ML20211H148

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Memorandum & Order (Initial Decision).* Concludes That Applicant Calabrese Failed to Meet Burden of Showing That Staff Incorrectly Scored Operating Test Portion of SRO Exam. W/Certificate of Service.Served on 970926
ML20211H148
Person / Time
Site: 05561425
Issue date: 09/26/1997
From: Bollwerk G
Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel
To: Calabrese F
AFFILIATION NOT ASSIGNED
References
CON-#497-18525 97-725-02-SP, 97-725-2-SP, SP, NUDOCS 9710060262
Download: ML20211H148 (47)
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00CKETED ggq5;LS) USNRC UNITED STT.TES OF AMERICA LBL- 97-16 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION w SEP 26 A10:07 ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD PANEL gy9 ,

Before Presiding Officer:

G. Paul Bollwerk, III, Administrative Judge h '

h F Special Assistant:

Thomas D. Murphy, Administrative Judge '

SERVED SEP 26 E97 4 e In the Matter of Docket No. 55-61425-SP FRANK J. CALABRESE JR. ASLBP No. 97-725-02-SP (Denial of Senior Reactor September 26, 1997 Operator's License)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER (Initial Decision)

This 10 C.F.R. Part 2, Subpart L informal adjudication was convened at the behest of Frank J. Calabrese Jr., who requested a hearing to challenge the NRC staff's action denying his application for a senior reactor operator (SRO) license. Specifically, he seeks to have overturned the staff's finding that during one of the simulator scenarios in the operating test portion of his SRO examination, he failed properly to use an emergency operating procedure (EOP) in responding to a major transient event, thereby meriting a score that is below the level needed to pass the examination.

For the reasons set forth below, the Presiding Officer concludes that applicant Calabrese has failed to meet his burden of showing that the staff incorrectly scored the 9710060262 970926 PDR MISC 9710060262 PDR 36M j

operating test portion of his SRO examination. Egg 10 C.F.R. 5 2.1237(b). Accordingly, the staff's determination that he did not pass the operating portion of the examination is affirmed and his application for an SRO license is denied.

I. BACKGROUND A. Calabrese License Application and Hearing Request Applicant Calabrese currently is employed by Pennsylvania Power and Light Company (PP&L) at its Susquehanna Steam Electric Station (SSES), which has two 3300 megawatt General Electric Mark II boiling water reactors. By application dated September 30, 1996, Mr.

Calabrese-requested an upgrade of his existing reactor operator (RO) license to an SRO license.2 Sam Hearing File (May 8, 1997) , - item 1, at 2 ('U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), Personnel Qualification Statement - Licensee, Form 396) (hereinafter Hearing File).

An SRO examination, which consists of a written examination and an operating test, was administered to him over a four-day period in late-October 1996. Initially, -}UU examiners found applicant Calabrese failed both the written 2

As a licensed RO,'Mr. Calabrese is authorized to manipulate the reactor controls at the SSES facility. As an SRO, Mr. Calabrese also would be authorized to direct the licensed activities of other ROs. Egg 10 C.F.R. S 55.4 (definitions of " operator" and " senior operator").

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examination and operating test portions of the SRO examination and proposed denying his SRO license application. Egg id., item 8, at 1 (Letter from Glenn W.

Meyer, Chief, Operator Licensing and Human Performance Branch, Division of Reactor Safety, NRC Region I., to Frank J. Calabrese Jr. (Dec. 2, 1996)). Later, as a result of an informal review of his examination requested by applicant Calabrese, the-staff concluded he had passed the written portion of the examination. As part of that same review, however, the staff reaffirmed its finding that Mr. Calabrese had failed the operating test portion of the examination, in particular Competency 4, entitled " Compliance With and Use of Procedures." Sag id., item 13, encl. at 4-5 (Letter from Bruce A. Boger, Director, Division of Reactor Controls and Human Factors, NRC Offic' of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, to Frank J. Calabrese Jr. (Mar. 3, 1997)). As a result, the staff sustained its earlier proposed denial of his SRO license application.'

Applicant Calabrese then filed a timely request for an adjudicatory hearing regarding the staff's determination.

Egg id., item 14, at 1 (Letter from F.J. Calabrese Jr. to NRC Secretary (Mar. 14, 1997)). His hearing petition was 2

Although applicant Calabeese also sought staff review of a portion of his score on Competency 7, " Direct Shift Operations," the staff did not consider that request because he received an overall passing grade regarding that competency. Egg Hearing File, item 13, encl. at 5.

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assigned to this Presiding Officer, who granted his request cn April 8, 1997. Egg G2 Fed. Reg. 15,542, 15,542 (1997);

62 id. 18,155, 18,156 (1997). In accordance with 10 C.F.R.

S 2.1231, on May 8, 1997, the staff submitted the hearing file concerning its action on Mr. Calabrese's application.

Thereafter, both applicant Calabrese and the staff filed their written presentations setting forth their positions on why the staff's denial action was, or was not, appropriate.

Sag Presentation on Behalf of Frank J. Calabrese Jr.

(June 4, 1997) [ hereinafter Calabrese Written Presentation);

NRC Staff Presentation in Support of Denial of (SRO) License for Frank J. Calabrese Jr. (June 30, 1997) [ hereinafter Staf f Written Presentation) . In addition, in accordance with section 2.1233(a), Mr. Calabrese was afforded an opportunity to respond to the staff's written presentation.

Sag Reply Presentation on Behalf of Frank J. Calabrese Jr.

(July 16, 1997) (hereinafter Calabrese Reply Presentation).

Finally, as part of the informal hearing process, the Presiding Officer asked for and received responses to a series of written questions directed to the staff. Egg Presiding Officer Memorandum and Order (Presiding Officer Questions) (July 23, 1997) [ hereinafter Presiding Officer Questions); NRC Staff Response to Presiding Officer's Questions (Aug. 4, 1997) [ hereinafter Staff Questions Response). Applicant Calabrese was, in turn, provided with

5-I an opportunity to address the staff's response.2 Egg Response on Behalf of Frank J. Calabrese Jr. to NRC Staff Answers (Aug. 18, 1997) (hereinafter Calabrese Questions Response).

The filings and documents described above constitute the record upon which this determination is based.

B. The Operating Test Portion of the Examination As described in NUREG-1021, the agency's operator licensing examiner standards manual, agency regulations mandate that the operating test portion of an SRO examination require that an applicant demonstrate he or she understands and can perform those actions needed to accomplish a representative sampling of thirteen qualification items. Those items, which are specified in 10 C.F.R. S 55.45 (a), include performing prestartup procedures, identifying and responding to annunciator and condition-indicating signals, and demonstrating knowledge of significant radiation hazards and emergency plan procedures.

Egg Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Operator Licensing Examiner Standards, NUREG-1021, Examiner Standard (ES)-301, at 2 3

As is described more fully below, in responding to the staff's answers applicant Calabrese provided an affidavit from a former NRC employee with experience in the agency's operator licensing program. The staff was given an opportunity to respond to that affidavit, which it declined to do. Egg Letter from Charles A. Barth, Staff Counsel, to Presiding Officer (Aug. 21, 1997).

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of 26 (rev. 7 Jan. 1993 & supp. 1 June 1994) [ hereinafter NUREG-1021).* And relative to these items, the operating test incorporates two formats -- a facility walk-through and performance in a simulator.

The facility walk-through, in turn, is divided into two categories -- administrative topics and control room and "

facility walk-through. The former is designed to cover the knowledge and abilities needed for administrative control of the plant in areas such as daily operations conduct, equipment management, radiation protection, and etaergency plan execution. The latter, on the other hand, determines if the applicant's knowledge of plant system design is adequate and if he or she is able to operate those systems safely. Both walk-through categories are administered in a one-on-one, facility walk-through format. Sag id at 3-4 of 26.

The simulator portion of the operating test, which is the most performance-based operating test category, is 4

intended to evaluate the applicant's ability to operate the plant's systems safely under dynamic conditions. It is

  • One section of NUREG-1021, ES-303, was included as item 21 in the Hearing File. At the Presiding Officer's request, as an attachment to its June 30, 1997 written presentation the staff provided a complete copy of the January 1993 version, as supplemented in June 1994, that was in effect at the time of applicant Calabrese's examination.

Egg Staff Written Presentation at 5. The Presiding Officer has relied upon this January 1993 version of NUREG-1021 as an addendum to the hearing file.

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administered in a team format with as many as three applicants (or surrogates) filling the RO and SRO licensed positions on an operat;ng crew. This enables the examiners to evaluate each applicant's ability to function as a member of the control room team in the appropriate position. Each team must conte -' th one or more scenarios, which are an integrated group of events thac simulate a set of plant malfunctions and evolutions. These scenarios are designed to allow the examiners to evaluate each applicant individually on a range of applicable competencies. Egg 1.d.

at 1, 5 of 26.

SRO candidates are evaluated on as many as eight competency categories,5 each of which is broken down into three or four specific rating factors. Applicants are assigned weighted numerical grades under each of the-particular rating factors that classify the applicant's performance under that factor. The assigned scores for each rating factor must result in a total score for each competency sufficient to demonstrate proficiency on his or her license level, which commonly is a score of greater than 1.8 out of_a possible total of 3.0. Examiners generally can-deny the operator licence application of any individual who 5

One competency area, " Control Board Operations," is optional for 520 upgrade applicants like Mr. Calabrese. If it.is evaluated, however, that competency must be factored into the applicant's final grade. Egg NUREG-1021, ES-303, at 5 of 27. Mr. Calabrese was, in fact, graded in this area. Egg Hearing File, item 2, at 3 of 8.

I 8-fails to demonstrate proficiency in every single competency.' Egg id. ES-303, at 5 of 27.

In this instance, applicant Calabrese's problems arose in connection with the fourth competency category,

" Compliance With and Use of Procedures." As set forth in the pertinent part of the examination report, applicant Calabrese's scores on this " Procedures" competency were as follows:

c. SENIOR REACIOR OPERA *IOR INTEGRATED PLANT OPERATIONS (SIMULATOR TEST) GRADING SIBG4ARY COMPETENCIES /

RATING FACTORS WEIGHT 3.0 2.0 1.0 TOTAL ,..

4. PROCEDURES ...

A. REFERENCE 0.25 0.75 0.50 JLif. ...

B. CORRECT USE 0.50 1.50 1.00 M ,,.

C. CREW IMPLEMENTATION 0.25 0.75 0.50 0.25 (1.5} ...

Hearing File, item 2, at 3 of 8 (NRC Operator License Examination Report Form ES-303-1 for Frank J. Calabrese (Nov. 26, 1996) (underscoring denotes original handwritten markings)).

C. The Operating Test Scenario at Issue From the discussion in applicant Calabrese's written presentation, it is apparent that the portion of the

' A candidate can receive a score of less than 1.8 on Competency 6, " Communications and Crew Interactions," and still pass the operating test if he or she has a score of at least 1.0 on that competency and total grades for all other competencies that are 2.0 or greater. figg NUREG-1021, ES-303, at 5 of 27.

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operating test now in controversy is the sixth and final event of simulator scenario two, which was one of the two scenarios upon which he was tested. The summary of that scenario event prepared by the SSES Training Center states:

Event six. A steam line break in the common RCIC ((reactor core isolation cooling)] and HPIC [(high pressure coolant injection)) pipe routing area occurs requiring entry into EO-100-104, Secondary Containment Control. The crew will attempt to isolate RCIC but the f outboard valve will not close. The crew will manually scram the reactor as temperatures continue to rise towards maximum safe values. The crew will implement EO-100-102, RPV ((reactor pressure vessel)] Control, and manually scre.7 the reactor. Seven control rods will fail to insert requiring entry into EO-100-113, Level / Power Control. The CRD ((control rod drive)) north areas and remote shutdown panel area will rise above 10 R/hr ((rads per hour)],

requiring the crew to enter EO-100-112, Rapid Depressurization. The crew will rapidly depressurize the reactor. Both PCOs ((reactor operators)] and the US

[(unit supervisor) ] will be actively involved in this major transient-and two component failures.

Hearing File, item 5, at 3 of 21 (PP&L-SSES Training Center, Simulator Scenario No. 2, Flow Comparator Failure Of APRM Upscale Trip, RCIC Pump Operability, Loss of Feedwater Heating, Loss of 1B246, Unisolable RCIC Steam Line Break (rev. 1 Oct. 8, 1996)). Moreover, the scenario indicates that during event six the SRO position occupied by Mr.

Calabrese (also referred to as the Unit Supervisor or US) is to perform the following activities:

Enter and direct actions of EO-100-104, Secondary Containment Control Directs starting emergency service water (ESW) and room coolers Directs manual scram of reactor on approaching maximum safe temperature Enters and directs EO-100-113, Level / Power Control Enter and directs actions of EO-100-112, Rapid Depressurization Directs preventing injection of low pressure systems Directs opening automatic depressurization system (ADS) safety relief valves (SRVs)

Egg id, at 20 of 21.

1. ADolicant Calabrese's Recountino of the scenario.

Applicant Calabrese described event six in his af fidavit accompanying his written presentation, agg Calabrese Written Presentation, Statement of Frank J. Calabrese Jr. (May 30, 1997) at 5-9 [ hereinafter Calabrese Statement], and in a supplemental affidavit filed with his response to the staff's written presentation, rag Calabrese Reply Presentation, Supplemental Statement of Frank J. Calabrese Jr. (July 11, 1997) at 1-5. It began when the reactor operator-(also referred to as the Plant Control Operator - Unit or PCOU) -- a role being played by RO applicant Arnold J. Avery -- reported a high radiation level in the RCIC area. Recognizing this as an unexplained area radiation level above maximum normal level, applicant Calabrese declared an emergency, dirccted reactor building

evacuation, and entered EO-100-104, Secondary Containment Control.

Implementing this emergency operating procedure, he directed efforts to have all systems discharging into the RCIC area isolated. He then declared a site area emergency and, because the isolation valve would not close, entered into EO-100-102, RPV Control. Following that procedure, he then attempted to shutdown or scram the reactor. Seven control rods remained partially withdrawn, however.

Recognizing this as an anticipated transient without scram (ATWS), he then entered EO-100-113 and followed its alternate control rod insertion directions. This resulted in the control rods inserting further, although not completely, so that reactor power dropped to less than five percent.

At this point, applicant Calabrese recalled that the PCOU reported a high radiation-level in the main steam line.

Applicant Calabrese states he told the PCOU to continue to

. monitor radiation-levels and he.would back up the PCOU on level monitoring because the PCOU had other responsibilities, including reading secondary containment temperatures on a back panel that would require the PCOU to ,

step behind and out of sight of the control room consoles.

Applicant Calabrese also continued the EO-100-113 steps required for attempting to insert the seven still-partially withdrawn control rods.

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While applicant Calabrese was doing this, the PCOU reported radiation levels that exceeded maximum safe levels in two areas. Under EO-100-104, this required implementation of EO-100-112, Rapid Depressurization, by which radioactive steam from the reactor core is directed into a suppression pool beneath the core to reduce reactor pressure and thereby minimize public radiation exposures.

According to applicant Calabrese, the EOPs like EO-100-112, which are in the form of logic tree diagrams directing the operators to certain courses of action depending-on plant conditions, are printed on thick boards stacked on edge in a rack in the control room. In this instance, he asserted he looked in the rack where EO-100-112 should have been but was unable to find it. Concerned about the importance of prompt depressurization in avoiding public exposures, he decided to depressurize immediately relying on his memory of what EO-100-112 required.

Toward'that end, he called the PCOU and the balance of plant (BOP) operator (also referred to as the Plant Control Operator - Extra or PCOX) -- a role being played by SRO candidate Gordon E. Robinson -- for a 'tailboard" conferenco. During this discussion, he informed them he planned to enter rapid depressurization and discussed their duties, including the PCOX's assignment to open the automatic depressurization system (ADS) and prevent low pressure emergency core cooling system (ECCS) injection.

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p Thereafter, the PCOU and PCOX returned to their stations and applicant Calabrese went back to looking for EO-100-112, but was still unable to find it.

Applicant Calabrese then directed the PCOX to open the ADS valves to start depressurization. The PCOX acknowledged this direction and asked if he should prevent low pressure injection. Applicant Calabrese stated that he confirmed low pressure injection should be prevented.

After giving this direction, however, applicant Calabrese located the EO-100-112 board, which he previously overlooked because it was pushed to the back of the rack.

According to Mr. Calabrese, he then quickly reviewed the procedure and saw its direction that, absent a determination the reactor will remain shutdown under all conditions without the addition of boron, all reactor pressure vessel injection must be stopped and prevented before opening the ADS valves. Recognizing this direction _is to prevent a fuel-damaging power increase resulting from a reactivity insertion by the injection of cold water into the reactor, he checked the reactor pressure gauge to see if it had fallen below a level at which low pressure injection would occur. The pressure was at 350 pounds per square inch and falling. He then looked to see if low pressure injection was prevented, and found it was not because one residual heat removal (RHR) pump was still running. He directed the PCOX to turn off that pump, which the PCOX did promptly.

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-The PCOX then informed applicant Calabrese there may have been some inject. ion. Mr. Calabrese stated he asked the PCOU to check the reactor power and water levels and the PCOU reported there was no change. The scenario then ended, applicant Calabrese declared, without cold water injection or a depressurization-related power excursion or fuel damage.

2. Other Examination Particinants' Descriotions of the Scenario. As part of his reply to the staff's written presentation, applicant Calabrese provided the affidavits of PCOX Gordon Robinson and PCOU Arnold Avery. Sag Calabrese Reply Presentation, Statement of Gordon Robinson (July 11, 1997) at 1-3; id. Statement of Arnold Avery (July 11, 1997) at 1.
a. Mr. Robinson. According to Mr. Robinson, near the end of the scenario Mr. Avery reported radiation exceeded the maximum safe levels in two areas. He recalled that Mr.

Calabrese then told both operators that he wanted to hold a tailboard discussion. .During this discussion, applicant Calabrese said that rapid reactor depressurization was necessary and Mr. Robinson would need to open the six ADS valves. Mr. Robinson also declared that they discussed the need to prevent low pressure injection, but'did not discuss whether low pressure injection should be prevented before opening the ADS valves. Mr. Robinson also recollected that applicant Calabrese told Mr. Avery he would have certain l

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duties during depressurization, but cannot remember what those were.

Mr. Robinson further declared that after the tailboard discussion, Mr. Calabrese gave him the direction to open the six ADS valves, which he echoed and added *w.d inhibit low pressure ECCS." Mr. Calabrese then repeated what Mr.

Robinson had said. Although Mr. Robinson staced he knew that the ECCS pumps should be inhibited before depressurization, he declared he understood Mr. Calabrese's recitation to be a direction that the ADS valves be opened first. He then complied with this direction without questioning Mr. Calabrese about the order of the two actions because of his concern about not infringing on che pretest directive that the applicants not prompt each other during the test.

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Thereafter, according to Mr. Robinson, he placed the ADS hand switches in the open position, looked at the

-control board indicator to confirm the valves were open, and looked at the reactor pressure indicator to verify pressure was decreasing. He recalled noticing the reactor pressure was about 700 pounds per square inch and decreasing. He reported the ADS valves open status and the decreasing pressure to applicant Calabrese. 14r. Robinson then told Mr.

Calabrase he was starting ECCS pump inhibition, which Mr.

Calabrese confirmed he should.

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Prior to ECCS pump inhibition, Mr. Robinson ctated, the "A" Loop Residual Heat Removal (RHR) pump was running in alignment for suppression pool cooling, which sends the pump

-flow into the pool rather then the reactor. Just before Mr.

Robinson turned off the "A" RHR, which was the last pump ,

running, applicant Calabrese directed him " insistently and urgently" to turn that pump off. When he shut it off, he looked at the flow indication for that loop and saw'what appeared to be a small " bounce" from zero to approximately 2500 gallons per minute and then back to zero. Mr. Robinson reported to Mr. Calabrese that all low pressure ECCS was inhibited and there might have been some injection based on that flow indication, which Mr. Robinson now believes was a minor simulator response rather than a real flow indicatcr.

  • Mr.- Robinson also recalled a discussion among all three applicants that took place after completing this scenario and leaving the simulator in which Mr. Avery indicated-ha had been monitoring the water and power level change indicators when Mr. Robinson was preventing the low pressure' ECCS-injection and had seen no change in either one. Mr.

Robinson also recollected that during this discussion Mr.

Calabrese stated that prior to the depressurization sequence he had-tried and failed to find the procedure board, but did find it while Mr. Robinson was opening the ADS valves and marked it up to-catch up to where they.were in the

procedure.

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b. Mr. Averv. As the PCOU, Mr. Avery recalled that during the test he was monitoring rising radiation levels that were approaching maximum safe levels. After going behind the main control panels to perform a back panel task, he returned to find radiation levels had risen above maximum safe levels. He reported this to Mr. Calabrese.

Thereafter, Mr. Calabrese held a tailboard discussion during which he told Mr. Avery and Mr. Robinson he was going to initiate rapid depressurization. Mr. Avery remembered

, monitoring reactor power and water levels while this was happening and, although he does not remember any specific details, he recalled he did not see any significant change in either level.

3. Staff Descriotion of the neenario. The staff has a somewhat different recollection of the circumstances ,

surrounding event six of the second acenario, which it provided in an affidavit filed with the staff's written presentation. SAA Staff Written Presentation, Staff Response to Mr. Calabrese's Written Presentation in the Form of an Affidavit by Siegfried Guenther, John G. Caruso, Trs?y E. Walker, and Carl O. Sisco (June 19, 1997) at 13-16

[ hereinafter Staff Written Presentation Affidavit].

Staff license examiners John G. Caruso, and Tracy E.

Walker, both of whom were present during the scenario and

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observed it,' stated that Mr. Calabrese f ailed to refer to or comply with the procedures in EO-100-112. Neither examiner recalled, nor do their notes reflect, any attempt by Mr. Calabrese to locate the procedure before Mr. Robinson mentioned the low pressure ECCS pumps after Mr. Calabrese gave the order to open the ADS valves. According to the af fidavits, Mr. Caruso, who was monitoring Mr. Cal'abrese during the scenario, did not note that Mr. Calabrese was having any problems locating this procedure. These staff affidavits also declared that Mr. Calabrese made no mention of a problem with locating the procedure either when Mr.

Caruso questioned him about the scenario after the examination or in any of his submissions during his informal staff appeal. The staff examiners further stated they have no recollection of a formal tailboard discussion nor do their notes reflect such a discussion taking place. Both,

' The other principal staf f affiant, senior reactor engineer Siegfried Guenther, is an examiner familiar with the agency's " examination procedures and expectation regarding operator performance." Staff Questions Response, Staff Response to Presiding Officer Questions in the Form of an Affidavit by Siegfried Guenther, John G. Caruso, and Tracy E. Walker (Aug. 4, 1997) at 2 [ hereinafter Staff Questions Response Affidavit). He did not, however, become involved with Mr. Calabrese's application until he was given the task of assembling the hearing file for this adjudication. Although he asserts he "has no reason to doubt" the truthfulness and accuracy of the staff's June 30 written presentation, 14. at 3, he apparently has no direct knowledge of what happened during the scenario. His

" support" of those portions of the staff's affidavits that describe events during the scenario-at issue thus provides little, if any, corroboration for the staff's version of what transpired.

however, did note Mr. Robinson's observation that the "A" loop RHR pump had begun to inject water in the RPV before that activity was overridden.

II. THE PARTIES' POSITIONS As the description above makes apparent, applicant Calabrese and the staff have outlined some serious disagreements about the sequence and significance of events that occurred during event six of scenario two of the simulator portion of his operating test. Not unexpectedly, each party also asserts that events during this portion of scenario two support its position that Mr. Caltbrese's application should or should not be granted.

A. Parties' Written Presentations

1. Aonlicant Calabrese's Position. Mr. Calabrese emphasizes that he received fully satisfactory ratings on twenty-three of the twenty-seven individual rating factors under the eight competencies that were evaluated in the two simulator scenarios. He declares, however, that his
  • uniformly" good performance was overshadowed by the unsatisfactory rating value of *1" he was assigned under rating factor 4.B, which concerns the correct use of procedures. Because of his score on this rating factor, which is one of the three rating factors under Competency 4,

' Compliance With and Use of Procedures," he received an 1

overall score of 1.5 on that competency.' He observes that if he were given a fully satisfactory rating value of "3" or a middle range, marginal score of "2" on rating factor 4.B.

he would have a total score above 1.8 for that competency and so would have qualified for an SRO license. Egg Calabrese Written Presentation at 6-7.

According to applicant Calabrese, each deficiency in an applicant's performance on a simulator test must be judged in light of the total knowledge and ability demonstrated by that applicant during the entire test. Asserting agency examiners found nothing in his performance to criticize other than taking one step in EO-100-112 out of order, he explains that he did look, albeit unsuccessfully, for that procedure. This, along with the fact his failure to refer to the procedure before ordering the ADS valves opened was prompted by his concern about radioactive leaks, should not be considered to reflect adversely on his ability to

  • Initially, Mr. Calabrese also sought a' Presiding officer determination regarding the efficacy of the staff's scoring of another of the three rating factors under competency 4 -- rating factor 4.A concerning reference to procedures. As part of his August 18, 1997 response to the staff's answers to a series of questions posed by the Presiding Officer to the staff, Mr. Calabrese included the sworn statement of former NRC employee Robert J. Pate. Egg Calabrese Questions Response, Statement of Robert J. Pate (Aug. 14, 1997). In that statement, Mr. Pate declared he agreed with the staff's position on the scoring of this rating factor. Egg id. at unnumbered p. 2. As a consequence, Mr. Calabrese withdrew his challenge to the staff's scoring on rating factor 4.A. Egg Calabrese Questions Response at 5-6.

4 understand and use procedures. Applicant Calabrese aho j asserts that, as the substance of the tailboard discussion makes apparent (and contrary to the staff's assertion during his informal appeal), he was aware of the need to prevent low pressure injection in conjunction with opening the ADS j valves. His action ordering the RHR pump turned off thus was not simply the result of prompting by Mr. Robinson. Nor

did he misunderstand or ignore the procedural requirements, but rather " proceeded" when he should have " referred." S.n.e 1.d. at 18 & n.91--ans also Calabrese Reply Presentation at 9.

, Mr. Calabrese also contends he demonstrated the necessary attributes for an SRO when, after authorizing ADS 4

valve opening and RPV injection prevention, upon finding EO-100-112, he recognized the need to perform the latter i

before the former and took prompt action to prevent

' injection before reactor pressure dropped below the low pressure ECCS pumps' shutoff head.

Because the grading worksheet indicates an applicant who makes minor errors and timely corrections should be considered marginally satisfactory, his action once he found EO-100-112 to verify the status of low presoure injection prevention and to shut down the 'A" loop RHR pump shows that he knows how to use .

procedures properly. San Calabrese Written Presentation at 18-19;-agg also Calabrese Reply Presentation at 10.

At the same time, applicant Calabrese maintains, by

.taking this action, no significant error occurred that led'

to plant degradation warranting an unsatisfactory rating in the use of procedures. Acknowledging the staff's assertion nis actions resulted in low pressure injection that could have caused a power spike and core damage, he explains this claim is based on Mr. Robinson's statement after the PCOX turned off the "A" loop RHR pump. He declares, however, that by reason of Mr. Avery's checks on reactor power and water levels, Mr. Robinson subsequently was shown to be incorrect. There was,-therefore, no injection or resulting power spike or fuel damage. Mr. Calabrese thus concludes his performance on this scenario does not merit an unsatisfactory rating on the use of procedures. Egg Calabrese Written Presentation at 19-20; 313 also Calabrese Reply Presentation at 11-13.

2. The Staff's Position. According to the staff, its decision not to pass applicant Calabrese based on his performance in event six of scenario two is rooted in his failure to comply with several different regulatory and -

facility requirements. The staff notes that under items (6), (8), and (13) in 10 C.F.R. S 55.45(a), an applicant is to be able to * [plerform control manipulations required to obtain desired operating results during normal, abnormal, and emergency situations," "(s)afely operate the facility's auxiliary and emergency systems, including operation of those controls associated with plant equipment that could affect reactivity or the release of radioactive materials to

the environment," and demonstrate the

  • ability to function within the control room-team as appropr!. ate to the assigned position, in such a way that the facility licensee's procedures are adhered to and that the limitations in its license and amendments are not violated." Moreover, in connection with the staff-developed competencies for evaluating an applicant's performance in simulator operating

-tests, under Competency 4 SRO applicants are expected to

'USE PROCEDURES CORRECTLY, including following procedural steps in correct sequence (and) abiding by procedural cautions and limitations," and *(elnsure the safe, efficient IMPLEMENTATION of procedures BY THE CREW.* NUREG-1021, ES-303, at 23 of 27 (Form ES-303-4). There is also, according to the staff, the specific requirement in each-operator license that the holder

  • observe the operating procedures and other conditions specified in the facility license authorizing operation of the facility." San Staff Written Presentation, Staff Written Presentation Affidavit at 8-9.

So too, the staff makes note of the provisions of PP&L's operating procedures for the SSES facility. Sag id.

at 9-10.- It points out that under the heading

  • Procedure compliance," the licensee's procedural directives state
  • (p)rocedures represent Management's expectations and bounds of authorization to operate plant systems and equipment.

Procedures form the basis (from) which individual operator

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i actions will be evaluated and judged for adequacy.

1' Procedure compliance is our standard to operate the plant '

j safely and efficiently." Hearing File, item 16, at 30 of 75 l

(PP&L, Nuclear Department Procedure OP-AD-001, 1 6.18.1 (rev. 9 Jan. 29, 1997).' In addition, the facility l

operating procedures declare that an "EOP flowchart shall be

present and continuously referred to while being executed."

Id. at 34 of 75 (1 6.18.6.f).

Concerning the specifics of event six of scenario two, t

the staff asserts there were three EOPs of potential importance to Mr. Calabrese's successful completion of that portion of the simulation. EO-100-104, " Secondary l

Containment Control," indicates in Step SC/R-6 that if rapid depressurization becomes necessary, which it did under this

  • scenario, then the operator must look to EO-100-113,

" Level / Power Control." According to the staff, using EO-100-113 would have provided Mr. Calabrese with the proper procedural steps in two ways.

one, upon which the staff placed principal reliance in its proposed license denial action, is that under EO-100-113

, in the circumstances that existed in event six of scenario

)

' In referring to this SSES operating procedure, the staff has indicated that it has attempted to obtain from the i licensee the version in effect at the time of Mr.

Calabrese's examination, but has been unable to do so. Eta i Staff Written Presentation at 5. Mr. Calabrese has not sought to show there is any material difference between this version and the one in effect at the time of the j examination.

4

l

two, the operator must to look at Step RD-3 of EO-100-112, '
  • Rapid Depressurization." E23 Hearing File, item 15, at unnumbered p. 1 (SSES Emergency Operating Procedure EO-100-113, Level / Power Control). This step in EO-100-112 then requires the operator to determine whether the reactor will remain shutdown under all conditions without boron.

Egg id. at unnumbered p. 2 (SSES Emergency Operating Procedure EO-100-112, Rapid Depressurization). According to the basis document on this procedure prcpared by the facility licensee, such a determination is necessary because, if reactor shutdown cannot be assured, injection of large volumes of cold, unborated water into the RPV during rapid depressurization could result in serious core damage.2' The basis document also states that reactor shutdown confirmation can best be obtained by observing that all control rods are fully inserted, which did not happen in event six. E22 id., item 19, at 3 of 15 (PP&L, Nuclear Department Procedure EO-100-112, Rapid Depressurization (rev. 6 May 16, 1994)). And if, as was the case in this l'

As it is more specifically described in tne basis document, if injection is not prevented, as RPV pressure decreases to and below the shutoff head set points of the low pressure ECCS injection system pumps, those pumps may inject large quantities of cold, unborated water into the RPV that would quickly dilute in-core boron concentration and reduce core region water temperature. This, in turn, may result in the addition of positive reactivity sufficient to induce a reactor power excursion large enough to damage the core severely. Egg Hearing File, item 19, at 5 of 15 (PP&L, Nuclear Department Procedure EO-100-112, Rapid Depressurization (rev. 6 May 16, 1994)).

1 simulator exercise, that determination cannot be made, the i basis document indicates that precautionary steps must be taken to control RPV injection. Those actions are mandated by Step RD-5, which refers the operator to either Step LQ/L-19 in EO-100-113 or Step RF-13 in EO-100-114, both of I

which direct the operator to continue with rapid '

depressurization only after it is confirmed all RPV injection is stopped and prevented. Sag id. at 5 of 15.

According to the staff, contrary to Step 6.18.6.f of PP&L Nuclear Department Procedure OP-AD-001 quoted above, Mr. Calabrese did not keep the EO-100-112 flowchart present or refer to it continuously while it was being executed.

Further, the staff asserts, nothing provided by Mr.

Calabrese adequately explains his clear failure to follow the required procedures. At the end of scenario two, when NRC examiner Caruso specifically questioned Mr. Calabrese regarding his use of EO-100-112, Mr. Calabrese acknowledged he did not take the procedure out and start marking it up until after he had given the order to terminate and prevent low pressure ECCS injection. The examiner also did not note, and Mr. Calabrese did not mention, any problem with locating the flowchart nor did the examiners recall any tailboard discussion at which issue of preventing low pressure injection was discussed. Yet, both Mr. Caruso and Ms. Taylor, the chief examiner, did note Mr. Robinson's observation that the "A" loop RHR pump has begun to inject

water into the RPV before it was overridden. Egg Staff Written Presentation, Staff Written Presentation Affidavit at 11-16.

The other EO-100-113 avenue referred to by the staff is under Step LQ/L-9 of that procedure. According to the staff, this procedure, which Mr. Calabrese entered when he determined the reactor would not remain shutdown under all conditions-without boron, directs the op9rator to Step LQ/L-19 if rapid depressurization is required. And, as was noted above, this step, which is the same one referred to in Step RD-5 of EO-100-112, directs the operator to prevent low pressure injection into the RPV before initiating rapid depressurization. The staff, however, did not mention this alleged failure during its review process on the proposed denial of Mr. Calabrese's license application. Sag id.

at 18.

In light of these alleged procedural missteps, the i

staff does not agree with Mr. Calabrese's assertions that he deserved a higher grade under rating f actor 4.B regarding use of procedures. A-higher grade under this rating factor was inappropriate because the consequences of the error -- severe core damage -- rose above the level of what could reasonably be classified as " minor." The fact he performed well during most of the simulator exercise, the staff asserts, is not sufficient to outweigh tne safety-significant procedural error for which he was

.a___-_ _- -

i l -

responsible in what was clearly the most critical portion of 1

f his operating test. His failure to comply with both  !

!_ EO-100-112 and EO-100-113 provides adequate justification i

j for his low score on rating factor 4.B. Egg 14. at 21-23.

1 .

t Moreover, recognizing applicant Calabresu'e ansertions 4

that proper grading of rating factor 4.B should take into j account the fact he subsequently found and used the procedure-to make timely corrections to prevent RPV i

injection, the staff asserts that neither the examiner's

! notes nor their recollection of events support the notion

! Mr. Calabrese made any attempt to locace the procedure until [

, Mr. Robinson prompted him concerning preventing injection

{ after Mr. Robinson was given the order to open the ADS l valves. Further, the staff declares that the fact no i reactor power or water level increases were detected does i

, - not negate Mr. Robinson's observation that the RHR injection valves opened and some injection occurred given such i increases could have been masked by the increased reactor ,

water level and might not have caused a measurable power increase. Because there is no way to anticipate or control f.

l-the pressure rate decrease once the ADS valve is opened,'the staff maintains it is " imperative" the low pressure ECCS

[

pumps be disabled by preventing their injection before rapid

[

i depressurization begins. Egg 14. at 24-25.

Finally, according to the staff, alth'ough the agency's simulator operating test grading procedure in ES-303 of i

L l .- __.. . . . - - . ._,_. _.,..,_.._.n._.-.- . --,._ .,_-_- -

NUREG-1021 is competency rather than task based, successful reactor depressurization without reactor fuel damage does not necessarily mean an applicant has mastered the eight SRO competencies. Testing necessarily uses scenarios containing a cross-section of events that the staff evaluates to draw inferences regarding an applicant's ability and-compliance with facility procedures and license conditions. The staff concludes that because of the significance of Mr.

Calabrese's errors, it is not confident of his ability to comply with those procedures in other omergency situations.

As a result, the staff concludes that its denial of his license should be sustained. Egg id. at 25-26.

B. Parties' Responses to Presiding Officer's Questions After reviewing the parties' written presentations, pursuant to 10 C.F.R. S 2.1233 (a) , the Presiding Officer posed a series of written questions to the staff regarding, among other things, its information retention policies relative to the October 1996 operating test and the issues of whether (1) a tailboard discussion was held, and (2) low pressure injection took place." Further, in connection with the tailboard and injection issues, the staff was asked

" The Presiding Officer also asked a question regarding Mr. Calabrese's purported difficulty locating the EO-100-112 procedure board. Egg Presiding Officer Questions at 2-3. It was in' responding to the staff's answer to this question Mr. Calabrese declared, based on the response in his own witness' affidavit, that he was abandoning the issue of the staff's scoring of whether he properly " referred" to procedures under rating factor 4.A. Egg supra note 8.

bi

to explain the impact, if any, on Mr. Calabrese's score if it is assumed the matter at issue was found to be as Mr.

Calabrese presented it. Egg Presiding Officer Questions at 2-7. The staff's responses, and Mr. Calabrese replies to the staff's responses, were as follows:

1. Tailboard Discussion. In response to a Presiding Officer question on whether staff examiners listen in on tailboard discussions, the staff states that they do. The staff also declares that if such a discussion between Mr.

Calabrese, Mr. Robinson, and Mr. Avery is assumed to have taken place as described in those individuals' affidavits, staff knowledge of that discussion would not have affected Mr. Calabrese's score. His score on rating factor 4.B, the staff asserted, was based on the staff's analysis that his 3 performance most closely matched the description of a grade "1" on the three-point rating scale in ES-303 in that the consequence of his error -- possible severe core damage --

rose above the level of what could reasonably be classified as " minor" under the higher grade *2." Egg Staff Questions Response, Staff Questions Response Affidavit at 6-7, 10-11.

Relative to rating factor 4.B, the staff again maintains applicant Calabrese failed to comply with Step RD-5 of EO-100-112 and Step LQ/L-19 of EO-100-113. As another ground for asserting noncompliance with Step LQ/L-19, the staff relies on Mr. Avery's failure in his affidavit to indicate Mr. Calabrese ever directed him to

i take action to prevent further injection from the condensate system or confirm that injection was prevented as that step

[

4 requires. The staff also declares that even if Mr.

l calabrese stated to Mr. Robinson it would be necessary to prevent low pressure injection during any discussion, Mr.

Calabrese nonetheless failed to direct that action be

performed in the proper sequence. Finally, the staff declares that if it had taken issue with Mr. calabrese's
conduct of the tailboard discussion, this would have been reflected in connection with the scoring of competency 6, i

" Communicate and Interact with the crew and other

Personnel," or Competency 7, " Direct Shift Operations." In both, however, Mr. calabrese had overall scores that were satisfactory. Sag id, at 12-13. '
In response to the staff's answer to this question, Mr.
calabrese declares the tailboard discussion was important to the scoring of his exam because-it showed he was aware of
the need to inhibit low pressure injection. It also is evidence that, contrary to the staff's assertions during the l

informal review process, his order directing Mr. Robinson to

! inhibit low pressure injection was not the result of I *orompting" by Mr. Robinson. Further, on the issue of the l

need to prevent condensate injection, Mr. calabrese provideu another affidavit from Mr. Avery, who explains that his silence on.this point in his first affidavit was no indication that this subject was or was not discussed. Mr.

i 1

i

, . - _ . . _ _ _ . _ . , _ _ . . , . . _ . . . _ . , _ . . _ _ m._.. . .- _ .. . . _ . . ,..._..m_ . _ _ . , , . , . _ -

Calabrese also declares in his own affidavit that there was no indication in the examiners' notes or in a follow up question that there was a problem with condensate injection.

Mr. Calabrese also provides an affidavit in which he asserts that no direction to Mr. Avery was required because he could.

have verified there was no risk of an uncontrolled condensate injection by looking at the control board. Egg Calabrese Questions Response at 11-12.

2.- Iniection. In' discussing the Presiding Officer's question whether Mr. Calabrese's score would have been different if it is assumed that low pressure injection did not occur,28 the staff maintains that a significant fact has not been addressed by Mr. Calabrese: the effect of Mr.

Robinson depressing the initiation buttons for the RHR systems. According to the staff, pressing these buttons also sends a message to open the RHR RPV injection valves.

Thereafter, injection can occur as soon as reactor pressure drops below the RHR pump shutoff head discharge pressure..

Because there is no way to anticipate or control the rate of pressure decrease once the ADS valves were opened, it was imperative the low pressure ECCS pumps be disabled by initiating the systems and then preventing injection before

    • In responding to that question, however, the staff now states that it believes Mr. Robinson's suggestion that the change in RHR flow indication may have been a simulator response *has merit and is consistent with the (staff]

examiners' notes." Staff Questions Response, Staff Questions Response Affidavit at 16.

rapid depressurization was begun. San Staff Questions Response, Staff Questions Response Affidavit at 16-17.

The staff also addresses a related Presiding Officer inquiry regarding the applicability of a statement in ES-303, which concerns the Category B

  • Control Room Systems / Facility Walk-through" portion of the operating test z part of the examination. This examiner standard declares that "[i]f the applicant missed a critical step but later

' performed it correctly and accomplished the task standard without degrading the condition of the system or the plant, the applicant's performance on that (job performance measure (JPM)] should be graded as satisfactory." NUREG-1021, >

ES-303, at 4 of 27. According to the staff, this guidance applies to situations in which an applicant corrects an error that does not represent an unsafe practice, such as starting or stopping the wrong equipment component when the mistake has little consequence and is not an unsafe practice. In Mr. Calabrese's case, however, his error in not consulting and following the proper procedure represented'an unsafe practice and thus could not have been graded as satisfactory. Ssa Staff Questions Response, Staff Questions Response Affidavit at 17-18.

In responding to-this staff answer, applicant calabrese points out that the staff's position that the occurrence of injection is irrelevant to his= score is inconsistent with its reliance throughout the staff scoring and appeal process-m, , , .,

on the fact that injection did occur. In addition, its position that his error in failing to follow the appropriate procedure merits an unsatisfactory score, notwithstanding the fact that no injection took place, is inconsistent with longstanding staff practice. Egg Calabrese Questions Response at 14-17. In support of this point, Mr. Calabrese relies upon the affidavit of Robert J. Pate, a former agency employee who for some six years in the late 1980's was involved with the agency's operator licensing program. In his affidavit, Mr. Pate declares:

I reviewed the failure of Mr. Calabrese to perform the lockout of the L.P. ECCS pumps in the proper sequence against the anchor statements of ES-303 Rating Factor 4.B. I concluded that the '

performance of Mr. Calabrese most closely matches the description of a grade of *2" on the 3-point rating 4 scale. Although the term " minor error" does not fit well, it is a better description than a grade of *1" because the action was not a significant error that impeded or slowed recovery or significantly degraded the plant unnecessarily. There was minor degradation of the plant over a two minute period and there was no safety significance as long as the L.P. ECCS pumps were locked out in time to prevent injection.

. . . Over the 21 years that I was employed by the NRC, an actual event was consistently-considered much more safety significant than a potential event. In this case, if there was no injection, which from the record appears to be the most probable case, there is no potential damage to the core. If there was an injection, there was a

potential for core damage. If the failure to follow procedures had resulted in an injection, I would agree with the Staff that there was a significant degradation and Mr.

Calabrese's performance should be graded appropriately.

Id., Statement of Robert J. Pate (Aug. 14, 1997) at unnumbered pp. 4-5 (hereinafter Pate Statement).

Admitting he made a " procedural misstep" by not locating EO-100-112 and then transposing the procedure's steps relative to depressurization and inhibiting injection, Mr. Calabrese nonetheless declares-that by continuing to looking for the procedure, finding it, and properly using it, he took the immediate actions escessary to rectify his error in a timely manner that prevented significant plant degradation. Because there was no core injection and so no damage to the reactor fuel, he declares he demonstrated he understood the situation and possessed the requisite skill to prevent any negative consequences. As a consequence, he argues he should be given a grade of *2" on rating factor 4.B, which would result in his passing the examination. Egg Calabrese Questions Response at 17-18.

III. ANALYSIS As the recitation above makes apparent, the dispute between-Mr. Calabrese and the rtaff over his application has come down to the question whether his score en rating

^

factor 4.B under competency 4, " Compliance With and Use of U

Procedures," was appropriate. Relative to this dispute, it is clear the parties are in agreement that Mr. Calabrese did not follow procedure EO-100-112 when he allowed the PCOX to initiate depressurization before inhibiting low pressure system injection. San Calabrese Written Presentation, Calabrese Statement at 8, 9; Calabrese Questions Response, Second Supplemental Statement of Frank J. Calabrese Jr.

(Aug. 12, 1997) at 4. It is equally apparent, based on.the affidavits-and other information submitted by both parties, that the applicant and the staff have various other disagreements about what transpired during event six of scenario two of the simulator test. Principal among these are whether applicant Calabrese and the other two candidates involved in the exam held a tailboard discussion and whether low pressure system injection-occurred.

Because the credibility of various of the affiants appears to be at the center of these disputes, if it is necessary to resolve these discrepancies to decide the rating factor 4.B issue, the Presiding Officer would-have to convene an oral presentation session to receive testimony.

Egg 10 C.F.R. S 2.1235. -This is not necessary, however, because the Presiding _ Officer has decided that, regardless of-the_ outcome of these disputes, the existing record establishes the staff's determination to award the lowest

score on rating factor 4.B was justified and should be sustained."

As both parties have emphasized, in resolving this matter a focal point 10 NUREG-1021, Form ES-303-4, the

" The Presiding Officer's conclusion that he is able to reach a decision in this case based on the existing written record does not gainsay the fact, as the parties' written presentations and the Presiding Officer's followup written questions have revealed, att Presiding Officer Questions at 2, 5-6, that in several circumstances potentially relevant information was not available because the staff did not retain certain examination-related materials.

For instance, one of the three staff examiners who observed the simulator scenario in controversy destroyed his notes while this matter wao still pending before the staff.

He did this, he asserts, because he was only responsible for testing one of the other applicants who passed the examination and was issued a license, so that his action was consistent with the policy guidance in NUREG-1021, ES-501, at 2 of 24, that states "(olnce the licensing decisions are complete, the examiners should discard any marked up documentation or rough notes for those applicants receiving licenses . . . ." Egg Staff Questions Response, Response of Carl E. Sisco to Presiding Officer Question Dated July 23, 1997 (July 24, 1997) at 1. In another instance, which was noted by a three-member appeal panel acting as part of the staff's informal review process, gag Hearing File, item 12, attach, at 4-5, staff examiners did not ask facility officials to retain simulator chart recordings concerning the scenario that could have established whether injection did or did not occur, notwithstanding guidance in NUREG-1021, ES-302, at 5 of 11, indicating that ' tpl arameter readings should be collected at meaningful intervals . . .

[and t]he chief examiner should retain the recordings as backup documentation to augment the note's taken by the examiners during the. simulator test." gas Staff Questions Response, Staff Questions Response Affidavit at 14-15.

Given the possible negative inference that can be applied to missing or destroyed evidence, agg 2 James H.

Wigmore, Evidence S 291 (3d ed.1940) ,- additionnl staf f review of these policies and their application at the context of simulator tests involving multiple applicants seems warranted.

i worksheet used by the staff for grading the competency of SRO candidates in the simulator portion of their test. Of course, the materials in documents bearing the NUREG designation, such as NUREG-1021, generally do not establish regulatory requirements. Sag, e.q.., General Public Utilities Nuclear Coro. (Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station), LBP-97-1, 45 NRC 7, 25 (1997) (citing cases).

NUREG-1021 itself echoes this theme, declaring the examiner standards it contains are intended to " provide policy and guidance to NRC examiners and establish the procedures and practices for examining licensees and applicants for (:RO) and (SRO) licenses at power reactor facilities pursuant to

[10 C.F.R. Part 55)." NUREG-1021, at lii.

The document, however, goes on to state it is intended to " assist NRC examiners and facility licensees to better understand the initial and requalification examination processes and to ensure the equitable and consistent administration of examinations to all applicants." Id.

What this suggests is that, while heedful of the discretion afforded the staff in making its examination determinations, a presiding officer properly can look to NUREG-1021 as an important source in assessing whether the staff has strayed too far afield of the stated twin goals of " equitable and consistent" examination administration. Cf. Raloh L.

Tetrick (Denial of Application for Reactor Operator License), CLI-97-10, 46 NRC , (slip op, at 8)

m__.. - .__ . . _ . _ _ . . . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ - . _ . . _ _ . _ _ _ _ . . _ _ .-

(Aug. 7, 1997) (because agency practice is one indicator of how agency interprets regulations, consistently-held staff view on operator testing policy matter will not be '

disturbed).

j With the above in mind, the Presiding Officer turns to i

Form ES-303-4, which relative to rating factor 4.B provides:

4. COMPLIANCE WITH AND USE OF PROCEDURES .

DID THE APPLICANT:

(b) USE PROCEDURES CORRECTLY, including following procedural steps in correct sequence, abiding by procedural cautions

and limitations, selecting correct paths e

on decisions blecks, and correctly transitioning between procedures?

3 2 1 Accurately Minor errors, Significant but made and promptly errors impeded executed necessary or slowed procedural corrections in recovery or j steps a timely degraded plant g fashion unnecessarily

. NUREG-1021, ES-303, at 23 of 27 (Form ES-303-4, at 4).

Because the award of an integral rating value of $2" would give Mr. Calabrese a passing score on the SRO examination,

! the parties' dispute comes down to the question whether the

' behavioral anchor" under that value or integral rating l

value *1" more accurately reflects Mr. Calabrese's performance.

a

i As they are set forth above, neither rating value appears to be a perfect fit as a measure of Mr. Calabrese's performance. As the staff argues, the error Mr. Calabrese admits he made -- not following a clear procedure when failure to do ao could have resulted in serious damage to the fuel in the reactor core -- can hardly be described as

" minor" under rating value *2." When Mr. Calabrese ordered depressurization before inhibiting iow pressure system -

injection in violation of a specific facility procedure, as well as NRC and facility requirements that this procedure (and others) must be followed," the staff is correct in its assertion he placed the facility at significant risk. on the other hand, assuming (as Mr. Calabrese has argued) that his mistake did not cause injection to occur or result in fuel damage, the degree to which Mr. Calabrese's error

" impeded or slowed recovery or degraded (the) plant unnecessarily" under rating value "1" is problematic if that rating value is intended to reflect only

  • actual" plant impedance or degradation.

The Presiding officer concludes that, even accepting Mr. Calabrese's assertions about the tailboard discussion and the lack of injection, the staff's judgment applying rating value *1" was correct. By any objective measure,

" In this regard, PP&L procedures also state that

  • [ilf an existing precedure addresses the evolution to be performed and the current circumstances, the procedure shall be used." Hearing File, item 16, at 31 of 75 (1 6.18.3.a).

i event six of scenario two was intended to test the ability of each applicant, and in particular the SRO candidate, to deal with a significant emergency situation." This portion of the scenario, albeit brief, provided a vital opportunity for the staff to judge how the candidates reacted when faced with a high-stress situation requiring the exercise of critical decisionmaking skills to reach a safe shutdown of the facility. When faced with this situation, notwithstanding explicit agency and facility requirements that emergency operating procedures be referred to and followed, responding from memory based on an apparently mistaken belief about the time sensitivity of his actions,"

" The staff observes in its response to the Presiding Officer's July 23 questions that event six was added to scenario with the intent of. creating a more severe event.

This was done at the behest of staff operator license examiner Tracy, who was chief examiner for Mr. Calabrese's l

October 1996 examination. She apparently took this step as a corollary to a April 1996 staff inspection report in which che criticized the SSES facility's simulator examinations for not having a control rod insert failure that would mandate operator actions beyond those generally being required under the ATWS scenarios being used for SSES operator licensing applicants. Eng Staff Questions Response, Staff Questions Response Affidavit at 9.

"In his initial written presentation, Mr. calabrese declared that the reason he did not continue to hunt for the board containing procedure EO-100-112 was his desire to >

minimize publicutadiation exposure. Ein Calabrese Written Presentation, Ct.labrese Statement at 7. In its August 4, 1997 response t.o the Presiding Officer's questions, the staff asserts, without being contradicted by'Mr. Calabrese in his August 18 reply, that delaying depressurization by another minute to find the board would not have made a significant difference in radiation levels because the maximum safe levels in two areas already had been exceeded.

(continuer...)

- 42 -

Mr. Calabrese failed to follow crucial procedure EO-100-112 and thereby unnecessarily put the facility at substantial risk." Not surprisingly, the staff responded with a score in the lowest range under the rating factor intended to measure such procedure-related activities.

Mr. Calabrese's attempt to downplay the significance of his err by emphasizing his overall performance is not convincing. While the several minutes in which the scenario event at issue occurred were proportionately a small part of the entire operating test, they loomed large in terms of the operator skills and abilities that the examination was designed to test. Given the " snapshot" nature of the operating test process, the quality of Mr. Calabrese's critical decisionmaking during this crucial interval, no matter how brief in relation to the rest of his test, was an

"( . . . continued)

San Staff Questions Response, Staff Questions Response Affidavit at 4; Egg also Calabrese Questions Response, Pate Statement at unnumbered p. 2 (Mr. Calabrese should have known terminating releases does not demand action in terms of minutes or priority attention over proper execution of emergency procedures),

" As was described earlier, the staff also asserts Mr. Calabrese violated procedure EO-100-113 by his actions.

Sga supra pp. 27, 31. Its reliance on those purported missteps for the first time before the Presiding Officer raises the troubling question of the extent to which, in defending its actions before a presiding officer, the staff for the first time may rely on grounds that it arguably could have asserted, but did not, as a basis for its own decision to deny an operator license application. Given Mr.

Calabrese's clear admission that he did not follow EO-100-112, the Presiding Officer need not reach this issue, however.

) appropriate yardstick for taking the measure of his performance.

At the same time, even ...epting Mr. Calabrese's contention that his admitted error did not result in "

injection or actually impede recovery at or degrade the O facility, the Presiding officer finds equally unpersuasive his argument, which Mr. Pate's affidavit emphasizes, that there is a distinction between *ectusl" and " potential" events in terr.s of safety significance that was not reflected in the staff's decision to give Mr. Calabrese the lowest score on .'ating factor 4.B. Mr. Pate may well be correct there is such a difference in terms of the staff's assessmei.; of " actual" events that take place at a functioning facility. Here, however, what the staff is assessing is whether it should permi.t an applicant like Mr.

Calabrese to be placed in the position of responsibility at such a facility as a senior reactor operator when his action (or inaction) can be the cause of such ar. " actual" event.

In the context of this testing process, the distinction between " potential" and " actual" events is one that has significantly less resonance, particularly when, as with event six, the consequences ultimately can result in serious core damage.

Under these circumstances, the staff's decision to assign the lowest rating factor was an entirely reasonable exercise of its decisionmaking authority in such examination j

- 44 -

scoring matters, and, in any event, not arbitrary or an abuse of the discretion afforded it in such matters. The Presiding Officer thus concludes the staff acted appropriately in proposing to deny Mr. Calabrese's senior operator's license application and, affirming that decision, concludes his application must be denied.

IV. CONCLUSION When viewed against the backdrop of the extensive SRO testing regime, Mr. Calabrese's decision to proceed to a depressurization without first obtaining and reviewing procedure EO-100-112 may, at first blush, seem a rather harmless deviation, particularly if one assumes (as the Presiding Officer-has done for the purposes of deciding this case) that no direct harm could be attributed to the facility as a result of his admitted misstep. Nonetheless, as.both the agency's and the licensee's requirements make clear, in undertaking the crucial responsibility of operating, and directin, others in the operation of, a nuclear power reactor, inuividuals like Mr. Calabrese are s expected to follow the procedures that have been established to ensure the safe operation of the facility. Based on Mr.

Calabrese's failure to follow a crucial procedure during his simulator test, the staff acted properly in assigning him an integral rating value of *1" on rating factor B of 1

_ , . --- J

competency category four, " Compliance With and Use of Procedures."

With this score as an appropriate measure of his performance in that competency category, Mr. Calabrese's grade on the operating portion of the SRO examination falls below the level needed to pass. Accordingly, his application for an SRO license must be denied.

For the foregoing reasons, it is this twenty-sixtn day of September 1997, ORDERED that:

1. The staff's proposed denial of the September 30, 1996 application of Frank J. Calabrese Jr., for a SRO license is affirmed and his SRO license application is denied.
2. Fursuant to 10 C.F.R. S 2.1251(a), this initial 5

decision shall constitute final action of the vommission thirty days from the date on which it is issued, or on Mondav, October 27. 1997, unless a party petitions for Commission review in accordance with sections 2.786 and 2.1253, or the Commission directs otherwise.

3. In accordance with 10 C.F.P. SS 2.786, 2.1253, within fifteen days after service of this initial decision, or on or before Thursday, October 16. 1997, any party may file a petition for review with the Commission on the grounds specified in section 2.786 (b) (4) . The ciling of a

petition for review is mandatory in order for a party to have exhausted its administrative remedies before seeking judicial review. Within ten days after service of a petition for review, any party to the proceeding may file an answer supporting or opposing Commission review. The petition for review and any answers shall conform to the requirements of sectirn 2.786 (b) (2)-(3) .

Ol G. Paul Bollwerk, III-N ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE Rockville, Maryland September 26, 1997 5

l-i i

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION In the Matter of FRANK J. CALAERESE JR. Docket No.(s) 55-61425-SP (Denial of Senior Reactor Operator's License)

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that copies of the-foregoing LB M&O (ID) LBP-97-16 DTD 9/26 have been served upon the following persons by U.S. mail, first class, except as otherwise noted and in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR Sec. 2.712.

Administrative Judge Office of Commission Appellate G. Paul Bo11werk, III Adjudication Presiding Officer U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Counission Atomic Saf6ty and Licensing Board Washington, DC 20555 Mail Stop - T-3 F23 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Connission Washington, DC 20555 Administrative Judge _

Thomas D. Murphy Charles A. Barth, Esq.

Special Assistant Office of the General Counsel Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Mail Stop 15 B18 Mail Stop - T-3 F23 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 Washington, DC 20555 Alvin H. Gutterman, Esq.

Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, LLP Frank J. Calabrese Jr.

1800 M Street, NW' 698 S. Kennedy Drive Washington, DC 20036 McAdoo, PA 18237 Dated at Rockville, Md. this 26 cay of September 1997 w 1^ B&v Cffice of the Secret &y of thf Commission

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