ML20214M751
| ML20214M751 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vogtle  |
| Issue date: | 05/08/1987 |
| From: | Livermore H, Rogge J, Schepens R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20214M717 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-424-87-27, 50-425-87-27, NUDOCS 8706010418 | |
| Download: ML20214M751 (27) | |
See also: IR 05000424/1987027
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UN'ITED STATES
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NUCLEAR R,EGULATORY COMMISSION
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101 MARIETTA STREET.N.W.
ATLANTA, GEORGI A 30323
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Report Nos.: ~50-424/87-27 and 50-425/87-12
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Licensee: Georgia Power Company ? .
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P.O.-Box 4545
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Atlanta, GA 30302
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Docket Nos.:
50-424 and 50-425
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. License Nos.': NPF-68,and~CPPR-109
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Facility Name: Vogtle 1 and 2
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Inspection Conducted: March 10 - April'17, 1987,
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Inspectors:
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H. H. Livermore, Senior Resident Inspector,
Date Signed
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Construction
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-J. F. Rogge, Senior Resident Inspector,
Date Signed
Operations
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R. J..Schepens, Resident Inspector,
.Date Signed
- 0perations-
Accompanying Personnel: .C. Burger, Resident--Inspector, Operations
-Approved By: YM
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M. V. Sinkule,'Section Chief
Date. Signed
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Division of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY
Scope: This routine, unannounced inspection entailed Resident Inspection in
the .following areas:
plant operations, radiological controls, maintenance,.
surveillance, fire protection, . security, outage activities, containment and
safety _ related . structures, piping systems and supports, safety ' related '
components,
auxiliary
systems,
electrical
equipment-
and
cables,+
instrumentation, startup test program, and quality programs and administrative
controls affecting quality.
Results: Two violations were identified in the area of Plant Operations. A
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failure to- implement the procedure for placing the AFW System in standby
readiness and a failure to establish an appropriate procedure to determine and
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- evaluate unidentified leakage.
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REPORT DETAILS
-1.
Persons Contacted
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Licensee Employees
P. D. Rice, Vice-President, Vogtle Project Director
R. H. Pinson, Vice-President, Project Construction
C. W. Whitney, General Manager, Project Support
- G. Bockhold, Jr., General Manager Nuclear Operations
- E. M. Dannemiller, Technical Assistant to General Manager
- T. V. Greene, Plant Manager
R. M. Bellamy, Plant Support Manager
C. W. Hayes, Vogtle Quality Assurance Manager
- C. E. Belflower, Quality Assurance Site Manager - Operations
E. D. Groover, Quality Assurance Site Manager - Construction
- W. E. Mundy, Quality Assurance Audit Supervisor
D. M. Fiquett, Project Construction Manager - Unit 2
G. A. McCarley, Project Compliance Coordinator
W. C. Gabbard, Regulatory Specialist
- C. L. Cross, Senior Regulatory Specialist
C. F. Meyer, Operations Superintendent
R. M. Odom, Regulatory Compliance Supervisor
C. L. Coursey, Maintenance Superintendent (Startup)
M. A. Griffis, Maintenance Superintendent
G. R. Frederick, Quality Assurance Engineer / Support Supervisor
' *J. F. D' Amico, Nuclear Safety & Compliance Manager
W. F. Kitchens, Manager Operations
V. J. Agro, Superintendent Administration
A. L. Mosbaugh, Assistant Plant Support Manager
M. P. Craven, Nuclear Security Manager
- J. E. Swartzwelder, Deputy Manager - Operations
- W. E. Burns, Nuclear Licensing Manager
Other licensee employees contacted included craftsmen, technicians,
supervision, engineers, operations, maintenance, chemistry, inspectors,
and office personnel.
Other Organizations
H. M. Handfinger, Asst. Plant Support Manager - Bechtel
- Attended Exit Interview
2.
Exit Interviews - Units 1 & 2-(30703) (30703C)
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on April 3,
and
April 16, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above.
The
inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the
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inspection results.
No dissenting comments were received from the
licensee.
The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the
materials provided to or reviewed by the inspector during this inspection.
Region based NRC exit interviews were attended during the inspection
period . by a resident inspector.
The items identified during this
inspection are:
a.
Violation 50-424/87-12-01, " Failure to Place the AFW System in
Standby Readiness" - Paragraph 5.a.
b.
Violation 50-424/87-12-02, " Fail ure to Establish An Appropriate
Procedure to Determine and Evaluate Unidentified Leakage" - Paragraph
5.b.(6).(a).
c.
Unresolved Item 50-424/87-12-03, "Reportability of CRVI Actuations As
a Result of the Chlorine Gas Monitors" - Paragraph 4.
d.
IFI 50-424/87-12-04, " Review Licensee's Progress Toward Synchronizing
the ERF and SOE Clocks." - Paragraph 5.b.(1).
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters - Units 1 & 2 (92702)
Not inspected.
4.
Unresolved Items - Units 1 & 2 (92701)
Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to
determine whether they are acceptable or may involve violations or
deviations.
One unresolved item identified during this inspection is
discussed in Paragraph 7.
5.
Operational Safety Verification - Unit 1 (71707) (93702)
The plant began this. inspection period in startup (Mode 2) conducting low
power physics tests. On March 15, the unit dropped rod J3 and was forced
to proceed to cold shutdown (Mode 5) to perform repairs. On March 17, the
unit commenced a return to Mode 2 which was achieved on March 18.
On
March 19, the reactor tripped due to a high positive power rate and
subsequently returned to Mode 2.
Between March 20 and March 23, the unit
experienced three reactor trips related to steam generator level control.
On March 23, at 9:03 P.M. power operation (Mode 1) was obtained for the
first time.
Between March 23 and April 8,
the unit experienced three
reactor trips.related to steam generator level control. On April 8, the
unit was tripped as part of the Remote Shutdown Panel Capability Test and
returned to Mode 1.
On April 10 the unit tripped due to a feedwater check
valve failure and subsequently returned to power. On April 11, the unit
tripped due to steam generator water level problems. A unit outage was
conducted from April 11 through April 14. On April 14, the unit returned
to Mode 1 operation.
During the inspection period a total of ten (10)
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ESFAS Actuations occurred as follows: Five (5) Auxiliary Feedwater System
Actuations of which four (4) were related to tuning problems with the
bypass and main feed reg valves and the steam dump valves and one (1) was
as a result of a procedure error when I&C personnel were installing a
monitoring Jack; four (4) control room ventilation isolations of which
three (3) were as a result of an intake radiogas monitor (1RE-12116) and~
one (1) as a result of the Train
"B"
chlorine gas monitor; and one
(1) fuel handling building isolation as a result of an effluent radiogas
monitor (IRE-2532B). At the end of the inspection period the unit was
performing startup testing at the 50% power plateau.
a.
Control Room Activities
Control Room tours and observations were performed. to verify that
facility operations were being safely conducted within regulatory
requirements.
These inspections consisted of one or more of the
following attributes as appropriate at the time of the inspection.
Proper Control Room staffing
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Control Room access and operator behavior
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Adherence to approved procedures for activities in progress
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Adherence to Technical Specification (TS) Limiting Conditions
for Operations (LCO)
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Observance of instruments and recorder traces of safety related
and important to safety systems for abnormalities
Review of annunciators alarmed and action in progress to correct
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same.
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Control Board walkdowns
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Safety parameter display and the plant safety monitoring system
operability status
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Discussions and interviews with the On-Shift Operations
Supervisor, Shift Supervisor, Reactor Operators, and the Shift
Technical Advisor to determine the plant status, plans and
assess operator knowledge
Review of the operator logs, unit log and shift turnover sheets
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Additional inspections conducted consisted of an in-depth review of
the following safety-related clearances:
1-87-998 CCW #1 Train A
1-87-899 Accumulator Isolation Valve Breakers
During an NRC walkdown of the Main Control Board on April 2,1987,
the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump speed controller
(PDIC-5180A) was noted to be in the manual in lieu of the required
auto position. Upon notification by the NRC Resident, the licensee
took immediate corrective action to place the controller in the auto
position and completed the required Independent Verification Sheet.
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The inspector notes that while immediate action was taken to place
the identified mispositioned controller in its correct position, no
action was taken by the licensee to complete independent verification
(IV) sheets for other equipment which had not been previously
documented on IV sheets.
The inspector brought this to the
licensee's attention and IV sheets were to be completed to verify AFW
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standby readiness. The unit was in Mode 1 power operation at the
time of the discovery.
The inspector conducted further inspection into this matter to
determine if the licensee was in compliance with Techpical
Specification LCO 3.7.1.2.
A review of the completed unit o'perating
procedures (U0P's) (12004-1), the completed independent verification
sheets for placing the auxiliary feedwater system in standby
readiness per system operating procedure (SOP) 13610-1, and the
completed TDAFW pump operability tests per surveillance procedure
14546-1 was performed to determine when the TDAFW pump was last
operated and properly restored to standby readiness.
The inspector
determined that the TDAFW pump was last operated on March 28, 1987,
during the loss of offsite power (LOSP) startup test as documented in
the unit control log and was subsequently secured at 1002 (CST) the
same day.
When securing the TDAFW pump the speed controller is
placed in the manual position and reduced to 15-20% to reduce turbine
speed to 1500-1550 RPM, then the steam supply isolation valve is
closed and the pump is aligned for standby readiness if the unit is
in Modes 1, 2, or 3 per S0P 13610-1. After the LOSP test the unit
was in Mode 3.
The unit then went critical on March 29, 1987, at
0958 (CST) and subsequently entered Mode 1 on March 30, 1987, at 0338
(CST).
During this review the inspector noted that independent
verification sheets which document that certain components are
positioned and then independently verified to be correct had not been
performed for either of the above two evolutions when the TDAFW was
initially secured and then later when Mode 1 was entered as required
by the applicable S0P 13610-1 and UDP 12004-1.
In addition, the
inspector noted that independent verification (IV) sheets had not
been performed for placing the AFW System (i.e. motor and turbine
driven pumps) in standby readiness for the following additional
evolutions:
Evolution Requiring IV of AFW
Date
Procedure
In Standby Readiness
3/20/87
Securing TDAFW Pump
3/25/87
S0P 13610-1
Securing TDAFW Pump
3/25/87
UOP 12004-1
Entering Mode 1
3/27/87
U0P 12004-1
Entering Mode 1
A review was then conducted of the auxiliary feedwater startup test
procedure (1-5AL-01) results to determine the TDAFW pump ability to
supply feedwater to the steam generators with the speed controller in
the manual position and set at approximately 20%. The startup test
data reflected that with the speed controller in manual and set at
50% the turbine speed is 2700 RPM and the pump discharge pressure is
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750 psig.
Therefore, the inspector concluded that the TDAFW pump
would not feed the steam generators which are at approximately
1000 psig.
This information was presentea to the licensee on
April 3, 1987.
The licensee's investigation into this matter revealed that with the
speed controller in manual with a 20*; demand signal that the pump
would have developed a discharge head of approximately 700 psig upon
start and that operator action would have been required to adjust the
speed control unit while in manual or place it in automatic during
response to an accident condition. Relative to the failure to place
the TDAFW pump in standby readiness the licensee determined that this
failure to comply with plant procedures was centered primarily around
one operating crew which has now been counselled as to the
seriousness of this situation and the importance to comply with plant
policy requirements.
Based on the above, the inspector concluded the following: The AFW
system was signed off in the unit control log and in the UOP 12004-1
as being placed in standby readiness on 3/30/87 at 0230 (CST).
Therefore, the maximum amount of time the TDAFW pump would be
considered inoperable based on the above signoffs is 75 hours8.680556e-4 days <br />0.0208 hours <br />1.240079e-4 weeks <br />2.85375e-5 months <br /> and 25
minutes.
Since TS LCO 3.7.1.2 action statement allows 78 hours9.027778e-4 days <br />0.0217 hours <br />1.289683e-4 weeks <br />2.9679e-5 months <br />
before the unit should be placed in hot standby it does not appear
that the time limit for complying with the TS action statement was
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violated. However, it should be noted that since the IV sheets were
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n'ot performed for placing the AFW standby readiness during the
securing of the TDAFW pump after the LOSP test the possibility exists
that the TDAFW pump could have been inoperable since March 28, 1987,
in which case TS LCO 3.7.1.2 action statement time limit would have
been exceeded.
Due to the failure to perform independent verification sheets for
placing the AFW system in standby readiness per S0P 13610-1 the
inspector concluded that TS 6.7.la which requires that written
procedures shall be implemented had been violated.
The foregoing is considered to be in violation of Technical Specification 6.7.la
and will
be
identified as Violation
50-424/87-12-01, " Failure to Place the AFW System in Standby
Readiness."
b.
Facility Activities
Facility tours and observations were performed to assess the
effectiveness of the administrative controls established by direct
observation of plant activities, interviews and discussions with
licensee personnel, independent verification of safety systems status
and LC0's, licensee meetings and facility records.
During these
inspections the following objectives are achieved:
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(1) Safety
System Status (71710) - Confirmation of system
operability was obtained by verification that flowpath valve
alignment, control and power supply alignments, component
conditions, and support systems for the accessible. portions of
the ESF' trains were. proper.
The inaccessible portions' are
confirmed
as
availtbility permits.
Additional
in-depth
inspection of the auxiliary feedwater (AFW) system was performed
to review the_ system lineup procedure with the plant drawings
and as-built configurations, compare valve : remote and local
indications, walkdowns were expanded to include . hangers and
supports, and electrical equipment interiors.
The inspector
verified that the lineup was in accordance with license
requirements for system operability.
During the NRC walkdown of the AFW System Valve Lineup the
inspector questioned the installation of the splice boxes for
motor operator valves 1HV-5113 " Condensate Stor.ne Tank No.2
Supply to TDAFW Pump" and 1HV-5106 "TDAFW Pump Steam Supply
Isolation." A review was conducted of the following documents
to determine the installation requirements:
Document %
Title
X3AR01
Electrical Construction Specification
CX3DF001,
Conduit and Tray General Notes,
2, 3, & 6
Symbols and Details Shts 1 - 4
1X3DH7C4
Conduit Grounding Lighting &
Communications Plan - AFW Pumphouse -
Unit 1
AX2094V050,
Typical Conduit Support Details
51, 52, 53,
Shts 1
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54, 55, & 56
Elementary Diagram AFW IHV-5113
Elementary Diagram AFW 1HV-5106
ED-T-02
Raceway Installation
ED-T-08
Cable Termination
ICE 7C4RS119
EE 580 Card for 1HV- 5106
1CE7C4RL120
EE 580 Card for 1HV-5106
1CE7C4RL121
EE 580 Card for 1HV-5113
1CE7C4RS122
EE 580 Card for 1HV-5113
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The inspector's concern relative to the installation of the
splice boxes for the subject valves was that they were not
anchored nor supported from a structure but rather were being
supported off of the conduit. Based on the inspector's review
of the above documents the inspector concluded that this was not
an acceptable installation without further engineering review to
ensure that it would meet seismic design criteria.
This
information was presented to the licensee on April 3, 1987.
A followup meeting with the licensee was conducted on April 15,
1987, where the licensee presented the following information to
the inspector.
The licensee had initiated Deficiency Card
No. 1-87-1060 to address the inspector's concern.
This
deficiency card documented the concern and provided engineering
justification consisting of a calculation which qualified the as
installed condition for a use as is disposition.
The above information was considered by the inspector for the
existence
of a violation against 10 CFR 50 Appendix B,
Criterion V.
In addition, the fact that the installed condition
was determined to be acceptable and that the inspector had not
identified any other examples of
improper splice box
installations was taken into consideration. Since the inspector
considers the above an isolated case with no safety significance
it was decided that a violation does not exist.
During the inspection period the inspector inquired about the
progress that was being made to coordinate the Emergency
Response Facility (ERF) computer and Sequence of Events (SOE)
clocks as a result of a deficiency noted in the preoperational
test program.
The inspector was informed that the engineering
request to add a circuit that would maintain the clocks
synchronized had been disapproved. The inspector addressed a
concern to the Plant Support Manager that, based on a human
factor's point of view, the manual correction of time errors
could affect the accuracy of a post event review. The inspector
obtained a commitment to re-review the issue and develop a
resolution either by an administrative program or hardware
change.
During the Remote Shutdown Test the inspector also
noted that the ERF computer time was approximately ten minutes
slower than the control room clock.
The Technical Support
Center was noted as having three clocks with different times.
While the inspector's concern was to synchronize the two clocks
(ERF and SOE) the licensee should develop a program to
synchronize all plant clocks. The following item is identified
to track this item IFI 50-424/87-27-04, " Review Licensee
Progress Toward Synchronizing the ERF and SOE Clocks."
Storage of material and
(2) Plant Housekeeping Conditions
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components and cleanliness conditions of various
areas
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throughout the facility were observed to determine whether
safety and/or fire hazards existed.
(3) Fire Protection - Fire protection activities, staffing and
equipment were observed to verify that fire brigade staffing was
appropriate and that fire alarms, extinguishing equipment,
actuating
controls,
fire
fighting
equipment,
emergency
equipment, and fire barriers were operable.
(4) Radiation Protection - Radiation Control Areas (RCAs) were
observed to verify proper identification and implementation. In
addition, an inspector attended the licensee's respiratory
protection training program which is conducted once a week at
the on-site training center.
The total program was observed
including all lessons, written test, subsequent fit testing and
actual respirator usage.
(5) Security - Security controls were observed to veri fy that
security barriers were intact, guard forces were on duty, and
access to the Protected Area (PA) was controlled in accordance
with the facility security plan.
Personnel within the PA were
observed to verify proper display of badges and that personnel
requiring escort were properly escorted. Personnel within vital
areas were observed to ensure proper authorization for the area.
One item of concern regarding the Badge Island was forwarded to
the Region II office. The inspection also included attendance
at the security meetings being held to improve security
hardware.
(6) Surveillance (61726)(61700) - Surveillance tests were observed
to verify that approved procedures were being used; qualified
personnel were conducting the tests; tests were adequate to
verify equipment operability; calibrated equipment was utilized;
and TS requirements were followed.
The inspectors observed
portions of the following surveillances and reviewed completed
data against acceptance criteria:
Surv. No.
Date
Title
14000
3/25/87
Mode 1 and 2 Shift and Daily
Surveillances
14915
3/25/87
Minimum Temperature for
Criticality - Data Sheet 1
14915
3/25/87
Control Rod Insertion Limits -
Data Sheet 5
24614-102-
4/1/87
Safety Features Sequencer Train B
3009
Analog Channel Operational Test
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'(a)
Independent Measurement of RCS Leak Rates (61728)
This inspection was conducted to independently verify .that
operations procedure 14905-1, "RCS Leakage Calculation
(Inventory Balance)" demonstrated compliance with Technical
Specification LC0 3.4.6.2.
The inspection utilized the
RCSLK9 computer program contained in NUREG-1107.
During the inspection conducted on April 7 the surveillance
data for the licensee tests conducted on April 3 and
April 6,
1987, were reviewed.
From this review the
inspector noted that the licensee had calculated the
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following results (Note: All values gpm)
1
Total
Test
Previous
Date
Leakage
Identified
Identified
Unidentified
Apr 3
2.61
0
6.2
-3.59
Apr 6
4.874
.327
6.2
-1.653
The NRC calculational results were:
Total
Test
Previous
Date
Leakage
Identified
Identified
Unidentified
Apr 3
2.83
0
6.2*
-3.37
Apr 6
4.48
.07
6.2*
-1.80
- 6.2 gpm Previous Identified leakage is not calculated as
part of this test.
From the above data the inspector concluded that both GPC
and NRC were in close agreement with what the Total Leakage
should be,- however two concerns were generated. The first
concern pertained to the fact that Unidentified leakages
were being calculated as negative values.
The acceptance
criteria requires action when unidentified leakage exceeds
<1 gpm. Since the licensee was calculating negative values
(e.g. April 3, -3.59 gpm) the true unidentified leakage
would have to increase by 4.59 gpm before the acceptance
criteria would be exceeded. The use of imaginary numbers
is not an acceptable practice and the licensee must
investigate and evaluate the source of negative values to
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ensure that a <1 gpm unidentified leakage can be measured.
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The second concern, relates to the first, was that the
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Total Leakage had increased from 2.61 to 4.874 gpm, or a
2.264 gpm change.
This change represented an increase in
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unidentified leakage which exceeded the <1 gpm limit. This
information was presented to the licensee on April 7, 1987.
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While the licensee developed a course of action to address
these issues the inspector- obtained previous test data.
The inspectors concluded that the major source of error
appeared to be the 6.2 gpm value of previous identified
leakage.
This value was extracted from surveillance
14450-1, "RCS Pressure Isolation Valve Leak Test."
The
inspectors informed the licensee that this data should,
with proper engineering evaluation or methodology be
adjusted to reflect the test configuration appropriate for
the inventory balance conditions. These adjustments should
consider actual Delta P across the leaking valve or the
system valve lineups which might affect the leakrate. The
objective is to recognize that unidentified leakage must be
a number greater than 0 gpm and action taken to identify
the leakage when the leakage exceeds <1 gpm.
On April 9 the licensee computed the following test
results:
Total
Test
Previous
. Leakage
Identified
Identified
Unidentified
6.34
2.5
6.2
-2.36
The NRC results were:
Total
Test
Previous
Leaka_ge
Identified
Identified
Unidentified
6.53
2.88
6.2
-2.55
From the above data the total leakage had increased an
additional 1.466 gpm (6.34-4.874) and identified leakage
had increased 2.173 gpm from the April 6 test results.
The licensee preliminary investigation as of April 14 has
indicated several sources of error where corrective action
is needed. The first source of error appears to be that
the Reactor Collection Drain Tank levels were not being
recorded correctly during the tests. This error results in
larger values of identified leakage which when added to the-
6.2 gpm value would have resulted in unidentified leakage
being more negative than previously calculated.
The
licensee also is continuing to quantify crude tank and
accumulator levels to support making correction to the
previous identified values.
The April 14 test did not
include the 6.2 gpm value of identified leakage as the
licensee now believes that an appropriate adjustments can
be made.
The April 14 data indicates the following:
Total
Test
Previous
Leakage
Identified
Identified
Unidentified
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5.15
3.7
1.95
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If the licensee had continued to utilize the 6.2 gpm value,
the 10 gpm identified leakage limit would have been
exceeded. The licensee intends to revise the procedure Lto
incorporate methodology that will ensure that the 1 gpm of
unidentified leakage will be detectable and not masked by-
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excessively large values of identified leakage. This will
ensure prompt identification of the leakage.
Due to the inadequacy of Surveillance Procedure 14905-1,
"RCS Leakage Calculation (Inventory Balance)" to properly
quantify the amount of unidentifiable leakage.the inspector
concluded that T.S.6.7.la which requires that written
procedures shall be established, implemented and maintained
had been violated.
The following item is identified to track this violation
50-424/87-27-02, " Failure to Establish an Appropriate
Procedure to Determine and Evaluate Unidentified Leakage."
The inspector considered the potential for the existence of.
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a violation against the Technical Specification LCO 3.4.6.25. but after discussions with the Region II office
and the fact that total leakage was low the violation was
more appropriate to address the procedural aspects of the
problem.
(7) Maintenance Activities (62703)(62700) - The inspector observed
maintenance activities to verify that correct equipment
clearances were in effect; work requests and fire prevention
work permits, as required, were issued and being followed;
quality control
personnel were available for inspection
activities as required; retesting and return of systems to
service was prompt and correct; TS requirements were being
followed. Maintenance backlog was reviewed
I
The
inspector
reviewed
the
following completed / approved
Maintenance Work Orders to verify that required administrative
approvals were obtained before initiating the work; LCO's were
met while the component or system was removed fron service;
inspections were made in accordance with the. licensed
l.
requirements and quality control
records were complete;
'
functional
testing and calibrations, as necessary, were
completed before returning the equipment to service; measuring
i
l
and test equipment used was identified and in calibration and
that parts and materials used were identified and at least met
!
i
the specifications of the original equipment.
l
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MWO #
Title
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1-87-03393
AFW SG#2 and 3 Valves (1 HV-5132 & 1
HV-5134) Failed to Open on Actuation.
1-87-04377
VCT Outlet Isolation Valve ILV-0112C
Failed to Stroke Fully Closed When
Manually Stroked From QMCB.
1-87-04394
Loop #4 Wide Range Cold Leg Temperature
Indicator ITI-0443B is Reading Approxi-
mately 40 Degrees F. Colder Than Other
Loops.
1-87-04362
Voltage From Turbine Impulse Chamber
Pressure Transmitter 1PT-505 is Reading
Lower Than From the Other IPT-506.
1-87-04221
Main Steam Safety Reliefs Lifted Due To
High Pressure But Failed to Fully Seat.
1-87-04538
While Reactor was At 35% Power NI-32
Re-energized by Itself.
Two violations were identified as discussed above.
6.
Startup Test Program Implementation / Verification - Unit 1 (72302)
The inspector reviewed the present implementation of the Startup Test
Program.
Test Program attributes
inspected
included review of
administrative requirements, document control, documentation of major test
events and deviations to procedures, operating practices, instrumentation
calibrations, and correction of problems revealed by testing.
Periodic facility tours were made to observe Startup Test activities in
progress.
The - inspector verified that procedural prerequisites and
i ni'ti al conditions were met.
Verification was performed by the
inspector's review of records (valve lineup sheets, test equipment
calibration status, system status checklists, or appropriate signoffs
listed in procedure were maintained current) or by direct observation
(monitoring instrumentation indications, valve positions,
equipment
position switches or personnel actions).
Discussions were held with
responsible personnel, as they were available, to determine their
knowledge of the Startup Test Program. Schedules for Startup Test Program
completion and progress reports were routinely monitored.
Specific
. inspections conducted are listed below:
a.
Startup Tests
(1) Loss of Offsite Power Test Procedure Review and Witnessing
(72582)
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The inspector reviewed the loss of offsite power at greater than
10% Power Startup Test. Procedure (1-600-09) for administrative
format and technical adequacy. A review of licensee commitments
from applicable FSAR Chapters, Regulatory Guide 1.68 and the
Safety Evaluation Report was performed and compared with
requirements contained in the test procedure.
This included
verifying that pertinent prerequisites were identified, initial
test conditions and system status were specified, acceptance
-criteria were specified, and management approval and appropriate
committee review were indicated.
The inspector witnessed selected portions of the loss of offsite
power at greater than 10% Power Startup Test Procedure. The
inspection included attendance at briefings held by .the test
supervisor to observe the coordination and general knowledge of
the procedure with the test participants.
Overall crew
performance was evaluated during testing. A preliminary review
of the test results was compared to the inspector's own
observations.
Problems encountered during performance of the
test were verified to be adequately documented, evaluated and
dispositioned. During the performance of the test the inspector
verified that the following occurred:
-
Hot Standby Condition was achieved and maintained, for 30
minutes, using only emergency.on-site power sources.
-
Natural circulation of the Reactor Coolant System.
Reactor Trip, -Turbine Trip, and Reactor Coolant Pumps
-
tripped following loss of offsite power.
-
Transfer from the Reserve Auxiliary Transformer to the
onsite standby power supply occurred and the diesel
generators started and loaded on loss of offsite power.
-
Turbine driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump started.
(2) Shutdown From Outside the Control Room Procedure Review and Test
Witnessing (72583)
The inspector reviewed the Remote Shutdown Startup Procedure
(1-600-08) for administrative format and technical adequacy. A
review of licensee commitments from applicable FSAR Chapters,
Regulatory Guide 1.68 and the Safety Evaluation Report was
performed and compared with requirements contained in the test
procedure. This included verifying that pertinent prerequisites
were identified, initial test conditions and system status were
specified, acceptance criteria were specified and management
approval and appropriate committee review were indicated.
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.
The inspector witnessed the Remote Shutdown Test from the Main
Control Room and the Train "B" Remote Shutdown Panel on: April 9
and 14, 1987. The purpose of this was to verify that the test
was conducted with the minimum shift crew and that no equipment
was used other than that which would normally be available for a
plant cooldown from.outside the Control Room.
A preliminary
review of the test results was compared to the inspector's own
observations.
Problems encountered during performance of the
test were verified to be adequately documented, evaluated and
dispositioned. During the performance of the. test the inspector
verified that the following occurred:
-
The Reactor was tripped from the Remote Shutdown Panel.
-
Control was transferred from the Control Room to the Remote
Shutdown Panel.
-
With stable conditions were achieved the plant was
maintained in a hot standby condition from the Remote
Shutdown Panel for a minimum of 30 minutes.
-
Remote Shutdown Panel
Instrumentation, Controls, and
Interlocks functioned properly.
(3) Ultimate Heat Sink Heat Rejection Capability Test Procedure
Review
The inspector reviewed the Ultimate Heat Sink Heat Rejection
Capability Startup Test Procedure (1-6EF-01) for administrative
format and technical adequacy. A review of licensee commitments
from applicable FSAR Chapters, Regulatory Guide 1.68 and the
Safety Evaluation Report was performed and compared with
requirements contained in the test procedure.
This included
verifying that pertinent prerequisites were identified, initial
test conditions and system status were specified, acceptance
criteria were specified, and management approval and appropriate
committee review were indicated.
No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
Review of Licensee Event Reports - Unit (90712)
Licensee Event Reports (LERS) and Deficiency Cards (DC's) were reviewed
for potential generic impact, to detect trends, and to determine whether
corrective actions appeared appropriate.
Events which were reported
immediately, were reviewed as they occurred to determine if the technical
specifications were satisfied.
During the inspection period the inspector conducted a review of the
licensee's evaluation of reportability per 10 CFR 50.72 and 10 CFR 50.73
.
.
.
. .
15
for Control Room Ventilation Isolation (CRVI) Actuations to date which
were documented in the Unit Control Log and on the following DCs:
DC No~.
Title
Licensee's Evaluation
1-87-746
CRVI on Radiogas Monitor RE12116
Reportable
1-87-782
No CRVI, RE12117 Radiogas Monitor
Not Reportable
1-87-792
CRVI on Radiogas Monitor RE12116
Reportable
1-87-849
CRVI on Chlorine Gas Monitor
Not Reportable
1-87-1012 CRVI on Radiogas Monitor RE12116
Reportable
1-87-1022 CRVI on Radiogas Monitor RE12116
Reportable
1-87-1061 CRVI on Chlorine Gas Monitor AE12110
Not Reportable
1-87-1071 CRVI on Radiogas Monitor RE12116
Reportable
The inspector questioned the licensee concerning their evaluation of
non-reportability of the two (2) CRVI actuations on Chlorine Gas which
occurred on February 20, 1987, and April 4,
1987.
The licensee-informed
the inspector that their present guidance on Engineered Safety Features
'
Actuation System (ESFAS) actuations reportability which is specified in an
internal correspondence letter dated February 2,1987, does not consider
CRVI Actuation as a result of the Chlorine Gas Monitors an ESFAS
Actuation. The licensee further stated that their basis for determining
that CRVI actuations as a result of the Chlorine Gas Monitors were not
reportable was
that Technical
Specification Table
3.3-3,
Instrumentation Trip Setpoints."
Item 10 Control Room Emergency Mode
Actuation does not list the Chlor.ine Gas Monitors but rather only the
Intake Radiogas Monitors. Therefore, only CRVI actuations as a result of
the Intake Radiogas Monitors are reportable as ESFAS actuations.
The inspector informed the licensee that based on the following criteria
the CRVI actuations which occurred on February 20, 1987, and April 4,
1987, as a result of the Chlorine Gas Monitors should be considered
reportable ESFAS actuations per 10CFR50.72 and 10CRF50.73.
FSAR Sections
6.0,
6.4 and 7.3.6 describe the CRVI System as an Engineered Safety
Features System. NUREG 1022 Supplement No. I which gives guidelines for
reporting states that ESF systems in general are defined in the FSAR and
that actuation of any ESF is reportable. The licensee stated that their
corporate office was presently reviewing their reportable guidelines and
that this issue would be re-reviewed.
Pending the results of the
licensee's review of the reportability of CRVI actuations as a result of
the Chlorine Gas Monitors this item will remain unresolved and be
identified as Unresolved Item 50-424/87-12-03, "Reportability of CRVI
Actuations As A Result of the Chlorine Gas Monitors."
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No violations or deviations were identified.
8.
General Construction Inspection - Unit 2 (92706)
Periodic random surveillance inspections were made throughout this
reporting period in the form of general type inspections in different
. areas of the facility.
The areas were selected on the basis of the
scheduled activities and were varied -to provide wide coverage.
Observations were made of activities in progress to note defective items
or items of noncompliance with the required codes and regulatory
requirements.
On these inspections, particular note was made of the
presence of quality control inspectors, supervisors, and quality control
. evidence in the form of available process sheets, drawings, material
identification,
material
protection,
performance
of tests,
and
housekeeping.
Interviews were
conducted
with
craft
personnel,
supervisors, coordinators, quality control inspectors, and others as they
were available in the work areas.
The inspector reviewed numerous
construction deviation reports to determine if requirements were met _in
the areas of documentation, action to resolve, justification, and approval
signatures in accordance with GPC Field Procedure No. GD-T-01.
No violations or deviations were identified.
9.
Fire Prevention / Protection and Housekeeping Measures - Unit 2 (42051C)
The inspector observed fire prevention / protection. measures throughout the
inspection period. Welders were using welding permits with fire watches
and extinguishers.
Fire fighting equipment was in its designated areas
throughout the plant.
The inspector . reviewed and examined portions of procedures pertaining to
the fire prevention / protection measures and housekeeping measures to
determine whether they comply with applicable codes, standards, NRC
Regulatory Guides and licensee commitments.
The inspector observed fire prevention / protection measures in work areas
containing safety related equipment during the inspection period to verify
the following:
(
-
Combustible waste material and rubbish was removed from the work
areas as rapidly as practicable to avoid unnecessary accumulation
of combustibles.
-
Flammable liquids were stored in appropriate containers and in
designated areas throughout the plant.
Cutting and welding operations in progress have been authorized by an
-
appropriate permit, combustibles have been moved away or safely
covered, and a fire watch and extinguisher was posted as required.
Fire protection / suppression equipment was provided and controlled in
-
accordance with applicable requirements.
l
No violations or deviations were identified.
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10.
Structural Concrete - Unit 2 (47053C)
a.
Procedure and Document Review
The inspector. reviewed and examined portions of the following
' procedures pertaining to the placement of concrete to determine
whether they comply with applicable codes, standards, NRC Regulatory
Guides and licensee commitments.
- CD-T-02, Concrete Quality Control
- CD-T-06, Rebar and Cadweld Quality Control
- CD-T-07, Embed Installation and Inspection
b.
Installation Activities
The inspector witnessed portions of the concrete placement indicated
below to verify the following:
(1)
Forms, Embedment, and Reinforcing Steel Installation
Forms were properly placed, secure, leak tight and clean.
-
-
Rebar and 'other embedment installation was installed in
accordance with construction specifications and drawings,
secured, free of concrete and excessive rust, specified
distance from forms, proper on-site .rebar bending (where
applicable) and clearances consistent with aggregate size.
(2) Delivery, Placement and Curing
-
Preplacement inspection was completed and approved prior to
placement utilizing a Pour Card.
-
Construction joints.were prepared as specified.
-
Proper mix was specified and deliverad.
-
Temperature control of the mix, mating surfaces, and
ambient were monitored.
-
Consolidation was performed correctly.
-
Testing at placement location was properly performed in
accordance with the acceptance criteria and recorded on a
Concrete Placement Pour Log.
-
Adequate crew, equipment and techniques were utilized.
-
Inspections during placements were conducted effectively
by a sufficient number of qualified personnel.
-
Curing methods and temperature was monitored.
(3) Rebar Splicing
The inspector witnessed cadwelding operations to verify the
following:
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18
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Inspections are performed during and after splicing by
qualified QC inspection personnel.
Each splice was defined by a unique number consisting
-
of the bar size, splice type, the position, the
operator's symbol, and a sequential number.
Process and crews are qualified.
-
-
The sequential number and the operator's symbol are marked
on all completed cadwelds.
The inspector also conducted random inspections of completed
cadwelds to verify the following:
-
Tap hole does not contain slag, blow out, or porous metal.
-
Filler metal was visible at both ends of the splice sleeve
and at the tap hole in the center of the sleeve. No voids
were detected at the ends of the sleeves.
-
The sequential number and the operator's symbol are marked
on all completed cadwelds.
No violations or deviations were identified.
11.
Containment (Steel Structures and Supports) - Unit 2 (48053C)
Periodic inspections were conducted to observe containment steel and
support installation activities in progress, to verify the following:
Components were being properly handled (included bending or
-
straightening).
-
Specified clearances were being maintained.
-
Edge finishes and hole sizes were within tolerances.
-
Control, marking, protection and segregation were maintained during
storage.
Fit-up/ alignment meets the tolerances in the specifications and
-
drawings.
No violations or deviations were identified.
12.
Safety-Related Structures (Structural Steel and Supports) - Unit 2
(48063C)
Periodic inspections were conducted to observe construction activities of
safety-related structures / equipment supports for major equipment outside
the containment to verify that:
-
Materials and components were being properly handled to prevent
damage.
-
Fit-up/ alignment t.are within tolerances in specifications and drawing
requirements.
-
Bolting was in accordance with specifications and procedures.
-
Specified clearances from adjacent components were being met.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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13. Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary and Safety Related Piping - Unit 2
(49053C) (49063C) (37301)
Periodic inspections were conducted to observe construction activities of
the Reactor Coolant Boundary and other safety-related piping installations
inside and outside Containments.
Verifications included but were not
limited to the following:
)
Material and components were being properly handled and stored in
-
order to prevent damage.
Fit-ups and alignments were within tolerances per specifications and
-
drawings.
Specified clearances from pipe to pipe and adjacent components were
-
met.
Piping was installed and inspected in accordance with applicable
-
drawings, specifications, and procedures.
-
Those people engaged in the activity are qualified to perform the
applicable function.
Drawing and specification changes (revisions) are being handled and
-
used correctly.
No violations or deviations were identified.
14. Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary and Safety Related Piping Welding - Unit
2 (55073C) (55083C)
Periodic inspections were conducted during daily plant surveillances on
safety-related pipe welding at various stages of weld completion.
The
purpose of the inspection was to determine whether the requirements of
applicable specifications, codes, standards, work performance procedures
and QC procedures are being met as follows:
Work was conducted in accordance with a process sheet which
-
identifies the weld and its location by system, references procedures
or instructions, and provides for production and QC signoffs.
-
Welding procedures, detailed drawings and instructions, were readily
available in the immediate work area and technically adequate for the
welds being made.
-
Welding procedure specification (WPS) were in accordance with the
applicable Code requirements and that a Procedure Qualification
Record (PQR) is referenced and exists for the type of weld being
made.
-
Base metals, welding filler materials, fluxes, gases, and insert
materials were of the specified type and grade, have been properly
inspected,
tested and were
traceable
to
test reports or
certifications.
_ _ _ . . .
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. Purge and/or shielding gas flow and composition were as specified in
-
!-
the welding procedure specification and that protection was provided
to shield the welding operation from adverse environmental
l
conditions.
9
Weld joint _ geometry including pipe wall thickness was specified and
-
that surfaces to be welded have been prepared, cleaned and inspected
'
in accordance with applicable procedures or instructions.
. A sufficient . number of adequately qualified QA and QC inspection -
-
personnel were'present at the work site, commensurate with the work
in progress.
The. weld area cleanliness was maintained and that pipe alignment and
-
fit-up tolerances were within specified limits.
Weld . filler material being used was in accordance with welding
-
specifications, unused filler material was separated from other types
'
of material and was stored properly and that weld rod stubs were
!
properly removed from the work location.
i ,-
3~
That there were no evident signs of cracks, excessive heat input,
-
sugaring, or excessive crown on welds.
-
Welders were qualified to the applicable process and thickness, and
that necessary controls and records were in place.
'
No violations or deviations were identified.
- 15 .
Reactor Vessel, -Integrated Head Package, and Internals - Unit 2 (50053C)
(50063C)
,
The inspection consisted of examinations of the Reactor Vessel installed
"
in' containment,- the Reactor Vessel head with the installed control rod
drive mechanisms, and the upper and lower internals in their designated
a
laydown area.
Inspections also determined that proper storage protection
practices were in place and that entry of foreign objects and debris was
. prevented.
'
No violations or deviations were identified.
16.
Safety Related Components - Unit 2 (50073C)
i
The inspection consisted of plant tours to observe storage, handling, and
f
protection; installation; and preventive maintenance after installation of
safety-related components to determine that work is being performed in
accordance with applicable codes, NRC Regulatory Guides, and licensee
commitments.
'
I
During the inspection the below listed areas were inspected at various
j
times during the inspection period to verify the following as applicable:
i
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4
,
. ,.
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-
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_
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.
Storage, environment, and protection of components were in accordance
-
with manufacturer's instructions and/or established procedures.
Implementation of special storage and maintenance requirements such
-
as:
rotation of motors, pumps, lubrication, insulation testing
(electrical), cleanliness,etc.
' Performance of licensee / contractor surveillance activities and
-
documentation thereof was being accomplished.
-
Installation requirements were met' such as: proper location,
placement, orientation, alignment, mounting (torquing of bolts and
expansion anchors), flow direction, tolerances, and expansion
clearance.
Appropriate stamps, tags, markings, etc. were in use to - prevent
-
oversight of required inspections, completion of tests, acceptance,
and the prevention of inadvertent operation.
Safety-Related piping, valves, pumps, heat exchangers, and instrumentation
were inspected in the following areas on a random sampling ~ basis
throughout the inspection period:
- Residual Heat Removal Pump Rooms
- Diesel Generator Building
- Auxiliary Feedwater Pumphouse
- Containment Spray Pump Rooms
- Pressurizer Rooms
- Main Coolant Pump Areas
- Steam Generator Areas
,
- Safety Injection Pump Rooms
- RHR and CS Containment Penetration Encapsulation Vessel Rooms
- Component Cooling Water (CCW) Heat Exchangers, Surge Tanks & Pump Rooms
- Cable Spreading Rooms
- Accumulator Tank Areas
- Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS) Letdown Heat Exchanger
Pump Room
- Battery & Charger Rooms
- Nuclear Grade Piping, Valves & Fittings Storage Areas
- Spent Fuel Pool Heat Exchanger Rooms
- Pressurizer Relief Tank Area
'
- CVCS Centrifugal Charging Pumps & Positive Displacement Pump Rooms
- Bottom Mounted Instrumentation (BMI) Tunnel and Seal Table Area
- BMI and Supports Under Reactor Vessel
- NSCW Tower Pump Rooms and Pipe Tunnels
- Containment, Auxiliary Building, Control Building, and Fuel Handling
Building auxiliary (secondary) areas
No violations or deviations were identified.
,
17.
Safety Related Pipe Support and Restraint Systems - Unit 2 (50090C)
l
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-
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.
22
Periodic random inspections were conducted during the inspection period to
observe construction activities during installation of safety-related pipe
supports to determine that the following work was performed in accordance
with applicable codes, NRC Regulatory Guides, and licensee commitments:
Spring hangers were provided with indicators to show the approximate
-
" hot" or " cold" position, as appropriate.
No deformation or forced bending was evident.
-
-
Where pipe clamps are used to support vertical lines, shear lugs were
welded to the pipe (if required by Installation Drawings) to prevent
slippage.
-
Sliding or rolling supports were provided with material and/or
lubricants suitable for the environment and compatible with sliding
contact surfaces.
-
Supports are located and installed as specified.
-
The surface of welds meet applicable code requirements and are free
from unacceptable grooves, abrupt ridges, valleys, undercuts, cracks,
discontinuities, or other indications which can be observed on the
welded surface.
No violations or deviations were identified.
18.
Electrical and Instrumentation Components and Systems - Unit 2 (51053C)
(52153C)
Periodic inspections were conducted during the inspection period to
observe safety-related electrical equipment in order to verify that the
storage, installation, and preventive maintenance was accomplished in
accordance with applicable codes, NRC Regulatory Guides, and licensee
commitments.
During the inspection period inspections were performed on various pieces
of electrical
equipment during storage,
installation,
and cable
terminating phase in order to verify the following as applicable:
- Location and alignment
- Type and size of anchor bolts
- Identification
- Segregation and identification of nonconforming items
- Location, separation and redundancy requirements
- Equipment space heating
- Cable identification
- Proper lugs used
- Condition of wire (not nicked, etc.), tightness of connection
- Bending radius not exceeded
- Cable entry to terminal point
- Separation
No violations or deviations were identified.
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19. Electrical and Instrumentation Cables and Terminations - Unit 2 (51063C)
(52063C) (53053C)
a.
Raceway / Cable Installation
The inspector reviewed and examined portions of the following
procedures pertaining to raceway / cable installation to determine
whether they comply with applicable codes, NRC Regulatory Guides and
licensee comm'tments.
- EO-T-02, Raceway Installation
- ED-T-07, Cable Installation
Periodic
inspections were conducted to observe construction
activities of Safety Related Raceway / Cable Installation.
In reference to the raceway installation, the following areas were
inspected to verify compliance with the applicable requirements:
- Identification
- Alignment
Bushings (Conduit)
- Grounding
- Supports and Anchorages
In reference to the cable installation the following areas were
inspected to verify compliance with the applicable requirements:
- Protection from adjacent construction activities (welding, etc.)
- Coiled cable ends properly secured
- Non-terminated cable ends taped
- Cable trays, junction boxes, etc. , reasonably free of debris
!
- Conduit-capped, if no cable installed
- Cable supported
'
I
- Bend radius not exceeded
- Separation
b.
Cable Terminations
The inspector reviewed and examined portions of the following
r
I
procedures pertaining to cable termination to determine whether they
comply with applicable codes, NRC Regulatory Guides and licensee
commitments.
- ED-T-08, Cable Termination
In reference to cable terminations the following areas were inspected
to verify compliance with the applicable requirements.
-
.
_
.
.
-
24
- Cable identification
- Proper lugs used
- Condition of wire (not nicked, etc.)
- Tightness of connection
- Bending radius not exceeded
- Cable entry to terminal point
- Separation
No violations or deviations were identified.
20.
Containment and Safety Related Structural Steel Welding - Unit 2 (55053C)
(55063C)
Periodic inspections were conducted during daily plant surveillances on
safety-related steel welding at various stages of weld completion.
The purpose of the inspection was to determine whether the requirements of
applicable specifications, codes, standards, work performance procedures
and QC procedures are being met as follows:
Work was conducted in accordance with a process sheet or drawing
-
which identifies the weld and its location by system, references,
procedures or instructions, and provides for production and/or QC
signoffs.
Welding procedures, detailed drawings and instructions, were readily
-
available in the immediate work area and technically adequate for the
welds being made.
-
Welding procedure specification (WPS) were in accordance with the
applicable Code requirements and that a Procedure Qualification
Record (PQR) is referenced and exists for the type of weld being
made.
-
Base metals and welding filler materials were of the specified type
and grade, were properly inspected, tested, and were traceable.
Protection was provided to shield the welding operation from adverse
-
environmental conditions.
-
Weld joint geometry including thickness was specified and that
surfaces to be welded were prepared, cleaned and inspected in
accordance with applicable procedures or instructions.
A sufficient number of adequately qualified QA and QC inspection
-
personnel commensurate with the work in progress were present at the
work site.
4
Weld area cleanliness was maintained and that alignment and fit-up
-
tolerances were within specified limits.
- - _ - _ _ _ - - _ - _ _ _
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ - _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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25
Weld - filler material being used was in accordance with welding
-
specifications, unused filler material was separated from other types
of material and was stored and controlled properly, and stubs were
properly removed from the work location.
There were no visual signs of cracks, excessive heat input, or
-
excessive crown on welds.
Welders were qualified to the particular process and thickness; and
-
that necessary controls and records were in place.
No violations or deviations were identified.
21. Allegations - Units 1 & 2
a.
Allegation, RII 86-A-0216, Electrical Splices Inside Penetrations.
Concern
An - alleger stated there were electrical cable splices inside two
penetrations at Plant Vogtle.
Discussion
The alleger could not identify the specific penetrations except that
they were somewhere in the Auxiliary Building.
The inspector
reviewed the GPC Quality Concern files and found that this specific
concern had not been submitted to GPC Quality Concerns, and that
,
there were no other concerns relating to electrical cable splices in
penetrations. A review of procedures and specifications reveals that
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electrical cable splices are not permitted in field run conduit or
trays (raceways), except on a special case by case basis.
Cable
insulation damage may be replaced with an approved splice when
documented on a Deviation Report (DR) or a Field Change Reouest
(FCR). Specific controls and inspections are delineated in Procedure
ED-T-08 and Specification X3AR01.
The inspector, GPC Quality
Control, and GPC Quality Concerns are unaware of any past or present
problems with unauthorized field run cable splices. The inspector
/
notes that many NRC electrical inspections such as 50-424/87-13 and
85-20 Para. 6 included plant walkdowns and detailed electrical
inspections which did not detect any unauthorized cable splicing
practices.
Conclusion
<-
.
The alleger could not identify or locate the subject penetrations.
Since there have been no prior examples of unauthorized cable
splicing, the inspector can only conclude that the splices seen by
the alleger were authorized and acceptable.
This allegation is
considered closed.
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22.
Followup on Previous Inspection Items - Units 1 & 2 (92701)
(Closed) IFI 50-424/87-12-06, . Review Followup Interview Regarding QCP File
87V0044. Georgia Power Quality Concern personnel interviewed the subject
QC inspector referred to in the tasic Quality Concern. No additional
specific detailed information was provided that affected the conclusion
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presented in Inspection Report 50-424/87-12.
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