ML20248G005

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Proposed Tech Specs,Changing Tables 3.3-1 & 4.3-1,per Generic Ltr 85-09 for Reactor Trip Sys Automatic Actuation Using Shunt Coil Trip Attachments
ML20248G005
Person / Time
Site: Byron, Braidwood, 05000000
Issue date: 04/03/1989
From:
COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20248F989 List:
References
GL-85-09, GL-85-9, NUDOCS 8904130287
Download: ML20248G005 (23)


Text

- _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - _ _ - . -

ATTAC10(ENT A ERRPOSED CHANGES TO APPENDIX A.

  • [ECHNICAL SPECIFICATJDNS OF FACIL12X QEEBATING LICENSES NPF-37, NPF-66, NPF-72, and NPF-77 Byron Statinn- Braidwood Station Revised Paces: 2-6 _ Ep_v.11ed Pages : 2-6 3/4 3-4 3/4 3-4 3/4 3-5 3/4.3/5 3/4 3-6 3/4 3-6 3/4 3-9 3/4 3-9 3/4 3-11 3/4 3-11 3/4 .3-12a 3/4 3 t- 3/4 3-12a 8904130287 890403 I PDR ADOCK 05000454 P 'l . PDC t.

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TABLE 3.3-1 (Continued)

. TABLE NOTATIONS

  • With the Reactor Trip System breakers in the closed position and the Control Rod Drive System capable of rod withdrawal.
    • The boron dilution flux doubling signals may be blocked during reactor startup.
      • These channels also provide inputs to ESFAS. The Action Statement for-the channels in Table 3.3-3 is more conservative and, therefore, controlling. #
  1. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

' ##Below the P-6 (Intermediate Range Neutron Flux Interlock) Setpoint.

      1. Below the P-10 (Low Setpoint Power Range Neutron Flux Interlock) Setpoint.

0 k&neuer Use Asete 17:b Bspa.ss Bres.Lers on mcled h dnd c/med nr Auressoy e teaebo- Tns' Brea.Ler.

ACTION STATEMENTS .

ACTION 1 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Minimum ,4 Channels OPERABLE requirement, restore the inoperable channel 'l to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or be in HOT STANDBY within ,

the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

ACTION 2 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed provided the following conditions are satisfied:

a. The inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />; ,.

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b. The Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met;'however,.

the inoperable channel may be bypassed for up to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> for surveillance testing of other channels per Specification ,,,,

4.3.1.1; and

c. Either, THERMAL POWER is restricted to less than or equal to 75% of RATED THERMAL POWER and the Power Range Neutron Flux Trip Setpoint is reduced to less than or equal to 85% of RATED THERMAL POWER within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />; or, the QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO is monitored at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> per Specification 4.2.4.2.

ACTION 3 - With the number of channels OPERABLE one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement and with the THERMAL POWER level:

a. Below the P-6 (Intermediate Range Neutron Flux Interlock)  !

Setpoint, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE  ;

status prior to increasing THERMAL POWER above the P-6 Setpoint; and i

b. Above the P-6 (Intermediate Range Neutron Flux Interlock) 1 t

Setpoint but below 10% of RATED THERMAL POWER, l restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status prior to increasing. THERMAL POWER above 10% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

l BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 3-5

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  • TABLE 3.3-1 (Continued)

ACTION STATEMENTS (Continued).

ACTION 4 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement suspend all operations involving positive reactivity changes.

ACTION 5 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less. than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or within the next hour open the-reactor trip breakers, suspend all operations involving positive reactivity changes, and verify valves CV-1118, CV-8428, CV-8439, g CV-8441 and CV-8435 are closed and secured in position. With j no channels OPERABLE verify compliance with the SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirements of Specification 3.1.1.1 or 3.1.1.2, as applicable, and take the actions stated above within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> and verify '

compliance at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> thereafter.

5 ACTION 6 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed

.provided the following conditions are satisfied:

a. The inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />; and [
b. The Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met; however, the inoperable channel may be bypassed for up to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> v for surveillance testing of other channels per /

Specification 4.3.1.1. .

ACTION 7 - Deleted [

-l ACTION 8 - With less than the Minimum Number of Channels OPERABLE, within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> determine by observation of the associated permissive annunciator window (s) that the interlock is in its required state for the existing plant condition, or apply Specification 3.0.3. l ACTION 9 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Minimum '

Channels OPERABLE requirement, be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />; however, one channel may be bypassed for up to i!

  • 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> for surveillance testing per Specification 4.3.1.1, provided the other channel is OPERABLE.

ACTION 10 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, restore the inoperable channel

, to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or open the Reactor trip breakers within the next hour.

ACTION 11 - With the number of OPERABLE channels less than the Total Number of Channels, operation may continue provided the inoperable channels are placed in the tripped condition within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.

ACfibd IB - Se<. Insert A ACT) bel /5 - See .Duert B BYRON - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 3-6 l

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INSERT A 1

ACTION 12 - a. With'one of the diverse trip features (Undervoltage or-

! . Shunt Trip Attachment) inoperable, restore it to OPERABLE I

status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or declare the breaker inoperable and apply _the requirements of b below. 'The breaker shall-not be bypassed while one of the diverse trip features is inoperable, except for the time required for performing maintenance and testing to restore the diverse trip feature to OPERABLE status,

b. With one of the Reactor Trip Breakers otherwise inoperable, O be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />; however, one Reactor Trip Breaker may be bypassed for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> for surveillance testing per Specification 4.3.1.1, provided the other Reactor Trip Breaker is OPERABLE.

INSERT B ACTION 13 - With the Reactor Trip Bypass Breaker inoperable, restore i the Reactor Trip Bypass Breaker to OPERABLE status prior to using the Reactor Trip Bypass Breaker to bypass a Reactor' Trip Breaker. If-the Reactor Trip Bypass Reactor is racked in and closed for bypassing a Reactor Trip Breaker and it J becomes inoperable, be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 '

hours. Restore the Bypass Breaker to OPERABLE: status within the next 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or open the Bypass Breaker within the following hour.

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TABLE NOTATIONS l (10) Setpoint verification is not applicable.

(11)itt i = t w m ps _l8-months-and-folicising maintenance ur adju m = si sur Reactor trip breakers, the ikli'dCfDAT4NG-DEVEE nPFRATIONAL TEST shall inct + % ~nmsnt verification of the undervelt;g; and ; hunt tc3g,

'(12) At least once per 18 months during shutdown verify that on a simulated i

Boron Dilution Doubling test signal CVCS valves 1120 and E open and 112B,and C close within 30 seconds.

(13) CHANNEL CALIBRATION shall include the RTD bypass loops flow rate.

(14) Wdfy that the affegro'cAe sojna.ls reach the Undeevokaye and Si,ud trif Relays, fue 60 ih Yde TeacAer TF yh an d ~ Bypass

^ , l seskers Goon tAe /fanst H,'p .% telas. EnsGI perbrmance  !

i o f f4's survellianco regiaemen6 Ar 64e Teactor- 17/ Bypa.ss r

Breal<ers is A be. cen,pkfed p n o r t'o Y4 %c1up fa isw,nj

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bs-) Heud Sl>ud frp priar- A & a.ae+< i;p sy,s y,,6 behy rachd in'and chued Sr Lypassihy a- eeae. toc- Tr.,b Breakr.

bb) Aidomdl Undervsh'aye tr.,b. EnkiL/ per-fu, mane.e af Ag surveltknee reguaiemaart 4 % se eo,,y,tetes y,J s de  :

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TABLE 3.3-1 (Continued)

TABLE NOTATIONS

  • With the Reactor Trip System breakers in the closed position and the Control Rod Drive System capable of rod withdrawal.
    • The boron dilution flux doubling signals may be blocked during reactor startup.
      • These channels also provide inputs to ESFAS. The Action Statement for the channels in Table 3.3-3 is more conservative and, therefore, controlling.

a

  1. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.
    1. Below the P-6 (Intermediate Range Neutron Flux Interlock) Setpoint.
      1. Below the P-10 (Low Setpoint Power Range Neutron Flux Interlock) Setpoint

@ Menever Ue Reache - T~rh BJP u* B " "*PC *!* fG'A

  • d 5 " d CI*5C d be d
  • 4" M e9'8"AT40 STATEMENTS ACTION 1 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the~ Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or be in HOT STANDBY within 9

the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

ACTION 2 - With tha number of.0PERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed provided the following conditions are satisfied: i

a. The inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition t within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />; I b. The Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met; however, l tha inoperable channel may be bypassed for up to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> for surveillance testing of other channels per Specification 1 4.3.1.1; and
c. Either, THERMAL POWER is restricted to less than or equal to 75% of RATED THERMAL POWER and the Power Range Neutron Flux Trip Setpoint is reduced to less than o: equal to 85% of RATED THERMAL POWER within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />; or, the QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO is monitored at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> per Specification 4.2.4.2.

ACTION 3 - With the number of channels OPERABLE one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement and with the THERMAL POWER level:

a. Below the P-6 (InternAc4 ate Range Neutron Flux Interlock)

Setpoint, restore the troperable channel to OPERABLE staws prior to increasing THERMAL POWER above the P-6 Setpoint; and

b. Above the P-6 (Intermediate Range Neutron Flux Interlock)

Setpoint but below 10% of RATED THERMAL POWER, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status prior to increasing THERMAL POWER above 10% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 3-5

[

TABLE 3.3-1 (Continued)

ACTION STATEMENTS (Continued)

ACTION 4 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement suspend all operations involving positive reactivity changes.

ACTION 5-- With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or within the next hour'open the reactor trip breakers, suspend all operations involving positive reactivity changes, and verify valves CV-111B, CV-8428, CV-8439, CV-8441 and CV-8435 are closed and secured in position. With no channels OPERABLE verify compliance with the SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirements of Specification 3.1.1.1 or 3.1.1.2, as applicable, and take the actions stated above within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> and verify compliance at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> thereafter.

ACTION 6 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total f Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed provided the following conditions are satisfied:

a. The inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />; and
b. The Minimum Channel OPERABLE requirement is met; however, the inoperable channel may be bypassed for up to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> for surveillance testing of other channels per Specification 4.3.1.1.

ACTION 7 - Deleted ACTION 8 - With less than the Minimum Number of Channels OPERABLE, within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> determine by observation of the associated permissive annunciator window (s) that the interlock is in its required state for the existing plant condition, or apply Specification 3.0.3.

ACTION 9 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, be in at least H0T STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />; however, one channel may be bypassed for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> for surveillance testing per Specification 4.3.1.1, provided the other channel is OPERABLE.

ACTION 10 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, restore the inoperable channel l to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or open the Reactor trip l breakers within the next hour. '

ACTION 11 - With the number of OPERABLE channels less than the Total Number of Channels, operation may continue provided the inoperable channels are placed in the tripped condition within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.

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l TABLE 4.3-1 (Continued)

I TABLE NOTATIONS

    • These channels also provide inputs to ESFAS. The Operational Test Frequency for these channels in Table 4.3-2 is more conservative and, therefore, controlling. l
  1. The specified 18 month interval may be extended to 32 months for cycle 1 only.

pl v

    1. Below P-6 (Intermediate Range Neutron Flux Interlock) Setpoint.
      1. Below P-10 (Low Setpoint Power Range Neutron Flux Interlock) Setpoint.

(1) If not performed in previous 7 days.

(2) Comparison of calorimetric to excore power indication above 15% of RATED  !'

THERMAL POWER. Adjust excore channel gains consistent with calorimetric power if absolute difference is greater than 2%. The provisions of Speci-fication 4.0.4 are not applicable for entry into MODE 2 or 1.

(3) Single point comparison of incore to excore AXJAL FLUX DIFFERENCE above 15% of RATED THERMAL POWER. Recalibrates if the absolute difference is greater than or equal to 3%. The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable for entry into MODE 2 or 1.

(4) Neutron detectors may be excluded from CHANNEL CALIBRATION. , l (Sa) Initial plateau curves shall be measured for each detector. Subsequent I plateau curves shall be obtained, evaluated and compared to the initial curves. For the Intermediate Range and Power Range Neutron Flux channels the provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable for entry into MODE 2 or 1.

(5b) With the.high voltage setting varied as recommended by the manufacturer, an initial discriminator bias curve shall be measured for each detector. Sub-sequent discriminator bias curves shall be obtained, evaluated and compared to the initial curves.  !

(6) Incore - Excore Calibration, above 75% of RATED THERMAL POWER. The provi-sions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable for entry into MODE 2 or 1.

(7) Each train shall be tested at least every 62 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS.

(8) With power greater than or equal to the interlock Setpoint the required ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST shall consist of verifying that the inter-lock is in the required state by observing the permissive annunciator window.

(9) Surveillance in MODES 3*, 4*, and 5* shall also include verification that permissives P-6 and P-10 are in their required state for existing plant conditions by observation of the permissive annunciator window. Surveil-lance shall include verification of the Boron Dilution Alarm Setpoint of less than or equal to an increase of twice the count rate within a 10-minute period. .

1 (10) Setpoint verificat. ion is not applicable. 1 eg (11) at '~+ ~~e-oer--18-months-and-following-maintenance-or-edfustment_cf +" 1 4 m Reactor trip breakers, tne__lRIEdt&TUAT4EDEvicV0PERATIONAL TEST shall  ;

M Mdegnde nt-ver4f4 ca t4cn-o f-the-Unde rv olt a ge-a nd-6 hun te-tr4 p n ,

BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 3-12 AMENDMENTNO.[ ]

1

-TABLE-4.3-1 (Cr.ntinued)

TABLE NOTATIONS (12) At least once per 18 months during shutdown verify that on a simulated Boron Dilution Doubling test signal CVCS valves 112D and E open and l' 1128 and C close within 30 seconds.

(13)' CHANNEL CALIBRATION shall iticlude the RTD bypass loops flow rate. )

(14) On a one-tima basi; only, through June 15, 1983, the periodicity of thir #

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'l BRAIDWOOD - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 3-12a Amendment No.

INSERT A The TRIP ACTUATING DEVICE OPERATIONAL TEST shall be performed such that each train is tested at least every 62 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS and following maintenance or adjustment of- the Reactor Trip Breakers and shall include independent verification of the OPERABILITY of the Undervoltage and Shut Trip Attachments of the Reactor Trip Breakers.

INSERT B ACTION 12 - a. With one of the diverse trip features (Undervoltage or Shunt Trip Attachment) inoperable, restore it to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or declare the breaker inoperable and apply the requirements of b below. The breaker shall .

I not be bypassed while one of the diverse trip features is inoperable except for the time required for performing maintenance and testing to restore the diverse trip feature to OPERABLE status.

b. With one of the Reactor Trip Breakers otherwise inoperable, be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />; however, one Reactor Trip Breaker may be bypassed for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> for surveillance testing per Specification 4.3.1.1, provided the other Reactor Trip Breaker is OPERABLE.

ACTION 13 - With the Reactor Trip Bypass Breaker inoperable, restore the Reactor Trip Bypass Breaker to OPERABLE status prior to using the Reactor Trip Bypass Breaker to bypass a Reactor Trip Breaker. If the Reactor Trip Bypass Breaker is racked in and closed for bypassing a Reactor Trip Breaker and it becomes inoperable, be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />. Restore the Bypass Breaker to OPERABLE status within the next 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or open the Bypass Breaker within the following hour.

INSERT C (15) Verify that the appropriate sinnals reach the Undervoltage and Shunt Trip relays, for both the Reactor Trip and bypass breakers from the Manual Trip Switches. Initial performance of this surveillance requirement for the Reactor Trip Bypass Breakers is to be completed prior to the Startup following the Unit 1 Cycle 1 Refuel Outage.

J (16) Manual shunt trip prior to the Reactor Trip Bypass Breaker being l racked in and closed for bypassing a Reactor Trip Breaker.

(17) Automatic undervoltage trip. Initial performance of this surveillance requirement is to be completed prior to the startup l following the Unit 1 Cycle and Refuel Outage.

0064Tr10

ATTACHMENT B 3

~' '

DESCRIPTION AND

SUMMARY

OF PROPOSED CHANGES As a consequence of the Salem ATWS event, Item 4.3 of Generic Letter 83-28 established the requirement for the automatic actuation of the shunt trip attachment for the reactor trlp breakers. Generic Letter 85-09 provided guidance on the Technical Specifications a licensee should propose i in response to Item 4.3 of Generic Letter 83-28. In the NRC's evaluation, it was concluded that the licensee should propose Technical Specification changes to explicitly require independent testing of the undervoltage (UV) and shunt trip attachments (STA) during power operation and independent testing of the control room manual switch contacts during each refueling outage. These tests are necessary to ensure reliable reactor trip breaker operation. Commonwealth Edison believes the proposed amendment addresses and implements the guidelines presented in Generic Letter 85-09.

The first proposed change adds functional unit 22 to Technical Specification Table 2.2-1. This change is being made to be consistent with Technical Specification Tables 3.3-1 and 4.4-1, which also reference the Reactor Trip Bypass Breakers.

The next proposed change involves functional unit 20 on Technical Specification Table 3.3-1. Action 9 is being deleted from functional unit 20, and action 12 is being added. Action 12 is broken down into Lio independent requirements. Action 12-a invokes the actions stated in action 14 of Generic Letter 85-09. This action permits continued operation for up to 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> when one of the reactor Trip Breaker diverse trip feature is found to be inoperable. After this 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> period elapses, Action Statement 12-b must be entered. Action Statement 12-b was previously 9.

The words " Channel" have been replaced with " Reactor Trip Breaker" for clarity. This Action will require the Unit to be placed in Hot Standby within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> for any failure not addressed by Action 12-a.

The next proposed change adds functional unit 22 to Technical Specification Table 3.3-1. The addition of functional unit 22 is necessary to provide both a condition of applicability and action statement for the Reactor Trip Bypass Breakers. The condition of applicability was chosen to be whenever the Reactor Trip Bypass Breaker is racked in and closed for the purpose of bypassing a Reactor Trip Breaker with the Unit in Modes 1 or 2, or in Modes 3, 4, or 5 with the Control Rods capable of withdrawal. With a Reactor Trip Bypass Breaker inoperable, Action 13 requires the brea'ar to be returned to an operable status prior to using the breaker for the purpose of bypassing a Reactor Trip Breaker. The first portion of this Action Statement is stated this way due to the normal mode of discovering an inoperable breaker through the Manual Shunt Trip test, required prior to breaker use in the proposed note 16 to Technical Specification Table 4.3-1.

If the Bypass Breaker becomes inoperable after being racked in and closed for the purpose of bypassing a Reactor Trip Breaker, then the second portion of Action 13 will require the Unit to be placed in Hot Standby in 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, then the breaker must be restored to operable status within the next 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />, or the breaker must be opened in the next hour. These actions are based on the present Action Statements 9 and 10 for the Reactor Trip Breakers. The testing clause associated with Action 9 was removed from Action 9, due to it not being applicable in this configuration.

0064T:4

. i " .

The next change is applicable to Braidwood Station only. It involves the deletion of note (14) to Technical Specification Ttble 4.3-1.

This was a one time only change for Braidwood Station, that has expired.

The next proposed change. adds note 14, for Byron, and 15 for Braldwood, to the Trip Actuating Device Operational Test for functional unit 1 on Technical Specification Table 4.3-1. Note 14, for Byron, and 15, for Braidwood, requires that the appropriate signals reach the undervoltage and shunt trip relays for both the. Reactor Trip and Bypass Breakers, from the Manual Trip Switches. This note also provides an implementation time frame for this surveillance requirement. .The implementation time frame chosen was due to this surveillance requiring the Unit to be in a shutdown condition to perform. This proposed change reflects the intent of note 11 of Generic Letter 85-09.

The next proposed change involves a revision to note 11 on the Trip Actuating Device Operational test for functional unit 20 on Technical Specification Table 4.3.1. The requirements of note 7 have been incorporated into note 11 for clarity, and note 7 has been deleted from functional unit 20. Note 11 has been revised to combine the need to independently verify the Operability of both the undervolt trip and the shunt trip attachment. A requirement to test these functions following maintenance or adjustment has also been incorporated into note 11.

The final proposed change involves the addition of functional unit 22 to Technical Specification Table 4.3-1. Included with this area are notes 15 and 16, for Byron, 16 and 17, for Braidwood. Note 15/16 requires manual Shunt Trip testing prior to the reactor Trip Bypass Breaker being racked in and closed for the purpose of bypassing a Reactor Trip Breaker.

The monthly frequency designation associated with note 15/16 is being deleted. The requirement to Shunt Trip test the Reactor Trip Bypass 1 Breakers prior to use is controlled through note 15/16, the monthly frequency is not necessary for this to ensure compliance with this item.

Note 16/17 requires the Reactor Trip Bypass Breaker to be trip tested from an automatic undervoltage signal once per 18 months. This Surveillance Requirement poses a high potential to cause a Unit Trip, if performed with the Unit on line. Due to this potential for a Unit trip, this surveillance is being viewed as a shutdown item. Therefore, note 16/17 also contains an implementation time frame.

\

0064T 5

ATTACHMENT C

. ' s ,

SAFETY EVALUATION AND ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENI ltem 4.3 of Generic Letter 83-28, " Required Actions Based on Generic Implications of Salem ATWS Events, " established the requirement for the automatic actuation of the shunt trip attachment for Westinghouse plants. In the staff's evaluation of the Westinghouse generic design modifications, the staff concluded that Technical Specification changes should be propocad by licensees to explicitly require independent testing of the control room manual switch contacts during each refueling outage. The staff concluded that these tests are necessary to ensure reliable reactor trip breaker operation. The proposed changes address the NRC concerns and provide an increase in the margin of safety because if one trip mechanism fails, the other trip mechanism is available which increases the reliability of the reactor protection system and decreases the possibility of an ATWS event.

Commonwealth Edison has evaluated the proposed amendment against the criteria for and identification of licensing and regulatory actions requiring environment assessment in accordance with 10 CFR 51.21. It has been determined that the proposed change meets the criteria for a categorical exclusion as provided for under 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). This determination was based on the fact that this change is being proposed as zua amendment to a license issued pursuant to 10CFR50.

The change involves changes to a surveillance requirement. The change involves no significant change in the types or amounts of off-site effluents, and there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. t l

l l

l 0064T:6

i ATTACMEtCLD EVAWATJDN OF S I G[iI F I CANT . HAZ ARDjLCQEDERAT1QtlE Commonwealth Edison has evaluated this proposed amendnent and has determined that it involves no significant. hazards considerations. According to 10 CFR 50.92(c), a proposed amendment to an operating license involves no significant hazards considerations if operation of the facility, in accordance with the proposed snendment, would not:

1) Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or
2) Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or
3) Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The proposed mnendment involves additions to surveillance requirements of the Reactor Trip Bypass Breakers in accordance with sneric Letter 85-09. Although the specific proposed changes are not identical to those recommended in the Generic Letter, the intent of the Generic Letter is fully satisfied. The specific changes include; the addition of functional Unit 22 to Table 2.2-1 to remain consistent I with the other tables, the addition of an action statement for the Reactor Trip Breakers to permit continued plant operation for up to 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> with one of the diverse trip features inoperable, the ability to bypass the reactor breaker for the time required to perform maintenance and testing of the breakers, the addition of a part 12b to the action requirements to replace Action 9, the addition of item 22 in Table 3.3-1 in accordance with the Generic Letter, a clarification of the applicable modes for the operability of the bypass breakers, the addition of Action 13 to verify the operator action if a bypass breaker becomes inoperable while in service, the addition of Action 13 to clarify the operator action if a bypass breaker becomes inoperable while in service, the addition of note 14 to add a refueling outage basis surveillance to ensure a manual reactor trip initiation from the manual trip switches which will provide the appropriate trip signals to the

( reactor trip and bypass breakers, the addition to notes 14 and 16, for Dyron, 15 and 17, for Braidwood, for a delayed initial surveillance performance to avoid a reactot-shutdown, the addition of item 22 to table 4.3-1 for the reactor trip bypass breakers, and several editorial and administrative changes.

1) The_p rsp o s ed _cha ng e s_do._nol_inynly e_a._s i g;dt i c an t_1 nm a s e_in_the probability _QI_SQDsequenceS of an accident previously_e.yalgAtad.

The automatic actuation of the shunt trip attachment provides an alternate l

j method to open the reactor trip breakers. When a reactor trip signal is generated, there are diverse mechanisms to provide a reactor breaker trip which should minimize the possibility of an Anticipated Transient Without i Scram (ATWS) occurring. The proposed changes revise the surveillance to require independent testing of the undervoltage and shunt trip attaciunent for the manual reactor trip and the reactor trip breakers. These surveillance provide assurance of teactor trip breaker opt sbility when l

0064T 7 i

l - _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

. 4 l ' . r 4

required. Since there are now two diverse trip mechanisms, a change is also q proposed to allow forty-eight (48) hours to restore one of the trip features when )

it becomes inoperable, before a reactor shutdown is required. This is conservative because it recognizes that there are two trip mechanisms instead of one and allows '

forty-eight (48) hours to restore the inoperable trip feature. This change is based on the allowable time referenced in the NRC Generic Letter 85-09. Removal of note 14, for the Braidwood Technical Specifications is a6ninistrative in nature.

2) Tite _ptopR69.d Changes._dQ_nQt._ctRate_lhe._20EElbility of a new or diff1 Lent kind of accident f rom.any_previously_eralvatad.

The proposed changes do not change the manner in which the reactor ]

protection system provides plant protection. The addition of surveillance 'J test requirements provides assurance that the Reactor Trip functions will occur when required. Present plant equipment is not being altered to ,

I accommodate these changes, hence, no new failure mechanisms are introduced.

3) The propm ed changes do not involve a significant reduction in a margin _q[

anfaty.

The proposed changes are expected to increase the overall margin of safety because they provide periodic test requirements for the Reactor Trip Breakers. These proposed surveillance changes are designed to provide assurance of operability of the reactor trip and bypass breakers.

Therefore, based upon the above evaluation, Commonwealth Edison concludes that the proposed changes to the Technical Specifications do not involve a significant hazards consideration.

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