ML20248A628
| ML20248A628 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | McGuire, Mcguire  |
| Issue date: | 08/03/1989 |
| From: | DUKE POWER CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20248A625 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8908080351 | |
| Download: ML20248A628 (85) | |
Text
- - - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _. _. _ _ _ _ _
e i
ATTACM ENT 1 Proposed McGuire Unit I and 2 Technical Specifications Changes l
8906080351 890803 ADOCK 05000369 PDR PDC p
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POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS l
3/4.2.2 HEAT FLUX HOT CHANNEL FACTOR - Fn(Z)
LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.2.2 F (Z) shall be limited by the following relationship:
q F (Z) < [2.32] [K(Z)] for P > 0.5 9
F (Z) $ h 3 [K(Z)] for P $ 0.5 l
E 9
Where: P = THERMAL POWER RATED THERMAL POWER '
and K(1) is the function obtained from Figure 3.2-2 for a given core height location.
APPLICABILITY:
MODE 1.
ACTION:
g With F (Z) exceeding its limit:
I q
a.
Reduce THERMAL POWER at least 1% for each 1% F (Z) exceeds the limit n
within 15 minutes and similarly reduce the Power Range Neutron Flux-High Trip Setpoints within the next 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />; POWER OPERATION may proceed for up to a total of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />; subsequent POWER OPERATION may proceed provided the Overpower Delta T Trip Setpoints (value of K ) have been reduced at least 1% (in AT span) for each 4
1% F (Z) exceeds the limit; and j
9 l
b.
Identify and correct the cause of the out-of-limit condition prior I
to increasing THERMAL POWER above the reduced limit required by ACTION a., above; THERMAL POWER may then be incr6ased provided F (Z) g is demonstrated through incore mapping to be within its limit.
4 McGUIRE - UNITS 1 and 2 3/4 2-6 Amendment No.73(Unit 1)
Amendment No.54(Unit 2)
r s
POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.2.2.1 The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable.
4.2.2.2 For RA0C operation, F (z) shall be evaluated to determine if F (z) q q
is within its limit by:
a.
Using the movable incore detectors to obtain a power distribution map at any THERMAL POWER greater than 5% of RATED THERMAL POWER.
b.
Increasing the measured F (z) component of the power distribution q
map by 3% to account for manufacturing tolerances and further increasing the value by 5%'to account for measurement uncertainties.
l t
Verify the requirements of Specification 3.2.2 are satisfied.
c.
Satisfying the following relationship:
Fq (z) 1 x K(z) for P > 0.5 Y
N 2.32 P x W(z)
Fg (z) 1 x K(z) for P 1 0.5 h
M 2.32 W(z) x 0.5 M
where F (z) is the measured F (z) increased by the allowances for q
manufacturing tolerances and measurement uncertainty, 2.32 is the i
F limit, K(z) is given in Figure 3.2-2, P is the relative THERMAL g
POWER, and W(z) is the cycle dependent function that accounts for I
power distribution transients encountered during normal operation.
This function is given in the Peaking Factor Limit Report as per Speci-fication 6.9.1.9.
M d.
Measuring Fq (z) according to the following schedule:
1.
Upon achieving equilibrium conditions af ter exceeding by 10% or more of RATED THERMAL POWER, the THERMAL POWER at which F (z) was last determined,* or q
2.
At least once per 31 Effective Full Power Days, whichever occurs first.
- 0uring power escalation at the beginning of each cycle, power level may be increased until a power level for extended operation has been achieved and a power distribution map obtained.
fylt( Af% Twan em f Nw 78 50% PD M foR MHW 9, C4CLc b, wuGH TME H+4EM Ol' A VA 6V A Bht (40VE/)BLG CErEcron Pt/h8LC1 IS*L-fil nw,s=r or rur wrn,rwe gs Mrassumar unntremerv seu at wcstAno r=
L is.+ O-U14.5)hs)>uut r os not um8cx e Amane wours.
McGUIRE - UNITS 1 and 2 3/4 2-7 Amendment No.
(Unit 1)
Amendment No.
(Unit 2)
~ ho; CHAMts r
p,,,
Fan wrotth Ahw om; POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS-SURVEILLANCE' REQUIREMENTS (Continued) q J
e.
With measurements indicating maximum-t F (z) over z
.(
K(z) )
M has increased.since'the previous determination of Fq (z) either of the following actions shall be taken:
M 1)
Fq (z) shall be increased by 2% over that specified inL Specifi-cation 4.2.2.2c. or M
2)
Fq (z) shall be measured at least once per 7 Effective Full Power Days until two successive maps' indicate that
[Fn(z)Iisnotincreasing.
M maximum over z
\\
K(z) )
J f.
With the relationships specified in.'Specif.ication' 4.2.2.2c. above not being satisfied:
i 1)
Calculate the percent F (z) exceeds its limit by the following q
expression:
)
Imaximum
~
g()xW(z))l-1lrx100
'M 9
for P > 0.5 over z x K(z) !/
h_
2 32 p
3 maximum M
Fg (z) x W(z)
-l' x 100 for P < 0.5 over z 2.32 g x K(z{
l-2)
One of the following actions shall.be taken:
a)
Within 15 minutes, control the AFD to within new AFD limits which are determined by reducing the AFD limits of 3.2-1 by 1% AFD for each percent F (z) exceeds its limits-as' deter-q mined in Specification 4.2.2.2f.1).
Within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />, reset.
the AFD alarm setpoints to these modified limits,.or b)
Comply with the requirements of. Specification 3.2.2 for F (z)
~
9 exceeding its limit by the percent calculated above, or c)
Verify that the requirements of Specification 4.2.2.3 for Base Load operation are' satisfied and enter' Base Load operation.
l McGUIRE - UNITS 1 and 2 3/4 2-8 Amendment No.73 (Unit 1)
Amendment No.54 (Unit 2) '
I i
POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued) g.
The limits specified in Specifications 4.2.2.2c, 4.2.2.2e., and 4.2 2.2f.
I above are not applicable in the following core plane regions:
1.
Lower core region from 0 to 15%, inclusive.
2.
Upper core region from 85 to 100%, inclusive.
ND 4.2.2.3 Base Load operation is permitted at. powers above APL if the following condit b s are satisfied:
a.
Prior to entering Base Load operation, maintain THERMAL POWER above NO APL and less than or equal to that' allowed by Specification 4.2.2.2 for at least the previous 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
Maintain Base Load operatico surveillance (AFD within 15% of target flux difference) during thi:
time period.
Base Load operation is then permitted providing THERMAL POWER is maintained between APL [ and APLBL ND N
or between APL and 100% (whichever is most limiting) and FQ surveillance is maintained OL pursuant to Specification 4.2.2.4.
APL is defined as:
APLOL = *I"I"U" [ (2.32 x K(Z) ] x 100*;
[
over Z F (Z) x W(Z)BL where:
F (z) is the measured F (z) increased by the allowances for 9
manufacturing tolerances and measurement uncertainty.
The F limit q
is 2.32.
K(z) is given in Figure 3.2-2.
W(z)BL is the cycle dependent
{
function that acccunts for limited power distribution transients en-countered during base load operation.
The function is given in the Peaking Factor Limit Report as per Specification 6.9.1.9.
b.
During Base Load operation, if the THERMAL POWER is decreased below ND APL then the conditions of 4.2.2.3.a shall be satisfied before re-entering Base Load operation.
4.2.2.4 During Base Load Operation F (Z) shall be evaluated to determine if q
F (Z) is within its limit by:
g a.
Using the movable inc:re detectors to obtain a power distribution ND map at any THERMAL POWER above APL b.
Increasing the measured F (Z) component of the power distribution q
map by 3% to account for manufacturing tolerances and further increasing the value by 5%'to account for measurement uncertainties.
l Verify the requirements of Specification 3.2.2 are satisfied.
n s~ sa ca <' r= s=- ^ ~a cat ma o
w r-a uor qcme b wen rn umra ce svauma mvesusue verrc on inoment li* cE U ThM 75 % ef wt Trinc, THE 5 % HCAlwMMENT urvlitrheN71 EkAbu RE lacst AIEo ro L s /.n 3-r/,v.r) gn.g -wr. 7 #5 mr veses or m ww m,~scrs, McGUIRE - UNITS 1 and 2 3/4 2-9 Amendment No. '(Unit 1)
Amendment No.
(Unit 2)
No cyn net pus p ce
fo$ WroEMATlw any POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued) c.
Satisfying the following relationship:
M ND F (Z) < 2.32 x K(Z) for P > APL Q
- P x W(Z)gg.
M where:
F (Z)'.is-the measured F (Z).
The F limit is 2.32.
l 9
q q
K(Z) is given in Figure 3.2-2.
P is the relative THERMAL POWER.
W(Z)BL is the cycle dependent function that accounts for limited rower distribution transit-nts encountered during normal operation.
This function is given in the Peaking Factor Limit Report as per Specification 6.9.1.9.
d.
Measuring F (Z) in conjunction with target flux difference deter-mination according to the following schedule:
1.
Prior to entering BASE LOAD operation after satisfying Section-4.2.2.3 unless a full core flux map has been taken in the previous 31 EFPD with the relative thermal power.having been ND maintained above APL for the 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> prior'to mapping, and 2.
At least once'per 31 effective full power days.
i e.
With measurements indicating maximum [
]
over Z has increased since the previous determination F (Z) either of the following actions shall be taken:
1.
F (Z) shall be increased by 2 percent over that specified in 4.2.2.4.c, or 2.
F (Z) shall be measured at least once per.7 EFPD until 2 sue essive maps indicate that l
F (Z) maximum [
] is not increasing.
over I f.
With the relationship specified in 4.2.2.4.c above not being satisfied, either of the following actions shall be taken:
1.
Place the core in an equilbrium condition where the limit in 4.2.2.2.c is satisfied, and remeasure F (I), or McGUIRE - UNITS 1 and 2 3/4 2-9a Amendment No. 71 Unit 1)
Amendment No. 5(Unit 2)
q' 1
l 1
POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued) 2.-
Comply with the requirements of Specification 3.2.2 for F (Z) j g
7 exceeding.its limit by the percent calculated with the following expression:
F (Z) x W(Z)BL ] ) -1 ] x 100 for P > APL ND
[(max. over I of [ 2.32 p-- x K(Z) p g.
The limits specified in 4.2.2.4.c, 4.2.2.4.e and 4.2.2.4.f above are not' applicable in the following core plan regions:
l 1.
Lower core region 0 to 15 percent, inclusive.
2.
Upper core region 85 to 100 percent, inclusive.
4.2.2.5 When F (Z) is measured for reasons other than. meeting the requirements g
of specification 4.2.2.2 an overall measured F (z) shall be obtained from'a power 9
distribution map and increased by 3% to account for manufacturing tolerances and further increased by 5%'to account for measurement uncertainty.
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i McGUIRE - UNITS 1 and 2 3/4 2-9b Amendmer.t No.
(Unit 1)
.l Amendment No (Unit 2)
(20 C4At4ts ruo pint, l
ott luratti smos suur l
1 i
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i This page deleted.
McGUIRE - UNITS 1 and 2 3/4 2-10 Amendment No.42(Unit 1)
Amendment No.23(Unit 2)
0 cynrars Twi FAVE, 9
pon Intom wo+1owny.A t.
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l This page deleted.
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McGUIRE - UNITS 1 and 2 3/4 2-11 Amendment No.42(Unit 1)
Amendment No.23(Unit 2)
- -. _ _ ~ - _.
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no canusts rws fee fanwrnennon;uult
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FIGURE 3.2-2 K(Z)- NORMALI.'.ED Fo(Z) AS A FUNCTION OF CORE ttEIGHT l
I
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n
- f P
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l
\\
c'
=
t:5
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=
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' s.
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--oo i
+=
c 2 4
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w=
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ei g e m r u ct
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oqo wnu I
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s s
8 8
8 8
o o
o a
(Z)Od GZl1\\'WWON (Z) N l
McGUlRE - UNITS 1 and 2 3/4 2 12 Amendment No.
73 (Unit 1)
Amendment No. 54 (Unit 2) e
'l No CHA423:ns Fart, l
For wtas u nas oncy i
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I McGUIRE - UNITS 1 and 2 3/4 2-13 Amendment No.43(Unit 1).
Amendment No.24(Unit 2)
_m
POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS 3/4.2.3 RCS FLOW RATE AND NUCLEAR ENTHALPY RISE HOT CHANNEL FACTOR LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 1
1 3.2.3 The combir.ation of indicated Reactor Coolant Sys tem (RCS) total flow l
rate and R shall be maintained within the region of allowable operation shown
{
on Figure 3.2-3 for four loop operation:
i Where:
f N
F 4
3g R _ 1.49 L1.0 + 0.3 (1.0 - P)]
h i
a.
f THERMAL POWER f
j b.
P - RATED THERMAL POWER
/
j e.
FfH=MeasuredvaluesofFfH obtained by using the movable incore c.
detectors to obtain a power distribution map..The measured
(
valuesofFhshallbeusedtocalculateRsinceFigure3.2-3
}
includes penalties for undetected feedwater venturi fouling of y
0.1% and for measurement uncertainties of 1.7% for flow and 4%*
- l !
for incore measurement of FfH' s
APPLICABILITY:
MODE 1.
1 ACTION-With the combination of RCS total flow rate and R outside the region of f
acceptable operation shown on Figure 3.2-3:
a.
Within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> eithen
~
1.
Restore the combination of RCS total flow rate and R t
to within the above limits, or 2.
Reduce THERMAL POWER to less than 50% of RATED THERMAL POWER and reduce the Power Range Neutron Flux - High Trip Setpoint to less than or equal to 55% of RATED THERMAL POWER within the next 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.
+ raa m~sr o,c,ae s, +ute mt wmeen or avm Aue h~ensa cureron wmeses s, Gnwen 14AW CR Ennu to 50 % Ayr Gest 7 MAN 2 5*/, & THE 7ethL, THE 4 % MintuREhtur Whit $1 Mow!'
$HAGL 86 IWilttAlle DY CHAW 6lWG l.49 fe/ DIE n EawAtsou 10 t io.o on tos.s)y o.nv n3 -uur r o s rm ~~up on ava,unn,sc wnssts.
McGUIRE - UNITS 1 and 2 3/4 2-14 Amendment No.
(Unit 1)
Amendment No.
(Unit 2)
.-_____.-._-_-___n__.___--__
o cuners un raer, Salt pusop%Antsi apasy POWER DISTRIBUT:0N LIMITS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION ACTION:
(Continued) b.
Within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> of leitfally being outside the above limits, verify through incore flux app 4g and RCS total flow rate comparison that the combination of A and RI.5 total flow rate are restored to within l
the above limits, or reduce THERNAL POWER to less than 5% of RATED THERMAL POWER within the not 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.
Identify and correct the cause of the out-of-limit condition prior c.
to increasing THERMAL POWER above the reduced THERMAL POWER limit required by ACTION h.2. and/or b. above; subsequent POWER OPERATION may proceed provided that the combination of R and indicated RCS l
total flow rate are demonstrated, through incore flux mapping and RCS total flow rate comparison, to be within the region of acceptable [
operation shown on Figure 3.2-3 prior to exceeding the following THERMAL POWER levels:
1.
A nominal 50% of RATED THERMAL POWER, 2.
A nominal 75% of RATED THERMAL POWER, and 3.
Within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> of attaining greater than or equal to 95% of RATED THERMAL POWER.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS
^
4.2.3.1 The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable.
4.2.3.2 The combination of indicated RCS total flow rate determined by process computer readings or digital voltmeter measurement and R shall be within the region of acceptable operation of Figure 3.2.3:
a.
Prior to operation above 75% of RATED THERMAL POWER after each fuel loading, and b.
At least once per 31 Effective Full Power Days.
4.2.3.3 The indicated RCS total flow rate shall be verifie'd to be within the region of acceptable operation of Figure 3.2-3 at least once per 12' hours when the most recently obtained value of R obtained per Specification 4.2.3.2, is l
assumed to exist.
4.2.3.4 The RCS total flow rate indicators shall be subjected to a CHANNEL CALIBRATION at least once per 18 months.
4.2.3.5 The RCS total flow rate shall be determined by precision heat balance measurement at least once per 18 months.
McGUIRE - UNITS 1 and 2 3/4 2-15 Amendment No. 42(Unit 1)
Amendment No. 23(Unit' 2)
Nb canwoli THU /A&E, Fait McwhAnod onse
'J
.4
.i i
This page deleted.
l 1
l McGUIRE - UNITS 1 and 2 3/4 2-16 Amendment No.43 (Unit 1)'
Amendment No.24 (Unit 2)
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- This page deleted 4
l McGUIRE - UNITS.1 and 2 3/4 2-18 Amendment No.42(Unit 1)
Amendment No.23(Unit 2)
1 1
No C H AMES %
- l'MF,
~l fo A wronwnou on y
POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS 3/4.2.4 QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO i
l LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION
]
3.2.4 The QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO shall not exceed 1.02.
j APPLICABILITY:
MODE I above 50% of RATED THERMAL POWER *.
ACTION:
a.
With the QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO determined to exceed 1.02 but less than or equal to 1.09:
1.
Calculate the QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO at least once per hour j
until either:
a)
The QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO is reduced to within its limit, or b)
THERMAL POWER is reduced to less than 50% of RATED THERMAL POWER.
2.
Within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> either:
a)
Reduce the QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO to within its limit, or b)
Reduce THERMAL POWER at least 3% from RATED THERMAL POWER for each 1% of indicated QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO in i
excess of 1.0 and similarly reduce the Power Range Neutron Flux-High Trip Setpoints within the next 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.
3.
Verify that the QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO is within its limit within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> after exceeding the limit or reduce THERMAL POWER to less than 50% of RATED THERMAL POWER within the next 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> and reduce the Power Range Neutron Flux-High Trip Setpoints to less than or equal to 55% of RATED THERMAL POWER within the next 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />; and 4.
Identify and correct the cause of the out-of-limit condition i
prior to increasing THERMAL POWER; subsequent POWER OPERATION above 50% of RATED THERMAL power may proceed provided that the QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO is verified within its limit at least once per hour for 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> or until verified acceptable at 95%
or greater RATED THERMAL POWER.
- See Special Test Exception 3.10.2.
j r
McGUIRE - UNITS 1 and 2 3/4 2-19 Amendment No. 32 (Unit 1)
Amendment No.13 (Unit 2)
no cmuoes run rag C*M i+@Ah,Arock own POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS
~
LIMITING C0i4ITION FOR CPERATION i
ACTION: (Continued) b.
With the QUADRANT POWER TILT. RATIO determined to exceed 1.09 due to misalignment of either a shutdown or control rod:
1.
Calculate the QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO at least once per hour until either:
1 a)
The QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO is reduced to.within j
its limit, or b)
THERMAL POWER is reduced to less than 50% of RATED THERMAL l
POWER.
2.
Reduce THERMAL POWER at least 3% from RATED THERMAL POWER for.
each 1% of indicated QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO in excess of 1.0, within 30 minutes; 3.
Verify that the QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO.is within its limit within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> after exceeding the limit ~or reduce THERMAL POWER to less than 50% of-RATED THERMAL POWER within the next' 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> and reduce the Power Range Neutron Flux-High Trip i
Setpoints to less than or equal to 55% of RATED THERMAL POWER within the next 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />; and 4.
Identify and correct the cause of the:out-of-limit condition prior to increasing THERMAL POWER;. subsequent POWER OPERATION above 50% of RATED THERMAL POWER may proceed provided that the-QUADRANT POWER TILT-RATIO is verified within its limit at least once per hour for 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> or until. verified acceptable at 95%
or greater RATED THERMAL POWER.
c.
With the QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO determined to exceed 1.09 due to
)
causes other than the misalignment of either a shutdown or control i
rod:
1.
Calculate the QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO at least once per hour
- l until either:
i-a)
The QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO is reduced to within j
its limit, or b)
THERMAL POWER is reduced to less than.50% of RATED THERMAL l
POWER.
l l
'l McGUIRE - UNITS 1 and 2 3/4 2-20 Amendment No.32 -(Unit 1) l Amendment No.13 (Unit 2) j
i pc eweeg nn peg )
94wr-am wom, J
l I
POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS l
LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION J
l ACTION:
(Continued) 1 2.
Reduce THERMAL POWER to less than 50% of RATi.D THERMAL POWER i
within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> and reduce the Power Range Neutron Flux-High l
Trip Setpoints to less than or equal to 55% of RATED THERMAL POWER within the next 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />; and 3.
Identify and correct the cause of the out-of-limit condition prior to increasing THERMAL POWER; subsequent POWER OPERATION above 50% of RATED THERMAL POWER may proceed provided that the QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO is verified within its limit at least i
once per hour.for 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> or until verified at 95% or greater RATED THERMAL POWER.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.2.4.1 The QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO shall be determined to be within the
]
limit above 50% of RATED THERMAL POWER by:
a.
Calculating the ratio at least once per 7 days when the alarm is OPERABLE, and b.
Calculating the ratio at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> during steady-state operation when the alarm is inoperable.
4.2.4.2 The QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO shall be determined to be within the limit when above 75% of RATED THERMAL POWER witn one Power Range cnannel inoperable by using the movable incore detectors to confirm that the normalized symmetric power distribution, obtained from two sets of four symmetric u.imble locations or a full-core flux map, is consistent with the indicated QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
1 McGUIRE - UNITS 1 and 2 3/4 2-21 Amendment No. 8XUnit 1)
Amendment No. 6(Unit 2)
'i i
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I 3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION 1
3/4.3.1 REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM I..STRUMENTATION
]
1 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 1
i l
3.3.1 As a minimum, the Reactor Trip System Instrumentation channels and interlocks of Table 3.3-1 shall be OPERA 8LE with RESPONSE TIMES as shown in Table 3.3-2.
APPLICA8ILITY: As shown in Table 3.3-1.
ACTION:
As shown in Table 3.3-1.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.3.1.1 Each Reactor Trip System Instrumentation channel and interlock shall I
be demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of the Reactor Trip System Instrumentation Surveillance Requirements specified in Table 4.3-1.
4.3.1.2 The REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME of each Reactor trip function shall be demonstrated to be within its limit at least once per 18 months.
Each test shall include at least one train such that both trains are tested at least once per 36 months and one channel per function such that all channels are tested at least once every N times 18 months where N is the total number of redundant channels in a specific Reactor trip function as shown in the
" Total No. of Channels" column of Table 3.3-1.
4.3.1.3 The response time of RTDs associated with the Reactor Trip System shall be demonstrated to be within their limits (see note 2 to Table 3.3-2) at least once per 18 months.
J McGUIRE - UNITS 1 and 2 3/4 3-1 Amendment Noa4(Unit 1)
Amendment No65(Unit 2)
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TABLE 3.3-1 (Continued) l TABLE NOTATION
- With the Reactor Trip System breakers in the closed position, the Control Rod Drive System capable of rod withdrawal.
j Values left blank pending NRC approval of three loop operation.
Comply with the provisions of Specificatici 3.3.2 for any portion of the channel required to be OPERABLE by Specification 3.3.2.
"Below the P-6 (Intermediate Range Neutron Flux Interlock) Setpoint.
Below the P-10 (Low Setpoint Power Range Neutron Flux Interlock) Setpoint.
ACTION STATEMENTS ACTION 1 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, restore the inoperable channel i
to OPERARLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or be in HOT STANOBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
ACTION 2 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed provided the following conditions are satisfied:
a.
The inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, b.
The Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met; however, j
the inoperable channel may be bypassed for up to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> j
for surveillance testing of other channels per Specification 4.3.1.1, and c.
Either, THERMAL POWER is restricted to less than or equal to 75% of RATED THERMAL POWER and the Power Range Neutron Flux Trip Setpoint is reduced to less than or equal to 85% of RATED THERMAL POWER within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />; or, the QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO is monitored at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> l
per Specification 4.2.4.2.
1 i
McGUIRE - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 3-6 Amendment No.81 Unit 1)
Amendment No.6(Unit 2)
---___w
No cyom,2s nm r4&g foA IMcAMAriod omv
]
TABLE 3.3-1 (Continued)
ACTION STATEMENTS (Continued) l ACTION 3 - With the numoer of channels OPERABLE one less than the Minimtm i
C'tannels OPERABLE requirement and with the THERMAL POWER level:
I a.
Below the P-6 (Intermediate Range Neutron Flux Interlock) 3etpoint, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status prior to increasing THERMAL POWER above the P-6 Setpoint, and b.
Above the P-6 (Intermediate Range Neutron Flux Interlock)
Setpoint but below 10% of RATED THERMAL POWER, restore the i
inoperable channel to OPERABLE status prior to increasing THERMAL POWER above 10% of RATED THERMAL POWER.
i ACTION 4 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Minimum
]
Channels OPERABLE requirement suspend all operations involving positive reactivity changes.
ACTION 5 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, verify compliance with the SHUTOOWN MARGIN requirements of Specification 3.1.1.1 or 3.1.1.2, as applicab.le, within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> and at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> thereafter.
ACTION 6 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed provided the following conditions are satisfied:
a.
The inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, and l
b.
The Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met; however, i
the inoperable channel may be bypassed for up to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> l
for surveillance testing of other channels per Specification 4.3.1.1 and Specification 4.3.2.1.
ACTION 7-Delete ACTION 8 - With less than the Minimum Number of Channels OPERABLE, within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> determine by observation of the associated permissive annunciator window (s) that the interlock is in its required i
state for the existing plant condition, or apply Specification 3.0.3.
MCGUIRE - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 3-7 Amendment No34(Unit I)
Amendment No35(Unit 2)
q 4
No Cp4AHMJ T2 TIS fMC, l
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TABLE 3.3-1 (Continued)
ACTION STATEMENTS (Continued)
ACTION 9 - With'the number of OPERABLE channels'one less than the Minimum 2
Channels OPERABLE requirement, be in at least HOT STANDBY -
J within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />; however,.one channel may be bypassed for up to 2-hours for surveillance testing per Specification 4.3.1.1, provided the other channel is OPERABLE.
-ACTION 10 - With-the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Minimum i
Channels OPERABLE requirement, restore the inoperable channel-to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or open the Reactor trip breakers within the next hour.
ACTION 11 - With the number of OPERABLE channels less'than the. Total Number of Channels, operation may continue provided the inoperable channels are placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
ACTION 12 - With one of the diverse trip features (Undervoltage or shunt I
trip attachment) inoperable, restore it to 0FERABLE status I
within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or declare the breaker inoperable and apply.
ACTION 9.
The breaker shall not be bypassed while one of the diverse trip features is inoperable except for the time required for performing maintenance to restore the breaker to OPERABLE status.
i l
I i
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i McGUIRE - UNITS 1 and 2 3/4 3-8 Amendment No.74(Unit 1)
Amendment No.55(Unit 2)
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TABLE 4.3-1 (Continued)
TABLE NOTATION 1
With the Reactor Trip System breakers closed and the Control Rod Drive System capable of rod withdrawal.
Below P-6 (Intermediate Range Neutron Flux Interlock) Setpoint.
Below P-10 (Low Setpoint Power Range Neutron Flux Interlock) Setpoint.
(1)
If not performed in previous 7 days.
(2)
Comparison of calorimetric to excore power indication above 15% of RATED THERMAL POWER.
Adjust excore channel gains consistent with calorimetric power if absolute difference is greater than 2%.
The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable for entry into MODE 2 or 1.
(3)
Single point comparison of incore to excore axial flux difference above 15% of RATED THERMAL POWER.
Recalibrates if the absolute difference is greater than or equal to 3%.
The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable for entry into MODE 2 or 1.
(4)
Neutron detectors may be excluded from CHANNEL CALIBRATION.
(5)
Detector plateau curves shall be obtained, evaluated, and compared to manufacturer's data.
For the Intermediate Range and Power Range Neutron Flux channels the provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable for entry into MODE 2 or 1.
(6)
Incore - Excore Calibration, above 75% of RATED THERMAL POWER.
The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable for entry into MODE 2 or 1.
(7)
Each train shall be tested at least every 62 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS.
(8)
With power greater than or equal to the interlock Setpoint the required operational test shall consist of verifying that the interlock is in the required state by observing the permissive annunciator window.
(9)
Monthly surveillance in MODES 3*, 4* and 5* shall also include verification that permissives P-6 and P-10 are in their required state for existing plant conditions by observation of the permis-
.l sive annunciator window.
Monthly surveillance shall include verification of the High Flux at Shutdown Alarm Setpoint of less l
than or equal to five times background.
(10) -
Setpoint verification is not required.'
McGUIRE - UNITS 1 and 2 3/4 3-14 Amendment No. ag (Unit 1)
m cmnses run y foe infernmoa wy j
TABLE 4.3-1 (Continued)
TABLE NOTATION (11) -
The TRIP ACTUATING DEVICE OPERATIONAL TEST shall independently verify the OPERABILITY of the undervoltage and shunt trip circuits for the Manual Reactor Trip Function.
(12) -
The TRIP ACTUATING DEVICE OPERATIONAL TEST shall independently verify j
the OPERABILITY of the undervoltage and shunt trip attachments of j
the Reactor Trip Breakers.
j 1
(13) -
Prior to placing breaker in service, a local manual shunt trip shall l
be performed.
{
(14) -
The autoratic undervoltage trip capability shall be verified operable.
d I
i
\\
I I
McGUIRE - UNITS 1 and 2 3/4 3-14a Amendment No74 (Unit 1)
Amendment No.55 (Unit 2)
__m----._
_ - - - _ _. _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _..m_m__
~
INSTRUMENTATION MOVA8LE INCORE DETECTORS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATIC'j 3.3.3.2 The Movable Incore Detection System shall be OPERABLE with:
a.
At least 75%"of the detector thimbles, l
A minimum of two# etector thimbles per core quadrant, and l
b.
d c.
Sufficient movable detectors, drive, and readout equipment to map these thimbles.
APPLICABILITY: When the Movable Incore Detection System is used for:
a.
Recalibration of the Excore Neutron Flux Detection System, b.
Monitoring the QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO, or Measurement of F h and F (Z) c.
q ACTION:
With the. Movable Incore Detection System inoperable, do not use the system for I
the above applicable monitoring or cal 1bration functions.
The provisions of 1
Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable.
(.
l J
l'l 1
i SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.3.3.2 The Movable Incore Detection System shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at f
least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> by normalizing each detector output when required for:
l a
Recalibration of the Excore Neutron Flux Detection System, or b.
Monitoring the QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO, or MeasurementofFhandF(Z) c.
q l
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McGUIRE - UNITS 1 and 2 3/4 3-45 Amendment No. V (Unit 1)
Amendment No. fR (Unit 2) i
. ~
i No cones ws ret, f@ MaaM/)Tlatsusy r
i 3/4.2 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS 1
1 BASES The specifications of this section provide assurance of fuel integrity during Condition I (Normal Operation) and.'I (Incidents of Moderate Frequency) events by:
(1) maintaining the calculated DNBR in the core at or above the l
design limit during normal operation and in short-term transients, and (2) limiting I
the fission gas release, fuel pellet temperature, and cladding mechanical prop-erties to within assumed design criteria.
In addition, limiting the peak linear power density during Condition I events provides assurance that the initial conditions assumed for the LOCA analyses are met and the ECCS accept.ance criteria limit of 220C*F is not exceeded, l
The definitions of certain hot channel and peaking factors ac used in
)
these specifications are as follows:
F (Z)
Heat Flux Hot Channel Factor, is daff ned as the maximum local 0
heat flux on the surface of a fuel rod at core elevation Z divided by the average fuel rod heat flux, allowing for manufacturing toler-ances on fuel pellets and rods; F
Nuclear Enthalpy Rise Hot Channel Factor, is defined as the ratio of g
the integral of linear power along the rod with the highest integrated power to the average rod power.
I 3/4.2.1 AXIAL FLUX DIFFERENCE l
The limits on AXIAL FLUX DIFFERENCE (AFD) assure that the F (Z) upper q
bound envelope of 2.32 times the normalized axial peaking factor is not exceeded l
during either normal operation or in the event of xenon redistribution following power changes.
Target flux difference is determined at equilibrium xenon conditions.
The full-length rods may be positioned within the core in accordance with
-l their respective insertion limits and should be inserted near their normal position for steady-state operation at.high power levels.
The value of the target flux difference obtained under these conditions divided by the fraction of RATED THERMAL POWER is the target flux difference at RATED THERMAL P0WER-for the associated core burnup conditions. Target flux differences for other THERMAL POWER levels are obtained by multiplying the RATED THERMAL POWER value by the appropriate fractional THERMAL POWER level.
The periodic updating of the target flux difference value is necessary to reflect core burnup.
considerations.
McGUIRE - UNITS 1 and 2 B 3/4 2-1 Amendment No. 73 (Unit 1)
Amendment No. 54 (Unit 2)
yo cets rms IQ l
rn wrvnw-o POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS BASES 3/4.2.2 and 3/4.2.3 HEAT FLUX HOT CHANNEL FACTOR, and RCS FLOW RATE AND NUCLEAR ENTHALPY RISE HOT CHANNEL FACTOR
)
l The limits-on heat flux hot channel factor, RCS flow rate, and nuclear enthalpy rise hot channel factor ensare.that:
(1) the design limits on peak local power density and minimum DNBR are not exceeded, and (2) in the event of a LOCA the peak fuel clad temperature will not exceed the 2200'F ECCS accep-tance criteria limit.
Each of these is measurable but will normally only be determined periodically as specified in Specifications 4.2.2 and 4.2.3.
This periodic surveillance is sufficient to insure that the limits are maintained provided:
j a.
Control rods in a single group move together with no individual rod insertion differing by more than + 13 steps from the group demand position; b.
Control rod groups are sequenced with overlapping groups as described in Specification 3.1.3.6; c.
The control rod insertion limits of Specifications 3.1.3.5 and 3.1.3.6 are maintained; and d.
The axial power distribution, expressed in terms of AXIAL FLUX DIFFERENCE, is maintained within the limits.
FhwillbemaintainedwithinitslimitsprovidedConditionsa.through
- d. above are maintained.
As noted on Figure 3.2-3, RCS flow rate and power I
may be " traded off" against one another (i.e., a low measured RCS flow l
rate is acceptable if the power level is decreased) to ensure that the calcu-lated DNBR will not be below the design DNBR value.
TherelaxationofFhas a function of THERMAL POWER allows changes in the radial power shape for all permissible rod insertion limits.
i 1
R as calculated in Specification 3.2.3 and used in Figure 3.2-3, accounts for F less than or equal to 1.49.
This value is used in the various accident i
H analyses where F influences parameters other than DNBR, e.g., peak clad tem-l g
perature, and thus is the maximum "as measured".value allowed.
l Margin between the safety analysis limit DNBRs (1.47 and 1.49 for thimble and typical cells, respectively) and the design limit DNBRs (1.32 and 1.34 for thimble and typical cells, respectively) is maintained.
A fraction of this margin is utilized to accommodate the transition core DNBR penalty (2%) and the appropriate fuel rod bow DNBR penalty (WCAP - 8691, Rev. 1).
When an F measurement is taken, an allowance for both experimental error 9
and manufacturing tolerance must be made.
An allowance of 5% is appropriate McGUIRE - UNITS 3 and 2 B 3/4 2-2a Amendment No.42 (Unit 1)
Amendment No.23 (Unit 2)
. yo che-ess Tw4 /A6 i
4 rs ownsman,~ a4 l
l l
This page deleted.
.i
-l 1
I
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j j
'I
- )
1 I
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I 5
1 l
)
McGUI?F-- UNITS 1 and 2-B 3/4 2-3 Amendment No. 42 (Unit 1):
Amendment No. 23 (Unit 2)-
l
~
po cy mes rws t&t, 1
Tos. iaftAMATloW Gaw l
POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS i
BASES HEAT FLUX HOT CHANNEL FACTOR and RCS FLOW RATE AND NUCLEAR ENTHALPY RISE HOT CHANNEL FACTOR (Continued) 1
~
for a full-core map taken with the Incore Detector Flux Mapping System, and a 3% allowance is appropriate for manufacturing tolerance.:
WhenRCSflowrateandFfHare. measured, no additional allowances are necessary prior to comparison with the limits of Figure 3.2-3.
Measurement errorsof1.7%forRCStotal'lowrateand4%forFhhavebeenallowedfor.in l
f determination of the design DNBR value.
The measurement error for RCS total flow rate is based upon performing a precision heat balance and using the result to calibrate the RCS flow rate 4
indicators.
Potential fouling of the feedwater venturi which might not be I
detected could bias the result from the precision heat balance'in a non--
l conservative manner.
Therefore, a penalty of 0.1% for undetected fouling of l
the feedwater venturi is included in Figure 4.2-3.
Any fouling which might bias the RCS flow rate measurement greater than 0.1% can be detected by monitoring and trending various plant performance parameters.
If detected,
-l action shall'be taken before performing subsequent precision heat balance measurements, i.e., either the effect of the fouling shall be quantified and g
I compensated for in the RCS flow rate measurement or the venturi shall be cleaned to eliminate the fouling.
The 12-hour periodic surveillance of indicated RCS flow is sufficient to I
detect only flow degradation which could lead to operation outside the accept-able region of operation shown on Figure 3.2-3.
The hot channel factor F (z) is measured periodically and increased by'a cycle and height dependent power factor appropriate to either RAOC er Base Load operation, W(z) or W(z)BL, to provide assurance that the limit on the hot channel factor, F (z), is met. W(z) accounts for the effects of normal, q
operation transients and was determined from expected power control maneuvers over the full range of burnup conditions in the core.' W(z)BL accounts for the more restrictive operating limits allowed by Base Load operation which result in less severe transient values.
The W(z) function for normal operation l
is provided in the Peaking Factor Limit Report per Specification 6.9.1.9.
McGUIRE - UNITS 1 and 2 B 3/4 2-4 Amendment No. 42 (Unit 1)
Amendment No.-23 (Unit 2).
.y Ivo cxwbrs 7M FM6 Fak JMsitMnen ONH POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS-
' BASES
~
l' l
l 3/4.2.4 QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO The QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO lirr,it assures that the radial power 'distri-f bution satisfies the design values used in the power capability analysis.
Radial power distribution measurements are made during STARTUP testing and periodically during power operation.
The 2-hour time allowance for operation with a tilt condition greater than 1.02 but less than 1.09 is provided to allow identification and correc-tion of a dropped or misaligned rod.
In the event such action does'not cor-is reinstated by reducing rect the tilt, the margin for uncertainty on Fg the power by 3*.' from RATED THERMAL POWER for each percent of tilt in excess of 1.0.
For purposes of monitoring QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO when one excore detector is inoperable, the moveable incore detectors are used to confirm that 1
the normalized symmetric power distribution is consistent with the QUADRANT
]
POWER TILT RATIO.
The incore detector monitoring is done with a full incore J
flux map or two sets of four symmetric thimbles.
The two sets of four symmetric 1
thimbles is a unique set of eight detector locations.
These locations are C-8, E-5, E-11, H-3, H-13, L-5, L-11, N-8.
l 3/4.2.5 DNB PARAMETERS The limits on the DNB-related parameters assure that each of the para-meters are maintained within the normal steady-state envelope of operation assumed in the transient and accident analyses.
The limits are consistent with the initial FSAR assumptions and have been analytically demonstrated adequate to maintain a design limit DNBR throughout each analyzed transient.
The indicated T,yg values and the indicated pressurizer pressure values correspond to analytical limits of 592.6 F and 2220 psia respectively, with allowance for indication instrumentation measurement uncertainty.
The 12-hour periodic surveillance of these parameters through instrument readout is sufficient to er:sure that the parameters are restored within their limits following load changes and other expected transient operation.
Indication instrumentation measurement uncertainties are'accountad for in the limits provided in Table 3.2-1.
j McGUIRE - UNITS 1 and 2 B 3/4 2-5 Amendment No.65 (Unit 1)
Amendment No.46 (Unit 2)
5&Mm Tm f%E, F=n incmnow car 3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION BASES 1
1 3/4.3.1 and 2/4'.3.2 REACTOR TRIP AND ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM IN m uMENTATION The OPERABILITY of the Reactor Trip and Engineered Safety Features i
Actuation System instrumentation and interlocks ensure that:
(1) the I
associated ACTION and/or Reactor trip will be initiated when the parameter 8
mor.itored by each channel or combination thereof reaches its Setpoint, (2) the specified coincidence logic and sufficient redundancy is maintained to permit
)
a channel to be out-of service for testing or maintenance consistent with j
maintaining an appropriate level of reliability of the Reactor Protection and Engineered Safety Features Instrumentation and (3) sufficient system functions capability is available from diverse parameters.
The OPERABILITY of these systems is required to provide the overall reliability, redundancy, and diversity assumed available in the facility J
design for the protection and mitigation of accident and transient conditions.
The integrated operation of each of these systems is consistent with the assumptions used in the accident analyses.
The Surveillance Requirements specified for these systems ensure that the overall system functional I
capability is maintained comparable to the original design standards.
The periodic surveillance tests performed at the minimum frequencies are sufficient to demonstrate this capabi.lity.
Specified surveillance intervals and surveillance and maintenance outage
{
times have been determined in accordance with WCAP-10271, " Evaluation of Sur-veillance Frequencies and Out of Service Times for the Reactor Protection Instrumentation System," and supplements to that report.
Surveillance inter-vals and out of service times were determined based on maintaining an appro-priate level of reliability of the Reactor Protection System and Engineered l
Safety Features instrumentation.
(Implementation of quarterly testing of RTS is being postponed until after approval of a similar testing interval for ESFAS.) The NRC Safety Evaluation Report for WCAP-10271 was provided in a i
letter dated February 21, 1985 from C. O. Thomas (NRC) to J. J. Sheppard (WOG-CP&L).
i The measurement of response time at the specified frequencies provides assurance that the Reactor trip and the Engineered Safety Feature actuation associated with each channel is completed within the time limit assumed in the accident analyses.
No credit was taken in the analyses for those channels with response times indicated as not applicable.
Response time may be demonstrated by any series of sequential, overlapping, or total channel test' measurements provided that such tests demonstrate the total channel respor:se time as defited.
Sensor response time verification may be demonstrated by either:
(1) in place, onsite, or offsite test measurements, or (2) utilizing replacement sensors with certified response times.
The Engineered Safety Features Actuation System senses selected plant parameters and determines whether or not predetermined limits are being exceeded.
If they are, the signals are combined into logic matrices sensitive to combinations indicative of various accidents, events, and transients.
Once the required logic combination is completed, the system sends actuation signals to those Engineered Safety Features components whose aggregate function best serves the requirements of the condition.
As an example, the McGUIRE - UNITS 1 and 2 B 3/4 3-1 Amendment NoS4(Unit 1)
Amendment No35(Unit 2) a
1 8 0 cwAnes,ws racq 1
Fon IaFopHAnow ousy INSTRlH,FNTATION BASES 3/4.3.1 and 3/4.3.2 REACTOR TRIP AND ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION 1
SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION (Continued) following actions may be initiated by the Engineered Safety Features Actuation l
System to mitigate the consequences of a steam line break or loss-of-coolant accident:
(1) Safety Injection pumps start and automatic valves position, (2) Reactor trip, (3) feedwater isolation, (4) startup of the emergency diesel generators, (5) containment spray pumps start and automatic valves position,
.(6) containment isolation, (7) steam line isolation, (8) Turbine trip, l
(9) auxiliary feedwater pumps start and automatic valves position, ana (10) nuclear service water pumps start and automatic valves position.
Technical Specifications for the Reactor Trip Breakers and the Reacter Trip Bypass Breakers are based upon NRC Generic Letter 85-09 " Technical Specifica-
)
tions for Generic Letter 83-28, Item 4.3," dated May 23, 1985.
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McGUIRE - L' NITS 1 and 2 B 3/4 3-la Amendment No74(Unit 1) i Amendment No3S(Unit 2) l i
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INSTRUMENTATION hj
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- JASES_,
REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM AND ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION (Continued)
The Engineered Safety Features Actuation System interlocks perform the following functions:
0-4 Reactor tripped - Actuates Turbine trip, closes main feedwater valves on T,yg below Setpoint, prevents the opening of the main feedwater valves which were closed by a Safety Injection or High j
s Steam Generator Water Level signal, allows Safety Injection block so that components can De reset or tripped.
Reactor not tripped prevents manual block of Safety Injection.
P-11 Defeats the manual block of Safety Injection actuation on low pressurizer pressure and low steamline pressure and defeats steam-line isolation on negative steamline pressure rate.
Defeats the inanual block of the motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pumps on trip l
of main feedwater pumps and low-low steam generator water level.
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P-12 On increasing reactor coolant loop temperature, P-12 automatically provides an arming signal to the steam dug:,s systela.
On decreasing reactor coolant loop temperature, P-12 automatically removes the j
arming signal from the steam dump system.
"g
.-14 On increasing steam generator level, P-14 automatically trips all feed-water isolation valves and inhibits feedwater control valve modulation.
3/4.3.3 MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION 3/4.3.3.1 RADIATION MONITORING FOR PLANT OPERATIONS The OPERABILITY of the radiation monitoring instrumentation for plant operations ensures that:
(1) the associated cetion will be initiated when the radiation level monitored by each channel or combination thereof reaches its Setpoint, (2) the specified coincidence logic is maintained, and (3) suffi-cient redundancy is maintained to permit a channel to be out-of-service for testing or maintenance.
The radiation monitors for plant operations senses radiation levels in selected plant systems and locations and determines whether or not predetermined limits are being exceeded.
If they are, the signals are combined i.ito logic matrices sensitive to combinations indicative of various accidents and abnormal conditions.
Once the required logic combination is ccmraleted, the system sends actuation signals to intiate alarms or automatic i oiation action and actuation of Emergency Exhaust or Ventilation Systems.
3/4.3.3.2 MOVABLE INCORE DE1ECTOR$
The OPERABILITY of the movable incore detectors with the specified miniinum complement of equipment ensures that the measurements obtained froin
'e of this system accurately represent the spatial neutron flux distribution McGUIRE - UNITS 1 and 2 B 3/4 3-2
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INSTRUMENTATION -
BASES
~-
MOVA8tE INCORE DETECTORS (Continuedl The OPERA 81LITY of this system is demonstrated by irradiating each detecter used and determining the acceptability of its voltage curve.
of the core.
N For the purpose of measuring F (Z) or F a full incore flux map is used.
g Quarter-core flux maps, as defined in WCAP-8648, June 1976, may be used in recalib"ation of the Excore Neutron Flux Detection System, and full incere flux maps or symmetric incere thimoles may be used for monitoring the QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO when one Power Range channel is inoperable.
3/4.3.3.3 SEISMIC INSTRUMENTATION The OPERA 81LITY of the seismic instrumentation ensures that sufficient capability is available to promptly determine the magnitude of a seismic event This capa-and evaluate the response of those features important to safety.
bility is required to permit comparison of the measured response to that used in the design basis for the facility to determine if plant shutdown is reouired The instrumentation is consistent pursuant to Appendix A of 10 CFR Part 100.
with the recenseendations of Regulatory Gw4de 1.12, " Instrumentation for Earth-quakes," April 1974.
3/4.3.3.4 METEOROLOGICAL INSTRUMENTATION The OPERA 81t.ITY of the meteorological instrumentation ensures that suf ficient meteorological data are available for estimating potential radia--
l tien cases to the public as a result of routine or accidental release of 1
This capability is required to radioactive materials to the atmosphere.
evaluate the need for initiating protective measures to protect the health and safety of tne public and is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.23, "Cnsite Meteorological Programs," February 1972.
3/4.3.3.5 AE W.E SHUTOOWN INSTRUMENTATION l
The OPERA 8ILITY of the remote snutdown instrumentation ensures tnat sufficient capability is available to permit snutdown and maintenance of HOT This STAN08Y of the facility from locations outside of the control room.
capability is required in the event control room habitability is lost and is consistent with General Design Criterion 19 of 10 CFR 50.
3/4.3.3.6 ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION The OPERABILITY of the accident faonitoring instrumentation ensures tnat f
1 sufficient information is available on selected plant parameters to monitor i
I This capability is consis-l and assess these variab'les following an accident.
tent witt. the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.97, " Instrumentation f or Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants to Assess Plant Conditions During a Following an Accident," December 197S and NUREG-0578. "utI-2 Lessons Learn insk Force Status Report and Short-Term Recommendations."
McGUIRE - UNITS 1 and 2 S 3/4 3-3 l
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ft ATTACHMENT 2 j
JUSTIFICATION AND SAFETY ANALYSIS The proposed changes to Technical Specifications 3/4.2.2, 3/4.2.3,'and 3/4.3.3.2 are a one-time only chang 4 for McGuire Unit 1 Cycle 6 t;o reduce from 75% to 50% -
the number of available moveable incore detector thimbles required for the q
i Hoveable Incore Detection System to be operable. Technical. Specifications 3/4.2.4 and 3/4.3.1 would also be impacted by thest changes. These changes would-allow continued operation of Unit 1 should a current problem with sticking detector thimbles become worse.
Background / Justification:
The Moveable Incore Detection System consists of 58 incore flux thimbles to
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permit measurement of the axial and radial neutron flux distribution within the reactor core. Moveable fission chamber detectors are available to scan the length of the 58 selected fuel assemblies. 'The detector thimbles'in Unit I were cleaned and eddy current' examined during the last refueling outage as required in-NRC Bulletin No. 88-09.
Upon restart the detectors had sticking problems that prevented them from traveling the entire length of the incore thimbles into the reactor vessel.
These numerous mechanical thimble problems eventually disappeared as the plant reached operating temperatures and the drives were exercised. After the steam generator tube rupture outage March 7, 1989 and subsequent return to power (Ref. Licensee Event Report No.. 369/89-04), the plant again experienced detector sticking problems. The problems did not decrease and a flux map taken on July 14, 1989 could only access 43 of the 58 inst? tiled' flux thimble tubes. This was one lesr than the 75% criterion (i.e 44 detector thimbles) required by the. Technical Specifications (T.S.3.3.3.2.a), and thus wasn't valid for Technical Specification Compliance use. After various-corrective actions were taken including readjusting the clutches on the detector drives, 44 detector thimbles were able to be accessed for a flux map taken on July 18, 1989.
The following table illustrates the detector sticking problems encountered so far for McGuire Unit ? Cycle 6:
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'j FLUX MAP DATE
% POWER NO. OF ACCESSED THIMBLES-i j
01/04/89 38.47 48 01/05/89 76.20 50-01/06/89 76.19 52 01/17/89 99.91 55 02/15/89 99.61 47-l S/G TUBE RUPTURE OUTASE 03/07/89 THROUGH 05/09/89 05/16/89 99.77 49 06/16/89 99.88 45 07/14/89 99.18 43 (74.1%)
07/18/89 99.87 44 (75.9%)
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. It should be noted that the reduction in'the number of thimbles in the 02/15/89 mapping was a result of six thimbles that weren't blocked not being surveyed, not Jue to a reoccurrence of the sticking problems (therefore, 53 thimbics were actually accessible).- Similarily, three thimbles that were not' blocked were not surveyed for the the 05/16/89 mapping (i.e. 52 thimbles actually accessible).
In-addition, three thimble core locations have been sticking since before Cycle 6=
(although one has since been reaccessed), resulting in-56'being the number of
' thimbles actually available during Cycle 6.
It is also important~to note that the thimbic sticking problems on Cycle 6 have' occurred randomly, not a systematic thimble deletion. The availabl3 detectors are well distributed throughout the core and are close to all assenlies (including the high peaking assemblies).
This is evidenced by Attachment 2A, which illustrates the detector thimble-locations that were accessible sud inaccessible for the 06/16/89 45 trace flux map (Map'No. 24) and the 07/14/89 43 trace flux map (Map No. 25). Consequently, the instrumentation thimble coverage is adequate.
It is suspected that residue left.from the cleaning process is causing the sticking problems (McGuire has not had a history of severe detector thimble problems - this was the first time this particular cleaning method has been used at McGuire). Efforts are continuing at the plant to repair.the Moveable'Incore Detection System. The thimbles will be cleaned again (by a different method) at the next refueling outage (or should a' shutdown of sufficient duration occur before the next refueling outage), and/or other corrective steps'as necessary, in order to alleviate the sticking problems. Until such corrective measures can be taken, in view of the recent borderline numbers of detector thimbles available, McGuire is concerned about meeting the 75% criterion called for in the Technical Specifications fo-future required Moveable Incore Detection System monitoring / calibration uses (i.e. T.S.'s 3/4.2.2, 3/4.2.3, 3/4.2.4, and 3/4.3.1).
L McGuire anticipates that this problem has the potential to get worse throughout j
the cycle. Failure to have at least 44' thimbles. accessible (75%) would
'1 eventually result in a forced Unit 1 shutdown due to the inability to meet the F,gquirements of Technical Specifications 3/4.2.2 and 3/4.2.3 (i.e. measur r
and F z)) [ Inability to meet the applicable requirements of T.S.'s 3/4.2.4 ann 3/4.39(1wouldonlyresultinpowerreductionsto.<50%and<75%,
respectively].
i Based on the above concern, in order to avoid an unnecessary potential shutdown of McGuire Unit 1, relief is sought from the 75% criterion. Duke Power Company proposes to change the Technical Specifications to allow McGuire Unit 1 Moveable l
Incore Detection System operability (and therefore continued operation) with less than 75% of the detector thimbles available for the remainuer of Cycle 6, at which time the detector thimble sticking problem will be addressed.
Dases/ Safety Analysis:
l As discussed in McGuire FSAR Section 7.7, the Moveable Incore Detection System is-l used for confirmatory information and is not required for the day to day safe l
operation of the core (Daily core power performance is monitored by'the excore detectors). The measured power distribution is affected by the "true" power distribution that exists in the core and the instrument thimble pattern. The
-l thimbles are distributed nearly uniformly over the core with approximately the same number of thimbles in each quadrant. The number and location of these
e 0 4 l
tMmbles have been chosen to permit measurement of local to average peaking factors to an accuracy of 15 percent (95 percent confidence). Measured nuclear peaking factors are increased by 5 percent to allow for this accuracy.
If the measured power peaking is larger than acceptable, reduced power capability is indicated. The 75% detector thimble operability requirement was chosen by the NRC (via Westinghouse Standard Technical Specifications) to allow a reasonable amount of failures of the incore detectors, but to encourage licensees to strive for as near as 100% as possible. Reduction of operable detector thimbles to 50%
does not significantly degrade the ability of the Moveable detector system to I
l measure core power distributions. However, core peaking factor measurement uncertainties will be increased by a reductlon in the number of operable detector thimbles from 75% since they were previously determined for the Technical i
Specifications assuming the 75% criterion.
Duke Power Company commissioned Westinghouse to assess the incremental peaking factor measurement uncertainties and excore calibration impact associated with a reduction to a minimum of 29 (i.e. 50%) of the 58 moveable detector thimbles in l
McGuire Unit I for Cycle 6.
This study is provided as Attachment 2B.
Briefly I
summarized, the study, which is based on a Westinghouse generic thimble deletion f
analysis, indicates that additienal uncertainties of 1.0% for F and 2.0% for F areappropriatewhenthenumberofinstrumentedassembliesisrNucedfrom58toO 29.
The additional uncertainties should be applied linearly from below 75% to greater than or equal to 50% moveable thimble locations.
In addition to the uncertainty, a minimum of 4 thimbles per quadrant is required (where quadrant 1
includes both horizontal-vertical quadrants and diagonally bounded quadrants) to establish the bounds of applicability cf the study. The study concludes that operation of the moveable detector system with a minimum of 50% of the thimbles available is acceptable with the above provisos.
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Note that due to the significant database used in the above study Westinghouse intended that the uncertainties derived are to be considered of a generic nature and should be applicable to subrequent cycles with all Westinghouse fuel. The Westinghouse generic thimble deletion analysis portion of the study was originally to support permanent reduction of the detector thimble operability 1
requirement to 50% (29) in Westinghouse four-loop plants (Note that the study alno addresses measurement uncertainties for F which McGuire does not use).
I However, the NRC has previously denied attemptNYfor such permanent changes (Ref.
Beaver Valley Power Station Facility Operating License No. DPR-66 Amendment No.
73 Safety Evaluation Report) on the grounds that reducing the number to 50% might result in a lack of incentive to keep the.mptem operating as close to 100% as possible which could result in an unacceptably degraded ability to detect anomalous conditions in the core. However, the NRC has permitted such relaxation of the 757. requiremer.t for the duration of affected reactor cycles (including one i
for Beaver Valley based on this Westinghouse generic analysis - ref. Facility Operating License No. DPR-66 Amendment No. 61).
Consequently, Duke Power Company is only proposing the Technical Specifications changes be applicable for the remainder of the McGuire Unit 1 Cycle 6, and Westinghouse only confirmed the uncertainties are applicable to the McGuire Unit 1 Cycle 6 core. McGuire Unit 1 Cycle 6 contains 4 BabccLk & Wilcox (B&W) demonstration fuel assemblies.
Westinghouse modeled these 4 assemblies and generated the flux map constants for them. Therefore, the presence of B&W assemblies does not represent an
. inconsistency with the data base used in the generic thimble deletion analysis.
In addition, the study uses the INCORE Computer Code whereas McGuire uses SNACORE. The equivalence of SNACORE and INCORE for processing measured power distributions has been previously demonstrated in Duke Power Company's "McGuire/ Catawba Nuclear Station Nuclear Physics Methodology For Reload Design",
DPC-NF-2010A, approved by the NRC SER issued on March 13, 1985.
It is also noted that the input factors for SNACORE are generated by Westinghouse using identical methods as used for INCORE. Therefore, the effects of deleting thimbles from SNACORE are considered as properly analyzed using the results of the generic thimble deletion analysis.
Burnup on Cycle 6 is currently at about 5700 MWD /MTU of a 15,500 MWD /MTU cycle.
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At this point in cycle operation, the core characteristics have been well established and, specifically, core power distribution is well defined. Reaction rate error distribution indicates that the core-is still operating as designed.
The predicted peak location does not move from 4000 to 8000 MWD /MTU and the' peak is very constant (the peak from here to the end of cycle stays in the same assembly and only changes about 1%). All power distribution surveillance parameters (Fg, F ) currently have suffient margin to their limits after the n
current Technical Specification required uncertainties are applied. From the flux map taken July 18, 1989' Nit is calculated that there is approximately 6.1%
margin in Fg (i.e. measured Fg plus its measurement uncertainty to its Technical Specification limit), and approximately 6.4% margin in F (z) (although there is n
some flexibility available with this F limit). These mifrgins will continue to n
increase for the remainder of Cycle 6 Based on McGuire Unit 1 core design predictions. Therefore adequate margin exists for implementation of the Westinghouse study specified additional measurement uncertainties.
Description of Proposed Technical Specifications Changes:
The proposed Technical Specifications changes are based on guidance provided by Westinghouse with the commissioned McGuire 1 Cycle 6 thimble reductfon study.
T.S.3/4.2.2 is modified by adding a footnote to surveillance Specifications 4.2.2.2.b 4.2.2.4.b, and 4.2.2.5, where the measurement uncertainties are addressed. The footnotes, which are applicable only for McGuire Unit 1 and then only for Cycle 6 for reasons discussed above, instruct that the 5% F (Z) n measurement uncertainty be increased linearly (with the' maximum 2%) When the number of available detector thimbles is less than 75% of the total (with the minimum 50%). This additional uncertainty is in accordance with the results/
bounds of the McGuire Unit 1 Cycle 6 Westinghouse study discussed above, and will result in a maximum F (z) measurement uncertainty of 7% at the.50% available o
detector thimble level. No other changes to Specification 3/4.2.2 are required I
for the reduction in the number of available moveable incore detector thimbles.
Note that a footnote is added to Specification 4.2.2.4 which applies for base load operation, even though no base load operation analysis was performed for McGuire Unit 1 Cy-le 6 and thus the specification wouldn't be used for Unit 1 Cycle 6 (Ref. H. B. Tucker (DPC) letter to NRC dated December 30,1988). This was done for conservatism in cr.se base load operation is subsequently analyzed and implemented on Unit 1 Cycle 6 for some reason, since fai2ure to increase the
. measurement uncertainties under the specified conditions (i.e.' base load operation and less than 75% available detector thimbles) would be non-conservative.
T.S.3/4'.2.3 is modified by adding a footnote to limiting condition for operation Specification 3.2.3.c, where measurement uncertainties are addressed. The footnote,whichisappigcaoleonlyforMcGuireUnit1 Cycle 6asdiscussedabove, instructs that the 4% F measurement uncedainty.be increased-linearly (with aH the maximum 1%) when the number of available detector thimbles is less than 75%
of the total (with the minimum 50%).. This additional uncertainty is in-accordancewiththeresults/boundsoftheMcGuireUnig1 Cycle 6 Westinghouse study discussed above, and will result in a maximum F measurement uncertainty of 5% at the 50% available detector thimble level. NhHother' changes to Specification 3/4.2.3 are required for the reductiog in the number of available moveable incore detector thimbles.
Note that the F m
limit of 1.b (easurement uncertainty-would be increased by adjusting the F linearlybyg%from75%to 50%thimblesavailable),ratherthanaNjustingghemeasuredvalueFmeasureme n 3
ny h W method used is equivalent to adjusting the 4% F AH
+ (3-T/14.5) (1%)], where T is the number of available thimbles, similarily to the method used in Specification 3/4.2.2.
This was deemed the best way to accomplish incorporating the additional uncertainty into Specification 3/4.2.3.
Specification 3.2.3.cstatesthatFigure3.2-3inclugesthe4%F#g measurement.
uncertainty. Since both the F limit of 1.49 and F are used in'the R equation (definedinSpecificakhon3.2.3.a)whichis#UtilizedwithFigure3.2-3, adjustingthe1.49valuegoreflecttheadditionaluncertaintyaccomplishesthe same thing as adjusting F NochangestoSpecificagion3.2.3.aorFigure3.2-3 (whichspecifytheRequakko.n) are needed since the F utilized in the equation isdefinedinSpecifics. tion 3.2.3.cwhichincludesth$Hadditional uncertainty.
adjustment rootnote.
T.S.3/4.3.3.2 is modified by adding footnotes to limiting condition for operation Specifications 3.3.3.2.a and 3.3.3.2.b, where the minimum percentage.of detector thimbles and minimum number of detector thimbles per core quadrant are'specified for operability of the Moveable Incore Detection System. The Specification 3.3.3.2.a footnote states that the minimum percentage of available detector thimbles may be reduced from 75% down to 50%, provided that any necessary adjustments are made to peaking factor measurement uncertainties and the minimum number of detector thimbles per core quadrant is appropriately adjusted. This reduction to 50% (with attendant provisions) is in accordance with the results/ bounds of the McGuire 1 Cycle 6 Westinghouse study discussed above.
The Specification 3.3.3.2.b foctnote states that the minimum number of available detector thimbles per core quadrant, where quadrant includes both horizontal-vertical quadrants and diagonally bounded quadrants, must be raised from 2 to 4 for a reduction of the number of available detector thimbles below 75% of the total (with the minimum 50%). This increased minimum (with quadrant I
proviso) is in accordance with the results of the Westinghouse study discussed above and is required to establish the bounds of applicability of the study.
Both of the above footnotes are applicable only for McGuire Unit 1 Cycle 6 for reasons previously discussed. No other changes to Specification 3/4.3.3.2 are required for the reduction in the number of available moveable incore detector thimbles.
l
. i No other chcnges to Technical Specifications are required for the reduction in the number of available moveable incore detector thimbles. -The Moveable'Incore Detection System is also utilized for Specifications 3/4.2.4 (i.e. surveillance
- Specification 4.2.4.2) and 3/4.3.1 (i.e. Surveillance Table 4.3-1 Item 2).
While these specifications will be impacted by the reduction (i.e. the changes.to Specification 3/4.3.3.2-will allow performance of the surveillance of Specifications 3/4.2.4 and 3/4.3.1 with the Moveable Incore Detection System having less than 75% of the detector thimbles available),.there are no peaking.
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factor measurement uncertainties or other factors referenced in the specifications which require changing. The changes to Specification 3/4.3.3.2 are all thats needed to handle the Specification 3/4.2.4 and'3/4.3.1 aspects of the reduction in the number of available moveable incore detector thimbles.
Further, since this is a temporary one-time change which will expire at the end of Unit 1 Cycle.6, the Bases sections of the'affected Technical Specifications are not being changes to reflect the temporary provisions. The' basts for these temporary provisions will be documented via this submittal and the M, Safety Evaluation Report approving these proposed amendments.
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Conclusions:==
This proposed Technical Specifications change would allow an iterease in pi ant operating flexibility (for Unit 1 Cycle 6) while maintaining sufficient data j
collection capability to ensure that the operation of the core is within licensed i
limits. This change would be utilized only if further failures of the detector thimbles occur. Based upon the preceding justification, Duke Power Company concludes that the proposed amendments are necessary to avoid an unnecessary potential shutdown of McGuire Unit I which has real benefits in terms of availability, component lifetime (avoiding an unnecessary thermal cycle on the reactor and associated systems), and safety. Based upon the preceding safety.
analysis, Duke Power Company concludes that the proposed amendments will not be inimical to the health and safety of company personnel or the public. Further, such amendments have been granted by the NRC for other plants in similar situations in the past (e.g. Yankee Nuclear Power Station, Facility Operating License No. DPR-3 Amendment No. 100; and Beaver Valley Power Station, Facility Operating License No. DPR-66 Amendment No. 61).
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MOVABLE DETECTOR AND THERMOCOUPLE LOCATIONS I
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F esu ATTACHMENT 2B-NCGUIRE UNIT 1 EVALUAT A 0F THINBLE DELETION ON PEAKING FACTORS-Introduction l
This study was undertaken to assess incremental peaking factor measurement j
l uncertainties associated with a reduction to a minimum of 29 of the 58 of the movable detector (M/D) thimbles in McGuire Unit 1..Due to the significant database used in the study, it is intended that the uncertainties quantified herein is to be considered of a generic nature and should be aplicable to subsequent cycles.
Section 1 of this study presents the methodology and results of. randomly deleting thimbles from actual INCORE maps to..i.ntify the uncertainties.
j Section 2 quantifies the m nimum number of thimbles per quadrant required in l
i order to improve the ability to distinguish between random and systematic
)
thimble deletion events and to establish the bounds of applicability of Section 1.
For McGuire Unit 1 Cycle 6, an evaluation was performed to confirm applicability of this cycle to the study described herein. Review of current cycle flux maps indicate that measurement to predicted peaking factors are well within the required measurement uncertainties and indicate the core is behaving as predicted. Based on this, it is not anticipated that the core will not perform as expected for the remainder of the cycle..It is not expected that the additional uncertainties on the peaking factors will result in any violation of the limits.
Even with the increased measurement uncertainty applied as a result of the thimble delection study,'the McGuire Unit 1 F Surveillance Technical Specification will provide additional 0
protection. The Tech. Spec. is designed to reduce the operating band (AFD) resulting from violations of the limiting condition of operation (LCO).
1 430tW e-800720
umsnusuevam-enonertamMameet fy, 4
I In order to address thimble deletion in four loop plants, flux maps were chosen from plants with the maximum of 58 thimbles. When referring to percentages in Sections 1 and 2 they refer to the percentage from a total of 58 thimbles unless otherwise specified.
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i SECTION 1 METHODOLOGY - GENET!AL l
To assess the. additional peaking factor measurement uncertainties associated with as few as 50% of the M/D thimbles available, twenty-c,ne full core INCORE flux maps from various plants and cycles were used. The selection of these maps was made to reflect the wide variety of loading pattern types such as annual reload cycles, low leakage, first cores, and eighteen month reload cycles. For each of the INCORE maps, five separate random deletions were i
i made, giving a total of 105 thimble deletion cases with 50% of the thimbles available. Five separate random deletions were also done with this same set of 21 INCORE maps giving 105 thimble deletion cases with 75% of the thimbles available. The INCORE code was used to randomly delete thimble locations.
fhe measured peaking factors for the thimble deletion maps were then compared with the measured peaking factors in the reference maps, i.e., the INCORE maps employing all or most of the 58 movable dwetor thimbles. Figure 1 shows th:,
m;vable detector (M/D) locations for the four-loop plants considered and Table 1 provides additional information on the twenty-one maps ussd in the e
study. For those maps with less than 100% of available thimbles (e.g.,
J 89.7%), thimble deletion cases to 50% of available thimbles were run utilizing _
50% of the available thimbles in the reference map (e.g. 44.8%).
These comparisons yielded the additional measurement uncertainties to be applied to Thimble deletion effects on the INCORE measured AH, F, and Fxy.
F g
axial offset and quadrant tilt were addressed in a similar manner.
To examine the effect of thimble deletion on measurement of off-normal power distributions, a pseudo dropped rod map was generated with random deletions such that maps with 50 and 75% of the available detector thimbles were cbtained. The measured peaking factors from the thimble deletion maps were then compared to the reference map as for the normal operation maps described above.
i 3
essorkegono
-wsum:meouse-anomeww-etanw,-
y 1
METHODOLOGY - STATISTICAL l
I The percent error between the reference peaking factor value, F, (Reference), and the thimble deletion casa peaking factor value, F, (T.D.)
is defined in Equation 1 as
[
F,(T.D.)
\\
x 00 Uq.1)
% Error (T.D.) = (1 F- (Reference)
I where F,is F3g, Fxy, or Fg and T.D. refers to 75% or 50% of available thimbles in the reference case. A positive value of error implies that the peaking factor from the thimble deletion map is non-conservative l
relative to the reference.
In the following paragraphs the error will be denoted X$3 where i refers to one of the 21 flux maps and j refers to one of the 5 thittle daletion cases for each map. The percent error between the reference value and the thimble deletion case value for quadrant tilt and l
axial offs 6t are defined in Equations 2 and 3 as Error (T.D.) = (Ref. - Celeted) x 100 for QUAD Tilt (Eq.2)
Error (T.D.) = (Ref. - Deleted) for A.O.
(Eq. 3)
The mean error for map i, E; and the percent relative sample standard deviation for map i, S are defined in Equations 4 and 5, respectively.
g 5
E=h[
X (Eq.4) g gj j=1 l
5 1/2
[ (X - E )2 g3 4
(Eq.5)
S=
j=1 g
5-1 4
C500P:9-800730
+
pa After computing 2 and S for each map, for each parameter of 9
g interest, and for both 50% and 75% thimble deletion cases, the data is combined. The combined mean for all maps, icombined, is given by Equation 6 as:
21 A
(Eq. 6)
Aconbined
- 1 i
1 The combined percent relative sample standard deviation of all maps is given by Equation 7 as:
\\N
[N-1)S2+N i 2 g
g
-2 T
Scombined "
N N ~1/
T T
1 where Ng = Number of random deletion cases of each map = 5 and NT = Total number of datapoints = 21 maps x 5 deletions / map = 105 Equations 6 and 7 are constructed in such a manner that if one were to directly compute the mean and standard deviation for all 105 datapoints, the same numeric results would be obtained.
AfterEcombined and Scombined have been obtained for each parameter of interest, and for both 50% and 75% thimble deletion cases, 95% confidence /
95% probability one-sided upper tolerance limits are constructed to quantify the thimble deletion uncertainty component (See Equation 8).
Thimble Deletion Uncertainty Component (%) = icombined + kS combined (Eq. 8) essers-econo
.wesmeneves-enemsvwmy wherek=theog-sided 95% confidence /95%probabilitytolerancelimitfactor for 104 degrees of freedom = 1.919.
Application of the above methodology is presented in the "Results" section of I
this report. The statistical combination of the thimble deletion uncertainty component with INCORE measurement is discussed in the " Thimble Deletion Uncertainty" section of this report.
RESULTS Table 2a provides the peaking factors sample mean (%) for each map (see Equation 4) and the sample standard deviation (%) for each map (see Equation
- 5) for the 50% thimbles available case. The co,bined sample mean (%) and the combined standard deviation (%) for each parameter of interest, as calculated per Equations 6 and 7, is also shown. Table 2b presents the analagous information for the 75% thimbles available case. Tables 2c and 2d provide the i
sample mean and the sample standard dariation for quadrant tilt and axial offset over the same database.
Thimble deletion uncertainty components (i.e. the 95% probability, 95%
confidence tolerance litit) for FAH, F,y, and Fg are calculated in Appendix A using Equation 8 and are based upon the data of Tables 2a and 2b.
The Thimble Deletion Uncertainty Component (%) is plotted in Figure 2 as a function of Percentage of Thimbles Available. This figure is provided for information only and is not directly used in the uncertainty application.
Table 3a and 3b show the pseudo-dropped rod map data and will be discussed in more detail in a later section.
THIMBLE DELETION UNCERTAINTY Current flux map peaking factor measurement uncertainties include allowance for down to 75% thimbles available. Accordingly, an incremental thimble 1
deletion uncertainty component penalty from 75% to 50% of thimbles available could be considered to be appropriate. However, for conservatism and
)
simplicity, the full thimble deletion uncertainty component penalty from 100%
6 1
J
4.
-west, I
to 50% thimbles available will be used. The Thimble Deletion Uncertainty Component (50% T.D.) discussed in the preceding section is combined with the appropriate flux map measurement uneartainty to obtain a total uncertainty.
FaUNCERTAINTY,Fh l
3 3
The appropriate equation for combining statistically independent uncertainty components is j
l (Ff-1)2+(KS)f.D.
(Eq.7)
F (50%)
=1+F
+
3 AH 3
k T.D. Bias For conservatism, a negative value of T.D. Bias will be treated as zero.
U Analagous equations apply to Fg and Fx.
Evaluating the above expression yields ths following result F l (50%) = 1 + 0 + ((1.04 - 1)2 + (.016532)2) 1/2
= 1.043 3
For conservatism to support generic application to subsequent cycles, l
F (50%) will be rounded up to 1.05. This value can be interpreted 3
as a 95% probability tolerance limit tt a high confidence level.
This one percent incremental thimble deletion penalty is. linearly applied from 75% to ~
50% thimbles available (i.e., 1,04 at 44 thimbles and 1.05 at 29 thimbles available).
U
' Q UNCERTAINTY, F g
g(50%)=1+0+!(1.05-1)2+(0.021535)2\\1/2=1.054 U
F
(
/
U For conservatism to support generic application to subsequent cycles, F g (50%) will be rounded to 1.07. This 2% incremental thimble deletion penalty is linearly applied from 75% to 50% thimbles available (i.e., 1.05 at 44 thimbles and 1.07 at 29 thimbles available).
l 7
ene m n J
- marecxss ir;;g f
F, UNCERTAINTY, F The appropriate F,y Uncertainty for as few as 29 thimbles remaining is I
31/2 F*U (50%) = 1 + 0 +1 (1.05 - 1)2 + (.024217)2 I
= 1.056 Y
(
/
For conservatism, to support generic application to subsequent cycles, F
(5C%) will be rounded to 1.07.
This 2% incremental thimble x
deletion penalty is linearly applied from 75% to 50% thimbles available (i.e.,
1.05 at 4/. thimbles and 1.07 at 29 thimbles available).
OFF-NORMAL POWER DISTRIBUTIONS Thimble deletion uncertainty compenent tolerance limits are constructed in Appendix B based upon the pseudo-dropped rod data from Table 3a.
It is interesting to note that the pseudo-dropped rod results are generally less limiting than typical flux cap results. For example, for FAH, the thimble deletion uncertainty component (50%) is 1.029% for the dropped rod maps as compared to 1.317% for typical flux maps.
AXIAL OFFSET AND QUADRANT TILT The mean change in quadrant tilt with 29 of the thimbles available was found to be only,0 16% and the two-sided 95% confidence limit was calculated in g
Appendix X to be -0.16% i.07%. Similarly, the mean change in axial offset with 50% of the thimbles available was also quite small at -0.039%. The two-sided 95% confidence limit was calculated in Appendix C to be
.039% 1
.043%. Note that all uncertainties on A.O. and tilt are absolute values and not percentages of A.O. nor tilt. These values indicate that thimble deletion has a negligible impact on the core average axial power shape measurement.
Changes of this magnitude are not significant and will not adversely affect excore detector calibration.
8 a.- ono
I su j
CONSERVATIVE AT'AMPTIONS For convenience a sumeary of conservative assumptions employed in this study are provided below:
1)
The total thimble deletion penalty from 100% to 50% of the available i
thimbles was utilized rather than the incremental penalty from 75% to 50%
of the available thimbles.
1
- 2) Thimble deletion uncertainty results were rounded up and negative bias values were set to zero.
4
- 3) One of the uncertainty components included in the flux map measurement uncertainties,Fh,Ff,andF is a term for reaction rate extrapol-ation from an instrumented to a non-instrumented fuel assembly. This study treats FAH(Reference)andFg (Reference) as absolute (i.e.
l "true") values while there is actually an " error bar" around F 3g (Reference) or Fg (Reference) due to extrapolation uncertainty. The error definition of Equation (1) implicitly includes some double counting with the extrapolation uncertainty definition.
- 4) Pure measurement reproducibility uncertainty of the incore system is implicitly included in thimble deletion uncertainty.
This is a conserva-tive double counting since measurement reproducibility is included in thefluxmapmeasurementuncertaintiesFh,Ff,andF
- 5) Results of this study are based upon running full core flux maps using the full core option. Running full core maps using the quarter-core symmetric option would effectively increase the n;mber of instrumented locations, j
Lack of perfect quarter-core symmetry would need to be accounted for.
I 9
.mo.mm
u SECTION 2 This section quantifies the number of thimbles per quadrant required for McGuire Unit 1 in order to improve the ability to distinguish between random and systematic thimble deletion events and to establish the bounds of applicability of the incremental peaking factor uncertainties.
1 1
The current Technical Specification requirement of a minimum of 2 N/D thimbles per core quadrant is not sufficient to distinguish between random and I
systematic deletion events with high confidence. By increasing the required minimum number of M/D thimbles per quadrant, and by defining quadrant in such a manner as to essentially place a requirement on each 1/8th core, the ability l
to distinguish between random and systematic events will be significantly enhanced.
If, for example, for 50% thimbles remaining, the requirement of 4 or more thimbles per quadrant is satisfied, then in all likelihood a random deletion occurred and incremental thimble deletion peaking factor measurement uncertainties are appropriate. On the other hand, if there are less than four thimbles per quadrant, then it is possible that a systematic thimble deletion occurred and that the impact en measured quadrant peaking factors, may be larger than quantified in Section 1.
METHODOLOGY - ANALYTIC SOLUTION Recall that the number of combinations of n events taken r at a time, C, is the number of ways of selecting r out of n elements without n
regard to order. For example, the number of ways of selecting 29 elements out 16 of58 isch =3.01x10 Ratios of different combinations can be interpreted as probabilities. For convenience the notation C(n r) will be o
usedtorepresentC[.
In the actual thimble deletion problem of interest some thimbles lie on the axis or diagonals and hence are common to two quadrants.
Solving this type of problem analytically is quite complex. A somewhat simpler problem type that can be solved exactly is described below.
10 ANOP:8-M0730
m Assume that the core is divided into quadrants with all thimbles interior to each quadrant -- i.e., no thimbles on the horizontal or vertical ar.is. Let nT be the total initial nuoter of thimbles in the core and ri be the total
]
nuabar of thimbles in the core to remain after a random thimble deletion event has occurred. The number of possible combinations is C(nT' "T).
For the quadrant of interest, say 01, let ni be the initial number of thimbles in 01 and r1 be the number of thimbles remaining in Q1 after a random deletion of (nT rT) thimbles over the entire core. The number of possible ways for
)
rg thimbles to remain in 01 is C(n,rg). For the remaining three g
quadrants, let n be the initial total number of thimbles in 02 through Q4 l
r and let r be the total number of thimbles remaining in Q2 through Q4 after r
randomly deleting (nT-rT) thimbles over the entire core. The number of possible combinations for Q2 through Q4 is C(n 'I ).
Note that n +"1 i
r r r
= nT and r +r3 = r7 r
The multiplication of C(n,rg) times C(n 'I ) yields the number of l
g r r thimbles can remain in 01 and the number of ways r thimbles can ways rg r
remain in 02 through Q4 having deleted nT - rT thimbles over the entire core. Ratioing the appropriate combinations yields the fractional probability of exactly rg thimbles remaining in Q1.
C(n,r )
- C (n '"r)
(E. 9) g g r
Fractional Probability (rl)
- C (nT'# I T
To make this more concrete consider the following numeric example. Consider a core with 3 interior thimbles per quadrant (12 total). A total of 6 thimbles are to be deleted. The fraction probability that after the deletion of the 6 l
thimbles that 0 thimbles remain in any particular quadrant is:
Probability of 0 thimbles left = C(3,
,6) i 11
.me mm
M Evaluation of this expression leads to a
-2 Probability of 0 thimbles left = 9.09 x 10 Probability of 1 thimble left = C(3,1 9'6)=40.91x162 25 Probabilityof2thimblesleft=CI3'f(z5fII'4)-40.91x10-2 Probability of 3 thimbles left = C(
C(9.3)-
-2 9.09 x 10 The total probability of 0 through 3 thimbles remaining in a particular quadrant is of course 1.0.
This method will be applied to the test problem described later in this report.
METHODOLOGY - COMPUTER SIMULATION A short computer program for determining the probability distribution of thimbles remaining was written.
The program allows for different nt.aber of thimbles per quadrant and keeps track of interior, axis, and diagonal thimbles (see4-loopdescription).
Starting with nT thimbles in the core and randomly deleting down to ri thimbles constitutes one case. After deleting n
~I thimbles from the T
t core, the number of thimbles remaining in each of the eight quadrants is determined. The minimum number of thimbles remaining over all 8 quadrants is then found. A large number of cases is run in order to determine the probability distribution of thimbles remaining.
l i
12 amesem
6 AAV4EAeay
=
TEST FROBLEM DESCRIPTION j
The tes;. problem select >d was chosen to be sufficiently complex so as to adequately test the simulation ecde, but also simple enough as to permit an exact analytic solution.
l The problem consisted of a core with an initial compliment of 60 thimbles total with 15 thimbles in each of the 8 quadrants. All thimbles are defined to be in interior locations, i.e. no common thimbles asist within the four vertical-horizontal quadrants and no common thimbles exist within the four diagonally bounded quadrants. Thirty (30) thimbles are randomly deleted for each case. The above information is depicted in Figure 3.
1 TEST PROBLEM RESULTS I
1 For the analytic solution the method described earlier in the text was used to calculate the percent probability of 0 thimbles left in a pcrticular quadrant, I thimble left, etc. up to 15 thimbles left.
Results are summarized in Table 4.
I i
The computer simulation was performed using two different methods, method 1 i
is analogous to the "real" 4-loop problem in that the minimum number of thimbles left over all 8 quadrants was used to obtain the probability distribution. Wethod 2 is the enmputer analog to the analytic solution in that the probability distribution for a particular quadrant was obtained.
Results for both of these methods are provided in Table 4.
TEST PROBLEM CONCLUSIONS i
1.
For Method 2 (count cases for Q1 only) the computer simulation and analytic solution using ratios of combinations agree very well.
Therefore, for this type of problem, the program can be considered to be verified.
l l
13 anemna
es 2.
For the probles type of actual interest (Method 1) the program must calculate the minimum number of thimbles over all 8 quadrants.
The probability distribution from the Method 1 simulation is skewed more toward fewer numbers of thimbles remaining.
Intuitively this makes sense.
For small number of thimbles remaining,'if the analytic probabilities for Method 2 are multiplied by 4, the resulting values are close to the Mathod 1 simulation.
Because an exact analytic solution for Method 1 is very complex the computer simulation results are relied upon to determins the minimum num>er ef thimbles per quadrant for the 4-loop core problem.
4-LOOP PROBLEM DESCRIPTION The maximum possible number of available thimbles for c 4-loop Westinghouse PWR is
- 58. The initial distribution of these thimbles is provided in the following table. Figures 4 and 5 should also help in visualization.
No. of Interior Thimbles in 01 11 No. of Interior Thimbles in 02 10 No. of Interior Thimbles in 03 11 No. of Interior Thimbles in 04 11 No. of Axis Thimbles 01-02 4
No. of Axis Thimbles 02-03 4
No. of Axis Thimbles 03-04 3
No. of Axis Thimbles 04-01 4
J7otal No. of Interior Thimbles in 0A Il No. of Interior Thimbles in OB 14 No. of Interior Thimbles in OC 12 No. of Interior Thimbles in 00 12 Nc. of Diagonal Thimbles QA-0B 1
No. of Diagonal Thimbles OB-0C 3
No. of Diagonal Thimbles 08-00 2
No. of Diagonal Thimbles 00-0A 3
5F' Total a
s IA more-eoono J
w Note that all thimbler are counted as whole values even if they lie on an axis or diagonal. Provided the ter.hnical specification value and computer simulation are consistent this is appropriate. Twenty nine (29) thimbles are randomly deleted from each case.
4-LOOP PROBLEM RESULTS A 3000 case simulation was run to obtain the probability distribution of the minimum number of thimbles left after having reduced to 29 thimbles available.
Results are summarized in Table 5.
As seems reasonable there u negligible probability of 0 or 1 thimbles remaining and only.3% likelihood of finding 2 thimbles in the worst qua,dyagt The j
cumulative probability of 0 through 3 thimbles remaining isJ M25. Therefore, a requirement that 4 or more thimbios per quadrant be available is appropriate.
Assuming random thimble deletion, it is unlikely that with 29 thimbles remaining overall, fewer than 4 thimbles will be available over the 8 quadrants.
CONCLUSION With the inclusion of the additional peaking factor uncertainties, it is concluded that operation of the movable detector system with a minimum of 50% of the thimbles available is acceptable provided that an additional 1.0% for F3g and 2.0% for F and F be applied to the INCORE measured peaking factors. However, when 0
xy fewer than 75% of the thimbles are available there should be a minimum of 4 thimbles per quadrant wnere quadrant includes both horizontal-vertical quadrants and diagonally bounded quadrants. This requirement increases the ability to distinguish between random and systematic thimble deletion events.
In addition, the confidence on the appropriateness of the incremental thimble deletion peaking factor uncertainty values is increased provided that 4 or more thimbles per quadrant are observed to be available, and counting thimbles on the axis and diagonal as whole values.
i
l PBW I
TA8LE 1
]
INCORE DETECTOR THIM8LE REDUCTION STUDY MAPS Burnup Core Power Percent (MWD /MTU)
Thimble Available (Ref.)
)
Piant A Cyc 2 MAP 1 2,111 99.7 89.7 i
MAP 2 6,760 100.0 86.2 MAP 3 11,598 100.0 87.7 1
Plant A Cyc 3 MAP 1 304 100.0 98.3 MAP 2 10,322 100.0 100.0 MAP 3 13,105 100.0 100.0 Plant B Cyc 1 MAP 1 2,950 90.5 98.3 l
MAP 2 7,386 98.8 94.8 l
MAP 3 10,924 98.8 91.4 i
i Plant C Cyc 3 j
MAP 1 200 100.0 93.1 MAP 2 5,050 100.0 87.9 Plant C Cyc 4 MAP 1 5.335 100.0 93.1 Plant D.Cyc 3 MAP 1 500 130.0 100.0 MAP 2 5,200 97.0 96.6 MAP 3 8,806 75.0 81.0 Plant D Cyc 4 MAP 1 180 84.0 96.6 MAP 2 3,715 100.0 93.1 MAP 3 4,998 100.5 81.0 Plant E Cyc 1 MAP 1 2,966 96.0 87.9 MAP 2 9,230 100.0 94.8 MAP 3 14,594 100.0 84.5 16 4mem7m
-_____-____--__-__--_a
au q
TA8LE 2a SAMPLE STANDARD DEVIATION AND MEAN FOR INCORE-MAPS WITH 50% OF THE THIMBLE AVAILABLE FOR FOUR LOOP i
REACTOR CORE PARAMETERS l
F F
F 0
AH g
Plant Cycle MAP S$ (%) ig (%)
Sg (%) R (%)
Sg (%)' R (%)
l A
2 1
1.3399 -1.4689 0.5775 -0.3456 1.4722 -2.055 A
2 2
0.5289 -0.9861 0.1660 0.0206 0.4796 0.0101 A
2 3
0.3424 0.1442 0.5636 0.2570 0.3787 -0.0243 l
A 3
1 1.0164 -0.5324 0.9066 -0.3041 1.3320 -0.8488 A
3 2
0.4326 -0.6149 0.3201 -1.0804 0.6479 -1.7188 A
3 3
0.5253 -0.7181 0.5313 -0.5010 0.3397 -0.2522 8
1 1
0.1190 -0.1923 0.0746 -0.1751 0.4887 -0.8114 8
1 2
1.4164 -0.5846 0.8235 0.1097 0.7687 -0.9818 8
1 3
0.1020 -0.1085 0.2054 -0.0233 0.5202 -0.2047 C
3 1
0.2497 -0.2912 0.9006 -0.6511 1.5073 -0.8689 C
3 2
0.8298 -0.6846 1.3646 -0.4844 2.4924 -1.7934-
]
C 4
1 1.4696 1.5771 0.4649 -0.5956 1.2419 1.0637 l
D 3
1 1.5742 0.6137 1.2204 0.4433 2.1957 0.2182 D
3 2
1.0217 -1.0250 0.1921 0.2941 0.6679 -1.3153 D
3 3
0.4224 -0.0410 0.6759 -0.8097 0.9922 -1.3815 1
D 4
1 1.3606 0.9207 0.8515 0.7349 1.8538 -0.4300 D
4 2
0.8354 -1.2822 0.8841 -0.0645
'1.4727 -1.5092 D
4 3
0.5197 -1.3699 1.4574 -0.9054 1.1327 1.7018 E
1 1
0.8947 -0.3673 0.7912 -1.0177 1.0014 -0.9923 E
1 2
0.5590 -0.4708 0.4108 -0.8266 0.3525 -1.1564 E
1 3
0.6976 -1.7033 0.5859 -1.1264 0.8696 -1.7849 i
S,g i
1.1222 -0.4374 0.8615 -0.3358 1.2619 -0.7204 gg 17 msom
--__ _ _ _ _ -___ _ _. L
s;,2.=;.:== r-g,
I TABLE 2b i
SAMPLE STANDARD DEVIATION ANO MEAR FOR INCORE N WITH 75% OF THE THIMBLE AVAILABLE FOR FOUR LOOP REACTOR CORE. PARAMETERS l
F F,y F*
AH g
Sg (%) 2 (%)
Sg(%) 2 (%)
9 Plant Cycle MAP S$(%) i,(%)
9 A
2 1
0.2061 -1.7237 0.2103 -0.1889 0.9305 -1.3211 A
2 2
0.4404 -0.4681 0.1400 -0.1327 0.3425 -0.1035 A
2 3
0.7097 0.3549 0.7123 0.3533 0.3217 0.1850 A
3 1
0.5569 -0.5201 0.1173 -0.1590 0.8030 -0.8078 A
3 2
0.3287 -0.5306 0.3093 -0.4364 0.6757 -0.6367 A
3 3
0.5365 -0.6892 0.3293 -0.45B2 0.7691 -0.8331 l
B 1
1 0.2939 -0.1797 0.1490 -0.0768 1.4878 -0.7951 I
B 1
2 0.4641 -0.0487 0.4463 0.0183 0.3570 -0.3623 B
1 3
0.0870 0.1410 0.2282 0.1302 0.1680 0.0508 C
3 1
0.2224 -0.1731 0.3839 -0.1893 2.0399 -1.3014 C
3 2
0.7397 -0.5151 0.9407 -0.6469 0.8573 -1.0563 C
4 1
1.5221 1.4202 0.6022 0.3920 1.8760 1.2299 l
D 3
1 1.9623 1.0695 1.3575 0.5888 1.8936 0.9265 0
3 2
0.5039 -0.4229 0.2256 -0.0866 0.6131 -0.4943 0
3 3
1.0653 -0.5640 0.3101 -0.2130 0.3611 -0.9863 7
0 4
1 1.2868 1.0504 0.7527 0.3587 1.3681 0.2278 D
4 2
0.8676 -0.8066 C.5575 -0.2567 1.2430 -0.5119 0
4 3
1.2840 -1.1395 0.8246 -0.5124 0.2809 -0.9946 E
1 1
0.5470 -0.7748 0.7992 -0.6032 0.5616 -0.3590 E
1 2
0.6917 -1.0230 0.7414 -0.7159 1.9781 -1.9195 E
1 3
0.6019 -1.1076 0.4263 -0.9591 0.4496 -1.4159 l
S E
1.0886 -0.2790 0.6615 -0.1807 1.2449 -0.5370 comb comb
- Plant 0 Cycle 4 Nap 3 S,, and i based on 3 random deletions. All g
others based on 5 deletions.
18
.mn p=
sa TABLE 2c SAMPLE STANDARD DEVIATION AND NEAN FOR INCORE MAPS WITH 50% THIMBLES AVAILABLE FOR FOUR LOOP REACTOR CORE PARAMETERS QUAD TILT +
A.O.
Plant Cycle MAP S (%)
X (%)
S (%)
X (%)
g g
g g
A 2
1 0.22
-0.06 0.1721
-0.0692 A
2 2
0.21
-0.31 0.0658 0.0366 A
2 3
0.38
-0.23 0.0897 0.0536 A
3 1
0.28
-0.21 0.2069
-0.0002 A
3 2
0.22
-0.20 0.1200
-0.0718 A
3 3
0.28
-0.27 0.1634 0.0532 B
1 1
0.23
-0.36 0.1861
-0.2436 B
1 2
0.23
-0.27 0.1654 0.0484 8
1 3
0.23
-0.23 0.1076
-0.0118 C
3 1
0.29
-0.24 0.1582
-0.0232 C
3 2
0.47 0.05 0.3579
-0.1244 C
4 1
0.24
-0.32 0.1776
-0.2126 D
3 1
0.54
-0.24 0.2033
-0.0019 D
3 2
0.25 0.59 0.1152
-0.0984 D
3 3
0.?,9
-0.69 0.2434 0.0308 0
4 1
0.13 0.07 0.5619
-0.1224 0
4 2
0.01
-0.07 0.1766
-0.2600 D
4 3
0.34
-0.19 0.1769 0.1608 E
1 1
0.25
-0.28 0.3972 0.0260 E
1 2
0.30 0.03 0.0902 0.0208 E
1 3
0.33
-0.02 0.0807
-0.0118 S
A 0.3613
-0.16 0.2265
-0.0390 comb comb
+ Standard deviation for QUAD TILT about Atilt = (Ref. - Deleted) x 100%.
Standard deviation for A.O. about AA.O. = (Ref. - Deleted).
IS
<memna
-4WOSMNGHOWetfROPREMAV4ASe Rg l
I TABLE 2d SAMPLE STANDARD DEVIATION AND MEAN FOR INCORE MAPS WITH 75Y,OF THE THIMBLE AVAILABLE FOR FOUR LOOP J
REACTOR CORE PARAMETERS QUAD TILT +
'A.O.
Plant Cycle MAP S (%)
X (%)
S (%)
X (%)
j g
g g
g A
2 1
0.14
-0.15 0.0892 0.0622 A
2 2
0.05
-0.13 0.0622 0.0416 A
2 3
0.19
-0.34 0.1333 0.0066 A
3 1
0.08
-0.04 0.1591 0.0276 A
3 2
0.09
-0.09 0.0616
-0.0426 i
A 3
3 0.10
-0.04 0.0752
-0.0096 B
1~
1 0.30
-0.16 0.1236
-0.0460 B
1 2
0.16
-0,05 0.0322 0.0434 B
1 3
0.12
-0.15 0.0300
-0.0262 C
3 1
0.12
-0.10 0.1280 0.0422 C
3 2
0.26
-0.22 0.0986
-0.0634 C
4 1
0.12
-0.18 0.1055 0.0192 0
3 1
0.62
-0.07 0.0737
-0.0440 0
3 2
0.38
-0.20 0.0624 0.0264 0
3 3
0.23
-0.21 0.1444 0.0066 D
4 1
0.30 0.04 0.0532
-0.1010 D
4 2
0.22
-0.07 0.0728
-0.0476 D
4 3
0.18
-0.06 0.0968 0.0030 E
1 1
0.09 0.05.
0.1920
-0.0018 E
1 2
0.27 0.12 0.0678-0.0246 E
1 3
0.16
-0.12 0.0434 0.0468 S
E 0.2350
-0.1033 0.0993
-0.0015 comb comb
+ Standard deviation for QUAD TILT about Atilt = (Ref. - Deleted) x 100%.
Standard deviation for A.O. about AA.O. = (Ref. - Deleted).
20 4300P-6-800730
an.
Yvo.
888888 888884
- et 44444A 444444 I l t E
765402 777629 306004 36741 1
s 667887 666685 ay 666666 666666 ex ni F 111 111 111111 3
2 4
6 s4 a3 S
0 0
P A
R I
0 1
01509 6
80486 5
ER f
44896 i2 36283 0
6362 23043 i O
f 1
C H1 0
0 N
AD I
F NO H
8 T
P E
2 L
E Ha n 444444 444444 3
D Ac o 8DDDDD mm1 2D5 8
1 S
F ot E
Lt L
0 8
M 7
a I
308669 342938 R.
3 H
868493 844762 T
J34443 334343 g
Y E
s E
L D
a 666666 666666 1
B N
e R
A A
t F.
11111 1 1111 11 h
P T
O D
R O
f R
t D
3 E
U P
O P
M O
3 1
G R
02642 8
90258 1
N D
f.
24297 5
36293 s3 t
f.
74146 s.
23023 T
F Qi 0
0 S
O F D e
M N
O S
I R
6 1
A 1
1 P
x1 i0 I
a n.
444444 0
444444 0
O Qc o 28 DD01 4M8 sD8 4
8 8
C F ot a
8 L
t.
931 034 942471 596370 S04528 5
081 019 001 019 C
s 323332 333332 0
aQ 1
222222 222222 eF.
R x
i e
A8C0E A8C0E O00000 O55555 i
D n 55555 77777 f
mu
~
e R
R i
h T
U U
=
T T
N M
/
/
f D
D f
p M
f i
n u
M D
I nr 0
0 u
0 0
B 2
2 mW t!
,il
a
.wermew g
TABLE 3b COMPARISON OF DROPPED ROD AND THIMBLE DELETION INCORE MAPS Thisble Quad Meas.
Burnup Run Tilt atilt +
A.O.
AA.O.**
200 MWD /MTU 0
1.1406
-6.540
.50A 1.1427
-0.21
-6.642
.10'2
.508 1.1316 0.90
-6.913
.373
.50C 1.1376 0.30
-6.617
.077
.500 1.1370 0.36
-6.743
.203
.50E 1.1356 0.50
-6.589
.049 X
S X
S 0.37 0.40 0.1608 0.132 l
200 MWD /MTU 0
1.1406
-6.540
.75A 1.1414
-0.08
-6.507
.033
.75B 1.1366 0.04
-6.723
.183
.75C 1.1358 0.48
-6.571
.031
.75D 1.1372 0.34
-6.578
.038 l
.75E 1.1357 0.49
-6.478
.062 x
s x
s O.33 0.24 0.0314 0.0947 l
+ Atilt' = (Ref. - Deleted) x 100%
- AA0
= (Ref. - Deleted) 22
.=w w m i
a
sy TA8LE 4 TEST PROBLEM
SUMMARY
Min. # Thim. Left in Method 1 or Simulations Analytic Solution S
- Thimbles Left in Method 1 Method 2 Method 2*
01 is Method 2
% Cases
% Cases Probability %
0 0
0 0
1 0
0 0
2 0
0.1%
0.1%
3 4.8%
0.5%
0.7%
4 10.8%
3.1%
2.8%
5 31.6%
7.6%
8.0%
6 40.4%
17.7%
16.0%
7 12.4%
22.9%
22.4%
8 0
21.7%
22.4%
9 0
15.5%
16.0%
10 0
7.2%
8.0%
11 0
2.8%
2.8%
12 0
0.8%
0.7%
13 0
0.1%
0.1%
14 0
0 0
15 0
0 0
250 cases 1000 cases Analytic Solution for Method 1 is not available.
PSW TABLE 5 4-LOOP CORE SUW4ARY 3000 CASE THIMBLE DELETION SIMULATION 29 THIMBLES DELETED Minimum No. of Number of Percent of Cumulative Thimbles left Cases Cases Percentage 0
0 0
0 1
0 0
0 2
10 0.3 0.3 3
48 1.6 1.9 4
144 4.8 6.7 5
595 19.9 26.6 6
1125 37.5 64.1 7
903 30.1 94.2 8
175 5.8 100.0 9
0 0
0 10 0
0 0
24 4W6-800720
_ :;;;t;;:: ':: "" S"" ! E ? i" Y GLOSS-t-P8ss FIGURE 1 R
P W
M L
g J
H G
F E
D C
B A
180' i
I e
e e
e e
2 I
e e
e e
3 e
e e
4 e
e e
e 5
e e
e e
e a
e e
e e
y 00*
270' s
e e
e e
g e
e e
to e
o e
e e
11 e
o e
12 e
e o
e 13 e
e e
e 14 e
e 15 0'
s Movsete Detector (58)
MOVABLE DETECTOR LOCATIONS FOR FOUR LOOP PLANTS 25
~
1 rea s.o
^ 2.5 M
v i--
z wz O 2.o o_
i
- s
==,,,,,g g -
.-===....._
- =..,
a tU g;:e O
7 n
r W
//'
~
F--
1.5 Z
h
//
~
Ai s
y c 88##
[
Ls !
y O 1.0 g
8
/
iu z
e p
j{
/
f
/
f y
jr f
t--
.50 7 7 I i
) /
H f
o.oo 58 29 NUMBER OF THIMBLE 8 AVAILABLE FIGURE 2 THIMBLE DELETION UNCERTAINTY COMPONENT VERSUS NUMBER OF THIMBLES AVAILABLE 26
esTtwoMousetnoPRttTARYetAss+,,,
FIGURE 3 TEST PROBLEM DESCRIPTION QI-03 Analytic Solution:
45 Thin 61es Initial 60 Thimbles Initial Total 30 Thimbles Remaining Q1 15 Thimbles Initfal Computer Simulation:
Q1 02 15 15 No Thimbles on Axis 60 Thimbles Initial Total 30 Thimbles Remaining Q4 03 15 15 QA 15 No Thimbles on Diagonal 60 Thimbles Initial Total QD 15 5
15 QB 30 Thimbles Remaining 15 QC f
\\
27
_ t: 0 ? ! Mt"$'j"
?:07 isT=&V s6m&& is ~
P8+/
l FIGURE 4 l
MORIZONTAL* VERTICAL QUADaANTS 1
NOVASLE DETECTOR THINBLE NUMBER SCHEME l
l R
P N
M L
M J
H G
F E
D C
B A
i 1
l 180' j
11 l
'e 8
'4 j
[
i l
3
- e
~
i s, is 24 4.f e
3 4
o 4e 4
e e
y 5
l ".
4%
' o.
"o l
8 4*
.!!o _ '_k..
87_o*
i
_ m.9*-. u.
.e f. _
5.7.
5% _
1%_
_ r.
33 22 23 24 e
i e
e o
e 34 35 25 e
e i
50 52 26, 27, 26, 37, i
8 '.
- *e 39
- O 53 30e 13 e
G T
41 42 31 32*
e i
e
$4 43 54 e
o
,5 III oe I
e m.v.oi. o.s.etor (se) eDvamLt ottactoR LOCATIONS FOR FOUR LOOP PLANTS l
c i
1 28 l
1 A
e i
, y$h ym V
O w
WW m'P8W FIGURE S DIASONAL DUADRANTS 50VASLE DETECTOR TH!a5LE NUNSER SCHENE A
]
R P
W M
L M
J H
G F
E D
C B
A I
s s
q
\\
/
)
\\
3, 4,
8,
/
's 8
'e 8
i 12 e
e
\\
/
)
N SO SO 9
p 4
l g
g 10, Sg/
13,
"\\
'o s'
' 'e a
E' l
D 5
\\
' '5
'S
.g
.To-4 5
.., A-s co.
,g e
/
9 9
g
^%
/
- *e
'h
,o
/
- /
8 '.
\\
x
= =.
N
)
l v
sy' sg N
8%
l x
,' 8%,
8%,
\\
N i
O 15
/
l l
C-l d
e novoste Detector (es)
NOVASLE DETECTOR LOCATIONS FOR FOUR LOOP PLANTS l
29
)
___________,_-.__mu-.._-______
-_m__
1
-g i
APPENDIX A THINBLE DELETION UNCERTAINTY CONPONENTS 955 PROBABILITY AND 95% CONFIDENCE (Xcomb. + Ucomb.)
]
NORMAL (TYPICAL) FLUX NAPS j
j F
a._H.
j
-0.3358 + (1.919) (0.8615)
T. D. Uncert. Component (50%)
=
-0.3358 + 1.65322
=
1.3174%
=
-0.1807 + (1.919) (0.6615)
T. D. Uncert. Component (75%)
=
-0.1807 + 1.26942
=
1.0887%
=
b
-0.4374 + (1.919) (1.1222) l T. D. Uncert. Component (50%)
=
-0.4374 + 2.15350
=
1.7161%
=
-0.2790 + (1.927) (1.0886)
T. D. Uncert. Component (75%)
=
-0.2790 + 2.03773
=
1 1.8187%
~
=
F 2.1 l
4
-0.7204+(1.919)(1.26194) j T. D. Uncert. Component 425F(50%)
=
-0.7204 + 2.4217
-rs-
=
1.7013%
=
-0.5370 +-(1.919) (1.2449)
T. D. Uncert. Component (75%)
=
-0.5370 + 2.38896
=
1.8520%
=
30 420P.0-400720 1
APPENDIX B THIMBLE DELETION UNCERTAINTY COMPONENTS 955 PROBABILITY AND 95% CONFIDENCE (Ecor.6. + KScomb.)
PSEUD 0 DROPPED R00 FLUX MAPS 1
l FAH
-0.261 + (2.911) (0.443)
T. D. Uncert. Component (50%)
=
-0.261-+ 1.28957
=
1.0286%
=
-0.050+(2.911)(0.362)
T. D. Uncert. Component (75%)
=
-0.050 + 1.05378
=
1.0038%
=
F S
+0.116 + (2.911) (0.583)
T. D. Uncert. Component (50%)
=
+0.116 + 1.697113
=
1.8131%
=
-0.011 + (2.911) (0.311)
T. D. Uncert. Component (75%)
=
-0.011 + 0.905321
=
0.8943%
a b
-0.746 + (2.911) (0.435).
T. D. Uncert. Component (50%)
=
-0.748 + 1.26628
=
0.5183%
=
-0.055 + (2.911) (0.580)
T. D. Uncert. Component '75%)
=
-0.055 + 1.68838
=
1.633%
=
l l
f 31 4300P6-4SO730
1 IIH l
APPENDIX C TWO-SIDED 95% CONFIDENCE LIMITS ON MEAN A TILT AND MEAN A A.0 1
/
jN (approximate t by z)
X 1
t s
comb.
.025 comb.
tilt or tilt or l
A.O.
A.O.
1 I
QUADRANT TILT:
75%: -0.1033 1 x.2350 = -0.1033% i.0449%
(50%): -0.1600 1 x.3613 = -0.1600% 1 0691%
1 AXIAL OFFSET:
75%:
-0.0015 1 x.0993 = -0.0015% i.0190%
(50%): -0.039 1 x.2265 = -0.039% 1 04332%
32 4380F S-8807N
.q i
w ATTACHMENT 3 Analysis of Significant Hazards Consideration As required by 10CFR 50.91, this analysis is provided concerning whether the proposed amendments invc1ve significant hazards considerations, as defined by 10CFR 50.92.
9tandards for determination that a proposed amendment involves no significant hazards considerations are if operation of the facility.in accordance with the proposed amendment would not:
- 1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated: or 2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously.
evaluated; or 3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
The proposed amendments are a one-time only change for McGuire Unit 1 Cycle 6 to reduce from 75% to 50% the number of available moveable incore detector thimbles I
required for the Moveable Incore Detection System to be. operable, thus allowing j
continued operation of Unit 1 should a current problem with sticking detector thimbles become' worse.
.The propcaed amendments would not involve an increase in the probability of an.
accident previously evaluated.
The Moveable Incore Detection System is used only to provide confirmatory information on the neutron flux distribution and not rcquired for the day to day safe operation of the core, and its information is not considered in the accident analyses. The system is not a process variable that is an initial condition in FSAR Chapter 15 analyses. The only previously evaluated accident the system could be involved in is breaching of.the detector thimbles (due to wear by the detectors for example) which would be enveloped by the small break loss of coolant accident (LOCA) analysis. As thel proposed changes do not involve any changes to the system's equipment and no' equipment is operated in a new or more deleterious manner, there is no increase in the probability of.such an accident (if fact, the probability of such an accident would be decreased since fewer thimbles would be in use). The proposed' amendments would not involve an increase in the consequences of'an accident
.j previously evaluated.
The Moveable Incore Detection System is not used for accident mitigation (the system is not used in the primary success path.for mitigation of a Design Basis Accident). The system is a control system not required for safety. The ability of the Reactor Protection System or Engineered i
Safety Features System instrumentation to mitigate the consequences ofLan l
accident have not been impaired. The small break LOCA analysis (and thus its-consequences) continues to bound potential breaching of the system's detector thimbles. Therefore, the change does not' involve an increase in-the probability l
or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
The proposed amendments would not create the possibility of a new or different-kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated as they only affect;the minimum complement of equipment necessary for operability of the Moveable Incore l
Detection System. As discussed above, no new equipment is introduced and no equipment is operated in a new manner. Thus the changes could create no new or different accident causal mechanisms.
Therefore, the proposed amendment does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of. accident from any accident l
previously evaluated since it'does not modify plant operation or components.
i-;
1
- The proposed amendments would not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
The reduction in the minimum complement of equipment necessary for operability of the Moveable Incore Detection System could only impact the monitoring / calibration functions of the system. Reduction of the number of available moveable incore detector thimbles to the 50% level does not significantly degrade the ability of the Moveable Ir. core Detector System to measure core power distributions. Core peaking factor measurement uncertainties will be increased, but will be compensated for by conservative measurement uncertainty adjustments in the Technical Specifications to ensure that pertinent core design parameters are maintained. Sufficient additional penalty is added to the power distribution measurements such that this change does not impact the safety margins which currently exist. Also, available detector thimble reduction has negligible impact on the quadrant tilt and core average axial power shape measurement. Sufficient detector thimbles will be available to ensure that no quadrant will be unmonitored. Based on these factors, the margin of safety is not reduced as the core will continue to be adequately monitored.
In addition, similar changes on other plants in the past have been determined not to involve Significant Hazards Considerations.
Based upon the preceding analysis, Duke Power Company concludes that the proposed amendments do not involve a Significant Hazards Consideration.
I
_ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _