Text

2020 Palisades Ile Proposed Scenarios
	ML20267A349
Person / Time
Site:	Palisades
Issue date:	07/06/2020
From:	; Entergy Nuclear Operations
To:	; NRC/RGN-III/DRS/OLB
	Bergeon B
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ML19213A184	List: ML20267A310; ML20267A321; ML20267A332; ML20267A334; ML20267A343; ML20267A344; ML20267A349; ML20267A352; ML20267A356; ML20267A359; PNP 2020-003, 2020 Palisades Ile Proposed Exam Submittal Letter;
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Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: __Palisades Nuclear Plant Scenario No.: NRC-1 Op-Test No.: NRC-2020 Examiners: ___________________________ Operators: ____________________________

Initial Conditions: The plant is at 100% power, middle of core life. P-66B, High Pressure Safety Injection Pump, is removed from service for motor replacement. The CVCS is in single letdown and charging. The Main Feedwater Pump Combined Speed Controller is in manual for I&C testing of the controller.

Turnover: Shift orders are to return the Main Feedwater Pump Combined Speed Controller to the Cascade Mode per SOP-12.

Critical Tasks:

1. Manually Start P-66A, HPSI before (CET) subcooling indicating less than zero degrees subcooling.

2. Trip 2 Leave 2 PCP strategy - Trip 2 PCPs in less than 3 minutes after reaching 1300 psia in the PCS.

3. Remove all PCPs from operation when conditions do not support their operation. - Trip ALL PCPs within 10 minutes of a CIS or outside operating curve.

4. Initiate Containment Spray before containment pressure exceeds 60 psia, or containment temperature exceeds 145°F.

Event Malf. No. Event Type* Event No. Description 1 N/A BOP (N) Return MFP Combined Speed Controller to Cascade 2 RX11A BOP (I/C) Feed Reg valve erratic operation. SG manual control available.

3 RP23B ATC (I/C) THOT #2 RTD Fails to 100%- requiring ATC and BOP actions BOP (I/C)

SRO (TS) 4 CV06 ATC (I/C) CVCS Backpressure regulator fails closed with failure of RV-CV18 SRO (TS) 2006 to seat.

5 FW163 BOP (N) Moisture Separator Drain Tank Outlet Valve, CV-0608, HDP ATC (R) outlet valve fails open. Requires a rapid power reduction SRO (N) before the Heater Drain Pumps trip.

6 RC03 ALL (M) 100 gpm LOCA inside of Containment. Requires manual RC04 ATC(I/C) reactor trip. LOCA raises to 500 gpm on the trip. Failure of SI09B A HPSI Pump to auto start - manual start available 7 RC04 ATC (I/C) Trip2 Leave 2 and LOCA raises to 1100gpm 8 SI16A ATC (I/C) Failure of P-54A, Containment Spray Pump; SI16B AND Failure of P-54B, C to auto start - manual start SI16C available

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC-1 Summary The crew takes the shift at 100% power and the BOP places the Main Feed Pump Combined Speed Controller in to the CASCADE mode of operation.

The auto control of the A S/G Feed Reg Valve becomes erratic causing a cyclic over feeding/under feeding of the A S/G. The BOP will take MANUAL Control of the valve to control A SG level.

The ATC will respond to a failed PCS Thot RTD. Controlling channels will need to be re-selected. The BOP will BYPASS VHP and TM/LP Trips in RPS. The SRO will make Tech Spec and ORM determinations.

The ATC will respond to a failure of the Letdown Intermediate Pressure Controller that results in the lifting of a relief valve to the Quench Tank. The ATC will control letdown intermediate pressure manually, but the relief fails to fully seat. A leak rate determination will be performed.

Charging and Letdown will be manually removed to isolate the leak. The SRO will apply Tech Specs.

The BOP will respond to a failure of the Moisture Separator Drain Tank outlet valve that affects Main Feed Pump Suction Pressure. The crew will perform a rapid power reduction to stabilize tank level and suction pressure. The ATC will manipulate Control Rods to match Tave with Tref. The BOP will manually control A SG level and the Main Turbine. The SRO will monitor for Tech Spec LCO entry on Control Rods (PDIL).

A small break LOCA starts at approximately 100 gpm and leads the crew into a manual reactor trip. When the reactor trips, the magnitude of the LOCA will be adjusted such that PCS Pressure will lower to the point that the Trip 2 / leave 2 strategy for PCP operation applies. After TWO PCPs are tripped, the LOCA ramps to 1100 gpm over 5 minutes. One HPSI pump must be manually started, and Containment Spray must be established on at least one train as a result of the LOCA and post trip equipment failures. Required SI flow must be established before minimum subcooling is reached. PCPs must be stopped for small break LOCA concerns, and / or for conditions that do not allow continued operation (CIS which isolates CCW to the PCPs).

The scenario ends when a PCS Cooldown is in progress or at the Lead Examiners discretion.

Bean Count:

ATC: 1R, 2I/C, 1M, 2I/C post trip BOP: 2N, 2I/C, 1M SRO: 2N, 2TS, 1M

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC-1 Simulator Instructions

Initialize Simulator Protected IC-112 OR

Initialize IC for desired power level and Load NRC-1 Scenario Schedule and Event Triggers form jump drive.

Validate Malfunctions, Remotes and Overrides from Table below.

Event # Remote or Instructions Trigger #

N/A Active SI24 (SI02), Rackout HP Pump 66B Malfunction N/A Active SI09A (SI02), P-66A Failure to Auto Start Malfunction N/A Active SI16A (SI03), P-54A Failure to Auto Start Malfunction N/A Active SI16B (SI03), P-54B Failure to Auto Start Malfunction N/A Active SI16C (SI03), P-54C Failure to Auto Start Malfunction N/A Initial MFP Combined Speed Controller to Manual with an error signal on Alignment input (77.3) 1 N/A Normal Ops- Return MFP Combined Speed Controller to Cascade.

2 1 RX11A (RX02), FRV Erratic operation FRV CV-0701= ACTIVE 3 2 RP23B (RPN1), Hot Leg No 1 RTD Fail TE-0122H-B Final Value=100.

4 3 CV06 (CV03), Loss of Letdown Pres Control Low CV18 (CV03), Letdown Relief Valve RV-2006 Leakage, Final Value =3. Automatically Inserted from Trigger 11, zdi2p(23),

Letdown Pressure Controller placed in manual.

5 4 FW163 (FW02), Failure of CV-0608, Final Value=100.

FW109 goes to 32% when T-5 level reaches low alarm setpoint (50%) via Trigger 10, zao3f(7)<=0.5 over one minute.

5 Emergency Downpower 6 5 RC03 (RC01), Small Coolant Leak Final Value=100. Operators will manually trip the reactor.

6 6 RC04 (RC01), Primary Coolant Sys Leak into Containment, Final Value=50 is automatically inserted on Trigger 6 from reactor trip 6 12/13 RC04 (RC01), Primary Coolant Sys Leak into Containment, Final Value=100 is automatically inserted on Trigger 12 OR Trigger 13 OR Trigger 14 OR Trigger 15 from the operator action of performing the trip 2 leave 2 PCP strategy.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 TRIGGERS

Description Reason 5 SD Group A Rod 1<100 Inserts RC03=100 if crew trips earlier than expected.

6 SD Group A Rod 1<100 Inserts RC04=50 on Reactor Trip.

10 T-5 level <50% Allows rate of lowering in T-5 to be decreased.

11 zdi2p(23) Inserts RV-2006 Leakage when PIC-202 is placed into Manual.

12 zlo2p(93) Raises PCS Leak (RC04=100) when P-50A is tripped (Green Light Lit).

13 zlo2p(96) Raises PCS Leak (RC04=100) when P-50B is tripped (Green Light Lit).

14 zlo2p(99) Raises PCS Leak (RC04=100) when P-50C is tripped (Green Light Lit).

15 zlo2p(102) Raises PCS Leak (RC04=100) when P-50D is tripped (Green Light Lit).

Special Instructions:

Caution tag on P-66B, HPSI Pump, 152-113 CS.

Protected Train tags by 152-207/CS, P-66A control switch.

Set Phoenix up with P-66B out of service and calculate risk.

Single Charging and Letdown.

Place the MFP Combined Speed Control into manual and bump controller to provide an error signal (PV from 76.7 to 77.3) and allow to stabilize.

Post Bands Placard with S/G-MFP Delta Pressure at 160 psid to 210 psid with target of 180 psid.

Handouts:

Ensure SOP-12, Feedwater System available at briefing site. Step 7.6.4c.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC-1 Student Turnover INITIAL PROCEDURE AND STEP Chemistry 2231 ENPM 914-272-3459 CRDM leakage:

Protected Equipment 0 ml/min. Duty Station Reactor 152-207/CS HPSI P-66A Control 3688 2497 Charging Pump Seal leakage: Manager Engineering Switch P-55A = 0 ml/min, P-55B/C = 0 152-207 P-66A Breaker Electrical 2446 Security 2264/2278 ml/min. P-66A HI Press Safety Shop Zinc Injection: Inject Pump Engineer on MECS 2438 248-380-2931 Call Balancing 0 ml/min.

CRITICAL PARAMETER Health Trans Sys T-90, PMWT Temperature: 2230 248-380-2901 S/G-MFP DP Control Band of 160 Physics Coord 85 degrees F. psid-210 psid with target of 180 psid Instrument Work Control 2247 2282

& Control Center Work Week Bret Baker 2332 3500 Manager Boron: 938ppm Weather: Sunny. ACTIVITY: PER PPC OFFGAS: 7.2 SCFM Power History over the last 24 Surveillances Completed Last PLANNED ACTIVITIES hours Shift Availability/Restoration of P-66B in 10 hours1.157407e-4 days 0.00278 hours 1.653439e-5 weeks 3.805e-6 months Restore HIC-0525 to CASCADE (SOP-12, Step 7.6.4c) 100% Steady State N/A Three 40 gallon dilutions/shift PHOENIX SCORE: 2.7 INTEGRATED RISK: HIGH EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS/OOS ACTION TIME Compensatory Actions/ Notes

MFP Combined Speed 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months into action 3.5.2.B None.

Controller in Manual for I&C

P-66B Tagged out for motor replacement

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC-2020 Scenario No.: NRC-1 Event No.: 1 Page 1 of 1 Event

Description:

Return MFP Combined Speed Controller to Cascade Cue:

From Turnover Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP Refers to SOP-12, Step 7.6.4.c.

BOP Determines that HIC-0525, Feedwater Control Mode Selector is not nulled out and must be adjusted to place in Cascade Mode.

BOP LOWERS HIC-0525, Feedwater Control Mode Selector, signal using the manual output button to match signals.

BOP WHEN the setpoint and process signals are matched within 0.5%

AND PF light is flashing, THEN PUSHES AUTO pushbutton on HIC 0525, Feedwater Control Mode Selector, to place in CASCADE.

SRO Provides Oversight for the Feedwater control manipulations and monitors Heat Balance Power on the PPC.

ATC Monitors Heat Balance Power on the PPC during the evolution as well as Core monitoring/ATC duties.

BOP Monitors Main Feedwater System parameters for stability.

SRO Once verified stable, removes CRITICAL PARAMETER and band requirements.

Continue to Event 2

Appendix D 2 Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC-2020 Scenario No.: NRC-1 Event No.: 2 Page 1 of 2 Event

Description:

Erratic A S/G Feedwater Valve Operation Cue:

Heat Balance Power Transient cycling

A S/G level cycling

CV-0701 position indication cycling Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior At the Lead Examiners discretion, INSERT Trigger 1.

NOTE: Heat Balance Power Transient is not stable from event one.

CREW Identifies a change in Heat Balance Power Transient.

BOP Identifies Main Feedwater perturbation and makes crew UPDATE.

Indications:

Heat Balance Power Transient cycling

A S/G level cycling

CV-0701 position indication cycling SRO Enters AOP-3, Main Feedwater Transients and provides UPDATE.

SRO Reviews Reactor Trip Criteria with crew with UPDATE.

SRO Diagnoses A Feed Reg Valve affected more than B Feed Reg Valve.

SRO Directs Main Feed Reg Valve, CV-0701 be placed in Manual.

BOP Places CV-0701 in Manual and adjusts to maintain S/G level.

SRO Directs a band for operating with controller in Manual. 65% target with band inclusive of current level and assigns CRITICAL PARAMETER A S/G level to BOP.

Appendix D 3 Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC-2020 Scenario No.: NRC-1 Event No.: 2 Page 2 of 2 Event

Description:

Erratic A S/G Feedwater Valve Operation Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO Calls Duty Station Manager to activate support personnel for the condition.

ATC Monitors Feedwater parameters and Containment parameters.

ATC Contacts NPO to locally investigate CV-0701 operation.

Simulator Operator:

When sent to CV-0701 respond that the valve is cycling if it not in Manual control and steady if it is Manual control.

If asked to monitor CV-0703 report that it is steady.

Report no other abnormalities can be found.

ATC Provides Feedwater trends to the BOP from observation of the PPC parameters.

SRO Briefs crew per Transient Brief, EN-OP-200, Attachment 1.

SRO Directs Shift Engineer to update Phoenix and initiate a Condition Report for the failure.

Continue to Event 3

Appendix D 4 Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC-2020 Scenario No.: NRC-1 Event No.: 3 Page 1 of 3 Event

Description:

THOT #2 Fails to 100%.

Cue:

THOT panel indication failed high

Many alarms including EK-0772, Loop 2 Hot Leg Hi temp Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior At the Lead Examiners discretion, INSERT Trigger 2.

SRO Enters Transient Alarm Response using CREW UPDATE.

ATC Diagnoses failure of THOT.

Indications:

THOT panel indication failed high Alarms:

EK-0772, Loop 2 Hot Leg Hi temp

EK-0924, Group 1 Power Dependent Insertion Limit

EK-0967, Loop1 /Loop2 TAVG Deviation

EK-0969, Loop2 TREF/TAVE Gross Deviation

Rack A K-0601, Variable High Power Level Ch Trip

Rack A K-0605, Variable High Power Level CH. Pre-Trip

Rack A K-0606, High Power Rate Ch. Pre-Trip ASI

Rack C K-0601, TM/LO Pressure Ch. Trip

Rack C K-0605, TM/LO Pressure Ch. Pre-trip

Rack D-K-0604, Nuclear dT Power Dev. Inlet Off-Normal/Calculator Trouble Channel B ATC

Checks ARP-4, ARP-5 and ARP-21 for alarms present:

References SOP-1A, Att 1 for PCS temperature Instrumentation functions.

Checks Delta-T Power for PIP Node and SPI Node/Host Computer on a workstation and compare to actual heat balance power SRO Enters and directs actions of AOP-27, TAVG/TREF Controller Failure and provides CREW UPDATE.

Appendix D 5 Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC-2020 Scenario No.: NRC-1 Event No.: 3 Page 2 of 3 Event

Description:

THOT #2 Fails to 100%.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO

Verifies a valid TAVE Signal is available.

Directs SS-TAVE, T-AVE Selector Switch to the channel with a valid TAVE signal

Determines PDIL Alarm inoperable for PIP.

Verifies POWER_PIP_DELTA_T is within 4% of actual Reactor Power

Verifies POWER_SPI_DELTA T is within 4 of actual Reactor Power ATC Places SS-TAVE, T-AVE Selector Switch to the Loop 1 position and verifies input back to ~560 oF.

BOP Identifies TI-0122HB has failed and uses CREW UPDATE.

(TIA-0121H in alarm due to this failure).

BOP Maintains Main Feedwater control in Manual OR turns this task over to the ATC while addressing this event.

BOP Bypasses TMLP Trips per SOP- 36 Section 7.4.2 for

KS-RPS-AW5#1 (key #289) Hi Power trip

KS-RPS-AW5 #9 (key #297) TM/LO PRS Trip Performs the following to bypass each TMLP trip:

ENSURE the RPS Bypass Key is the correct key for the RPS Trip

INSERT bypass key above affected RPS Trip Unit

TURN key 90 deg clockwise

VERIFY the yellow light above the bypass keyswitch is ON

RECORD the evolution in the Ops Log as necessary.

Appendix D 6 Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC-2020 Scenario No.: NRC-1 Event No.: 3 Page 3 of 3 Event

Description:

THOT #2 Fails to 100%.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO Refers to and implements the following Tech Spec LCOs:

3.3.1. Cond A (Table 3.3.1-1 Items 1 and 9), 7 day action statement Refers to and implements the following ORM LCOs as necessary:

ORM 3.17.6 (Item 12.1), Prior to next Mode 1 entry from Mode 2 ORM 3.17.6 (Item 16), Prior to next Mode 4 entry from Mode 5 SRO

Briefs crew using Transient Brief, EN-OP-200, Att 1.

Calls Duty Station Manager for troubleshooting and repairs.

Continue to Event 4

Appendix D 7 Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC-2020 Scenario No.: NRC-1 Event No.:4 Page 1 of 3 Event

Description:

CVCS Backpressure regulator Failure with failure of RV to Seat Cue:

PIC-0202, Pressure Control Intr Press Letdown CV-2012 or CV-2122 fail light lit

Letdown pressure on PIC-0202 rising

EK-0702, Relief Valve2006 Disch Hi Temp

EK-0704, Letdown Ht Ex Tube Inlet Hi-Lo Press Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior At the Lead Examiners discretion, INSERT Trigger 3.

ATC Diagnoses failure of CVCS Backpressure Regulator.

Indications:

PIC-0202, Pressure Control Intr Press Letdown CV-2012 or CV-2122 fail light lit

Letdown pressure on PIC-0202 rising Alarms:

EK-0702, Relief Valve2006 Disch Hi Temp

EK-0704, Letdown Ht Ex Tube Inlet Hi-Lo Press ATC Takes manual control of PIC-0202 and returns letdown system to pre-event pressure.

Depresses the M on PIC-0202

Moves the slide bar to the right to re-open the Control Valve.

SRO Provides the following:

Reviews ARP actions

Direction to take Manual control

System parametric bands (450 psi-470 psi, target 460 psi)

Monitors T-73, Quench Tank Level

Assigns CRITICAL PARAMETER to ATC on backpressure control target 460 psig and encompassing current pressure.

ATC Places Control Switches CV-2004 and CV-2005, Letdown Orifice Stop Valves in the closed position per ARP EK-0702.

BOP Provides the following:

Monitors Quench Tank level

Maintains feedwater within bands with controller in Manual.

Appendix D 8 Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC-2020 Scenario No.: NRC-1 Event No.4: Page 2 of 3 Event

Description:

CVCS Backpressure regulator Failure with failure of RV to Seat Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Malfunction of RV (failure to seat) is automatically inserted when the ATC takes PIC-0202 to manual via Trigger 11.

ATC Diagnoses RV-2006 has not fully seated.

Indications:

Quench Tank, T=73, Level and pressure slowly rising SRO Directs Shift Manager to review EI-1 for Emergency Plan applicability.

SRO Enters AOP-23, Primary Coolant Leak and directs a PCS leakrate Determination be performed per Attachment 1 and provides CREW UPDATE.

ATC Performs a PCS Leakrate calculation as directed.

Determines PCS leakage is between 3 gpm-5 gpm.

SRO Implements AOP steps:

VERIFY PCS leak rate within Technical Specifications LCO 3.4.13, "Primary Coolant System," limits.

Directs Clean Waste Receiver Tank vents closed.

Implements Attachment 2, Conserving PCS Inventory.

BOP Ensures Closed the following valves:

CV-1064, Clean Waste Receiver Tank Vent

CV-1065, Clean Waste Receiver Tank Vent

CV-1910, PCS Sample Isolation

CV-1911, PCS Sample Isolation

Appendix D 9 Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC-2020 Scenario No.: NRC-1 Event No.:4 Page 3 of 3 Event

Description:

CVCS Backpressure regulator Failure with failure of RV to Seat Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ATC Isolates letdown as follows:

Close Letdown Orifice Stop Valves CV-2003 CV-2004 CV-2005 By taking H/S to close

Close CV-2009, Letdown Containment Isolation Valve

Stop P-55A, Charging Pump

Monitors T-73, Quench Tank Level ATC Determines that PCS leakage has been isolated.

SRO Directs a new PCS Leakrate Determination be initiated.

SRO

Briefs crew per Transient Brief, EN-OP-200, Att 1.

Calls Duty Station Manger for troubleshooting and repairs.

Notifies Chemistry of removal of Charging and Letdown Continue to Event 5

Appendix D 10 Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC-2020 Scenario No.: NRC-1 Event No.:5 Page 1 of 4 Event

Description:

Moisture Separator Drain Tank (T-5) Outlet Failure causing need for Rapid Power Reduction Cue:

Heat Balance Power Rising

Lowering HDT, T-5 level

EK-0172, Moist Sep Drain Tank Hi-Lo Level Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior At the Lead Examiners discretion, INSERT Trigger 4.

NOTE: a 100%/hr downpower must be started before T-5 reaches 30% or Heater Drain Pump, P-10B will trip before 90% power can be reached. (~23 minutes without any action)

ATC/BOP Diagnoses a failure of Moister Separator Drain Tank Controlling System Indications:

Heat Balance Power Transient rising

Lowering HDT, T-5 level Alarm:

EK-0172, Moist Sep Drain Tank Hi-Lo Level (In ~3 min)

SRO IF low level, THEN:

CHECKS CV-0608, Moisture Separator Drain Tank T-5 Level Control, for proper operation.

IF CV-0608 is malfunctioning, THEN REFERS TO SOP-10, Section titled "CV-0608, T-5 Level Control."

CHECKs CV-0609, Moisture Sep Drn Tk T-5 Dump to Condenser, for proper orientation.

IF CV-0609 is malfunctioning, THEN:

BYPASSES affected valve.

ISOLATES affected valve.

IF the potential to lose a P-10, Heater Drain Pump exists, THEN REFERS TO AOP-7 AND REDUCE power to less than 90%.

ATC Dispatches NPO to T-5 to report on status of CV-0608, Moisture Separator Drain Tank Level Control

Appendix D 11 Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC-2020 Scenario No.: NRC-1 Event No.:5 Page 2 of 4 Event

Description:

Moisture Separator Drain Tank (T-5) Outlet Failure causing need for Rapid Power Reduction Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator:

When sent to CV-0608 respond that the valve is full open.

When asked to throttle

MV-HED165, T-5 Level Control CV-0608 Bypass,

MV-HED164, T-5 Level Control CV-0608 Inlet.

MV-HED166, T-5 Level Control CV-0608 Outlet.

report back in two minutes that you cannot get any of them to move.

If sent to CV-0609, Moist Sep Drn Tk T-5 Dump to Condenser, report in one minute that it is closed.

SRO Enters and directs the actions of AOP-7, Rapid Power reduction

Provides CREW UPDATE for trip criteria of AOP-7.

Assigns BOP CRITICAL PARAMETER for T-5 level.

NOTE:

P-10A, Heater Drain Pump, is tripped at 12.8% level in T-5

P-10B, Heater Drain Pump, is tripped at 22.5% level in T-5.

Any operating Main Feedwater Pump trips >80% power requires a manual reactor trip SRO/ATC/BOP Initiates a rapid power reduction to stabilize below 90% power at a rate of > 30% per hour and < 300% per hour.

ATC Requests a Peer Check AND INSERTS Group 4 Control Rods 10 inches:

Rod Control switch operated to INSERT Group 4 Regulating Rods 10 inches

Announces All Rod Motion is stopped.

NOTE:

ATC is allowed to insert control rods up to 20 to maintain TAVE/TREF per Admin Proc 4.00 Att 9. This can be reset by the SRO to allow subsequent control rod insertions.

Appendix D 12 Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC-2020 Scenario No.: NRC-1 Event No.:5 Page 3 of 4 Event

Description:

Moisture Separator Drain Tank (T-5) Outlet Failure causing need for Rapid Power Reduction Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP Requests Peer Check AND Commences turbine load reduction in Operator Auto using RUNBACK at a rate of > 30% per hour and <

300% per hour, as ordered by the SRO.

BOP Places turbine in GO and verifies actions and response and provides CREW UPDATE.

SRO Refers to and implements the following Tech Spec LCOs:

3.1.6 Cond A, 2-hour action to restore rods above PDIL NOTE: Verify applicability with alarm EK-0942, Group 4 Power Dependent Insertion Limit.

SRO Notifies Chemistry to perform an isotopic analysis for iodine when reactor power changes > 15% in any one-hour period and notify RP of changing reactor power levels.

Simulator Operator:

If Chemistry or RP contacted by SRO, acknowledge sampling and/or posting requirements.

NOTE: Crew has 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months to balance control rods, thus the action below may not occur during the evaluation.

Appendix D 13 Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC-2020 Scenario No.: NRC-1 Event No.:5 Page 4 of 4 Event

Description:

Moisture Separator Drain Tank (T-5) Outlet Failure causing need for Rapid Power Reduction Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ATC Requests a Peer Check Balances group 4 control rods.

PLACES rod Selector Switch in the position for the rod being moved.

TURNS Group Selector Switch to the position for the group containing the rod being moved.

PLACES Mode Selector Switch to MI (Manual Individual) position

PERFORMS the following:

OPERATES the Raise-Lower Switch

MONITORS Nuclear Instruments and TAVG closely while repositioning rod.

IF necessary, to maintain power level, THEN STOPS single rod motion AND COMPENSATES with regulating Rods.

PLACES the Group Selector Switch to desired position.

PLACES the Mode Selector Switch in MS (Manual Sequential) position or as directed by the SRO.

Continue to Event 6

Appendix D 14 Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC-2020 Scenario No.: NRC-1 Event No.:6 Page 1 of 5 Event

Description:

Primary Coolant Leak/LOCA/ SI failure Cue:

PZR pressure lowering

PZR level lowering

Charging Pumps P-55B, P-55C start

Containment Sump rising

Containment Radiation rising

EK-0734, Charging Pumps Seal Cooling Lo Pres

EK-1364. Gaseous Waste Monitoring Hi Radiation

EK-0761, Pressurizer Level Hi-Lo

EK-1351, Containment Sump Hi Level Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior At the Lead Examiners discretion, INSERT Trigger 5, 100gpm PCS Leak.

ATC Diagnoses PCS Leak:

Indications:

PZR pressure lowering

PZR level lowering

Charging Pumps P-55B, P-55C start

Containment Sump rising

Containment Radiation rising Alarms:

EK-0734, Charging Pumps Seal Cooling Lo Pres

EK-1364. Gaseous Waste Monitoring Hi Radiation

EK-0761, Pressurizer Level Hi-Lo

EK-1351, Containment Sump Hi Level SRO Enters or Re-enters AOP-23, Primary Coolant Leak and directs the actions:

Places Turbine in HOLD

Determines that PCS leakage >10 gpm

Holds a Reactor Trip Brief

Directs a Manual Reactor Trip and entry into EOP-1.0, Standard Post trip Actions.

ATC Trips the Reactor via the reactor trip pushbutton on C-02.

ATC/BOP Performs EOP-1.0 immediate actions.

SRO Commences EOP-1.0 verbal verifications.

Appendix D 15 Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC-2020 Scenario No.: NRC-1 Event No.:6 Page 2 of 5 Event

Description:

Primary Coolant Leak/LOCA Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ATC Reactivity Control: (met)

Reactor power lowering

Negative SUR

Maximum of on control rod not inserted BOP Main Turbine Generator: (met)

Main Turbine tripped

Generator disconnected from grid BOP Feedwater criteria: (met)

PLACES MFP Controller to MANUAL and RAMPS to minimum speed

Main FRVs and bypass valves CLOSED (Must CLOSE CV-0701 manually from the controller).

BOP Vital Auxiliaries-Electric (met)

Bus 1C and 1D energized

Bus 1E energized (If SIAS is not actuated)

Bus 1A and 1B energized

EY-01 energized

3 of 4 preferred AC Buses energized

Six DC Buses energized

Main Feed Pump Trip Power available lights LIT

AFW Pump control power lights LIT

MSIV control power lights LIT ATC VERIFY adequate PCP seal cooling: (met)

At least one CCW Pump operating

At least one SW Pump operating

Both Critical SW headers in operation with pressure >

42psig

CCW Containment Isol Valves open, CV-0910/0911/0940

Appendix D 16 Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC-2020 Scenario No.: NRC-1 Event No.:6 Page 3 of 5 Event

Description:

Primary Coolant Leak/LOCA Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ATC PCS Inventory Control: (not met)

PRZ level 20%-85% and trending toward normal (42%-

57%)

PCS 25 °F subcooled (use THOT for forced circulation)

Starts Charging Pump, P-55A.

PCS Pressure Control: (not met)

PZR pressure 1650 to 2185 psia and trending toward normal (2010 to 2100 psia)

VERIFY sprays closed and all heaters ON (trip off on low PZR level)

ATC

When PCS pressure is < 1605 psia, verify SIAS initiated:

Verify EK-1342 in alarm

Starts HPSI Pump, P-66A

Verifies LPSI Pumps in service and valves open CRITICAL TASK: Manually Start P-66A, HPSI before (CET) subcooling indicating less than zero degrees subcooling.

NOTE: Crew may misdiagnose this due to Hot Leg #2 RTD failure.

Core Heat Removal: (Met)

At least one PCP operating ATC

Verify Loop T less than 10°F

Verify PCS at least 25°F subcooled PCS Heat Removal: (Met)

Verify at least one S/G has; level 5% - 70% and Feedwater BOP available

Verify TAVE 525°F - 540°F

Verify BOTH S/G pressures 800-970 psia

Appendix D 17 Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC-2020 Scenario No.: NRC-1 Event No.:6 Page 4 of 5 Event

Description:

Primary Coolant Leak/LOCA Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Containment Isolation: (Met)

Containment pressure < 0.85 psig

When Containment pressure > 4.0 psig:

VERIFY EK-1126 CIS Initiated in alarm

ENSURE CLOSED: Both MSIVs (MO-0510 and MO-ATC 0501); Main FRVs; Main FRV Bypasses; CCW Isolation Valves

ENSURE EK-1342 Safety INJ Initiated OR PUSH High Radiation Initiate pushbuttons on Panel EC-13

ENSURE all available HPSI and LPSI Pumps operating with associated loop isolation valves open.

Containment Isolation: (Met)

Verify Containment Area Monitor alarms clear BOP

IF Cont Rad > 1x10 R/hr, then Ensure Actuated CIS

Verify Condenser Off Gas Monitor alarm clear

Verify Main Steam Line Monitor alarms clear NOTE: The B ventilators will be off if an SIAS has occurred.

Verify Containment Atmosphere: (Met)

Cnmt temp < 125oF

Ensure operating all CACs

V-1A and V-1B, V-2A and V-2B, V-3A and V-3B, V-4A and V-4B ATC

Ensure open all CAC Hi-Cap outlet valves

CV-0867, CV-0861, CV-0864, CV-0873

When Cnmt pressure > 4.0 psig:

Ensure both CS pumps start. CS valves open, and CS spray

> 2850 gpm BOP VERIFY IA pressure > 85 psig

Appendix D 18 Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC-2020 Scenario No.: NRC-1 Event No.:6 Page 5 of 5 Event

Description:

Primary Coolant Leak/LOCA Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ATC VERIFY SIRWT level > 25%

ENSURE CR HVAC is aligned for Emergency Mode Operation within 20 mins of time of Reactor Trip.

VERIFY Supply Fan V-95 or V-96 for desired train is ON BOP

ENSURE Air Filter Unit Fan V-26A or V-26B for desired train is ON

ENSURE OFF V-94 Purge Fan and V-47 Swgr Exh Fan VERIFY at least one Condensate Pump and one Cooling Tower BOP Pump operating.

BOP VERIFY MSIVs are open OR MSIV Bypass valves are open Commence Emergency Shutdown Checklist (GOP-10) as time SRO allows.

SRO Commence EOP Supplement 45 SFP Monitoring Diagnose LOCA using EOP-1.0 Att 1 Event Diagnostic Flow SRO Chart and transition to EOP-4.0 Continue to Event 7

Appendix D 19 Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC-2020 Scenario No.: NRC-1 Event No.:7 Page 1 of 4 Event

Description:

Larger LOCA Cue:

Containment Sump Fill Rate rising

PCS Pressure lowering at a faster rate

PCS Subcooling lowering at a faster rate Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO Conducts an EOP Transition Brief.

SRO Enters and directs actions of EOP-4.0 using CREW UPDATE.

Initiates Safety Function Status Checks for EOP-4.0 and are SRO satisfied at intervals of approximately fifteen minutes.

Directs SM to refer to the Site Emergency Plan.

SRO Establishes Bands for EOP-4.0 strategy.

SRO ATC Implements bands and EOP-4.0 strategy.

SRO DETERMINES that PCS Inventory acceptance criteria NOT met.

Appendix D 20 Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC-2020 Scenario No.: NRC-1 Event No.:7 Page 2 of 4 Event

Description:

Larger LOCA Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Verifies SIAS and directs the following:

EOP Supplement 5.

SRO

EOP Supplement 4.

Either directs BOP to report equipment out of position OR directs repositioning to EOP Supp 5.

ENSURES available safeguards equipment operating (EOP Supplement 5)

Direct NPO to locally close:

BOP

CV-0944 Evap CCW Supply.

CV-0977B Evap CCW Return.

Simulator Operator:

When requested by NCO, wait eight minutes and report CV-0944 and CV-0977B are closed.

Performs EOP Supplement 4, HPSI and LPSI Flow Curves.

BOP If PZR level < 36% (40% for degraded containment):

ATC

PLACES HS-2003, HS-2004, HS-2005, Orifice Stop Valves, to CLOSE. (Should have been closed previously)

CRITICAL TASK: Secures PCPs as needed to establish one PCP operating in each loop within 3 minutes of PCS pressure lowering to less than 1300 psia.

If PZR pressure lowers to less than 1300 psia and SIAS initiated,

ENSURES one PCP is stopped in each loop ATC

If PCS is < 25oF subcooled, STOPS all PCPs.

VERIFIES PCP operating limits per EOP Supplement 1

Appendix D 21 Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC-2020 Scenario No.: NRC-1 Event No.:7 Page 3 of 4 Event

Description:

Larger LOCA Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NOTE: TRIGGER 12 (P-50A) or TRIGGER 13 (P-50B) automatically insert when the respective PCP is removed from service. This raises the LOCA to 1100gpm.

CLOSES CWRT vent valves CV-1064 and CV-1065 (If not already BOP closed).

Attempt to isolate the LOCA by:

VERIFIES Both PORVs closed

ENSURES CLOSED Letdown stop valves CV-2001 / 2009

ENSURES CLOSED PCS Sample Isol valves CV-1910 / 1911

ENSURES CLOSED

Reactor Vessel and PZR Vent valves C-11A BOP

PRV-1067 / 1068 / 1069 / 1070

VERIFIES RIA-0915 CCW Rad Monitor, alarm clear

VERIFIES EK-1172, CCW Surge Tank T-3 Hi-Lo Level, clear

VERIFIES PZR Relief Valves not lifting

Acoustic monitors (C-11A)

PZR Relief valve discharge temps (C-12)

Quench Tank temp/level/pressure BOP PLACES Hydrogen Monitor(s) in service per SOP-38 If Containment pressure > 4.0 psig OR Containment Rads > 10 ATC R/hr, VERIFIES EK-1126, CIS Initiated, in alarm

Appendix D 22 Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC-2020 Scenario No.: NRC-1 Event No.:7 Page 4 of 4 Event

Description:

Larger LOCA Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Note:

Containment Spray should not be actuated at this point.

VERIFIES at least one Cooling Tower Pump operating BOP

VERIFIES at least one Condensate Pump operating.

VERIFIES one train of CR HVAC operating in Emergency Mode BOP (per SOP-24).

Commences emergency boration per SOP-2A Att 12 to establish PCS boron concentration greater than or equal to boron needed for ATC Tave > 525°F as verified by sample or hand calculation per EOP Supplement 35.

COMMENCES steaming S/Gs.

BOP REFERS to

EOP Supplement 1 Pressure Temperature Limit Curves

EOP Supplement 33 PCS Heatup/Cooldown Rate Data When PCS cooldown rate can be controlled within required limits, BOP OPERATES the TBV to cooldown at the maximum allowable rate.

Critical Task: Remove all PCPs from operation when conditions do not support their operation. - Trip ALL PCPs within 10 minutes of a CIS or outside operating curve When PCS is < 25°F subcooled or outside of the EOP Supplement ATC 1 curves performs the following:

Trips the remaining PCPs

Appendix D 23 Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC-2020 Scenario No.: NRC-1 Event No.:8 Page 1 of 1 Event

Description:

Failure of Containment Spray Cue:

Containment pressure >4.0psig

CIS received

NO Spray Pumps on Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NOTE: These steps apply when the Containment High Pressure setpoint is reached.

This could occur earlier pending the crew timing through the procedures.

If Containment pressure > 4.0 psig OR Containment Rads > 10 ATC R/hr, VERIFY EK-1126, CIS Initiated, in alarm (Continuous Step)

IF Containment pressure > 4.0 psig, VERIFY Containment Spray alignment and at least minimal spray ATC flow

Manually Starts P-54A, P-54B and P-54C Critical Task: Initiate Containment Spray before containment pressure exceeds 60 psia, or containment temperature exceeds 145°F. Must start P-54A OR BOTH P-54B and P-54C in order to complete a least one train of Containment Spray Operation.

When PCS cooldown is in progress OR at discretion of the Lead Examiner, TERMINATE SCENARIO.

Appendix D 24 Form ES-D-2 CRITICAL TASKS With the plant operating in MODE 1, 2, or 3 and:

A LOCA, SGTR, or ESDE in progress AND PC-CT16-

PCS pressure has lowered below SIAS setpoint (1605 psia)

SIAS/Required

NEITHER SI train has automatically actuated Flow OR (Respond to a

PCS pressure is below the shutoff head of the HPSI and/or LPSI failure of safety pumps and safety injection flow is less than the minimum flow injection actuation requirements of EOP supplement 4 signal or required (Manual initiation of safety injection is possible) flow) the crew takes action to manually initiate SI (manual pushbuttons) or start SI pumps and align loop injection valves as necessary to establish required SI flow greater than the minimum EOP supplement 4 curve for current PCS pressure prior to the PCS (CET) subcooling indicating less than zero degrees subcooling.

With the plant operating in MODES 1, 2, or 3 and:

HR-CT17-PCP

A LOCA is in progress T2L2

SIAS has actuated

Pressurizer pressure has dropped below 1300 psia (t=0)

(Implement PCP

At least three PCPs are operating Trip 2/Leave 2 (T2/L2) Strategy) the crew secures PCPs as needed to establish one PCP operating in each loop within 3 minutes of PCS pressure lowering to less than 1300 psia.

Appendix D 25 Form ES-D-2 CRITICAL TASKS With the plant operating in MODES 1, 2, or 3 and:

SIAS is actuated

PCS subcooling is less than 25°F (t=0) or PCS is operating less than the minimum PT curve for PCP operation (t=0)

At least one PCP is operating OR

In service PCP in distress by indicating high vibrations or seal HR-CT23-PCPTrip temperatures (t=0) the crew secures effected PCPs within ten minutes:

(Trip Primary Coolant Pump)

once the PCS is less than 25°F subcooled if the in use EOP is 4.0, 5.0, 6.0 or 9.0 OR

once the PCS is less than the minimum PT curve if the in use EOP is 1.0 OR

PCPs are demonstrating distress via high vibration alarms or high seal temperature alarms The plant is operating in MODES 1, 2, or 3 and:

CA-CT15-

Containment temperature, pressure, and humidity are rising CONTCLG uncontrollably due to a LOCA or ESDE inside of containment

Containment pressure is greater than 4.0 psig (CHP setpoint has (Establish been exceeded)

Containment

Less than one full train of containment cooling has been established Temperature and Pressure Control) the crew establishes at least one full train of containment cooling per the in-use EOP in time to prevent containment pressure from exceeding 70 psia.

Appendix D 26 Form ES-D-2 EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION EAL Threshold:

Met on EAL FA1.1 PCS Potential Loss 4 Indication Leakrate determination from step change in charging flow, VCT Level, Pressurizer Level, Containment sump, Pri-Sec rad monitors, S/G Level Release in NO. Unless CV-1064 AND CV-1065 are left open Progress AND stack monitor counts are significantly rising.

EAL Threshold:

Met on Loss of PCS Subcooling >15 minutes FS 1.1 may be declared within the 15 minute time frame if the SM believes that subcooling will not be restored within the 15 minute interval.

EAL After 15 minutes of lost subcooling FS1.1 FC Potential Loss 2 PCS Loss 1 Indication Reactor Trip and Loss of Subcooling Release in NO. Unless CV-1064 AND CV-1065 are left open Progress AND stack monitor counts are significantly rising.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: Palisades Scenario No.: NRC-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2020 Examiners: ___________________________ Operators: ____________________________

Initial Conditions: The plant is at 100% power. The PCS is being sampled to determine/confirm possible fuel failure.

Turnover: Shift orders are to Borate to the SIRW Tank.

Critical Tasks:

1. Isolation of all feed water to the faulted S/G within 30 minutes.

2. Isolation of Ruptured S/G from the control room within 50 minutes.

3. Manually actuate at least one train of SI prior to the loss of subcooling (25F).

4. Throttle Safety Injection prior to going solid in the Pressurizer.

Event Malf. No. Event Type* Event No. Description 1 N/A ATC (N) Borate to the SIRW Tank 2 N/A SRO (TS) Chemistry results provided to SRO showing high activity 3 CW01A BOP (I/C) Cooling Tower Pump, P-39A Seal Lube Low flow - Requires manually tripping pump and initiation of rapid down power.

4 N/A ATC (R) Rapid Down power BOP (N)

SRO (N) 5 ED89A SRO (TS) Spurious trip of bus 1C with failure of auto transfer to Startup ED93 power resulting in EDG 1-1 supplying Bus 5 SW10A ATC (I/C) Failure of Service Water Pump to start from NSD Sequencer SW10C SRO (TS) 6 SG01B ATC M Steam Generator Tube Rupture on B S/G requiring a BOP (M) manual reactor trip.

SRO (M) 7 ED13A ATC (I/C) On the Manual Reactor Trip ED13B BOP (I/C) Failure of auto SIAS on both trains (fail auto signals, and manual actuation pushbuttons) 8 MS06B All (M) Ten minutes after the reactor trip, the B S/G has an ESDE (SV)

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC Scenario 2 Summary The plant is at 100% power. The PCS is being sampled for activity to confirm suspected failed fuel. The SIRW Tank is at 2000 ppm and it is desired to raise boron to 2003 ppm.

The BOP will perform a line up and normal boration of the SIRW Tank based on the calculation provided to the crew.

During the boration of the SIRW Tank, the chemistry results are reported confirming a small amount of failed fuel. DE I-131 is 4.2 uCi/gm, gross activity is 18uCi/gm, E-Bar is 5. The SRO will apply Tech Specs for high activity.

After the SRO applies PCS Activity Tech Specs, a Cooling Tower Pump lube low flow alarm comes in. An operator is dispatched to the pump and reports seal lubrication flow parameters and pump conditions that exceed the allowed operating limits of the Cooling Tower Pump. The SRO will order a manual trip of the Cooling Tower pump.

The BOP trips the cooling tower pump, and condenser vacuum conditions degrade necessitating a rapid reduction of power. During the down power, Control Rods being are inserted past the insertion limit providing an opportunity for the SRO to apply tech specs for Control Rods.

After the rapid power reduction is stabilized, a spurious trip of the normal feed breaker to 2400VAC Bus 1C occurs with failure of the Bus to fast transfer, causing the UV start of EDG 1-1. One of the previously running SW pumps does not restart automatically. To restore enough SW flow/pressure, P-7B or P-7A must be manually started by the ATC. The SRO will apply Tech Specs for the SW pump.

The next events are run consecutively. A SGTR occurs on B SG. The actions of the ATC are to attempt to maintain PZR parameters and determine leak size exceeds reactor trip criteria. PCS parameters degrade to the SIAS setpoint, requiring a manual Safety Injection Initiation by the operators because Auto SIAS is failed. Ten minutes after the reactor is tripped, an ESDE occurs on the affected SG (failed open MSSV). The ATC will start the ECCS pumps and align valves for injection. The BOP will start SWS and CCW and align valves per EOP Supplement 5. The crew diagnoses more than one event on the EOP-1.0 diagnostic flow chart, and responds to the SGTR and ESDE by using EOP-9.0 (FRP)

The scenario is terminated when the crew has control of the cooldown.

ATC: 1N,1R, 1I/C, 1I/C post trip, 2M BOP: 1N, 1I/C, 1I/C post trip, 2M SRO: 3TS, 2N, 2M

Initialize Simulator Protected IC-113 OR

Initialize IC-17 and Load NRC-2 Scenario Schedule and Event Triggers from jump drive schedule.

Validate Malfunctions, Remotes and Overrides from Table below.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Event # Remote or Instructions Trigger #

N/A Active ED89A, Failure of 152-106 to close = Active Malfunction N/A Active SW10A, P-7A failure to Auto Start = Active Malfunction N/A Active ED13A, SI Auto Init Sgnl Fail Channel Left = Active Malfunction N/A Active ED13B, SI Auto Init Sgnl Fail Channel Right = Active Malfunction N/A Active SI07A, SI Man Init Signl Fail Channel Left Malfunction N/A Active SI07B, SI Man Init Signl Fail Channel Right Malfunction N/A Active SW10B, P-7B Failure to Auto Start = Active Malfunction 3 1 P-39A-W, CLG TWR Pumps, P-39A, White Light = ON 3 1 ANN-K-35-08, Cooling Tower Pump P-39A Seal Lube Low Flow =

ON 5 2 152-105-1, SFGD Bus 1C, Switch 152-105 trip = ON 6 3 SG01B, Steam generator No 2 Tube Rupture = 30, (300gpm) 7 Initial On SIAS, Both Trains of SIAS Fail to initiate automatically or Alignment manually by pushbutton.

8 4 MS06B, Main Steam Relief Vlve RV-0711 Leak = 100 over a 5 minute ramp, ten minutes after the reactor trip, TRIGGER 4

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 TRIGGERS

Description Reason 3 SD Group A Rod 1<100 Ensures Major Events are put in even if the reactor is tripped in an earlier event.

4 SD Group A Rod 1<100 Ensures Major Events are put in even if the reactor is tripped in an earlier event.

14 Remote, CV28 SIRW Makeup Fill Line V2157=OPEN 15 Remote, CV28 SIRW Makeup Fill Line V2157=CLOSED 16 Remote, MS59 AE-128 Main Condenser E-10 West Side Air Off Take= 0 17 Remote, MS99 AE-111 A Secondary Air Ejector Steam Supply=100 18 Remote, FW123 AE-117 A Secondary Aire Ejector Suction=100 Special Instructions:

Ensure Turnover Page is available for all positions

Ensure 1 marked copy of SOP-2A is available for the SRO for Event 1.

Ensure Service Water Pump, P-7B and P-7C are in service.

None.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 INITIAL PROCEDURE AND STEP Chemistry 2231 ENPM 914-272-3459 CRDM leakage:

0 ml/min. N/A Duty Station Reactor 3688 2497 Charging Pump Seal leakage: Manager Engineering P-55A = 0 ml/min, P-55B/C = 0 Electrical 2446 Security 2264/2278 ml/min. Shop Zinc Injection: Engineer on MECS 2438 248-380-2931 Call Balancing 0 ml/min.

Health Trans Sys T-90, PMWT Temperature: 2230 248-380-2901 Physics Coord 85 degrees F. Instrument Work Control 2247 2282

& Control Center Work Week Bret Baker 2332 3500 Manager Boron: 938ppm Weather: Sunny. ACTIVITY: PER PPC OFFGAS: 7.2 SCFM Power History over the last 24 Surveillances Completed Last PLANNED ACTIVITIES hours Shift Borate to SRWT 100% Steady State N/A Three 40 gallon dilutions/shift PHOENIX SCORE: 1.0 INTEGRATED RISK: LOW EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS/OOS ACTION TIME Compensatory Actions/ Notes PCS Activity has been slowly rising- N/A Chemistry has recently sampled None.

PCS.

Appendix D 1 Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2020 Scenario No.: NRC-2 Event No.: 1 Page 1 of 4 Event

Description:

Borate to the SIRW Tank Cue:

Orders for the Shift on turnover.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO Directs actions to borate to the SIRW Tank.

ATC Refers to SOP-2A, Step 7.6.1.c.

BOP Provides peer checking of ATC Actions as requested.

NOTE: FIC-0210B will only allow concentrated boric acid flow rates of 25 gpm or less to be selected to prevent over ranging the flow indication.

ATC PERFORMS the following:

ENSURES CLOSED CV-2155, Make-Up Stop.

PUSHES RESET button on FIC-0210B, Concentrated Boric Acid Controller.

ENSURES in AUTO FIC-0210B, Concentrated Boric Acid Controller.

ENSURES FIC-0210B, Concentrated Boric Acid Controller, output signaling full closed.

SETS BATCH on FIC-0210B, Concentrated Boric Acid Controller, to the desired quantity of Concentrated Boric Acid.

SETS FLOW LIMIT on FIC-0210B, Concentrated Boric Acid Controller, to the desired Concentrated Boric Acid flowrate.

Appendix D 2 Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2020 Scenario No.: NRC-2 Event No.: 1 Page 2 of 4 Event

Description:

Borate to the SIRW Tank Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NOTE: Dilution additions should be made at flowrates greater than or equal to 30 gpm, as indicated on FIC-0210A, to prevent potential low range flow errors.

ATC PERFORMS the following:

ENSURES CLOSED CV-2155, Make-Up Stop.

PUSHES FIC-0210A, Primary Makeup Water Controller Reset Button.

ENSURES FIC-0210A, Primary Makeup Water Controller in AUTO.

ENSURES FIC-0210A, Primary Makeup Water Controller, output signal indicates full closed.

SETS BATCH on FIC-0210A, Primary Makeup Water Controller, to the desired quantity of Primary Makeup Water.

SETS FLOW LIMIT on FIC 0210A, Primary Makeup Water Controller, to the desired Primary Makeup Water flowrate.

OPENS MV-CVC2157, Blended Boric Acid to SIRW Tank T-58 Isolation Valve.

Simulator Operator: When directed to open MV-CVC2157, wait 4 minutes and Insert TRIGGER 14 and report to Control Room.

Appendix D 3 Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2020 Scenario No.: NRC-2 Event No.: 1 Page 3 of 4 Event

Description:

Borate to the SIRW Tank Cue: Orders for the Shift on turnover.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ATC

ENSURES appropriate Recirculation Control Valve 100%

OPEN:

CV-2136, BAST T-53B Recirc Inlet (preferred).

CV-2130, BAST T-53A Recirc Inlet.

STARTS a Boric Acid Pump:

P-56B, Boric Acid Pump (preferred).

P-56A, Boric Acid Pump.

PUSHES FIC-0210B, Concentrated Boric Acid Controller Start Button.

ATC Verifies actions as follows:

BAT level lowers on tank being used.

SIRW temperature changing.

CVCS/PCS parameters NOT changing.

ATC

WHEN FIC-0210B, Concentrated Boric Acid Controller, reaches its batch set value, THEN ENSURES:

(a) CV-2153, Concentrated Boric Acid Makeup Valve, is closed.

(b) FIC-0210B, Concentrated Boric Acid Controller, signals a zero output.

STOPS operating Boric Acid Pump.

NOTE: After Boration has been initiated start Event 2 and run the two simultaneously

Appendix D 4 Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2020 Scenario No.: NRC-2 Event No.: 1 Page 4 of 4 Event

Description:

Borate to the SIRW Tank Cue: Orders for the Shift on turnover.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ATC

FLUSHES line with at least 150 gallons of PMW.

ATC

ENSURES P-90A or P-90B, PMW Transfer Pump in MANUAL, and the other OFF.

PUSHES FIC-0210A, Primary Makeup Water Controller Start Button.

WHEN FIC-0210A, Primary Makeup Water Controller, reaches its batch set value, THEN ENSURES:

CV-2165, Primary Makeup Water Control Valve, is closed (zero flow).

FIC-0210A, Primary Makeup Water Controller, signals a zero output.

CLOSES MV-CVC2157, Blended Boric Acid to SIRW Tank T-58 Isolation.

RECORDS in appropriate log total gallons added from:

FIC-0210B, Concentrated Boric Acid Controller.

FIC-0210A, Primary Makeup Water Controller.

Simulator Operator: When directed to CLOSE MV-CVC2157, wait 4 minutes and Insert TRIGGER 15 and report to Control Room.

When Both Event 1 and Event 2 are completed continue to Event 3.

Appendix D 5 Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2020 Scenario No.: NRC-2 Event No.: 2 Page 1 of 1 Event

Description:

PCS Sample results Cue: Phone call from Chemistry Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator:

After the boration has been started and at the Lead Examiners discretion, call the SRO at x2608 as Chemistry and report the PCS results as follows:

DE I-131 is 4.2 uCi/gm.

Gross Activity is 18uCi/gm.

E-Bar is 5.

SRO Refers to and implements the following Tech Spec LCO:

3.4.16 Condition A, DE I-131 > 1.0 uCi/gm.

Verify DE I-131 < 40 uCi/gm once per 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months AND restore DE I-131 to within limit in 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months or be in Mode 3 in 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

SRO

Briefs crew on plant status via CREW UPDATE or Transient Brief Checklist, En-OP-200, Att 1.

Initiates notifications of Duty Station Manager (DSM) and Chemistry.

EN-OP-133-03 Reportability requirements for unplanned LCO entry that requires a plant shutdown within the next 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months .

Appendix D 6 Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2020 Scenario No.:NRC-2 Event No.:3 Page 1 of 1 Event

Description:

Cooling Tower Pump, P-39A In Distress Cue: Alarm EK-3508, P-39A White Light Lit (Pump Start Prohibit) by Control Switch and NPO confirmation of Lube Cooling failure.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior At the Lead Examiners discretion, INSERT Trigger 1.

BOP Diagnosis of failure of Cooling Tower Pump, P-39A Lube Cooling.

Indication:

P-39A White Light Lit (Pump Start Prohibit).

Alarm:

EK-3508, Clg Twr Pump P-39A Lub Low Flow.

BOP Implements ARP Actions to investigate and respond to alarm.

ATC Dispatches NPO to Cooling Tower Pump House.

Simulator Operator:

When dispatched as NPO to the Cooling Tower Pump House, report back via the radio in three minutes the parameters you are asked to provide:

Steam is coming from P-39A shaft packing and it is very hot.

Cooling water flow at FIA-5335A is 0 gpm.

Seal Coolant pressure at PI-5355 is 0 psi.

All parameters on unaffected P-39B are normal.

You are leaving the area for your safety.

SRO Directs tripping of P-39A per ARP.

Appendix D 7 Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2020 Scenario No.: NRC-2 Event No.: 4 Page 1 of 4 Event

Description:

P-39A Trip, Rapid Downpower.

Cue: Alarm EK-3522, CLG TWR PUMP P-39A TRIP.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Takes 252-303/CS for P-39A to STOP:

EK-3522, "CLG TWR PUMP P-39A TRIP."

P-39A red light OUT, green light ON.

BOP

P-39A ammeter reads ZERO.

Provides update on possible lowering trend on Main Condenser vacuum.

Enters and directs the actions of AOP-6, Loss of Condenser Vacuum, and AOP-7, Rapid Power Reduction and provides CREW SRO UPDATE..

Reviews Reactor Trip Criteria of AOP-6.

Reviews Reactor Trip Criteria of AOP-7.

NOTE:

Reactor trip will occur at < 22 Hg Main Condenser vacuum.

Note:

Power reduction will likely be performed at 100%/hr OR at 300%/hr and then be reduced to 100%/hr.

SRO Initiates a rapid power reduction to stabilize condenser vacuum at a ATC rate of > 30% per hour and 300% per hour, as directed by AOP-6 BOP and as controlled by AOP-7.

Requests a Peer Check and INSERTS Group 4 Regulating Rods 10 inches:

ATC

M/0100, Rod Control Switch, operated to LOWER position to INSERT Group 4 Regulating rods 10 inches.

Appendix D 8 Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2020 Scenario No.: NRC-2 Event No.:4 Page 2 of 4 Event

Description:

P-39A Trip, Rapid Downpower.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Note:

The NCO is allowed to insert control rods up to 20 to maintain TAVE/TREF per Admin Proc. 4.00, Att 9. This can be reset by the CRS to allow subsequent control rod insertions.

BOP

Requests Peer Check AND Commences turbine load reduction in Operator Auto using RUNBACK at a rate of > 30% per hour and < 300% per hour, as ordered by the SRO.

BOP

Places turbine in GO and verifies actions and response and provides CREW UPDATE.

Stabilizes reactor power when condenser vacuum stabilizes, as specified by CRS (this will likely be approx. 65-70% power).

BOP

COMMENCES turbine load reduction in Operator Auto using RUNBACK at a rate of > 30% per hour and 300%/hour, as ordered by the CRS.

NOTE: Verify applicability with alarm EK-0942 Group 4 Power Dependent Insertion Limit.

Refers to and implements the following Tech Spec LCOs:

SRO

3.1.6 Condition A, 2-hour action to restore rods above PDIL.

Notifies Chemistry to perform an isotopic analysis for iodine when SRO Reactor power changes > 15% in any one-hour period and notify RP of changing Reactor power levels.

Appendix D 9 Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2020 Scenario No.: NRC-2 Event No.:4 Page 3 of 4 Event

Description:

P-39A Trip, Rapid Downpower.

Cue:

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Implements AOP-6, Attachment 1 Actions as follows:

CLOSE MV AE128, Main Condenser E 10 West Side Air Off Take. Location: Hydrogen Cooler Mezzanine

ENSURE CLOSED MO 5311, Dilution PP P 40A Discharge to Mixing Basin.

BOP

ENSURE OPEN MO 5313, P 40A/B Discharge to C/T E 30A Makeup/Fill.

ENSURE OPEN MO 5315, P 40A/B Discharge to C/T E 30A Makeup/Fill.

ENSURE CLOSED MO 5326A, Basin 'A' Cooling Tower Blowdown Line Vlv.

Simulator Operator:

Acknowledge BOPs request and in three minutes CLOSE MV-AE128 via TRIGGER 16.

PLACES additional Secondary Air Ejector Jet in service, if available.

'A' Secondary Air Ejector BOP

ENSURES OPEN MV-AE111, 'A' Secondary Air Ejector Steam Supply.

ENSURES OPEN MV-AE117, 'A' Secondary Air Ejector Suction.

Simulator Operator:

Acknowledge BOPs request and in three minutes OPEN MV-AE111, via TRIGGER 17 AND OPEN MV-AE117 via TRIGGER 18.

NOTE: During the rapid downpower, the crew will experience charging pump starts and may end up with all three running to maintain programed level.

Appendix D 10 Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2020 Scenario No.: NRC-2 Event No.:4 Page 4 of 4 Event

Description:

P-39A Trip, Rapid Downpower.

Cue:

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NOTE: Crew has 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months to balance control rods, thus the action below may not occur during the evaluation.

Requests a Peer Check Balance Group 4 control rods:

PLACES Rod Selector Switch in the position for the rod to be moved.

TURNS Group Selector Switch to the position for the group containing the rod to be moved.

PLACES Mode Selector Switch to MI (Manual Individual) position ATC

PERFORMS the following to reposition the rod:

OPERATES the Raise-Lower Switch.

MONITORS Nuclear Instruments and TAVE closely while repositioning rod.

IF necessary to maintain power level, THEN STOPS single rod motion AND COMPENSATES with Regulating Rods.

PLACES the Group Selector Switch to desired position.

PLACES the Mode Selector Switch in MS (Manual Sequential) position or as directed by the Shift Manager.

Places one Main Feed Pump to MANUAL at minimum speed per BOP CRS direction.

SRO Calls Duty Station Manager to activate support personnel for the condition.

NOTE: If Reactor power is stabilized as soon as vacuum turns and before the Cooling Tower has emptied, a further power reduction will be needed during the next event.

The crew could decide to trip the reactor with multiple events occurring together. To be stable for an extended period requires power 65-70%.

After Reactor power has been reduced to stabilize condenser vacuum OR at the discretion of the Lead Examiner, INSERT Trigger 2 and Continue to Event 5.

Appendix D 11 Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2020 Scenario No.: NRC-2 Event No.: 5 Page 1 of 3 Event

Description:

Loss of Bus 1C.

Cue: Bus 1C zero volts, loss of power to all components feed by Bus 1C, loss of Control Room Lighting, many alarms including EK-0515, Fast Transfer breaker does NOT close, and EDG 1-1 starts and loads.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior At the Lead Examiners discretion, INSERT Trigger 2.

Diagnoses of loss of Bus 1C.

Bus 1C zero volts.

Loss of power to Bus 1C components.

Loss of Control Room lighting.

Indications:

ATC

EK-0503, 2400V Bus 1C Bkr 152-105 Trip.

BOP

EK-0541, Battery Charger Trouble.

EK-0548, 125 VDC Bus UV/Trouble.

EK-1163, Critical Serv. Water Header B Lo Pressure.

EK-1164, Critical Serv. Water Header A Lo Pressure.

EK-1165, Non-Critical Serv. Water Lo Pressure.

EK-1137, Service Water Pump P-7B Overload/Trip.

And many others.

Directs Turbine be placed in HOLD, provides CREW UPDATE and SRO enters AOP-8, Loss of Bus 1C, and directs actions.

Identifies Critical Service Water Header pressure is less than 42 ATC psig. Starts either P-7A or P-7B, Service Water Pumps.

Appendix D 12 Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2020 Scenario No.: NRC-2 Event No.:5 Page 2 of 3 Event

Description:

Loss of Bus 1C.

Cue: Bus 1C zero volts, loss of power to all components feed by Bus 1C, loss of Control Room Lighting, many alarms including EK-0515, Fast Transfer breaker does NOT close and EDG 1-1 starts and loads.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP Dispatches NPO to EDG 1-1 to monitor and clear alarms.

Simulator Operator If directed as NPO to the EDGs, report in three minutes that alarms are due to Low Raw Water Pressure. On PIDAN02, Reset and Acknowledge EDG 1-1 and EDG 1-2 alarms as directed. If asked, report that all parameters are normal at EDG 1-1.

NOTE: If Crew decides to transfer Bus 1C to Startup Power, it will be unsuccessful as the Startup Breaker has a malfunction.

Determines that there is no indication of a fault on Bus 1C and may BOP attempt to transfer Bus 1C from EDG 1-1 to Startup Power.

Makes provisions for Electrical Maintenance to verify Primary SRO Coolant Pump Backstop Oil Flows.

Dispatches NPO to address EK-0541, Battery Charger Trouble, BOP and EK-0548, 125VDC Bus Under Voltage/Trouble, alarms locally.

Appendix D 13 Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2020 Scenario No.: NRC-2 Event No.:5 Page 3 of 3 Event

Description:

Loss of Bus 1C Cue:

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator:

If directed as NPO to address Battery Charger Trouble and 125VDC Bus Under Voltage/Trouble, alarms locally, in five minutes, on page PIDED02:

Set ED79, Battery Charger Trouble Local Reset, to RESET.

Set ED80, 125 VDC Undervoltage Local Reset, to RESET..

Report to ATC that alarms have been reset.

Refers to and implements the following Tech Spec LCOs:

3.8.1 Cond A, 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months surveillance, 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months to OPERABLE NOTE: Cond C is only entered when the SRO comes to the SRO conclusion that Startup Source is failed.

3.8.1 Cond C, 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months to declare feature INOP, 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months to OPERABLE 3.7.8, Cond A, 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months to restore.

Continue to Event 6.

Appendix D 14 Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2020 Scenario No.: NRC-2 Event No.:6/7 Page 1 of 3 Event

Description:

B SGTR, with Auto SI failed.

Cue:

PZR pressure and level dropping

VCT level dropping

Charging maximized

B S/G level rising

Various Radiation monitor alarms Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior At the Lead Examiners discretion, INSERT Trigger 3.

Diagnoses SGTR:

PZR pressure and level lowering.

VCT level lowering.

Maximum Charging flow.

ATC

B S/G level rising.

Alarms:

EK-1364, Gaseous Waste Monitoring Hi Radiation.

EK-0205, Main Steam E-50B RIA-2323 High.

EK-0217, Main Steam E-50B RIA-2323 Alert.

Holds a Reactor Trip Brief and directs a Manual Reactor Trip and SRO entry into EOP-1.0, Standard Post Trip Actions.

ATC/BOP Performs EOP-1.0 Immediate Actions.

PLACES MFP Controller to MANUAL and RAMPS to BOP minimum speed.

Main FRVs and bypass valves CLOSED.

Appendix D 15 Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2020 Scenario No.:NRC-2 Event No.:6/7 Page 2 of 3 Event

Description:

B SGTR, with Auto SI failed.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO Commence EOP-1.0 verbal verifications.

Reactivity Control: (met)

Reactor power lowering.

ATC

Negative SUR.

Maximum of one control rod not inserted.

Turbine trip criteria: (met)

BOP

All governor valves closed.

Generator disconnected from grid.

Feedwater System criteria: (met but already done)

PLACES MFP Controller to MANUAL and RAMPS to minimum speed.

BOP

CLOSES Main Feed Regulating Valves and Bypass Feed Regulating Valves.

Vital Auxiliaries-Electric: (met)

Buses 1C and 1D energized with EDG 1-1 supplying Bus 1C.

Bus 1E energized (If SIAS is not actuated).

Bus 1A and 1B energized.

EY-01 energized.

BOP

3 of 4 Preferred AC Buses energized.

Six DC Buses energized.

Main Feed Pump Trip Power available lights LIT.

AFW Pump control power lights LIT.

MSIV control power lights LIT.

Appendix D 16 Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2020 Scenario No.: NRC-2 Event No.:6/7 Page 3 of 3 Event

Description:

B SGTR, with Auto SI failed.

Cue:

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior VERIFY adequate PCP seal cooling: (met)

At least one CCW Pump operating.

ATC

At least one SW Pump operating.

Both Critical SW headers in operation with pressure > 42 psig.

CCW Containment Isol Valves open, CV-0910 / 0911 / 0940.

VERIFY PCS Inventory Control: (Not Met)

ATC

VERIFY PZR Level

VERIFY >25°F subcooled.

CRITICAL TASK: Manually actuate at least one train of SI prior to the loss of subcooling (25°F).

PCS Pressure Control: (not met)

PZR pressure 1650 to 2185 psia and trending toward normal (2010 to 2100 psia).

Manually operates PPCS in MANUAL and operates PZR heaters and sprays to maintain EOP Supplement 1 limits.

When PCS pressure is < 1605 psia, verify Safety Injection ATC DID NOT initiate:

Depress Both Trains of SIAS at PB1-1 AND PB1-2 and determines that Safety Injection DID NOT initiate.

Starts HPSI and LPSI Pumps.

Opens loop isolation valves.

Core Heat Removal: (met)

At least one PCP operating.

ATC

Verify Loop T less than 10°F.

Verify PCS at least 25 °F subcooled.

Appendix D 17 Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2020 Scenario No.:NRC-2 Event No.:7/8 Page 1 of 9 Event

Description:

B SGTR With B S/G ESDE Cue:

PZR pressure and level dropping

VCT level dropping

Charging maximized

B S/G level rising

Various Radiation monitor alarms

Audible Steam Noise after ADVs close Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior B ESDE is automatically ramped in on the Reactor Trip plus 10 minutes via Trigger 4.

BOP

Determines steam noise can be heard with ASDVs closed.

BOP

Dispatches NPO to search for steam release.

Simulator Operator:

When sent to report on steam noise, respond in three minutes that steam is coming from a Main Steam Safety Valve on the B Steam Generator.

CRITICAL TASK: Secures all feedwater to the faulted S/G within 30 minutes of ESDE.

(May have already performed this step as a part of SGTR response).

PCS Heat Removal: (not met)

Verify at least one S/G has; level 5% - 70% and Feedwater available.

BOP

Verify B S/G is NOT Intact.

SECURE all AFW flow to the B S/G.

Verify TAVE 525 °F - 540 °F.

Verify BOTH S/G pressures 800-970 psia.

Appendix D 18 Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2020 Scenario No.:NRC-2 Event No.:7/8 Page 2 of 9 Event

Description:

B SGTR With B S/G ESDE.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Containment Isolation: (met)

ATC

Containment pressure < 0.85 psig.

Containment Isolation: (not met)

Verify Containment Area Monitor alarms clear.

Verify Condenser Off Gas Monitor alarm clear (will be in alarm BOP

- no RNO actions).

Verify Main Steam Line Monitor alarms clear (will be in alarm -

no RNO actions).

Containment Atmosphere: (met)

ATC

Verify Containment temperature less than 125 °F.

Verify Containment pressure less than 0.85 psig.

BOP

VERIFY IA pressure > 85 psig.

ATC VERIFY SIRWT level > 25 %.

ENSURE CR HVAC is aligned for Emergency Mode Operation within 20 mins of time of Reactor Trip:

VERIFY Supply Fan V-95 or V-96 for desired train is ON.

BOP

ENSURE Air Filter Unit Fan V-26A or V-26B for desired train is ON.

ENSURE OFF V-94 Purge Fan and V-47 Swgr Exh Fan.

Appendix D 19 Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2020 Scenario No.:NRC-2 Event No.:7/8 Page 3 of 9 Event

Description:

B SGTR With B S/G ESDE Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior VERIFY at least one Condensate Pump and one Cooling Tower BOP Pump operating.

Note: If S/G Pressures <800 psig or if crew determined personnel or equipment safety was in jeopardy, then the MSIVs will be closed.

BOP VERIFY MSIVs are open OR MSIV Bypass valves are open.

Commence Emergency Shutdown Checklist (GOP-10), as time SRO permits.

SRO Commence EOP Supplement 45 SFP Monitoring.

ATC BOP turns over panels to the ATC.

BOP NOTE: Pending the timing of EOP-1.0 completion, the transition could be to EOP-5.0, SGTR until the ESDE is apparent. The crew must ultimately end in EOP -9.0, Functional Recovery.

Diagnoses SGTR AND ESDE on B S/G using EOP-1.0 Att 1 SRO Event Diagnostic Flow Chart and transition to EOP-9.0, Functional Recovery Procedure.

Appendix D 20 Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2020 Scenario No.: NRC-2 Event No.:7/8 Page 4 of 9 Event

Description:

B SGTR With B S/G ESDE Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO Conducts Transition Brief per Placard. Solicits input from Crew Directs SM to refer to the Site Emergency Plan.

SRO Establishes bands for EOP-9.0 strategy.

SRO ATC Implements bands and EOP-9.0 strategy.

If PZR pressure < 1300 psia and SIAS is initiated:

ENSURES one PCP is stopped in each loop ATC

If PCS is less than 25oF subcooled, then ENSURES all PCPs stopped.

IF PCPs are operating, ATC THEN VERIFIES PCP operating limits are satisfied. Refer to EOP Supplement 1.

Appendix D 21 Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2020 Scenario No.:NRC-2 Event No.:7/8 Page 5 of 9 Event

Description:

B SGTR With B S/G ESDE Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP If open, closes CV-1064 and CV-1065, CWRT Vent Valves.

ENSURES at least one train of CR HVAC in Emergency Mode.

BOP Refer to SOP-24, "Ventilation and Air Conditioning System."

IF ALL of the following conditions exist:

Steam Generator Blowdown Monitor, RIA-0707, has NOT alarmed

SIAS has NOT occurred SRO OR has been reset

CHP and CHR signals are NOT present, THEN SAMPLES S/Gs for activity and Lithium AND VERIFY sample results do NOT PLACES at least one Hydrogen Monitor in operation, ensuring the BOP appropriate Key Switch in the "ACCI" position. ."

Identifies the Resources and Success Paths SRO RC3, AC2, DC1, IC2, PC3, HR2, CI1, CA1. MVAW1, MVAA1 Enters EOP-9.0 CI-1, Containment Isolation and determines that SRO Heat Removal Success Path must be implemented and enters EOP-9.0 HR-2 and directs actions.

Verifies Attachment 1, Safety Function Status Check Sheet, SRO acceptance criteria are satisfied at intervals of approximately every 15 mins.

Appendix D 22 Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2020 Scenario No.:NRC-2 Event No.:7/8 Page 6 of 9 Event

Description:

B SGTR With B ESDE with Failure of SIAS Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Verifies SIAS and directs the following:

EOP Supplement 5.

SRO

EOP Supplement 4.

Either directs BOP to report equipment out of position OR directs repositioning to EOP Supp 5.

ENSURES available safeguards equipment operating (EOP Supplement 5)

Performs the following actions:

Direct NPO to locally close:

CV-0944, Evap CCW Supply.

CV-0977B, Evap CCW Return.

CV-1359 to CLOSE

CV-0869 to CLOSE

P-7B to START BOP

V-4B to OFF

CV-0938 to OPEN

CV-0937 to OPEN

CV-0944A to CLOSE

MO-2169 to OPEN

MO-2170 to OPEN

MO-2140 to OPEN

P-56A to START

P-56B to START Simulator Operator:

When requested by NCO, wait eight minutes and report CV-0944 and CV-0977B are closed.

Appendix D 23 Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2020 Scenario No.: NRC-2 Event No.:7/8 Page 7 of 9 Event

Description:

B SGTR With B ESDE with Failure of SIAS Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP VERIFIES at least minimum SI flow (EOP Supplement 4)

BOP Closes CV-1064 and CV-1065, CWRT Vent Valves if still open.

SRO Establishes operating bands for the current plant conditions (PCS Pressure, Temperature C/D Rate, Prz Level, S/G ATC Pressures and Levels.

Commences Steaming while monitoring the PCS Cooldown ATC rate due to the ESDE.

ATC Provides a crew update when all PCS TH <524°F.

Appendix D 24 Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2020 Scenario No.: NRC-2 Event No.:7/8 Page 8 of 9 Event

Description:

B SGTR With B ESDE with Failure of SIAS Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CRITICAL TASK: Isolation of Ruptured S/G from the Control Room within 50 minutes.

Performs EOP Supplement 13, B S/G SGTR Isolation BOP Checklist:

Performs an SI Throttling Brief as conditions approach throttling.

PCS at least 25F Subcooling.

> 20% PZR Level.

SRO

At least one S/G available.

RVLMS > 102 inches.

Reactivity Control Safety Function met.

CRITICAL TASK: Throttle Safety Injection prior to going solid in the Pressurizer.

Appendix D 25 Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2020 Scenario No.:NRC-2 Event No.:7/8 Page 9 of 9 Event

Description:

B SGTR With B ESDE with Failure of SIAS Cue: ??

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CRITICAL TASK: Throttle SI prior to going solid in the Pressurizer.

ATC Throttles SI as directed.

NOTE: The differences between EOP-Supplement 13 and EOP Supplement 18 are the MSIV bypass valve for the unaffected S/G and the plant isolation steps for radiological concerns.

Performs EOP Supplement 18, B S/G ESDE Isolation Checklist:

ENSURES CLOSED BOTH MSIVs:*

CV 0510, A' S/G MSIV

CV 0501, B' S/G MSIV

ENSURES CLOSED BOTH MSIV Bypass Valves.

MO 0510, 'A' S/G MSIV Bypass

MO 0501, 'B' S/G MSIV Bypass

CLOSES CV 0703, B' S/G Main Feed Reg Valve.

CLOSES CV 0744, B' S/G Main Feed Reg Block Valve.

BOP (KEY: 144)

CLOSES CV 0734, B' S/G Bypass Feed Reg Valve.

CLOSES the following S/G E 50B Blowdown Valves:

CV 0768

CV 0770

CV 0738

CLOSES the following S/G E 50B Auxiliary Feedwater Flow Control Valves:

CV 0736

CV 0736A

CV 0727 Termination per Lead Examiner- A controlled cooldown (as possible with events given) needs to be achieved before termination.

Appendix D 26 Form ES-D-2 CRITICAL TASKS With the plant operating in MODE 1, 2, or 3 and:

A LOCA, SGTR, or ESDE in progress AND

PCS pressure has lowered below SIAS setpoint (1605 psia)

NEITHER SI train has automatically actuated OR PC-CT16-SIAS/Required Flow

PCS pressure is below the shutoff head of the HPSI and/or LPSI pumps and safety (Respond to a failure of safety injection injection flow is less than the minimum actuation signal or required flow) flow requirements of EOP supplement 4 (Manual initiation of safety injection is possible) the crew takes action to manually initiate SI (manual pushbuttons) or start SI pumps and align loop injection valves as necessary to establish required SI flow greater than the minimum EOP supplement 4 curve for current PCS pressure prior to the PCS (CET) subcooling indicating less than zero degrees subcooling.

With the plant operating in MODES 1, 2, or 3 and:

An ESDE in progress

MSIS has not actuated or did not isolate CI-CT14-ESDEISOL (TCA) the ESDE

Auxiliary feedwater initiated to both steam (Isolate a steam generator during an ESDE) generators the crew isolates all feedflow to most affected S/G within 30 minutes of the initiation of the ESDE (t=0).

Appendix D 27 Form ES-D-2 CRITICAL TASKS With the plant operating in MODES 1, 2, or 3 and:

SGTR in progress CI-CT14 -SGTRISOL

All narrow range Thot indicate less than 524°F (Isolate a steam generator during a SGTR)

Affected S/G has NOT been isolated the crew isolates the most affected steam generator IAW EOP supplement 12 or 13 within 50 minutes of initiation of a steam generator tube rupture (t=0).

With the plant operating in MODES 1, 2, or 3 and:

A LOCA, SGTR, or ESDE is occurring

Plant cooldown and depressurization are in progress

HPSI makeup exceeds the required PCS HR-CT30-THROTTLESI makeup as noted by a rising pressurizer level trend (Throttle HPSI flow when conditions allow)

HPSI flow has NOT been throttled

Safety Injection Throttle criteria is met per the in use EOP the crew throttles SI flow to prevent filling the PZR solid as indicated by rapidly rising pressure.

Appendix D 28 Form ES-D-2 EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION EAL Threshold met EAL FA1.1 PCS Potential Loss #4 OR PCS Loss #2 Indication Indications of SGTR, RIA-0631 rising.

Release in Yes.

Progress SGTR in progress.

EAL Threshold: Met 2 minutes after TRIGGER 6.

EAL FS1.1 PCS Loss 2, Pot Loss 4 AND Containment Loss 3 OR Containment Loss 4 Indication ESDE from failed open Sec Relief and Hi Rad on Same S/G Release in YES.

Progress SGTR and Secondary Relief lifting in same S/G

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: Palisades Scenario No.: NRC-3 Op-Test No.: NRC 2020 Examiners: ___________________________ Operators: ____________________________

Initial Conditions: The plant is at 60 % power escalating to full power. The second Main Feedwater Pump has just been started.

Turnover: Shift orders are to alternate CCW pumps and then continue power escalation in accordance with procedure GOP-5 at a ramp rate of 12%/hr.

Critical Tasks:

1. Manually start CCW within 10 minutes of exceeding the operating limits of any PCP.

2. Manually trip the main turbine within one minute of the reactor trip.

3. Isolate Aux Feedwater to the S/G with ESDE within 30 minutes AND MSIVs prior to 450psia in faulted S/G.

4. Throttle SI before Pressurizer reaches 100%.

Event Malf. Event Event No. No. Type* Description 1 N/A BOP (N) Alternate CCW pumps to place P-52B in service.

SRO (N) 2 N/A ATC (R) Power Escalation at 12%/hr.

BOP (N)

SRO (N) 3 ED08A ATC (C) Loss of EY-10, Preferred AC BOP (C)

SRO (TS) 4 CC02B ATC (C) Trip of CCW Pump with failure of auto start on other pumps CC13A SRO (TS)

CC13C 5 RX15B BOP (C) Main Steam Flow Transmitter Failure 6 RX08B ATC (I) Pressurizer Level Channel (2) fails downscale demand 7 TC04D N/A Main Turbine GV failure, requiring manual reactor trip 7 MS15B ATC (C) ESDE outside of Containment 9 TC02 BOP (C) Main Turbine Auto Trip Failure, manual trip available 10 MS15B ALL (M) ESDE severity rises, MSIVs fail to auto close 11 CC13A BOP (C) Failure of Second CCW Pump to auto start on the SIAS.

CC13C

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC Scenario 3 Summary The plant is at 60% power and escalating. MFP P-1B was just started.

Setup:

The BOP will alternate CCW pumps as a normal evolution to place P-52B in service.

The Crew will continue the power escalation at 12%/hr.

After the reactivity change, a loss of Preferred Bus EY-10 occurs due to a tripped DC input breaker. Operable channels will be selected for the heater controls by the ATC. The BOP will bypass reactor trip channels, and place EY-10 on the bypass regulator. The BOP will coordinate local closure of isolation valve for MFP P-1A recirc valve. The SRO will investigate several Tech Specs.

A trip of a CCW pump with the failure of the standby auto start feature will require the ATC to manually start a CCW pump. The SRO will apply Tech specs.

A Main Steam Flow Transmitter failure affects Main Feed Flow requiring manual control and adjustments by the BOP. NO Tech Specs, NO ORM.

A PLCS level channel failure requires manual action by the ATC and BOP. The ATC will attempt to take manual control (unsuccessfully) and then switch to non-failed channel of Pressurizer Level Control. NO Tech Specs, NO ORM. (If PZR level doesnt exceed LCO 3.4.9 limits).

A Governor valve fails closed resulting in the need for a manual reactor trip, causing a pressure spike in the Main Steam system that results in a weld failure where a Main Steam Safety Valve connects. This 0.75 % failure high energy line break is ramped in over a one minute period and causes PCS Temperature and pressure to lower and power to rise prior to the trip.

The Turbine fails to auto trip and requires the BOP to manually trip the turbine from the Main Turbine Control Panel in the Control Room. When the rest of the turbine valves close, the additional spike in steam pressure causes the weld failure to worsen. The steam leaks grows to 6% failure over 5 minutes.

The crew should close the MSIVs based on lowering SG pressure and PCS cooldown. The auto closure of the MSIVs at 500 psig is failed.

On the SIAS the second CCW Pump will not auto start in auto requiring the BOP to start in post SIAS checklist. The crew responds per EOP-6.0 ESDE.

The scenario terminates when the crew has controlled the cooldown.

Bean Count:

ATC: 1R, 4 I/Cs, 1M, BOP: 2N, 4 I/Cs, 1M SRO: 2N, 2 TS, 1M

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Event # Remote or Instructions Trigger #

N/A Active CC13A, P-52A Failure to Auto Start = Active Malfunction N/A Active CC13C, P-52C Failure to Auto Start = Active Malfunction N/A Active TC02, Fail of Turb Auto Trip Actuation = Active Malfunction N/A Active TC02, Fail of Turb Auto Trip Actuation = Active = Delete on Malfunction Trigger 10 (Manual TT Pushbutton)

N/A Active MS01A, Stm Gen Isltn Vlve CV-0510 Fails To Shut = Active Malfunction N/A Active MS01B, Stm Gen Isltn Vlve CV-0501 Fails To Shut = Active Malfunction 3 1 ED08A, Loss of Preferred AC Bus No. 1 = Active 4 2 CC02B, Loss CC Wter Pump P-52B = Active 5 3 RX15B, Main Stm Flow Transmitter Fail FT-0704 on a 2:00 minute ramp to 100 6 4 RX08B, Prszer Lvl Cntrl Dwnscl Demand LT-0101B = Active 7 5 TC04D, Turbine Cntrl Vlv CV-4 Fails Shut = Active 8 5 MS15B, Stm Line No. 2 Brk Just Outside of Cont on a 1:00 minute ramp to 0.75 9 Active TC02, Main Turbine Auto Trip failure=ACTIVE Malfunction TRIGGER 10 allows manual PB to work.

10 7 MS15B, Stm Line No. 2 Brk Just Outside of Cont on a 5:00 minute ramp to 6.0 11 Active Failure of Second CCW Pump to auto start on the SIAS.

Malfunction TRIGGERS 7 SD group A Rod Ramps ESDE larger after reactor trip.

1 <100 10 zdi3p(136) Allows manual turbine trip pushbutton to work 11 Manual Remote FW63, FW-0733 Manual Valve=0 12 Manual Remote, ED46, By-Pass Regulator to Y10= CLOSED Special Instructions:

Ensure CCW Pump, P-52A in service.

Ensure marked up copy of GOP-5, GCL-5.1 signed off up to step 4.3

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 INITIAL PROCEDURE AND STEP Chemistry 2231 ENPM 914-272-3459 CRDM leakage:

Protected Equipment 0 ml/min. Duty Station Reactor GOP-5, GCL 5.1 Step 4.3 3688 2497 Charging Pump Seal leakage: Manager Engineering P-55A = 0 ml/min, P-55B/C = 0 Electrical 2446 Security 2264/2278 ml/min. Shop Zinc Injection: Engineer on MECS 2438 248-380-2931 Call Balancing 0 ml/min.

Health Trans Sys T-90, PMWT Temperature: 2230 248-380-2901 Physics Coord 85 degrees F. Instrument Work Control 2247 2282

& Control Center Work Week Bret Baker 2332 3500 Manager Boron: 938ppm Weather: Sunny. ACTIVITY: PER PPC OFFGAS: 7.2 SCFM Power History over the last 24 Surveillances Completed Last PLANNED ACTIVITIES hours Shift 1. Remove CCW P-52A and place P-52B in service for Maintenance.

60% Steady State N/A

2. MFP, P-1B been returned following maintenance on the Three 40 gallon dilutions/shift Lube Oil System and the Combined Speed Control is in MANUAL.

3. Raise reactor power to 100% at 12%/hour.

PHOENIX SCORE: 1.0 INTEGRATED RISK: LOW EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS/OOS ACTION TIME Compensatory Actions/ Notes None N/A None.

Appendix D 1 Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2020 Scenario No.: NRC-3 Event No.: 1 Page 1 of 2 Event

Description:

Swap CCW Pumps.

Cue:

Orders for the Shift on turnover.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO Directs actions to place P-52B, CCW Pump, in service.

BOP Refers to SOP-16, section 7.3.6.

Directs NPO to perform steps locally to ensure P-52B is ready to BOP start.

Simulator Operator:

Provide only information requested as NPO, report:

MV-CC920 and MV-CC942, P-52B suction and discharge valves are locked open.

MV-CC557, CCW P-52B Casing Vent, is opened and closed to vent air from the casing.

Initial CCW Hx Ps are E-54A = 6.6 psid, E-54B = 6.8 psid.

BOP VERIFIES both CCW Heat Exchangers in operation.

ATC Provides Peer checks when requested Starts P-52B by placing control switch 152-208 CS to TRIP (to BOP remove from STANDBY) and then to CLOSE.

Verify proper pump response (amps and discharge pressure).

BOP Stops P-52A by placing control switch 152-109CS to TRIP.

Places P-52A in standby:

BOP

Depress amber STANDBY button above control switch.

Verify amber light is LIT.

Requests final reading on CCW Heat Exchangers differential BOP pressure. (May request).

Appendix D 2 Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2020 Scenario No.: NRC-3 Event No.: 1 Page 2 of 2 Event

Description:

Swap CCW Pumps.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator:

If asked as NPO after starting P-52BA report:

CCW Hx Ps are: E-54A = 6.7 psid, E-54B = 6.8 psid.

Continue to Event 2.

Appendix D 3 Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2020 Scenario No.: NRC-3 Event No.: 2 Page 1 of 3 Event

Description:

Commence Power Escalation.

Cue:

Orders for the Shift on turnover Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior At the Lead Examiners discretion, INSERT Trigger 1 during this event.

Enters and directs the actions of GOP-5, Power Escalation in Mode SRO 1.

SRO Reviews GOP-5 Precautions and Limitations with crew.

Note:

CRS may notify ENPM, BA, RP, and Chemistry of impending load change.

SRO Performs reactivity brief with crew.

Note:

Crew should use Cycle 27 Reactivity Management Briefing.

Selects ramp speed and rate (at 12% per hour), using SOP-8 Attachment 10:

PRESSES CONTROL SETPOINT on the Displays keypad.

ENTERS Setter value on numeric keypad

PRESSES SELECT on the numeric keypad AND OBSERVES BOP the following:

HOLD displayed in the upper right corner of the CRT.

HOLD light/pushbutton illuminates on the Manual Panel.

PRESSES TAB RIGHT on the cursor keypad.

ENTERS desired acceleration rate using numeric keypad.

PRESSES SELECT on the numeric keypad.

Appendix D 4 Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2020 Scenario No.: NRC-3 Event No.: 2 Page 2 of 3 Event

Description:

Commence Power Escalation.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Requests Peer Check MAINTAINS TAVE within 3°F of TREF during the power escalation by regulating dilution and/or regulating rod withdrawal.

For Dilution (SOP-2A Att 12):

ENSURES CLOSED CV-2155 M/U Stop.

ENSURES one of the following in MANUAL and the other in OFF.

P-90A, PW M/U Pump.

P-90B, PW M/U Pump.

ENSURES RESET and in AUTO FIC-0210A, PW M/U Boration flow.

ENSURES ZERO output signal on FIC-0210A, PW M/U ATC Boration flow.

SETS quantity and batch flow limit on FIC-0210A, PW flow controller

OPENS CV-2155, M/U Stop.

PUSHES start pushbutton on FIC-0210A.

MONITORS Reactor Power and TAVG.

WHEN dilution complete, THEN ENSURES FIC-0210A output signal at zero.

CLOSES CV-2155.

For Control Rod manipulations:

Operates Rod Control Switch to RAISE to WITHDRAW Group 4 Regulating Rods in increments specified by CRS.

MONITORS reactor power using highest indicated dT power and TAVE.

Diverts, as needed, around the VCT due to rising VCT level from the dilution by:

ATC

Placing CV-2056 handswitch AMS-2056 to CWRT.

When divert is complete, returns CV-2056 handwitch AMS-2056 to AUTO

Appendix D 5 Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2020 Scenario No.: NRC-3 Event No.: 2 Page 3 of 3 Event

Description:

Commence Power Escalation.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Requests Peer Check.

Initiates load change (SOP-8 Att 10):

ENSURES Limiter setting will not interfere with desired change.

PERFORMS ONE of the following:

o PRESSES GO pushbutton on Manual Panel BOP o PRESSES GO/HOLD custom key on Display keypad o PRESSES SELECT on numeric keypad, then PRESSES START on control keypad.

OBSERVE HOLD light extinguishes and GO light illuminates.

WHEN ramp is complete, THEN VERIFIES GO/HOLD light extinguished.

Provides CREW UPDATE.

NOTE: DO NOT allow Crew to raise power to > 80% or it will cause the operators to trip the reactor on the next event.

Continue to Event 3

Appendix D 6 Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2020 Scenario No.: NRC-3 Event No.: 3 Page 1 of 4 Event

Description:

Loss of Preferred AC EY-10.

Cue:

Channel 'A' RPS Trip Ladder Logic Lights Illuminated.

Many alarms including:

EK-0543, "PREFERRED AC BUS NUMBER 1 TROUBLE" Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior At the Lead Examiners discretion, INSERT Trigger 1.

Uses CREW UPDATE to announce Transient Alarm SRO Response.

Directs Crew to stop power ascension.

BOP

Places Main Turbine in HOLD and provides CREW UPDATE.

Stops dilution if still in progress.

ATC

Stops Dilution Blender

CLOSES CV-2155 Diagnoses Loss of EY-10 and enters AOP-12, Loss of Preferred Bus EY-10.

SRO

Directs actions.

Provides CRE UPDATE for Reactor Trip Criteria.

Directs NPOs to:

BOP

Investigate Bus EY-10 breaker status.

Close MV-FW733, Feed Pump P-1A Recirc Valve Stop.

Simulator Operator Respond to direction given:

CV-0711 is failed open.

NPO to close MV-FW733, wait three minutes and insert Trigger 11.

NPO to EY-10, report in four minutes that DC Input Breaker is TRIPPED OPEN and the AC Output Breaker is CLOSED.

SRO Refers to SOP-3, Main Feedwater Transients.

Appendix D 7 Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2020 Scenario No.: NRC-3 Event No.: 3 Page 2 of 4 Event

Description:

Loss of Preferred AC EY-10.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Manually operates Charging System to maintain Pressurizer level ATC between 42% and 57%.

Positions HS 1/LIC-0101, Heater Control Selector Switch, to ATC CHANNEL B.

RESTORES Pressurizer Heaters from LCC-16, Load Control Center 16, as follows:

ENSURES Pressurizer level greater than or equal to 36%.

BOP

MATCHES control switch target with breaker position for 152-211, Bus 1D to PZR Heater Xfmr EX-16.

CLOSES breaker 152-211.

Appendix D 8 Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2020 Scenario No.: NRC-3 Event No.: 3 Page 3 of 4 Event

Description:

Loss of Preferred AC EY-10.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NOTE: Bypassing the Trip Units may not be performed immediately.

Bypasses ALL Channel A RPS Trip Units per SOP-36, Step 7.4.2.

Bypass desired RPS Trip Unit (or each CH A RPS Trip Unit):

1. ENSURES the RPS Bypass Key is the correct key for the RPS Trip Unit to be bypassed.

2. INSERTS bypass key above affected RPS Trip BOP Unit.

3. TURNS key 90° clockwise.

4. VERIFIES the yellow light above the bypass keyswitch is ON.

5. RECORDS evolution in the Operations Log unless logged in the applicable procedure.

After information from NPO at EY-10 is received:

Determines that EY-10 is Fault Free.

SRO

Updates Crew.

Directs EY-10 be placed on the Bypass Regulator.

SRO Refers to and implements the following Tech Spec LCO:

3.8.7 DC Inverter, Cond A, Restore in 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

3.8.9 Distribution System, Cond B, Restore in 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months .

3.3.1 RPS Instrumentation, Cond A, Place in trip 7 days Admin 4.11 review is required for support /supported systems.

SRO Requests SE to perform a review of Reportability and Notifications requirements.

Appendix D 9 Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2020 Scenario No.: NRC-3 Event No.: 3 Page 4 of 4 Event

Description:

Loss of Preferred AC EY-10.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Direct NPO to place EY-10 on the Bypass Regulator per SOP-30, BOP 7.6.2.

Provides CREW UPDATE prior to energizing Bus.

Simulator Operator When directed to place EY-10 on the Bypass regulator, wait five minutes and insert Trigger 12, (ED46 to Close)

NOTE: Once power is restored to EY10, the crew may restore any or all components manipulated during this failure.

NOTE: Not allowing the crew to restore power to EY-10 will change the response remaining events due to control systems not having power.

SRO

Briefs crew using Transient Brief Checklist, EN-OP-200, Att 1.

Calls Duty Station Manager to activate support personnel for the condition.

Notifications, Risk, Contingency actions.

Continue with Event 4

Appendix D 10 Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2020 Scenario No.: NRC-3 Event No.: 4 Page 1 of 2 Event

Description:

Trip of CCW Pump, P-52B, with Failure of Auto Start of Standby CCW pumps Cue:

Red Light OFF on P-52B.

Lowering CCW Pressure and Amps.

Low flow alarms for components cooled by CCW.

EK-1167, Component Clg Pumps P-52A, P-52B, P-52C Trip.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior At the Lead Examiners discretion, INSERT Trigger 2.

Diagnosis of failure of P-52B.

Indications:

Lowering CCW Pressure and Amps.

Red Light OFF on P-52B.

ATC Alarms:

EK-1167, Component Clg Pumps P-52A,P-52B, P-52C Trip.

EK-0931-34, Pri Coolant Pump P-50A/B/C/D Clg Wtr Lo Flow.

Enters AOP-36, Loss of Component Cooling.

Directs actions.

SRO

Provides CREW UPDATE for Reactor Trip Criteria .

Verifies T-3, CCW Surge Tank, > 47%.

ATC

Starts P-52A OR P-52C.

CRITICAL TASK: Manually start CCW within 10 minutes of exceeding the operating limits of any PCP.

Appendix D 11 Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2020 Scenario No.: NRC-3 Event No.:4 Page 2 of 2 Event

Description:

Trip of CCW Pump, P-52B, with Failure of Auto Start of Standby CCW pumps.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Verifies adequate CCW flow available via:

PCP Seal temperatures.

TIC-0203, Low Pressure Letdown Flow Temp Control.

ATC

TIA-0931, TIA-0933, Reactor Shield Cooling Coil Outlet BOP Temps.

FI-0971, FI-0972, FI-0973, Comp Clg Wtr Outlet Flow Charging PPs.

SRO Refers to and implements the following Tech Spec LCO:

3.7.7, Cond A, Restore to OPERABLE in 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months .

Admin 4.11 review is required for support /supported systems.

SRO

Briefs crew using Transient Brief Checklist, EN-OP-200, Att 1.

Calls Duty Station Manager to activate support personnel for the condition.

Notifications, Risk, Contingency actions.

Continue to Event 5

Appendix D 12 Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2020 Scenario No.: NRC-3 Event No.:5 Page 1 of 1 Event

Description:

Main Steam Flow Transmitter Fails.

Cue:

Indicated Steam Flow rising on B S/G.

Heat Balance Power Changing.

CV-0703 opening.

B S/G Level Rising.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior At the Lead Examiners discretion, INSERT Trigger 3.

Diagnosis of failure Steam Flow Input to B S/G level controller

Indicated Steam Flow rising on B S/G.

Heat Balance Power Transient rising.

BOP

CV-0703 opening.

B S/G level rising.

Alarms:

EK-0963, Steam Generator E-50B Hi Level (Possible).

Enters AOP-3, Main Feedwater Transient.

SRO

Directs actions.

Uses update for Reactor Trip Criteria NOTE: If the Hi level is reached in the B S/G a High Level Override will occur and close CV-0703 automatically. If levels are not maintained between 60%-90%, then a Manual Reactor Trip is required Takes manual control of the following:

BOP

CV-0703, E-50B Feed Regulating Valve.

SRO

Briefs crew using Transient Brief Checklist, EN-OP-200, Att 1.

Calls Duty Station Manager to activate support personnel for the condition.

Provides Operating Bands for Controller in MANUAL.

Assigns BOP CRITICAL PARAMETER of S/G Level, (65%

and encompassing current level).

Continue to Event 6

Appendix D 13 Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2020 Scenario No.: NRC-3 Event No.:6 Page 1 of 2 Event

Description:

Failure of the Pressurizer Level Control.

Cue:

Pressurizer Program input Fails High

Charging Pump, P-55A speed lowers

Actual Pressurizer Level lowers

EK-0761, Pressurizer Level Hi-Lo Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior At the Lead Examiners discretion, INSERT Trigger 4.

NOTE: If EY-10 is NOT on the Bypass Regulator, then Pressurizer Level Control will not work on either channel.

Diagnoses failure B Channel of Pressurizer Level Control

Pressurizer Program input fails high.

P-55A, Charging Pump, speed lowers.

ATC

Actual Pressurizer level lowers.

Alarms:

EK-0761, Pressurizer Level Hi-Lo.

Enters AOP-22, Pressurizer Level Control Malfunctions, and provides CREW UPDATE.

SRO

Directs actions.

Provides CREW UPDATE for Reactor Trip Criteria.

Requests Peer Check and attempts MANUAL control of ATC LIC-0101B. (has no impact.)

ALTERNATES Pressurizer Level Controllers as follows:

ENSURES controller (LIC-0101A) in MANUAL.

Using manual operating lever, ADJUSTS output signal of the controller to be selected to match the output signal of ATC the currently selected controller or to desired output.

PLACES HS 1/LRC-0101, Pressurizer Level Control Selector Switch, to Channel A.

PLACES HS 1/LIC-0101, Heater Control Selector Switch, in the Channel A position.

Appendix D 14 Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2020 Scenario No.: NRC-3 Event No.:6 Page 2 of 2 Event

Description:

Failure of the Pressurizer Level Control Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior IF operation in CASCADE is directed, THEN PERFORMS the following:

VERIFIES expected TAVE signal available from selected TAVE/TREF controller (TYT-0100, TYT-0200).

ATC

Using raise/lower pushbuttons, SLOWLY ADJUSTS selected controller setpoint (blue pointer) to the Pressurizer level setpoint determined by present TAVE.

DEPRESSES the "A" pushbutton on LIC-0101A.

DEPRESSES the "C" pushbutton on LIC-0101A.

BOP Maintains S/G Levels with a controller in Manual.

SRO

Briefs crew using Transient Brief Checklist, EN-OP-200, Att 1.

Calls Duty Station Manager to activate support personnel for the condition Continue to Event 7

Appendix D 15 Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2020 Scenario No.: NRC-3 Event No.:7 Page 1 of 1 Event

Description:

Turbine GV-4 Fails Closed requiring manual reactor trip.

Cue:

Indication on DEH panel

Load lowering initially.

Steam Generator pressure rising initially.

PCS temperature rising initially.

Reactor power lowering initially.

EK-0318, TURBINE PANEL TROUBLE, alarms.

Steam noise from outside CR.

Above parameters starting to reverse pending size of leak at the time of Reactor trip.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior At the Lead Examiners discretion, INSERT Trigger 5.

Provides CREW UPDATE.

Diagnoses Turbine GV-4 failing closed:

EK-0318, TURBINE PANEL TROUBLE, alarms.

Indication on DEH panel.

BOP

Load lowering.

Steam Generator pressure rising.

PCS temperature rising.

Reactor power lowering.

Enters AOP-1, Loss of Load, and provides CREW UPDATE.

SRO

Direct the actions of AOP.

Uses update for Reactor Trip Criteria.

Places Turbine Controls to MANUAL by depressing Turbine BOP Manual pushbutton on DEH.

Determines Turbine GV-4 is NOT responding in MANUAL and SRO directs a Reactor Trip.

Appendix D 16 Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2020 Scenario No.: NRC-3 Event No.:8/9 Page 1 of 8 Event Description B ESDE on MSSV line, with turbine auto-trip failure.

Cue:

Turbine does not trip when reactor is tripped.

Steam noise from outside CR.

Steam Generator pressure lowering.

PCS temperature lowering.

B S/G level? lowering faster than A S/G.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Trigger 7, The magnitude of the ESDE is increased when the MSIVs are closed.

Simulator Operator:

If contacted by Control Room as NPO to check on steam leak, wait three minutes and REPLY back there is a steam break on the steam line near the Main Steam Safety Valves ATC Depresses RPS-PB1, Reactor Trip, pushbutton on Panel C-02.

ATC/BOP Performs EOP-1.0 Immediate Actions.

SRO Commences EOP-1.0 verbal verifications.

Reactivity Control: (met)

Reactor power lowering.

ATC

Negative SUR.

Maximum of one control rod not inserted.

CRITICAL TASK: Manually Trip the Turbine within 1 minute of failure to automatically trip following a Reactor trip.

Turbine trip criteria: (met with contingency actions)

Main Turbine does not trip and must be manually tripped from BOP PB-20AST.

Generator disconnected from grid.

Feedwater System criteria: (met)

PLACES MFP Controller to MANUAL and RAMPS to minimum BOP speed.

Main Feed Regulating Valves and Bypass Feed Regulating valves CLOSED.

Appendix D 17 Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2020 Scenario No.: NRC-3 Event No.:8/10/11 Page 2 of 8 Event Description B ESDE, with failure of MSIVs to auto close, and second CCW pump fail to auto start Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Vital Auxiliaries-Electric: (met)

Buses 1C and 1D energized.

Bus 1E energized (If SIAS is not actuated).

Bus 1A and 1B energized.

BOP

EY-01 energized.

3 of 4 Preferred AC Buses energized.

Six DC Buses energized.

Main Feed Pump Trip Power available lights LIT.

AFW Pump control power lights LIT.

MSIV control power lights LIT.

VERIFY adequate PCP seal cooling: (met)

At least one CCW Pump operating.

BOP

At least one SW Pump operating.

Both Critical SW headers in operation with pressure > 42 psig.

CCW Containment Isol Valves open, CV-0910 / 0911 / 0940.

PCS Inventory Control: (not met)

PZR level 20% - 85% and trending toward normal (42% - 57%).

ATC

PCS 25°F subcooled (use Thot for forced circulation).

Takes actions to manually control Charging and Letdown.

PCS Pressure Control: (not met)

PZR pressure 1650 to 2185 psia and trending toward normal (2010 to 2100 psia).

Manually operates PPCS in MANUAL and operate PZR heaters and sprays to maintain EOP Supplement 1 limits.

ATC

When PCS pressure is < 1605 psia, verify Safety Injection initiated:

Verify EK-1342 in alarm.

Verify all available HPSI and LPSI pumps in service and valves open.

When PCS pressure is < 1300 psia, stop A and D PCPs.

Appendix D 18 Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2020 Scenario No.: NRC-3 Event No.:8/10/11 Page 3 of 8 Event Description B ESDE, with failure of MSIVs to auto close, and second CCW pump fail to auto start Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Core Heat Removal: (met)

At least one PCP operating.

ATC

Verify Loop T less than 10°F.

Verify PCS at least 25°F subcooled.

Containment Isolation: (met)

ATC

Containment pressure < 0.85 psig.

Containment Isolation: (met)

Verify Containment Area Monitor alarms clear.

BOP

Verify Condenser Off Gas Monitor alarm clear.

Verify Main Steam Line Monitor alarms clear.

Containment Atmosphere: (met)

Verify Containment temperature less than 125o F.

ATC

Verify Containment pressure less than 0.85 psig.

Appendix D 19 Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2020 Scenario No.: NRC-3 Event No.:8/10/11 Page 4 of 8 Event Description B ESDE, with failure of MSIVs to auto close, and second CCW pump fail to auto start Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ATC VERIFY IA pressure > 85 psig.

ATC VERIFY SIRWT level > 25%.

ENSURE CR HVAC is aligned for Emergency Mode Operation within 20 mins of time of Reactor Trip.

VERIFY Supply Fan V-95 or V-96 for desired train is ON.

BOP

ENSURE Air Filter Unit Fan V-26A or V-26B for desired train is ON.

ENSURE OFF V-94 Purge Fan and V-47 Swgr Exh Fan.

VERIFY at least one Condensate Pump and one Cooling Tower BOP Pump operating.

CRITICAL TASK: The crew isolates feedflow to most affected S/G within 30 minutes of the initiation of the ESDE.

AND The crew isolates the steam generators by closing the MSIVs, Mainfeed regulating valves, Mainfeed regulating bypass valves, IAW EOP Supplement 17/18 prior to the most affected steam generator pressure reaching 450 psia.

VERIFY MSIVs are open OR MSIV Bypass valves are open

Closes MSIVs due to S/G Pressure lowering or for personnel BOP and equipment protection.

Appendix D 20 Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2020 Scenario No.: NRC-3 Event No.:8/10/11 Page 5 of 8 Event Description B ESDE, with failure of MSIVs to auto close, and second CCW pump fail to auto start Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO Commence EOP Supplement 45, SFP Monitoring.

Diagnoses ESDE using EOP-1.0 Attachment 1 Event Diagnostic SRO Flow Chart and transition to EOP-6.0.

Diagnoses Main Steam line rupture outside containment:

S/G pressures and PCS temperatures and pressures lowering.

ATC/BOP

PCS subcooling rising.

Steam noise outside Control Room.

Verifies EOP-6.0 Attachment 1, Safety Function Status Check SRO Sheet, acceptance criteria are satisfied at intervals of approximately every 15 minutes.

SRO Conducts Transition Brief per Placard. Solicits input from Crew SRO Directs SM to review the Emergency Plan Verifies EK-1342, SAFETY INJ INITIATED, is alarmed due to ATC PZR pressure less than or equal to 1605 psia.

Appendix D 21 Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2020 Scenario No.: NRC-3 Event No.:8/10/11 Page 6 of 8 Event Description B ESDE, with failure of MSIVs to auto close, and second CCW pump fail to auto start Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ENSURES available safeguards equipment operating (EOP Supplement 5)

Directs NPO to locally close:

CV-0944 Evap CCW Supply.

BOP

CV-0977B Evap CCW Return.

Starts CCW Pumps

P-52A

P-52C Simulator Operator:

When requested by NCO, wait eight minutes and report CV-0944 and CV-0977B are closed.

Starts CCW Pumps, P-52A and P-52C per EOP Supplement 5 BOP If PZR level < 36%:

ATC

PLACES Letdown Orifice Stop Valve handswitches HS-2003, HS-2004, HS-2005, to CLOSE.

ENSURES MSIVs and Bypass valves closed if not already BOP accomplished.

VERIFIES one train of CR HVAC operating in Emergency Mode BOP per SOP-24, Ventilation and Air Conditioning System.

Determines B S/G is the most affected S/G by evaluating:

High steam flow from S/G.

BOP

Lowering S/G pressure.

Lowering S/G level.

Lowering loop Tcold temperatures.

Appendix D 22 Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2020 Scenario No.: NRC-3 Event No.:8/10/11 Page 7 of 8 Event Description B ESDE, with failure of MSIVs to auto close, and second CCW pump fail to auto start Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Isolates B S/G per EOP Supplement 18:

ENSURES CLOSED both MSIVs.

ENSURES CLOSED BOTH MSIV Bypass Valves.

CLOSES CV-0703, B S/G Main Feed Reg Valve

CLOSES CV-0744, B S/G Main Feed Reg Block Valve (Key:

144)

CLOSES CV-0734, B S/G Bypass Feed Reg Valve

CloseS B S/G blowdown valves:

BOP

CV-0768.

CV-0770.

CV-0738.

CLOSES B S/G AFW flow control valves:

CV-0736.

CV-0736A.

CV-0727.

Verifies the correct S/G is isolated:

S/G pressure.

BOP

S/G levels.

PCS Loop Tcold temperatures.

Stabilizes PCS temperature by maintaining level in the least BOP affected S/G between 60-70%.

STEAMS the least affected S/G as necessary to maintain the following:

Maintain the least affected S/G pressure within 50 psid above BOP the most affected S/G pressure.

When Tcold(s) in the affected loop are not lowering, STABILIZE PCS Tcold(s) using the least affected S/G.

Appendix D 23 Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2020 Scenario No.: NRC-3 Event No.:8/10/11 Page 8 of 8 Event Description B ESDE, with failure of MSIVs to auto close, and second CCW pump fail to auto start Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CRITICAL TASK: Throttle SI before Pressurizer reaches 100%.

VERIFIES SI Pump throttling criteria are satisfied by ALL of the following:

Based on the Average of Qualified CETs, PCS subcooling meets ONE of the following:

At least 25°F subcooled for non-degraded Containment conditions.

Greater than the minimum subcooling curve on EOP Supplement 1 for degraded Containment conditions.

SRO

Corrected PZR level is greater than 20% and controlled.

At least one S/G is available for PCS heat removal with corrected level being maintained or being restored to between 60% and 70%.

Operable RVLMS channels indicate greater than 102 inches above the bottom of fuel alignment plate (621' 8")

Directs ATC how the SI Throttling will be accomplished.

When conditions are present, THROTTLES SI as directed.

ATC When B S/G has been isolated, PCS temperature control has been established OR at discretion of the Lead Examiner, TERMINATE SCENARIO.

Appendix D 24 Form ES-D-2 CRITICAL TASKS With the plant operating in MODES 1, 2, or 3 and:

At least one PCP is operating OR Restore CCW Prior to PCP Damage

In service PCP in distress by indicating high vibrations or seal temperatures (t=0) the crew restores CCW to the effected PCPs within ten minutes:

With the plant operating in MODE 1 and:

A reactor trip has occurred

The main turbine has failed to automatically trip RC-CT01-MAINTURBTRIP the crew takes action to trip the Main Turbine within1 minute of failure to automatically trip (Trip the Main Turbine) following a reactor trip (t=0) by either:

Depressing the turbine trip pushbutton on EC-01 panel OR

Closing the MSIVs

Appendix D 25 Form ES-D-2 CRITICAL TASKS With the plant operating in MODES 1, 2, or 3 and:

An ESDE in progress

MSIS has not actuated or did not isolate CI-CT14-ESDEISOL (TCA) the ESDE

Auxiliary feedwater initiated to both steam (Isolate a steam generator during an ESDE) generators the crew isolates all feedflow to most affected S/G within 30 minutes of the initiation of the ESDE (t=0).

With the plant operating in MODES 1, 2, or 3 and:

A LOCA, SGTR, or ESDE is occurring

Plant cooldown and depressurization are in progress HR-CT30-THROTTLESI

HPSI makeup exceeds the required PCS makeup as noted by a rising pressurizer (Throttle HPSI flow when conditions allow) level trend

HPSI flow has NOT been throttled

Safety Injection Throttle criteria is met per the in use EOP the crew throttles SI flow to prevent filling the PZR solid as indicated by rapidly rising pressure.

Appendix D 26 Form ES-D-2 EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION NO Emergency Plan Classification

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: Palisades Nuclear Plant Scenario No.: NRC-4 Op-Test No.: NRC-2020 Examiners: ___________________________ Operators: ____________________________

Initial Conditions: The plant is at 25% power.

Turnover: Shift orders are to close 25F7 breaker in the switchyard.

Critical Tasks:

1. Trip PCP in distress within 10 minutes of reaching trip criteria.

2. Trip 2 Leave 2 PCP strategy - Trip 2 PCPs less than 3 minutes after reaching 1300 psia in the PCS

3. Remove all PCPs from operation when conditions do not support their operation. - Trip ALL PCPs within 10 minutes of exceeding the operating limits curve.

4. Energize Bus 1C OR 1D within 60 minutes of loss.

Event Malf. Event Event No. No. Type* Description 1 N/A BOP (N) Close switchyard breaker 25F7 2 N/A ATC (R) Power ascension BOP (N) 3 RM08C ATC (I/C) RIA-1810 failure low requiring ATC to close dampers for SRO (TS) Safeguards Room isolation.

4 P-40A-1 BOP (I/C) P-40A, Dilution Water Pump Trip requiring BOP valve throttling to SRO (TS) maintain Cooling tower levels.

5 CV17 ATC (C) VCT level failure resulting in charging suction swapping to SRWT requiring manual isolation of charging and letdown to prevent boration of PCS.

6 RC16D ATC (C) P-50D vibration resulting in manual reactor trip of reactor followed by securing of failing PCP.

7 RC21 ALL (M) Ramped Vapor Space LOCA 8 ED01 BOP (C) Loss of offsite power 10 minutes after P-50D is tripped.

ED12A Failures of both EDG requires manual action to restore power to ED11B either bus 1C or 1D.

9 ED01 ATC (C) Manually start of Instrument Air Compressor after EDG loading is completed.

10 ED01 ATC (C) Manual action required to restore Charging Pumps.

CV17 11 CH03AA BOP (C) After Loss of All AC, two Containment Air Cooling Fans (V-1A CH03BA and V-2A) trip off requiring manual action to start during post SIAS checklist.

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC Scenario 4 Summary The plant is at 25% power and escalating. Chemistry hold has just been removed.

Setup: Plant at 25% IC with Main Generator Output Breaker 25F7 breaker in the switchyard is open.

The BOP will close Main Generator Output Breaker, 25F7 as a normal evolution.

The Crew will continue the power escalation at 12%/hr to 49%.

After the reactivity change, RIA-1810, W Safeguards Room Radiation Monitor fails low. The ATC will place the associated dampers for this room to close to isolate the non-monitored radiation area. SRO will investigate TS requirements.

A trip of Dilution Water Pump, P-40A occurs requiring the BOP to manipulate flow to balance Cooling Tower levels. Dilution Pump is not TS however, the breaker that has tripped provides backup power to Pressurizer Heaters and is TS related. SRO TS review.

A failure of VCT level switch automatically re-configures the charging system to take suction from the SIRW Tank by closing the normal VCT valves and opening the SIRW Tank valve. ATC must diagnose this event and then manually remove charging and letdown from service.

Primary Coolant Pump, P-50D experiences a continual rising of vibrations until a reactor trip is required. The ATC must monitor conditions and manually trip the reactor. Once reactivity safety functions are met, P-50D must be removed from service.

On the reactor trip, a vapor space (Relief Valve) fails full open on a 5-minute ramp. Ten minutes later a loss of all offsite power occurs. The BOP must manually start EDG 1-1 to energize Bus 1C and Close the EDG 1-2 output breaker to energize Bus 1D. Two Containment Air Cooler Fans trip and fail to restart after D/G Loading. Manual starting is required from the BOP. The ATC must start charging pumps and Instrument Air Compressors to combat the VS LOCA.

The scenario terminates after the above actions are taken and the crew has initiated a PCS Cooldown.

Bean Count:

ATC: 1R, 5IC, 1M BOP: 2N, 3IC, 1M SRO: 2(TS), 2N, 1M

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC-4 Simulator Instructions

Initialize Simulator Protected IC-115 OR

Initialize IC-14 and Load NRC-4 Scenario Schedule and Event Triggers form jump drive.

Validate Malfunctions, Remotes and Overrides from Table below.

Event # Remote or Instructions Trigger #

N/A Active ED12A (ED08), Diesel Gen Fail To Auto Start 1-1 = ACTIVE.

Malfunction N/A Active ED11B (ED08), Diesel Gen Breaker Fail 1-2 = ACTIVE.

Malfunction N/A Active ED11B (ED08), Diesel Gen Breaker Fail 1-2, Delete in 1 sec from Malfunction Trigger 10 (152-213 to Close) = ACTIVE.

N/A Active 152-213-4 (Override), 2400V Bus 1D Switch 152-213 Close = OFF.

Malfunction 3 1 RM08C (RM04), Low Rad W Sfgrds Room RIQA-1810 = ACTIVE.

4 2 P-40-1 (Override), DWS P-40A Selector Switch Stop = ON.

5 3 CV17 (CV01), VCT Level Switch LS-0204 Failure = 0.

6 4 RC16D (RC06), High Vibration On Prim Cool PMP P-50D =

ACTIVE.

7 6 RC21 (RC02), Pres Safety Relief Vlve RV-1040 Leak = 100 with 5 minute ramp.

8 5 ED01 (ED03), Loss of All Offsite Power = Active with a 10 minute delay after Trigger 5 (Reactor Trip).

8 5 CH03BA (CH01), Cont Air Cooler Fan Fail V-2A = Active with 10:01 Delay (Dont restart after loss of AC) 8 5 CH03AA (CH01), Cont Air Cooler Fan Fail V-1A = Active with 10:01 Delay (Dont restart after loss of AC)

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 TRIGGERS

Description Reason 5 SD Group A Rod 1<100 Starts Loss of Offsite AC on timer from Reactor Trip 10 zdi5p(960) Allows manual closure of EDG1-2 Output Breaker when switch is closed manually.

15 zdi1p(93) Allows V-1A to be started manually from the C/S in the Control Room 16 zdi1p(100) Allows V-2A to be started manually from the C/S in the Control Room Special Instructions:

Ensure 25F7 breaker in the switchyard is open

C-01 Panel Feedwater Placard aligned as follows:

MV-FW0705 B MFP CLOSED

MV-FW0707 A MFP OPEN

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 INITIAL PROCEDURE AND STEP Chemistry 2231 ENPM 914-272-3459 CRDM leakage:

0 ml/min. GOP-5, GCL-5.1, Step 3.1 Duty Station Reactor 3688 2497 Charging Pump Seal leakage: Manager Engineering P-55A = 0 ml/min, P-55B/C = 0 Electrical 2446 Security 2264/2278 ml/min. Shop Zinc Injection: Engineer on MECS 2438 248-380-2931 Call Balancing 0 ml/min.

Health Trans Sys T-90, PMWT Temperature: 2230 248-380-2901 Physics Coord 85 degrees F. Instrument Work Control 2247 2282

& Control Center Work Week Bret Baker 2332 3500 Manager Boron: 938ppm Weather: Sunny. ACTIVITY: PER PPC OFFGAS: 7.2 SCFM Power History over the last 24 Surveillances Completed Last PLANNED ACTIVITIES hours Shift 1. Close Output Breaker 25F7

2. Raise power at 12%/hr to 49%.

25% Steady State N/A Three 40 gallon dilutions/shift PHOENIX SCORE: 1.0 INTEGRATED RISK: HIGH EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS/OOS ACTION TIME Compensatory Actions/ Notes CHEMISTRY HOLD LIFTED None.

AFTER FORCED OUTAGE FOR CRDM LEAK REPAIRS

Appendix D 1 Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2020 Scenario No.: NRC-4 Event No.: 1 Page 1 of 1 Event

Description:

Close Main Generator Output Breaker Cue:

Orders for the Shift on turnover.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO Briefs and directs BOP to CLOSE 25F7, Main Generator Output Breaker per SOP-32, 345 KV Switchyard, step 7.1.2.

BOP Performs CREW UPDATE prior to closing 25F7.

IF closing a generator breaker, THEN PERFORMS the following:

1. At Panel C-01, ENERGIZES Synchscope for breaker to be operated:

25F7, Generator Breaker.

2. WHEN correct synchronization is indicated, THEN OPERATES the breaker control switch to the CLOSE BOP position.

3. DE-ENERGIZES Synchscope.

4. VISUALLY CHECKS ALL phases CLOSED.

ATC Provides PEER CHECK of 25F7 closure, if requested.

Simulator Operator:

When called to verify all 25F7 breaker phases CLOSED, report immediately that all phases are CLOSED.

Appendix D 2 Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2020 Scenario No.: NRC-4 Event No.: 2 Page 1 of 3 Event

Description:

Commence Power Escalation.

Cue:

Orders for the Shift on turnover Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior At the Lead Examiners discretion, INSERT Trigger 1 during this event.

Performs power escalation evolution brief including roles, SRO responsibilities. (should have been performed prior to entry into the simulator).

Enters and directs the actions of GOP-5, Power Escalation in Mode SRO 1.

SRO Reviews GOP-5 Precautions and Limitations with crew.

Note:

CRS may notify ENPM, BA, RP, and Chemistry of impending load change.

Reactivity brief may be conducted during their turnover, but they should summarize before they start using Cycle 27 Reactivity Management Briefing.

SRO Performs reactivity brief with crew.

Selects ramp setter and rate (at 12% per hour), using SOP-8 Attachment 10:

PRESSES CONTROL SETPOINT on the Displays keypad.

ENTERS Setter value on numeric keypad.

PRESSES SELECT on the numeric keypad AND OBSERVES BOP the following:

HOLD displayed in the upper right corner of the CRT.

HOLD light/pushbutton illuminates on the Manual Panel.

PRESSES TAB RIGHT on the cursor keypad.

ENTERS desired acceleration rate using numeric keypad.

PRESSES SELECT on the numeric keypad.

Appendix D 3 Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2020 Scenario No.: NRC-4 Event No.: 2 Page 2 of 3 Event

Description:

Commence Power Escalation.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior MAINTAINS TAVE within 3°F of TREF during the power escalation by regulating dilution and/or regulating rod withdrawal.

For Dilution (SOP-2A Att 11):

ENSURES CLOSED CV-2155 M/U Stop.

ENSURES one of the following in MANUAL AND the other in OFF.

P-90A, PW M/U Pump.

P-90B, PW M/U Pump.

ENSURES RESET and in AUTO FIC-0210A, PW M/U flow.

ENSURES ZERO output signal on FIC-0210A, PW M/U flow.

SETS quantity and flow limit on FIC-0210A, PW M/U flow controller.

OPENS CV-2155, M/U Stop.

PUSHES start pushbutton on FIC-0210A.

ATC

MONITORS Reactor Power and TAVG.

WHEN dilution complete, THEN ENSURES FIC-0210A output signal at zero.

CLOSES CV-2155.

Uses Update to communicate start of Dilution.

For Control Rod manipulations:

ENSURES Mode Selector Switch in MS (Manual Sequential) position.

OPERATES Raise-Lower Switch to RAISE position to WITHDRAW Group 4 Regulating Rods in increments specified by CRS.

Reports to CRS when all rod motion has stopped.

MONITORS reactor power using highest indicated dT power and monitors TAVE.

ATC

Requests peer check for all rod manipulations and BOP BOP provides check.

Appendix D 4 Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2020 Scenario No.: NRC-4 Event No.: 2 Page 3 of 3 Event

Description:

Commence Power Escalation.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Diverts, as needed, around the VCT due to rising VCT level from the dilution by:

ATC

Placing CV-2056 handswitch AMS-2056 to CWRT.

When completed, returns CV-2056 handswitch AMS-2056 to AUTO.

Initiates load change (SOP-8 Att 10):

ENSURES Limiter setting will not interfere with desired change.

PERFORMS ONE of the following:

o PRESSES GO pushbutton on Manual Panel.

BOP o PRESSES GO/HOLD custom key on Display keypad.

o PRESSES SELECT on numeric keypad, then PRESSES START on control keypad.

OBSERVES HOLD light extinguishes and GO light illuminates.

WHEN ramp is complete, THEN VERIFIES GO/HOLD light extinguished.

Coordinates with ATC prior to placing the Turbine in GO.

BOP

UPDATES crew to inform that Turbine is inGO.

Provides peer check BOP placing Turbine in GO , as ATC requested.

NOTE: The next malfunction takes 5 minutes to present itself.

Continue to Event 3.

Appendix D 5 Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2020 Scenario No.: NRC-4 Event No.: 3 Page 1 of 2 Event

Description:

RIA-1810, East Eng Sfgd Rm Vent Rad Monitor, failure.

Cue:

EK-1371, Radiation Monitor System Ckt Failure.

RIA-1810 RANGE Light lit.

RIA-1810 FAIL Light lit.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NOTE: SRO may direct HALTING the power escalation due to unexpected alarm.

Secures PCS Dilution if still in progress.

ATC

UPDATES Crew on dilution status.

BOP Provides PEER CHECK for securing Dilution BOP Places Turbine in HOLD.

Uses Update to communicate Turbine in HOLD.

BOP ATC ATC peer checks BOP placing Turbine in HOLD, as requested.

INFORMS the CRS of alarms:

ATC EK-1371, Rad Monitor Sys Ckt Failure.

COORDINATES with ATC on status of RIA-1810 and dispatches BOP NPO to investigate RIA-1810 locally.

SRO

Reviews ARP for this condition.

Appendix D 6 Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2020 Scenario No.: NRC-4 Event No.: 3 Page -2 of 2 Event

Description:

RIA-1810, East Eng Sfgd Rm Vent Rad Monitor, failure.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CHECKS RIA-1810 on Panel C-11 Rear and notes failure low condition:

BOP

RANGE light is LIT.

FAIL light is LIT.

Value =0.00E00 on monitor Reports to CRS that RIA-1810 is failed

Performs ARP-8 actions BOP

Refers to SOP-39 Attachment 1 and 2.

Reports ARP-8 actions as complete to the CRS.

Enters and implements LCO 3.3.10Cond A.1 and directs BOP SRO to close East ESS Room Iso Dampers immediately.

Take actions as directed by CRS from LCO 3.3.10 Cond A.1:

Obtains KEY #310 and position HS-1810A, East Es Room Isol ATC Damper PO-1810, to CLOSE.

DIRECTS NPO to check status of remote damper PO-1817.

Simulator Operator:

If directed as NPO to check status of remote ventilation damper PO-1817, report in four minutes that it is closed.

Refers to ODCM. Action 5 of Table 1-1 specifies that if either channel fails low or is otherwise inoperable, the ventilation dampers associated with that channel shall be closed SRO immediately and action shall be taken to have the affected channel repaired. (This is identical to action statement in LCO 3.3.10 Cond A.1.)

Continue with Event 4.

Appendix D 7 Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2020 Scenario No.: NRC-4 Event No.: 4 Page 1 of 2 Event

Description:

Loss of P-40A, Dilution Water Pump.

Cue:

P-40A Green Light Lit, Red Light Out at 152-102/CS.

P-40A amps indicate zero.

A Cooling Tower level lowering.

EK-3518, Dilution Wtr Pump P-40A Trip.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior At the Lead Examiners discretion, INSERT Trigger 2.

Diagnoses the Loss of P-40A, Dilution Water Pump.:

Indications:

P-40A Green Light Lit, Red Light Out.

BOP

P-40A amps indicate zero.

A Cooling Tower level lowering.

Alarms:

EK-3518, Dilution Wtr Pump P-40A Trip.

Dispatches NPOs to locally check P-40A and 152-102, P-40A ATC Breaker.

Simulator Operator:

When directed as NPO to locally check P-40A, in four minutes report that P-40A motor is hot to the touch but there is no fire.

When directed to 152-102, P-40A breaker, in four minutes report that 152-102 has tripped on Overload.

BOP Updates Crew of NPO Report on P-40A and its breaker BOP Monitors Cooling Tower level:

Opens MO-5305, Cooling Tower P-39A Discharge Valve, to maintain Cooling Tower level.

Appendix D 8 Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2020 Scenario No.: NRC-4 Event No.: 4 Page 2 of 2 Event

Description:

Loss of P-40A, Dilution Water Pump.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP BOP addresses and performs ARP-24 actions and reports to CRS that all ARP actions are complete.

SRO Enters and implements LCO 3.4.9 Cond B, 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months .

SRO

Briefs crew on plant status using placard.

Initiates troubleshooting and repairs.

Notifications and Reportability.

Sets Contingency actions if needed.

Continue with Event 5.

Appendix D 9 Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2020 Scenario No.: NRC-4 Event No.: 5 Page 1 of 2 Event

Description:

VCT Level Switch Failure.

Cue:

Heat Balance Power Transient (HBP) lowering.

VCT level rising on LIC-0205.

VCT pressure rising on PIA-0215.

MO-2087, Charging Pump Suction from VCT, closed indication

MO-2160, Charging Pump Suction from SIRW, open indication.

EK-0710, Volume Control Tank Lo Lo Level.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior At the Lead Examiners discretion, INSERT Trigger 3.

Diagnoses failure of VCT Level Switch.

Indications:

HBP Transient Lowering

VCT level rising on LIC-0205.

VCT pressure rising on PIA-0215.

ATC

MO-2087, Charging Pump Suction from VCT, closed indication.

MO-2160, Charging Pump Suction from SIRW, open indication.

Alarms:

EK-0710, Volume Control Tank Lo Lo Level.

ATC Reviews ARP-4 actions and aligns with SRO SRO Reviews ARP-4 and directs actions.

ATC Secures Charging and Letdown per SOP-2A, Step 7.3.1.

Appendix D 10 Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2020 Scenario No.: NRC-4 Event No.:5 Page 2 of 2 Event

Description:

VCT Level Switch Failure.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ATC

Obtains PEER CHECK from BOP for switch manipulations

PLACES CV-2023, Ion Exchangers Bypass in BYPASS.

PLACES Charging Pumps Control Select Switch for P-55B and P-55C in MANUAL.

STOPS Charging Pump(s) AND IMMEDIATELY CLOSES Letdown Orifice Stop Valves by placing the following handswitches to CLOSE:

ATC

HS-2003, Letdown Orifice Valve Switch.

HS-2004, Letdown Orifice Valve Switch.

HS-2005, Letdown Orifice Valve Switch.

OPERATES MV-CVC2086, VCT Drain Valve, as needed.

ATC MONITORS Reactor Power closely for power level changes due to the boric acid addition.

SRO

Briefs crew on plant status using placard.

Initiates troubleshooting and repairs.

Notifications to the Duty Station Manager and I&C maintenance.

Contingency actions if needed.

SRO Include actions, as needed, to stabilize power with rod withdrawal, pending length of boration OR by load reduction.

Continue to Event 6

Appendix D 11 Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2020 Scenario No.: NRC-4 Event No.: 6 Page 1 of 2 Event

Description:

P-50D, Primary Coolant Pump, High Vibrations and Reactor Trip Cue:

Vibrations rising on VIA-141B, P-50D Vibration Monitor.

EK-0913, PCP Vib Alert / Mon Trouble.

EK-0915, PCP Vibration Danger.

Red lights LIT for Alert and Danger on VIA-141B.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior At the Lead Examiners discretion, INSERT Trigger 4.

Diagnoses rising vibrations on P-50D.

Indications:

Vibrations rising on VIA-141B, P-50D Vibration Monitor.

Red lights LIT for Alert and Danger on VIA-141B.

ATC Alarms:

EK-0913, PCP Vib Alert / Mon Trouble.

EK-0915, PCP Vibration Danger.

Enters AOP-29, Primary Coolant Pump Abnormal Conditions

Uses Update to announce AOP entry.

SRO

Direct AOP actions.

Updates Crew on Reactor Trip Criteria.

ATC Monitors P-50D parameters for verification of vibration rising trend.

Determines P-50D bearing temperatures are rising on BOP LTVR-0901, PCP Condition Monitor.

NOTE:

Reactor Trip criteria for PCP vibration is 29 mils.

Appendix D 12 Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2020 Scenario No.: NRC-4 Event No.:6 Page 2 of 2 Event

Description:

P-50D, Primary Coolant Pump, High Vibrations and Reactor Trip.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Directs Reactor Trip based on imminent PCP failure attributed to SRO continuing rise in indicated vibration; verification of Reactivity Control and securing P-50D.

ATC TRIPS Reactor from RPS-PB1, Reactor Trip, pushbutton on C-02.

ATC/BOP Perform EOP-1.0 Immediate Actions.

CRITICAL TASK: Secure P-50D within 10 minutes of demonstrating distress via high vibration alarms or high seal temperature alarms.

Verifies Reactivity Control:

Maximum of one full length Control Rod not fully inserted.

Reactor power lowering.

ATC

Negative SUR.

Positions 252-204CS, P-50D, control switch to TRIP and verifies P-50D has stopped.

Appendix D 13 Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2020 Scenario No.: NRC-4 Event No.: 7 Page 1 of 6 Event

Description:

Vapor Space LOCA.

Cue:

PZR pressure lowering.

EK-1373, SV and/or PORV Open Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Trigger 6 is Automatically inserted (after P-50D) is removed causing a ramped Vapor Space LOCA.

Diagnoses PCS Vapor Space LOCA.

Indication:

PZR pressure lowering.

ATC Alarm:

EK-1373, SV and/or PORV Open.

Updates Crew on these conditions.

BOP may go to EC-11A Rear to silence alarm on PORV.

SRO Commences EOP-1.0 verbal verifications.

Reactivity Control: (met)

Maximum of one full length Control Rod not fully inserted.

ATC

Reactor power lowering.

Negative SUR.

Turbine trip criteria: (met)

BOP

Main Turbine tripped.

Generator disconnected from grid.

Appendix D 14 Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2020 Scenario No.: NRC-4 Event No.: 7 Page 2 of 6 Event

Description:

Vapor Space LOCA.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NOTE: Event 8 is a Loss of Offsite Power and will automatically be inserted 10 minutes after the Reactor Trip. It is expected to occur sometime during EOP-1.0 Verbal Verifications. The steps for this event are provided immediately after the verbal verification pages.

Feedwater System criteria: (met)

PLACES MFP Individual Speed Controllers to MANUAL and BOP RAMPS to minimum speed.

ENSURES Main Feed Regulating and Bypass Feed Regulating Valves are CLOSED.

Vital Auxiliaries-Electric: (met)

Buses 1C and 1D energized.

Bus 1E energized (If SIAS is not actuated).

Bus 1A and 1B energized.

BOP

EY-01 energized.

3 of 4 Preferred AC Buses energized.

Six DC Buses energized.

VERIFY adequate PCP seal cooling: (met)

At least one CCW Pump operating.

At least one SW Pump operating.

ATC

Both Critical SW headers in operation with pressure > 42 psig.

CCW Containment Isol Valves open, CV-0910 / 0911 / 0940.

PCS Inventory Control: (not met)

PZR level 20% - 85% and trending toward normal (42% - 57%).

PCS 25°F subcooled (use Thot for forced circulation).

ATC

Ensures ALL charging pumps are in operation:

Manually starts P-55A.

Manually starts P-55B and/or P-55C if not set up for auto start.

Appendix D 15 Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2020 Scenario No.: NRC-4 Event No.: 7 Page 3 of 6 Event Description Vapor Space LOCA.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CRITICAL TASK: Secures PCP as needed to establish one PCP operating in each loop within 3 minutes of PCS pressure lowering to less than 1300 psia.

NOTE: Diesel Generators could start on the SIAS actuation pending the starting currents and bus voltages.

PCS Pressure Control: (not met)

PZR pressure 1650 to 2185 psia and trending toward normal (2010 to 2100 psia).

VERIFY PZR spray valves closed and all PZR heaters are ON (trip off on low PZR level).

ATC

When PZR pressure is < 1605 psia, verify SIAS initiated:

Verify EK-1342, Safety Injection Initiate, in alarm.

Verify all available HPSI and LPSI pumps operating with associated loop isolation valves open.

When PZR pressure is < 1300 psia, stop P-50A, PCP.

CRITICAL TASK: Remove all PCPs from operation when conditions do not support their operation. - Trip ALL PCPs within 10 minutes of exceeding the operating limits curve, EOP Supplement 1.

Core Heat Removal (not met)

At least one PCP operating.

Verify Loop T less than 10°F.

ATC

Verify PCS at least 25°F subcooled.

Trips the remaining PCPs when EOP Supplement 1 parameters are exceeded for PCP operation..

PCS Heat Removal: (met)

Verify at least one S/G has narrow range level between 5% -

BOP 70% and Feedwater is available.

Verify TAVE between 525°F - 540°F.

Verify BOTH S/G pressures between 800-970 psia.

Appendix D 16 Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2020 Scenario No.: NRC-4 Event No.: 7 Page 4 of 6 Event Description Vapor Space LOCA.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Containment Isolation: (not met IF T-73, Quench Tank rupture disc has ruptured.)

Containment pressure < 0.85 psig.

When Containment pressure > 4.0 psig:

VERIFY EK-1126, CIS Initiated, in alarm.

ENSURE CLOSED: Both MSIVs (CV-0510 and CV-0501);

ATC Main Feed Regulating Valves (CV-0701 and CV-0703);

Bypass Feed Regulating Valves (CV-0735 and CV-0734)

CCW Isolation Valves (CV-0940, CV-0911 and CV-0910).

ENSURE EK-1342, Safety Injection Initiated, OR PUSH High Radiation Initiate pushbuttons on Panel EC-13.

ENSURE all available HPSI and LPSI Pumps operating with associated loop isolation valves open.

Containment Isolation: (not met if T-73, Quench Tank, rupture disk has ruptured).

Verify Containment Area Monitor alarms clear and not rising.

BOP

IF any two Cntmt Area Monitors are in Trip 2 status, , then ENSURE ACTUATED CIS.

Verify Condenser Off Gas Monitor alarm clear and not rising.

Verify Main Steam Line Monitor alarms clear and not rising.

Appendix D 17 Form ES-D-2 Verify Containment Atmosphere: (pending timing if met)

Containment temperature < 125 oF.

ENSURE OPERATING all available Containment Air Cooler fans:

V-1A and V-1B, V-2A and V-2B, V-3A and V-3B, V-4A and V-4B.

ENSURE OPEN Containment Air Cooler high capacity outlet valves as SW System capacity permits:

ATC

CV-0867, CV-0861, CV-0864, CV-0873

When Containment pressure > 4.0 psig:

o ENSURE OPERATING all available Containment Air Cooler A fans.

o ENSURE OPEN all available Containment Spray Valves.

o ENSURE OPERATING all available Containment Spray pumps.

o ENSURE at least minimal acceptable flow (1 pump - 1425 gpm, > 2 pumps 2850 gpm.

Op-Test No.: NRC 2020 Scenario No.:NRC-4 Event No.: 7 Page 5 of 6 Event Description Vapor Space LOCA.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ATC VERIFY Instrument Air pressure > 85 psig.

ATC VERIFY SIRWT level > 25%.

ENSURE CR HVAC is aligned for Emergency Mode Operation within 20 minutes of the time of the Reactor Trip.

VERIFY Supply Fan V-95 or V-96 for desired train is ON.

BOP

ENSURE Air Filter Unit Fan V-26A or V-26B for desired train is ON.

ENSURE OFF V-94 Purge Fan and V-47 Swgr Exh Fan.

VERIFY at least one Condensate Pump and one Cooling Tower BOP Pump operating.

Appendix D 18 Form ES-D-2

VERIFY MSIVs are open OR MSIV Bypass valves are open, BOP unless CHP has been received.

Appendix D 19 Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2020 Scenario No.: NRC-4 Event No.: 7 Page 6 of 6 Event Description Vapor Space LOCA.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO Commences EOP Supplement 45, SFP Monitoring.

Diagnoses LOCA using EOP-1.0 Attachment 1 Event Diagnostic SRO Flow Chart and transition to EOP-4.0.

SRO Conducts Transition Brief per Placard. Solicits input from Crew Confirms Vapor Space LOCA:

Pressurizer level rising.

ATC/BOP

Pressurizer pressure lowering.

PCS subcooling lowering.

SRO Enters and directs actions of EOP-4.0.

Appendix D 20 Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2020 Scenario No.: NRC-4 Event No.: 8 Page 1 of Event Description Vapor Space LOCA with Loss of Offsite AC Power.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Loss of Offsite Power will automatically be inserted 10 minutes after the Reactor Trip via Trigger 5.

NOTE: This event has the following due to the Loss of Offsite Power:

EDG 1-1 will not start automatically (Malfunction)

EDG 1-2 Starts but does NOT close in on Bus 1D automatically (Malfunction).

Charging Pump, P55B must be started manually (design and previous events)

V-2A does not automatically restart on EDG (Malfunction)

V-1A does not automatically restart on EDG (Malfunction)

Recognizes a Loss of Offsite Power has occurred:

Numerous alarms.

ATC/BOP

Control Room lights out.

No charging flow (Charging pumps tripped).

No Instrument Air compressors operating CRITICAL TASK: Energize Bus 1C OR 1D within 60 minutes of loss.

Diagnoses Buses 1C and 1D are NOT energized.

Manually STARTS EDG 1-1 by positioning G1-1/CS, Engine Control, switch at C-04 to START.

BOP

Verifies 152-107, EDG 1-1 Output Breaker, is CLOSED.

Verifies Bus 1C is energized.

Manually closes 152-213, EDG 1-2 Output Breaker.

Updates crew before and after actions on EDGs Coordinates with BOP prior to energizing loads on the EDGs Starts ATC P-55B, Charging Pump, due to event in progress and the pump is NOT running.

Starts an Instrument Air Compressor while monitoring EDG ATC loading.

Appendix D 21 Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2020 Scenario No.: NRC-4 Event No.:8 Page 2 of 4 Event Description Vapor Space LOCA with Loss of Offsite AC Power.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Initiates Safety Function Status Checks for EOP-4.0 and are SRO satisfied at intervals of approximately fifteen minutes.

SRO Directs SM to refer to the Site Emergency Plan.

SRO Establishes Bands for EOP-4.0 strategy.

ATC Implements bands and EOP-4.0 strategy.

Verifies SIAS and directs the following:

EOP Supplement 5.

SRO

EOP Supplement 4.

Either directs BOP to report equipment out of position OR directs repositioning to EOP Supp 5.

BOP Performs EOP Supplement 4, HPSI and LPSI Flow Curves.

BOP Checks adequate EDG loading is available prior to starting loads.

Simulator Operator:

When requested by NCO, wait eight minutes and report CV-0944 and CV-0977B are closed.

Performs EOP Supplement 5, Checklist for Safeguards Equipment BOP Following SIAS:

Performs EOP Supplement 4, HPSI and LPSI Flow Curves.

BOP Ensures Letdown is isolated by positioning Letdown Orifice Stop ATC Valve handswitches to CLOSE. (Should have been done in Event 5)

HS 2003 Reviews the status of Pressurizer Heaters.

SRO ATC CLOSES CWRT Vent Valves, CV-1064 and CV-1065.

Appendix D 22 Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2020 Scenario No.: NRC-4 Event No.: 8 Page 3 of 4 Event Description Vapor Space LOCA with Loss of Offsite AC.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Ensures the following valves are CLOSED for LOCA isolation:

Letdown Stop valves, CV-2001, CV-2009.

ATC

PCS Sample Valves, CV-1910, CV-1911.

Reactor Vessel and PZR Vent Valves, PRV-1067, PRV-1068, PRV-1069, PRV-1070.

Verifies PCS leak is NOT into CCW:

SRO

RIA-0915, CCW Radiation Monitor, alarm clear.

EK-1172, CCW Surge Tank HI Lo Level, alarm clear.

Places Hydrogen Monitor in operation in the ACCI position per BOP SOP-38.

Informs SRO that Hydrogen Monitor is in service and gives time BOP when placed into service.

If Containment pressure > 4.0 psig OR Any operable Containment ATC Radiation Monitor rises to 1 x 101 R/hr, VERIFIES EK-1126, CIS Initiated, in alarm (should not reach this threshold).

IF Containment pressure > 4.0 psig, ATC VERIFIES Containment Spray alignment and at least minimal spray flow (should not reach this threshold).

VERIFIES at least one Cooling Tower Pump operating.

BOP

VERIFIES at least one Condensate Pump operating.

Appendix D 23 Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: NRC 2020 Scenario No.: NRC-4 Event No.: 8 Page 4 of 4 Event Description Vapor Space LOCA with Loss of Offsite AC Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

VERIFIES one train of CR HVAC operating in Emergency Mode BOP per SOP-24 Commences Emergency Boration per SOP-2A Att 12 to establish PCS boron concentration greater than or equal to boron needed for ATC Tave > 525°F as verified by sample or hand calculation per EOP Supplement 35.

COMMENCES steaming S/Gs to initiate PCS cooldown.

ATC REFERS to:

EOP Supplement 1 Pressure Temperature Limit Curves. EOP Supplement 33 PCS Heatup/Cooldown Rate Data.

When PCS cooldown is in progress OR at discretion of the Lead Examiner, TERMINATE SCENARIO.

ML20267A349

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