ML20210Q680
| ML20210Q680 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 07200022 |
| Issue date: | 08/09/1999 |
| From: | Chancellor D UTAH, STATE OF |
| To: | Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20210Q684 | List: |
| References | |
| CON-#399-20733 97-732-02-ISFSI, ISFSI, NUDOCS 9908160089 | |
| Download: ML20210Q680 (20) | |
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USHPC UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 99 ALTJ l3 P3 :36 BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD A[
)
In the Matter of:
)
Docket No. 72-22-ISFSI
)
PRIVATE FUEL STORAGE, LLC )
ASLBP No. 97-732-02-ISFSI (Independent Spent Fuel
)
Storage Installation)
)
August 9,1999 STATE OF UTAH'S RESPONSE TO THE APPLICANT'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL
SUMMARY
DISPOSITION OF UTAH CONTENTION R AND F EPLY TO THE STAFF'S RESPONSE TO THE APPLICANT'S MOTION I.
INTRODUCTION The Applicant filed a Motion for Partial Summary Disposition of Contention R (Emergency Plan), Basis 3, on June 28,1999 (" Applicant's Motion"). The Applicant urges the Board to grant its Motion based on the underlying fact that the PFS facility "is designed to withstand the effects of credible fires without fire-fighting by personnel or the operation of any automatic fire detection / suppression system."
Motion at 3 (emphasis added). In its July 28,1999 Response to Applicant's Motion for
' Contention R, Basis 3, is as follows:
CONTENTION: The Applicant has not provided reasonable assurance that the public health and safety will be adequately protected in the event of an emergency at the storage site or the transfer facility in that... (3) PFS has not adequately described the means and equipment for mitigation of accidents because it does not have adequate support capability to fight fires onsite.
Private Fuel Storace. LLC (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation),1.BP 98-7 47 NRC 142,254 (1998).'
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Parital Summary Disposition of Utah Contention R - Emergency Plan (" Staff's Response"), the Staff supports the Applicant's Motion albeit on a different premise.
The Staff relies on the fact that the Applicant's emergency response plans are sufficient to respond t'o a fire event. Unlike the Applicant, the Staff does not base its determination on the fact that it is not credible that a fire will occur which may result in the significant release of radiation.2 Staff's Response at 11 and n.16. In accordance with the Board's Order of July 1,1999, the State hereby responds to the Applicant's Motion and replies to the Staff's Response. In this response, the State shows that many _ material facts are in dispute with the Applicant. The State also disputes some of the factual premises underlying the Staff's response. Accordingly, summary disposition should not denied.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW Pursuant to10 CFR $ 2.740, a party is entitled to summary disposition if "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact" and the party "is entitled to a decision as a
]
matter oflaw." The burden of proving entitlement to summary disposition is on the
'movant. Advanced Medical Systems. Inc. (One Factory Row, Geneva, Ohio 44041),
% its Response at 11, the Staff concluded, (S)ufficient information has been provided concerning the Applicant's plans for
, detecting, assessing, and mitigating the consequences of fires at the facility.... [T]his determination is based, not on the credibility of a fire occurring which may result in a significant release of radiation, but on the sufficiency of the Applicant's plans for j
responding to a fire event.
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7-i CLI-93-22,38 NRC 98,102 (1993). Because the burden of proofis on the proponent, "the evidence submitted must be construed in favor of the party in opposition thereto, I
who receives the benefit of any favorable inferences that can be drawn." Seouovah l
Fuels Corp. and General Atomics Corp. (Gore, Oklahoma Gite Decontamination and Decommissioning Funding), (hereafter " Gag") LBP-94-17,39 NRC 359,361, aff'd 40 i
NRC 55, CLI-94-11 (1994). Furthermore,if there is any possibility that a litigable issue of fact exis.4 or any doubt as to whether the parties should be permitted or required to proceed further, the motion must be denied. General Electric Co. (GE Morris Operation Spent Fuel Storage Facility), LBP-82-14,15 NRC 530,532 (1982).
III.
ARGUMENT-4 A.
SUMMARY
JUDGMENT IS INAPPROPRIATE BECAUSE THERE ARE SIGNIFICANT MATERIAL FACTUAL DISPUTES AND MATERIAL FACTUAL UNCERTAINTIES THAT
'CANNOT BE RESOLVED WITHOUT A HEARING.
PFS has moved for partial summary disposition "on the grounds that the adequacy of the PFS [ facility] water supply (and firefighting generally) is immaterial to the decision the NRC must make regarding the adequacy of the PFS Emergency i
Plan...." because the facility is designed to withstand the credible effects of fires.'
'The Applicant's Motion is supponed by the Declarations of Jeffrey Johns and Ram Srinivasan.
In response to the State's general and continuing interrogatories Nos. 3 5, which require the identification of witnesses, their qualifications, and the scope of their testimony, PFS has identified only Dr. Carlton Britton as an expert witness testifying about wildfires for Contention R. Applicant's Objections and Non-Proprietary Responses to State's First Requests for Discovery, dated April 21, 1999, at 17-18; see also Applicant's Objections and Non-Prorietary (sic) Responses to State's Second Requests for Discovery (Group I)Qune 4,1999) at 5; Applicant's Objections and Non-Proprietary Responses to State's Second Requests for Discovery (Group II and III)Qune 28,1999) at 5-6; Applicant's 3
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I Applicant's Motion at 3.1 The NRC Staff, however, "does not agree... that events -
invo ing fires are beyond the EP [ Emergency Plan] planning basis; indeed the Commission's regulatory guidance indicates that an ISFSI emergency plan needs to consider events involving fires." Staff Response at 11 and n.16. Thus, contrary to J
PFS's assertion, the Staff's analysis is not based on whether an event involving a fire is
" credible." Instead the Staff's determination is based on "the Applicant's plans for detecting, assessing, and mitigating the consequences of fires at the facility." Staff Response at 11.
PFS's underlying premise that its Emergency Plan need only describe the consequences of radiological acciden'ts at the facility does not comport with NUREG
- 1567, Standard Review Plan for Soent Fuel Dry Storage Facilities. Applicant's Motion at 5. According to NUREG 1567, Appendix C, the accident description in an emergency plan must include, inter alia, "any non-radiological, hazardous material releases that could impact emergency response efforts..." and " events which could lead
- to initiation of an alert... [ including] fire onsite that might affect radioactive systems important to safety-... [or compromise] ongoing security...." NUREG 1567 at C-6 to
~ C-7. NUREG 1567 is consistent with 10 CFR $ 32(a)(5), which requires the Emergency Plan to provide a description of "the means of mitigating the consequences
- Objections and Non-Proprietary Responses to State's Third Requests for Discovery Oune 28,1999) at 6.
The Applicant stated it would supplement its response as it obtains funher information, which obviously it has not done. ' Applicant's Discovery Response at 18.
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Jof each type of accident, including those provided to protect workers onsite, and a
[ description of the program for maintaining the equipment."
I There are fatal shortcomings in the Applicant's Motion because litigable facts remain ~and the Motion omits significant material facts. In addition, the Staff cannot 1
support the Applicant's Motion when it too has not provided the answer to imponant i
- material facts omitted from the Applicant's Motion.
.The Applicant has failed to analyze the effects from fire to other systems, structures or components important to safety ("SSCs")at the facility, especially from a fire caused by spilled fuel inside the Canister Transfer Building. It is in this building
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' hat fuel is at its most vulnerable; the canister is taken out of the transportation cask, t
placed in a transfer cask and then transferred to a storage cask. Material Fact.18. The Holtec Topical Safety Analysis Repon (" TSAR") has only analyzed a fire from a 50 gallon diesel fuel spill involving the storage casks, while the TranStor TSAR has no
-such analysis. Material Fact.111; Resnikoff Dec.117-8. Moreover, the Holtec
~ TSAR does not analyze a fire involving a 50 gallon fuel spill inside the transfer bay
)
. during canister transfer operations.- Meanwhile, in its Motion, the Applicant purports
- to have analyzed a 300 gallon fuel spill inside the Canister Transfer Building.*
Applicant's Motion at 6-7; Johns Dec. at 115, 8-10. PFS relies on the assumption that i a 300 gallon fuel spill from a heavy haul trailer will not spread beyond the unloading
% its 300 gallo$ fuel spill analysis supportingits Motion, the Applicant takes no credit for the sprinkler system inside the Canister Transfer Building. Applicant's Motion at 7.
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' bays. Johns Dec. at 111. The SAR provides absolutely no facts to support PFS's assertion that the building design will assure that 300 gallons of spilled fuel will not run
- into the transfer cells. SAR at 8.2-27. PFS uses the same design basis argument to preclude a 50 gallon fuel spill from the cask transporter reaching the transfer bays. Id.
at 8.2 28. Furthermore, there are significant unanswered questions relating to the
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' collection of spilled diesel fuel in the drain sumps. Johns Dec. at 111.
'The State surely is entitled to cross examine the Applicant's witnesses as to
]
'what ' hese building design measures will be and how they will prevent the spread of t
- spilled fuel and the collection of fuel in drain sumps. These facts are critical because
. PFS has stated that a fire involving 300 gallons of diesel fuel will cause temperatures inside the Canister Transfer Building to reach 1200*F. Johns Dec. at 110. The o
transfer casks are not designed to withstand such temperatures and such temperatures
< - would likely cause degradation of the cladding surrounding the spent fuel.' Resnikoff Dec at 17; Facts at 1113-14.
The Applicant admits that a fire involving 300 gallons of fuel may cause the loss
.of electrical power to SSCs inside the Canister Transfer building. Johns Dec.110.
The Applicant even argues that if such a loss of power occurred "while canister transfer operations were in progress" it would not result in the release of radioactivity. Id.
The Applicant's conclusions bring up a number of significant and unresolved
. questions. First, neither the Applicant's Motion nor the SAR discuss how electrical 6
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power will be restored if there is a fire in the middle of canister transfer operations that
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cuts off electricity and burns out electrical wiring inside the Canister Transfer 4
Building. Material Facts 1115-16. Second, the Applicant has not described how the recovery sequence would be completed if electrical wiring supplying the Canister Transfer Building is burned out during canister transfer operations. Id.116. Third, the Applicant has not analyzed the means of protecting onsite electrical repair workers needed to repair faulty or burned out wiring inside the Canister Transfer Building. Id.
Again, the State is entitled to cross examine the Applicant's expen witnesses to obtain answers to the foregoing questions which are germane to the Applicant's ability to mitigate the consequences of accidents. See 10 CFR S 72.32 (a)(5).
. The Applicant's analysis of a fire involving fuel from a locomotive is woefully deficierit. There is not one iota of evidence as to the fuel capacity of the locomotive that will be at the PFS site. The Board should not uphold the Staff's position that the
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1 PFS Emergency Plan is adequate when the Staff, either through ignorance or oversight, j
has not divulged this critical fact. The fuel capacity of the locomotive at the PFS ISFSI
. is a significant fact; locomotives may have a fuel capacity of as much as 6,000 gallons.
Exhibit 1 to Resnikoff Dec.
The Applicant's attempted analysis of a fire involving a mysterious quantity of i
fuel from a locomotive located outside the Canister Transfer Building concludes: "the l
heat flux impinging on a storage cask from the fire [ involving an unknown quantity of 7
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diesel fuel] would be much less than the heat flux that would impinge on a storage cask from a 50-gallon diesel fuel fire engulfing a cask." Motion at 8. The State would-
-merely add that as the quantity of fuel is unknown, the Applicant's flux analysis impinges upon credulity. Material Facts at 1117 and H ; Resnikoff Dec. at 1110,11 and Exhibit 1. Furthermore, the Applicant has only attempted to analyze the effect of a radiological release and has given no consideration to the effects on SSCs.
The Applicant's Motion relies on the fact that administrative procedures will keep the locomotive outside the Canister Transfer Building. Applicant's Motion at n.8.5 - Another significant material fact absent in the Applicant's motion is how a cask loaded on a railcar weighing over 200 tons will get into the Canister Transfer Building and how an unloaded car will exit the building. Material Facts 1119-22. Nowhere in
'the license application is there a discussion of how casks will be moved into or out of the Canister Transfer Building. In a summary disposition motion, the burden is on the Applicant and any favorable inference from the evidence must be construed to the l
benefit of the State (the party opposing the motion). Gore,39 NRC at 361.
Therefore, as there is no evidence to show how railcars will enter or exit the Canister Transfer Building, the Board should infer that the locomotive will be required to enter the Canister Transfer Building to accomplish this operation.
'In addition, the Applicant again relies on unspecified building design to prevent the movement of spilled fuel. This time the design is supposed to prevent fuel from entering into the building.
j Applicant's Motion at 8 and n. 8. Because PFS relies on building design for its analysis, the State must be given the opportunity to examine PFS's witnesses about the design details.
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It is obvious why the Applicant does not want the locomotive inside the Canister Transfer Building. A fire involving 50 or 300 gallons of fnei pales in comparison to a 6,000 gallon spill; so does the analysis. The Applicant's omission of l
'how the railcars get inside and out'of the building, creates a material deficiency in its
- analysis of fires involving the locomotive. Furthermore, the Applicant must also analyze the effects of a fire on both the locomotive and heavy haul trailer being in the building at the same time. Material Fact 123; see SAR Fig. 4.7-1.
Finally, the Staff's analysis comes up short. The Staff has not disclosed (or does not have before it) the material facts described above that are critical to analyzing the Applicant's position (e.g., building design to prevent fuel from spreading, fuel capacity of the locomotive, recovery operations after burn out of electrical wiring in the Canister Transfer Building). Moreover, the Staff first regurgitates the Applicant's position that the ISFSI does not need to rely on firefighting personnel or automatic fire suppression system (e.g., sprinkler system). Staff Response at 3-4. Then the Staff
- relies on the fact that the Applicant wiU ' e a fire pumper truck on site, another fire truck elsewhere on the reservation, and an uzsupported response to an RAI that sufficient water will be maintained for firefighting. Staff's Response at 9. In the arid west, the availability of water should not be taken for granted. The Utah State Engineer is charged with the allocation of all water within the State, including
'It'is unclear whether the Staff's Response rupports the Applicant's supposition.
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m groundw~ater. Material Fact 127; Utah Code Ann. Chapter 73. PFS has not applied to i
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~ he State Engineer for a water right to withdraw groundwater. See Material Fact 127.
t Thus, there is no evidence in the record to support the assumption that PFS will have enough water to fight fires on site. The maintenance and operability of the PFS fire truck is irrelevant if there is insufficient water to supply fire fighting needs.
Accordingly, there is a genuine dispute between the Staff and the State whether there will,in fact, be a sufficient quantity of water allocated to PFS or the tribe that will
- enable PFS to fulfil the commitments it made in its RAI responses with respect to the quantity of water it will have on site.
IV.
CONCLUSION
- The Applican' 's Motion and the Staff's Response are rife with disputed and t
- absent material facts. The State must be given the opportunity to cross examine the Applicant's witnesses and those of the Staff. It would be patently unfair of the Board to grant summary disposition in~ these circumstances.
DATED this 9th of August,1999.
l Re lly submit Af>>wA a
'De%e ChancellMssistant Attorney General Fred G Nelson, Assistant Attorney General Diane Curran, Special Assistant Attorney General Connie Nakahara, Special Assistant Attorney General Attorneys for State of Utah, Utah Attorney General's Office 160 East 300 South,5th Floor, P.O. Box 140873 Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0873; Ph.: (801) 366-0286, Fax: (801) 366-0292 10 i
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l DOCKETED USNPC CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
'99 AUG 13 P3 :36 I hereby cenify that a copy of STATE OF UTAH'S RESPONSE TO THE APPLICANT'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL
SUMMARY
DISPOSITihN[OF ~D ADJE,
,F UTAH CONTENTION R AND REPLY TO THE STAFF'S RESPONSE TO THE APPLICANT'S MOTION was served on the persons listed below by electronic mail
- (unless otherwise noted) with conforming copies by United States mail first class, this 9th day of August,1999:
Rulemaking & Adjudication Staff Dr. Peter S. Lam Secretary of the Commission Administrative Judge U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Washington D.C. 20555 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission E-mail: hearingdocket@nrc. gov Washington, DC 20555 (originaland two copies)
E-Mail: psl@nrc. gov G. Paul Bollwerk, III, Chairman Sherwin E. Turk, Esq.
Administrative Judge Catherine L. Marco, Esq.
Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Office of the General Counsel U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mail Stop 15 B18 Washington, DC 20555 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission E-Mail: gpb@nrc. gov Washington, DC 20555 E-Mail: set @nrc. gov -
Dr. Jerry R. Kline E-Mail: cim@nrc. gov AdministrativeJudge E-Mail: pfscase@nrc. gov Atomic Safety and Licensing Board II. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Jay E. Silberg, Esq.
Washington, DC 20555 Ernest L. Blake, Jr.
E Mail: jrk2@nrc. gov Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge E-Mail: kjerry@erols.com 2300 N Street, N. W.
Washington, DC 20037-8007 E-Mail: Jay _Silberg@shawpittman.com E-Mail: ernest _blake@shawpittman.com E-Mail: paul _gaukler@shawpittman.com 11
John Paul Kennedy, Sr., Esq.
Danny Quintana, Esq.
1385 Yale Avenue Danny Quintana & Associates, P.C.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105 68 South Main Street, Suite 600 E-Mail: john @kennedys.org Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 E-Mail: quintana @xmission.com Richard E. Condit, Esq.
Land and Water Fund of the Rockies
. James M. Cutchin 2260 Baseline Road, Suite 200 Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Boulder, Colorado 80302 -
Panel E-Mail: rcondit@lawfund.org U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555-0001
- Joro Walker, Esq.
E-Mail: jmc3@nrc. gov Land and Water Fund of the Rockies (electronic copy only) 2056 East 3300 South Street, Suite 1 Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 Office of the Commission Appellate E-Mail: joro61@inconnect.com Adjudication Mail Stop: 16-G-15 OWFN U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 (UnitedStates mailonly)
Denise Chancellor Assistant Attorney General State of Utah 12 I
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 1
BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD
)
In the Matter of:
)
Docket No. 72-22-ISFSI
)
PRIVATE FUEL STORAGE, LLC )
ASLBP No. 97-732-02-ISFSI -
(Independent Spent Fuel
)
Storage Installation)
)
August 9,1999 STATE OF UTAH'S STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS '
IN DISPUTE REGARDING UTAH CONTENTION R The State of Utah submits,in support ofits opposition to the Applicant's Motion for Partial Summary Disposition on Utah Contention R, this statement of material facts in dispute.
1.
-The State disputes the Applicant's material fact No.1 because the Applicant, inappropriately, attempts to summarize the State's argument for the underlying bases for Contention R in the Material Facts, as opposed to in the Motion, and quotes language without attribution.
1 2.
The State disputes material fact No. 2 that the Applicant has adequately analyzed the potential impact of fire on the facility or the spent fuel casks.
Resnikoff Dec. at 15.
3.
The State disputes material fact No. 3 that the only fires the Applicant need be concerned with are the four types of fires listed in material fact No. 3. Ld.
4.
The State disputes material fact No.10 because, as described in the following paragraphs, there is a threat from a fire to other systems, structures, or components ("SSCs")important to safety at the facility that the Applicant must mitigate or that may cause a radioactive release.
5.
Fuel will be transported to PFS in either a HI-STAR or TransStor transportation cask. SAR at 4.5-1.
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6.
The transportation casks will enter the Canister Transfer Building on either a heavy haul truck or on a rail car. SAR Fig. 4.7-1 i
. 7.
Fuel will be stored at PFS in either a Hl. STORM or TranStor storage cask.
L SAR at 3.1-1.
j 8.
The canister containing the fuel will be transferred from a transportation cask l
- to a storage cask in the Canister Transfer Building. SAR at 5.1-4 (Rev. 2).
L 9.
The fuel transfer from a transportation cask to a storage cask will be accomplished via the HI-TRAC or TranStor metal transfer cask. SAR at 4.7-14 and 4.7-23.
10.-
There are no facts to support the assenion in the SAR that " building design measures assure that any diesel fuel spilled in the cask load / unload bay will remain in the bay and cannot enter a transfer cell" (SAR at 8.2-28) and l
"[b]uilding design measures assure that any diesel fuel spilled in the Canister Transfer Building main bay outside the transfer cell will not run into a transfer cell" (SAR at 8.2-27). The John's Declaration attached to Applicant's Motion fo. Partial Summary Disposition (" Johns Dec.") offers no factual suppon for the assenions in the SAR. John's Dec. at i ll. Resnikoff Dec.at 16.
i 11.
The HI-STORM Topical Safety Analysis Report (" TSAR") has considered a fire analysis from a 50 gallon spill but the TranStor TSAR has not analyzed the short-term accident design temperatures for a fire involving 50 gallons of diesel fuel. Resnikoff Dec. at 117 & 8.
12.
There is no accident analysis of a HI-TRAC or TranStor transfer cask involving 300 gallons of fuel, such as that from a heavy haul vehicle tractor. Id.
13.
The Applicant states that the likely temperature reached inside the Canister Transfer building from a fire involving 300 gallons of diesel fuel will be i
-,200*F. Johns Dec. at i 10.
1 14.
The HI-TRAC cask is not designed to withstand temperatures as high as 1,200 F. Taking into account the shon-term accident design temperatures for l
the HI-TRAC cask that Holtec has analyzed,it is likely that a fire from a 300 gallon fuel spill would cause gross cladding defects. Resnikoff Dec.at 17.
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s 15.
The fire inside the Canister Transfer Building could cause a loss of electrical power to SSCs, including power for equipment needed to undertake the transfer of a canister from a transportation cask to a storage cash. Johns Dec.1
- 10. Such'a fire would also cause electrical wiring in the Canister Building to burn. Resnikoff Dec.at 19.
16.
The Applicant has not described the recovery sequence if an electrical wire is burned and the transfer cask is left hanging in the middle of a canister transfer operation. Id. Nor has the Applicant analyzed the occupational exposure to workers needed to replace electrical wiring in the transfer bay or other areas of the Canister Transfer Building. Id.
17.
The State disputes material fact No.11 that the Applicant has analyzed "the impact of a fire involving the diesel fuel from the postulated rupture of the fuel tanks of the locomotive outside the Canister Transfer Building" because, among other things, there are no facts to support what the fuel capacity will be of a locomotive used to transport casks to the PFS site. Resnikoff Dec. at 1110 &
- 11. Locomotives may have a capacity of as much as 6,000 gallons of diesel fuel.
Resnikoff Dec'. at i ll and Exhibit 1 thereto.
18.
The State disputes material facts Nos.14 and 15 because the Applicant has analogized the effects of "a fire involving the diesel fuel from the locomotive at the PFS [ facility]" (material fact Nc.15) to that from " diesel fuel fire that engulfed the casks, such as the 50-gallon fire for which the storage casks to be used at the PFS [ facility] have been analyzed" (material fact No.14) without showing the fuel capacity of the locomotive. Resnikoff Dec. at i 10.
19.
The State disputes material fact No.12 that administrative procedures will prevent the locomotive at PFS from entering the Canister Transfer Building
' because there are no facts to support how a cask on a railcar may enter the Canister Transfer Building without the use of a locomotive. P.:snikoff Dec.at i 12.-
20.
Figures 8 and 14 attached in support of Applicant's RAI response 141 dated February 8,1999, show that railroad trackr, enter and exit the Canister Transfer Building. See Attachment A to this Statement of Facts; see also, SAR Fig. 4.7-1 21.'
SAR Fig. 4.7-1 (sheet 1) shows a cask loaded rail car on railroad tracks located in the middle of cask load / unload bay inside the Canister Transfer Building.
The load / unload bay is 198 feet long and 48 feet wide. SAR Fig. 4.71; Johns 3
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- Dec.19. The distance from the edge of a rail car inside the building to either
. the east or west openings along the rail track to the outside d the Canister Transfer Building is more than 70 feet. SAR Fig. 4.7-1 (Sheet 1).
22.
The' logical inference from the facts at hand is that a locomotive mt st be used to move a more than 200 ton loaded railcar into the Canister Transfe: Building and an unloaded railcar out of the building. Resnikoff Dec. at 112.
L 23.
The cask load / unload bay inside the Canister Transfer Building is capable of accommodating both a heavy haul truck and rail car. SAR Fig. 4.7-1 (sheet 1);
Resnikoff Dec. at i 13.
24.
There are no facts to support the possibility that a heavy haul truck and a locomotive will not be in the Canister Transfer Building at the same time. M.
25.
There is no analysis of a fire involung fuel from a locomotive located inside the Canister Transfer Building. Isla 26.
There is no analysis of a fire involving fuel from both a locomotive and a heavy haul truck located inside the Canister Transfer Building at the same time. M.
27.
The State disputes the factual underpinnings of the Staff's reliance on the J
" operability of the Applicant's fire protection system (including fire truck, fire pumps, and sprinkler systems)." Staff Response at 10. The Applicant has no
. facts to suppoit its assertion that'a sufficient quantity of water will be available to it to sustain its water needs for the facility, including two water tanks of 200,000 gallons each. State of Utah's Objections and Response to Applicant's Second Set of Discovery Requests with Respect to Group II and Group III Contentions, Response to Admissions Nos.1 and 2 and Interrogatory No. 7, Utah Contention 0 at 78-79 and 85 and Exhibit 1 thereof (Declaration of Jerry D. Olds, P.E. Assistant State Engineer Division of Water Rights supporting the foregoing discovery answer).
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Private Fuel Storage, uC P.O. Box C4010, La Crosse, WI 34602 4010 John D. Parkyn, Chairman of the Board February 18,1999 Director Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 SUBMITTAL OF EIS RAI RESPONSE ATTACIIMENTS PRIVATE FUEL STORAGE FACILITY DOCKET NO. 72-22 / TAC NO. L22462 PRIVATE FUEL STORAGE L.L.C.
Reference:
- 1) PFSLLC Letter, Parkyn to Director, Office of Material Safety and Safeguards, Responses to EIS Request for Additional Information, dated February 18,1999 Please find enclosed Private Fuel Storage certain attachments referenced in the EIS RAI responses (Reference 1).
Ifyou have any questions regarding this response, please contact me at 608-787-1236 or our Project Director, John Donnell, at 303-741-7009.
Sincerely, I
b ohn D. Parkyn, Chai an Private Fuel Storage L.L.C.
JDP:cis Enclosures G 7F31ETTERS0216A DOC wam
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EIS RAI 14-1 Artist's Concepts of the PFSF in Skull Valley, the Low Corridor Rail Line, and the Intermodal Transfer Facility at Full Development 15 Pages (Excluding this page)
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