ML20212K160

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Summary of 860730 Meeting W/Util in Region II Ofc Re Review & Subsequent Actions on NRC-identified Cable Separation Problem
ML20212K160
Person / Time
Site: Harris Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 08/08/1986
From: Fredrickson P
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
Shared Package
ML20212K132 List:
References
NUDOCS 8608190204
Download: ML20212K160 (3)


Text

F AUS 11556 ENCLOSURE 2 MEETING

SUMMARY

- CABLE SEPARATION Licensee: Carolina Power and Light Company Facility: Harris Nuclear Plant Docket No.: 50-400 License No.: CPPR-158

SUBJECT:

PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH ELECTRICAL CABLE SEPARATION A meeting was held in the NRC Region II office on July 30, 1986 to discuss CP&L's review of and subsequent actions on an NRC - identified cable separation problem.

The problem involved electrical cable installed and inspected to the separation requirements of Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.75, Physical Independence of Electric Systems. NRC inspectors had identified numerous cables that had already been installed, inspected and accepted by CP&L that had interaction points which violated RG 1.75 requirements.

CP&L discussed their program for inspection and identification of nonconformances and their subsequent engineering evaluation for acceptance or repair, using a Wyle Laboratory Analysis. A discussion commenced concerning the instructions provided to the QC inspector as to whether a " worst case" system was used for cable inspection or whether all separation violations were being identified.

CP&L stated that " worst case" was used and that if engineer evaluation revealed the need for rework, then the entire cable would be reinspected. CP&L provided a significance review of those violations that were not identified by QC. CP&L stated th'at, based on their review, the inspection proficiency was acceptable for cable separation in both the Fuel Handling and Reactor Auxiliary Building. This acceptability was based on comparing the number of missed cable separation violations to an estimated total potential inspection points. Region II questioned this process with respect to determining whether or not a safety issue existed in the cable separation area. Regardless of inspection proficiency, Region II was concerned about the total number of new separation violations that required rework. Specifically, in the Reactor Auxiliary Building, CP&L had reviewed two rooms and had identified several new violations which required rework. To improve the program, CP&L stated that they planned to increase QA surveillance manpower, intensify room turnover QA surveillance, reorganize the inspection force to achieve more consistent results and continue training of supervisory and inspection personnel. Based on Region II's concerns, CP&L stated that cable separation QA surveillances would be conducted on all rooms, including those already turned over. Region II additionally stated that the root cause appeared to be inadequate craf t work, compounded by the QC inspection problem.

An additional contribution to the problem appeared to be CP&L's using the " worst case" method of violation identification. CP&L stated that the inspection F608190204 PDR 860011 V

ADOCK 03000400 PDR

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'7 3 I TJS5 I Enclosure 2 2 instruction would be modified to ensure that all separation violations are identified by QC. The Regional Administrator expressed concern that CP&L was changing their program based on NRC concern, when problems in the program should have been recognized and changed independently by CP&L. Discussion continued on the " worst case" method, with CP&L stating that this inspection method was only used in cable separation inspections. The meeting was concluded with the NRC requesting CP&L to provide a schedule for conduct of the surveillances.

Subsequent to the meeting, by telephone call on July 31, 1986 (A. Herdt and D. Verrelli, NRC; M. McDuffy and A. Watson, CP&L), CP&L provided clarifica-tion of their commitment to perform 100% surveillance of all rooms. To begin with, CP&L plans 100% surveillance inspection of all electrical cable and equipment within an area. Depending on findings, this may be reduced to 80% tnan 60% as appropriate. However, as a minimum, CP&L will do 100% reinspection of all engineered safety feature (ESF) systems for compliance with RG 1.75 as modified by the Wyle Laboratory Analysis, which has received NRC approval for deviations from RG 1.75. ESF systems are those identified in Section 7.3 of the FSAR. At some future time, prior to licensing, CP&L will determine the root cause of identified deficiencies to the extent necessary to assure Region II that this craft /QC problem is an isolated condition and not applicable to other areas of construction. CP&L suggested that another meeting be held, in approximately two weeks to discuss their findings.

V P.' E.~ Fredrickson, Sed. ion Chief T N Bate Division of Reactor Projects

li'G 1 *. 'd36 ENCLOSURE 3 ATTENDANCE LIST Attendance at the CP&L - NRC meeting on July 30, 1986 at the NRC Region II office.

CP&L E. E. Utley R. A. Watson L. W. Eury H. R. Banks M. A. McDuffie J. L. Willis B. J. Furr NRC J. N. Grace #G. A. Belisle

  • R. D. Walker G. F. Maxwell L. A. Reyes #R. W. Wright A. F. Gibson L. S. Mellen D. M. Verrelli *K. E. Brockman
  • C, A. Julian #T. D. Gibbons
  1. A. R. Herdt #S. Stein P. E. Fredrickeson #D. Ford
  1. T. E. Conlon
  • Attended Operator Licensing Portion Only
  1. Attended Cable Separation Portion Only l

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