ML20217E807

Ro:On 980127,containment Integrity No Longer Existed & Key Switch Was Still 'On' for One of Test & Calibr Procedures. Caused by Retrieving Tool Box from Truck Air Lock.Discussed Occurrence W/Personnel & Will Consider TS Rev Re Key Switch

ML20217E807
Person / Time
Site:	MIT Nuclear Research Reactor
Issue date:	03/23/1998
From:	Lau E, Newton T MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, CAMBRIDGE
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
NUDOCS 9803310162
Download: ML20217E807 (2)

Text

4

..s' NUCLEAR REACTOR LABORATORY AN INTERDEPARTMENTAL CENTER OF MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY 8---

N

/

f JOHN A BERNARD 138 Albany Street, Cambndge, MA 02139-4296 Activation Analysis Director Telefax No (617) 253-7300 Coolant Chemlstry DirIctor of Reactor operabons Nudear Meene Tel No. (617) 253 4202 Reactor Engineering Principal Research Engineer 23 March 1998 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington D.C. 20555 Attn: Document Control Desk

Subject:

Reportable Occurrence 50-20/1998-1, Violation of Technical Specification No. 3.5.l(a) and Definition No.1.1.2 Gentlemen:

The Massachusetts Institute of Technology hereby submits this ten-day report of an occurrence at the MIT Research Reactor (MITR) in accordance with paragraph 7.13.2(d) of the Technical Specifications. An initial report was made by telephone to Mr. Thomas Dragoun of NRC Region I on 13 March 1998.

The format and content of this report are based on Regulatory Guide 1.16, Revision 1.

1. Egoort No.: 50-20/1998-1 2a. Report Date: 23 March 1998 2b. Dates of Occurrence: 27 January 1998, 6 March 1998; (Occurmnce identified 13 Mamh 1998)

3. Facility: MIT Nuclear Reactor Laboratory 138 Albany Street Cambridge, MA 02139

4. Identification of Occurrence:

Technical Specification No. 3.5.l(a) and Definition No.1.1.2

5. Conditions Prior to Occurrence:

On both occasions the reactor was shutdown and maintenance was being performed. j

6. Description of Occurrence:

'1 On the first occasion,27 January 1998, the reactor was shutdown and work was l being perfonned to support installation of the fission converter. This entailed moving large t

3 0

9803310162 980323

PDR I

S ADOCK 05000020 PDR b j

w

^ (.'!X components from the dismantled blanket test facility (BTF) out of the building. To facihtate this operation, the main airlock doors were bypassed to provide a path to move materialin and out of the building. During this time, test and calixation procedures were i being performed. Some of these procedures requimd that the reactor be in a ' start'-

condition.' This means that the reactor key switch must be in the "on" position, the reactor ready lamp lit, and the mn down relays reset. This is to verify that when a scram occurs, the Withdraw Permit Circuit opens, and the scram' being tested does in fact function properly. Given that both airlock doors were opened, containment integrity did not exist.

Hence, by defm' ition the key switch should have been in the "off" position with the key removed. The length of time that the switch was 'on' with the airlock doors open is not known exactly. It is believed to have been les than an hour.

On the second occurrence,6 March 1998, the mactor was shutdown. Test and calibration procedures were being performed... Some of these procedures required that the reactor be in a " start" condition. At one point, it was necessary to retrieve a toolbox from the truck air lock. When this occurred, containment integrity no longer existed and the key switch was still 'on' for one of the test and' calibration procedures. This condition existed for only a few minutes.

I 7.- Description of Aboarent Cause of Occurrence:

On both occasions, the cause of= the occurrence was misinterpretation of the technical specification requirements by the reactor supervisor.

8. Analysis of Occurrence:

Nothing of safety or radiological significance occurred or could have occurred because the reactor was in a shutdown condition.

9. Corrective Actig[n This occurrence was discussed on 03/13/98 with the reactor supervisor in question.

It was subsequently discussed with all reactor shift supervisors. It will be discussed with all licensed personnel on or before 3 April 1998. The technical specification definition of '

reactor secumd is felt to be worded in a needlessly restrictive manner and a revision of the Technical Specification is now being considered that will decouple the requirement that the key switch be 'off from the definition of containment integrity.

10. FailureDatit

- None.

Sincerely, C q 'v z)

Edward S. Lau Thomas H. Newton Asst. Superintendent for Operations Asst. Superintendent for Engineering

MIT Research Reactor MIT Research Reactor i cc

MirRSC

- USNRC- Senior Project Manager. -

NRR/oNDD USNRC- Region I-Project Scientist l.

' Efnuents Radiation Pratection Section

. PRSsB/DRSS 1

I,- ,, ..4g., . . , , . ,- . . . . . . . . , . . .

. . . . , . .. , , . _ , , , . , , ,