ML20237D655

Proposed Tech Specs Deleting Provision for Continued Plant Operation in Section 3/4.4.6.2 & Requiring Prompt Unit Placement in Cold Shutdown After Pressure Boundary Leakage Occurrence

ML20237D655
Person / Time
Site:	Trojan File:Portland General Electric icon.png
Issue date:	12/16/1987
From:	PORTLAND GENERAL ELECTRIC CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20237D639	List: ML20237D638 ML20237D647 ML20237D655
References
TAC-66096, NUDOCS 8712240107
Download: ML20237D655 (3)

Text

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REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM BASES 3/4.4.6.2 OPERATIONAL LEAKAGE Industry experience has shown that while a limited amount of leakage is expected from the RCS, the unidentified portion of this leakage can be i reduced to a threshold value of less than 1 GPM. This threshold value is sufficiently low to ensure early detection of additional leakage.

The Surveillance Requirements for RCS Pressure Isolation Valves provide hdded assurance of valve integrity thereby reducing the probability of gross valve failure and consequent intersystem LOCA.

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.The 10 GPM IDENTIFIED LEAKAGE limitation provides allowance. for a ,

f limited amount of leakage from known sources whose presence will not interfere with the detection of UNIDENTIFIED LEAKAGE by the leakage

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detection systems.

The CONTROLLED LEAKAGE limitation restricts operation when' the total flow f rom the reactor coolant pump seals exceeds 20.GPM with the Reactor Coolant Pump seal return control valves full open at a nominal RCS' pres-(r sure of 2230 psig. This limitation ensures that in the event of a LOCA, ,

the safety ~ injection flow will not be less than assumed in the accident analyses.

The total steam generator tube leakage limit of 1 GPM for-all steam generators ensures that the dosage contribution from the tube leakage will

'be limited to a snell fraction of Part 100 limits in the event of either a steam generator tube rupture or steam line break. The 1 GPM limit.is consistent with the assumptions used in the analysis of these accidents.

The 500 gpd leakage limit per steam generator ensures that steam generator tube integrity is maintained in the event of a main steam line rupture as under LOCA conditions.

, J PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE of any magnitude is unacceptable since it f may be indicative of an impending gross failure of the pressure boundary.

Therefore, the presence of any PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE requires the unit to be promptly placed in COLD SHUTDOWN.

Should leakage occur through a component which can be isolated from l the balance of the Reactor Coolant System, Plant operation may. continde provided the leaking component is promptly isolated from the Retator Coolant System since isolation removes.the source of potential failure.

3/4.4.7 CHEMISTRY The limitations on Reactor Coolant System chemistry ensure that corrosion of the Reactor Coolant System is minimized and reduces the potential for Reactor Coolant System leakage or failure due to stress corrosion. Maintaining the chemistry within the Steady State Limits ,

provides adequate corrosion protection to ensure the structural integrity of the Reactor Coolant System over the life of the plant. The associhted ef fects of exceeding the oxygen, chloride and fluoride limits are time and temperature dependent. Corrosion studies show that operation may be continued with contaminant concentration levels in excess of the Steady State Limits, up to the Transient Limits, for the specified limited time intervals without having a significant effect on the structural integrity of the Reactor Coolant System. The time interval permitting continued operation within the restrictions of the Transient Limits provides time for taking corrective actions to restore the contaminant concentrations to within the Steady State Limits.

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!)' thefpffects of cyc Mc loads due it systerre temperature and pressure changes. .

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cyrJe3 used for design. purposes araprovide:.1 in Section 12 of tM (SAR.

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. , Dur1n$startup and shutdown, the rafes.of., temperature and pressu s -cnanges arDimited so thnt the maximum spf nf% beatup and cooldown rates 'are At,nsishdt with the desMn assumptbp'end satisfy the stress limits for A i E tyclic ortratIon. ' '

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