ML20101B381
| ML20101B381 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Indian Point  |
| Issue date: | 12/07/1984 |
| From: | Brons J POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (NEW YORK |
| To: | Martin T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| References | |
| IEB-84-02, IEB-84-2, IP-WDH-3952, NUDOCS 8412200284 | |
| Download: ML20101B381 (3) | |
Text
e Indien Point 3 Nucleo, Power Plant p
P.O. Ebx 215 Buchanan, NewWrk 10511 914 739.8200
- > NewWrkPbwer 4# Authority December 7, 1984 IP-WDH-3952 Docket No. 50-286 License No. DPR-64 Mr. Thomas T. Martin Division of Engineering and Technical Programs l
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission j
Region I 631 Park Avenue l
. King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406
Subject:
I.E. Bulletin No. 84-02: Failures of General Electric Type HFA Relays in Use in Class lE Safety Systems
References:
1)
Letter from John C. Brons to Thomas T.
Martin, dated July 17, 1984 2)
Letter from John C. Brons to Thomas T.
Martin, dated October 15, 1984
Dear Mr. Martin:
This letter supplements the Authority's previous responses to the subject bulletin and addresses the general concerns cited in this bulletin.
Per the referenced letters, the Authority indicated that the specific concerns of the subject bulletin regarding General Electric Type liFA relays were not applicable to Indian Point Unit 3 (IP-3).
The referenced letters further indicated that a comprehensive review of the general bulletin concerns was being conducted.
These general concerns involve the accelerated thermal aging of relay components which could result in shorter service life and a potential i
for relay failure for relays that are in normally energized circuits.
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, w A detailed and comprehensive data base has been established which identifies.the various types of relays used.for safety-related functions at IP-3.
This data base includes information with respect to relay l
type,' manufacturer,. function, normal state (i.e.,
energized, cycled, or de-energized), and surveillance practices.
In conjunction with the evaluation of this established data base, past operating history and
- s available manufacturer's literature were reviewed to ascertain the applicability of the general bulletin concerns to the safety-related relays existing at IP-3.
From these reviews, the relay failures that have occurred at IP-3 and corrective actions taken were identified in addition to a number of preventative measures that have been taken to reduce the potential lfor relay failures.
'It should be noted that similar concerns were previously identified by the NRC in IE Bulletin No. 79-25 (" Failures of Westinghouse BFD Relays in Safety-Related Systems") dated November 2, 1979 for Westinghouse (3 BFD relays.
As part of the Authority's efforts to address these concerns, BFD relays with style numbers 46E7352 and 766A235 (and with their associated coil style number 503C428G21) were replaced with the modified BFD relay-designated as NBFD with style number 5072A49 and coil style number 1271C50G01 as recommended'by IE Bulletin No. 79-25.
This replacement program is documented in the 4
Authority's December 17, 1979 response to IE Bulletin No. 79 (Letter from J. P. Bayne - then Resident Manager, IP-3 to Boyce H. Grier - then Director, Region-I Office of Inspection and. Enforcement).
Subsequent to installation of the modified BFD relay noted above, additional concerns were raised by W in Nuclear Service Division Technical Bulletin 81-14,' Revision 1, dated January 15, 1982.
Appropriate actions were taken by-the Authority to resolve the concerns cited in this !!
bulletin.
!! BFD and NBFD relays constitute a large-percentage of the relays used in safety-related
^
functions at IP-3.
No similar concerns have'been
- identified for the balance of relays used in
-safety-related functions at IP-3.
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. From our review of the general concerns cited in IE Bulletin No. 84-02, it is concluded that these concerns are not applicable to IP-3, that the current practices at IP-3 are sufficient to minimize the potential for relay failures and that no further actions are necessary at this time.
Should you or your staff have any questions regarding this matter, please contact Mr.
W. Hamlin of my staf f.
Very truly yours,
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ohn C. Brons
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i ndian Point Unit 3 pg 3. so ' A 5]yC "$ss cc: Resident Inspector's Office
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3 Document Control Desk U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C.
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