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Category:REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE REPORT (SEE ALSO AO LER)
MONTHYEARML20205A6551999-03-19019 March 1999 Ro:On 990310,main Ventilation Damper Failed to Close on Receipt of High Radiation Test Signal.Cause Indeterminate. Relays Associated with Main Exhaust Damper/Fans & Main Intake Damper Were Replaced ML20206P5321999-01-0606 January 1999 Ro:On 981229,only One Nuclear Safety Period Scram Channel Was Operable,For Period of Five Minutes.Caused by Placement of Nuclear Safety Sys Channel 1 Input Signal Cable on Wrong Bnc Connector.Placed Channel on Correct Bns Connector ML20217E8071998-03-23023 March 1998 Ro:On 980127,containment Integrity No Longer Existed & Key Switch Was Still 'On' for One of Test & Calibr Procedures. Caused by Retrieving Tool Box from Truck Air Lock.Discussed Occurrence W/Personnel & Will Consider TS Rev Re Key Switch ML20092K8281995-09-22022 September 1995 Corrective Action for RO 50-20/1995-4,re Abnormal Situations Which Occurred on 950711 ML20091K3091995-08-18018 August 1995 Ro:On 950809,malfunction of Shim Blade Drive Mechanism Occurred.Determined That Mechanism Experienced Intermittent Slippage When Blade Being Withdrawn.Blade Drive Mechanism Assembly Procedure PM 7.1.1.1 Will Be Reviewed ML20086T7571995-07-28028 July 1995 RO 50-20/1995-4:on 950720,operated W/One Shim Blade Fully Inserted.Caused by Failure of Licensed Operators to Follow Written Procedure for Investigating Mismatch.Failed Proximity Switches Replaced ML20082B8551995-03-30030 March 1995 RO 50-20/1995-2:on 950320,operation of Reactor in natural- Circulation Mode W/O Required Two Operable Nuclear Safety Level Channels Set to Scram at or Less than 100 Kw,Mitr TS 3.7 ML20078S2241995-02-17017 February 1995 Reportable Occurrence 50-020/95-01:on 950206,voltage & Specific Gravity Measurements of Cell of Emergency Battery Bank Recorded at Less than Specified Weekly SR in TS 4.3.5. C/A Will Modify SR to Monthly ML20058Q2371993-12-17017 December 1993 RO 50-20/1993-1:on 931207,operation W/Fewer than Required Number of 100 Kw Nuclear Safety Sys Level Channels Identified.Caused by Faulty four-segment Relay in low-range Amplifier of Channel 5.Amplifier Replaced ML20094K0721992-03-12012 March 1992 RO 50-020/1992-2:on 911030,three Fission Chambers Missing During Annual Inventory of SNM Matl.Search for Missing Chambers Completed on 920311 W/O Locating Chambers.Snm Inventory for 1991 Has Been Amended ML20090D6661992-03-0202 March 1992 RO 50-20/92-1 on:920218,malfunction Occurred in Reactor Analog Controller Due to Improper Performance of Increase in Reactor Power.Caused by Operator Error.Analog Automatic Control Sys Investigated & Temporarily Repaired ML20082K5911991-08-22022 August 1991 RO 50-20/1991-1:on 910813,fission Product Gas Levels Rose from Normal Operating Levels to Max of 15% of Mpc.Caused by Small Blister on One of Element MIT-17 Fuel Plates. Corrective Action Consisted of Removing MIT-17 from Core ML20248C7111989-08-0404 August 1989 RO 50-20/1989-2:on 890726,console Operator Received Abnormal Bldg Alarm.Leak Test Revealed Crack on Sys Ref Line Which Senses Atmospheric Pressure Outside Containment.All Polyethylene Tubing in Sys Replaced ML20246P3071989-03-17017 March 1989 RO 50-20/1989-1:on 890308,operation W/Fewer than Required Number of Nuclear Safety Channel Level Scrams Due to Lack of High Voltage Power Supply (Hvps) to Channel 5.Reactor Shut Down & Hvps Energized to Supply Channel 5 ML20154M6501988-05-26026 May 1988 RO 50-20/1988-1:on 880511,incipient Fuel Clad Defect Detected.Caused by Small Blister on One Element MIT-12 Fuel Plate.Element MIT-12 Removed from Core ML20236S4931987-11-19019 November 1987 RO 50-20/1987-2:on 871110,improper Performance of Reactor Reshim Resulted in Excessive Power Rise.Caused by Operator Error.Operator Suspended from All Licensed Duties Pending Further Review of Circumstances & Disciplinary Measures ML20213G0601986-11-0606 November 1986 RO 50-20/1986-3:on 861027,shim Blade 6 Could Not Operate at full-out Position Due to Mechanical Interference.Caused by Misalignment of Blade Proximity Switch Tube.Switch Tube Reinstalled Properly ML20214V9001986-10-17017 October 1986 Revised RO 50-20/1986-2:on 861008,elevated Levels of Fission Gases Discovered in Primary Containment.Cause Undetermined. Refueling Initiated & Element MIT-19 Removed.All in-core Elements Sipped.No Abnormalities Found ML20214H9541986-10-17017 October 1986 RO 50-020/86-02:on 861008,elevated Levels of Fission Gases in Primary Containment Observed.Cause Unknown.Element MIT-19 Removed from Core & All in-core Elements Sipped ML20154S4591986-02-28028 February 1986 RO 50-20/1986-1:on 860219,fission Product Gas Levels Rose from Normal Operating Levels.Caused by Blister on Surface of Outer Fuel Plate of Element MIT-11.Element MIT-11 Removed from Core ML20137G3661985-07-23023 July 1985 RO 50-20/1985-2:on 850715,defect in Fuel Element Cladding Observed.Caused by High Rate of Outgassing from Fuel Element MIT-32.Defective Element Removed ML20137G3531985-04-18018 April 1985 RO 50-20/1985-1:on 850408,main Intake Valve Failed Light Test Maint Procedure.Caused by Excessive Wear of Valve Gasket.Gasket Replaced ML20081H8191983-09-15015 September 1983 RO 50-20/1983-2:on 830906,fission Product Gas Levels Rise from 2.8% Max Permissible Concentration in Jul 1983 to 4.57% in Aug Noted.Caused by Excessive Outgassing of Fuel Element MIT-08.Element Removed from Core ML20074A7521983-04-29029 April 1983 RO 50-20/1983-1:on 830419,main Intake Valve Closed & Could Not Be Reopened.Caused by Piston Rod Rupture Near Rod Eye, Leaving Valve in Closed Position.Defective Hydraulic Cylinder Shaft Replaced ML20063B9221982-08-17017 August 1982 Ro:On 820809,slight Increase Found in Levels of Fission Products in Reactor Primary Sys.Cause Under Investigation. Criterion for Operation W/Possible Faulty Core Element Per RO 50-20/79-4 Will Be Observed 1999-03-19
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML20209C9331999-07-0808 July 1999 Vols 1 & 2 to SAR for Ma Institute of Technology Nuclear Reactor Lab ML20196K0331999-06-30030 June 1999 Quality Mgt Program for Generation of MITR-II Medical Therapy Facility Beams for Human Therapy, Reflecting Change to Provision 14 ML20205A6551999-03-19019 March 1999 Ro:On 990310,main Ventilation Damper Failed to Close on Receipt of High Radiation Test Signal.Cause Indeterminate. Relays Associated with Main Exhaust Damper/Fans & Main Intake Damper Were Replaced ML20206P5321999-01-0606 January 1999 Ro:On 981229,only One Nuclear Safety Period Scram Channel Was Operable,For Period of Five Minutes.Caused by Placement of Nuclear Safety Sys Channel 1 Input Signal Cable on Wrong Bnc Connector.Placed Channel on Correct Bns Connector ML20199H2371998-12-31031 December 1998 Revised SER for Fission Converter Facility ML20196B7541998-06-30030 June 1998 Mit Research Reactor Nuclear Reactor Lab Ma Inst of Technology,Annual Rept to Us NRC for Period 970701-980630. with ML20217E8071998-03-23023 March 1998 Ro:On 980127,containment Integrity No Longer Existed & Key Switch Was Still 'On' for One of Test & Calibr Procedures. Caused by Retrieving Tool Box from Truck Air Lock.Discussed Occurrence W/Personnel & Will Consider TS Rev Re Key Switch ML20217G2181997-10-0303 October 1997 SER for Fission Converter Facility ML20198P8071997-06-30030 June 1997 Annual Operating Rept for Jul 1996 - June 1997 ML20137L5901997-04-0303 April 1997 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 30 to License R-37 ML20129B3201996-06-30030 June 1996 Annual Rept to Us NRC for Period 950701-960630 ML20092K8281995-09-22022 September 1995 Corrective Action for RO 50-20/1995-4,re Abnormal Situations Which Occurred on 950711 ML20091K3091995-08-18018 August 1995 Ro:On 950809,malfunction of Shim Blade Drive Mechanism Occurred.Determined That Mechanism Experienced Intermittent Slippage When Blade Being Withdrawn.Blade Drive Mechanism Assembly Procedure PM 7.1.1.1 Will Be Reviewed ML20086T7571995-07-28028 July 1995 RO 50-20/1995-4:on 950720,operated W/One Shim Blade Fully Inserted.Caused by Failure of Licensed Operators to Follow Written Procedure for Investigating Mismatch.Failed Proximity Switches Replaced ML20092K2301995-06-30030 June 1995 Mit Research Reactor Annual Rept to NRC for Period Jul 1994 - June 1995 ML20082B8551995-03-30030 March 1995 RO 50-20/1995-2:on 950320,operation of Reactor in natural- Circulation Mode W/O Required Two Operable Nuclear Safety Level Channels Set to Scram at or Less than 100 Kw,Mitr TS 3.7 ML20078S2241995-02-17017 February 1995 Reportable Occurrence 50-020/95-01:on 950206,voltage & Specific Gravity Measurements of Cell of Emergency Battery Bank Recorded at Less than Specified Weekly SR in TS 4.3.5. C/A Will Modify SR to Monthly ML20072T3041994-06-30030 June 1994 Annual Rept for Mit Research Reactor for 930701-940630 ML20058Q2371993-12-17017 December 1993 RO 50-20/1993-1:on 931207,operation W/Fewer than Required Number of 100 Kw Nuclear Safety Sys Level Channels Identified.Caused by Faulty four-segment Relay in low-range Amplifier of Channel 5.Amplifier Replaced ML20056G8011993-06-30030 June 1993 Mit Research Reactor Nuclear Reactor Lab Mit,Annual Rept to NRC for Period 920701-930630 ML20128P4371993-02-16016 February 1993 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 27 to License R-37 ML20073H1451992-12-0909 December 1992 Study of MITR-II Core Tank Aging for Relicensing Consideration ML20114D9261992-06-30030 June 1992 Mit Research Reactor Nuclear Reactor Lab Mit,Annual Rept to NRC for 910701-920630 ML20094K0721992-03-12012 March 1992 RO 50-020/1992-2:on 911030,three Fission Chambers Missing During Annual Inventory of SNM Matl.Search for Missing Chambers Completed on 920311 W/O Locating Chambers.Snm Inventory for 1991 Has Been Amended ML20090D6661992-03-0202 March 1992 RO 50-20/92-1 on:920218,malfunction Occurred in Reactor Analog Controller Due to Improper Performance of Increase in Reactor Power.Caused by Operator Error.Analog Automatic Control Sys Investigated & Temporarily Repaired ML20082K5911991-08-22022 August 1991 RO 50-20/1991-1:on 910813,fission Product Gas Levels Rose from Normal Operating Levels to Max of 15% of Mpc.Caused by Small Blister on One of Element MIT-17 Fuel Plates. Corrective Action Consisted of Removing MIT-17 from Core ML20082L8451991-06-30030 June 1991 Mit Research Reactor Annual Rept to NRC for Jul 1990 to June 1991 ML20058N5741990-08-10010 August 1990 QA Program for MITR-II Spent Fuel Shipment ML20059G4331990-06-30030 June 1990 Mit Research Reactor Annual Rept to NRC for Jul 1989 - June 1990 ML20012D9651990-03-22022 March 1990 RO 50-20/1990-1:on 900312,incorrect Calculation of Estimated Critical Position (ECP) Attained During Reactor Startup. Caused by Failure to Check Second Portion of ECP Calculation Performed by Individual in Training ML20012C2771990-03-0909 March 1990 SER for BWR Coolant Chemistry Loop to Be Installed & Operated in Mitr ML20248C7111989-08-0404 August 1989 RO 50-20/1989-2:on 890726,console Operator Received Abnormal Bldg Alarm.Leak Test Revealed Crack on Sys Ref Line Which Senses Atmospheric Pressure Outside Containment.All Polyethylene Tubing in Sys Replaced ML20247H7041989-06-30030 June 1989 Mit Research Reactor Annual Rept for Jul 1988 - June 1989 ML20246P3071989-03-17017 March 1989 RO 50-20/1989-1:on 890308,operation W/Fewer than Required Number of Nuclear Safety Channel Level Scrams Due to Lack of High Voltage Power Supply (Hvps) to Channel 5.Reactor Shut Down & Hvps Energized to Supply Channel 5 ML20195K1161988-10-24024 October 1988 Suppl to PWR Loop Ser:Use of Large Circulating Pump ML20154J6221988-08-29029 August 1988 Revised Mit Research Reactor Annual Rept to NRC for Jul 1987 - June 1988 ML20153F5591988-06-30030 June 1988 Mit Research Reactor Annual Rept to NRC for Jul 1987 - June 1988 ML20154M6501988-05-26026 May 1988 RO 50-20/1988-1:on 880511,incipient Fuel Clad Defect Detected.Caused by Small Blister on One Element MIT-12 Fuel Plate.Element MIT-12 Removed from Core ML20151R7341988-04-19019 April 1988 Sser for PWR Coolant Chemistry Loop (Pccl) MITNRL-020 ML20236S4931987-11-19019 November 1987 RO 50-20/1987-2:on 871110,improper Performance of Reactor Reshim Resulted in Excessive Power Rise.Caused by Operator Error.Operator Suspended from All Licensed Duties Pending Further Review of Circumstances & Disciplinary Measures ML20237K6121987-06-30030 June 1987 Mit Research Reactor Annual Rept to NRC for Jul 1986 - June 1987 ML20151R7271987-02-13013 February 1987 SER for PWR Coolant Chemistry Loop (Pccl) MITNRL-020 ML20213G0601986-11-0606 November 1986 RO 50-20/1986-3:on 861027,shim Blade 6 Could Not Operate at full-out Position Due to Mechanical Interference.Caused by Misalignment of Blade Proximity Switch Tube.Switch Tube Reinstalled Properly ML20214V9001986-10-17017 October 1986 Revised RO 50-20/1986-2:on 861008,elevated Levels of Fission Gases Discovered in Primary Containment.Cause Undetermined. Refueling Initiated & Element MIT-19 Removed.All in-core Elements Sipped.No Abnormalities Found ML20214H9541986-10-17017 October 1986 RO 50-020/86-02:on 861008,elevated Levels of Fission Gases in Primary Containment Observed.Cause Unknown.Element MIT-19 Removed from Core & All in-core Elements Sipped ML20148B3011986-06-30030 June 1986 Mit Research Reactor Annual Rept to NRC for Period Jul 1985 - June 1986 ML20154S4591986-02-28028 February 1986 RO 50-20/1986-1:on 860219,fission Product Gas Levels Rose from Normal Operating Levels.Caused by Blister on Surface of Outer Fuel Plate of Element MIT-11.Element MIT-11 Removed from Core ML20214R3811986-01-31031 January 1986 Rept of Educational & Research Activities for Academic/ FY84-85 W/Selected Data from Previous Yrs ML20137G3661985-07-23023 July 1985 RO 50-20/1985-2:on 850715,defect in Fuel Element Cladding Observed.Caused by High Rate of Outgassing from Fuel Element MIT-32.Defective Element Removed ML20133H4081985-06-30030 June 1985 Mit Research Reactor Annual Rept to Us NRC for Jul 1984 - June 1985 1999-07-08
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NUCLEAR REACTOR LABORATORY
. AN INTERDEPARTMENTAL CENTER OF MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
' O. K. HARUNG 138 Abany Street, Cambridge. Mass. 02139 4 296 J. A. BERNARD. JR.
Director ' Telefax No. (617) 253 7300 cirector of Reactor Operatens Telex No. 921473-MIT-CAM Tel. No. (617) 253 4211/4202 March 30,1995 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Attn: Document Control Desk
Subject:
Reportable Occurrence 50 20/1995-2, Operation with Fewer than the Required Number of <100 kW Nuclear Safety System Level Channels Gentlemen:
The Massachusett: Institute of Technology hereby submits this ten-day report of an occurrence at the MIT Research Reacter (MITR) in accordance with paragraph 7.13.2(d) of the Technical Specifications. An initial report was made by telephone to NRC
~ Headquarters, Mr. Alexander Adams, Jr. at about 1600 on March 21,1995, and to NRC Region I, Mr. Thomas F. Dragoun, at about 1640 the same day. This was followed at 1715 by a more detailed report that was teleconferenced to include both the NRC Headq uarters and NRC Region I (Dr. Seymour H. Weiss, Mr. Alexander ' Adams, Jr., and Mr. Thomas F. Dragoun). Additional information was provided on both 03/23/95 and 03/24/95. It was postulated at that time that the calibration of the low-range amplifiers was incorrect. This has subsequently been verified. ,
1 The format and content of this report are based on Regelatory Guide 1.16, l Revision 1.
l
- 1. Report No.: 50-20/1995 2 2a. Reoort Date: 30 March 1995 2b. Date of Occurrence: 20 March 1995
- 3. Facility: MIT Nuclear Reactor Laboratory 138 Albany Street Cambridge,MA 02139 7
- 1 9504060073 PDR 950330 9
._ S .
ADOCK 05000020 I PDR
~
Reportable Occurrence 50-20/1995-2 ,
Page 2- of 5 l
- 4. Identification of Occurrence: l l
Operation of the reactor in natural-circulation mode without the required two operable nuclear safety level channels set to scram at or less than 100 kW, MITR Technical Specification No. 3.7.
- 5. Conditions Prior to Occurrence:
'Ihe reactor had been prepared for operation in the natural-circulation mode in order to perform an approved experiment. This mode of operation is pennitted under MITR Technical Specification No. 2.2. The maximum allowed power level is 100 kW and there is no forced flow of coolant through the core. MITR Technical Specification No. 3.7 also xrtains to operation in the natural-circulation mode and one ofits requirements is t 1at there be two neutron flux level channels set to scram at or below 100 kW. This is normally accomplished by replacing two of the three high-range safety channel amplitkrs with low range amplifiers that are capable of scramming the reactor at 100 kW or less. This had been done and the reactor instrumentation had been tested in accordance with the "Startup for Less than 100 kW Operation" checklist, PM 3.1.3.
- 6. Description of Occurrence:
Reactor startup began at 1222. The low-range amplifiers (Channels #5 and
- 6) were adjusted in accordance with PM 3.1.3 to cause a scram at 75 kW. The high range amplifier (Channel #4) was set at 5.5 MW. The procedure for conduct of the experiment required a series of flux measurements at various low power levels. The major portion of the experiment was conducted at low power levels
(<50 kW) and, for these power levels, the response of the low-range amplifiers was expected to be quite low. Accordingly, there was no reason to believe that the amplifiers were not fully operable. The maximum power attained during the experiment was 70 kW as indicated by Channel #7, which is a compensated ion chamber that is used to provide indication to the console operator. Two other Channels (#8 and #9) confirmed this. The response of the low-range amplifiers at power levels of 50 70 kW appeared low and subsequent analysis confirmed this.
As a result, the actual scram serpoints on the Channel #5 and #6 low-range amplifiers were 420 kW and 230 kW respectively.
- 7. Description of Apoarent Cause of Occurrence:
The MIT Research Reactor's nuclear safety system consists of six independent channels that are designated as Channels #1 through #6. Channels
- 1-#3 provide period scrams. These were fully functional during the occurrence reported here. Channels #4-#6 provide power level scrams. The minimum required complement of nuclear instrumentation is two period and two level l channels. Monitoring of the reactor power by the console operator is performed using three other channels that are not part of the safety system.
Each level channel consists of a neutron-sensitive ion chamber, a voltage supply, and a scram amplifier together with its power supply. Two types of scram amplifiers are used. For forced-circulation cooling of the core, 'high-range' amplifiers are installed in all three level Channels (#4-#6). These are set to scram at 5.5 MW For natural-circulation cooling, two of the high-range amplifiers are
p' s 3A Reportable' Occurrence 50-20/1995-2 Page 3 of 5 s- ...
i gysically removed ese amplifiers and, in their are connected to the place, same ion two ' low-range' chambers as their amplifiers corresponding are inserted.
high-range am )lifiers. 'Ihe result is that, when operating in the natural-circulation mode, Channe . #4 is a high-range amplifier set to scram at 5.5 MW and Channels
- 5 and #6 are low range amplifiers set to scram at or below 100 kW.
In order to determine the scram setpoints of the low-range amplifiers, the most recent equilibrium indication of the corresponding high-range channel is used -
along with an " amplification factor" to determine a value at which to set the low-range scrams. The equation below describes this process:
low range scuing = .+ offset equilibrium power The above formula is specified in PM 3.1.3 together with an amplification factor of 80. The calculation of the settings for the low-range amplifiers was donc properly in accordance with that procedure.
On 03/28/95 and 03/29/05, the low range amplifiers were placed in parallel with the high-range amplifiers and the reactor was operated in the forced-circulation mode. . Comparisons were made of the readings on each low-range amplifier with Channel #7's output and it was found that the amplification factors for low-range Channels #5 and #6 were actually 10.8 and 7.7 respectively.
- 8. . Analysis of Occurrence:
This occurrence involved a failure to maintain the minimum complement of low-range safety channels during operation in the natural-circulation mode. No challenge of the safety system took place during this occurrence. Accurate indications of the reactor power were available to the reactor operator at all times via Channels #7, #8, and #9 which were fully functional, and power never exceeded .
70 kW.
All of the other components of the reactor's safety system that were required for operation in the natural circulation mode were fully operable. This included the ~
three period scram Channels (#1 - #3) as well as two primary coolant outlet ,
temperature scrams. It is known that these would have caused a scram had the !
reactor power approached 100 kW. In addition, the level scrams on Channels #5 l and #6 were fully functional and would have scrammed the reactor at approximately 400 kW and 230 kW, respectively.
It should be noted that operation of the MIT Research Reactor in the natural circulation mode is rare. It is used primarily for refuelings, and the installation / removal of in core experiments. For these operations the reactor is never critical and the reactor's reactivity state is the maximum possible negative value (i.e., all blades fully inserted and reflector dumped). The low-range amplifiers are a technical specification requirement but, under this reactivity condition, they serve no purpose and have no safety significance. Operation of this type usually occurs for a few hours per month.
4 d , , w , , .,-v-- - . -- - g
Reportable Occurrence 50-20/1995-2 Page 4 of 5 Critical operation in the natural circulation mode is even rarer. Four types of activities are possible:
(a) Intermediate Criticals Daring Refuelings: If a refueling is complex and/or if it involves significant reactivity, an intermediate critical is performed to confirm the accuracy of the reactivity calculations. These occur every few refuelings, perhaps once or twice a year. The reactor power is limited to I kW by Technical Specification No. 3.1 during such criticals and is kept at a few hundred Watts for only a few minutes.
(b) Blade Calibrations: By procedure these can be donc under either natural-circulation or full-flow conditions. No use of the natural-circulation mode for this purpose has occurred in the last ten years.
(c) Reactor Physics Exoeriments: These include xenon transients and subcritical multiplication for MIT courses. These can be ; ne under natural-circulation or full flow conditions. No use of the natural-circt > tion mode for this purpose has occurred in the last ten years.
(d) Flux Synthesis Exoeriments: This experiment, which is now complete, was run in the natural-circulation mode at power levels above ikW in December 1993, A pril 1994, and March 1995. These are believed to be the only instances wherein the low-range amplifiers have been used for critical operation at power levels in excess of 1 kW during the last ten years.
- 9. Corrective Action:
(a) The low-range amplifiers were bench-tested for functionality and found operable. In addition, the as-built amplifiers were compared to the design drawings. No discrepancies were found.
(b) The high-range am 31ifiers and their associated circuitries were verified to be fully functional anc in proper calibration.
(c) The amplification factors of the low range amplifiers was determined both by electronic testing and by reactor operation in parallel with the high-range amplifiers. The amplification factors were determined to be 10.8 and 7.7 for Channels #5 and #6 respectively.
(d) A requirement to verify the am on a periodic basis (annual) is to beplification instituted.factor of be This will thedone low byrange amplifiers operating these amplifiers in parallel with the high-range amplifiers in the reactor under full flow conditions. (Initial tests done on 03/28/95-03/29S5.
Permanent procedure to be in effect by 04/30/95.) This item of corrective action resolves the root cause of the occurrence.
(e) PM 3.1.3, "Startup for Less than 100 kW Operation" is to be modified to reflect the correct amplification factor. (Temporary change made; permanent change to be made by 04/07/95).
In addition to the above, all of the safety amplifiers, including the low-range amplifiers, are scheduled for replacement later this year. The new equipment will L i
hH 4- ] ,
, Reportable Occurrence 50-20/1995-2 L
- - Page 5 of 5 be capable of indicating the detector response over the full range of reactor operation, from startup to full power.
- 10. Failure Data:
ROR #50-20/1993-1 involved the failure of a relay in one of the low-level ;
scram amplifiers, resulting in the loss of detection signal to the amplifier. 1 Sine ly,
, ffy Qt f Q Edward S. La , NE Thomas H. ewton, Jr., PE Asst. Superintendent for Engineering Asst. Superintendent for Opera: ions MIT Research Reactor MIT Research Reactor
/Q O J hn A. Bernard, Ph.D. j '
Director of Reactor Operations MIT Research Reactor j JAB /gw ;
1 cc: MITRSC (with enclosures) l USNRC - Project Manager, NRR/ONDD USNRC - Region I- Project Scientist, Efiluents Radiation Protection Section (ERPS)
FRSSB/DRSS i
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