ML20213E764

Forwards Branch Review Rept on Section 3.6 Lighting Criteria of Emergency Lighting,App R Exemption Request Submittal.Emergency Lighting Illumination Levels Well Below Recommended Values for Safe Operation

ML20213E764
Person / Time
Site:	Indian Point
Issue date:	03/21/1984
From:	Moore V Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	Benaroya V Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML20213E767	List: ML20213E764 ML20217C076 ML20217C081 ML20217C088 ML20217C094 ML20217C100 ML20217C106 ML20217C112 ML20217C148 ML20217C165 ML20217C171 ML20217C176
References
FOIA-90-570 NUDOCS 8404040324
Download: ML20213E764 (2)

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.2ic=rs) 1 MAR 211934 DISTRIBUTION:

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MaiORANDUM FOR:

Victor Benaroya, Chief Chemical Engineering Branch Division of Engineering i

i FROM:

Yoss A. Moore, Chief i

Human Factors Engineering Branch i

Division of Human Factors Safety

SUBJECT:

EMERGENCY LIGHTING, APPuiDIX R EXDlPTION REQUEST,

!HDIAN P0lHT 2 Enclosed is the HFEB review report on Section 3.6 Lighting Criteria" of the.

Emergency Lighting, Appendix R Exemption Request submittal for Indian Point 2.

Wo find that the emergency lighting illumination levels proposed by the licensee are well below the reconsnanded values for safe operation

-(readinggaugesandswitchlabels)andsafetransitofpersonnel, i

This review was conducted by R. J. Eckenrode of the HFEB.

If further k'

information is required. Hr. Eck,enrode may be reached on extension 24882.

Yoss A. Moore, Chief Human Factors Engineering Branch Division of Human Factors Safety

Enclosure:

As Stated cci -11. Thompson W. Russell R. Ferguson

0. Kubicki

Contact:

R. J. Eckenrode x24882

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3.6.2 Category 2

_ Reading $ witch Designations The required lighting level for reading a label is inversely proportional to the size of the lettering.

The 0.03 ft-L luminance level selected by the licensee, based on the referenced Human Engineering Guide, suggests a letter height of at least 0.30 inches to be viewed at no farther than 28 inches.

1 Label lettering and markings on controls are rarely) 0.30 inches height.

The staff recomends a minimum of ten (10 ft-c illumination for 3 emergency lighting to provide a luminance of approximately six (6) ft-L. '

3.6.3 Category 3

-Reading Gauges The coments of 3.6.2 also apply to this task category.

The staff recomends aminimumoften(10)ft-cilluminationforemergencylighting, 3.6.4 Category 4 General Access and Eoress The staff has accepted the recomendation of the IES as it pertains to lighting for safety.

We consider personnel transit conditions in a nuclear power plant to present a high hazard situation (not low, as the licensee suggests) and operator activity level to range from low to high.' The

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' ant'cipated level of operator activity should be determined and justified by the licensee.

The IES recomendation for these conditions is an absolute 4

minimumoftwo(2)ft-catthelowactivitylevelandfive(5)ft-catthe's high activity level.

To avoid tripping hazards and head injury. the staf endorses these illumination levels at both the floor and six-foot levels z

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SAFT AMERICA INC

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Portablo Battery Division

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April 12, 1990 i

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1450 Maria Lane i

Suite 210 Walnut Creek, CA 94596 i

ATTH: Mr. Chuck Ramsey Gentlemen:

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An explanation of'the curve attached is as follows.

I After charging at 20" C for 14 - 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> at the C/10 charge rate, the battery is stored for 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> at a specific temperature.

After storage the battery is discharged at a specific rate and the remaining available capacity is as found on the curve.

Best Regards, g

w. C*w 0 J.M. Connelly Manager, Government Sales and Customer Support Services JMC:jh

Enclosure:

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/,g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION C '

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%.....e Ak120NA PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY SALT RIVER PROJECT AGRICULTURAL IMPROVEMENT AND POWEP DISTRICT ELPASOELECTRILCOM.PANY SOUTHERN CALIF 0PNIA EDISON COMPANY PUBl1C SERV 1CE COMPANY OF NEW MEX100 LSE ANGELES DEPARTMENT OF WATER AND POWER i

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA PUBLIC POWER AUTHORITY DOCKET NO. STN 50-530 PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNIT 3 FACILITY OPERAT1hG LICENE License No. NPF-74 C

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1.

The Nuclear _ Regulatory Comission (the Comission or the NRC) has found that:

A.

The application for license filed by Arizona Public Service Company on behalf of itself and the Salt River Project Agricultural Improve-ment and Power District El Paso Electric Company, Southern California Edison Company, Public Service Company of New Mexico. Los Angeles Department of Water and Power, and Southern California Public Power Authority (licensees)complieswiththestandardsandrequirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and the Comission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter 1,'and all required-notifications to other agencies or bodies have been duly made; B.-

Construction of the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 3-(facility) has been substantially completed in conformity with Construction Pemit No. CPPR-143 and the application, as amended.

the provisions of the Act, and-the regulations of the Comission; C.=

The facility will operate-in confomity with the application, as amended,-the provisions of the Act and the regulations of the Comission (except as exempted-from compliance in Section 2.0 Lelow);

D.

There is reasonable assurance:

(1)thattheactivitiesauthorized by this operating license can be conducted without endangering the

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health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Comission's regelations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I (except as exempted from compliance'in Section 2.D below);

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-5 Nuclear Generating Station Security Plan," with revisions submitted through March 10,1?S7, including a Chapter 8 Contingency Plan, ard

'Falo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Guard Training and Qualification Plan," with revisions submitted through December 7, 1984 F.

ApS thall implement and traintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire trotection program as descMbed in the Final Safety Analysis Report for the facility, as supplemented and amenced, and as approved in the SER through Supplement 11 subject to the following provision:

APS rnay make changes to the approved fire protection program without approval of the Comission only if those changes would not adversely affect the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown in the event of a fire.

G.

Except as otherwise provided in the Technical Specifications or the Environmental Protection Plan, APS shall report any violations of the requirements contained in Section 2.C of this license in the following r,anner:

Initial notification shall be made within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> to the NRC Operations Center via the Errergency Notification System, with written follow-up within 30 days in accordance with the procedures described in 10 CFR 50.73(b), (c), and (e);

H.

The licensees shall have and maintain financial protection of such type and in such amounts as the Comission shall require in accordance with Section 170 of t:u Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, to cover public liability claires; and I.

This licenst is effective as of the date of issuance and shall expire at midnight on March 25, 2027.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION NN Thomas E. Murley, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Attachments:

1.

2.

Appendix A -

Technical Specifications 3.

Appendix B -

Environmental Protection Plan 4.

Appendix C -

Antitrust Conditions Date of Issuance:

November 25, 1987

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At least one division would remain free of fire damage.

Alternately, applicant has upgraded the floor / ceiling assembly in such a manner that this a" mbly forms a continuous barrier between one elevation and tne next.

In some cases, suth as between elevation 120 ft and 140 ft of the auxiliary-building, the vertical fire barrier is not completely fire rated, such as at a steel hatchway.

How ver, because of the existing fire protection features (fire detection, u t.a1 fire suppression, manual firetighting equipment) and the low fire load, it is the staff's judgment that the non-fire-rated construction will withstand the effects of a fire until the fire is extinguished.

-The staff, therefore, concludes that althougl. deviations have bean identified in Amendment No. 13 to the FSAR, the fire protection capability for safe shut-down achieves an acceptable sevel of safety comparable to that achieved by full compliance with Section III.G of Appendix R.

Alternate' Shutdown By letters dated September 26 and October 5 and 16, 1984, the applicant sub-mitted the results of its spurious actuation analyses for a fire it the contu room or outside of the control room.

Because of several concerns raised dur s the staff's review of these reports, the applicant provided revisions to these documents by a November 1_L_19.8.4.,, letter.

In determining thc ability of the plant to be safely shut down in the event of a fire,-the applicant analyzed the effects of fire-induced hot shorts, open circuits, and shorts to grounds on safe shutdown capability.

For the firA Auk-

'ce of the control room, the evaluation was performed for each fire zone iden-led in the submittal; for the control room fire the study considered only

..e electrical circuitry in the contiol room.

Both aralyses were performed for situations with and without offsite power.

Once a given spurious operatica was identified, whether action or-inaction of a coroponent, the applicant determined what capabilities would be availabic to the ooerator which would assist in the identification and mitigation of the undesirable event.

In addition, any time constraints that affected rectifica-tion of unwanted plant conditions were quantified.

Next, those actions neces-sary to prevent-the spurious ope.tA. tion _were~ de_ tail _ed_alorg_with_any20mpensatory measures neadq Lto implement the_ corrective action _s.

s The results of the above process yielded those areas of the plant where either ganual actions were acceptable or where design changes, such as rerouting or protecting cables, were necessary.

In_ those instanc_es where_oper_alo_t._ag_tions are needed, the applicant will identify those requirements itLthe_p.lant_procc-d.EeLor_li.te_s.Critegy_ book.

On the basis of its review of the methodology used by the cpplicant to determine those spurious ' operations resulting from a fire outside of or in the control room, the stafi concludes that the PVNGS 1-3 design conforms to the technical requirements of Section III.G and III.L of Appendix R to 10 CFR 50.

During its review the staf f noted that several fire areas, systems, or evalua-tion findings had been deleted in a November 13, 1984, submittal (Revision 1 to 9 reports) without justification.

In response to staff questions, the appli-it stated in a letter dated December 7,1984, that Fire Areas 1, 2, 3A, and Palo Verde SSER 7 9-15

l1 G Ct) eu 2

_s 38, all of which involved spurious operation of the'es"?ntial chilled water expansion tank level control valve, were removed beci a hydraulic analysis demonstrated that the discharge pressure of the cundne transfer pump could not lift the chilled watsr system. lief valves; therb c i, this was not a credible release path.

This analysis also accounted for the removal of the chilled water expansion tank from several evaluation findings contained in the November 13, 1984, submittal.

On the basis of its review of the above information and the information con-tained in the December 7, 1984, letter, the staff concludes that the applicant 3l has acceptably addressed all deviations between the original and revised ver-sions of the reports,

jj During the course of the reviLw, the staff expressed L concern that multiple i

high impedance f aults cou'1 result in the loss of the necessary power supply for safe shutdown equipment.

The effects of multiple high impedance faults occur when several circuits from a common bus are located in the same fire area. When a fire occurs in this area, it can cause faults in these circuits, but the faults may not be of low enough impedant, to trip the individual breakers.

However, the sum of the faults (low impedance) may trip the main breaker which protects the power supply of the bus.

If safe-st.utdown equipment is energized from the same bus, once the main breaker trips, the equipment has lost its power source.

During discussions with the applicant on December 18, 1984, the applicant con-firmed that its previous cable separation analysis demonstrates that for a fire in any one area, multiple high-impedance faults may affect only one division.

However, the second electrical train is available to ensure power to safe-shutdown equipment.

On the basis of the review of this information, the staff concludes that the applicant has acceptably demonstrated that multiple high impedance faults are not a concern in the PVNG5 1-3 design, As a further result of the spurious actuation and associated circuits analyses, the applicant committed to implement a number of modifications to satisfy the staff's guidelines or to mitigate staff concerns.

These commitments are con-tained in letters dated October 2 and November 13 and 21, 1984.

All work will be completed by April 1, 1985.

Implementation of these modifications prior to low power operation is not necessary because only small quantities of radio-nuclide inventory will exist in the reactor coolant system and, therefore, will not affect the health and safety of the public.

Pending completion of these nodifications, the applicant will establish an hourly fire watch in all the affected areas.

This measure provides reasonable assurance that if a fire should occur, it will be detected and suppressed in its initial stages before significant damage occurs.

On the basis of the applicant's commitments and the interim fire protection measures, the staff concludes that the requirements of GDC 3 have been met and are, therefore, acceptable.

In updated responses to Questions 9A.74(12), 9A.92 and 9A.92(19e) provided in the FSAR, the applicant identified a number of shutdown-related circuits that will be rerouted in PVNGS Units 2 and 3, in lieu of protecting them with a fire-rated barrier as was done in PVNGS Unit 1.

Because these cables will be

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physically and electrically independent of the fire area, the separation of these cables will meet the requirements of Section III.G of Appendix R and is,

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therefore, acceptable.

Palo Verde SSER 7 9-16

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Basis?

I Appendix R's scope does not consider any failures other than thoss caused'by the fire.

14.

Evaluation drawings will be Bechtel-controlled project documents.

Examples are:

P&ID's 13-M-XXP-XXX Elementaries 13-E-XXB-XXX Loop Diagrams 13-J-XXE-XXX One-Line Diagrams 13-E-XXA-XXX Controlled Vendor Prints

- PSAR Chapter 9 Appendix 9B Basis:

The identification of the control drawings defines the cource mate-rial used for the evaluation and aids in trae*6bility and reproduci-

.bility of results.

15.

Postu1Lted fires in each PSAR Table 9B fire scne mi the Auxiliary Building,' Control Builcing and Main Steam Su;; rt Stincture will be evaluated for their impact on the ability to acales. SSD.

Basis:

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The Turbine Building and Radwaste Building are excluded since no safety-related equipment is housed in these areas.

The Puel Handling Building is excluded since it does not house safe shutdown components.

Tne Diesel Generator Building is excluded because it complies with Appendix R with no deviations.

The Containment Build-ing is excluded because it is addressed by the deviation from the-separation requirements of Appendix R for components and circuits located inside containment.

16.

Deleted.

17.. Simultaneous failures of both power supplies to one of the BOP ESPAS

. cabinets (PPEVAS, CREPAS, CPIAS Load Shed, CRVIAS, DGSS, Load Sequencer) cannot prevent the ability to achieve safe (cold) shutdown.

Basis:

SLmultaneous failures of both power supplies to a BOP ESPAS cabinet can result in activation of both trains of sequencer activated devices associated with PBEVAS, CREPAS, and CPIAS.

This is.not a significant concern since actuation of these devices (essential i

chilled water, cooling water, spray pond, etc.) has no negative 1

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P 2) below the ceiling.

This is in accordance with other guidance provided in NFPA.72E.-

Because, the detectors in the power block are installed at a greater density than required and because the above design concept ~provides reasonable assurance that fire and smoke will be detected, the staff considers this con-cept to be an acceptable deviation from Section 4-4.7.3 of NFPA 72E.

9.5.1.4 Emergency Lighting The SER stated that 8-hour battery powered emergency lights are provided in all areas of the plant necessary for safe shutdown.

By letter dated April 15, 1985, the applicant confirmed that this design concept includes the access and egress routes to these areas.

This is in accordance with the technical require-ments of_ Section III.J of Appendix R to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regula tions Part 50 (10 CFR 50).

It is, therefore, acceptable.

9. 5.1. 5 Fire Protection for Specific Areas Other Plant Areas The SER evaluated the fire hazards and. corresponding fire protection for a num-ber of plant locations and found them acceptable.

By letter _ dated April 15, 1985, the applicant stated tha.t the fire load in auxiliary building fire zone 54 was incorrectly calculated.

The corrected loading is 88,000 Btu /ft2 instead

-of 1400_ Btu /ft2, This _ change is simply an error currection, It does not re-

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- present new hazards or combustible material.

This was confirmed in an inspec-

- tion by NRC fire protection engineera between March 4 and 8,1905.

Therefore,

.the staff's previous conclusion as to the acceptability of the fire protection program in-this location rew ins valid.

9. 5.1. 7 Administrative Controls-and Fire Brigade The SER concl'uded that the self-contained breathing apparatus for the fire bri-gade and control room personnel was. acceptable. -By-letter. dated April 29, 1985, the-applicant deleted reference to-a supplemental; air compressor that had been

in Amendment 13.

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However, the guidelines of -Section 0.4 of Appendix A to NRC Branch Technical Position;(BTP) APCSB-9.5-1 are still being met-because the l

l required 6-hour reserve air supply is provided via bottled air.

Therefore,-the staff's SER conclusion that the system is acceptable remains unchanged.

9.5.1.10 Summary of Deviations From Appendix A to BTP APCSB 9.5-1 and Appendix R to 10 CFR 50 SSER No. 7 listed the approved deviations from the staff's fire protection guide-lines.

On the basis of the above evaluation, the staff also concludes that the l

following deviation is acceptable:

(25) Location of certain fire detectors below the ceiling,

'( 9. 5.1. 2 ) -

Palo Verde SSER 8 9-4

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Fg i1 Table 98.3-1 C

U COMPARISON OF PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION TO APPENDIX A OF 13 L1 1

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NRC BRANCH TECHNICAL POSITION APCSB 9.5-1 (Sheet 14 of 68)

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QUALITY ASSURAFCE rpOCRAM (COWTINITI) e

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APPLICA;10N DOCKETED BITT CONSTRUCTION F1JurTS L'NDER CONSTRUCT.ON AND PERrt1T NOT RECEIVED AS OF 7/1/76 OPERATING FIANTS PVNCS POSITION AND BAS 15 TOR NON-C0f!PLIANCE ITLM i

3. Coetrol of Purchased Material. Equip-

3. Control of Perchased Materiel. Equipment and Services (cestimmed) seet and Services (continued)

Performance Test Verification Reports (where *Fplicable).

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Pressere Test Verification Reports (hydro, site leek, or versom h

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g Cestificates of Ceegliance for $bipment.

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of activities affecting fire protection the independent inspection orgeoisetion. ANI is tecluded is the U

should be established and executed by, seview cycle for oli instellation drawings and witness of system 13 g

h or for the orgasiastion performing the acceptence tests.

g activity to verif y confermance with Qgg documented installation drawings and g

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test procedures for accomplishing the O VI O activities.

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5. Test end Test Control

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OO U3 E 'O and implemented to assure that testing N

is performed and verified by inspecties NNU and sedit to de**astrate confermance WOO with design ame system reedimese h

requisements. The tests should be performed to accordance with writtes test procedures; test resulte should be g

N properly evaluated and acted on.

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6. Inerectice. Test and Operettea Status

6. leerection. Test med Drerstier Status UIh C3

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X Measures should be established to FVNCS complies.

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required tests and inspections.

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Table 9B.3-1 V

g COMPARISON OF PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION TO APPENDIX A OF kI' 13 G

6 NRC BRANCH TECHNICAL POSITION APCSB 9.5-1 (Sheet 13 of 68) 19 C.

QCALITY ASSURMCE FROCRAM F*

La APP 11 CATION DOCKE7ED SCT CONSTRtlCTION F! ANTS WDER CONSTRUCTION AC FERMIT NOT RECEITT.D AS OF 7/1/76 CPERATING PUUfTS

'FvN;S POSITION AND BASIS FOR NON-CCPFLIANCE ITL%

Quality assurance (QA) progrees of appli-SAME esats and contractors should be developed APS bas deu-loped end Leptemested a enslity esserence pregree for the and implencated to assere that the fire protec*.ios progree for esfety related erees. The F7NGS fire pre-requireecets for desige, precerement, tacties QA progree includes the fellowies:

installation, sed testieg and seeiefstra-tive controls for the fire protection Z

progree for asfety related areas as 00 def f ac-1 in this Branch Peef ties are O

satisfied. The progree should be ssder s

the management costret of the Q% organi-D zation. The QA progree criterte that T

[

applies to the fire protecties progree O

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should include the following; C

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1. Design Centrol and Procerceent. Docu-4 seat Centrol

1. Design Centrol end Procarceret Dense +et Centrol qh q

gg5m Measures shoald be established to O N *>

FWCS complies. The oceemres to be established are delleested is

• Z M y>

assare that all design-related guide-1tres (2) through (10) below, 13 k Q w lines of the Branch Technical Posities are included la design and procurenest w

Cf3 docuecate end that deviattees therefree O in O are controlled.

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2. Instruct!oes. Procedores and Dravinte HO

2. lestructies. Procedures and Ereviens

• M lastructions, tests, administrative cos' els, fire drille end training FVNGS complies.

that govera the fire protection progree should be prescribed by documented gg wQ instructions, procedures or dreviege O

and should be accomplished is accord-Zpy asce with these docueents.

MM y

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3. Control of Purchased Material. Iquip-TMU to meet end Serences

3. Centrol et Purchased Material. Enf reent and Services O3M c

Mv C1 Meeseres should be established to DH~

assure that purchased material, equit-PVNCS complies by requirieg each surplier/subcostrector to furnish 6

mest and services confers to the the following documents for their respective fire protecties equip-g yp precarement documents.

sent er serviceer g

g Code Ceeplisere documents which ere prepered by the mesefecturer 8 O>

3 er installer and certified by the Authorized Code leepector.

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION j

WASHINGTON,r 'A 20555

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ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY SALT RIVtR PROJECT AGRICUL_TURAL IMPROVEMENT AND POWER DISTR EL PASO ELECTRIC COMPANY

_ SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF NEW MEXIC0 LOS ANGELES DEPARTMENT OF WATER AND POWER

_ SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA PUBLIC POWER AUTHORITY DOCKET NO. STN 50-529 PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNIT 2 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE i

License No. NPF-51 1.

The Nuclear Regulatory Comission (the Comission or the NRC) has found that:

A.

The application for license filed by Arizona Public Service Company, on behalf of itself and the Salt River Project Agricultural Improve-ment and Power District, El Paso Electric Company, Southern California Edison Company, Public Service Company of New Mexico, Los Angeles Department of Water and Power, and Southern California Public Power Authority (licensees), complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and the Comission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I and all required notifications to other agencies or bodies have been duly made; B.

Construction of the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 2 (facility) has been substantially completed in conformity with Construction Permit No. CPPR-142 and the application, as amended, the provisions of the Act and the regulations of the Commission; C.

The facility will operate in conformity witn the application, as amended, the provis %ns of the Act, and the regulations of the Comission (except as exempted from compliance in Section 2.D below);

(6) Fire Protection Program (Section 9.5.1, SSER S, SSER 7 and SSER 8)

APS shall implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program as described in the Final Safety Analysis Report for the facility, as supple-mented and amended, and as approved in the SER through Supplement 8, subject to the following provision:

APS may make changes to the approved fire protection program without prior approval of the Comission only if those changes would not adversely affect the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown in the event of a fire.

(7)

Inservice Inspection Program (Sections 5.2.4 and 6.6, SER and SSER 9)

Prior to September 10, 1986, APS shall submit the inservice inspection program for Unit 2 for NRC review and approval.

(8) ppplementNo.ItoNUREG-0737 Requirements APS shall complete the items listed in Attachment 2.

D.

(1) APS has previously been granted an exemption from Paragraph lll.D 2(b)(ii) of Appendix J to 10 CFR Part 50. This exemption was previously granted in Facility Operating License NPF-46 pursuar.t to 10 CFR 50.12.

(2) APS has previously been granted a partial exemption from those portions of General Design Criterion 4 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50 which require protection of structures, systems, and components against certain dynamic effects associated with postulated reactor coolant system pipe breaks. This exemption was granted on November 29, 1985 (50 FR 50020) pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12 for a period ending with the completion of the second refueling outage for PVNGS-2 or the adoption of the proposed rulemaking for modification of GDC 4 whichever occurs first.

With the granting of these exemptions, the facility will operate, to the extent authorized herein, in conformity with the application, as amended, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission.

E.

APS shall fully implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the physical security, guard training and qualification, and safeguards contingency plans previously approved by the Commission and all amendments and revisions to such plans made pursuant to the authority of 10 CFR 50.90 and 10 CFR 50.54(p). The plans, which

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ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY SALT RIVER PROJECT AGRICULTURAL IMPROVEMENT AND POWER DISTRI EL PASO ELECTRIC COMPANY SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF NEW MEXICO LOS ANGELES DEPARTMENT OF WATER AND~ POWER

• SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA PUBLIC POWER AUTHORITY DOCKET NO. STN 50-528 PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNIT 1 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE License No NPF-41 1.

The Nuclear Regulatory Comission (the Commission or the NRC) has found that:

A.

The application for license filed by Arizona Public Service Company, on behalf of itself and the Salt River Project Agricultural Improve-ment and Power District, El Paso Electric Company, Southern California Edison Company, Public Service Company of New Mexico Los Anceles Department of Water and Power *, and Southern California Public Power Authority (licensees), complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I and all required notifications to other agencies or bodies have been duly made; B.

Construction of the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1 (facility) has been substantially completed in confonnity with Construction Permit No. CPPR-141 and the application, as amended, the provisions of the Act and the regulations of the Commission; C.

The facility will operate in conformity with the application; as amended, the provisions of the Act, and the regulations of the Commission (except as exempted from compliance in Section 2.D below);

• Los Angeles Department of Water and Power will be included as an owner in this license on the date it officially acquires an ownership interest in the facility which is expected to occur shortly after Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1 achieves commercial operation.

)

_.. (6) Enviro'imental Qualification Pursuant tn the extension granted in the Commission letter of i

November 18, 1985, APS shall environmentally qualify the j

hydrogen recombiners according to the provisions of 10 CFR 50.49 by March 30, 1986.

This license amendment is effective as of November 18, 1985.

(7) Fire P_rotection Program (Section 9.5.1, SSER 6, SSER 7 and SSER 8)

APS shall implement and r.aintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program as described in the Final Safety analysis Report for the facility, as supplemented and amended, and as approved in the SER through Supplement 8, subject to the following provision:

s APS may make changes to the approved fire protection program without prior approval of the Comission only if those changes would not adversely affect the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown in the event of a fire.

This license amendment is effective as of the date of issuance.

Date of Issuance: April 8,1987 (8)

Emergency Preparedness In the event that the NRC finds that the lack of progress in completion of the procedures in the Federal Emergenc)

Management Agency's final rule, 44 CFR Part 350, is an '

indication that a major substantive problem exists in

, achieving or maintaining an adequate state of' preparedness, the provisions of 10 CFR Section 50.54(s)(2) will apply.

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Akl20NA~PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY SALT RIVER PROJECT AGRICULTURAL IMPROVEMENT AND POWEP DISTPICT EL PAS 0 ELECTRIC COMPANY

_ SOUTHERN CALIF 0PNIA EDISON COMPANY PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF NEW MEXICO LOS ANGELES DEPARTMENT OF WATER AND POWER SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA PUBLIC POL' R AUTHORITY DOCKET NO. STN 50-530 PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNIT 3 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE License No. NPF-74 f

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The Nuclear Regulatory Comission (the Commission or the NRC) has found that:

A.

The application for license filed by Arizona Public Service Company on behalf of itself and the Salt River Project Agricultural Improve-ment and Power District, El Paso Electric Company, Southern California Edison Company, Public Service Company of New Mexico, Los Angeles Department of Water and Power, and Southern California Public Power Authority (licensees) complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as acerded, and the Comission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter 1, and all required notifications to other agencies or bodie; have been duly made; B.

Construction of the Palo Verde Nuclear Gererating Station, Unit 3 (facility) has been substantially completed in confomity with Construction Pemit No. CPPR-143 and the ai> plication, as amended, the provisions of the Act, and the regulations of the Comission; C.

The facility will operate in confomity with the application, as amended, the provisions of the Act, and the regulations of the Comission (except as exempted from compliance in Section 2 D below);

D.

There is reasonable assurance:

(i) that the activities authorized by this operating license can be conducted without endangering the 1

(

health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will N

be conducted in compliance with the Comission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I (except as exempted from compliance in Section 2 D below);

-l! &.<t

I E./0 Huclear Generating Station Security Plan," with revisions submitted through March 10, 1987, including a Chapter 8 Contingency Plan, and "Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Guard Training and Qualification Plan," with revisions submitted through December 7, 1984 F.

APS shall implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program as described in the final Safety Analysis. Report for the facility, as supplemented and amended, and as approved in the SER through Supplement 11, subject to the following provision:

APS may make changes to the approved fire protection program without approval of the Comission only if those changes would not adversely affect the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown in the event of a fire.

G.

Except as otherwise provided in the Technical Specifications or the Environmental Protection Plan, APS shall report any violations of the requirements contained in Section 2.0 of-this license in the following manner:

Initial notification shall be made within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> to the NRC Operations Center via the Emergency Notification System, with written follow-up within 30 days in accordance with-the C

procedures described in 10 CFR 50.73(b), (c), and (e);

H.

The licensees shall have and maintain financial protection of such type and in such amounts as the Comission shall require in accordance with Section 170 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954,-as amended, to cover public liability claims; and I.

This license is effective as of the date of isstisnce and shall expire at midnight on March 25, 2027.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 1

r Thomas E. Murley, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Attachments:

1.

2.

Appendix A -

Technical Specifications 3.

Appendix B -

Environmental Protection Plan 4.

Appendix C -

Antitrust Conditions Date of Issuance:

November 25, 1987

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Table 9B.3-1 D

COMPARISON OF PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION TO APPENDIX A OF ct 13 D

NRC BRANCH TECHNICAL POSITION APCSB 9.5-1 (Sheet 33 of 68) o I

ti m

s D.

W CFYERA @ y rt.1r(S FOR PJ.A U Rg.fE 105 tCONTINURD)

(11 APPLICATION DOCrtTED ptTT COmfTRUCTION P!AKT3 t?IDER COW 5im aIOR AND FtRMIT NOT PFCt!?fD AS OF 7/1/16 OPER4T19*. F1JWT3 13 FvWG3 POSITIDF AND BASIS FOR WOW-COMP (,1ANCE ffEM3 5.

Lightinn and cm n h t h (Cont) 5.

Lightintend_ccersmleadon (cont) 5. ", tthtler and ccmicatJon (continued) indleideal 8-hour mis.1 seam bettery power supp13ee.

safe eh.tdown equirment end in access and egrose router thereto.

Emergency lighting f or persennel egrees f rom other plant erees le 15 provided bF 1-1/2-hour bettery unite. See section 98.2. " Fire g

Merards Aretysle*, for speelfle renes containing eeergency lighting.

O (b) P.itable seeled beam bettery g

overed portable hand Itghts (b) Sultable eseled been be'.tery powered portable hand lights are g

should be provided for provided t..

ergency use.

g emergency woe.

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Z l

(c) Fired esorgency commuf:Icetion OZ Q

W A

should use voice powered heed (c) Fire $ emergency vetee-powered headsete are provided et ZMOM sete et pre-selected statices.

pre-selecte$ ststions. See settlen 93.2 for specific renes 8.p O tenteinleg welce rowered headset phone jocke.

g3 37 ZM (d) Fired repeetore instelled to per-Md>TM Ow sit use of Portette redte cone = uni-(d) Fired rereetere are not utilfred in rywC3. The design et PvyCS hNNN cotton unite should be protected uses redte coew=micetione end base stet tene for coeumsnications

• • O N f rom erposure to fire demote.

frem the contrel room and remote shutdown renels.

The beee D

statione oro located renotely and wired to the control etstions.

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u se b....ieo on. e,e ot,roterto., fre..

,e fire.amage.

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'N REQUIREMENT DESIGN FEATURE tr H.

A site fire brigade shall be established, t'VNGS will comply

t4 trained, and equipped for manuaI u

firefighting.

r Y-1.

The fire brigade training program shall PVNGS will comply v

ensure that the capability to fight potential fires is established and maintained' mI J.

Emergency lighting units with at least PVNGS complies e

1 8-hour battery supply shall be provided

[

.M in-all areas needed for' operation of 3

safe shutdown' equipment and in access Y

and egress routes thereto y

K.

Administrative controls shall be The PVNGS Manager of Nuclear Operations implemented to minimize fire hazards will establish controls as required in areas important to safety L.

1.

Alternative or dedicated shutdown PVNGS alternative shutdown capability,

}

capability provided for a specific which is required only for the control area shall be able to achieve and room, has this capability maintain cold shutdown. During the postfire shutdown, the reactor d

PVNGS UPDATED FShR 2 A C2)

C OTi!ER AUXILIARY SYSTEMS Table 9.5-5 AREAS REQUIRING BOTil EMERGENCY AND ESSENTIEL LIGHTING

~

FOR SAFE SIIUTDOWN IN THE EVENT OF FIRE (Sheet 2 of 2)

Area Main Steam Support Structure Turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump room Motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pump room Train A main steam isolation and dump valves area Train B main steam isolation and dump valves area Access to above locations Nonpower Block Areas Condensate storagr tank pump house Access to above location 6

5 0

1 9.5-57

2 A (4)

PVNGS UPDATED FSAR OTHER AUXILIARY SYSTEMS tornado effects in discus

,d in section 3.3.

Flood design is discussed in section 3.4.

Missile protection 13" discussed in section 3.5.

Protection against the dynamic effects associated with the postulated rupture of piping is discussed in section 3.6.

Environmental design is discussed in section 3.11.

9.5.3.1.1 Safety Design Bases Safety design bases applicable to the lighting system are as follows:

A.

Safety Design Basis One Structures supporting the components of essential lighting and emergency lighting systems, which serve the main control room and the remote shutdown room, shall bo designed to retain structural integrity during and aftet a safe shutdown earthquake.

B.

Safety Design Basis Two IThelightingsystem, comprised of normal, emergency,

/<~

an'd essential subsystems, shall be designed so that a single failure of any subsystem or electrical com-ponent of a subsystem, assuming loss of offsite power.

terminate the system's ability to illuminate cannot areas occupied during a reactor shutdown or emergency.

9.5.3.1.2 Power Generation Design Basas Power generation design bases applicable to the lighting system are as follows:

A.

Power Generation Design Basis One Area lighting intensities provide the illumination required for comfort and worker etficiency in the performance of the visual activities required in that 9.5-54

7, 4 (d)

PVNGS UPDATED FSAR OTHER AUXILIARY SYSTEMS Xs area.

Outdoor lighting complies with the security provisions of ANSI N18.17-1973.

B.

Power Generation Decinn Basic Two Mercury-vapor fixtures and mercury switches are not I

used inside the containment building and fuel building.

C.

Power Generation Design Basis Three Lighting fixtures containing aluminum or aluminum alloys are not used inside the containment building.

9.5.3.1.3 Codes and Standards i

Design and installation of the plant lighting systems use the guidance provided by the National Electrical Code (NFPA No. 70-1975/ ANSI Cl-75) and the Handbook of the Illuminating Engineering Society, a

9.5.3.2

System Description

9.5.3.2.1 General Description Unit lighting is divided into three subsystems:

normal.

essential. and emergency.

The normal system is supplied from non-Class lE ac buses.

The essential system is connected to Class lE ac buses.

The emergenet lighting system, consisting of batteries, battery chargers, and lamps, is fed from the same supply as the essential lighting a:d function upon loss of ac power.

Refer to table 9.5-5 for a list of areas, requiring operator access to achieve safe shutdown in the event of fire, served by both the essential and emergency lighting systems.

9.5.3.2.2 Component Description The three lighting categories are described briefly in the following paragraphs.

/

9.5-55

- - ~.

s 2,_A_(

)

PVNGS UPDATED FSAR

g-_

OTHER AUXILIARY SYSTEMS

'(j[

The emergency lighting system is described-in subsec-tion 9.5.3.-

~

Applicable codes and regulations of the-State of Arizona, the National Fire Codes of-the National Fire Protection-Association (NFPA), and applicable sections.

of Title-29,-Chapter XVII. Part 1910, Occupational Safety and Health Standards of the Code of Federal Regulations, as set forth in the Federal Register.

Volume 37 Number 202, dated October 18, 1972, have been used as guidance in developing the plant fire protection system design.

9.5.1.2

System Description

'The water;and gaseous: portions of the fire protection systems are.shown schematically in figure 9.5-1.

Jable 9.5-1 provides a tabulation of the types.of fire protec-r tion and fire detection and actuating devices provided for q

each specific area ~in the plant.

Each units fire protection system is Ecomprised of diversified monitoring, detection, alarm. suppression. - and 'extinguisilment facilities particularly selected to protect thelarea or equip-ment ~from damage by fire.

The s'ystem includes t~he-following major' features:

Fire protection water supplies, yard mains, and e.

-hydrants Wet pipe sprinkler systems (h'/draulically designed) e Deluge water spray. systems (hydraulically ~ designed) o Automatic preaction systems'(hydraulically designed) e e:

Low-pressure carbon dioxide systemc.

~ e-Halon_1301 systems n

(

Standpipes and fire hose stations 9.5-7

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2 8 N)

PVNGS UPDATED FSAR FIRE IIAZARDS ANALYSIS

(-

H.

Fire Suppression 1.

Primary one portable CO fire extinguisher.

Partial 2

coverage by a preaction water sprinkler system near the nontated door in the north wall 2.

Secondary One portable CO fire extinguisher is located in 2

adjacent Zone 72.

I.

Ventilation Flow to outside J.

Drainage One 4-inch drain K.

Emergency Lighting Lighting with 8-hour battery unit (s) positioned for the operation of safe shutdown equipment is provided.

L.

Emergency Communications Sound powered phone jack (s) is provided.

[ 9B.2.12.4 Fire Area XII. Fire 20ne 74A. Main Steam Isolation and Dump Valves Area A.

Location Fire Zone 74A (figLres 9B-30, 9B-31, and 9B-32) is located in the main steam support structure at elevations 100 feet 0 inch, 120 feet 0 inch, and 140 feet 0 inch.

B.

Fire Prevention Features L.

Zone Boundaries and Rated Fire Barriers

[

North:

3-hour rated wall common to a turbine ama

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building staltwell k

98.2-342

2. /4[d)

PVNGS UPDATED FSAR

{f~

FIRE IIAZARDS ANALYSIS

(

l.

Ventilation Flow to outside J.

Drainage One 4-inch drain is provided at elevation 100 feet 0 inch.

K.

Emergency Lighting Lighting with 8-hour battery unit (s) positioned for the operation of safe shutdown equipment is provided.

L.

Emergency Communications Sound powered phone jack (s) is provided.

9B.2.12.5 Fire Area XII. Fire Zone 74B, Main Steam Isolation and Dump Valves Area A.

Location Fire 7,one 74B (figures 9B-30, 9B-31, and 9B-32) is located in the main steam suppott structure at eleva-

<tions 100 feet 0 inch, 120 feet 0 inch, and 140 feet 0 inch.

B.

Fire Prevention Features 1.

Zone Boundaries and Rated Fire Barriers North:

Nonrated wall of heavy concrete construction common to Zone 74A l0 Open to Zone 74A above elevation 156 feet 0 inch South:

3-hour rated wall common to:

l0 Fire Area XVII at elevations o

100 feet 0 inch and 120 feet 0 inch Fire Area XV at elevations 100 feet e

0 0 inch, 120 feet 0 inch, and 140 feet 0 inch 98.2-347

7, /3 ( b PVMGS UPDATED FSAR

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FIRE IIAZARDS ANALYSIS

.i

^

Open to the atmosphere above elevation

'(

155 feet 0 inch 0

East:

Nontated exterior wall of heavy concrete construction adjacent to the turbine building Open to the atmosphere above elevation 156 feet 0 inch k

West:

3-hour rated wall common to Fire Area X1 Open to the atmosphere above elevation 156 feet 0 inch Floor:

Nonrated barrier of heavy concrete construction common to Zone 73 0

Ceiling:

Nontated roof raised above the top of 4

the four walls, supported by steel structural beams

(

2.

Zone Access e

One nonrated maintenance door (pair) and transom in the nonrated north wall to Zone 74A at elevation 100 feet 0 inch ol Two nonrated d'o'rs in the noncated north wall e

o to Zone 74A, one each at elevations 120 feet 0 inch and 140 feet 0 inch One nonrated equipment hatch in the nonrated e

floor to Zone 73 One nonrated watertight o

emergency hatch in the nonrated floor to Zone 73 Ceiling is open to the atmosphere, to the o

south and cast, above elevation 156 feet 0 inch Ceiling is open to Zone 74A, e

to the north, above elevation 156 feet 0 inch 9B.2-348

bM PVNGS UPDATED FSAR

(.

FIRE IIAZARDS ANALYSIS A

3.

Sealed Penetrations Seals equal or exceed fire barrier rati.,t<<.

4.

Fire Dampers None S.

Protected Raceways Train A safe shutdown related conduit is covered by protective coating of 1-hour rating.

6.

Protected Structural Members None C.

Safety-Related Equipment and Components Train A steam generator No. 2 line No.

2, e

atmospheric dump valve, solenoid valves and controller (#'

f k

o Train B steam generator No. 1 line No.

2.

atmospheric dump valve, solenoid valves and controller a

Train A steam generator No. 2 blowdown isolation and solenoid valves (#

Train A steam generator No. 2 downcomer feedwater e

isolation and solenoid valves (a) e Train B steam generator No. 2 downcomer feedwater isolation and solenoid valves (#}

e Train A steam generator No. 2 economizer feedwater isolation valve (#}

^

Train B steam generator No. 2 cconomizer feedwater e

isolation valve ( }

l a.

Safe shutdown related 9B.2-349

2.A O/)

EVNGS UPDATED FSAR FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS e

Steam generator No. "., line No.

1, ~'ain steam m

isolation valve (#

Steam generator No.

2, line No.

2, main steam isolation valve ("I e

Steam generator No. 2 MSIV bypass and solenoid valves "

Train A steam supply to auxiliary feedwater e

I (turbine-driven) pt.m p " }

Train A nitrogen supply to atmospheric dump e

valve J-SGA-IIV-179 Train B nitrogen supply to atmospheric dump valve e

J-SGB-HV-185(#}

Train A conduit (a) e I"

e Train B conduit

(

D.

Nonsafety-Rolated Equipment and Components Cable trays and conduit E.

Radioactive Material None F.

. Combustible Loading l.

In Situ Combustible Load Quantity / Type e

33 pounds of cable insulation (llypa lo n )

e 143 pounds of cable insulation (other) 1 e

22 pounds of oil / grease e

1184 pounds of hydraulic fluid (Pyrquel) 2.

Transient Combustible Load Quantity / Type 50 pounds of-ordinary-combustible e

/

e 525 pounds of hydraulic fluid (Fyrquel) em :.

k a.

Safe shutdown related March 1989 9B.2-350 Revision 1

2, g (gf )

PVNGS UPCATED FSAR FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS 3.

Total Combustible Loading 56,lDV Btu per 1

square foot 4.

Equivalent Fire Severity 42 minutes G.

Fire Detection Heat actuated devices a';o provided f or actuating the deluge valve of the pecaction sprinkler system and to provide early warning.

H.

Fire Suppression 1.

Primary Automatic preaction sprinkler system 2.

Secondary One portable CO fire extinguisher is located in 2

adjacent Zone 74A at elevation 100 feet O inch.

One manual hose reel is located in the adjacent turbine building.

I.

Ventilation hlowtooutside J.

Drainage One 4-inch drain K.

Zmergency Lighting Lighting with 8-hour battery unit (s.'

positioned for the operation of safe shutdown equipment is provided.

Emergency Communications Sound povered phone jack (s) is provided.

March 1989 9B.2-351 Revision 1

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UNITED STATES

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 2

WASHING TON, D. C. 20555

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ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY

_ SALT RIVER PROJECT AGRICULTURAL IMPROVEMENT AND PO EL PASO ELECTRIC COMPANY 4

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF NEW MEXICO LOS ANGELES DEPARTMENT OF WATER AND POWER

_ SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA PUBLIC POWER AUTHORITY

-)

_ DOCKET NO. STN 50-529 PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNIT 2 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE q (" -

License No. NPF-51 1.

The Nuclear Regulatory Comission (the Commission or the NRC) has found that:

Th'e application for license filed by Arizona Public Service Company, A.

on behalf of itself and the Salt River Project Agricultural Improve-ment and Power: District, El Paso Electric. company,: Southern California Edison Company, Public Service Company,of New Mexico. Las Angeles

-Department of Water and Power, and Southern California Public Power Authority (licensees),complieswiththe~standardsandrequirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and the Commission's regulations set.forth.in 10 CFR Chapter I and all required no'ifications to other agencies or-bodies' have been du_1y made; B.

Construction of the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 2 (facility) has been substantially completed in conformity with Construction Permit No. CPPR-142 and the application, as amended, the provisions of the Act and the regulations of the Commission;.

=:

.C.

The facility will operate in conformity with the application, as.

amended, the provisions.of the Act, and the regulations of the.

Comission (except as exempted from compliance in Section 2.D below);

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(6) Fire Protection Program (Section 9.5.1, SSER 6. SSER 7 and SSER 8)

APS shall implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection' program as described in.the Final Safety Analysis Report for the facility, as supple-

"alted and amended, and as approved in the SER _ through i

Supplement 8, subject to the-following' provision:

APS may make changes to the approved fire protection program without prior approval of the Comission-only if those changes vwid not adversely affect the ability to-achieve and maintain safe shutdown in the event of a fire.

1 (7)

Inservice Inspection Program (Sections 5.2.4 and 6.6, SER and ISER 9)

Prior to-September 10, 1986, APS shall submit the insarvice

-inspectionLprogram for Unit 2 for NRC review and approval,

'(8)

Supplement-No. 1 to NUREG-0737 Requ_frements

_APS shall' complete the items listed in Attachment 2.

(

D.

(1) APS has previously been granted an exemption from Paragraph III.D.2(b)(11)rof Appendix J to 10 CFR Fart 50.t This exemption was:previously granted in Facility. 0perating License-NPF-46

. ; pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12.:

l(2) ;APS has previously been granted atpartial exemption'from those-

~ --portions of General Design Criterion 4:of Appendi.x A to 10 CFR--

Part 50 which require protection of; structures, systems. and components against certain dynamic effects' associated with postulated reactor coolant system 29, 1985 (pipe breaks.- This exemption was-granted on November 50 FR 50C20). pursuant to 10' CFR 50.12 for a period ending with the completion of-the second refueling outageLfor PVNGS-2 or the adoption of'the proposed rulemaking for. modification -of GDC 4 whicheverf occurs first.

.'With the-granting of these exemptions, the: facility:will operate, to the extent authorired hereir, in conformity with the: application, as amended.

the provisions nf the Act, and the rules and regulations of the-Commission.

E.

APSlshall. fully implement and maintain in effect al.1 provisions of the physical security, guard training: and qualification, and.

safeguards contingency plans previously approved by the Commission and all amendments and revisions to such plans made pursuant to:the authority of 10 CFR 50.90 and 10 CFR 50.54(p).

The plans, which

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I UNITED STATES a

I NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3 ;g,.. /: I 4

"k WASHINGTON, p. C 20555

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' _ ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY SALT RIVER PROJECT AGRICULTURAL IMPROVEMENT AND POW EL PASO ELECTRIC COMPANY-

_ SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY

_PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF NEW MEXICO LOS ANGELES DEPARTMENT OF WATER AND^ POWER

• SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA PUBLIC POWER AUTHORITY DOCKET NO. STN 50-528 PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION / UNIT 1

-_ FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE License No. NPF-41 1.

The Nuclear Regulatory Comission (the Comission or the.NRC) has found that:-

-A.-

Ths application for license filed by Arizona Public Service Company, t

on__ behalf-of itself and the Salt River Project Agricultural Improve-ment and: Power Districto El Paso Electric Company, Southern California Edison' Company,1Public Service Company-of New Mexico, Los Angeles

Department'of Water and Power *, and Southern California Public Power of the Atomic Energy)Act of 1954,- as amended and t regulations-set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I and all-required notifications to other agencies or_ bodies have-been duly made;-

B.

Construction of the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1-

-(facility) has-been substantially. completed in conformity with Construction Permit No. CPPR-141 and the application, as amended, the provisions of the Act and the regulations of the Comission; C..

The facility will operate in conformity with the applica' tion; as amended, the provisions of the Act, and the regulations of the '

"Comission (except as exempted from' compliance in Section 2 D below);

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• t.os Angeles Departmer.t of Water and Power will be included as an owner in-this which is expected to occur shortly after Palo Verde Nu Unit 1 achieves comercial operation, f ll-

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5-(6)

Environmental Oualification Pursuant to the extension granted in the Commission letter of November 18, 1985 APS shall environmentally qualify the hydrogen recombiners according to the provisions of 10 CFR 50,49 by March 30, 1986 This license amendment is ef fective.as of November 18, 1985.

(7) Fire Protection Program (Section 9.5.1. SSER 6, SSER 7 and SSER 8)

APS shall implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program as described in the final Safety analysis Report for the facility, as supplemented and amended, and as approved in the SER through Supplement 8, subject to the following provision:

APS may make changes to the approved fire protection program without prior approval of the Commission only if those changes would not adversely affect the abi'ity to achieve and maintain safe shutdown in the event of a fire.

This license amendment is effective es of the date of issuance.

Date of Issuance: April 8, 1987 (8)

Emeroency Preparedness In the event that the NRC finds that the lack of progress in completion of the procedures in the Federal Emergencf Management Agency's final rule, 44 CFR Part 350, is an '

indication that a major substantive problem exists _ in

, achieving or maintaining an adequate state of' preparedness,

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the provisions of 10 CFR Section 50.54(s)(2) will apply.

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Y EXIDEi conrarAnew April 18, 1990 Mr. Ohuck Samsey U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Dear Mr. Ramseyt Following our tel: phone conversation of April 12, 1990, this letter wDi ' int problem areas that can result from operating Lead Acid Stationawy cells at higher than normal temperatures:

1.

Reduced Service Life lhe operating life of a Lead Calcium Alloy Statione,

cell will be reduced in half for each 16*F increase in averate electrolyte temperature. This eta become very significant, as seen in the table below:

4 E g (f1ECTROLYTE TEMPERATURE UpECTEDSERVICEIJ3

[*

Years 77 20 93 10 10g 5

125 2.5 This reduced life results from an inc'eese in float current caused by the high temperature.

This increased current results in higher positive grid corrosion rates.

The life redurtion factor quoted above has been substantiated by many tests.

It is published in NEMA Specification IB 5 tnd IEEE Specification #535, where the acceleration factor has been worked out to show that ten days at 160'F is equal to one year at 77'F.

2.

Electrolyte loss As temperature increases, the cell will draw moro current to maintain the selected float voltago.

This increased currtnt in addition to having corrosive offects: caused the cell to gas more heavily. The gassing is a breakdown of water into hydrogen and oxygen, resulting in a significant increased water loss

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from the cell.

Evaporative effects are also increased i

64s Penn street Reedeng, PA 19001 P.O. Box 14205 Heeding. PA 19:12 4205 g, 3 y j g Q o C, 215/378 0500 TWX 510/e51628e - Telecopler 216/378 0012

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MR. CHUCK RAM 5EY 2.

APRIL 18, 1990 i

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at_ higher temperatures so the total effect on water i

lossisfurtt.ormagnifled. The degree of water loss increase, naturally, is dependent ott the average i

electrolyte temperature.

There is no direct way to estimate the effect of water loss on battery life, but there are three different ways it can contribute to i

significantly shorter life l

A.

The higher specific gravity of the electrolyte, due to water-lots, will contribute to increased r

corrosion rates at the positive.

l R.

If the electrolyte level drops below the tops of plates, the exposed portions of the plates con dry out and essentially become dead.

The plates would be badly sulfated and might not-be able to deliver capacity --even after re-6dbmerging in electrolyte.

C.

The incrokeed gassing that is a part of increased water loss can cause shedding of active material off of the surface of the positive plate..This will i

further. reduce available capacity in the cell.

1 The water loss effects of increar.ed temperature'can be-minimized by increasing the numoer of times per year on the cell watering schedule to insure that the electrol However,yte level never drops below the low level line.

a this will not minimize the reduced life resulting from the higher float current at elevated tamperatures.

Please call if you need further discussion on=any of this.

Sincerely, V

LTh s

rank L. Tarantino Director Product / Process Engineering.

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6 pALO VERDE EMERGENCY LIGHTING ISSUES 4/13 RAMSEY/ GEE / KIRSCH (1) PV lights are not designed / tested for conditions of operation as required by lis.ense/FSAR/ code.

(Enforcement basis would be App. B. Criterion 3),

(a) High temperature >120*F for batteries (9 areas).

(b)

Inadequate battery capacity for 100 feet level batteries (Auxiliary Building).

73 amp hrs installed vs 86 amp hrs req (100%)

104 amp hrs (125%)

(c) Original batteries were 96 A hr (marginal).

1988 desdgn change installed 73 A hr batteries.

No-design change loca (4% m'ted.

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(2) Surveillance of batteries is not adequate to meet requirements of license and/FSAR to demonstrate ops under condition of use. A**

(Enforcement basis would be test control, criterionG'I), or' dude U criterion 5)

(a) Need to check water level more frequent than quarterly to ensure adequate battery capacity for 8 hr ops.

(b) FSAR required annual capacity test and quarterly level check not being done in several instances (84 examples, 43 of which are the discharge test).

(c) Precondition battery before do capacity test (clean terminals, add electrolyte).

(recharge battery to establish voltage above " target acceptance value).

d (3) Light units were modified to reduce float voltage and add oil w/o proper engr review.

Design change implemented by EER.

(Enforcement basis would be criterion 3),

(e) Actual voltage < required to allow 8 hr ops.

(b) Couldn't perform test during inspection because need

~ 24 hrs to recharge first.

(c) May be adding oil to batteries.

(4) Made mods to batteries w/o Work Order (used only EER disp.).

(This iten would be folded into item 3, above-not a separate citation).

(a) Drill hole to adj. voltage.

(b) Add oil.

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i (5)

FSAR needs clarified.

(NRR would be advised of this perceived need 50 that NRR nay request such clarification). This will t

not be discussed with licensee.

(a)

Essential lighting not avail in Auxiliary Cuilding if losef A.

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(b)

Pre fire strategy manual not consistent with license basic (spuricus signal analysis).

(6) Operalors not trained to implement past fire actions required

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'in prey 41e-manual. RV will request clarification from licensee of what they intended by item b, below).

(a) Recognition of false instrument readings during fire.

(b)

Entering areas of fire to perform actions (F2 47A, B, 72, 73, 74A, B) in Auxiliary Building and M555.

(7)

In 1989 revised CA program to include emergency lights as

" quality-augmented" (input to safety implementing all 18 appx, B criteria) however, have not imp'.emented for current installed or new procured equipment.

(No citation - possibly an issue for discussion of intent).

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