ML20211M542
| ML20211M542 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 07200022 |
| Issue date: | 09/03/1999 |
| From: | Silberg J AFFILIATION NOT ASSIGNED, SHAW, PITTMAN, POTTS & TROWBRIDGE |
| To: | UTAH, STATE OF |
| References | |
| CON-#399-20794 ISFSI, NUDOCS 9909090138 | |
| Download: ML20211M542 (62) | |
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DOCKETED USHRC September 3.1999
, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 09 SEp -7 P 4 '.03 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board OPf}
l ADJG in the Matter of
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l PRIVATE FUEL STORAGE L.L.C.
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Docket No. 72-22-ISFSI l
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(Private Fuel Storage Facility)
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l APPLICANT'S RESPONSE TO STATE OF UTAll'S REQUEST FOR ADMISSION OF LATE-FILED SECOND AMENDED UTAH CONTENTION Q Applicant Private Fuel Storage L.L.C. (" Applicant" or "PFS") hereby responds to the " State of Utah's Request for Admission of Late-Filed Second Amended Utah Con-tention Q," filed August 20,1999. (" State's 2"d Request"). Like its initial late-filed l
amended Contention Q', the State's Request should be denied, first, for failing to meet l
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the requirements for late-filed contentions, and second, for failing to meet the Commis-sion's contentions requirements set forth in 10 C.F.R. 2.714.
l I.
BACKGROUND i
As part ofits June 1997 License Application, PFS included the results ofits cask vendors' analyses of vertical drops and tipover events. See Safety Analysis Report i
I
("SAR") at 8.2.6 (rev. 0). Based on the license application, the State filed a contention l
(Contention Q) which alleged, in part, that PFS did not adequately identify the "most vulnerable fuel" analyzed in a cask drop, and that PFS did not address lifting accidents.
The Board rejected the contention in its entirety. Private Fuel Storage. L.L.C. (Independ-ent Spent Fuel Storage Installation) LBP-98-7,47 NRC 142,195 (1998).
! Sy State of Utah's Request for Admission of Late-Filed Amended Utah Contention Q (July 22,1999)
(hereinader " State's I" Request").
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In February 1998, the State's expert Dr. Marvin Resnikoff, whose declaration supports the State's 2"d Request, began an exchange ofletters with the NRC StafTcon-cerning the methodology developed by the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
("LLNL")2 for analyzing the impacts of a cask drop on fuel integrity, including the dy-namic loading by fuel pellets and the efTects ofirradiated fuel cladding, the precise issues that underlie the State's 2"d Request (as well as its 1" Request).
On May 21,1999, the NRC Staffissued Interim StalT Guidance 12 - Buckling of Irradiated Fuel Under Drop Conditions ("lSG-12"), which recommended that the analysis of cask drop accidents include consideration of the effects ofirradiated fuel cladding and pellet weight. On July 22,1999, the State filed its 1" Request alleging, based on ISG-12, that PFS was required to perform a revised analysis of fuel integrity for a vertical drop event incorporating pellet weight and irradiated fuel cladding, and had failed to do so.
After PFS and the StatTpointed out that Holtee had performed such an analysis, the State withdrew its 1" Request.3 O'. August 20,1999, the State filed its 2"d Request based on alleged inadequacies in the Holtec analysis. Specifically, the 2"d Request alleges that (1) Holtee failed to con-sider the combined effect of cladding embrittlement due to irradiation and the potential thinning of cladding for high burnup fuel, and (2) that Holtec's analysis did not consider "the dynamic effects of a cask drop accident." State's 2"d Request at 6.
2 "Dy namic impact Effects on Spent Fuel Assemblies, UCID-21246 (October-1987).
' State of Utah's Reply to Applicant's and NRC Staff's Responses to Amended Q and Notice of With-j drawal of Amended Contention Q ( August 18,1999).
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II.
ARGUMENT The State's late-filed Amended Contention Q should not be admitted first, be-cause it does not satisfy the NRC's requirements for late-filed contentions, and second, I
because it seeks to require PFS to perform an analysis that is properly within the scope of the rulemaking for Holtec's cenificate of compliance. Moreover, the contention must be dismissed because it fails to present a genuine dispute of material fact.
A.
The State's Request to File Amended Contention Q Is Unjustifiably Late The State must demonstrate that a balancing of the five factors set forth in 10 C.F.R. 2.714(a)(1)(i)-(v) supports admission ofits late-filed contention, LBP-98-7,47 NRC at 167, which it has failed to do. Hence, it request must be denied.
1.
The State Lacks Good Cause The first and most important factor in determining the admissibility of a late-filed contention is a showing of good cause. The State lacks good cause here because the bases for its contention have been available to the State for much longer than the period required by the Board for timely filing.4 Holtec's alleged failure to consider the effects ofirradiation and pellet weight have been known to the State, through its expert Dr. Resnikoff, for at least 17 months be-fore this contention was filed / The State's familiarity with the concerns of cladding irra-j diation and the dynamic load from fuel pellets is evidenced by Dr. Resnikofrs dialogue I
with the Staff and the State's comments on the Holtec HI-STAR 100 storage cask. In Dr.
' See Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation,) LBP-99-3,49 NRC 40. 47 (1999)(stating the 45 days approaches the limit for timeliness).
Dr. Resnikoff copied his February 27,1998 letter to Denise Chancellor, the State's Assistant Attorney 5
General and Connie Nakahara of the Utah Division of Environmental Quality. See Letter from M. Res-nikoff to C. Haughney, dated February 27,1998 (attached as Exhibit 1).
3
ResnikolTs Februa~ y 27,,1998 letter to the NRC, he specifically questions the LLNL r
. methodology's use of"non-irradiated fuel assemblies" and its failure to "take into ac-count the weight of the fuel itself." Exh. I at 2. When the Staff responded that it had evaluat'ed his concerns for a horizontal drop accident,6 Dr. Resnikoff again wrote the Staff, stating they'"did not fully answer [his] concerns" and requested that they further evaluate "[his] concerns about brittleness" and the "important distinction between static and dynamic loading."'.The State's prior knowledge of the concerns raised in the State's 2"d Request is further illustrated by its March 26,' 1999 comments in the rulemaking for Holtec's Hi-STAR 100 certificate of compliance.8 in its comments, the State, with the assistance of Dr. Resnikoff, specifically questioned Holtec's reliance on the LLNL meth-odology, and the methodology's alleged failure to address the impacts ofirradiated clad-ding and the dynamic loads from fuel pellets. Exh. 4 (State's Comments) at 2-6.
Neither is the third basis offered in the State's 2"d Request, the potential thinning of cladding for high burnup fuel, is not based on any new information contained in i
H'oltec's revised ' analysis. Instead, the State cites to an NRC Information Notice released J
'over one year ago. State's 2"d Request at 8 (referencing Information Notice 98-29, Pre-dicted increase'in Fuel Rod Cladding Oxidation (August 3,1998)). The State had actual knowledge of this information Notice for at least five months before filing the 2"d Re-quest, as the State referenced it in its March 26,1999 comments on the HI-STAR 100 Storage cask. State's Comments at 3-4.
- Letter from M. Delligatti to M. Resnikoff, dated November.19,1998 (attache 3 as Exhibit 2).
7 Letter from M. Resnik'off to M. Delligatti, dated December 31,1998 (attached as Exhibit 3).
~ ' Letter from D. Chancellor to Secretary, NRC, dated March 26.1999 (" State's Comments")(attached as
- Exhibit 4). ~
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l
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I Rather than explain how its contention is derived from the Holtec analysis and why it could not have been filed earlier, the State simply claims that good cause exists because PFS has yet to file a license amendment and "because [the State] has diligently pursued the issue of the inadequacy of the Applicant's cask stability analysis.
State's 2"d Request at 13. These arguments are no excuse for the State's lack of timeli-ness.
When the license amendment discussing Holtec's analysis was filed' is irrelevant to the admissibility of this particular contention because the contention is not based on in-iormation that would be contained in the license amendment. Instead, the contention is based on the alleged failure by Holtec to consider certain additional factors that might in-fluence the analysis. Thus, the State cannot now claim that their alleged absence from PFS's fillh license amendment somehowjustifies the State's failure to raise these specific issues based on the original license application, or even the four previous license amend-ments.
Nor does the State's supposedly diligent pursuit of this issue through other means
'somehowjustify its failure to file a timely contention. As the Commission has clearly determined, intervenors cannot simply wait to file a contention when the information supporting the contention has previously been publicly available.'" The State has an
" ironclad obligation to examine [on a timely basis] the publicly available documentary material...."" Here, the information supporting the contention was not only publicly
- On August 27,1999. PFS submitted License Amendment No. 5, which contatns a discussion of the IIoltec buckling analysis. See SAR l 8.2.6.2 (rev 5.0).
(
See Duke Power Co. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units I and 2), CLI 83-19,17 NRC 1041,1048 (1983).
" Duke Power Co. (Catawba Nuclear Station. Units I and 2), LBP-83-8A,17 NRC 282,285 (1983).
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available, but has been c.yplicitly discussed for many months by the State and its expert.
Its failure to fulfill this obligation cannotjustify the admission of an untimely contention.
The State therefore lacks good cause. Where good cause is lacking, a compelling showing must be made on the other four factors, which the State has not done here.
2.
The Other Factors Do Not Justify Admission of the Late-Filed Contention Of the remaining four factors, the third and fifth factors are to be accorded more I
weight than the second and fourth factors, which concern the protection of the peti-tioner's asserted interest by other means or parties. LBP-98-7,47 NRC at 207-209.
While the State's interests may not be represented by another party in the PFS proceed-ing, it certainly has other means available to protect its interests, namely, the rulemaking associated with the certificate of compliance for the Holtec HI-STORM 100 storage cask.'2 As evidenced by its filing of comments for the rulemaking for the HI-STAR 100 storage canister, the State is well aware of the certificate of compliance rulemaking proc-ess and can represent its interests in those proceedings. S e Exh. 4 (State's Comments).
The State's claim that the generic rulemaking process for storage casks does not
' provide an adequate means to protect its interests is a direct challenge to the Commis-th sion's regulations. As decided in Kelly v. Selin,42 F.3d 1501 (6 Cir.1995), the generic rulemaking proc:ss established by the NRC for certifying storage casks is a permissible exercise of the Commission's statutory authority, despite the lack of an adjudicatory hearing. The State's argument that "[the generic rulemaking process] is a very different
" The comment period for the Hi-STORM cask hu not yet opened but the Staff has issued a Preliminary Draft Safety Evaluation Report to Holtec and is expected to publish the Draft Safety Evaluation Report and a notice of opportunity for comment in the Federal Register this fall. Sy Proposed Schedule provided by NRC Staff at December iI,1998 Pre-hearing Conference.
6
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type of proceeding; which affords the State much less of an opportunity to vindicate its views," State's 2"d Request at 15, is remarkably similar to the arguments clearly rejected l
l by the Sixth Circuit. A party's displeasure with the procedures of the proper forum is no justification for allowing admission of a contention in an inappropriate forum. Accord-ingly, this factor weighs against admitting the contention.
Likewise, neither the third nor the fifth factor support the State here. The State l
j has not established Dr. Resnikofrs expertise to assist in developing a sound record for determining fuel cladding structural integrity for cask drop and tipover, particularly in view of his failure to recognize that Holtec, as shown below, considered the effects ofir-L i
l radiation in its analysis. Also, contrary to the State's assertion, admission of the conten-tion will certainly broaden and inevitably delay this proceeding by expanding its scope to L
include a contentien that has already been dismissed by the Board and thus is not the subject of any existing contention.
In sum, the remaining four factors weighed together militate against granting the State's late-tiled motion, and therefore clearly do not make the compelling showing re-l l
quired to overcome the State's lack of good cause.
l B.
The State's Amended Contention is Inadmissible In its basis for Amended Contention Q, the State claims that PFS's Licehse Ap-l plication is inadequate because Holtec's analysis of spent fuel integrity under the design basis vertical acceleration for the HI-STORM storage cask system does not consider the j
{
effects of cladding irradiation, cladding thinning, and dynamic loads from fuel pellets.
l State's 2"d Request at 6. The State's contention must be rejected because (1) the proper forum for raising concerns regarding the adequacy of Holtec's analysis of fuel integrity 7
[
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l under design basis accelerations is the certificate of compliance rulemaking for the cask, and (2) the State's contention does not present any genuine dispute of material facts.
The State's contention is inadmissible in that it "impermissibly challenge [s] the Commission's regulatory scheme, provisions, or rulemaking-associated generic determi-i nations, which establish a separate cask design approval process... " LBP-98-7,47 NRC at 186. As the Board has previously recognized, generic issues conceming the ade-quacy of the vendors' designs are to be addressed in the separate rulemaking proceedings for certification of the casks, not the licensing of the PFSF. Id.'3 The issue of the fuel as-semblies' integrity under design basis drop conditions is a generic one, and the State has made no attempt to show how the conditions at PFS are unique. Thus, if the State has concerns with Holtec's analysis of fuel integrity under design bases accelerations for its casks, the proper forum for raising them is the rulemaking for the HI-STORM 100 cer-titicate of compliance." The State's attempt to raise this generic design issue as part of this proceeding is unwarranted and the Contention should be dismissed.
The State's contention must also be dismissed for failing to present any genuine
' dispute of material fact. First, the State's claim that Holtee's analysis fails to consider the effects ofirradiation on the cladding, as recommended by ISG-12, is incorrect. In Revi-sion 7.0 to the Topical Safety Analysis Report (" TSAR") for H1-STORM 100, Holtec in-cludes a revised analysis of fuel integrity under drop conditions that incorporates the rec-ommendations in ISG-12, including specifically, the use ofirradiated fuel cladding mate-
" See also Private Fuel Storage. LL.C., LBP-98-10,47 NRC 288,295 (1998)."
" As noted above, both Dr. ResnikolTand the State have raised similar issues in context of the rulemaking proceeding for the lil-STAR 100 cask storage system. The Commission has rejected these arguments in the final rule adding lil-STAR 100 to the list of approved casks. 64 Fed. Reg. 48,259 (Sept. 3,1999).
8
[
l rials. See HI-STORM TSAR, Section 3.5 (Rev. 7.0)(attached as Exhibit 5). The TSAR specifically states that "[t]he material properties used in the non-linear analysis are those for irradiated Zircallov..." Id. at 3.5-3. The State provides no evidence to suggest the contrary. That lloltee's analysis complies with the Staff s concerns addressed in ISG-12 is further evidenced by the Stairs approval of Holtee's buckling analysis for the Hl-STAR 100 storage and transportation system (64 Fed. Reg at 48,261-62) and its planned issuance of the drail Safety Evaluation Report for the HI-STORM storage cask.
Second, the State has failed to show any genuine issue of material fact conceming the alleged need to evaluate the dynamic loading from fuel pellets. Despite its knowl-edge of this issue for 17 months, the State and Dr. Resnikoff still offer no evidence be-yond mere speculation that dynamic loading will have any significant effect on cladding integrity. Indeed, the State has provided no technical basis for its claim that fuel pellets traveling less than 0.lmm" would somehow cause a failure of cladding integrity, espe-cially considering that the fuel cladding can resist a deceleration of 63.5 g's, which is 40% greater than the design basis acceleration of 45 g's. III-STORM TSAR at 3.5-15-19.
Third, as shown by the State's own calculations, State's Exhibit 4, the State's claims concerning the potential thinning of cladding for high burnup fuel are not material to this pioceeding. Even if the full 17% thinning occurred, buckling would only occur at 50.81 g's by the State's calculations, still above the maximum design load of 45 g's. Id.
In any event, the State has failed to show why thinning is even an issue since the HI-STORM cask storage system is not presently certified to take the high burnup fuel that l
" The gap between the cladding and fuel pellets for the Westinghouse 17xl7 Fuel Assembly is 0.082 mm.
See IIenry Graves. Nuclear Fuel Management, Appendix C - Typical Nuclear Reactor Power Data. (l979)
(attached as Exhibit 6).
9
would cause the increased thinning.'6 In short. the amended contention must also be dis-1 missed for failing to present any genuine dispute of material fact."
The State also contends, incorrectly, that the revised analysis must be performed for the Intermodal Transfer Point ("lTP") and "during transport on either rail or high-way." State's Request at 7. As this Board decided in granting summary disposition for Utah Contention B, transportation of spent fuel is governed by 10 CFR Part 71, and not Part 72, and is beyond the scope of this proceeding. Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C.,
LBP-99-34,50 NRC (1999).Thus, this part of the State's contention must be re-jected.
Ill.
CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, Applicant respectfully requests that the Board deny Utah's request to admit its late-filed, second amended Contention Q.
Respectfully submitted, A
ilberg
)
Jay.[L. Blake, Jr.
Ernest Paul A. Gaukler SHAW PITTMAN 2300 N Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20037 (202) 663-8000 September 3,1999 Counsel for Private Fuel Storage L.L.C.
- PFS plans to accept high burnup fuel in the future. Before this can occur, llottee would have to amend l
an approved Hi-STORM certificate cf compliance, at which time the State could raise any concerns.
I
" The State's discussion of"the concept of multiple confinement," State's 2"d Request at 9-11, does not re-fute the authority cited at pages 209-210 in Applicant's December 24,1997 Answer to Petitioner's Conten-tions, in particular the quotation from the proposed rule (51 Fed Reg. 19,106,19,108 (1986)) which explic-itly provides that the " canister could act as a replacement for the cladding." Thus, the fact that the State's contention would not entitle the State to relief even if it was proved true constitutes another basis for the dismissal of Second Amended Contention Q.
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1
00CKETED USSRC
- UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
'99 SEP -7 P4 :03 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFc RUti.
VF ADJU Before the Commission l
In the Matter of
)
)
PRIVATE FUEL STORAGE L.L.C.
)
Docket No. 72-22
)
(Private Fuel Storage Facility)
)
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that copies of Applicant's Response to State of Utah's Request for Admission of Late-Filed Second Amended Utah Contention Q and related exhibits were served on the persons listed below (unless otherwise noted) by e-mail with conforming copies by U.S. mail, first class, postage prepaid, this 3rd day of September 1999.
G. Paul Bollwerk III, Esq., Chairman Dr. Jerry R. Kline Administrative Judge Administrative Judge Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555-0001 Washington, D.C. 20555-0001 e-mail: GPB@nrc. gov e-mail: JRK2@nrc. gov; kjerry@erols.com Dr. Peter S. Lam
- Susan F. Shankman Administrative Judge Deputy Director, Licensing & Inspection Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel Directorate, Spent Fuel Project Office U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Conunission Office ofNuclear Material Safety &
Washington, D.C. 20555-0001 Safeguards e-mail: PSL@nrc. gov U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.,20555
a Office of the Secretary
- Adjudicatory File U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel Washington D.C.20555-0001 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention: Rulemakings and Adjudications Washington, D.C. 20555-0001 Staff e-mail: herringdocket@nrc. gov (Original and two copies)
Catherine L. Marco, Esq.
Denise Chancellor, Esq.
Sherwin E. Turk, Esq.
Assistant Attorney General Office of the General Counsel Utah Attomey General's Office Mail Stop O-15 BIS 160 East 300 South,5* Floor U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission P.O. Box 140873 Washington, D.C. 20555 Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0873 e-mail: pfscase@nrc. gov e-mail: dchancel@ state.UT.US John Paul Kennedy, Sr., Esq.
Joro Walker, Esq.
Confederated Tribes of the Goshute Land and Water Fund of the Rockies Reservation and David Pete 2056 East 3300 South, Suite 1 1385 Yale Avenue Salt Lake City, UT 84109 Salt Lake City, Utah 84105 e-mail: ioro61@inconnect.com e-mail: john @kennedys.org Diane Curran, Esq. _
Danny Quintana, Esq.
H.armon, Curran, Spielberg &
Skull Valley Band of Goshute Indians Eisenberg, L.L.Pc Danny Quintana & Associates, P.C.
1726 M Street, N.W., Suite 600 68 South Main Street, Suite 600 Washington, D.C. 20036 Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 e-mail:DCurran.HCSE@.zzapp.org e-mail: quintana @xmission.com
- By U.S. mail only n
sOm Paul A. Gaukler 2
J R_WrlR P
RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATES 1
1 February 27,1998 Charles Haughney, Director Spesa Puel Project OfBce, Mail Stop 6F18 Nuchar Rapistory cannniamian Washington, D.C. 20555
)
Re:
Hokee HI-STAR 100 TSAR NRC Docket No. 72-1008
Dear Charley:
This letter concerns the g force that spent fbel cladding can withstand and the use of this parameter in safety analyses by Hokac, Sierra Nuclear and other cask manufacturies. Th issue relates to the Hohec and Transtar surc'u r- =t cask and transportation casks in general. In nry opinion the most vulnerable fbel cannot withstand a 63g force in the most adverse orientation (Holtec TSAR, p. 3.5-1) but a force E"+f.,4 less. At the very least, aMi*iamat information should he requested from Hokac before issuing a Certi6cate of Ccf - e for the HI-STAR 100 cask. The Commission may also need to fund
- Minia==I studies to consider this issue u it generally relates to transportation accidents involving irradiated Ibel=====ahliam The "63 g" force for most vulnerable Aiel is based on an analysis of the rnore ducede unirradiated, not irradiated, cladding. Despite the title of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory report on which Hokec miies (" Dynamic knpact Effects on Spent Fuel Assemblies," UCID 21246, October 1987), the LLNL repost does not deal with
" spent fbel" amassahlies, only with mos> irradiated fuel amassahlima As you are aware, irradiation within a reactor makes ibel=== hsia= more brittle and less resisume to impact l
"cW-ductility decreases and yield st ess increases with increasing ncutron fluence."
(" Assessment o(the Use of Extended Burnup Fuel in Light Water Power Reactors,"
nanan. Pacific Northwest Labs, NUREGCR-5009, p. 2-5, February 1988).
Il.NL's calculation for most vulnerable Ibel also does not take into account the weight of the fbelitasiC only the g force without the additional weight of the Ibel. This considerable additional weight is an additionalinsamal force. LLNL assumes fbel pelless remain in a rigid array in e high impact accident sad will not impart a force to the d-M% Th obviously not correct.
NRC staff should ask Holtec and Sierra Nuclear to address this issu no available studies analyze irradiated fbel cladding in high impact #d-nt, the NRC should fund additional studies to address this issue.
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C Haushery, NRC 02/27ss
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I wish these -a to be inchaded 'm Hoksc's NRC dockt.t and to be raamdered in the Staffs W evahastica rsport. Menos send une s copy of the maff s drat safety evahastion report for the Hokac cask so that we may provide commemas. If you have queadons, aust tuo to caE.
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~W UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION M 9Af l
wAammeTom, o.c. menwen November 19, 1998 Dr. Marvin Resrukoff, Senior Associate Radioactive Waste Management Assooates 526 West 26* Street, Room 517 New York, NY 10001
Dear Dr. Resnikott:
I am responding to your February 27,1998, letter regar$ng your concerns related to the structural integnty of spent fuel claddeg under hypothetical accident conditions in spent fuel casks. In his March 11,1998, letter, Charles J. Haughney, at the time, Acting Director, Spent Fuel Project Office, mdicated the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff was reviewing your concerns and would report their findings to him to report directly to you. I apologize for the delay in responding to you; however, Mr. Haughney is currently serving in another office and several licensmg actions took procedence in allocation of limited staff resources for completing the review. The staff has now completed its review of your concoms regarding the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) Report UCID 21246," Dynamic impact Effects on Spent Fuel Assemblies," dated October 20,1987, and determined that the LLNL report appeared to use sufficiently conservative data in the characterization of spent fuel cladding properties. The staff also found that the LLNL report conclusions appeared to be based on acceptable analysis and assumpoons.
In particular, you stated that the LLNL report does not address irradiated fuel claddeg, only unirradiated fuel claddmg. In actuahty, Table 3 of the report dehneates irradiated cladding longitudmal tenssie strength values. This table indicates that irradiated cladding has a greater strength value than unirradiated claddmg. The LLNL report analysas used the values of unirradiated claddmg strength, wtuch is acceptable.
In your letter, you also stated that the LLNL report did not take into account the weight of the fuel assembly in the side drop orientation evaluation. In actuality, the fuel weight was delineated in Table 4 of the report and used appropriately in the analysis in Appendix A of the report. Thus, the LLNL report used the proper weight value in the analysis of the side drop onentation.
The NRC is commdted to ensuring the safe operation of dry spent fuel storage and transport caska. The NRC staff will continue to evaluate industry data and analysis on spent fuel claddeg properties in hypothetical accident conditions for these casks.
Please note that your letter has been placed in all applicable dockets (i.e.,721008,721014, 71 9261, 72 1023, and 71 9268) and your questions and concoms will certainty be considered in the staff's safety evaluations of the pertinent cask designs. YDu will also have an opportunity to comment on the drott safety evaluation report for each cask design during the public comment penod of federal rulemaking to incorporate that cask into Part 72 to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations.
4 99t-t-250204-99 t 1+9-PDR ADOCK 07109261 C
'o M. Resnikoff..
.I trust this responds to your concems. If you have additional questions or wish to discuss this matter further, please contact me at (301) 415 8518.
- Sincereh, ORIGINAL SI'NED IV /s/
Mark S. Delligatta, Senior Project Menager Spent Fuel Ucensing Section Spent Fuel Project Office Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards Docket Nos.: 72 1008,72 1014,71 9261, 72 1023,71 9268 Docfwes NRC File Center PUOLIC PJMSS R/F SFPO R/F Detreupon NJensen. OGO STurk. OGC CMarco. OGC SFLS R/F WKane TJohnson. NMSS CLyon NRR TKobotz TMcGinty V9adey Ntur!
Kleu DHuang HLee GMt0LTECUIESee.RES OFC SFPO*
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NAME SO Connor W ;+ r VTharpe Eteeds W%s SShankman DATE 11990 11G%
11898
'1998 11/9M
' ' < 9/98 C = COVER E = COVER & ENCLOSURE N = NO COPY l I ; l'8; **:it'l OFFICIAL RECOMO CO"'"
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P RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATES December 31,1998 Mark 5 Deuigetti, Senior Project Manager sessaPuelLicensing Sasion NMSS US NuclearRaylatory ca==i=aion Washingsaa,DC 20555
Dearwark:
Thank you er your November 19 response to my February 27 letter. Your letter did not fhily answer my concerns, no I'll try once more.
Estemenese Frans severalNRC contractor reporta, it is my undensanding that irradiated fhet cladding is more brimis than usinadiated fhet cladding. 'this should sker the m-of a transpostation or ISFSI acadent involving impact. You stated that irradiated fhel cladding has *s greater strength valus" than unirradiated Asel cladding, but this does not address my conseras about br% It does not appear that NRC staff we quaying Hohne and SNC about this heportant Ah between irradisted and unirradiated fhet cladding. Simply using unirradiated cladding strength in the Holtec and SNC SAR's may notbe acceptable.
symemes Lones I ami aware Ibat abs Anel assembly weight is taken into account in the LLNL report and abs Hokee SAR, but the loading is matic, that is, the fbel weight is assumed to be evenly distributed slams tbs cladding. The model is mially a beam benveen two supports.
/
But this model may not bound tbs physical situation. In a side impact, the cladding and
/)
en aml== disinst bases. Under impact the ami pdiese would be expected to break their Sand coa 8pration sad strike the cladding with force. This dynamic loading is not fft considered la the LLNL report and may be important h does not appear that NRC maff are gearyingHobsc and SNC about this inaportant daiweiaa betwrn matic and dynamic loading.
Thank you Ar.-:= " ; g these issues And best wishes for the year.
%3MJ e
p C
P0ft
_3ruor Aw gute Marun Remke df. l'h !)
526 West 2fxh 9.Rm. 517
- NY. NY 18 Null + 212420462fs + l.a 212 8>.'*61H + cnud r.ulw.Nedru re
S T AT E O F tr T A H
....cse, m....u...u.a j
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14% Gnan4u 4TTOt%E) Gtssau Janets A SrMa m geo.ges paapse DN Sames h caosemme %eswo
>=s-sesum= Pw,a %
Maare 26,1999
)
Sec**tarY
"' ?% r Regulacry Coensnimion Sent via redI.mynn R llib RocAvale Pike EmmL-spraare. gar Rockvile MD 20e52 2739 Aarn. Ruleinskir.as and M Mas Camroents ce Proposed Rate :o add Hattac Hi Saar 1000 Cask System re:
ta t}se list of Apyreved Spent Feel 54cray CaAs.
Deer 5ecutary:
Is response to 64 Fed. Reg.1542.Jannary II,1999, due 5cate of Utah rubans commenti on the Prelinminary Safety Evalumnos Repost and Proposed Certificme af Cogi:ar.cc for the Hahoe HI-STAR 100 Storay Cask. %ew casunents itsw been prepared with as.istance frorn Marvie ResnikcH. Ph.D., Radioactive Waste Managernen Asocimes.
7 w ni.,cs nor Asdstant Atterary General Eme:
._.y a
l Comments from the State of Utab j
Preliminary Safety Evaluation Report and Proposed Certificate of Compliance Hi-STAR 100 Storage Cask March 29,1998 The Sese a(Usah. mM assimace Aom Marwin Remnetr, Ph.D. of FwhaW Wasse Manasonsat Associsses, ademim shame commernis on the prelianinary Safirty Evahaden Report (SER) and proposed Certificaer of Cosapliance (CoC) for te Hohec }U STAR I 00 irradiansd fud storage can, NRC Duches No.72-100s. 64 Fed. Reg.1542 (1999).
The ESTAR 500 is na alt.mmal cask with an ouser metal owcrysch thm -4a== a scaled heJiuse Med canisert (MPC) conminisw ireadimed fluel. Ahhough the SER and CoC under resiew henSeress morage only. she Hi-STAR 600 'ss designed far both stocage ed vanspostation of spent nuciser pnwr plant fuel.
The Sesac has a th:ee-fold insetess in the adapacy of1he SER sad CoC for ibe HI STAR 100 morage task. First. ita design isi*wasnEy idernicd to the desip of she 10 STAR 100 transpermico cask. which Pdvane Fest $4cruge LLC. iPFS) proposes en use so manapart spent fuel to hs psoposed indrysndosi spens fue3 moesse 'mstalladen 05FSI) in thsh. The ondy differ erre herweeti the saneage cat and transpoensson ask is the thet1har she transportanics casi uses impact limisers and nues smisfy hypothetical accident condsmas iander le CTR Part 71. Second. PFS plana to use ibe 10 STAR 100 semage cask's irearnal welded canimer [ mdti purpose can~ user ne MPC)to eensport and esse fus!. Tbc MPC wilt hold the irradiased fuel during mansparadon te abe prhase Fuel Sineage facGity. Aftermrival ad Ibe PFS facilky.1he MPCs willhe sented in the Ml-STORM 100 concrew overynet as the proposed PF5 facilley. Thind.abhoughPFS huruds en use ilus HI-STORM 100 cod fue searage imder asemat coadhions. in case of an accident, ahe a5-metal cask HI-STAR 100 sank wili be used as a siossee teckup These onmosans addesas the coactusions of she SER, as we5 m she assertions saade by the cask anssanfariner. Hollee Internenand. ie dis Technica15hisfy Analysis Repons (15ARs) for Ibs Hl4 TAR and Hi-Irr0RM casks %e ESTAR 100 storage TEARis Holtse Report 58 941184 (NRC Doches A 121005). The ESTAR 100 transponstina T3ARJs Hohec Report HWPS1251 (NRC Dodnet No. 71926l). The HI-STORM 100 sacrags TS AR is Hahac Repose 15-951312 (NRC Dochen No. 72-1 D14).
cosmosa se Pretamery sen.De-5 TAR 100$simer cad, Pave susatLAab t
The State isia the process of finalir.ing a coendertistity alreement wie Hohse stat mill allow 6e State acee.ss no the Hohec proprisesry wrnon of Hl.5 TAR 100 SAR. Revision 9 and H6 STORM 100 T3 AR., Revenan 5. The Sante wE subast additional commumts. as a prepractary mi confidsstial subudital aAer is 1ms received m$ reviewd Hottsc prepnetary documents.
Genera! Comments The Hl.$ TAR 100 design should not be opjuced, because Helene has not psovided ed assurance dhas the etsdding and cask wE teenim iheir imegrity medar acaust, ommen-ar and accident condhines. Mmeer, Hohec Gees aos concedy calcu!sts haates e ander bounding accidents. Norhas 14 ohne evalumed abe iragnet ofa sabotage ewar, Finally, she 75AR and SER do not provide assuramoe the cask and cJsodtag silt w.am their inmgrity ieder thamunal condisions ihme exist as an ISFSI. Raser than addressing these deficienans, the NRC's SER has glassed thern swr. These issues are crucially important to pesarssing the pub 8e health and safety, and therefore noust te addressed before she Hobec CoC can be issued.
l Specific Comments l
Clodding lesegrity Under tapact According to she Hi STAR 300 saarner TSAR LSec. J.$). the fit-STAR 100 syssue is j
desigand to withstand a snamirwns deceiension of 60 Shile
- 1**Mac8 E I'8pn888 5
i I
National r me=nsocies report shous that the n:oa ednerable fuel can whtstand a 3 n the tacstaberse e seassion [sidedsop).' Hohec dieseRae asseres decelamica ofdi3 i
dist fuel rod irusgrhy will be maintained ander all socident eenditions. la ihe,.19 7 5ER(at Il-6}. the NRC SudTenneurs that 9 hew is summonable assmance thattime claddsag will snannain confinernsen ineryity during a designbasis skogt" l
ki our view, shis analyas is inconect. Hahac and the NRC Seaff haue run dennensaatad a wasonable assuranse chas the claddmg will maintain ins inneyity.
(
Holesc*s analysis does nos provide ressunable asemance for the following seasons: (1)it does oss sabe inne secouns the possible incsusee in ruse of caldenen af c: adding ofItiWe l
bear up Asek (2) Holase meias for ins usutysis an a Lawrence 13vermass Nasional l
Laboranesias (Lt.NI.) espare than fasis to dissimamsb the cNects af reasser irradiation em
' UCID-21346. Draurrais names Elfssas an fraaie Fad Amanslaan. Gen. Wlst. 5eb=was tonsber3.
19879U D 4.Repen).
ar.aus a reei.ur, xx. m4..w.
3,,.
suseetuie.
~
fud asseveMies; and (3) Haltec abo relles on the LLNt. Report's incorrect assumpion ihst fusi saarmMies act as a sastic rigid rod. The first facter (increased see of eandstina) increases the likelDood that fuel cladding may rupast. and. sten the teese (sciars see
{
tahen tagedber, they conspoimd the Jikelihood of a release af rmhoactiac materials desisy a foressesble drop acendent ut the psoposed ISFSt.
3.
Eseressed Rade of Osidenties.
The NJtC's kifortandan Nesice IN 98 29, endded "Preiseted farmane in Fuel Rod Cfadding Onishdsm' (Angust 3. l998). pievides new inismmmaion, nonW in she Hohes TSAR, sher calts Isin quesdom Haltme's necident analysis. IN 93 29 dinamess the oeidsstas rate of fud casesing for high been, furt tasas an mported esperiences stih wc - sfue scies. Nacsu
,mipi.msi. miewiheleformei ror appucasuiry en their finslities and easideracties as approprisse. toaseid simie r p#obleens." Nuclest Rep'~ory Comsnission. IN 95 29. hedidrdbieresse brFart Aod a
C/oddiair ridssaar(Angast 3.1995)st I.
The Notice rupcots thm
- Octaber of 1997. Wendnshouse riotified NRC thss enodification m
of its fuel cladduis costosico snodel in its fuel assign code no reflees new dem os ZirealoyJ exidstion at high bururup 'nsay csrate corspliance issues flor hs inwaral Finet Bumable Ahlorber(IFRA) fuel with 23restoy4 cradding? Id. at 1. As actedis de i
infonastian Nesior.
The modided code remy perdics higiner feel seinparstures and internal ycessmes at high bumup condicians, This. in insa. may Jand so cede mesults ihst de not meet she Wes1iadeuse critenon prohibiting gap reopendng and ther do not smeet ihs
{
loss of coolam accident 1LOCA) esierrion in le CTR 594d(bX2K
/d Ahhoughits penblem was initisity discoveredio Wessingbouse witis relatice to Zircsk.y 4 fue!. the Infoemsame Nodes nossa dies "the baransp =Imed phenomena,dicis could resuti is noncoempliance with she osidation wouisemems of le Crit. $0.4ti, may ans be timised so Westirighosse IFRA fiset bus might afTees any Zircaliry Asel usedin hid tranup applicadoef IN 95 29 as 2. Thus,the experience se Westingbooseis alas germane to any high burnup fhel that user he sacred in fiellec casks -notjust so Westingbouse fhal.
Acceeding so IN 9892, the Jncreened asidatics af the ehddies is a funcune of the fbst burnsp. OxWi=*er= may canse Ibe cladding so beceane efliectiwly 1himmer. decreasing its strusenet integrity. This drianer studding due so onidiassion also lowers the 's' irupset force as which fhel cladding will shamer Hohee'sTSAR rulies se the permise that fhel chddies wilt est simmer for any fiestseeable drop. This jneenise is based om de assursytice that itwould ede a side drop ofgrasset than 63g so damage the cladding.
Our speesdaheet cate=itanioma. presented below, show that the g loading for high bursup
wcan.in Prussemarpl.K.Wi il A A m Erapr w rys=
9eanofDub 6sr1 with esidiand cleMirg aggwonches 45g. The NRC Saa# should not apprme the Hohse applisaman uniens and urnd Hohac has factoied the infrarunation in IN 98 29 isso its cak ani-n=. De clamr bugilication efIN 95-29 k tha:t t!w isft heigk of the 16. STAR 100 cask must tw ediscesi se Ismer abr g-fforces en the deadnes.
teremdcasesis vartshan 7sht 4 h Z)visunt Isipuri f.fErces avJrwar Tarf.4struiWrus A
B C
D E
F G
Rod arunir F7kl7 17ml?
17x17 Ihl7 thi?
17:17
~ 17:17 AsannWy eeWa tt) 1450 m 14 Hee 65040 I430D0 149040 84Mee 14scAO 8errods 2 mat 264.00 3 4.00 364 M 3M 90 264M 264 DO Fuehaltmash(b)
SMap 14400 an(gl 144 m 54430 144.99 64eDO edomsesof; 22 7.no 7.as 7m 7.as 7mo 7.Os L =(Aseledlamphge.
344g 2tte 24De 34e0 34 2 24 00 34.9D E(emi) 1.04 Emit LD4E+07 IAdE4F i.30E47 1J4E+07 LME407 1.SeE+47 e ape.J E.03E+94 RDSE+04 849E*M S45E40 438E+04 4.3DM4 EOSE+04 8(m) tdII RJI2 Eat 442 4 52
'! O2 4AS retime D.tf 0.t9 A3t 0.10 s.89 19 021 ri(m) 0.16 e.66 a14 n.16 6.16 ute e 96 A(in?)
Dal 6 62 til!
DA2 0c2 on2 ees B -(1M'114(ro*4-3ME-04 12SE 48 35lE44 J.RSEAl4 325E-04 3.BSE44 e.lTE4e W ilb) a34 ead Om DM e te D S4 I?ra w [Grush 4A4 OD4 684 RM 044 a0d 0 64 r(le) 0.18 0 14 4.57 EIS 0.It e.it 8.b9 presart(Ib1 2230.00 185730 223900 22 Sam 225530 314739 2139.40 sa lpai) 5787.58 4)eA2 1847114 E75738 8751.50 J43992.86%DO 15 lble)
.733 2.I?
2 72 132 332 2 32 JJ3 obipu) 6538.70 Il3 Ele 1375.57 182s.70 1828.10 1825.10
$l9.50 P tib) 68.54 4836 3SAO 43m9 64.56 esS6 16kt7 54 31.93
$1.9J 3946 Ig!Al I1 93 51.91 91.71 gy 63.53 4721 Se BI 4354 31.05 15.75 145 M I
A: Vabes Does Maimpunae syrtioun (D munic impets Effetm.Tnter41 3
B: Pressare stansed to e noew wobe ( valuein Aa Aussenses eisw Risk 1 C;"! Linus of ful:Isedrog dennesed ase in osasise tg t1% Cokaan A's Gharm is redutul by 17's.
D-E 64edales sAeoseesehlWW iebetoutse in An Assammeus efer Alst-6 E; Y wid stress lowness astaifThe artgland witas F: Yutd sertas louered andyarunare tomartd(E meilt)
Cx Denharag the1Msisarts Mres; DEE = Divusnc hapuse EMsta..
AAR = At Ameesrnemaef the tiuL AAR't E meshins was espassedes he lom st.asifwy esek essEssd shoaley ines asseum.19eerer. It vna act nArt sawnism AAA EXE 1!medidas 1306ee? IJeE*07 put m
31sf.s 22Sn40 psi e e e ee.e eggh
- 4895hm --
- '8*
consiens an hewoess3 sut Wl4T At ivu haig &
ewet SunsdDuh 2.
hvadisted and Uelrradiased Finet Assessblies.
Hohec*s T3AR Air the Hl.5TAlt 100 snarare cash seEes for iss esriouse ofg force est will darange fisel ciaddng upon a 1947 wport by LLNt> The LLNL Report finits en take into account the incinased brinkness of irradisted fisel asserr.hlies? Besanse the irradused fuel masushlies sisy how been embrimfad. ibey saidd also be less resistant to impact. During the course of a fuel asses >hly's life. *ah==nse particle bostardmem.
inclwEins Emma Sm. signi6caruey decreases she assenhly's ductiEty and increases de assenhly's yieldmens, thex1pyembritding ibe fuel asssably. 'Cadding desciliry decrummes and yirjd stress incrosses wish increasing memon fluence "
Futtermore, die proposed NT.5 TAR 100 wiB sense only Isindiased fus) assembliss; thus,
- Appfscant cammas afy as IDdL*s umfysis becsume the LLNL does not account for aradmaien and emanirifemast. which lower $w impecs asistance of the fue! assemblies.
These facts are sign & ant mese essgdad widi che imewssedes*=ameiaa suresporend im IN 98 29 tecause incremed exidation oculd anagemisDy cause an incrzase in canddag emteicilemesn 5 Thus. IN 95 29 composuuks the LLNL*s error in disegarding she teinde chssaceensiscs c(imednamed final dadding.
J.
Feet Assembliss Do Not Act as a RigM Red.
& hec *s calenisileas uly igen L1 M.'s e:vemeous asswnytian that se fuel within he eindding hebsws as a rigid rod. Then.Hahac snestly moed a simic estriMan insised of 1sking into account the dynesnic loading upon ingscL Time LLNL Report speci6cally sesees. "it as imposanar to runphaelar ess the a loadings shown la Figs. 6 and"I are emaic loadings 7* lhis assumpsion is incorrecs lastead of a M _== rigid rod.the fuel ted consias effaael pelless stacked like coins wnhim thin subung. la any impact scenarlo, te fuel assemtdy does por act as a rigid rod: raeer, it acts as a dynunse syneses wie the fisef irapocaing the inside of the elsedng sad etusens a guster lihiiliced eIcladdisig repure.
W1 tee has nec shown that the assasspeian of a rigid sod is conservanin. The shimmer cradding due en the increased cedution smes to emapound shie eEscs breense a smaller g fosse would be rsquimd se ruptmse the senembly. The NRC mes!Tshnuhl siot appme the
- LLWL Repen.
8 See e.g. UCED.212ss. Tutte 4, usseh makmac dhsinense brimeen Yeaugtiesths sid yieW seamph de nuqsresturassmeWiss.
- *Assenumsat dihe tape of Dornded Darmip Tusi es Lighi Waar huser llassers? Bundle Facute NeM0pmeer Lah.IsUItEGCR.Ss0D(February 1988)
' Tua snesias maytes eravis sherseesses a e hser rest thesihiehstclaeung bring lhet IEs. Saa fW 98 29 se 2 ("ef eis estel askhnien Bruitwere is he encended hitsao mesidues. she timsdbis could baseme embrieled?).
- 11ML Repen.
u,-.
1 w:n.mse,wsran,am.n.-a..m.* 3 %. m snarat0e Hohec applicatiumi mi(hom a iboming by the appbeant das hs takidsdans are conservatrve in sure, the newly disco +vred 6ndisus at Westangbonse. as moognized in the NRC's Nasice. and the odise concerns dscusard abow. raise signnficani questians altan the adequacy of Hohm's accidsenamalpis, i
Mealth Impact ofAceldents
~Ibe calculaned boahh isspects unSee hyposhets:al accidesa candiliosa, discusand in tbspoor 7 ef Hohec's HI-STAR 100 TSAR, are not conserrative, Three issom need to ha-terre fuDy enunkied by NatC Staff: see design basis ~M=ar,,the rudimien pedrasys, and me dose so chtidrum.
L Design basis seeldsma.
Holzsc's hypothesical design basis'accidses candialen ausenes 100M ef the fact rush are noe. mechanically rstptwed and the gases and particulates in ibe fuel red pap between the d aMar and fuel pelles are re(assed so the MPC cavisy and shes to the external envsronnsent. Radiadandoses are calculaned 100 m from the cadt. In1he siane imarsul betsmen production af Rev.4 and Rev. 6 af the TEAR. the NRC Samff mapaessed Hohec to condm: the duse calculwiiums in confosnusace with the Ensl wroon of NUREG-15M.'
The accideas anstpis in she fhsal tersion afNUREG-1536 "messased the ameias ef radcactinty to the MFC cavity by 5 orders af rmagnbude and usald have placal doses ar i
100 mi cmr the EPA's limit of 5 sem. In Rev. 6.Hoher respanded to the NRC's respuess by changing the vnethod af " " g dosesto buceponse an satseensey small eask lessage rase, ralber than assumsog 100% ef the cask conqy was seleased te the esternal em-ironmem. 73AR.Itev. 6 at 11.2-15. Thus. Holsec's nen analysisincmased the ran=w1inty refsmaed to ibe cadt essity by 5 amlers o(smanisude. but the leakage une reduced the amomus ielessed frors the cask cavisy to the envisomment by incre than 5 orderi of rnagnisode. 'the est effecs efehis sleight af hand. was is champe the design basis accident. no as so reduce the desas to ibe abpaid and whole body at 100 rn. In essance, the NitC sentf has alloned ihe applicant to change the defisitica of a boundtng accidesi no one thus invetwss 100% fuel red alsdding supwe, widhibe coals lid irancs. l.e.
enly sliebt leakage fross the casic. The desip basis accidem no longer espresems a nsus-eI-coefinement-barrier accident.
Holuc's assempt se charge she design basis acesSent for seerage casks is sat only inappropeista, butis r;g,il. We stranaly dissyes thatthe slight cak leakags,1.5 x
' Wisclear Reguissary Cerruimism,"5mnsard 3 edew Plan Eur Dry Cat $1mrage Symens
- NJELEG-l$M.
Inney 1997 9 es gammen e.ee h am._ _
e h 8W eefb-888
1 l
.e.= ru. e 2..%..,......
samrerunk It' can%. ceasemdesabourdus accidsen. A neemano tint could lead so a grestar rolesse rue is a meldst ester thas allows helleen to leak from the MPC ifa cask is dropped.
lastage of bebuntwig allow 1he manamm cladding temperature to rise amt the feet rod cladding to suprure. In this case, the pertrntage effuel sods that rupsce may be less, taas she listage rete Irom ihe cask comy would be gnster sham assumed by bltes.
1 2.
Radstion pashnys escluded In Chapeer 7, Holtec has calaidated the rudimios dose to an aduk 100 m 6eun Ibe nacident, duc solely to inhalstion of she passists cland. Other r:1cvant pathasys. such as drect redimion from cesium and embah40 depearted on the geound, sesaspension of 1
deposited redboucedes, ingestion efcanans=h==a food and water and incidemal act!
ingenian,are not oansidered,in vialution of 30 CFR 72.24(enk 3.
Dais as childrum aos asna6dneed Contrary to 1he standards in 30 CJ.R. Parts 72 and 20. Hohec has not calenistad the donc se childica 71sese stamleds prescribe dose timits for *an indandual outside the controlled area 710 C.F.R. { 7234m)). and "indisidual members ofihe public"( It)
C.F.R. H 20.130l. 2tLI302). For purposes ofthe Part 20 dese mandards. =h reguletkus defme "individuef* as *any taman heing.* and Niesnbcr of she pduic" as asey indisidual neept wherithm indh Wual is receiving an occupstionsi dose." (Emphasis mada8) The pencept of "any individust" clesr9y includes people odser than a$olt snen. f r.. childsen.
Nor does abe Atosnic Energy Act Emis les grosociion assiest under risk so adult sneles.1si fact. NRC tegulsticas akeady make special czoep: ion forthe dose to a namor (le CTR {
20.1297) mad the dose so an etsbr3 odesus 110 CFK i 20.1208) mishin restricted areas.
Funber, R eguistory Guier 3.51. " Calculational Models for Estianaring Ra&asion Domes so N!an from Autcrne Radioactive Msimals Ressliing from Uraniuan Milling Operatinen" nho calculates the donc to shiMrea and infants by mQanting the organ sier, twenhing rue and &ee conversion factass.
Children ese aseet sutnerable io radiasion sham adults because of their hider surface.orsm-tr>voliane of organs estio.' Other coarselnalag factors incinde the fact ihai children have higher soilingestian tames sham ashdts.' Chs1dsen also have reduced ingssiles sad ineistainri mies cornpased to adules;'* nevertheless the dose to chddren undera design besis accideas is likely to be significantly higher sham the dose to an adult. Thus, in enter te sasisfy ilms suplasiums and the Ateede Baergy Act.is is accessary to desermine weisehsr
' isemmonimelChmenissime ims Radiologiani Peassedes. *1999 Roosasmundsvises etshe enemsdenal Casumistaa en Ramslegism1 Proscien." lCllF 40.1998. Fwyvese Prues.
' EPA.*stisk aan====n thsidense fur Superfund Vdame I-Human Heahb Evehenensa--I cPatsk Dreelapuerve eiRiisMesed PreEmbery Renediriian Genk? EPAJ540rR43408.Derenser 1991.
'." Sclamaan,I;F as at/10 mien Rins fraum Lem 1.ewed Emnte1mennd Esposwr esRadieneclides? Eedereg G adaar Itgest h II. Part 1 - laterire Vernien. propmed IIr the EPA.1998.
- j..
i Gumeumsao % SELlh+1 Ak i.,angem taas ofunet the dese lisaits ese enti=&d Er childssa. la addision. chinken are as a IWishee risk than aduhs of developing cancer because etildrum hwleaper than adshe and their eef}s pow more aspidh than aduks' cells.
Near shat it is apt ihe reguinisse of 25 rathr or 100 mrly er the EPA accidem dose limits Of $ l53585 Et M laduc. 'vt 's ikr NRC 5am#s maibadology is calculmiing a
exposuses no childass.
Sebotsge Evest We disagree the an aceWas wrot$g 100% fusi red dad 6g roptwe wish a5sla tid t-sksee is a imeding hecident. 3se mynsL shsaussies em deman basis =mh We usar NRC assif to consider the e#ect era sahissge ews weift an and. tank mansik:. The Nfic akendy conssders lhe inspect ofa somado missile and e=rh=6 but a tomado missile.
like am I" diamrter seest ad meikmg the end at 126 mph.8' ikwe met how the impo:s of an anti-tank imasarle Sissilarty, an explosaem mWsan smernal pansswe o(300 psig does not have abe impact of an arti-tank ruisses. De led of acon 2 -
'.e assessmern of the risks of natsange and terscrisen assanat ametest masse facilisim ad shapmasns es usil eeahhaltad. Terrorists inic she=1e that they are capable of exploidag the weak innsefscus associnand with asansparauian as svel as esusing 1.esmeadous dsensge so sistic sarortwes such as the World Tende Censeemed the OklahomaCity entfinnes Innilding. As NRC Saaff is saare. German seguisses) subevices hsw imposed an additional esadition en casks, ammaly. ibes shey be able to whhesad the impact af a 1-oon vaissite impaccing a cask si ibe speed of sousd. By this condision. German casks are aNe to widisasid de irspact of ajet engme ariking a cask. NRC sesif eculd isopose ad6tiasmi coednions on dry storage casks sid ISF51a.es.. the CoC eenald reipare ihst an 15P5r be designed with as conhen hann no sansme she line.af-sight.
Since abe eek 1980s, she )GtC has relied as and has poedy interpreted an==d===A ses of esperneants casied esas by Sandia and Benelle Cohadas La-- Hes lhet ansaswed the release of radioactm maserials as a result of cod, whosses. In ons of the Sandia eqwrinsenes.a GE 1F.'!eo truct essk enesaroing one useradisied thse assseWy sus siteded with as M3A1. s maianry'diayed changr." Ahhegh the seedhs "dm _
that sasks oculd indeed be breachad 1ry miEsery emplosites and stat a coanderable fracman of spent fast consid be ratessed by sert sa stack.**ihe NItc._, + te Sandan's f' dengs by anncludagthat since esey.'A A00A00afibe heial fus) wsG hs ses 3
m Teleased 'm inbetsbis Antfa, der "awsage radiological essesgsences Of a seisase ista heav5y popadened uden arts mach as New YoakCity wou6d be no early finalisies and less
Muisse 14t4TAlt tsS9sner'!HR.Tatte 321
" Jteiness. anhanJ. and suma Deens gesend.mlarmer fremyerussensesong saaseAmy Immes ths 1ths asTerrenas ans sshouse Apsmai Sepsahary shipsessm' pegnes for sirismosa Agrocy to lesden reessue, C omanOqr.30evesa esadhus. D9er.p 2s.
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Camuusms an Freamuus) SER. EnTAR Juu sterJy una r.ye =
a lha ofunli shst oer (IL4)Issent camour finality? But diis mahsis is high4 deficient. = dirts a huge awoher etapestionable asusanpdess wasnang camation and faiEng no include sawral significans t=dissian padnamys such as direct genana espoenus frero deposierd radioeciides A imore weser analysis" of a transparsasion accidem in a rural area for a cask holdig 14 (em 24) PWR fhel assemblies shoms a cear of $629 milf5cn and a reeuwsry sinne of 460 days Ear its clesaup opeiasion. This eleseyp is only to a lowl that wouhl reduce dnees to 500 mremfyear. Based om this academ scenario in a rural seeing a pmperly conducaed, seatstic acodem enmann in an urham area can be spected to sdienu bicions of domnes in efeemap enes and lou revemmes An urban accideus weald als asume a large ammber of mhese heelei efliriss. Deficiar as 1he amef> sis of a sabouge euss eming amanponadem ia,ihr NRC 5emirhas never aseiromal the econorais and afety impliendaae af a sabotage swens or a fund amonge Ascaley.
'M"::*: s arver esplaiand udy it con =34==8 de Sandia +*.r.sindicaniw of weist codd occur in any type of sermrat attack, no mater the circumstammes Following l
the publir.asion oftbcse Sensha asuAm ihe NRC pmposed elimimados of many of ahs safay requiremems for shiyameess ofsysus fourt a6ad more than 850 days, such as, no anned guards for the shir==-=*= in highly popidserd urees.no advece notice m the NRC ce local law enforcemem of6essis, and no pensube consnunicasion between escorts and a 1
l convenmur=mani center " 'At least 32 parties suhanitsed saarc dann 100 pages of cominens in msgiasme to the notics? In stick the NRC arver pasb]Icly._,.i :. See seps. Helsaced and Baltard. note 12.
In the interwning years since she Sandis experuments. anni.innk weapons with souch grester accuracy and pencera6sg power how been inanufacteed and sidsfy distribined.
These devices condd wicane aruch snoer radioacthe sneemial. 'the NRC suspended assion en the tele-rumidss,but h inapproprimely ensninuss to use abe surevised conclusions in l
l the proposed rule asa basis for its policies on tetronam und saboinge ofescieer shipmeans T1 c saanssous seierist sancks c(she last seural years have ymphisdly deracestanut that the NRC ccaniones en ignose the risks ef saboange as significant peril so the pundic.
The NRC sAnould adopt she spacinc reconsnamentions of Halstead and Ballard far custans a rnalissc.ugso date termrism risk annessment. Same efthe nfeernce paremmeses Halstead and Ballard suggest we as follows:
The seresence seapon should be parishie asti.4ank missiles te dwir ability a permenar the strong eask snuserials, their sange and availstalisy.
e
" Sandtider.theast *Empsess nullheth Effees temSymse f eel Transpanmus.* Regesat Ad-RAE-j stMit2,3,pe=weedner35.ltal.
" Jiahnendmus enfinni es 27.
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l Casseek as pseismeary SEA. Hi. MAR 100 sesrase i.ana:
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Sneservasi A IS.yane. cooled.medue tusra-up. Wesunghouse FWR anneartly should be the reference spent ibeL A Hohec NhSTAJt joesscense cad loaded wish 24 rwit assemblies of due airscace feet would represset a sotal radicactivity of shoes $.$ million Ories A terrorist incidset ruant%ia e eneterceas reisese would love radmtagical ceasequences for greater thaa shee assurard irs the Hl STAR TSAR.
The follomag two scensnos. as a mininues sbould be consideed "an ann:k is wtsch the cask is capeered, pearuand ley one at soare explosive devices, and ecleasesa significant amr=== (st least one percent) ofits radionedwe conmets; and an artack in which she cask is perfbrosed by oor er moet arinor piercing voebets crisisodes and estemas a agesEsant amount (as fease one parsest) cfins madoactiw coassata"*
Note ther Halseead and ItaBard escanumend a 1% saisess beemse dus is the percantage of meersadissed fuel rudessed ' es Sansis==hnampe testa We maintain dat a design insis m
seculent sheadd set be she relanse of 2 3108sr lesser 1he sesium invenory, but 1%,
based as the Sanes sabotags insts. Furnber,it is not simph inhMMal g' ' -
that are irmpartans. I.arger4tard particulases mill be relsmed and deposind dMunnied, givies rise to a direct gamena done.
Thermat Regssirements The,.W CoC temperarse auditissa far sfr Holms Hf-STAR 100 storage cask are not sofficient to paarusse that cladding and nennreo shield degradstiam mill be reanimsaad. To reduce high tempossares, NRC staff must incorporate a adeucash coednion into he CaC. a sniennums pias er eenier so.oraner dissance beswen ensks.
While Hohee has suggemed a pinch a(1 T er a 4' spacing betusse essks, this mahais is lhely mes based as necrous calcalmicas. Usnit the 5 sse recestes the proprietsy calculatioras Anet Hohec. it cannot comunens with specificityon thees. Hewever, based on revirar ofssailer proprietary esiculmiens for de HI-SICAM 100 ensks we have reviewed. w are skeptical that the popm calcadasions forihr HI-STAR 100 caskme riparow and sufficient.
Under the peesens regulancey fassnework.NRC sanKand eenmeesers muss show that indhidual casks will not overtune if subjected to narmal (meegeT = B0 *F) sad of-riormal(amageT = 100 T) semperarums. If the normalor etr normel mmpetases conditisms are snaisfied, cum 6e ensk sney be used in dist loestloa. This is sivuile so the approach for she CaC earth panke and somado caedsiaan, bin with one important diSerence individual cads snay inseract with each meer, csushg immpersass conditions abow aanbina eneperseuse sandhines. As missalm, time Holine neutros shoosbirgiasterid
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" surdsatt kPatalJa Aburesuasse gs6r 3g4,7(fpmer M Twme Dean Kan6amar SAPGftbases persares an not g sensistahn.n,= sen.
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unnsnaen netsmarpEJt. sh-uAst.* way u
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fem erussi andtecladdingmaydayadeduenoaraaiwtem. tothe1E STAR 1001SAR.the pnsence of a4ssem enski und Gie coecrete pa$ sna) not be cocert!y takse imo arm==
as far as one can densrvaise 6am <ae's slunch) renpropietary analysis. This seuld be propsuty addiemed in the SER sad CoC.
Ifthe camer-uxemar datance besween a4 scent Ki-STAR f(n) essks is too sent). casks may errroaDyinsernes vrie each other, eSectInty ineressing the ambiem serqpeasture.
According to Holese's TSAR. the empack shr5 evraide marisce ermpersares are 229 T mai 249 T ieder nared and a5enensal tempermare cuaddoes." la the arsest extresse example,ifa4acent casks are in isomedhoc comast. mstcad of &c arnbient samp:sseurs being Be T undue asensal cond!tiens, ir westd be 229 T. As abe eseks me snowd smey l
from each nect, as name disassene she usuks harerne thseussBy indsynadem of nach oter, l
hitne attempts to calculste this Estanes in Fig. 4 A.5 by assumam8 a radiative bloskiss
(--due to te passence afeeer enska. Bas the sitsudsen as an ISFSI is farznosa em --7 =-i Is is not a biocidag facsor so moorb as the presence af adjacent boss sources at 229T. De effeceive ambissa *=; n 4 351 be raised as she eaAs hasnuswith
)
. each other. The distance at which casks isillact independernly of cath otherraunt be calculssed by Holisc and included it; the CoC. For the HI-STAR I00 cask. the uitical tenirpesarure is 300 T for the inner st rface of she Hedite neuerce absostises materisi that surrounds the metal can&. Tns maxianan temperatures of she McGlu under nonsal and l
a5eeminal conditiosu are 214 T and 294 . respectively. Thas is, the }G4 TAR 100 is j
alresd> operating with a durt safety surgia, are acemsning forthe interactsan beeween casks.
To see inno accous the insecsetism of casks. the felleminig factors inns he inw,.:: l j
imo not calculatica. As a first approximation. Holtec condd assume a4acem casts at the sanne semperalme.T,= 229 7. Insotaison, merage pad sampessiuse, cxsernal canvecove air cunessa. and mind speed snusc aise be incorporaerd kno ihe madrL De swface
]
sersperarme af the cesner cask.T, could shes hecakulstad. En the nest lessation. the adjacem casts cou68 he saken et temperamare T, and a new teraperanus for 1he cenner cask
^
could be calcuissed T:. Hahme could eben deimusine utstherthe series Ts, T,T. is i _
comwgias to sosse asympecac ulus lfihe value for he inner surface of sne neuerce dirld exceeds 300 T. 6e casks avust in spaced fusiberapart.-
As the siruasion pasens1;===as the SER and Cet are deficient. The maximrura cjetdirigtempetanse or temperstwe eIshe rwussa shickl inner swface has not be caseetly calculated. NRC sendtand Hohsc are assumisig 1bese is no interaction between the caska. This assumspiion la esa esasemiive.
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seu eruse Reamevable Sarfaa Costaanisation The I3AR incitales Technical SpeciGradore flor rernovable surface =mariamIou.8 If the smearabic contamiassion exceeds 22004xn/100 crn: fsora gnauna and beta samunas sencoes. the Tecimical Specifscations require abar the acc:ssible sussace be finsbed or jwessure washed. "If the sneerable comissninmion limiss sdal m be reduced to accepenble lewis, cubate and perioren ahematist actions up to, and incimfmg. eenseval efebe l@C from she Hl STAR 100 swepack a8er removirg the speni Amt froom the MPC.** These onodiabans sanace be snee at de proposed off-aise Skus VaBey ISFSIin Utah. No provisions exist fardesca:t=-W easks under PFS's "usert clan stay etenn*
phileenphy. FFS's n - 2 po5cy is to sueurs maaki that are commadanted shove regulsiory liants back to reacnor sites. No piumssers would esist as PF5 forreasoving the
.. O tem Ibe ID-STAR 100 overpacL Inzucogni6an eithe smaniet bermeen the Tech Specs for abe Hi-STAR 100 and design ef she Pf3 recitky (mui passitdy other ISFSist the NRC sould specify then all users ef the }G 3 TAR 300 have the r =p=h hty to sensove smearable centurniranienensine.
Future Rolesnaking Procedures The State c(1/ ash snauty esseries sah any proposal by she NRC to aggsow future adfisions mad revisicas to de list of approved spens feet sig smaks a disset fmal rules. Under such a procedure Ibere sould be no psopoemd role. Instand, the rule mould become f5.nsi wthia 75 dap after publication salens NRC sectives "significan adserse corrimams on the drecs anal rule within M days afte puh=dr=i
- 64 Fed. Re5-si l543. On ieceipt af such =eyiirmanth schwese ccanmems. NRC mould wishdres16e ruls, vfstress the cornmems, diem publish a Anal sule. First, the presuse uniesi>ing i
NRC't psoposed precedumml diange - thus
- additions and revisines to the Est of appeeved spem feef s'orage casks are mencomunwriint and roarine*- is inneeusme. The above sesamarts shoe, that NRC's sppeord is aos *nourisis." IWlorecuer, ghen die past probleens. such as haidine cracks sesociated midi dry morage casks, ~ is impeed,s that s
fhrere approval or rrvision to the ist ci approwd ensks be adiset so adripsste mid ngersias public scrunimy. Second,a direct final rule reestes is 30 days the period orthne for efirective public connment. This is an insunicisme iisie period se review and prepose canumense that assy be "signiSeantly atherse" in csuse NRC to withdraw the publisbet i
final rule. ThinL a disses finai ssle wilt dnnimie the public mie in comansening and a1Feedngthe maecane afrMias precedure h is snoce Ekely that NRC will give dus ocasideration to comunents sa the propose rule stay.: any sensnents at die final rule stags
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1 Conraerm1ms PruErtarury EER.)c4 TAR 400 !herage Cs4 gg Suneofone M har to be Ngnificush aberW for NRC to rewrse cmme and wiridrawthe direcs Tsad ruk.
Saicy coesderations are ice imperamt for NRC to evpedne the approval proorns at the enpense of dnninishing the puhtr's tale in commenting en the apperal o(spent maclem fuel casks.
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[
]
[a 3.5.
FUEL RODS The cladding of the fuel rods is the initial confinement boundary in the HI STORM 100 System.
Analyses have been performed in Chapter 3 to ensure that the maximum temperature of the fuel l
cladding is below the Pacific Northwest Laboratory's threshold values' for various cooling times.
l These temperature limits ensure.that the fuel cladding will not degrade in an inert helium l
environment. Additional details on the fuel rod cladding temperature analyses for the spent fuel to l
be loaded into the HI-STORM 100 System are provided in Chapter 3.
j i
The dimensions of the storage cell openings in the MPC are equal to or greater than those used in l
spent fuel racks supplied by Holtec International. Thousands of fuel assemblies have been shufiled l
in and out of these cells over the years without a single instance of cladding failure. The vast body l
of physical evidence from prior spent fuel handling operations provides confirmation that the fuel l
handling and loading operations with the HI-STORM 100 MPC will not endanger or compromise l
the integrity of the cladding or the structural integrity of the assembly.
The HI-STORM 100 System is designed and evaluated for a maximum deceleration of 45g's. Studies of the capability of spent fuel rods to resist impact loads [3.5.1] indicate that the most vulnerable fuel can withstand 63 g's in the side impact orientation. Therefore, limiting the HI-STORM 100 System to a maximum deceleration of 45 g's (perpendicular to the longitudinal axis of the overpack during i
L all normal and hypothetical accident conditions) ensures that fuel rod cladding integrity is j
j maintained. In [3.5.1], it is assumed that the fuel rod cladding provides the only structural resistance l
to bending and buckling of the rod. For accidents where the predominate deceleration is directed l
l along the longitudinal axis of the overpack, [3.5.1] also demonstrates that no elastic instability or yielding of the cladding will occur until the deceleration level is well above the HI-STORM 100 l
limit of 45g's. The solutions presented in [3.5.1], however, assume that the fuel pellets are not
. intimately attached to the cladding when subjected to an axial deceleration load that may cause an elastic instability of the fuel rod cladding.
The limit based on classical Euler buckling analyses performed by Lawrence Livermore National l
Laboratory in [3.5.1] is 82 g's. In the LLNL report, the limiting axial load to ensure fuel rod stability l
is obtained by modeling the fuel rod as a simply supported beam with unsupported length equal to the grid strap spacing. The limit load under this condition is:
2 2
F = x EI/L In the preceding formula, E = Young's Modulus of the cladding,I = area moment 7finertia of the cladding, and L = spacing of the grid straps.
(
Hi-STORM TSAR Rev.7 REPORT HI-951312 3.5-1 l
F j
i
- Assuming that F = WxA/g with W being the weight of a fuel rod, and A = the deceleration, the Euler buckling formula can be expressed as 1
3 2
2 A/g = n ( ER tn/Wr.L ) = 3 p l
l In the preceding formula, g = gravity, n = number of fuel rods in the fuel assembly, Wr.= the total j
weight of the fuel assembly, t = cladding wall thickness, and R = cladding mean radius.
l i
Using the preceding formula, a survey of a large variety of fuel assembly types in [3.5.1] concluded j
that a 17 x 17 PWR assembly resulted in the minimum value for deceleration and results in the lower bound limit of:
A/g = 82 1
The fuel pellet weight was omitted from the analysis in [3.5.1] by virtue of the assumption that under axial load, the cladding did not support the fuel pellet mass. Since the results may not be conservative because of the assumption concerning the behavior of the fuel pellet mass, a new analysis of the structural response of the fuel cladding is presented here. It is demonstrated that the 1
maximum axially oriented deceleration that can be applied to the fuel cladding is in excess of the design basis deceleration specified in this TSAR. Therefore, the initial confinement boundary
)
remains intact during a hypothetical accident of transport where large axially directed decelerations are experienced by the HI-STORM 100 package.
The analysis reported in this section of the TSAR considers the most limiting fuel rod in the fuel assembly. Most limiting is defined as the fuel rod that may undergo the largest bending (lateral) deformations in the event of a loss of clastic stability. 'Ihe fuel rod is modeled as a thin-walled elastic tube capable of undergoing large lateral displacements in the ever.t that high axial loads cause a loss of stability (i.e., the non-linear interaction of axial and bending behavior of the elastic tube is included in the problem formulation). The fuel rod and the fuel pellet mass is included in the analysis with the fuel pellet mass assumed to contribute only its mass to the analysis. In the HI-STORM 100 spent fuel basket, continuous support to limit lateral movement is provided to the fuel assembly along its entire length. The extent oflateral movement of any fuel rod in a fuel assembly is limited to: (1) the clearance gap bere.;;a the grid straps and the fuel basket cell wall at the grid strap locations; and, (2) the maximum available gap between the fuel basket cell wall and the fuel rod in the region between the grid straps. Note that the grid straps act as fuel rod spacers at the strap locations; away from the grid straps, however, there is no restraint against fuel rod -to-rod contact under a loading giving rise to large lateral motion of the individual rods. Under the incremental application of axial deceleration to the fuel rod, the fuel rod compresses and displaces from the axially oriented inertial loads experienced. The non-linear numerical analysis proceeds to track the HI STORM TSAR Rev.7 REPORT HI 951312 3.5-2
7 l
behavior of the fuel rod up to and beyond contact with the rigid confining walls of the HI-STORM 100 fuel basket.
j i
The analysis is carried out for the "most limiting" spent fuel assembly. The "most limiting" criteria used herein is based on the simple elastic stability formula assuming buckling occurs only between grid straps. This is identical to the methodology employed in (3.5.1) to identify the fuel assembly that limits design basis axial deceleration loading. Table 3.5.1 presents tabular data for a wide variety of fuel assemblies. Considerable data was obtained using the tables in (3.5.2]. The configuration with j
the lowect value of" Beta" is the most limiting for simple elastic Euler buckling between grid straps; the Westinghouse 14x14 Vantage,"W14V", PWR configuration is used to obtain results.
The material properties used in the non-linear analysis are those for irradiated Zircalloy and are obtained from (3.5.1]. The Young's Modulus and the cladding dynamic yield stress are set as:
E = 10.400.000 psi c, = 80,500 psi The fuel cladding material is assumed to have no tensile or compressive stress capacity beyond the material yield strength.
Calculations are performed for two limiting assumptions on the magnitude of resisting moment at the grid straps. Figures 3.5.1 through 3.5.9 aid in understanding the calculation. It is shown in the detailed calculations that the maximum stress in the fuel rod cladding occurs subsequent to j
the cladding deflecting and contacting the fuel basket cell wall. Two limiting analyses are carried out. The initial analysis assumes that the large deflection of the cladding between two grid straps occurs without any resisting moment at the grid strap supports. This maximizes the stress in the free span of the cladding, but eliminates all cladding stress at the grid strap supports. It is shown that this analysis provides a conservative lower bound on the limiting deceleration. The second analysis assumes a reasonable level of moment resistance to develop at the grid straps; the level developed is based on an assumed deflection shape for the cladding spans adjacent to the span subject to detailed analysis. For this second analysis, the limiting decelerations are much larger with the limit stress level occurring in the free span and at the grid strap support locations.
It is concluded that the most conservative set of assumptions on structural response still lead to the conclusion that the fuel rod cladding remains intact under the design basis deceleration levels set for the HI-STORM 100.
HI STORM TSAR Rev.7 REPORT HI-951312 r
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'In the following, a physiedl description of the structural instability problem is provided with the aid of Figures 3.5.1 to 3.5.9. A stored fuel assembly consists of a square grid of fuel rods. Each fuel rod consists of a thin-walled cylinder surrounding and containing the fuel pellets. The majority of the total weight of a fuel rod is in the fuel pellets; however, the entire structural resistance of the fuel rod to lateral and
' longitudinal loads is provided by the cladding. Hereinafter, the use of the words
" fuel rod", " fuel rod cladding", orjust " cladding" means the structural thin cylinder.
- The weight of the fuel pellets is conservatively assumed to be attached to the cladding for all discussions and evaluations.
Figure 3.5.1 shows a typical fuel rod in a fuel assembly. Also shown in Figure 3.5.1 are the grid straps and the surrounding walls of the spent fuel basket cell walls. The grid straps serve to maintain the fuel rods in a square array at a certain number of locations along the length of the fuel assembly. When the fuel rod is subject to a loading causing a lateral deformation, the grid strap locations are the first locations along the length of the rod where contact with the fuel basket cell walls occurs. The fuel basket cell walls are assumed to be rigid surfaces. The fuel rod is assumed subject to some axial load and most likely has some slight initially deformed shape.
For the purposes of the analysis, it is assumed that displacement under load occurs in i
a 2-D plane and that the ends of the fuel rod cladding have a specified boundary condition to restrain lateral deflection. The ends of the fuel rod cladding are assumed to be simply supported and the grid straps along the length of the fuel assembly are assumed to have gap "gi" relative to the cell walls of the fuel basket. The figure shows a typical fuel rod in the assembly that is located by gaps "g2" and "g3" with respect to the fuel basket walls. Because the individual fuel rod is long and slender and is not perfectly straight, it will deform under a small axial load into the position shown in Figure 3.5.2. The actual axial load is due to the distributed weight subject to a deceleration from a hypothetical accident of transport. For the purposes of this discussion, it is assumed that some equivalent axial load is applied to one end of the fuel rod cladding. Because of the distributed weight and the fact that a deceleration 4
load is not likely to be exactly axially oriented, the predominately axial load will j
induce a lateral displacement of the fuel rod cladding between the two end supports.
1 The displacement will not be symmetric but will be larger toward the end of the cladding where support against the axial deceleration is provided. Depending on the j
number of grid straps, either one or two grid straps will initially make contact with the fuel basket cell wall and the contact will not be exactly centered along the length of the cell. Figure 3.5.3 illustrates the position of the fuel rod after the axial load has l
increased beyond the value when initial contact occurred and additional grid straps are now in contact with the cell wall. The maximum stress in the fuel rod will occur 1
at the location of maximum curvature and will be a function of the, bending moment (F 'X(g2-gt)).
2 Hi-STORM TSAR 3.5-7 Rev. 7 Hi-961312
p f
I l-At some load F > F2, either the limit stress in the fuel rod cladding is achieved or the rod 3
begins to experience large lateral movements between grid plates because of the coupling between axial and lateral load and deformation. Figure 3.5.4 shows the deformation mode experienced by the fuel rod cladding caused by the onset of an instability between
. two grid straps that are in contact with the fuel basket cell wall.
i Once the lateral displacement initiates, the rod displaces until contact with the cell wall j
occurs at the mid point "A" ( see Figure 3.5.5) or the cladding stress exceeds the cladding material yield strength. Depending on the particular location of the fuel rod in the fuel assembly, the highest stressed portion of the fuel rod will occur in the segment with the larger of the two gaps "g2" and "g3". For the discussion to follow, assume that l
g2 > g3.The boundary condition at the grid strap is conservatively assumed as simply-supported so that the analysis need not consider what happens in adjacent spans j
between grid straps. At this point in the loading process, the maximum bending moment occurs at the contact point and has the value F4 x (g2-gi). Figure 3.5.5 shows the l
- displaced configuration at the load level where initial contact occurs with the fuel cell wall. If the maximum fuel rod stress (from the beding moment and from the axial load) equals the yield stress of the fuel rod cladding, it is assumed that F = F4 is the 3
maximum axial load that can be supported. The maximum stress in the fuel rod cladding occurs at point "A" in Figure 3.5.5 since that location has the maximum bending moment. If the cladding stress is still below yield, additional load can be i
supported. As the load is further increased, the bending moment is decreased and replaced by reaction loads, "V", at the grid strap and the contact point. These reaction loads V are shown in Figure 3.5.7 and are normal to the cell wall surface. Figure 3.5.6 shows the configuration after the load has been further increased from the value at initial contact. There are two distinct regions that need to be considered subsequent to initial contact with the fuel basket cell wall. During the additional loading phase, the point "A" becomes two " traveling" points, A, and A'. Since the bending moment at A' i
and A is zero, the moment F x (g2-81) is balanced by forces V at the grid strap and at 5
point A or A'. This is shown in Figure 3.5.7 where the unsupported length current "a" is 1-shown with the balancing load. At this point in the process, two " failure" modes are possible for the fuel rod cladding.
The axial load that develops in the unsupported region between the grid strap and point A' causes increased daformation and stress in that segment, or, The straight region of the rod, between A and A', begins to experience a lateral deformation away from the cell wall.
Hi-STORM TSAR 3.5-8 Rev. 7 Hi-961312
(.
Note that in this latter scenario, the slope at A or A' remains zero so this should never govem unless the flat region becomes large. The final limit load occurs when the maximum stress in either portion of the rod exceeds the yield stress of the tube, in what follows. the most limiting fuel assembly from the array of fuel types considered is subject to detailed analysis and the limit load established. This limit axial lord is considered as the product of the fuel rod weight times the deceleration. Therefore, establishing the limit load to reach cladding material yield establishes the limiting axial deceleration that can be imposed.
The preceding discussion has assumed end conditions of simple support for conservatism. The location of the fuel rod determines the actual free gap between grid straps. For example. a fuel rod furthest from the cell wall that resists lateral movement of the assembly moves to close up all of the clearances that exist between it and the resisting cell wall. The clearance between rods is the rod pitch minus the rod diameter.
In a 14 x 14 assembly, there are 13 clearance gaps plus an additional clearance g3
. between the nearest rod and the cell wall. Therefore, the gap g2 s given as i
g2 = 13(pitch-diameter) + g3 Figure 3.5.9 provides an illustration of the fuel rod deformation for a case of 5 fuel rods in a column. Clearly for this case, the available lateral movement can be considerable for the " furthest" fuel rod. On the other hand, for this fuel rod, there will be considerable moment resistance at the grid strap from the adjacent section of the fuel rod. The situation is different when the rod being analyzed is assumed to be the closest to the cell wall. In this case, the clearance gap is much smaller, but the moment resistance provided by adjacent sections of the rod is reduced. For calculation purposes, we assume that a moment resistance is provided as M = f x K0 for the fuel rod under analysis where K = 3El/L,
L= span between grid straps, and "f" is an assumed fraction of K Tite preceding result for the rotational spring constant assumes a simple support at each end of the span with an end moment "M" applied. Classical strength of materials gives the result for the spring constant. The arbitrary assumption of a constant reduction in the spring constant is to account for undetermined interactions between axial force in the rod and the calculated spring constant. As the compressive force in the adjacent members increases, the spring constant will be reduced. On the other hand, as the adjacent span contacts its near cell wall, the spring constant increases. On balance, it should be conservative to assume a considerable reduction in the spnng constant available to the span being analyzed in detail. As a further conservatism, we also use the angle 0 defined by the geometry and not include any additional elastic displacement shape. This will further reduce the value of the resisting moment at.any stage of the I
solution. In the detailed calculations, two limiting cases are eynminaA To limit the analysis to a single rod, it is assumed that after " stack-up" of the rods (see Figure 3.5.9),.
the lateral support provided by the cell wall supports all of the rods. That is, the rods are considered to have non-deforming cross-section.
Hi-STORM TSAR 3.5.g Rev.7 HI 961312
1 Numerical Analysis - Based on the tabular results in Table 3.5.1, the fuel assembly with the smallest value for the deceleration based on the classical Euler buckling formula is analyzed in detail. The following laput data is specified for the limiting 14 x 14 assembly
[3.5.2]:
Inside dimension of a HI-STORM 100 fuel basket cell s := 8.75 in Outside envelope dimension of grid plate gp := 7.763 in Outer diameter of fuel rod cladding D :=.4 in Wall thickness of cladding t :=.0243 in Weight of fuel assembly (including end fittings)
W := 1177 lbf Number of fuel rods + guide / instrument n := 14 tubes in a column or row Overall length of fuel rod between assumed end support L := 151 in t
Length of fuel rod between grid straps L := 25.3 in s
Average clearance to cell wall at a grid strap location S 1 :=.5-(s - gp) assuming a straight and centered fuel assembly g i - 0.494*in Rod pitch pitch := 0.556 in Clearance := (n - 1)-(pitch - D)
Clearance - 2.028 in Minimum available clearance for lateral movement of a fuel rod between grid straps g 3 := g i +.5-(gp - (n D + Clearance))
g 3 - 0.561 ain Maximum available clearances for lateral movement of a fuel rod between grid straps g 2 ".8 3 + Clearance g 2 -2.589 in Hi-STORM TSAR 3.5-10 Rev. 7 Hi-951312 -
c Young's Modulus of Zircalloy [3.5.1]
E := 10400000 psi Dynamic Yield Strength of Zircalloy [3.5.1]
y := 80500 psi o
Geometty Calculations:
Compute the metal cross section area A. the metal area moment ofinertia I, and the total weight of a single fuel rod (conservatively assume that end fittings are only supported by fuel rods in the loading scenario ofinterest).
1 := b D - (D - 2 t)4 A:=E-D - ( D - 2 t)2 2
4 4'
64 2
4 A'- 0.029 in 1 - 5.082 10~ 4.in W"W W - 6.005 albf r
T r
n As an initial lower bound calculation, assume no rotational support from adjacent spans and define a multiplying factor
-f:=0.0-Compute the rotational spring constant available from adjacent sections of the rod.
K := 3 E-f' K - 0*lbf in L s Now compute the limit load, if applied at one end of the fuel rod cladding, that causes an overall clastic instability and contact with the cell wall. Assume buckling in a symmetric mode for a conservatively low result. The purpose of this calculation is solely to demonstrate the flexibility of the single fuel rod. No resisting moment capacity is assumed to be present at the fittings.
0 := x E 1
'~
P 2
P o - 2.288.lbf l
Hl STORM TSAR 3.5-11.
Rev.7 l
- Hi-9E1312 1
i S
l Note that this is less than the weight of the rod itself. This demonstrates that in the absence of any additional axial support, the fuel rod will bow and be supported by the cell walls under a very small axial load. In reality, however, there is additional axial support that would increase this initial buckling load. The stress induced in the rod by this overall deflected shape is small.
P 's 1 D 0
Stress ; :=
Stress ; -444.32 psi P 0 Stress d
- A Stress d - 79.76 psi The conclusion of this initial calculation is that grid straps come in contact and we need only consider what happens between a grid strap. We first calculate the classical Euler buckling load based on a pin-ended rod and assuming conservatively that the entire weight of the rod is providing the axial driving force. This gives a conservatively low estimate of the limiting deceleration that can be resisted before a perfectly straight rod buckles.
1 1
a lim! := a E-a limi - 13.57 L
W s
r The rigid body angle of rotation at the grid strap under this load that causes contact is:
g := atan 2-(g 2 - 81[
0 0 g - 9.406 deg L s Conservatively assume resisting moment at the gr'id is proportional to this " rigid body" angle:
M := K 9 M -0.in lbf (in this first analysis, no resisting moment is r
g r
assumed)
The total stress at the grid strap due to the axial force and the resisting moment is W alimi MD r
r
+-
o
2841.172. psi gs :
o A
21 gs The total stress at the contact location is HI-STORM TSAR 3.5-12 Rev. 7 HI-951312
f
'W a liml'(8 2 - 81)- M D
r r
Stress 2 '"
Stress 2 - 6.721 10,* psi g
W a limi r
Stress 2d ;"
Stress 2d - 2841.172 psi A
4 Stress 2t = Stress 2 + Stress 2d Stress 2t - 7.00510 psi This is the maximum value of the stress at this location since, for further increase in axial load, the moment will decrease with consequent large decrease in the total stress.
The safety factor is o
-1.149 Stress 2t The axial load in the unsupported portion of the beam at this instant is (W alimi) r P ax "
c s(0 ;)
P
- 82.599 *1bf ax At this point in the load process, a certain axial load exists in the unsupported span on either side of the contact point. However, since the unsupported span is approximately 50% of the original span, the allowable deceleration limit is larger. As the axial load is incrementally increased, the moment at the contact point is reduced to zero with consequent increases in the lateral force V at the grid strap and at the contact points A and A'. Figure 3.5.8 provides the necessary information to determine the elastic deformation that occurs in the unsupported span as the axial load increases and the contact points separate (and, therefore, decreasing the free span).
From geometry, coupled with the assumption that the deflected shape is a half" sin" function with peak value "a", the following relations are developed:
- Assume "a" is a fraction of 50% of the span (the following calculations show only the fmal iterated assumption for the fraction c :=.9 Il s a - 11.385.in a := c -
L (2j Hi-STORM TSAR 3.5-13 Rev.7 Hi-951312
p
?
Calculate "b" in Figure 3.5.8
.5 (a) + (,g 3 - g g; b - 11.576 in b :=
)
an equation for 6 can be developed from the geometric relation
'(82-81):=
b a
2 (R - 6)
The inverse of the radius of curvature, R, at the point of peak elastic deflection of the free span, is computed as the second derivative of the assumed sin wave deflection shape. Based on the geometry in Figure 3.5.8, the peak deflection is:
5
+ 4 b)2 2
l b
b 6 :=.5-a-
l
- a-2-(g 2 - 81),
(3/
4'(82-81) 6 -0.426 in For the assumed "a", the limiting axial load capacity in the unsupported region is conservatively estimated as:
I
~
a lim 2 := n E m2 - 64.816 2
a W r The corresponding rigid body angle is:
2 := atan 1 -(8 2 - 81[
0 2 - 10.429 deg 0
a Hi-STORM TSAR 3.5-14 Rev.7 Hi-951312
The axial load in the unsupported portion of the beam at this instant is (W a1 m2) r P ax ;"
cos(0) 2 p ax - 395.763.lbf The resisting moment is
)
N1 r := K 02 r
M - 0 in lbf
~
The total stress in the middle of the unsupported section of free span "b" is I
(P 6-M)D ax r
4 stress 3 "
stress 3 - 6.63510. psi 2I i
P ax 4
stress 3d :=
stress 3d - 1.3810. psi A.
1 4
stress 3t := stress 3 + stress 3d stress 3t - 8.015 10. psi The safety factor is 0 y
-1.004 stress 3t The total stress at the grid strap due to the axial force and any the resisting moment is 1
W a lim 2 MD r
r 4
+
o
- 1.35710 ps,i gs :=
o A
21 gs The safety factor is Y - 5.932 0 gs For this set of assumptions, the stress capacity of the rod cladding has been achieved, so that the limit deceleration is:
~
A limit := a lim 2 A limit - 64.816 This exceeds the design basis for the HI-STORM 100 package.
i Hi-STORM TSAR 3.5-15 Rev.7 HI-961312 -
If there is any restraining inoment from the adjacent span, there is a possibility of exceeding the rod structural limits at that location due to the induced stress. Therefore, the above calculations are repeated for an assumed moment capacity at the grid strap.
f := 1.
K := 3 E I : f L
l s
The rigid body angle of rotation at the grid strap under this load that causes contact is:
2,(82-81) 0 3 -9.406 deg 0 g := atan L s 1
Conservatively assume resisting moment at the grid a function of this angle,is M - 102.875 ain lbf Ni r := K 0 g r
I The total stress at the grid strap due to the axial force and the resisting moment is W alimi MD r
r 4
+
o
-4.23310 apsi o gs :=
-A 21 gs The total stress at the contact location is W aliml-(8 2-81)- M -
Stress 2 - 2.67210 apsi D
r r
4 Stress 2 :=
2 >I i
W a limi r
Stress 2d :=
Stress 2d - 2841.172 psi i
A 4
Stress 2t:= Stress 2 + Stress 2d Stress 2t - 2.95610. psi This is the maximum value of the stress at this location since, for further increase in axial load, the moment will decrease with consequent large decrease in the total stress.
The axial load in the unsupported portion of the beam at this instant is P,x := (W a liml) r i
P
- 82.599.lbf l
ax cos(0) g Hi-STORM TSAR 3.5-16 Rev.7 Hi-961312
r l
At this point in the load prbcess, a certain axial load exists in the unsupported span on either side of the contact point. However, since the unsupported span is approximately 50% of the original span, the allowable deceleration limit is larger. As the axial load is incrementally increased, the moment at the contact point is reduced to zero with consequent increases in the lateral force V at the grid strap and at the contact points A and A'. Figure 3.5.8 provides the necessary information to determine the elastic deformation that occurs in the unsupported span as the axial load increases and the contact points separate (and, therefore, decreasing the free span).
From geometry, coupled with the assumption that the deflected shape is a half " sin" function with peak value "5", the following relations are developed:
Assume "a" is a fraction of 50% of the span (the following calculations show only the fina iterated assumption for the fraction e:=.7 L s a := e -
a - 8.855 in 2/
Calculate "b" in Figure 3.5.8 b := (a) + (g 2 - 81)2 5
7 b - 9.1.in The inverse of the radius of curvature, R, at the point of peak elastic deflection of the free span, is computed as the second derivative of the assumed sin wave deflection shape. Based on the geometry in Figure 3.5.8, the peak deflection is:
5 2
l 2
+4 b3 b
b 6 :=.5-a-
- a-2-(g 2 - 81),
Pj 4'(82-81) 5 - 0.427.in l
l Hi-STORM TSAR 3.5-17 Rev. 7 HI-951312
~
For the assumed "a", the limiting axial load capacity in the unsupported region is conservatively estimated as:
2 I
a lim 2 := a E-a 1 m2 - 104.9 2g The corresponding rigid body angle is:
1-(82-81) 0 3 - 13.314adeg 0, := atan a
The axial load in the unsupported portion of the beam at this instant is (W alim2) r P ax :=
P
- 647.331 *lbf ax cos(0) 2 The resisting moment is hi := K 0 M - 145.619 in lbf r
2 r
The total stress in the middle of the unsupported section of free span "b" is 6-M fD stress 3 := (P r
4 ax stress 3 - 5.14510
- psi 21 P ax 4
stress 3d := A stress 3d -2.25710 psi 1
i I
4 stress 3t := stress 3 + stress 3d stress 3t - 7.40210 psi l
The safety factor is a
i y
- 1.088 l
stress 3t l
l The total stress at the grid strap due to the axial force and any the resisting moment is Hi-STORM TSAR 3.5-18 Rev.7 HI-961312
' W a lim 2 MD r
r 4
+
- 7.92810 psi gs'*
A 3
gs The safety factor is Y -1.015 gs For this set of assumptions, the stress capacity of the rod cladding has been achieved, so that the limit deceleration is:
A limit := a 1 m2
^ limit - 104.9 Conclusions An analysis has demonstrated that for the most limiting PWR fuel assembly stored hi the HI-STORM 100 fuel basket, a conservative lower bound limit on acceptable axial decelerations exceeds the 45g design basis of the cask. For a reasonable assumption of moment resisting capacity at the grid straps, the axial deceleration limit exceeds the design basis by a large margin.
It is concluded that fuel rod integrity is maintained in the event of a hypothetical accident condition leading to a 45g design basis deceleration in the direction normal to the target.
Hi-STORM TSAR 3.5-19_
Rev.7 Hi-961312
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t NUCLEAR FUEL MANAGEMENT Harvey W. Graves,Jr.
Consulting Engmeer Chevy Chase, Maryland t
JOHN WILEY & SONS NEW YORK SANTA BARBARA CHICHESTER BRISBANE TORONTO E
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