ML20211B970

State of Utah Request for Admission of late-filed Second Amended Utah Contention Q.* for Stated Reasons,Second Contention Q Should Be Admitted.With Certificate of Svc. Related Correspondence

ML20211B970
Person / Time
Site:	07200022
Issue date:	08/20/1999
From:	Lockhart L UTAH, STATE OF
To:	Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel
Shared Package
ML20211B978	List: ML20211B970 ML20211C009
References
CON-#399-20754 97-732-02-ISFSI, ISFSI, NUDOCS 9908250136
Download: ML20211B970 (18)

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00CKETED UStiRC UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION g 3 gg; ;) g BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD ONt

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In the Matter of:

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Docket No. 72-22-ISFSI

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PRIVATE FUEL STORAGE, LLC )

ASLBP No. 97-732-02-ISFSI (Independent Spent Fuel

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Storage Installation)

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August 20,1999 STATE OF UTAH'S REQUEST FOR ADMISSION OF LATE FILED SECOND AMENDED UTAH CONTENTION Q' Introduction Pursuant to 10 C.F.R. $ 2.714, the State of Utah hereby seeks the admission of

' late-filed Second Amended Contention Q. Second Amended Contention Q challenges the adequacy of the Applicant's analysis of potential accidents that may damage the integrity of spent fuel cladding.' In particular, the Applicant relies for satisfaction of

' This amended contention is supported by the Declaration of Marvin Resnikoff in Support of State of Utah's Second Amended Contention Q (August 20,1999), which is j

attached hereto as Exhibit 1.

1 2 On July 22,1999, the State filed a request for admission of late-filed Amended Contention Q, which asserted that the Applicant must perform a revised cask stability analysis in conformance with newly issued NRC Staff guidance raising questions about the ability of stored spent fuel to withstand impacts. In responding to the contention, the Applicant pointed out that Holtec International, the manufacturer of the cask it intends to use, had performed such an analysis in June of 1999. It also appeared from the Applicant's Response that the Applicant intended to adopt the Holtec analysis in satisfaction of applicable NRC regulations. Therefore, the State withdrew Amended Contention Q on August 18,1999. State of Utah's Reply to Applicant's and Staff's Responses to Amended Contention Q and Notice of Withdrawal of Amended 9908250136 990820 3

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10.C.F.R. $ 72.74(d) on a cask stability analysis by Holtec International, Inc.

. ("Holtec"), which is inadequate to show that the storage casks used at the proposed Private Fuel Storage Facility ("PFSF") will maintain their integrity under design accident conditions.

f As discussed below, the amended contention satisfies the Commission's standards for late-filing.

Background

The Applicant's analysis of a hypothetical cask drop /tip-over accident is addressed in Section 8.2.6 of the PFS Safety Analysis Report ("SAR"). With rer.pect to i

accidents involving the HI-STORM cask, the Applicant relies on the analysis presented in section 3.5 of the Holtec Topical Safety Analysis Report (" TSAR") that asserts that the most vulnerable fuel can withstand 63g's in the most adverse orientation. PFS SAR, Rev. O, at 8.2-31.

l Based on these statements in the PFS application, the State's original contention Q charged that: "The Applicant has failed to adequately identify and assess potential accidents, and therefore, the Applicant is unable to determine the adequacy [of] the ISFSI design to prevent accidents and mitigate the consequences of accidents as required by 10 CFR 72.24(d)(2)." State of Utah's Contentions on the Construction and Operating License Application by Private Fuel Storage LLC for An Independent Contention Q. Second Amended Contention Q addresses the State's concern that the Holtec analysis is inadequate to satisfy the NRC's regulations.

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! Spent Fuel Storage Facility (November 23,1997) (" State's Contentions") at 114-115.

' Bases 1 and 3 related to the failure to take into account stresses on fuel cladding that would increase its vulnerability to impacts:

The Applicant states that "the most vulnerable fuel" can withstand 63 g in the most adverse orientation. SAR at 8.2-32. However, the Applicant does not provide the basis for its statement. The Applicant does not specify whether this includes fuel with leaks and cladding failures which has been stored underwater

'for many years and' dry for many more years. Furthermore the Applicant has not provided the g loading that would cause such fuel to' fail.

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i The cask maximum lift heights of 10 and 18 inches imply that vertical drops greater than these amounts would result in damage to the canister or interior contents. SAR at 10.2-9. The Applicant must not only address lifting accidents while onsite at the ISFSI, but at the intermodal transfer site or during transport on either rail or highway, where significant damage could occur during an accident with potential resulting release of nuclear material. Cladding of spent fuel elements is likely to be very brittle through extensive radiation

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embrittlement, so cladding failure is likely 'during such accidents.

State's Contentions at 114-115.

In opposing the admission of Contention Q, the Applicant stated that the analysis described in the PFS SAR relied on report UCID-21246, by the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories )(October 20,1987) ("LLNL Report"),,which identifies the 17 x 17 Westinghouse fuel assembly as the "most vulnerable fuel."

- Applicant's Answer to Petitioner's Contentions at 208 (December 24,1997)

(" Applicant's Answer to Contentions"). According to the Applicant, the LLNL y

Report states that despite having "the worst combination of the longest unsupported i

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I length and the thinnest cladding wall thickness," the Westinghouse fuel can " sustain a -

2 load in bending equivalent to 63 g's at 380 degrees Celsius without exceeding the yield strength of the cladding at that temperature." hL, citing LLNL Report at S 4.0, page 4.

- Both the Applicant and the Staff challenged the State's failure to provide a basis for its concern that the cladding was more vulnerable to rupture than supposed by the Applicant.: Applicant's Answer to Contentions at 209; NRC Staff's Response to Contentions Filed by (1) the State of Utah, (2) the Skull Valley Band of Goshute Indians, (3) Ohn'go Gaudadeh Devia, (4) Castle Rock Land and Livestock L.C., et al.,

and (5) the Confederated Tribes of the Goshute Reservation and David Pete (December 24,1997) at 39-40. At the Prehearing Conference, the State argued that although the Applicant had provided more information about what it characterizes as the most vulnerable fuel,it still had not specified whether the fuel analyzed " includes fuel with leaks and cladding failures that has been stored under water for many years and stored dry for many more years," making the fuel "especially vulnerable."

Statement by Diane Curran, Tr. at 390 91 Ganuary 28,1998). In addition, the State argued, the Applicant had not " described the G-loading that would cause such fuel to fail." Id.

Contention Q and its bases were denied admission in their entirety by the Licensing Board in LBP 98-7,47 NRC 142,195,'aff'd on other grounds, CLI-98-13,48

- NRC 26 (1998).: Without explaining its application of the law to the facts, the Board 4

t summarily ruled that the contention and its bases:

fail to establish with specificity any genuine material dispute; impermissibly challenge the Commission's regulations or rulemaking-associated generic determinations; lack materiality; lack adequate factual or expert opinion support, and/or fail properly to challenge the PFS application.

LBP-98-7,47 NRC at 195.

On May 21,1999, the NRC Staffissued NRC Interim Staff Guidance document ISG Buckling of Irradiated Fuel Under Drop Conditions, which is attached hereto as Exhibit 2. ISG-12 recommends that any analyses which rely on the LLNL Report should be re-done, using either the new information about the effects ofirradiation, or an alternative method which demonstrates that cladding stress remains below yield.

On June 8,1999, ten days before ISG-12 became available to the public, Holtec 1

submitted Revision 7 to its TSAR for the HI-STORM storage cask. Section 3.5 of the j

revised TSAR contains a new cask stability analysis, which responds to the information provided in ISG-12.

PFS has not issued any license application amendment adopting the revisions to Section 3.5 of the Holtec TSAR into its own license application. However, statements j

in the Applicant's and NRC Staff's responses to the State's July '22,1999 request for admission of Amended Contention Q, indicate that the Applicant intends to adopt Holtec's revised cask stability analysis in satisfaction of 10 C.F.R. $ 72.24(d)(2).

Applicant's Response to State of Utah's Request for Admission of Late-filed Amended Utah Contention Q at 8 (August 6,1999) (" Applicant's August 6 Response"); NRC 5

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Staff's Response to State of Utah's Request for Admission of Late-filed Amended Utah Contention Q at 11, note 12 (August 5,1999) ("NRC Staff's August 5 Response").

AMENDED CONTENTION Q: The Applicant has failed to adequately identify

- and assess potential accidents involving impacts to fuel cladding. In particular, the Applicant has failed to take into consideration (a) compounded embrittlement and thinning of the zircalloy cladding, and (b) the dynamic effects of a cask drop accident.

Therefore, the Applicant is unable to determine the adequacy of the ISFSI design to prevent accidents and mitigate the consequences of accidents as required by 10 CFR 72.24(d)(2).

BASIS:

In its SAR, the Applicant represents that the most vulnerable fuel cladding in the storage casks at the PFS facility can withstand an impact of 63 g's. SAR at 8.2-32. The Applicant relies for this calculation on Holtec's accident analysis, which in turn relies on the LLNL Report. Id., citing Holtec TSAR and Reference 21 (the LLNL Repon).

The Applicant now appears to rely on a new analysis, submitted by Holtec in Rev. 7 to its HI-STORM TSAR. The revised analysis constitutes an improvement, but does not fully satisfy the directives ofISG-12 or other applicable NRC guidance.

Holtec now uses the assumptions in ISG-12 that led the Staff to calculate a likely force of 13g's at which cladding would be damaged, rather than 63g's. However, Holtec imposes a constraint on the system, namely that the cladding cannot bow greater than 6

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1 the dimensions of the lattice in which it is placed. This is a valid assumption. When it is assumed that the cladding cannot bow greater than the dimensions of the lattice, Holtec calculates that the maximum force the cladding can withstand rises from 13g's to approximately'64g's. SAR at 3.5-15. This is greater than the 63g's previously calculated by Holtec and asserted in Rev. O of the PFS SAR.

However, two significant issues still have not been addressed by Holtec, which -

could here a significant effect on the g force that the cladding can tolerate. Therefore, the Holtec analysis constitutes an inadequate basis for determining the Applicant's compliance with 10 C.F.R. $ 72.24(d)(2).

I a) ' One of the deficiencies in the LLNL Report that is criticized in ISG-12 is that the analysis assumes material properties applicable to unirradiated fuel. ISG-12 at i

1. ISG-12 recommends that the characteristics ofirradiated fuel should be included,in either of the two alternative methodologies proposed. Id. at 2. Although ISG-12 characterizes this as a recommendation,it is clear that consideration of these characteristics is essential to performing an adequate cask stability analysis. This is illustrated by the fact that when the Staff re-did the LLNL analysis, taking irradiation effects into account, the g force that could be withstood by the cladding dropped dramatically from 63 g's to 13 g's, which is far below the design basis (45 g) for the HI-STORM cask. See PFS SAR at 8.5-31.

Contrary tcs the guidance of ISG-12,'there is no indication in the HI-STORM y

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TSAR that Hohec took into account the effects of the irradiation and consequent embrittlement of the zirconium alloy used in the cladding. The effect of continual bombardment by neutrons over time is to make the cladding more brittle and easily shattered.' This embrittlement effect is likely to be compounded by thinning of the zircalloy ciadding in high-burnup fuel, a phenomenon recognized by the NRC Staff in NRC Information Notice 98-29,- Predicted Increase in Fuel Rod Cladding Oxidation (August 3,1998) (attached hereto as Exhibit 3). As noted in IN 98-29, higher burnup fuel has a wall thinning effect (up to 17% according to Westinghouse). The State's expert has calculated that this would lead to a 25% reduction in g force to cause

' cladding failure. See Table entitled " Effects of Changing Variables," attached hereto as a

I Exhibit 4. 'As demonstrated by comparing columns A and C of the table, the force of 63.54 g's drops to 50.81 (a reduction of 25%) when a 17% decrease in fuel cladding

' thickness is assumed.~

4 The combined increased embrittlement and increased thinning of the cladding is likely to have a significant effect on the size of the g force that is necessary to rupture the cladding, and therefore it must be considered in the analysis, s

b); As instructed by ISG-12, Holtec's revised cask drop analysis takes into account the weight of fuel by assuming the cladding weight is due to the zirconium

- alloy plus weight of fuel.- However, Holtec applies an oversimplistic static analytical

model, using fixed moments, forces, and accelerations. TSAR at 3.5-7 and following.

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i In fact, the forces at work within the cask are more complex, requiring a dynamic analysis that takes into account the physical structure of the fuel pellets and their relationship to the cladding.

For instance, the Holtec analysis simply replaces the fuel pellets inside a fuel rod with effectively heavier cladding. This is incorrect. Within each fuel rod, the fuel pellets are stacked on their sides, inside the cladding. As Holtec acknowledges, during an horizontal drop, the cladding bows. When the cask drops, the individual pellets will break from their initial rigid constraint and strike the thin cladding. This has a dynamic effect similar to that of a " water hammer" that occurs in nuclear power plant piping. This would add an additional impulsive force on the cladding. Thus, the g force on the cladding may well be greater than the 45 g force to which the cladding is ostensibly designed. Hohee has not taken this significant dynamic effect into consideration.

The Applicant has previously argued that the Commission Iv9s determined that the cladding need not be maintained if additional confmement is provided, and that the " canister could act as a replacement for the cladding." Applicant's Answer to State's Contentions at 209-210, citing 51 Fed. Reg. 19,106,19,108 (1986); 53 Fed. Reg.

31,651 (1988); 10 C.F.R. $ 72.122(h)(1). Section 72.122(h) provides that:

i The spent fuel cladding must be protected during storage against degradation that leads to gross ruptures or the fuel must be otherwise confined such that degradation of the fuel during storage will not pose operational safety problems with respect to its removal from storage. This may be accomplished by canning 9

of consolidated fuel rods or unconsolidated assemblies or other means as appropriate.

The Applicant appears to believe that this regulation allows it to disregard a cladding failure and to fall back on the canister as the sole means of confining radioactivity in the cask. This is a misinterpretation of the regulation that would eviscerate the defense-in-depth, multiple barrier approach on which the Applicant has relied in its license application.' The regulation merely provides that if the cladding fails, then the licensee may substitute another, additional protective barrier, such as an additional caniste.' Reg. Guide 3.48, Standard Format and Content for the Safety 3 The SAR for the PFS facility refers to Chapter 7 of the Holtec HI-STORM TSAR for a description of the " confinement design" for the HI-STORM storage system. PFSF SAR S 4.2.1.5.5. As explained in the TSAR, the HI-STORM cask relies on " multiple confinement barriers provided by the fuel cladding and the MPC enclosure vessel [i.e.,

the canister] to assure that there is no release of radioactive material to the environment." Holtec Report HI-951312, Revision 5, at 7.2-1 (February 1999).

• In its August 6 Response to Amended Contention Q, the Applicant argued that the State's discussion of the concept of multiple confinement "does not refute the authority cited at pages 209-210 in Applicant's December 24,1997 Answer to Petitioners' Contentions, in particular the quotation from the proposed rule ) 51 Fed Reg.19,106, 19,108 (1986) which explicitly provides that the ' canister could act as a replacement for the cladding.'" Applicant's Response at 9, note 12. The Applicant misunderstands the rule, and completely ignores the defense in depth concept underlying the Commission's general requirement that spent fuel be protected by both cladding and canister. The Commission's requirement that spent fuel must be containerized when the cladding fails does not amount to the abandonment of the general requirement that spent fuel cladding must perform its function. Indeed, all NRC regulatory guidance, as addressed by PFS in the SAR and Holtec in the HI-STORM TSAR, assumes that under ordinary circumstances, both the cladding and the canister are available to protect the public from potential escapes of radioactivity from a storage cask.

Nor does the fact that PFS's accident dose calculation assumes a 100% fuel cladding failure lend any support to the Applicant's argument. Applicant's Response 10 6

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Analysis Report for an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation or Monitored

. Retrievable Storage Installation (Dry Storage) (1989) also contemplates that license applications will address " protection by multiple confinement barriers and systems."

Reg. Guide 3.48 5 3.3.2. It would utterly defeat the concept of multiple confinement, as well as the representations in the license application regarding the assurance of safety through defense-in-depth,if one of the confinement barriers could be completely

- disregarded when it failed.

The cask maximum lift heights of 10 and 18 inches imply that vertical drops greater than these amounts would result in damage to the canister or interior contents.

SAR at 10.2-9. ' The Applicant must not only address lifting accidents while onsite at the ISFSI, but 'at the intermodal transfer site or during transpon on either rail or

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highway, where significant damage could occur during an accident with potential resulting release of nuclear material.5 Cladding of spent fuel elements is likely to be very brittle through extensive radiation embrittlement; so cladding failure is likely during such accidents.

at 9 note 12. As with any other type of accident analysis, the analysis simply assesses whether, when the principal safety system fails, the backup system can perform the

required safety function. This is entirely consistent with the NRC's defense-in-depth approach to safety regulation.

5 The Applicant has argued that this requirement would n~ot apply to the intermodal f transfer facility ("ITF"), because it is a transportation facility. Applicant's August 6 '

Response at 9. As discussed in Utah Contention B, however, the State contends that the ITF does constitute a storage facility.

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Satisfaction of Late Filed Factors:

i The State meets the 10 CFR $ 2.714(a) late filed factors for amending its Contention.

Good Cause: First, the State has good cause for the late filing. The State first -

became aware that the' Applicant intends to amend its license to rely on the revised i

Holtec cask stability analysis when the Applicant filed its August 6 Response to Amended Contention Q. (Because of an e-mail transmission problem, the State did i

not receive the Applicant's Response until August 10,1999). Although Holtec had submitted the revised analysis to the NRC on June 8,1999, the Applicant did not not

. mention any change in Chapter 8 of the PFS SAR, which addresses the accident analysis required for compliance with 10 C.F.R' S 72.24(d)(2), when it amended its

SAR on August lO,1999. Letter from John D. Parkyn, PFS, to NRC, enclosing Amendment 4 to PFS License Application. In particular, there were no change pages

- to Chapter 8, no discussion of the revised Holtec analysis, and no change to either the 1

SAR's reliance on the 1997 Revision 1 to the Holtec HI STORM TSAR (listed as Reference 1 in the SAR at page 8.4-1), or the SAR's reliance on the 1987 LLNL Report,

. which is listed as Reference 21 in the SAR at page 8.4 2. As the State has discussed in i

previous pleadings before this Board, the NRC's regulations unequivocally require i

intervenors to identify disputes with the license application. See State of Utah's l Request for Admission of Late-Filed Amended Utah Contention C at 15-17 Qune 23, 12 L

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-1 1999). If anything, by raising this issue based on representations in the Applicant's pleadings before they have been adopted in the license application, the State is raising this issue early.' -

The State also has good cause because it has diligently pursued the issue of the inadequacy of the Applicant's cask stability analysis since this proceeding began. The State first ' attempted to raise the issue in Contention Q in 1997, but the contention was -

rejected. Then, because the State had no recourse through this licensing proceeding, the State and Dr. Resnikoff pursued the issue through comments on the Safety

' ' The State also notes that it has made a reasonable effort to keep up with the amendments to the Holtec TSAR for the HI-STORM storage cask. To this end, the State has had an ongoing informal arrangement with Holtec, by which Holtec sends the State revisions to the TSAR. See letter from Denise Chancellor, State of Utah Attorney General's office, to Gary Tjerland, Holtec International Qune 9,1999),

attached hereto'as Exhibit 5. In general, Holtec sends the revisions as they are issued.

The Holtec TSAR has been in a flurry of revisions over the last several months, as the application is in the last stages of being finalized. Thus, Holtec did not send either Revision 7 or Revision 8 to the State when they were issued in June of 1999. Instead, at the end of July, Holtec sent the State a copy of Revision 9, which incorporates all of

' the changes that were made in' Revisions 7, 8, and 9. See letter from Brian Gutherman, Holtec International, to Denise Chancellor, State of Utah Attorney General's Office

. Quly 27,1999) (attached hereto as Exhibit 6), enclosing Revision 9 to HI-STORM TSAR. This amended contention is being filed within 30 days of the State's receipt of Rev.9.

Nevertheless, it is imponant to bear in mind that the PFS SAR, and not the Holtec TSAR, is the focus of this licensing proceeding. It is reasonable for the State to l assume that,if some revision to the TSAR is to be relied on by the Applicant, the Applicant will provide notice of its changed reliance in an amendment to the PFS SAR. The State has made a much more diligent attempt to keep up with relevant Lamendments to the TSAR than the Applicant's effort to meet its obligation to

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incorporate relevant TSAR changes into its license application. The State should not be penalized for the Applicant's lax approach to revising the PFS SAR, or the Staff's endorsement ofits lax approach. See Staff's August 5 Response at 11 note 12.'

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Evaluation Report for the HI-STAR transportation cask, and through correspondence with the NRC Staff. Although the Applicant and the Staff cite these efforts as showing a lack of good cause, precisely the opposite is true: the State has continued to try to raise the issue in every way possible, despite the Board's rejection of the issue.

Moreover, the validity of the State's concerns have been vindicated by the Staff's issuance of ISG-12, which effectively implements the concerns raised in Amended Contention Q and Dr. Resnikoff's correspondence with the Staff. Now that Holtec and the Applicant have responded to ISG-12 by providing the analysis that the

. State has sought since 1997,it is appropriate that the State be given an opportunity to address whether the analysis is sufficient to demonstrate the integrity of PFS's casks under accident conditions.

Development of a Sound Record: The State's participation will assist in developing a sound record. Dr. Resnikoff, who has considerable expertise in technical 3

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issues regarding the storage and degradation of spent nuclear power plant fuel, will i

testify regarding Amended Contention Q. As stated in his attached Declaration, the amended contention constitutes a summary of the testimony that he will provide. He expects that his testimony will be augmented and refined after he has had a chance to review the calculations underlying the information provided in the Holtec TSAR.

Availability of Other Means for Protecting The State's Interests: The State l

has no alternative means, other than this proceeding, for protecting its interest in i

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m ensuring that the accident analysis for safety components used at the PES facility is adequate to ensure the protection ofits citizens from excessive radiation doses.

Although the Applicant argues that the adequacy of the cask design to protect against accidents is a generic issue related only to the approval of the HI-STORM storage cask, this position is belied by the regulations, which explicitly require the applicant for an ISFSI to provide an analysis of the adequacy of structures and components to protect against accidents.10 C.F.R. 5 72.24(d)(2). There is no other forum in which the State

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can challenge the adequacy of the PFS license application to provide this required information. Moreover, to the exten't that the generic rulemaking for the HI-STORM casks will address the issue, it is a very different kind of proceeding, which affords the State much less of an opportunity to vindicate its views. In the rulemaking for the approval of the HI-STORM cask, the State may submit written comments. However, it may not conduct discovery to probe the basis for the assertions in the HI-STORM TSAR, nor may it cross-examine the applicant's experts in a hearing. Thus, whatever L

opportunity may exist to criticize the HI-STORM cask design falls far short of the formal hearing provided for the proposed PFSF.

Representation by Another Party: The State's position will not be represented by any other party, as there is no other party with a similar contention admitted to this proceeding.

Broadening ofIssues or Delay of the Proceeding: The admission of Second 15 L

A' mended Contention Q will not unduly broaden or delay the proceeding. Litigation of the contention would require the opportunity for some discovery into the basis for the new Holtec analysis, which could be accomplished in Phase II of the hearing. The addition of one more issue, which is clearly defined and limited in its scope, would not

~ delay the completion of Phase II or place any unreasonable burdens on the parties. To the extent that the litigation does broaden or delay the proceeding,it is nevertheless important and worthwhile, because it raises a fundamental safety issue regarding the 3

integrity of spent fuel storage casks under accident conditions.

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Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, Second Amended Contention Q is both admissible and meets the Commission's standard for late filed contentions. Accordingly,it

'should be admitted.

DATED this 20th day of August,1999.

Respe lly sub d

AkYW DMiise Chancehor, Assistant Attorney General j

Fred G Nelson, Assistant Attorney General i

Laura Lockhan, Assistant Attorney General Diane Curran, Special Assistant Attorney General Connie Nakahara, Special Assistant Attorney General

' Attorneys for State of Utah Utah Attorney General's Office 160 East 300 South,5th Floor, P.O. Box 140873 j

Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0873 j

' Telephonei (801) 366-0286, Fax: (801) 366-0292 j

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DOCKETED USHRC CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE oo AUG 2: All :19 I hereby certify that a copy of STATE OF UTAH'S REQUEST FOR

' ADMISSION OF LATE-FILED SECOND AMENDED UTAH COMENTION Q ADJU; w

was served on the persons listed below by electronic mail (unless otherwise noted) with 6

conforming copies by United States mail first class, this 20 day of August,1999:

Rulemaking & Adjudication Staff Sherwin E. Turk, Esq.

Secretary of the Commission Catherine L. Marco, Esq.

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of the General Counsel Washington D.C. 20555 Mail Stop 15 B18 E-mail: hearingdocket@nrc. gov U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (originaland two copies)

Washington, DC 20555 E-Mail: set @nrc. gov G. Paul Bollwerk, III, Chairman E Mail: cim@nrc. gov Administrative Judge E-Mail: pfscase@nrc. gov Atomic Safety and Licensing Board U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Jay E. Silberg, Esq.

Washington, DC 20555 Ernest L. Blake,Jr.

E-Mail: gpb@nrc. gov Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge 2300 N Street, N. W.

Dr. Jerry R. Kline Washington, DC 20037-8007 E-Mail: Jay _Silberg@shawpittman.com Administrative Judge E-Mail: ernest _blake@shawpittman.com Atomic Safety and Licensing Board U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission E-Mail: paul _gaukler@shawpittman.com Washington, DC 20555 E-Mail: jrk2@nrc. gov John Paul Kennedy, Sr., Esq.

E-Mail: kjerry@erols.com 1385 Yale Avenue Salt Lake City, Utah 84105 Dr. Peter S. Lam E-Mail: john @kennedys.org Administrative Judge Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Richard E. Condit, Esq.

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Land and Water Fund of the Rockies Washington, DC 20555 2260 Baseline Road, Suite 200 E Mail: psl@nrc. gov Boulder, Colorado 80302 E Mail: rcondit@lawfund.org 17 b

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. Joro Walker, Esq.

James M. Cutchin Land and Water Fund of the Rockies Atomic Safety and Licensing Board 2056 East 3300 South Street, Suite 1 Panel

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Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission E-Mail: joro61@inconnect.com Washington, D.C. 20555-0001 E Mail: jmc3@nrc. gov Danny Quintana, Esq.

(electronic copy only)

- Danny Quintana & Associates, P.C.

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68 South Main Street, Suite 600 Office of the Commission Appellate Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

-Adjudication E Mail: quintana @xmission.com Mail Stop: 16-G-15 OWFN '

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 i

(United States mailonly)

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LauYa Lockhan '

Assistant Attorney General State of Utah 18