessary.
Appendix D 6
Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC-2020 Scenario No.: NRC-1 Event No.: 3 Page 3 of 3 Event
Description:
THOT #2 Fails to 100%.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO Refers to and implements the following Tech Spec LCOs:
3.3.1. Cond A (Table 3.3.1-1 Items 1 and 9), 7 day action statement Refers to and implements the following ORM LCOs as necessary:
ORM 3.17.6 (Item 12.1), Prior to next Mode 1 entry from Mode 2 ORM 3.17.6 (Item 16), Prior to next Mode 4 entry from Mode 5 SRO Briefs crew using Transient Brief, EN-OP-200, Att 1.
Calls Duty Station Manager for troubleshooting and repairs.
Continue to Event 4
Appendix D 7
Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC-2020 Scenario No.: NRC-1 Event No.: 4 Page 1 of 3 Event
Description:
CVCS Backpressure regulator Failure with failure of RV to Seat Cue:
PIC-0202, Pressure Control Intr Press Letdown CV-2012 or CV-2122 fail light lit Letdown pressure on PIC-0202 rising EK-0702, Relief Valve2006 Disch Hi Temp EK-0704, Letdown Ht Ex Tube Inlet Hi-Lo Press Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior At the Lead Examiners discretion, INSERT Trigger 3.
ATC Diagnoses failure of CVCS Backpressure Regulator.
Indications:
PIC-0202, Pressure Control Intr Press Letdown CV-2012 or CV-2122 fail light lit Letdown pressure on PIC-0202 rising Alarms:
EK-0702, Relief Valve2006 Disch Hi Temp EK-0704, Letdown Ht Ex Tube Inlet Hi-Lo Press ATC Takes manual control of PIC-0202 and returns letdown system to pre-event pressure.
Depresses the M on PIC-0202 Moves the slide bar to the right to re-open the Control Valve.
SRO Provides the following:
Reviews ARP actions Direction to take Manual control System parametric bands (450 psi-470 psi, target 460 psi)
Monitors T-73, Quench Tank Level Assigns CRITICAL PARAMETER to ATC on backpressure control target 460 psig and encompassing current pressure.
ATC Places Control Switches CV-2004 and CV-2005, Letdown Orifice Stop Valves in the closed position per ARP EK-0702.
BOP Provides the following:
Monitors Quench Tank level Maintains feedwater within bands with controller in Manual.
Appendix D 8
Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC-2020 Scenario No.: NRC-1 Event No.: 4 Page 2 of 3 Event
Description:
CVCS Backpressure regulator Failure with failure of RV to Seat Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Malfunction of RV (failure to seat) is automatically inserted when the ATC takes PIC-0202 to manual via Trigger 11.
ATC Diagnoses RV-2006 has not fully seated.
Indications:
Quench Tank, T=73, Level and pressure slowly rising SRO Directs Shift Manager to review EI-1 for Emergency Plan applicability.
SRO Enters AOP-23, Primary Coolant Leak and directs a PCS leakrate Determination be performed per Attachment 1 and provides CREW UPDATE.
ATC Performs a PCS Leakrate calculation as directed using one of the methods allowed in AOP-23, Attachment 1.
Determines PCS leakage is between 3 gpm-5 gpm.
SRO Refers to and implements the following Tech Spec LCOs:
3.4.13 Cond A.1, 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> action statement (Until leak is isolated and verified via removal of charging and letdown.)
VERIFY PCS leak rate within Technical Specifications LCO 3.4.13, "Primary Coolant System," limits.
Directs Clean Waste Receiver Tank vents and PCS Sample valves closed.
Implements Attachment 2, Conserving PCS Inventory.
BOP Ensures Closed the following valves:
CV-1064, Clean Waste Receiver Tank Vent CV-1065, Clean Waste Receiver Tank Vent CV-1910, PCS Sample Isolation CV-1911, PCS Sample Isolation BOP Notifies Chemistry to verify NSSS Sample Panel isolated.
Appendix D 9
Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC-2020 Scenario No.: NRC-1 Event No.: 4 Page 3 of 3 Event
Description:
CVCS Backpressure regulator Failure with failure of RV to Seat Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ATC Using AOP-23, Attachment 2, Isolates letdown as follows:
Close Letdown Orifice Stop Valves CV-2003 CV-2004- (Should have been closed previously)
CV-2005- (Should have been closed previously)
By taking H/S to close Close CV-2009, Letdown Containment Isolation Valve Stop P-55A, Charging Pump Monitors T-73, Quench Tank Level ATC Determines that PCS leakage has been isolated.
SRO Directs a new PCS Leakrate Determination be initiated.
SRO Briefs crew per Transient Brief, EN-OP-200, Att 1.
Calls Duty Station Manager for troubleshooting and repairs.
Notifies Chemistry of removal of Charging and Letdown Continue to Event 5
Appendix D 10 Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC-2020 Scenario No.: NRC-1 Event No.: 5 Page 1 of 4 Event
Description:
Moisture Separator Drain Tank (T-5) Outlet Failure causing need for Rapid Power Reduction Cue:
Heat Balance Power Rising Lowering HDT, T-5 level EK-0172, Moist Sep Drain Tank Hi-Lo Level Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior At the Lead Examiners discretion, INSERT Trigger 4.
NOTE: a 100%/hr downpower must be started before T-5 reaches 30% or Heater Drain Pump, P-10B will trip before 90% power can be reached. (~23 minutes without any action)
ATC/BOP Diagnoses a failure of Moister Separator Drain Tank Controlling System Indications:
Heat Balance Power Transient rising Lowering HDT, T-5 level Alarm:
EK-0172, Moist Sep Drain Tank Hi-Lo Level (In ~3 min)
SRO IF low level, THEN:
CHECKS CV-0608, Moisture Separator Drain Tank T-5 Level Control, for proper operation.
IF CV-0608 is malfunctioning, THEN REFERS TO SOP-10, Section titled "CV-0608, T-5 Level Control."
CHECKs CV-0609, Moisture Sep Drn Tk T-5 Dump to Condenser, for proper orientation.
IF CV-0609 is malfunctioning, THEN:
BYPASSES affected valve.
ISOLATES affected valve.
IF the potential to lose a P-10, Heater Drain Pump exists, THEN REFERS TO AOP-7 AND REDUCE power to less than 90%.
ATC Dispatches NPO to T-5 to report on status of CV-0608, Moisture Separator Drain Tank Level Control
Appendix D 11 Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC-2020 Scenario No.: NRC-1 Event No.: 5 Page 2 of 4 Event
Description:
Moisture Separator Drain Tank (T-5) Outlet Failure causing need for Rapid Power Reduction Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator:
When sent to CV-0608 respond that the valve is full open.
When asked to throttle MV-HED165, T-5 Level Control CV-0608 Bypass, MV-HED164, T-5 Level Control CV-0608 Inlet.
MV-HED166, T-5 Level Control CV-0608 Outlet.
report back in one minute that you cannot get any of them to move.
If sent to CV-0609, Moist Sep Drn Tk T-5 Dump to Condenser, report in one minute that it is closed.
SRO Enters and directs the actions of AOP-7, Rapid Power reduction Provides CREW UPDATE for trip criteria of AOP-7.
Assigns BOP CRITICAL PARAMETER for T-5 level.
NOTE:
P-10A, Heater Drain Pump, is tripped at 12.8% level in T-5 P-10B, Heater Drain Pump, is tripped at 22.5% level in T-5.
Any operating Main Feedwater Pump trips >80% power requires a manual reactor trip NOTE:
MAINTAIN TAVE within 5°F of TREF by regulating rod insertion and/or boration.
CRITICAL TASK: Initiate a rapid power reduction prior to Moisture Separator Drain Tank level lowering below 30% to prevent the loss of Heater Drain Pumps. (1)
SRO/ATC/BOP Initiates a rapid power reduction to stabilize below 90% power at a rate of > 30% per hour and < 300% per hour.
ATC Requests a Peer Check AND INSERTS Group 4 Control Rods 10 inches:
Rod Control switch operated to INSERT Group 4 Regulating Rods 10 inches Announces All Rod Motion is stopped.
Appendix D 12 Form ES-D-2 NOTE:
ATC is allowed to insert control rods up to 20 to maintain TAVE/TREF per Admin Proc 4.00 Att 9. This can be reset by the SRO to allow subsequent control rod insertions.
Op-Test No.: NRC-2020 Scenario No.: NRC-1 Event No.: 5 Page 3 of 4 Event
Description:
Moisture Separator Drain Tank (T-5) Outlet Failure causing need for Rapid Power Reduction Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP Requests Peer Check AND Commences turbine load reduction in Operator Auto using RUNBACK at a rate of > 30% per hour and <
300% per hour, as ordered by the SRO.
BOP Places turbine in GO and verifies actions and response and provides CREW UPDATE.
SRO Refers to and implements the following Tech Spec LCOs:
3.1.6 Cond A, 2-hour action to restore rods above PDIL NOTE: Verify applicability with alarm EK-0942, Group 4 Power Dependent Insertion Limit.
SRO Notifies Chemistry to perform an isotopic analysis for iodine when reactor power changes > 15% in any one-hour period and notify RP of changing reactor power levels.
Simulator Operator:
If Chemistry or RP contacted by SRO, acknowledge sampling and/or posting requirements.
NOTE: Crew has 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> to balance control rods, thus the action below may not occur during the evaluation.
Appendix D 13 Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC-2020 Scenario No.: NRC-1 Event No.: 5 Page 4 of 4 Event
Description:
Moisture Separator Drain Tank (T-5) Outlet Failure causing need for Rapid Power Reduction Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ATC Requests a Peer Check Balances group 4 control rods.
PLACES rod Selector Switch in the position for the rod being moved.
TURNS Group Selector Switch to the position for the group containing the rod being moved.
PLACES Mode Selector Switch to MI (Manual Individual) position PERFORMS the following:
OPERATES the Raise-Lower Switch MONITORS Nuclear Instruments and TAVG closely while repositioning rod.
IF necessary, to maintain power level, THEN STOPS single rod motion AND COMPENSATES with regulating Rods.
PLACES the Group Selector Switch to desired position.
PLACES the Mode Selector Switch in MS (Manual Sequential) position or as directed by the SRO.
Continue to Event 6
Appendix D 14 Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC-2020 Scenario No.: NRC-1 Event No.: 6 Page 1 of 3 Event
Description:
Primary Coolant Leak/LOCA/ SI failure Cue:
PZR pressure lowering PZR level lowering Containment Sump rising Containment Radiation rising EK-0734, Charging Pumps Seal Cooling Lo Pres EK-1364. Gaseous Waste Monitoring Hi Radiation EK-0761, Pressurizer Level Hi-Lo EK-1351, Containment Sump Hi Level Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior At the Lead Examiners discretion, INSERT Trigger 5, 100gpm PCS Leak.
Indications:
PZR pressure lowering PZR level lowering Charging Pumps P-55B, P-55C start Containment Sump rising Containment Radiation rising Alarms:
EK-0734, Charging Pumps Seal Cooling Lo Pres EK-1364. Gaseous Waste Monitoring Hi Radiation EK-0761, Pressurizer Level Hi-Lo EK-1351, Containment Sump Hi Level SRO Enters or Re-enters AOP-23, Primary Coolant Leak and directs the actions:
Places Turbine in HOLD Determines that PCS leakage >10 gpm Holds a Reactor Trip Brief Directs a Manual Reactor Trip and entry into EOP-1.0, Standard Post trip Actions.
ATC Trips the Reactor via the reactor trip pushbutton on C-02.
ATC/BOP Performs EOP-1.0 immediate actions.
SRO Commences EOP-1.0 verbal verifications.
Appendix D 15 Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC-2020 Scenario No.: NRC-1 Event No.: 6 Page 2 of 3 Event
Description:
Primary Coolant Leak/LOCA Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ATC Reactivity Control: (met)
Reactor power lowering Negative SUR Maximum of on control rod not inserted BOP Main Turbine Generator: (met)
Main Turbine tripped Generator disconnected from grid BOP Feedwater criteria: (met)
PLACES MFP Controller to MANUAL and RAMPS to minimum speed Main FRVs and bypass valves CLOSED (Must CLOSE CV-0701 manually from the controller).
BOP Vital Auxiliaries-Electric (met)
Bus 1C and 1D energized Bus 1E energized (If SIAS is not actuated)
Bus 1A and 1B energized EY-01 energized Six DC Buses energized Main Feed Pump Trip Power available lights LIT AFW Pump control power lights LIT MSIV control power lights LIT 3 of 4 preferred AC Buses energized ATC VERIFY adequate PCP seal cooling: (met)
At least one CCW Pump operating At least one SW Pump operating Both Critical SW headers in operation with pressure >
42psig CCW Containment Isol Valves open, CV-0910/0911/0940
Appendix D 16 Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC-2020 Scenario No.: NRC-1 Event No.: 6 Page 3 of 3 Event
Description:
Primary Coolant Leak/LOCA Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ATC PCS Inventory Control: (not met)
PRZ level 20%-85% and trending toward normal (42%-
57%)
PCS 25 °F subcooled (use THOT for forced circulation)
Starts Charging Pump, P-55A.
Appendix D 17 Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC-2020 Scenario No.: NRC-1 Event No.: 7 Page 1 of 6 Event
Description:
Failure of A HPSI Pump Cue:
SIAS actuation lights lit PCS pressure< SIAS setpoint No HPSI Pumps in operation Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NOTE: SIAS failure will come when the setpoint is reached. The steps that follow are the remainder of the EOP-1.0 Verbal Verifications ATC PCS Pressure Control: (not met)
PZR pressure 1650 to 2185 psia and trending toward normal (2010 to 2100 psia)
- VERIFY sprays closed and all heaters ON (trip off on low PZR level)
- Verify EK-1342 in alarm
- Starts HPSI Pump, P-66A
- Verifies LPSI Pumps in service and valves open CRITICAL TASK: Manually Start P-66A, HPSI before (CET) subcooling indicating less than zero degrees subcooling.
NOTE: Crew may misdiagnose Loop T due to Hot Leg #2 RTD failure.
ATC Core Heat Removal: (Met)
At least one PCP operating Verify Loop T less than 10°F Verify PCS at least 25°F subcooled
Appendix D 18 Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC-2020 Scenario No.: NRC-1 Event No.: 7 Page 2 of 6 Event
Description:
Failure of A HPSI Pump Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP PCS Heat Removal: (Met)
Verify at least one S/G has; level 5% - 70% and Feedwater available Verify S/G s intact Verify TAVE 525°F - 540°F Verify BOTH S/G pressures 800-970 psia ATC Containment Isolation: (Met)
Containment pressure < 0.85 psig
- When Containment pressure > 4.0 psig:
- VERIFY EK-1126 CIS Initiated in alarm
- ENSURE EK-1342 Safety INJ Initiated OR PUSH High Radiation Initiate pushbuttons on Panel EC-13
BOP Containment Isolation: (Met)
Verify Containment Area Monitor alarms clear
- IF Cont Rad > 1x10 R/hr, then Ensure Actuated CIS Verify Condenser Off Gas Monitor alarm clear Verify Main Steam Line Monitor alarms clear NOTE: The B ventilators will be off if an SIAS has occurred.
ATC Verify Containment Atmosphere: (Met)
Cnmt temp < 125oF
- Ensure operating all CACs
- V-1A and V-1B, V-2A and V-2B, V-3A and V-3B, V-4A and V-4B
- Ensure open all CAC Hi-Cap outlet valves
- CV-0867, CV-0861, CV-0864, CV-0873 When Cnmt pressure > 4.0 psig:
> 2850 gpm
Appendix D 19 Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC-2020 Scenario No.: NRC-1 Event No.: 7 Page 3 of 6 Event
Description:
Failure of A HPSI Pump Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP VERIFY IA pressure > 85 psig ATC VERIFY SIRWT level > 25%
BOP ENSURE CR HVAC is aligned for Emergency Mode Operation within 20 mins of time of Reactor Trip.
VERIFY Supply Fan V-95 or V-96 for desired train is ON ENSURE Air Filter Unit Fan V-26A or V-26B for desired train is ON ENSURE OFF V-94 Purge Fan and V-47 Swgr Exh Fan BOP VERIFY at least one Condensate Pump and one Cooling Tower Pump operating.
BOP VERIFY MSIVs are open OR MSIV Bypass valves are open BOP Turns panels over to the ATC.
SRO Commence Emergency Shutdown Checklist (GOP-10) as time allows.
SRO Commence EOP Supplement 45 SFP Monitoring SRO Diagnose LOCA using EOP-1.0 Att 1 Event Diagnostic Flow Chart and transition to EOP-4.0
Appendix D 20 Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC-2020 Scenario No.: NRC-1 Event No.: 7 Page 4 of 6 Event
Description:
Failure of A HPSI Pump Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO Conducts an EOP Transition Brief.
SRO Enters and directs actions of EOP-4.0 using CREW UPDATE.
SRO Initiates Safety Function Status Checks for EOP-4.0 and are satisfied at intervals of approximately fifteen minutes.
SRO Directs SM to refer to the Site Emergency Plan.
NOTE: When Containment pressure> 3 psig declares adverse containment and uses the appropriate graphs for decision making.
SRO Establishes Bands for EOP-4.0 strategy.
ATC Implements bands and EOP-4.0 strategy.
SRO DETERMINES that PCS Inventory acceptance criteria NOT met.
Appendix D 21 Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC-2020 Scenario No.: NRC-1 Event No.: 7 Page 5 of 6 Event
Description:
Failure of A HPSI Pump Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO Verifies SIAS and directs the following:
EOP Supplement 5.
EOP Supplement 4.
Either directs BOP to report equipment out of position OR directs repositioning to EOP Supp 5.
BOP ENSURES available safeguards equipment operating (EOP Supplement 5)
Direct NPO to locally verify closed:
CV-0944 Evap CCW Supply.
CV-0977B Evap CCW Return.
Simulator Operator:
When requested by NCO, wait eight minutes and report CV-0944 and CV-0977B are closed.
BOP Performs EOP Supplement 4, HPSI and LPSI Flow Curves.
ATC If PZR level < 36% (40% for degraded containment):
PLACES HS-2003, HS-2004, HS-2005, Orifice Stop Valves, to CLOSE. (Should have been closed previously)
CRITICAL TASK: Secures PCPs as needed to establish one PCP operating in each loop within 3 minutes of PCS pressure lowering to less than 1300 psia.
ATC If PZR pressure lowers to less than 1300 psia and SIAS initiated, ENSURES one PCP is stopped in each loop If PCS is < 25oF subcooled, STOPS all PCPs.
VERIFIES PCP operating limits per EOP Supplement 1
Appendix D 22 Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC-2020 Scenario No.: NRC-1 Event No.: 7 Page 6 of 6 Event
Description:
Failure of A HPSI Pump Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP Energizes Bus 1E per EOP Supplement 5, Follow-up Actions using SOP-30, Station Power Matches control switch targets with breaker position for 152-302, 2400 Volt Bus 1E Incoming Breaker AND152-303, 2400 Volt Bus 1E Startup Tranf Inc Bkr Dispatches NPO to return Feedwater Purity Battery Charger Dispatches NPO to close 52-7701, Load Center EB-77 Incoming Simulator Operator:
When directed as NPO to close 52-7701, wait 4 minutes and set ED15A to CLOSE.
When directed as NPO to restore FWP Battery Charger, wait 8 minutes and report it FWP Battery Charger has been placed into service.
Continue to Event 8
Appendix D 23 Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC-2020 Scenario No.: NRC-1 Event No.: 8 Page 1 of 2 Event
Description:
Larger LOCA Cue:
Containment Sump Fill Rate rising PCS Pressure lowering at a faster rate PCS Subcooling lowering at a faster rate Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NOTE: TRIGGER 12 (P-50A) or TRIGGER 13 (P-50B) automatically insert when the respective PCP is removed from service. This raises the LOCA to 1100gpm.
BOP CLOSES CWRT vent valves CV-1064 and CV-1065 (If not already closed).
BOP Attempt to isolate the LOCA by:
VERIFIES Both PORVs closed ENSURES CLOSED Letdown stop valves CV-2001 / 2009 ENSURES CLOSED PCS Sample Isol valves CV-1910 / 1911 ENSURES CLOSED Reactor Vessel and PZR Vent valves C-11A PRV-1067 / 1068 / 1069 / 1070 VERIFIES RIA-0915 CCW Rad Monitor, alarm clear VERIFIES EK-1172, CCW Surge Tank T-3 Hi-Lo Level, clear VERIFIES PZR Relief Valves not lifting
- Acoustic monitors (C-11A)
- PZR Relief valve discharge temps (C-12)
- Quench Tank temp/level/pressure BOP PLACES Hydrogen Monitor(s) in service per SOP-38 ATC If Containment pressure > 4.0 psig OR Containment Rads > 10 R/hr, VERIFIES EK-1126, CIS Initiated, in alarm
Appendix D 24 Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC-2020 Scenario No.: NRC-1 Event No.: 8 Page 2 of 2 Event
Description:
Larger LOCA Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Note:
Containment Spray should not be actuated at this point.
BOP VERIFIES at least one Cooling Tower Pump operating VERIFIES at least one Condensate Pump operating.
BOP VERIFIES one train of CR HVAC operating in Emergency Mode (per SOP-24).
ATC Commences emergency boration per SOP-2A Att 12 to establish PCS boron concentration greater than or equal to boron needed for Tave > 525°F as verified by sample or hand calculation per EOP Supplement 35.
BOP COMMENCES steaming S/Gs.
REFERS to EOP Supplement 1 Pressure Temperature Limit Curves EOP Supplement 33 PCS Heatup/Cooldown Rate Data BOP When PCS cooldown rate can be controlled within required limits, OPERATES the TBV to cooldown at the maximum allowable rate.
Critical Task: Remove all PCPs from operation when conditions do not support their operation. - Trip ALL PCPs within 10 minutes of a CIS or outside operating curve ATC When PCS is < 25°F subcooled or outside of the EOP Supplement 1 curves performs the following:
Trips the remaining PCPs
Appendix D 25 Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC-2020 Scenario No.: NRC-1 Event No.: 9 Page 1 of 1 Event
Description:
Failure of Containment Spray Cue:
Containment pressure >4.0psig CIS received NO Spray Pumps on Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NOTE: These steps apply when the Containment High Pressure setpoint is reached.
This could occur earlier pending the crew timing through the procedures.
ATC If Containment pressure > 4.0 psig OR Containment Rads > 10 R/hr, VERIFY EK-1126, CIS Initiated, in alarm (Continuous Step)
ATC IF Containment pressure > 4.0 psig, VERIFY Containment Spray alignment and at least minimal spray flow Manually Starts P-54A, P-54B and P-54C When PCS cooldown is in progress OR at discretion of the Lead Examiner, TERMINATE SCENARIO.
Appendix D 26 Form ES-D-2 CRITICAL TASKS PC-CT16-SIAS/Required Flow (Respond to a failure of safety injection actuation signal or required flow)
With the plant operating in MODE 1, 2, or 3 and:
A LOCA, SGTR, or ESDE in progress AND PCS pressure has lowered below SIAS setpoint (1605 psia)
NEITHER SI train has automatically actuated OR PCS pressure is below the shutoff head of the HPSI and/or LPSI pumps and safety injection flow is less than the minimum flow requirements of EOP supplement 4 (Manual initiation of safety injection is possible) the crew takes action to manually initiate SI (manual pushbuttons) or start SI pumps and align loop injection valves as necessary to establish required SI flow greater than the minimum EOP supplement 4 curve for current PCS pressure prior to the PCS (CET) subcooling indicating less than zero degrees subcooling.
HR-CT17-PCP T2L2 (Implement PCP Trip 2/Leave 2 (T2/L2) Strategy)
With the plant operating in MODES 1, 2, or 3 and:
A LOCA is in progress SIAS has actuated Pressurizer pressure has dropped below 1300 psia (t=0)
At least three PCPs are operating the crew secures PCPs as needed to establish one PCP operating in each loop within 3 minutes of PCS pressure lowering to less than 1300 psia.
Appendix D 27 Form ES-D-2 CRITICAL TASKS HR-CT23-PCPTrip (Trip Primary Coolant Pump)
With the plant operating in MODES 1, 2, or 3 and:
SIAS is actuated PCS subcooling is less than 25°F (t=0) or PCS is operating less than the minimum PT curve for PCP operation (t=0)
At least one PCP is operating OR In service PCP in distress by indicating high vibrations or seal temperatures (t=0) the crew secures effected PCPs within ten minutes:
once the PCS is less than 25°F subcooled if the in use EOP is 4.0, 5.0, 6.0 or 9.0 OR once the PCS is less than the minimum PT curve if the in use EOP is 1.0 OR PCPs are demonstrating distress via high vibration alarms or high seal temperature alarms N/A Upon receipt of Moisture Separator Drain Tank (T-5) Low Level Alarm (EK-0172) at a tank level of 50% and with the following conditions:
power greater than 90%
Moisture Separator Drain Tank (T-5) level lowering due to a malfunction of the level control system T-5 level greater than 30%:
The crew initiates a rapid power reduction at rate such that power is reduced below 90% prior to the trip of Heater Drain Pump P-10B on low level (nominally 22.5%) in T-5, thereby preventing a loss of feedwater and reactor trip.
(1) Critical Task 4 added post-exam administration
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: Palisades Scenario No.: NRC-3 Op-Test No.: NRC 2020 Examiners: ___________________________ Operators:
Initial Conditions:
The plant is at 60 % power escalating to full power. The second Main Feedwater Pump has just been started.
Turnover:
Shift orders are to alternate CCW pumps and then continue power escalation in accordance with procedure GOP-5 at a ramp rate of 12%/hr.
Critical Tasks:
- 2. Manually trip the main turbine within one minute of the reactor trip.
- 3. The crew isolates feedflow to most affected S/G within 30 minutes of the initiation of the ESDE. AND The crew isolates the steam generators by closing the MSIVs, Mainfeed regulating valves, Mainfeed regulating bypass valves, IAW EOP Supplement 17/18 prior to the most affected steam generator pressure reaching 450 psia Event No.
Malf.
No.
Event Type*
Event Description 1
N/A BOP (N)
SRO (N)
Alternate CCW pumps to place P-52B in service.
2 N/A ATC (R)
BOP (N)
SRO (N)
Power Escalation at 12%/hr.
3 ED08A ATC (C)
BOP (C)
SRO (C)
SRO (TS)
Loss of EY-10, Preferred AC 4
CC02B CC13A CC13C ATC (C)
SRO (C)
SRO (TS)
Trip of CCW Pump with failure of auto start on other pumps 5
RX15B BOP (I)
SRO (I)
Main Steam Flow Transmitter Failure 6
RX08B ATC (I)
SRO (I)
Pressurizer Level Channel (2) fails downscale demand 7
TC04D N/A Main Turbine GV failure, requiring manual reactor trip 8
TC02 BOP (C)
Main Turbine Auto Trip Failure, manual trip available 9
MS15B ALL (M)
ESDE outside of Containment 10 MS15B BOP (C)
ESDE severity rises, MSIVs fail to auto close 11 CC13A CC13C BOP (C)
Failure of Second CCW Pump to auto start on the SIAS.
(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC Scenario 3 Summary The plant is at 60% power and escalating. MFP P-1B was just started.
Setup:
The BOP will alternate CCW pumps as a normal evolution to place P-52B in service.
The Crew will continue the power escalation at 12%/hr.
After the reactivity change, a loss of Preferred Bus EY-10 occurs due to a tripped DC input breaker. Operable channels will be selected for the heater controls by the ATC. The BOP will bypass reactor trip channels, and place EY-10 on the bypass regulator. The BOP will coordinate local closure of isolation valve for MFP P-1A recirc valve. The SRO will investigate several Tech Specs.
A trip of a CCW pump with the failure of the standby auto start feature will require the ATC to manually start a CCW pump. The SRO will apply Tech specs.
A Main Steam Flow Transmitter failure affects Main Feed Flow requiring manual control and adjustments by the BOP. NO Tech Specs, NO ORM.
A PLCS level channel failure requires manual action by the ATC and BOP. The ATC will attempt to take manual control (unsuccessfully) and then switch to non-failed channel of Pressurizer Level Control. NO Tech Specs, NO ORM. (If PZR level doesnt exceed LCO 3.4.9 limits).
A Governor valve fails closed resulting in the need for a manual reactor trip, causing a pressure spike in the Main Steam system that results in a weld failure where a Main Steam Safety Valve connects. This 0.75 % failure high energy line break is ramped in over a one minute period and causes PCS Temperature and pressure to lower and power to rise prior to the trip.
The Turbine fails to auto trip and requires the BOP to manually trip the turbine from the Main Turbine Control Panel in the Control Room. When the rest of the turbine valves close, the additional spike in steam pressure causes the weld failure to worsen. The steam leaks grows to 6% failure over 5 minutes.
The crew should close the MSIVs based on lowering SG pressure and PCS cooldown. The auto closure of the MSIVs at 500 psig is failed.
On the SIAS the second CCW Pump will not auto start in auto requiring the BOP to start in post SIAS checklist. The crew responds per EOP-6.0 ESDE.
The scenario terminates when the crew has controlled the cooldown.
Bean Count:
N R
I/C Before Trip I/C After Trip M
T/S ATC 2
3, 4, 6 9
BOP 1, 2 3, 5 8, 10, 11 9
SRO 1, 2 9
3, 4
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Event # Remote or Trigger #
Instructions N/A Active Malfunction CC13A, P-52A Failure to Auto Start = Active N/A Active Malfunction CC13C, P-52C Failure to Auto Start = Active N/A Active Malfunction TC02, Fail of Turb Auto Trip Actuation = Active N/A Active Malfunction TC02, Fail of Turb Auto Trip Actuation = Active = Delete on Trigger 10 (Manual TT Pushbutton)
N/A Active Malfunction MS01A, Stm Gen Isltn Vlve CV-0510 Fails To Shut = Active N/A Active Malfunction MS01B, Stm Gen Isltn Vlve CV-0501 Fails To Shut = Active 3
1 ED08A, Loss of Preferred AC Bus No. 1 = Active 4
2 CC02B, Loss CC Wter Pump P-52B = Active 5
3 RX15B, Main Stm Flow Transmitter Fail FT-0704 on a 2:00 minute ramp to 100 6
4 RX08B, Prszer Lvl Cntrl Dwnscl Demand LT-0101B = Active 7
5 TC04D, Turbine Cntrl Vlv CV-4 Fails Shut = Active 8
5 MS15B, Stm Line No. 2 Brk Just Outside of Cont on a 1:00 minute ramp to 0.75 9
Active Malfunction TC02, Main Turbine Auto Trip failure=ACTIVE TRIGGER 10 allows manual PB to work.
10 7
MS15B, Stm Line No. 2 Brk Just Outside of Cont on a 5:00 minute ramp to 6.0 11 Active Malfunction Failure of Second CCW Pump to auto start on the SIAS.
N/A 11 Remote FW63, FW-0733 Manual Valve=0 N/A 12 Remote, ED46, By-Pass Regulator to Y10= CLOSED TRIGGERS 7
SD group A Rod 1 <100 Ramps ESDE larger after reactor trip.
10 zdi3p(136)
Allows manual turbine trip pushbutton to work
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Special Instructions:
Initialize Simulator Protected IC-114 OR Initialize IC for desired power level and Load NRC-3 Scenario Schedule and Event Triggers from jump drive.
Ensure CCW Pump, P-52A in service.
Ensure marked up copy of GOP-5, GCL-5.1 signed off up to step 4.3
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC-3, Student Turnover CRDM leakage:
0 ml/min.
Charging Pump Seal leakage:
P-55A = 0 ml/min, P-55B/C = 0 ml/min.
Zinc Injection:
0 ml/min.
T-90, PMWT Temperature:
85 degrees F.
INITIAL PROCEDURE AND STEP Protected Equipment GOP-5, GCL 5.1 Step 4.3 Chemistry 2231 ENPM 914-272-3459 Duty Station Manager 3688 Reactor Engineering 2497 Electrical Shop 2446 Security 2264/2278 Engineer on Call 2438 MECS Balancing 248-380-2931 Health Physics 2230 Trans Sys Coord 248-380-2901 Instrument
& Control 2247 Work Control Center 2282 Bret Baker 2332 Work Week Manager 3500 Boron:
938ppm Weather: Sunny.
ACTIVITY: PER PPC OFFGAS: 7.2 SCFM Power History over the last 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> 60% Steady State Three 40 gallon dilutions/shift Surveillances Completed Last Shift N/A PLANNED ACTIVITIES
- 1. Remove CCW P-52A and place P-52B in service for Maintenance.
- 2. MFP, P-1B been returned following maintenance on the Lube Oil System and the Combined Speed Control is in MANUAL.
- 3. Raise reactor power to 100% at 12%/hour. Reactor Engineering is allowing the 0.05 band for ASI control.
PHOENIX SCORE: 1.0 INTEGRATED RISK: LOW EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS/OOS None ACTION TIME N/A Compensatory Actions/ Notes None.
Appendix D 1
Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2020 Scenario No.: NRC-3 Event No.: 1 Page 1 of 2 Event
Description:
Swap CCW Pumps.
Cue:
Orders for the Shift on turnover.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO Directs actions to place P-52B, CCW Pump, in service.
BOP Refers to SOP-16, section 7.3.6.
BOP Directs NPO to perform steps locally to ensure P-52B is ready to start.
Simulator Operator:
Provide only information requested as NPO, report:
MV-CC920 and MV-CC942, P-52B suction and discharge valves are locked open.
MV-CC557, CCW P-52B Casing Vent, is opened and closed to vent air from the casing.
Initial CCW Hx Ps are E-54A = 6.6 psid, E-54B = 6.8 psid.
BOP VERIFIES both CCW Heat Exchangers in operation.
ATC Provides Peer checks when requested BOP Starts P-52B by placing control switch 152-208 CS to TRIP (to remove from STANDBY) and then to CLOSE.
- Verify proper pump response (amps and discharge pressure).
BOP Stops P-52A by placing control switch 152-109CS to TRIP.
BOP Places P-52A in standby:
- Depress amber STANDBY button above control switch.
- Verify amber light is LIT.
BOP Requests final reading on CCW Heat Exchangers differential pressure. (May request).
Appendix D 2
Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2020 Scenario No.: NRC-3 Event No.: 1 Page 2 of 2 Event
Description:
Swap CCW Pumps.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator:
If asked as NPO after starting P-52BA report:
CCW Hx Ps are: E-54A = 6.7 psid, E-54B = 6.8 psid.
Continue to Event 2.
Appendix D 3
Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2020 Scenario No.: NRC-3 Event No.: 2 Page 1 of 3 Event
Description:
Commence Power Escalation.
Cue:
Orders for the Shift on turnover Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO Enters and directs the actions of GOP-5, Power Escalation in Mode
- 1.
SRO Reviews GOP-5 Precautions and Limitations with crew.
Note:
CRS may notify ENPM, BA, RP, and Chemistry of impending load change.
SRO Performs reactivity brief with crew.
Note:
Crew should use Cycle 27 Reactivity Management Briefing.
BOP Selects ramp speed and rate (at 12% per hour), using SOP-8 0:
- PRESSES CONTROL SETPOINT on the Displays keypad.
- ENTERS Setter value on numeric keypad
- PRESSES SELECT on the numeric keypad AND OBSERVES the following:
- HOLD displayed in the upper right corner of the CRT.
- HOLD light/pushbutton illuminates on the Manual Panel.
- PRESSES TAB RIGHT on the cursor keypad.
- ENTERS desired acceleration rate using numeric keypad.
- PRESSES SELECT on the numeric keypad.
Appendix D 4
Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2020 Scenario No.: NRC-3 Event No.: 2 Page 2 of 3 Event
Description:
Commence Power Escalation.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ATC Requests Peer Check MAINTAINS TAVE within 3°F of TREF during the power escalation by regulating dilution and/or regulating rod withdrawal.
For Dilution (SOP-2A Att 12):
- ENSURES CLOSED CV-2155 M/U Stop.
- ENSURES one of the following in MANUAL and the other in OFF.
- P-90A, PW M/U Pump.
- P-90B, PW M/U Pump.
- ENSURES RESET and in AUTO FIC-0210A, PW M/U Boration flow.
- ENSURES ZERO output signal on FIC-0210A, PW M/U Boration flow.
- SETS quantity and batch flow limit on FIC-0210A, PW flow controller
- OPENS CV-2155, M/U Stop.
- PUSHES start pushbutton on FIC-0210A.
- MONITORS Reactor Power and TAVG.
- WHEN dilution complete, THEN ENSURES FIC-0210A output signal at zero.
- CLOSES CV-2155.
For Control Rod manipulations:
Operates Rod Control Switch to RAISE to WITHDRAW Group 4 Regulating Rods in increments specified by CRS.
MONITORS reactor power using highest indicated dT power and TAVE.
ATC Diverts, as needed, around the VCT due to rising VCT level from the dilution by:
- Placing CV-2056 handswitch AMS-2056 to CWRT.
- When divert is complete, returns CV-2056 handwitch AMS-2056 to AUTO
Appendix D 5
Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2020 Scenario No.: NRC-3 Event No.: 2 Page 3 of 3 Event
Description:
Commence Power Escalation.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP Requests Peer Check.
Initiates load change (SOP-8 Att 10):
ENSURES Limiter setting will not interfere with desired change.
PERFORMS ONE of the following:
o PRESSES GO pushbutton on Manual Panel o PRESSES GO/HOLD custom key on Display keypad o PRESSES SELECT on numeric keypad, then PRESSES START on control keypad.
OBSERVE HOLD light extinguishes and GO light illuminates.
WHEN ramp is complete, THEN VERIFIES GO/HOLD light extinguished.
Provides CREW UPDATE.
NOTE: DO NOT allow Crew to raise power to > 80% or it will cause the operators to trip the reactor on the next event.
Continue to Event 3
Appendix D 6
Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2020 Scenario No.: NRC-3 Event No.: 3 Page 1 of 5 Event
Description:
Loss of Preferred AC EY-10.
Cue:
Channel 'A' RPS Trip Ladder Logic Lights Illuminated.
Many alarms including:
EK-0543, "PREFERRED AC BUS NUMBER 1 TROUBLE" Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior At the Lead Examiners discretion, INSERT Trigger 1.
SRO Uses CREW UPDATE to announce Transient Alarm Response.
Directs Crew to stop power ascension.
BOP Places Main Turbine in HOLD and provides CREW UPDATE.
ATC Stops dilution if still in progress.
Stops Dilution Blender CLOSES CV-2155 SRO Diagnoses Loss of EY-10 and enters AOP-12, Loss of Preferred Bus EY-10.
Directs actions.
Provides CREW UPDATE for Reactor Trip Criteria.
Investigate Bus EY-10 breaker status.
Close MV-FW733, Feed Pump P-1A Recirc Valve Stop.
Simulator Operator Respond to direction given:
CV-0711 is failed open.
NPO to close MV-FW733, wait one minute and insert Trigger 11 as it takes 1.5 minutes to close.
NPO to EY-10, report in four minutes that DC Input Breaker is TRIPPED OPEN and the AC Output Breaker is CLOSED.
SRO Refers to AOP-3, Main Feedwater Transients.
Appendix D 7
Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2020 Scenario No.: NRC-3 Event No.: 3 Page 2 of 5 Event
Description:
Loss of Preferred AC EY-10.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ATC Manually operates Charging System to maintain Pressurizer level between 42% and 57%.
ATC Positions HS 1/LIC-0101, Heater Control Selector Switch, to CHANNEL B.
BOP RESTORES Pressurizer Heaters from LCC-16, Load Control Center 16, as follows:
ENSURES Pressurizer level greater than or equal to 36%.
MATCHES control switch target with breaker position for 152-211, Bus 1D to PZR Heater Xfmr EX-16.
CLOSES breaker 152-211.
ATC If directed places PLCS in CASCADE. Refers to SOP 1A, section titled "Pressurizer Level Control."
Appendix D 8
Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2020 Scenario No.: NRC-3 Event No.: 3 Page 3 of 5 Event
Description:
Loss of Preferred AC EY-10.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ATC WHEN desired, THEN PLACE PPCS in AUTO. Refer to SOP 1A, section titled "Pressurizer Pressure Control."
ATC VERIFY TAVE/TREF deviation is within 5° F.
BOP Dispatches NPO to MONITOR West ESS Room Sump Level locally every 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> and pump West ESS Sump manually when needed.
SIMUALTOR OPERATOR: If requested as NPO to monitor and pump as necessary the West ESS Room Sump report you will initiate monitoring and pump as necessary SRO REFERs TO Attachment 1, "Lost and Redundant Instrumentation,"
to assess service lost, available redundant components and alternate components.
Appendix D 9
Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2020 Scenario No.: NRC-3 Event No.: 3 Page 4of 5 Event
Description:
Loss of Preferred AC EY-10.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NOTE: Bypassing the Trip Units may not be performed immediately.
BOP Bypasses ALL Channel A RPS Trip Units per SOP-36, Step 7.4.2.
Bypass desired RPS Trip Unit (for each CH A RPS Trip Unit):
- 1.
ENSURES the RPS Bypass Key is the correct key for the RPS Trip Unit to be bypassed.
- 2.
INSERTS bypass key above affected RPS Trip Unit.
- 3.
TURNS key 90° clockwise.
- 4.
VERIFIES the yellow light above the bypass keyswitch is OFF.
- 5.
RECORDS evolution in the Operations Log unless logged in the applicable procedure.
SRO After information from NPO at EY-10 is received:
Determines that EY-10 is Fault Free.
Updates Crew.
Directs EY-10 be placed on the Bypass Regulator.
NOTE: If EY-10 is NOT on the Bypass Regulator, then Pressurizer Level Control (Event 6) will not work on either channel.
SRO Refers to and implements the following Tech Spec LCO:
- 3.8.7 DC Inverter, Cond A, Restore in 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
- 3.8.9 Distribution System, Cond B, Restore in 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />.
- 3.3.1 RPS Instrumentation, Cond A, Place in trip 7 days Admin 4.11 review is required for support /supported systems.
SRO Requests SE to perform a review of Reportability and Notifications requirements.
Appendix D 10 Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2020 Scenario No.: NRC-3 Event No.: 3 Page 5 of 5 Event
Description:
Loss of Preferred AC EY-10.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP Direct NPO to place EY-10 on the Bypass Regulator per SOP-30, 7.6.2.
Provides CREW UPDATE prior to energizing Bus.
Simulator Operator When directed to place EY-10 on the Bypass regulator:
Wait three minutes and call C/R to tell them you are ready to place the bypass Regulator in service for EY-10 Insert Trigger 12, (ED46 to Close)
NOTE: Once power is restored to EY10, the crew may restore any or all components manipulated during this failure.
NOTE: Not allowing the crew to restore power to EY-10 will change the response remaining events due to control systems not having power.
SRO Briefs crew using Transient Brief Checklist, EN-OP-200, Att 1.
Calls Duty Station Manager to activate support personnel for the condition.
Notifications, Risk, Contingency actions.
Continue with Event 4
Appendix D 11 Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2020 Scenario No.: NRC-3 Event No.: 4 Page 1 of 2 Event
Description:
Trip of CCW Pump, P-52B, with Failure of Auto Start of Standby CCW pumps Cue:
Red Light OFF on P-52B.
Lowering CCW Pressure and Amps.
Low flow alarms for components cooled by CCW.
EK-1167, Component Clg Pumps P-52A, P-52B, P-52C Trip.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior At the Lead Examiners discretion, INSERT Trigger 2.
ATC Diagnosis of failure of P-52B.
Indications:
Lowering CCW Pressure and Amps.
Red Light OFF on P-52B.
Alarms:
EK-1167, Component Clg Pumps P-52A,P-52B, P-52C Trip.
EK-0931-34, Pri Coolant Pump P-50A/B/C/D Clg Wtr Lo Flow.
SRO Enters AOP-36, Loss of Component Cooling.
Directs actions.
Provides CREW UPDATE for Reactor Trip Criteria.
ATC Verifies T-3, CCW Surge Tank, > 47%.
Starts P-52A OR P-52C.
CRITICAL TASK: Manually start CCW within 10 minutes of exceeding the operating limits of any PCP.
Appendix D 12 Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2020 Scenario No.: NRC-3 Event No.:4 Page 2 of 2 Event
Description:
Trip of CCW Pump, P-52B, with Failure of Auto Start of Standby CCW pumps.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP Dispatches NPOs to CCW Pump room and Breaker Simulator Operator: when dispatched to investigate CCW Pump failure:
- At breaker 152-208 for P-52B report in 2 minutes that the breaker has tripped on overcurrent
- P-52B pump motor is hot but no fire
- P-52A and P-52C are normal for given condition of running or not.
ATC BOP Verifies adequate CCW flow available via:
PCP Seal temperatures.
TIC-0203, Low Pressure Letdown Flow Temp Control.
TIA-0931, TIA-0933, Reactor Shield Cooling Coil Outlet Temps.
FI-0971, FI-0972, FI-0973, Comp Clg Wtr Outlet Flow Charging PPs.
SRO Refers to and implements the following Tech Spec LCO:
3.7.7, Cond A, Restore to OPERABLE in 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
Admin 4.11 review is required for support /supported systems.
SRO Briefs crew using Transient Brief Checklist, EN-OP-200, Att 1.
Calls Duty Station Manager to activate support personnel for the condition.
Notifications, Risk, Contingency actions.
Continue to Event 5
Appendix D 13 Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2020 Scenario No.: NRC-3 Event No.:5 Page 1 of 1 Event
Description:
Main Steam Flow Transmitter Fails.
Cue:
Indicated Steam Flow rising on B S/G.
Heat Balance Power Changing.
CV-0703 opening.
B S/G Level Rising.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior At the Lead Examiners discretion, INSERT Trigger 3.
BOP Diagnosis of failure Steam Flow Input to B S/G level controller Indicated Steam Flow rising on B S/G.
Heat Balance Power Transient rising.
CV-0703 opening.
B S/G level rising.
Alarms:
EK-0963, Steam Generator E-50B Hi Level (Possible).
SRO Enters AOP-3, Main Feedwater Transient.
Directs actions.
Uses update for Reactor Trip Criteria NOTE: If the Hi level is reached in the B S/G a High Level Override will occur and close CV-0703 automatically. If levels are not maintained between 60%-90%, then a Manual Reactor Trip is required BOP Takes manual control of the following:
CV-0703, E-50B Feed Regulating Valve.
SRO Briefs crew using Transient Brief Checklist, EN-OP-200, Att 1.
Calls Duty Station Manager to activate support personnel for the condition.
Provides Operating Bands for Controller in MANUAL.
Assigns BOP CRITICAL PARAMETER of S/G Level, (65%
and encompassing current level).
Continue to Event 6
Appendix D 14 Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2020 Scenario No.: NRC-3 Event No.:6 Page 1 of 2 Event
Description:
Failure of the Pressurizer Level Control.
Cue:
Pressurizer Program input Fails High Charging Pump, P-55A speed lowers Actual Pressurizer Level lowers EK-0761, Pressurizer Level Hi-Lo Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior At the Lead Examiners discretion, INSERT Trigger 4.
NOTE: If EY-10 is NOT on the Bypass Regulator, then Pressurizer Level Control will not work on either channel.
ATC Diagnoses failure B Channel of Pressurizer Level Control Pressurizer Program input fails high.
P-55A, Charging Pump, speed lowers.
Actual Pressurizer level lowers.
Alarms:
EK-0761, Pressurizer Level Hi-Lo.
SRO Enters AOP-22, Pressurizer Level Control Malfunctions, and provides CREW UPDATE.
Directs actions.
Provides CREW UPDATE for Reactor Trip Criteria.
ATC Verifies the following:
Pressurizer level is between 30-62%
Pressurizer level is >36%
Appendix D 15 Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2020 Scenario No.: NRC-3 Event No.:6 Page 2 of 2 Event
Description:
Failure of the Pressurizer Level Control Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ATC Requests Peer Check and Attempts MANUAL control of LIC-0101B. (has no impact.)
Determines LIC-0101A is available.
ATC ALTERNATES Pressurizer Level Controllers as follows:
ENSURES controller (LIC-0101A) in MANUAL.
Using manual operating lever, ADJUSTS output signal of the controller to be selected to match the output signal of the currently selected controller or to desired output.
PLACES HS 1/LRC-0101, Pressurizer Level Control Selector Switch, to Channel A.
PLACES HS 1/LIC-0101, Heater Control Selector Switch, in the Channel A position.
ATC IF operation in CASCADE is directed, THEN PERFORMS the following:
VERIFIES expected TAVE signal available from selected TAVE/TREF controller (TYT-0100, TYT-0200).
Using raise/lower pushbuttons, SLOWLY ADJUSTS selected controller setpoint (blue pointer) to the Pressurizer level setpoint determined by present TAVE.
DEPRESSES the "A" pushbutton on LIC-0101A.
DEPRESSES the "C" pushbutton on LIC-0101A.
BOP Maintains S/G Levels with a controller in Manual.
SRO Briefs crew using Transient Brief Checklist, EN-OP-200, Att 1.
Calls Duty Station Manager to activate support personnel for the condition Continue to Event 7
Appendix D 16 Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2020 Scenario No.: NRC-3 Event No.:7 Page 1 of 1 Event
Description:
Turbine GV-4 Fails Closed requiring manual reactor trip.
Cue:
Indication on DEH panel Load lowering initially.
Steam Generator pressure rising initially.
PCS temperature rising initially.
Reactor power lowering initially.
EK-0318, TURBINE PANEL TROUBLE, alarms.
Steam noise from outside CR.
Above parameters starting to reverse pending size of leak at the time of Reactor trip.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior At the Lead Examiners discretion, INSERT Trigger 5.
BOP Provides CREW UPDATE.
Diagnoses Turbine GV-4 failing closed:
EK-0318, TURBINE PANEL TROUBLE, alarms.
Indication on DEH panel.
Load lowering.
Steam Generator pressure rising.
PCS temperature rising.
Reactor power lowering.
SRO Enters AOP-1, Loss of Load, and provides CREW UPDATE.
Direct the actions of AOP.
Uses update for Reactor Trip Criteria.
BOP Places Turbine Controls to MANUAL by depressing Turbine Manual pushbutton on DEH.
SRO Determines Turbine GV-4 is NOT responding in MANUAL and directs a Reactor Trip.
Appendix D 17 Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2020 Scenario No.: NRC-3 Event No.:8/9 Page 1 of 1 Event Description B ESDE on MSSV line, with turbine auto-trip failure.
Cue:
Turbine does not trip when reactor is tripped.
Steam noise from outside CR.
Steam Generator pressure lowering.
PCS temperature lowering.
B S/G level lowering faster than A S/G.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Trigger 7, The magnitude of the ESDE is increased when the MSIVs are closed.
Simulator Operator:
If contacted by Control Room as NPO to check on steam leak, wait three minutes and REPLY back there is a steam break on the steam line near the Main Steam Safety Valves ATC Depresses RPS-PB1, Reactor Trip, pushbutton on Panel C-02.
ATC/BOP Performs EOP-1.0 Immediate Actions.
SRO Commences EOP-1.0 verbal verifications.
ATC Reactivity Control: (met)
Reactor power lowering.
Negative SUR.
Maximum of one control rod not inserted.
CRITICAL TASK: Manually Trip the Turbine within 1 minute of failure to automatically trip following a Reactor trip.
BOP Turbine trip criteria: (met with contingency actions)
Main Turbine does not trip and must be manually tripped from PB-20AST.
Generator disconnected from grid.
BOP Feedwater System criteria: (met)
PLACES MFP Controller to MANUAL and RAMPS to minimum speed.
Main Feed Regulating Valves and Bypass Feed Regulating valves CLOSED.
Appendix D 18 Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2020 Scenario No.: NRC-3 Event No.:10/11 Page 1 of 7 Event Description B ESDE, with failure of MSIVs to auto close, and second CCW pump fail to auto start Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP Vital Auxiliaries-Electric: (met)
Buses 1C and 1D energized.
Bus 1E energized (If SIAS is not actuated).
Bus 1A and 1B energized.
EY-01 energized.
3 of 4 Preferred AC Buses energized.
Six DC Buses energized.
- Main Feed Pump Trip Power available lights LIT.
- AFW Pump control power lights LIT.
- MSIV control power lights LIT.
BOP VERIFY adequate PCP seal cooling: (met)
At least one CCW Pump operating.
At least one SW Pump operating.
Both Critical SW headers in operation with pressure > 42 psig.
CCW Containment Isol Valves open, CV-0910 / 0911 / 0940.
ATC PCS Inventory Control: (not met)
PZR level 20% - 85% and trending toward normal (42% - 57%).
PCS 25°F subcooled (use Thot for forced circulation).
Takes actions to manually control Charging and Letdown.
ATC PCS Pressure Control: (not met)
PZR pressure 1650 to 2185 psia and trending toward normal (2010 to 2100 psia).
- Manually operates PPCS in MANUAL and operate PZR heaters and sprays to maintain EOP Supplement 1 limits.
- When PCS pressure is < 1605 psia, verify Safety Injection initiated:
- Verify EK-1342 in alarm.
Appendix D 19 Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2020 Scenario No.: NRC-3 Event No.:10/11 Page 2 of 7 Event Description B ESDE, with failure of MSIVs to auto close, and second CCW pump fail to auto start Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ATC Core Heat Removal: (met)
At least one PCP operating.
Verify Loop T less than 10°F.
Verify PCS at least 25°F subcooled.
BOP PCS Heat Removal At least one S/G between 5-70%
FW Available S/G Intact-isolates FW to B S/G PVS TAVE 525-540°F-Verifies feed/steam paths ATC Containment Isolation: (met)
Containment pressure < 0.85 psig.
BOP Containment Isolation: (met)
Verify Containment Area Monitor alarms clear.
Verify Condenser Off Gas Monitor alarm clear.
Verify Main Steam Line Monitor alarms clear.
ATC Containment Atmosphere: (met)
Verify Containment temperature less than 125o F.
Verify Containment pressure less than 0.85 psig.
Appendix D 20 Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2020 Scenario No.: NRC-3 Event No.:10/11 Page 3 of 7 Event Description B ESDE, with failure of MSIVs to auto close, and second CCW pump fail to auto start Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ATC VERIFY IA pressure > 85 psig.
BOP ENSURE CR HVAC is aligned for Emergency Mode Operation within 20 mins of time of Reactor Trip.
VERIFY Supply Fan V-95 or V-96 for desired train is ON.
ENSURE Air Filter Unit Fan V-26A or V-26B for desired train is ON.
ENSURE OFF V-94 Purge Fan and V-47 Swgr Exh Fan.
BOP VERIFY at least one Condensate Pump and one Cooling Tower Pump operating.
CRITICAL TASK:
The crew isolates feedflow to most affected S/G within 30 minutes of the initiation of the ESDE. AND The crew isolates the steam generators by closing the MSIVs, Mainfeed regulating valves, Mainfeed regulating bypass valves, IAW EOP Supplement 17/18 prior to the most affected steam generator pressure reaching 450 psia BOP VERIFY MSIVs are open OR MSIV Bypass valves are open Closes MSIVs due to S/G Pressure lowering or for personnel and equipment protection.
Trips both main Feed Pumps BOP Turns panels over to ATC
Appendix D 21 Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2020 Scenario No.: NRC-3 Event No.:10/11 Page 4 of 7 Event Description B ESDE, with failure of MSIVs to auto close, and second CCW pump fail to auto start Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO Commence EOP Supplement 45, SFP Monitoring.
SRO Diagnoses ESDE using EOP-1.0 Attachment 1 Event Diagnostic Flow Chart and transition to EOP-6.0.
ATC/BOP Diagnoses Main Steam line rupture outside containment:
S/G pressures and PCS temperatures and pressures lowering.
PCS subcooling rising.
Steam noise outside Control Room.
SRO Verifies EOP-6.0 Attachment 1, Safety Function Status Check Sheet, acceptance criteria are satisfied at intervals of approximately every 15 minutes.
SRO Conducts Transition Brief per Placard. Solicits input from Crew SRO Directs SM to review the Emergency Plan ATC Verifies EK-1342, SAFETY INJ INITIATED, is alarmed due to PZR pressure less than or equal to 1605 psia.
Appendix D 22 Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2020 Scenario No.: NRC-3 Event No.:10/11 Page 5 of 7 Event Description B ESDE, with failure of MSIVs to auto close, and second CCW pump fail to auto start Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP ENSURES available safeguards equipment operating (EOP Supplement 5)
Directs NPO to locally close:
CV-0944 Evap CCW Supply.
CV-0977B Evap CCW Return.
Starts CCW Pump P-52A P-52C Simulator Operator:
When requested by NCO, wait eight minutes and report CV-0944 and CV-0977B are closed.
BOP Starts CCW Pumps, P-52A or P-52C per EOP Supplement 5 ATC If PZR level < 36%:
PLACES Letdown Orifice Stop Valve handswitches HS-2003, HS-2004, HS-2005, to CLOSE.
BOP ENSURES MSIVs and Bypass valves closed if not already accomplished.
BOP VERIFIES one train of CR HVAC operating in Emergency Mode per SOP-24, Ventilation and Air Conditioning System.
BOP Determines B S/G is the most affected S/G by evaluating:
High steam flow from S/G.
Lowering S/G pressure.
Lowering S/G level.
Lowering loop Tcold temperatures.
Appendix D 23 Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2020 Scenario No.: NRC-3 Event No.:10/11 Page 6 of 7 Event Description B ESDE, with failure of MSIVs to auto close, and second CCW pump fail to auto start Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP Isolates B S/G per EOP Supplement 18:
- ENSURES CLOSED both MSIVs.
- ENSURES CLOSED BOTH MSIV Bypass Valves.
- CLOSES CV-0703, B S/G Main Feed Reg Valve
- CLOSES CV-0744, B S/G Main Feed Reg Block Valve (Key:
144)
- CLOSES CV-0734, B S/G Bypass Feed Reg Valve
- Closes B S/G blowdown valves:
- CV-0768.
- CV-0770.
- CV-0738.
- CLOSES B S/G AFW flow control valves:
- CV-0736.
- CV-0736A.
- CV-0727.
BOP Verifies the correct S/G is isolated:
S/G pressure.
S/G levels.
PCS Loop Tcold temperatures.
BOP Stabilizes PCS temperature by maintaining level in the least affected S/G between 60-70%.
BOP STEAMS the least affected S/G as necessary to maintain the following:
Maintain the least affected S/G pressure within 50 psid above the most affected S/G pressure.
When Tcold(s) in the affected loop are not lowering, STABILIZE PCS Tcold(s) using the least affected S/G.
When B S/G has been isolated, PCS temperature control has been established OR at discretion of the Lead Examiner, TERMINATE SCENARIO.
Note: If crew has NOT accounted for SI throttling AND conditions are about to exceed criteria, continue to next page.
Appendix D 24 Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2020 Scenario No.: NRC-3 Event No.:10/11 Page 7 of 7 Event Description B ESDE, with failure of MSIVs to auto close, and second CCW pump fail to auto start Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CRITICAL TASK: Throttle SI prior to going solid in the Pressurizer.
SRO VERIFIES SI Pump throttling criteria are satisfied by ALL of the following:
Based on the Average of Qualified CETs, PCS subcooling meets ONE of the following:
At least 25°F subcooled for non-degraded Containment conditions.
Greater than the minimum subcooling curve on EOP Supplement 1 for degraded Containment conditions.
Corrected PZR level is greater than 20% and controlled.
- At least one S/G is available for PCS heat removal with corrected level being maintained or being restored to between 60% and 70%.
- Operable RVLMS channels indicate greater than 102 inches above the bottom of fuel alignment plate (621' 8")
Directs ATC how the SI Throttling will be accomplished.
ATC When conditions are present, THROTTLES SI as directed.
When B S/G has been isolated, PCS temperature control has been established OR at discretion of the Lead Examiner, TERMINATE SCENARIO.
Appendix D 25 Form ES-D-2 CRITICAL TASKS Restore CCW Prior to PCP Damage With the plant operating in MODES 1, 2, or 3 and:
At least one PCP is operating OR In service PCP in distress by indicating high vibrations or seal temperatures (t=0) the crew restores CCW to the effected PCPs within ten minutes:
RC-CT01-MAINTURBTRIP (Trip the Main Turbine)
With the plant operating in MODE 1 and:
- A reactor trip has occurred
- The main turbine has failed to automatically trip the crew takes action to trip the Main Turbine within1 minute of failure to automatically trip following a reactor trip (t=0) by either:
- Depressing the turbine trip pushbutton on EC-01 panel OR
- Closing the MSIVs
Appendix D 26 Form ES-D-2 CRITICAL TASKS CI-CT14-ESDEISOL (TCA)
(Isolate a steam generator during an ESDE)
With the plant operating in MODES 1, 2, or 3 and:
An ESDE in progress MSIS has not actuated or did not isolate the ESDE Auxiliary feedwater initiated to both steam generators The crew isolates feedflow to most affected S/G within 30 minutes of the initiation of the ESDE.
AND The crew isolates the steam generators by closing the MSIVs, Mainfeed regulating valves, Mainfeed regulating bypass valves, IAW EOP Supplement 17/18 prior to the most affected steam generator pressure reaching 450 psia.
HR-CT30-THROTTLESI (Throttle HPSI flow when conditions allow)
With the plant operating in MODES 1, 2, or 3 and:
A LOCA, SGTR, or ESDE is occurring Plant cooldown and depressurization are in progress HPSI makeup exceeds the required PCS makeup as noted by a rising pressurizer level trend HPSI flow has NOT been throttled Safety Injection Throttle criteria is met per the in use EOP the crew throttles SI flow to prevent filling the PZR solid as indicated by rapidly rising pressure.
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: Palisades Nuclear Plant Scenario No.: NRC-4 Op-Test No.: NRC-2020 Examiners: ___________________________ Operators:
Initial Conditions: The plant is at 25% power.
Turnover: Shift orders are to close 25F7 breaker in the switchyard.
Critical Tasks:
- 1. Trip 2 Leave 2 PCP strategy - Trip 2 PCPs less than 3 minutes after reaching 1300 psia in the PCS
- 2. Remove all PCPs from operation when conditions do not support their operation. - Trip ALL PCPs within 10 minutes of exceeding the operating limits curve.
- 3. Energize Bus 1C OR 1D within 60 minutes Event No.
Malf.
No.
Event Type*
Event Description 1
N/A BOP (N)
Close switchyard breaker 25F7 2
N/A ATC (R)
BOP (N)
SRO (N)
Power ascension 3
RM08C ATC (I)
SRO (I)
SRO (TS)
RIA-1810 failure low requiring ATC to close dampers for Safeguards Room isolation.
4 P-40A-1 BOP (C)
SRO (C)
SRO (TS)
P-40A, Dilution Water Pump Trip requiring BOP valve throttling to maintain Cooling tower levels.
5 CV17 ATC (C)
SRO (C)
VCT level failure resulting in charging suction swapping to SRWT requiring manual isolation of charging and letdown to prevent boration of PCS.
6 RC16D ATC (C)
SRO (C)
P-50D vibration resulting in manual reactor trip of reactor followed by securing of failing PCP.
7 RC21 ALL (M)
Ramped Vapor Space LOCA 8
ED01 ED12A ED11B BOP (C)
Loss of offsite power 10 minutes after P-50D is tripped.
Failures of both EDG requires manual action to restore power to either bus 1C or 1D.
9 ED01 ATC (C)
Manually start of Instrument Air Compressor after EDG loading is completed.
10 ED01 CV17 ATC (C)
Manual action required to restore Charging Pumps.
11 CH03AA CH03BA BOP (C)
After Loss of All AC, two Containment Air Cooling Fans (V-1A and V-2A) trip off requiring manual action to start during post SIAS checklist.
(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC Scenario 4 Summary The plant is at 25% power and escalating. Chemistry hold has just been removed.
Setup: Plant at 25% IC with Main Generator Output Breaker 25F7 breaker in the switchyard is open.
The BOP will close Main Generator Output Breaker, 25F7 as a normal evolution.
The Crew will continue the power escalation at 12%/hr to 49%.
After the reactivity change, RIA-1810, W Safeguards Room Radiation Monitor fails low. The ATC will place the associated dampers for this room to close to isolate the non-monitored radiation area. SRO will investigate TS requirements.
A trip of Dilution Water Pump, P-40A occurs requiring the BOP to manipulate flow to balance Cooling Tower levels. Dilution Pump is not TS however, the breaker that has tripped provides backup power to Pressurizer Heaters and is TS related. SRO TS review.
A failure of VCT level switch automatically re-configures the charging system to take suction from the SIRW Tank by closing the normal VCT valves and opening the SIRW Tank valve. ATC must diagnose this event and then manually remove charging and letdown from service.
Primary Coolant Pump, P-50D experiences a continual rising of vibrations until a reactor trip is required. The ATC must monitor conditions and manually trip the reactor. Once reactivity safety functions are met, P-50D must be removed from service.
On the reactor trip, a vapor space (Relief Valve) fails full open on a 5-minute ramp. Ten minutes later a loss of all offsite power occurs. The BOP must manually start EDG 1-1 to energize Bus 1C and Close the EDG 1-2 output breaker to energize Bus 1D. Two Containment Air Cooler Fans trip and fail to restart after D/G Loading. Manual starting is required from the BOP. The ATC must start charging pumps and Instrument Air Compressors to combat the VS LOCA.
The scenario terminates after the above actions are taken and the crew has initiated a PCS Cooldown.
Bean Count:
ATC: 1R, 5IC, 1M BOP: 2N, 3IC, 1M SRO: 2(TS), 2N, 1M
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC-4 Simulator Instructions Initialize Simulator Protected IC-115 OR Initialize IC-14 and Load NRC-4 Scenario Schedule and Event Triggers form jump drive.
Validate Malfunctions, Remotes and Overrides from Table below.
Event # Remote or Trigger #
Instructions N/A Active Malfunction ED12A (ED08), Diesel Gen Fail To Auto Start 1-1 = ACTIVE.
N/A Active Malfunction ED11B (ED08), Diesel Gen Breaker Fail 1-2 = ACTIVE.
N/A Active Malfunction ED11B (ED08), Diesel Gen Breaker Fail 1-2, Delete in 1 sec from Trigger 10 (152-213 to Close) = ACTIVE.
N/A Active Malfunction 152-213-4 (Override), 2400V Bus 1D Switch 152-213 Close = OFF.
3 1
RM08C (RM04), Low Rad W Sfgrds Room RIQA-1810 = ACTIVE.
4 2
P-40-1 (Override), DWS P-40A Selector Switch Stop = ON.
5 3
CV17 (CV01), VCT Level Switch LS-0204 Failure = 0.
6 4
RC16D (RC06), High Vibration On Prim Cool PMP P-50D =
ACTIVE.
7 6
RC21 (RC02), Pres Safety Relief Vlve RV-1040 Leak = 100 with 5 minute ramp.
8 5
ED01 (ED03), Loss of All Offsite Power = Active with a 10 minute delay after Trigger 5 (Reactor Trip).
8 5
CH03BA (CH01), Cont Air Cooler Fan Fail V-2A = Active with 10:01 Delay (Dont restart after loss of AC) 8 5
CH03AA (CH01), Cont Air Cooler Fan Fail V-1A = Active with 10:01 Delay (Dont restart after loss of AC) 8 15 Deletes CH03AA, to allow manual start after 1 second 8
15 Deletes CH03BA, to allow manual start after 1 second
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 TRIGGERS Description Reason 5
SD Group A Rod 1<100 Starts Loss of Offsite AC on timer from Reactor Trip 10 zdi5p(960)
Allows manual closure of EDG1-2 Output Breaker when switch is closed manually.
15 zdi1p(93)
Allows V-1A to be started manually from the C/S in the Control Room 16 zdi1p(100)
Allows V-2A to be started manually from the C/S in the Control Room Special Instructions:
- Ensure 25F7 breaker in the switchyard is open
- C-01 Panel Feedwater Placard aligned as follows:
MV-FW0705 B MFP CLOSED MV-FW0707 A MFP OPEN
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 CRDM leakage:
0 ml/min.
Charging Pump Seal leakage:
P-55A = 0 ml/min, P-55B/C = 0 ml/min.
Zinc Injection:
0 ml/min.
T-90, PMWT Temperature:
85 degrees F.
INITIAL PROCEDURE AND STEP GOP-5, GCL-5.1, Step 3.1 Chemistry 2231 ENPM 914-272-3459 Duty Station Manager 3688 Reactor Engineering 2497 Electrical Shop 2446 Security 2264/2278 Engineer on Call 2438 MECS Balancing 248-380-2931 Health Physics 2230 Trans Sys Coord 248-380-2901 Instrument
& Control 2247 Work Control Center 2282 Bret Baker 2332 Work Week Manager 3500 Boron:
938ppm Weather: Sunny.
ACTIVITY: PER PPC OFFGAS: 7.2 SCFM Power History over the last 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> 25% Steady State Three 40 gallon dilutions/shift Surveillances Completed Last Shift N/A PLANNED ACTIVITIES
- 1. Close Output Breaker 25F7
- 2. Raise power at 12%/hr to 49%.
PHOENIX SCORE: 1.0 INTEGRATED RISK: HIGH EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS/OOS CHEMISTRY HOLD LIFTED AFTER FORCED OUTAGE FOR CRDM LEAK REPAIRS ACTION TIME Compensatory Actions/ Notes None.
Appendix D 1
Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2020 Scenario No.: NRC-4 Event No.: 1 Page 1 of 1 Event
Description:
Close Main Generator Output Breaker Cue:
Orders for the Shift on turnover.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NOTE: This power level I/C will bring in several low level alarms in the feedwater Heaters. If sent as NPO, report in five minutes that the specific level control is working properly.
SRO Briefs and directs BOP to CLOSE 25F7, Main Generator Output Breaker per SOP-32, 345 KV Switchyard, step 7.1.2.
BOP Performs CREW UPDATE prior to closing 25F7.
BOP IF closing a generator breaker, THEN PERFORMS the following:
- 1. At Panel C-01, ENERGIZES Synchscope for breaker to be operated:
- 25F7, Generator Breaker.
- 2. WHEN correct synchronization is indicated, THEN OPERATES the breaker control switch to the CLOSE position.
- 3.
DE-ENERGIZES Synchscope.
- 4.
VISUALLY CHECKS ALL phases CLOSED.
ATC Provides PEER CHECK of 25F7 closure, if requested.
Simulator Operator:
When called to verify all 25F7 breaker phases CLOSED, report immediately that all phases are CLOSED.
Continue to Event 2.
Appendix D 2
Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2020 Scenario No.: NRC-4 Event No.: 2 Page 1 of 3 Event
Description:
Commence Power Escalation.
Cue:
Orders for the Shift on turnover Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO Performs power escalation evolution brief including roles, responsibilities. (should have been performed prior to entry into the simulator).
SRO Enters and directs the actions of GOP-5, Power Escalation in Mode
- 1.
SRO Reviews GOP-5 Precautions and Limitations with crew.
Note:
CRS may notify ENPM, BA, RP, and Chemistry of impending load change.
Reactivity brief may be conducted during their turnover, but they should summarize before they start using Cycle 27 Reactivity Management Briefing.
SRO Performs reactivity brief with crew.
BOP Selects ramp setter and rate (at 12% per hour), using SOP-8 0:
- PRESSES CONTROL SETPOINT on the Displays keypad.
- ENTERS Setter value on numeric keypad.
- PRESSES SELECT on the numeric keypad AND OBSERVES the following:
- HOLD displayed in the upper right corner of the CRT.
- HOLD light/pushbutton illuminates on the Manual Panel.
- PRESSES TAB RIGHT on the cursor keypad.
- ENTERS desired acceleration rate using numeric keypad.
- PRESSES SELECT on the numeric keypad.
Appendix D 3
Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2020 Scenario No.: NRC-4 Event No.: 2 Page 2 of 3 Event
Description:
Commence Power Escalation.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NOTE: Dilution is ~ 90gallons/% power.
ATC MAINTAINS TAVE within 3°F of TREF during the power escalation by regulating dilution and/or regulating rod withdrawal.
For Dilution (SOP-2A Att 11):
- ENSURES CLOSED CV-2155 M/U Stop.
- ENSURES one of the following in MANUAL AND the other in OFF.
- P-90A, PW M/U Pump.
- P-90B, PW M/U Pump.
- ENSURES RESET and in AUTO FIC-0210A, PW M/U flow.
- ENSURES ZERO output signal on FIC-0210A, PW M/U flow.
- SETS quantity and flow limit on FIC-0210A, PW M/U flow controller.
- OPENS CV-2155, M/U Stop.
- PUSHES start pushbutton on FIC-0210A.
- MONITORS Reactor Power and TAVG.
- WHEN dilution complete, THEN ENSURES FIC-0210A output signal at zero.
- CLOSES CV-2155.
- Uses Update to communicate start of Dilution.
For Control Rod manipulations:
ENSURES Mode Selector Switch in MS (Manual Sequential) position.
OPERATES Raise-Lower Switch to RAISE position to WITHDRAW Group 4 Regulating Rods in increments specified by CRS.
Reports to CRS when all rod motion has stopped.
MONITORS reactor power using highest indicated dT power and monitors TAVE.
- Requests peer check for all rod manipulations and BOP provides check.
Appendix D 4
Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2020 Scenario No.: NRC-4 Event No.: 2 Page 3 of 3 Event
Description:
Commence Power Escalation.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ATC Diverts, as needed, around the VCT due to rising VCT level from the dilution by:
Placing CV-2056 handswitch AMS-2056 to CWRT.
When completed, returns CV-2056 handswitch AMS-2056 to AUTO.
BOP Initiates load change (SOP-8 Att 10):
ENSURES Limiter setting will not interfere with desired change.
PERFORMS ONE of the following:
o PRESSES GO pushbutton on Manual Panel.
o PRESSES GO/HOLD custom key on Display keypad.
o PRESSES SELECT on numeric keypad, then PRESSES START on control keypad.
OBSERVES HOLD light extinguishes and GO light illuminates.
WHEN ramp is complete, THEN VERIFIES GO/HOLD light extinguished.
BOP Coordinates with ATC prior to placing the Turbine in GO.
UPDATES crew to inform that Turbine is inGO.
ATC Provides peer check BOP placing Turbine in GO, as requested.
NOTE: The next malfunction takes 5 minutes to present itself.
Continue to Event 3.
Appendix D 5
Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2020 Scenario No.: NRC-4 Event No.: 3 Page 1 of 2 Event
Description:
RIA-1810, East Eng Sfgd Rm Vent Rad Monitor, failure.
Cue:
EK-1371, Radiation Monitor System Ckt Failure.
RIA-1810 RANGE Light lit.
RIA-1810 FAIL Light lit.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Note: this event takes 5 minutes to present conditions to the operators.
At the Lead Examiners discretion, INSERT Trigger 1 during this event.
NOTE: SRO may direct HALTING the power escalation due to unexpected alarm.
ATC Secures PCS Dilution if still in progress.
UPDATES Crew on dilution status.
BOP Provides PEER CHECK for securing Dilution BOP Places Turbine in HOLD.
BOP Uses Update to communicate Turbine in HOLD.
ATC ATC peer checks BOP placing Turbine in HOLD, as requested.
ATC INFORMS the CRS of alarms:
EK-1371, Rad Monitor Sys Ckt Failure.
BOP COORDINATES with ATC on status of RIA-1810 and dispatches NPO/RP to investigate RIA-1810 locally.
SRO Reviews ARP for this condition.
Appendix D 6
Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2020 Scenario No.: NRC-4 Event No.: 3 Page 2 of 2 Event
Description:
RIA-1810, East Eng Sfgd Rm Vent Rad Monitor, failure.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP CHECKS RIA-1810 on Panel C-11 Rear and notes failure low condition:
RANGE light is LIT.
FAIL light is LIT.
Value =0.00E00 on monitor BOP Reports to CRS that RIA-1810 is failed Performs ARP-8 actions Refers to SOP-39 Attachment 1 and 2.
Reports ARP-8 actions as complete to the CRS.
SRO Enters and implements LCO 3.3.10 Cond A.1 and directs ATC to close East ESS Room Iso Dampers immediately.
ATC Take actions as directed by CRS from LCO 3.3.10 Cond A.1:
Obtains KEY #310 and position HS-1810A, East Es Room Isol Damper PO-1810, to CLOSE.
DIRECTS NPO to check status of remote damper PO-1817.
Simulator Operator:
If directed as NPO to check status of remote ventilation damper PO-1817, report in four minutes that it is closed. If requested report PO-1810 is also closed.
SRO Refers to ODCM. Action 5 of Table 1-1 specifies that if either channel fails low or is otherwise inoperable, the ventilation dampers associated with that channel shall be closed immediately and action shall be taken to have the affected channel repaired. (This is identical to action statement in LCO 3.3.10 Cond A.1.)
Continue with Event 4.
Appendix D 7
Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2020 Scenario No.: NRC-4 Event No.: 4 Page 1 of 2 Event
Description:
Loss of P-40A, Dilution Water Pump.
Cue:
P-40A Green Light Lit, Red Light Out at 152-102/CS.
P-40A amps indicate zero.
A Cooling Tower level lowering.
EK-3518, Dilution Wtr Pump P-40A Trip.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior At the Lead Examiners discretion, INSERT Trigger 2.
Note: Overflow of a Cooling tower can impact the NPDES Permit.
BOP Diagnoses the Loss of P-40A, Dilution Water Pump.:
Indications:
P-40A Green Light Lit, Red Light Out.
P-40A amps indicate zero.
A Cooling Tower level lowering.
Alarms:
EK-3518, Dilution Wtr Pump P-40A Trip.
ATC Dispatches NPOs to locally check P-40A and 152-102, P-40A Breaker.
Simulator Operator:
When directed as NPO to locally check P-40A, in two minutes report that P-40A motor is hot to the touch but there is no fire.
When directed to 152-102, P-40A breaker, in two minutes report that 152-102 has tripped on Overload.
BOP Updates Crew of NPO Report on P-40A and its breaker BOP Monitors Cooling Tower level:
Opens MO-5305, Cooling Tower P-39A Discharge Valve, to maintain Cooling Tower level.
Appendix D 8
Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2020 Scenario No.: NRC-4 Event No.: 4 Page 2 of 2 Event
Description:
Loss of P-40A, Dilution Water Pump.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP BOP addresses and performs ARP-24 actions and reports to CRS:
Monitors Cooling Tower level Throttles MO-5305, Cooling Tower Pump, P-39A Discharge Valve as necessary to maintain desired Cooling tower level.
Monitors Makeup Basin level Verifies no batch releases in progress Notifies RMC Supervisor OR Chemistry Lab Initiates investigation of Pump trip SRO Enters and implements LCO 3.4.9 Cond B, 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
SRO Briefs crew on plant status using placard.
Initiates troubleshooting and repairs.
Notifications and Reportability.
Sets Contingency actions if needed.
Continue with Event 5.
Appendix D 9
Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2020 Scenario No.: NRC-4 Event No.: 5 Page 1 of 2 Event
Description:
VCT Level Switch Failure.
Cue:
Heat Balance Power Transient (HBP) lowering.
VCT level rising on LIC-0205.
VCT pressure rising on PIA-0215.
MO-2087, Charging Pump Suction from VCT, closed indication.
MO-2160, Charging Pump Suction from SIRW, open indication.
EK-0710, Volume Control Tank Lo Lo Level.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior At the Lead Examiners discretion, INSERT Trigger 3.
ATC Diagnoses failure of VCT Level Switch.
Indications:
HBP Transient Lowering VCT level rising on LIC-0205.
VCT pressure rising on PIA-0215.
MO-2087, Charging Pump Suction from VCT, closed indication.
MO-2160, Charging Pump Suction from SIRW, open indication.
Alarms:
EK-0710, Volume Control Tank Lo Lo Level.
ATC Reviews ARP-4 actions and aligns with SRO SRO Reviews ARP-4 and directs actions.
ATC Secures Charging and Letdown per SOP-2A, Step 7.3.1.
Appendix D 10 Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2020 Scenario No.: NRC-4 Event No.: 5 Page 2 of 2 Event
Description:
VCT Level Switch Failure.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ATC Obtains PEER CHECK from BOP for switch manipulations ATC PLACES CV-2023, Ion Exchangers Bypass in BYPASS.
PLACES Charging Pumps Control Select Switch for P-55B and P-55C in MANUAL.
STOPS Charging Pump(s) AND IMMEDIATELY CLOSES Letdown Orifice Stop Valves by placing the following handswitches to CLOSE:
HS-2003, Letdown Orifice Valve Switch.
HS-2004, Letdown Orifice Valve Switch.
HS-2005, Letdown Orifice Valve Switch.
- OPERATES MV-CVC2086, VCT Drain Valve, as needed.
ATC MONITORS Reactor Power closely for TAVG changes due to the boric acid addition.
SRO Briefs crew on plant status using placard.
Initiates troubleshooting and repairs.
Notifications to the Duty Station Manager and I&C maintenance.
Contingency actions if needed.
SRO Include actions, as needed, to stabilize power with rod withdrawal, pending length of boration OR by load reduction.
Continue to Event 6
Appendix D 11 Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2020 Scenario No.: NRC-4 Event No.: 6 Page 1 of 2 Event
Description:
P-50D, Primary Coolant Pump, High Vibrations and Reactor Trip Cue:
Vibrations rising on VIA-141B, P-50D Vibration Monitor.
EK-0913, PCP Vib Alert / Mon Trouble.
EK-0914, PCP Vibration Danger.
Red lights LIT for Alert and Danger on VIA-141B.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior At the Lead Examiners discretion, INSERT Trigger 4.
ATC Diagnoses rising vibrations on P-50D.
Indications:
Vibrations rising on VIA-141B, P-50D Vibration Monitor.
Red lights LIT for Alert and Danger on VIA-141B.
Alarms:
EK-0913, PCP Vib Alert / Mon Trouble.
EK-0914, PCP Vibration Danger.
ATC Verifies vibrations rising on PCP, P-50D SRO Enters AOP-29, Primary Coolant Pump Abnormal Conditions Uses Update to announce AOP entry.
Direct AOP actions.
Updates Crew on Reactor Trip Criteria.
ATC BOP Monitors P-50D parameters for verification of vibration rising trend.
Determines P-50D bearing temperatures are rising on LTVR-0901, PCP Condition Monitor.
NOTE:
Reactor Trip criteria for PCP vibration is 29 mils or various setpoints on bearing temperatures.
Appendix D 12 Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2020 Scenario No.: NRC-4 Event No.: 6 Page 2 of 2 Event
Description:
P-50D, Primary Coolant Pump, High Vibrations and Reactor Trip.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO Directs Reactor Trip based on imminent PCP failure attributed to continuing rise in indicated vibration; verification of Reactivity Control and securing P-50D.
ATC TRIPS Reactor from RPS-PB1, Reactor Trip, pushbutton on C-02.
ATC/BOP Perform EOP-1.0 Immediate Actions.
ATC Verifies Reactivity Control:
Maximum of one full length Control Rod not fully inserted.
Reactor power lowering.
Negative SUR.
Positions 252-204CS, P-50D, control switch to TRIP and verifies P-50D has stopped.
Note for transition: Trigger 6, (Vapor Space LOCA) is automatically inserted when P-50D is tripped and Event 7 is entered.
Appendix D 13 Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2020 Scenario No.: NRC-4 Event No.: 7 Page 1 of 6 Event
Description:
Vapor Space LOCA.
Cue:
PZR pressure lowering.
EK-1373, SV and/or PORV Open Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Trigger 6 is Automatically inserted (after P-50D) is removed causing a ramped Vapor Space LOCA.
ATC Diagnoses PCS Vapor Space LOCA.
Indication:
PZR pressure lowering.
Alarm:
Updates Crew on these conditions.
Note: BOP will go to EC-11A Rear to silence alarm on PORV.
SRO Commences EOP-1.0 verbal verifications.
ATC Reactivity Control: (met)
Maximum of one full length Control Rod not fully inserted.
Reactor power lowering.
Negative SUR.
BOP Turbine trip criteria: (met)
- Main Turbine tripped.
- Generator disconnected from grid.
Appendix D 14 Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2020 Scenario No.: NRC-4 Event No.: 7 Page 2 of 6 Event
Description:
Vapor Space LOCA.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NOTE: Event 8 is a Loss of Offsite Power and will automatically be inserted 10 minutes after the Reactor Trip. It is expected to occur sometime during EOP-1.0 Verbal Verifications. The steps for this event are provided immediately after the verbal verification pages.
BOP Feedwater System criteria: (met)
PLACES MFP Individual Speed Controllers to MANUAL and RAMPS to minimum speed.
ENSURES Main Feed Regulating and Bypass Feed Regulating Valves are CLOSED.
BOP Vital Auxiliaries-Electric: (met)
Buses 1C and 1D energized.
Bus 1E energized (If SIAS is not actuated).
Bus 1A and 1B energized.
EY-01 energized.
Six DC Buses energized.
- Main Feed Pump Trip Power available lights LIT.
- AFW Pump control power lights LIT.
ATC VERIFY adequate PCP seal cooling: (met)
At least one CCW Pump operating.
At least one SW Pump operating.
Both Critical SW headers in operation with pressure > 42 psig.
CCW Containment Isol Valves open, CV-0910 / 0911 / 0940.
ATC PCS Inventory Control: (not met)
PZR level 20% - 85% and trending toward normal (42% - 57%).
PCS 25°F subcooled (use Thot for forced circulation).
Ensures ALL charging pumps are in operation:
- Manually starts P-55A.
- Manually starts P-55B and/or P-55C if not set up for auto start.
Appendix D 15 Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2020 Scenario No.: NRC-4 Event No.: 7 Page 3 of 6 Event Description Vapor Space LOCA.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CRITICAL TASK: Secures PCP as needed to establish one PCP operating in each loop within 3 minutes of PCS pressure lowering to less than 1300 psia.
NOTE: Diesel Generators could start on the SIAS actuation pending the starting currents and bus voltages.
ATC PCS Pressure Control: (not met)
PZR pressure 1650 to 2185 psia and trending toward normal (2010 to 2100 psia).
- VERIFY PZR spray valves closed and all PZR heaters are ON (trip off on low PZR level).
- When PZR pressure is < 1605 psia, verify SIAS initiated:
- Verify EK-1342, Safety Injection Initiate, in alarm.
- When PZR pressure is < 1300 psia, stop P-50A, PCP.
CRITICAL TASK: Remove all PCPs from operation when conditions do not support their operation. - Trip ALL PCPs within 10 minutes of exceeding the operating limits curve, EOP Supplement 1.
ATC Core Heat Removal (not met)
At least one PCP operating.
Verify Loop T less than 10°F.
Verify PCS at least 25°F subcooled.
Trips the remaining PCPs when EOP Supplement 1 parameters are exceeded for PCP operation..
Verify at least one S/G has narrow range level between 5% -
70% and Feedwater is available.
Verify S/G are intact.
Verify TAVE between 525°F - 540°F.
Verify BOTH S/G pressures between 800-970 psia.
Appendix D 16 Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2020 Scenario No.: NRC-4 Event No.: 7 Page 4 of 6 Event Description Vapor Space LOCA.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ATC Containment Isolation: (not met IF T-73, Quench Tank rupture disc has ruptured.)
Containment pressure < 0.85 psig.
- When Containment pressure > 4.0 psig:
- VERIFY EK-1126, CIS Initiated, in alarm.
- ENSURE CLOSED: Both MSIVs (CV-0510 and CV-0501);
Main Feed Regulating Valves (CV-0701 and CV-0703);
Bypass Feed Regulating Valves (CV-0735 and CV-0734)
CCW Isolation Valves (CV-0940, CV-0911 and CV-0910).
- ENSURE EK-1342, Safety Injection Initiated, OR PUSH High Radiation Initiate pushbuttons on Panel EC-13.
BOP Containment Isolation: (not met if T-73, Quench Tank, rupture disk has ruptured).
Verify Containment Area Monitor alarms clear and not rising.
- IF any two Cntmt Area Monitors are in Trip 2 status,, then ENSURE ACTUATED CIS.
Verify Condenser Off Gas Monitor alarm clear and not rising.
Verify Main Steam Line Monitor alarms clear and not rising.
ATC Verify Containment Atmosphere: (pending timing if met)
Containment temperature < 125 oF.
- ENSURE OPERATING all available Containment Air Cooler fans:
- V-1A and V-1B, V-2A and V-2B, V-3A and V-3B, V-4A and V-4B.
- ENSURE OPEN Containment Air Cooler high capacity outlet valves as SW System capacity permits:
- CV-0867, CV-0861, CV-0864, CV-0873 When Containment pressure > 4.0 psig:
o ENSURE OPERATING all available Containment Air Cooler A fans.
o ENSURE OPEN all available Containment Spray Valves.
o ENSURE OPERATING all available Containment Spray pumps.
o ENSURE at least minimal acceptable flow (1 pump - 1425 gpm, > 2 pumps 2850 gpm.
Appendix D 17 Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2020 Scenario No.: NRC-4 Event No.: 7 Page 5 of 6 Event Description Vapor Space LOCA.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ATC VERIFY Instrument Air pressure > 85 psig. If Loss of Offsite AC has occurred an air compressor must be manually started.
BOP ENSURE CR HVAC is aligned for Emergency Mode Operation within 20 minutes of the time of the Reactor Trip.
VERIFY Supply Fan V-95 or V-96 for desired train is ON.
ENSURE Air Filter Unit Fan V-26A or V-26B for desired train is ON.
ENSURE OFF V-94 Purge Fan and V-47 Swgr Exh Fan.
BOP VERIFY at least one Condensate Pump and one Cooling Tower Pump operating.
BOP VERIFY MSIVs are open OR MSIV Bypass valves are open, unless CHP has been received.
Trip both Main Feedwater Pumps.
Appendix D 18 Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2020 Scenario No.: NRC-4 Event No.: 7 Page 6 of 6 Event Description Vapor Space LOCA.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO Commences EOP Supplement 45, SFP Monitoring.
SRO Diagnoses LOCA using EOP-1.0 Attachment 1 Event Diagnostic Flow Chart and transition to EOP-4.0.
SRO Conducts Transition Brief per Placard. Solicits input from Crew ATC/BOP Confirms Vapor Space LOCA:
Pressurizer level rising.
Pressurizer pressure lowering.
PCS subcooling lowering.
SRO Enters and directs actions of EOP-4.0.
Appendix D 19 Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2020 Scenario No.: NRC-4 Event No.: 8, 9, 10, 11 Page 1 of 4 Event Description Vapor Space LOCA with Loss of Offsite AC Power requiring action to restore EDG, charging pumps and CACs.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Loss of Offsite Power will automatically be inserted 10 minutes after the Reactor Trip via Trigger 5.
NOTE: This event has the following due to the Loss of Offsite Power:
- EDG 1-1 will not start automatically (Malfunction)
- EDG 1-2 Starts but does NOT close in on Bus 1D automatically (Malfunction).
- Charging Pump, P55B must be started manually (design and previous events)
- V-2A does not automatically restart on EDG (Malfunction)
- V-1A does not automatically restart on EDG (Malfunction)
ATC/BOP Recognizes a Loss of Offsite Power has occurred:
Numerous alarms.
Control Room lights out.
No charging flow (Charging pumps tripped).
No Instrument Air compressors operating CRITICAL TASK: Energize Bus 1C OR 1D within 60 minutes BOP Diagnoses Buses 1C and 1D are NOT energized.
Manually STARTS EDG 1-1 by positioning G1-1/CS, Engine Control, switch at C-04 to START.
Verifies 152-107, EDG 1-1 Output Breaker, is CLOSED.
Verifies Bus 1C is energized.
Manually closes 152-213, EDG 1-2 Output Breaker.
Updates crew before and after actions on EDGs ATC Coordinates with BOP prior to energizing loads on the EDGs Starts P-55B, Charging Pump, due to event in progress and the pump is NOT running.
ATC Starts an Instrument Air Compressor while monitoring EDG loading.
Appendix D 20 Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2020 Scenario No.: NRC-4 Event No.: 8, 9, 10, 11 Page 2 of 4 Event Description Vapor Space LOCA with Loss of Offsite AC Power requiring action to restore EDG, charging pumps and CACs.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO Initiates Safety Function Status Checks for EOP-4.0 and are satisfied at intervals of approximately fifteen minutes.
SRO Directs SM to refer to the Site Emergency Plan.
SRO Establishes Bands for EOP-4.0 strategy.
ATC Implements bands and EOP-4.0 strategy.
SRO Verifies SIAS and directs the following:
EOP Supplement 5.
EOP Supplement 4.
Either directs BOP to report equipment out of position OR directs repositioning to EOP Supp 5.
BOP Checks adequate EDG loading is available prior to starting loads.
Simulator Operator:
When requested by NCO, wait eight minutes and report CV-0944 and CV-0977B are closed.
BOP Performs EOP Supplement 5, Checklist for Safeguards Equipment Following SIAS:
BOP Performs EOP Supplement 4, HPSI and LPSI Flow Curves.
ATC Ensures Letdown is isolated by positioning Letdown Orifice Stop Valve handswitches to CLOSE. (Should have been done in Event
- 5)
HS 2003 SRO Reviews the status of Pressurizer Heaters.
ATC CLOSES CWRT Vent Valves, CV-1064 and CV-1065.
Appendix D 21 Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2020 Scenario No.: NRC-4 Event No.: 8, 9, 10, 11 Page 3 of 4 Event Description Vapor Space LOCA with Loss of Offsite AC Power requiring action to restore EDG, charging pumps and CACs.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ATC Ensures the following valves are CLOSED for LOCA isolation:
Letdown Stop valves, CV-2001, CV-2009.
PCS Sample Valves, CV-1910, CV-1911.
Reactor Vessel and PZR Vent Valves, PRV-1067, PRV-1068, PRV-1069, PRV-1070.
SRO Verifies PCS leak is NOT into CCW:
RIA-0915, CCW Radiation Monitor, alarm clear.
EK-1172, CCW Surge Tank HI Lo Level, alarm clear.
BOP Places Hydrogen Monitor in operation in the ACCI position per SOP-38.
BOP Informs SRO that Hydrogen Monitor is in service and gives time when placed into service.
ATC If Containment pressure > 4.0 psig OR Any operable Containment Radiation Monitor rises to 1 x 101 R/hr, VERIFIES EK-1126, CIS Initiated, in alarm (should not reach this threshold).
ATC IF Containment pressure > 4.0 psig, VERIFIES Containment Spray alignment and at least minimal spray flow (should not reach this threshold).
BOP All will be off when the loss of Offsite AC occurs.
VERIFIES at least one Cooling Tower Pump operating.
VERIFIES at least one Condensate Pump operating.
Appendix D 22 Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2020 Scenario No.: NRC-4 Event No.: 8, 9, 10, 11 Page 4 of 4 Event Description Vapor Space LOCA with Loss of Offsite AC Power requiring action to restore EDG, charging pumps and CACs.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP VERIFIES one train of CR HVAC operating in Emergency Mode per SOP-24 ATC Commences Emergency Boration per SOP-2A Att 12 to establish PCS boron concentration greater than or equal to boron needed for Tave > 525°F as verified by sample or hand calculation per EOP Supplement 35.
ATC COMMENCES steaming S/Gs to initiate PCS cooldown.
REFERS to:
EOP Supplement 1 Pressure Temperature Limit Curves. EOP Supplement 33 PCS Heatup/Cooldown Rate Data.
When PCS cooldown is in progress OR at discretion of the Lead Examiner, TERMINATE SCENARIO.
Appendix D 23 Form ES-D-2 CRITICAL TASKS HR-CT17-PCP T2L2 (Implement PCP Trip 2/Leave 2 (T2/L2) Strategy)
With the plant operating in MODES 1, 2, or 3 and:
A LOCA is in progress SIAS has actuated Pressurizer pressure has dropped below 1300 psia (t=0)
At least three PCPs are operating the crew secures PCPs as needed to establish one PCP operating in each loop within 3 minutes of PCS pressure lowering to less than 1300 psia.
MVAAC-CT03-EOP1DG (Energize 1C or 1D bus (2400 VAC) from its associated EDG during EOP-1)
With the plant operating in MODE 3 and EOP-1.0 in progress and:
- BOTH the 1C and 1D 2400 VAC busses are de-energized
- The associated bus D/G did NOT auto start or load on bus low voltage; however either D/G is available to be manually started OR have its output breaker closed the crew takes action to ensure at least one 2400 VAC bus (C or D) is energized from its associated D/G within 60 minutes.
HR-CT23-PCPTrip (Trip Primary Coolant Pump)
With the plant operating in MODES 1, 2, or 3 and:
SIAS is actuated PCS subcooling is less than 25°F (t=0) or PCS is operating less than the minimum PT curve for PCP operation (t=0)
At least one PCP is operating OR In service PCP in distress by indicating high vibrations or seal temperatures (t=0) the crew secures effected PCPs within ten minutes:
once the PCS is less than 25°F subcooled if the in use EOP is 4.0, 5.0, 6.0 or 9.0 OR once the PCS is less than the minimum PT curve if the in use EOP is 1.0 OR PCPs are demonstrating distress via high vibration alarms or high seal temperature alarms