ML20216D633
| ML20216D633 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 07200022 |
| Issue date: | 07/28/1999 |
| From: | Sherwin Turk NRC OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL (OGC) |
| To: | Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20216D637 | List: |
| References | |
| CON-#399-20690 ISFSI, NUDOCS 9907300041 | |
| Download: ML20216D633 (11) | |
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hh DOCKETED U1sli28,1999 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA .m
~~ g 3 gg NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING I BOARD Ab' In the Matter of )
)
PRIVATE FUEL STORAGE, L.L.C. ) Docket No. 72-22-ISFSI
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(Independent Spent Fuel )
Storage Installation) )
NRC STAFF'S RESPONSE TO APPLICANT'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL
SUMMARY
DISPOSITION OF UTAH CONTENTION R - EMERGENCY PLAN INTRODUCTION Pursuant to 10 C.F.R. 52.749(a), the NRC Staff (" Staff") herewith responds to
" Applicant's Motion for Partial Summary Disposition of Utah Contention Utah R - Emergency Plan" (" Motion"), filed on June 28, 1999, by Private Fuel Storage L.L.C. (" Applicant" or "PFS"). For the reasons set forth below and in the attached Affidavits of Randolph L. Sullivan
("Sullivan Aff.") and Pral W. Lain (" Lain Aff."), the Staff submits that there does not exist a genuine dispute of traterial fact with respect to the Appliccnt's fire fighting capability as set forth ;
in Utah Contenuon R. For these reasons, the Staff supports the Applicant's Motion.
' The Staff hereby requests a one-page extension of the page limit for its response to the Applicant's Motion, the need for which could not reasonably have been anticipated prior to the
- finalization of this Response. Counsel for the Applicant and the State of Utah have advised the Staff r- that they do not oppose this request.
9907300041 990728 PDR ADOCK 07200022 i C PDR - IJ i !
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. BACKGROUND'
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Utah Contention R (Emergency Plan) was filed by the State of Utah on November 23, 1997.2 As admitted by the Licensing Board on April 22,1998, the contention states as follows:
CONTENTION: The Applicant has not provided reasonable assurance that the public health and safety will be adequately protected in the event of an emergency at the storage site or the transfer facility in that:
- 1. PFS has not adequately described the ITP, the activities conducted there, or the area near the ITP in sufficient detail to evaluate the adequacy and appropriateness of the emergency plan.
- 2. PFS does not address response action, emergency information dissemination, or emergency response training programs for accidents at the ITP.
- 3. PFS has not adequately described the means and equipment for mitigation of accidents because it does not have adequate l support capability to fight fires onsite.'
Thus, one of the issues admitted in this contention concerns the Applicant's means and equipment for fighting fires onsite, as to which the Applicant's Motion now seeks summary disposition.'
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2 See " State of Utah's Contentions on the Construction and Operating License Application by Private Fuel Storage, LLC for an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Facility" (" Utah Contentions"),
! dated November 23,1997, at 116-22.
3 Private Fue/ Storage, LL C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), LBP-98-7,47 NRC 142,195-96,254 (1998). The Licensing Board excluded other portions of Utah Contention R. See Id. at 196.
d The other two subparts of this contention concern the need for emergency planning at the Applicant's proposed Intermodal Transfer Point (ITP). The Licensing Board has observed that further litigation on the merits of those issues "may be subject to any merits disposition of Utah B."
LBP-98-7,47 NRC at 196 n.18. PFS has filed a motion seeking summary disposition of Utah Contention B, which could affect the continued viability of the ITP portions of Utah Contention R.
In support of the firefighting issue in Utah Contention R, the State asserted that the climate and precipitation in Skull Valley are such that " fire is a serious risk which must be taken into account" (Utah Contentions at 121). The State further asserted that PFS had not described the means and equipment needed for mitigating the consequences of fires, contrary to 10 C.F.R.
i 72.32(a)(5) and Reg. Guide 3.67 6 5.3 (Id. at 120).5 In particular, the State asserted that (a) the Emergency Plan (EP) "does not state whether sufficient water is available to fight a fire of any consequence and does not describe the program for maintaining any equipment," and (b) while the Applicant's Safety Analysis Report (SAR) indicates that PFS will obtain water for fighting fires from surface storage tanks, the tanks' water capacity requires evaluation (Id.):
[W]hether the storage tanks could hold sufficient water for a serious '
fire must be further examined, especially since the Applicant has identified the use of a fire truck at the site, another fire truck
! available from the reservation, as well as trucks supplied by Tooele County Fire Department, all of which may need access to the water j tanks in a widespread difficult fire situation.
1 In its motion for partial summary disposition of Utah Contention R, PFS asserts that "the I 1
adequacy of the PFSF water supply (and firefighting generally) is immaterial to the decision the NRC must make regarding the adequacy of the PFS Emergency Plan ("EP"), in that the PFSF is l
5 As the Staffindicated in its response to this contention, Reg. Guide 3.67 (" Standard Format and Content for Emergency Plans for Fuel Cycle and Materials Facilities") applies to emergency plans submitted under 10 C.F.R. & 30.32(i)(3),40.31(j)(3), or 70.22(i)(3); it does not apply to emergency plans submitted with an application for an ISFSI under 10 C.F.R. Part 72. Rather, guidance for an ISFSI emergency plan is provided in NUREG-1567, " Standard Review Plan for Spent Fuel Dry Storage Facilhies" (Draft for Comment, October 1996). See "NRC Staff's Response to Contentions
- Filed by (1) the State of Utah, (2) the Skull Valley Band of Goshute Indians, (3) Ohngo Gaudadeh i
Devia, (4) Castle Rock Land and Livestock, et al., and (5) the Confederated Tribes of the Goshute Reservation and David Pete," dated December 24,1997, at 42.
designed to withstand the effects of credible fires without firefighting by personnel or the operation of any automatic fire detection / suppression system" (Motion at 3). PFS further states:
PFS does not need to provide for the active mitigation of the consequences of fire at the PFSF, in that the PFSF is designed so that no credible fire could cause a significant radioactive release, even without au firefighting by personnel or the operation of an automatic fire detection / suppression system. NRC regulations only require PFS to show how it will mitigate the consequences of
. potential radiolonical accidents at the PFSF. Thus, PFS has met the requirements and is entitled to summary disposition.
- Id. at 4; emphasis in original.
More specifically, PFS states (supported by the Declarations of Jeffrey Johns and Ram Srinivasan, as well as other Declarations filed in support of its motion for summary disposition of Utah Contention K),6that it has analyzed the consequences of various fires involving diesel fuel ;
at the site, which " represent the only instances in which a significant quantity of combustible material would be near a spent fuel storage cask" (Id. at 6). PFS indicates that this analysis showed that such fires would either be of short duration and produce temperatures below 1475" F.
. . . or would be located over 100 feet from the nearest storage cask . . . , with the result that the fires would not cause a radioactive release from a spent fuel cask (Id. at 6-8). Further, PFS states that its analysis of wildfires "showed that wik'. ires could not burn within the Restricted Area,
. because of the lack of combustible materials therein, and that wildfires would therefore not cause any significant harm to the spent fuel casks or any other system important to safety at the PFSF" (1d. at 8). In sum, PFS states:
6 See " Applicant's Motion for Partial Summary Disposition of Utah Contention K and
- Confederated Tribes Contention B," dated June 7,1999.
- -_ _ _ m . . . . . . u PFS has shown that fire at the PFSF would not cause a significant radioactive release, even without any firefighting by personnel or the operation of any automatic fire detection / suppression system such as a water sprinkler. No credible fire at the PFSF would threaten the integrity of a spent fuel storage cask or threaten any other SSCs important to safety in a way that could cause such a release. . . . Thus, the adequacy of the PFSF water supply (and PFSF firefighting generally) is immaterial to the decision the NRC must make under its emergency planning regulations as to the adequacy of PFS's description of the means of mitigating the consequences of accidents.
Id. ct 8-9. Accordingly, PFS concludes that summary disposition of this portion of Utah Contention R should be entered in its favor.
4 DISCUSSION A. Legal Standards Governine Motions for Summary Disposition.
Pursuant to 10 C.F.R. 62.749(a), "[a]ny party to a proceeding may move, with or without supporting affidavits, for a decision by the presiding officer in that party's favor as to all or any part of the matters involved in the proceeding." The Licensing Board has recently summarized the standards governing summary disposition in this proceeding. Private Fuel Storage, LLC (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), LBP-99-23,49 NRC (1999), slip op. at 10.' !
1 For the reasons set forth below and in the attached Affidavits of Paul W. Lain and Randolph L. Sullivan, the Staff submits that no genuine issue of material fact exists viih respect to this pcrtion of Utah Contention R, and the Applicant's Motion should therefore be granted.
7 In addition, the Staffhas previously addressed these standards in its responses to other motions for summary disposition in this proceeding; that discussion is hereby incorporated by reference herein. See, e.g., "NRC Staff's Response to Applicant's Motion for Summary Disposition of Utah Contention G (Quality Assurance)," dated July 19,1999, at 3-7.
B. No Genuine Discute of Material Fact Exists Concernine Utah Contention R.
In its Motion, PFS reviews the applicable regulatory requirements governing emergency plans for ISFSIs, stating that the Commission's emergency planning regulations in 10 C.F.R. Part 72 "are intended to provide protection against radiological hazards" (Motion at 4). As noted by PFS l 1
(/d.), these regulations require, inter alia, "a brief description of the means of mitigating the consequences" of accidents involving radioactive materials, including means provided to protect workers onsite. See 10 C.F.R. {G 72.32(a)(2) and (a)(5).8 in its SAR, as revised through May 19,1999, PFS described various events in its accident analysis, including fires which PFS considered to be credible. See SAR 8.2.5. Based on that l
analysis, PFS concluded that "the canister storage and transfer systems meet the general design l 1
- criteria of 10 C.F.R. { 72.122(c)" (SAR at 8.2-28); that "the temperature of the canister would not significantly change in the event of a credible fire near a storage cask or in the Canister Transfer Building" (/d at 8.2-29); and, "[t]herefore, canister integrity would be retained in the event of fires and no activity released" (Id.).
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- In addition, PFS prepared an Emergency Plan (EP), in accordance with the requirements of 10 C.F.R. 72.32(a). See SAR { 9.5, at 9.5-1. The S AR describes the responsibilities ofemergency response personnel in the event of an emergency, and indicates that training ws provided to members of the emergency response organization. Id. at 9.5 9.5-2. PFS furtherindicates, inter l ' See also, Proposed Rule, " Emergency Planning Licensing Requirements for Independent Spent Fuel Storage Facilities and Monitored Retrievable Storage Facilities," 58 Fed. Reg. 29795 (May 24, 1993) (the objective of the rule is "to protect the public against . . . radiological hazards"); cf 53 Fed.
Reg. 31651,31654 ("[t]he primary purpose of an emergency response plan is to prescribe measures to be taken to mitigate the effects of accidental releases of radioactivity").
7 alla, that a fire pumper truck is stationed at the site; members of the fire brigade are trained in the truck's operation; an additional fire truck is located at the Skull Valley Goshute reservation and is available for use at the site; and offsite assistance may be requested from the Tooele County Fire Department. Id. at 9.5-2. '
The Emergency Plan submitted by PFS, as revised on May 19,1999, provides detailed
-information concerning the Applicant's plans for responding to emergencies at the site. With ,
respect to fires, PFS indicates that while certain fires would not be deemed to constitute an emergency condition, if a fire causes emergency action levels (EALs) associated with increased radiation and airborne contamination levels to be exceeded, the fire would be classified as an Alert (EP at 2-12); in particular, the Emergency Plan indicates that "a fire involving a loaded storage, transfer or shipping cask that lasts longer than 15 minutes, warrants the Alert classification" (EP at 2-15).'"
In Chapter 3 of its Emergency Plan, PFS describes its plans for accident detection, mitigation, and assessment of radiological releases. With respect to the mitigation of accident I consequences involving a fire, the Plan states as follows (Id. at 3 3-6):
' See also, SAR at 8 2.24 - 8.2-28 (discussing the size and location of onsite diesel fuel storage tanks, administrative procedures, adtomatic fire detection and suppression systems).
PFS states that for fires lasting 15 minutes, the HI-STORM storage cask would suffer no
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significant damage and would retain its structural integrity, and the canister would be unaffected; but neutron shields utilized in the transfer casks "could be affected by high temperatures involved in a fire, and significant fires could potentially damage the neutron shield, resulting in higher dose .
rates in the vicinity of the canister" -- which PFS deems to be a credible event (EP at 2 2-17).
. PFS does not indicate the dose rates that would be expected in the event of damage to the neutron shield. However, the HI-STORM 3AR indicates that in the event of a total loss of the neutron shield, the dose rate at a distance of 1 meter from the cask would increase to 1,090 mrem /hr (from the previous dose rate of 380 mrem /hr). See HI-STORM SAR, Rev. 9, at 11.2-3.
Fire fighting capability is available onsite, consisting of a fire tnick, fire fighting equipment and trained personnel assigned to the fire brigade. Personnel will be evacuated from the affected area and the fire brigade will be mobilized to mitigate the consequences of a fire.
A second fire truck, stationed near the PFSF site at the Skull Valley Indian Reservation village, is also available and can rapidly respond to the site to supplement the fire fighting capability at the PFSF.
The Tooele County Fire Department will be called to assist in extinguishing fires beyond the capability of the fire brigade.
The Canister Transfer Building is constructed of fire retardant and non-flanunable building materials. Administrative controls will restrict combustibles within the building to those necessary for canister transfer operations. However, the diesel fuel in tanks of the heavy-haul transport vehicles will enter the Canister Transfer Building when shipping casks are trucked into and out of the building. Automatic fire detection and suppression capability will be provided in the Canister Transfer Building, in accordance with National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) requirements, to mitigate the effects of a worst case fire and assure a diesel fuel fire is extinguished in a timely manner.
In Chapters 4 and 5 of its Emergency Plan, PFS describes its normal and emergency response organizations, and personnel responsibilities for emergency response -- including duties during normal and off-shift hours; the use of emergency communications equipment; equipment and means for protection of onsite personnel; and emergency response equipment and facilities.
With respect to fires, the emergency response equipment includes, inter alia, the following:
Automatic fire detection and suppression equipment located in the Canister Transfer Building; The PFSF onsite fire truck Personnel protective equipment, including respirators and anti-contamination clothing; Fire fighting equipment and gear, including self-contained breathing apparatus . . . .
. Id. at 5-8. The Emergency Plan further indicates that specialized training will be provided to the emergency response organization, including the following: " Facility Fire Brigade members will receive training in methods of controlling fires under accident conditions in accordance with Fire protection Procedures, search and rescue, first aid, and procedures for handling and treating contaminated and injured personnel. Additional training will be provided on operation of the fire tnicks and ambulance." Id. at 6-2. In addition, the Emergency Plan indicates that fire drills will be conducted in accordance with Fire Protection Procedures, at least annually. Id. at 8-2.
During its review of the PFS SAR and Emergency Plan, the Staffissued two Requests for Additional Information (RAIs), which included requests concerning fire brigade staffing, the capability of the fire brigade to respond to fires during off normal hours, the amount of water to be maintained for firefighting at the site, the back-up fire truck located on the Goshute r reservation, an analysis of wildfires, and emergency procedures for response to external fires."
Responses to these portions of the Staff's RAIs were submitted by PFS on June 15,1998 (RAI 9-14) and February 10,1999, respectively.i2 In its responses to the Staff's RAIs, PFS, inter alia, provided details concerning (a) its_ EALs (which include an Alert classification for a fire affecting a loaded Storage, Transfer or Shipping cask, if the cask is affected by fire for longer
" See letter from Mark S. Delligatti (NRC) to John D. Parkyn (PFS), dated April 1,1998 ("First Round RAls"), Enclosure at SAR 9-4 (RAI 9-14); and letter from Mark S. Delligatti (NRC) to John D. Parkyn (PFS), dated December 10,1998 ("Second Round RAls"), Enclosure at 12,23,25 and 27 (RAls 8-3, EP-7, EP-8, EP-12, EP-21).
i2 See letter from John Donnell (PFS) to Director, NRC Ofiice of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards (NMSS), dated June 15,1998; and letter from John D. Parkyn (PFS) to Director, NMSS, dated February 10,1999. The Staff's RAls also sought information concerning other aspects of the Applicant's emergency plan, outside the scope of Utah Contention R.
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i than 15 ' minutes) (RAI EP-2); (b) the number and staffing of as 9<, brigade (RAI EP-7); (c) the capacity of its fire water tanks (Id.);" (d) staffing of the fire truck bdgade (RAI EP-8); and (e) its
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fire protection systems and equipment, and its related maintenance program (RAI EP-12)."
. On June 15,1999, the Staff filed a statement ofits position concerning Utah Contention R, as the Licensing Board had required." As stated therein, based on its review of the Applicant's SAR, Emergency Plan and responses to RAIs, the Staff concluded that "the Applicant's i
description ofits onsite fire fighting capability and equipment is adequate" (Statement of Position, l at 21). More particularly, the Staff stated as follows:
I The Applicant's Emergency Plan establishes that fire protection l systems will be tested and operational (including fire truck, fire i pumps, and sprinkler systems), fire personnel will be trained and available, and fire drills will be performed and determined acceptable.
The operability of the Applicant's fire protection systems (including fire truck, fire pumps, and sprinkler systems), the adequacy of
- PFS indicated that it will utilize two fire protection water tanks to provide water for fire
, fighting at the site, each of which will have a minimum capacity of'200,000 gallons, which is l adequate to supply fire water for a' minimum of 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> to the site fire protection systems in l accordance with NFPA 13," and to assure compliance with the NFPA 13 specification of an 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> l period for refill of the fire water tank (Response to RAI EP-7).
" PFS indicated that its fire protection system, described in { 4.3.8 ofits SAR, consists of"an electric and diesel fire pump, a primary and backup water supply tank for the fire pumps, a sprinkler type fire suppression system located in the Canister Transfer Building, fire hydrants located near
[ each building, fire trucks, breathing apparatus, and portable fire extinguishers located in each building and the yard area" (Response to RAI EP-12(c)). PFS further indicated that it would use written procedures to test and maintain fire protection systems and equipment in order to assure operability, and that its procedures will satisfy NFPA 25 requirements for testing, inspection and maintenar.ce (Id.).
" See "NRC Staff's Statement ofits Position Conceming Group 1 Contentions," dated June 15, 1999 (Enclosure at 21-22).
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i training to be received by its fire brigade, and the results of fire drills that are performed by PFS, will be evaluated by the Staff during its post-iicensing operational inspections of the facility.
Statement of Position, at 21-22.
In sum, the Staff has concluded that the Applicant's Emergency Plan satisfies the Commission's emergency planning regulations, and that sufficient information has been provided i
concerning the Applicant's plans for detecting, assessing, and mitigating the consequences of fires l I
at the facility. As set forth in the attached Affidavits of Paul Lain and Randolph Sullivan, this determination is based, not on the credibility of a fire occurring which may result in a significant l
release of radiation, but on the sufficiency of the Applicant's plans for responding to a fire event.'6 CONCLUSION For the reasons set forth above and in the attached Affidavits of Paul W. Lain and ,
Randolph L. Sullivan, the Staff supports the Applicant's motion for partial summary disposition of Utah Contention R, and recommends that it be granted.
Respectfully submitted, UAA)J Sherwin E. Turk Counsel for NRC Staff Dated at Rockville, Maryland this 28th day of July 1999 6 The Staff agrees with PFS' assertion that, under 10 C.F.R. y 72.32(a)(5), the Applicant needs to describe the means of mitigating the consequences of each type of radiological accident at the PFSF (see Motion at 4). The Staff does not agree, however, that events involving fires are beyond l the EP planning basis; indeed, the Commission's regulatory guidance indicates that an ISFSI l emergency plan needs to consider events involving fires. See, e.g, NUREG-1567, Appendix C I
(" Emergency Plenning"), at C-6, C-7, C-8, C-9, C-11, C-13, C-17, and C-18. Moreover, the Applicant's Emergency Plan indicates that certain types of fires warrant an EAL classification of Alert. See discussion supra, at 7 n.10, and 9-10.