ML20210H913

Response of CE Sisco to Presiding Officer Question,Dtd 970723.* Forwards Statement Re Denial of SRO License. W/Certificate of Svc

ML20210H913
Person / Time
Site:	05561425
Issue date:	07/24/1997
From:	Sisco C NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:	Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel
Shared Package
ML20210H877	List: ML20210H872 ML20210H892 ML20210H913
References
97-725-02-SP, 97-725-2-SP, SP, NUDOCS 9708140240
Download: ML20210H913 (32)

Text

. July 24,1997

o. ,

i UNITED STATES OF AMERICA g .

NUCLEAR REOULATORY COMMISSION f

BEFORE THE PDFtfDfNG OFFICFE '

0 Before Ahlal*'stive Judge:

I O. Paul Bollwerk. E Obonnas D. Mtupby, Special Assistant) in the Matter of )

• ) Docket No 5541425 SP.

FRANK J. CALABRESE JR. )

) ~

-~". ) " "" ASI.BP No 97 725kO SP.

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(Denial of Serdor Reactor

)

- Operator's License) )

.' )

RESPONSE OF CARL E. SISCO TO PRESIDING OFFICER QUES 110N DATED JULY 23,1997 j Carl E. Sisco, having first been duly sworn, hereby states as follows. In his Memorandum and Order (Presiding Omcer Questions) dated July 23,1997 the Presiding Officer j

b -

asked whether 1 made notes during the dynamic simulator e==6 don session at which Frank J.

Calabrese v is examined He further inquired as to what happened to those notes. My response

)

follows.

I made notes regarding the conduct of the candidate whom I was testing at the thne the I test was occurring. I discarded my notes when my Branch Chief signed the license of the applicant 1

.had examined. Those notes were discarded in accordance with the n=laar standards ES 303, page e 7 of 27. section 3.b and ES 501, page 2 of 24,section D.1 of NUREO 1021. Rev7. 5-1. Operator Licensing Examiner Standards, which was then in effem. This has been my usual and standard l practice. p- al g k[. . ..

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JUL-M-1997 07:51 $+C REG 1 KOP PA. f40 3!7 5366 P.02 N U C L.E A R R a f 00MWSS10N

_e o, ,a.dE=. _s M..... June 13, 1996

'. Mr. Robert G. Byram Senior Vice president - Nuclear Pennsylvania Power & Light Company t North Ninth'straat Allentown, Pennsylvania 18101

SUBJECT:

VOLUNTARY P! LOT EXAMINATION PROGRAN - SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION Deat Mr. Byram

' In a telephone conversation un June 10, 1996, between Ms. Walker and Mr. A. Fitch, arrangemerits were made for the administration of licensing examinations at the Susquthanna Steam Electric Station during the week of October 21, 1996.

Your staff has volunteered to prepare the written examinations and operating tests and submit them to the NRC regional office for evaluation and approval.

Your staff will prepare the proposed exarinations in accordance with tie guidelines in Draf t Revision 8 of NVREG-1021, ' Operator ticensing Examination

. Standards for Power Reactors." The NRC regional office will discuss with your staff any examination changes that might be necessary prior to their administration.

To meet the above schedule, it will be necessary for your staff to furnish the proposed examiration outlines by August 19, 1996. The aroposed written examination and operating tests, will be due by Septem>er 16, 1996, and September 13,1996, respectively. Any delay in receiving the required examination materials or the submittal of inadecuate or 'ncomplete materials psy result in.the examinations being reschedulec.

In order to conduct the requested written extainations and operating tests, it will be necessary Tar your stcff to provide adequate space and accommodations in accordance with ES-402 and to make the simulation facility available on the

, dates noted above. In accordance with CS-302, your staff should retain the original simulator perforrance data (e.g., system pressures, temperatures, and levels) generated during the dynamic operating tests until the examination results are final.

Appendix E of NUREG-1021 contains t nusber of NRC policies and guidelines that will be in effect while the written examinations and operating tests are being administered.'

Your. staff should submit preliminary reactor operator and senior reactor operator license applications and waiver requests at least 30 days before the first examination date so that the NRC will be able to review the applications and the medical certifications and evaluate any requested waivers. If the applications are not received at least 30 days before the examination date, a k

JUL 25-1997 87:52 9% REti s POP PA. 612 337 5366 F.e3

-Nr. Robert 8. Syram a

. Signed a p1(cations certifying that all postponement training Das been r.sycompleted be necesser(hould be sdaitted at least 14 days before the first examination date.

This request is covered by Office of Management and Gudset (OMS) Clearance Number 3150 0101, which expires April 30,1997. The estimated everage burden including gathering, peroxing and sailing the is required reference materia Send connents Mgarding ncludtt,g 7.7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br /> per response,l.. t11s burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, ' suggestlens for l

reducine this burden, to the information and Records Nanegement stanch, Mail '

Stop 1-6 F33, Office of Inforsation Mesources Management, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comissiondffice Washington D Project (3150-0101) of Infom.C. 20555 and to the Paperwork Reductior.at OfficeofManagemenlandBudget, Washington,D.C.20503.

Thank you_for your :ouperation in this matter. Mr. Fitch has been .Jvised of the policies and guidelines referenced in this letter. If you have any 4

questions regarding the NRC's examiration procedures and guidelines, please contact Ms. Walker at (610) 337-5381 (Internet address TEW9NRC. GOV) er myself at (410) W-6211 (Internet address GWMPNRC. GOV).

Sincerely, enn W. Meyer, Chief Operator Licensing and Human Performance Branch Division of Reactor Safety Dockel Nud, 50-387, 50-388 CC:

G. T. Jonas, Vice President - Nuclear Engineering G. Kuczynski,-Plant Manager Nuclear Licensing J.

G.M.D. Kenny, Supervisor, Miller, Manager - Nuclear Engineering R. R. Wehry Nuclear Licensing M.M.Urios(e,NuclearServicesManager,GeneralElectric C. D. Lopes Manager - Nuclear Security W. Burchill,, Manager, Nuclear Safety Assessment H. D. Woodeshick, $pecial Office of the President A. Fitch, Nuclear Operations Training Supervisor

8. Stitt. Nuclear Operations Training Supervisor W. Lowthert, Manager Nuclear Training

.1. C. Tilton 111, Allegheny Electric Coo Nuclear Safely infensation Center (N$1C) perativa, Inc.

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania

Ja.rt.39 n Miss 9K AEG 1 * > Fa.

3 Mr. It6bert G. Byram Otstribution:

Region ! Docket Room (with concurrences) '

W. Dean, Os.W NRR

$, Richards, OL6/Pro ject Manager, NRR C, Poslusny,1-2, J, stolz, P0 NRR InspectionProgramBranch,NRK(IPA 5)

• NRC Resident Inspector LIC S rfMT OL Facility File DRS File I

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\** June 27, 1996 l

Mr. Robert G. Byram 5enior Vice President - Nuclear 4 ,PennsylvaniaPower&LightCompany 2 Nor Lh Ninth Street

! Allentown, Pennsylvania 18101

. Dear Mr. Byramt j

This letter is to provide supplemental informatinn to our letter deted June 13, 1996, regarding the administration of licensing examinations at the Susquehanna steam Electric Station the week e10ctober it,1994.

j Your staff has agreed to participate in a voluntary pilot exami+,w.on program in which your staff will prepare the written examinations and operating tests

{ and submit them to the NRC regional office for evaluation and approval.

Our letter of June 13, 1996, instructed your staff to prepare the proposed 4

examinations in accordance with the guidelines in Revision 4 (DRAFT), of NUREC lot), " Operator Licensing Examination Standards for Power Reactors."

Those directions are hereby revised. Specifically, your staff will prepare the proposed examinations in accurdance with the guidelines in Revision 7, l

Supplemert 1 xaminer Standards." Revision l

• 5ofNUREG/8kofNUREG-1021,'OperatorLicensing[lopingOperatorL 0122, "Daminers' Har:dbook for Deve and the enclosure to this letter. The NRC regional l

Written [xaminations,ith offit.e will discuss w your staff any examination changes that might be 4

necessary prior to examination administration.

i ES-402, Attachment 1, and ES-302 Attachment 1, contain a number of NRC polletes sad guidelines that will be in effect while the written examinations and operating tests art being administered. In accordance with f$-302, your staff should retain the orfginal i sis 6ulator performance data (e.il., system i

pressures temperatures. and levels) generated during the dynam'c operating tests untIl- the examination results are final.

l Thank you for your continued cooperation in this matter. We regret any 4

inconvenience this may have caused you and your staff.

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Mr. Robert G. Dyram t If you have any questions regarding the NRC's exeninetion procedures and I guidelines, please contact Ns. Walker at (610) 337-5381 (Internet address T[W9NRC.60V) or myself at (610) 337 5211 (Internet address GWH9NRC.G0V).

s perely.

0

_4 ./ CMaf Glenn W.Licens Operator Meyer,ing and Human Performance tranch Division of Henctor Safety Docket Nos. 50-387;50-388

Enclosure:

Pilot Examination Guidelines cc W/ enc 1 G. T. Jones Vice President - Nuclear Engineering Plant Manager G.KuctynskI, Supervisor,NuclearLicensing g

J. M. Kenny, G. D. Miller, Hansger - Nuclear Engineering R. R. Wehry, Nuclear Licensing N. M. Urieste, Nuclear Services Manager, General Electric C. D. Lopes, Manager - Nuclear Security W. Burchill, Manager, Nuclear Safety Assessment H. D. Woodeshick

, J. C. Tilton, !!I,Special Office of the PmsidentA11esheny Electric Cooperative Nuclear Safety Information Center (Nt!C)

Comonwealth of Pennsylvania Distributfjn w/ encl:

flagion 4 Docket Room (with concurrences)

K. Gallagher DRP C.Screncl,hA0(1)$ ALP (2))

HRC Resident inspector PUBLIC W. Dean, OED0 Project Manager, NRR C.PosiusnyEl-2,NRR J. Stolz, Inspection Program Branch, NRR (IPAS)

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(NCto$URE nitof inNieuttov cutbrtins Facility licensees will prepare the written examinations and operating

• tests in accordance with the. instructions in (dynamic simulator and walkthr4n)1021 of NUlttC. [' Operator Licensing Examinar Revision 7. Supplement ar.d Revision1,5 of NURt6/8R-Oht! (' Examiners' Handbook for Standards")Operatur Developing Licensing Written Examinattena'). subject to the following additiona criteria:

The facility licenue will prepare are integrated examination outline (1) (written and operating test) and sutmit it to the Nhc regional office for review comment, and approval at least 60 days before the scheduled examination cate.

The NRC chief esselner will work with the facility licensee to resolve any problems at4 to aveld unnecesst 'y revision of the final examination products.

Facility employees Who are involved with developing the massilnations and

(!) before tests will sign a standar11 security agreement (Fors ES-201-2) Facility the gain s>ecific knowledge of the examinations end tests.

emp oyees wie clayed a sut>stantial role in training the licenu app icants will generally not be involved in developing the license

- examinations or tests. If the facility licensee considers such employees necessary for developing the examinations or tests, it will define the process it will take to ensure that the integrityI of the examinations is not compromised and discuss the process witt the NRC chief examiner.

The written praminations and operating tests will satisfy the following (1) specific criteria:

• A maximum of 50 percent of the written examination questions may be taken directly from the facility question bank; up to an additional

/0 percent of the questions may be taken from the facility bank but must be significantly modified; and a minimum of 10 percent of the questions will be newly developed. As discussed in NUREG/8R-0l!!,

4 new questions should emphasite the applicants' understanding at the comprehension or application levels of knowledge because they have the greatest operational and discriminatory validity.

• No more than Il percent of the questions on the examination say be repeated from examinations, quines, or tests administered to the license applicants during their license training class, or from the past two NRC license examinations at the facility. No questions may i>e drawn directly from the applicants' audit examination or similar testing vehicle given at the end of the license training class.

• Each walkthrough test will include at least two job performance measures (JPMs) that are either new or significantly altered, and 9e Dee et +=a=

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Enclosure each simulator nuntrio set will include et least one new or significantly altered scenario. Other scenarios used my be drawn directly from the facility nonaric banku however, they will bes altered to the degree needed to prevent .",he . applicants from intnediately recogniaing the scenarius based on initial conditions er other cues.

• A significant u dtfication, for purposes of the written questions, means a chanfle to the conditions in the stem and at least one distractor s'entficantly changed. Siellarly, JPMs and simulator scenarios will have at least one suMtantive event or condition change that alters the course of action in the JPN er scenario.

The facility licensee will submit the final written examinations and (4) operating tests to the NRC n replonal office at scheduled examinat.c., date, its submittal, theleast H days facility before the licensee bank, revised,new,anddatelastused)of will include a history (e.g.,itten and operating tests.

each test item used on the wr The NRC regional office will assign a chief examinerand to coordinate the validation of (5) review, revision (as deterutned necessary by the NRC),f4cility licensee.

the written aracinations and operating tests with the Additional NRC staff examiners will be assignedtoasattitt necessary the ch (typically W

' one or two depending on the numoer oftieap)1icants)ing operat tests in

- examiner with administering and grading'he facility licensee will accordance with existing procedures.

administer and grade the written examinations; NRC examinars will review and approve the licensee's grading.

TO7AL F.00

AprlL 9, 1996 Mr. tabert 8. Byres senter vice Preeldent a bucteer Pennsylvente Power & Llpht Ceegeny 2 herth hinth street Altontown, PomeyLvente 10101

. ausJttis WRC ContihE0 thlettftca a Pett not. 50 387/ M 01; 50 306/96 01 mof!CE Of VIOLAfton Door Mr. tyree On Merch it,19N, the het cespleted en inspection et your Mtic. Stees stectric stetten (Batt), selon toimship, Pennsylvente. The encteced report presente the reeutte of that inspectlen.

Durtrg the als wook period cent. i './ the inspectlen perled, eenskact of activltles et the tuosashame facilities was generetty therectorised by safety conocleus operation and sointenance practices, the ticonsed operator respellficetten eseelnettens effectively evolunted operator ability to safety operate the plant end operators were held to high stenderes of performance. The leprocess Corrected Errors trending by Duality Centret personnel was considered a poed inittetive.

A violatten of Nec regJlresents was identified, inntving a secondary contelneont leetetten desper that did ret fully close skJring a technical-specificetten reestred surveillance test. The operators felled to l promptly identify the degraded desper conditten and take appropelste action. Werk receeds show that

! Indicotten of the desteded desper wee first observed four senthe certler; heisever, operators felled to recognl e its sientficence er erwege the corrective actlen process.

l this violetten is cited in the enetooed hetite of Violetten, and the circumetences surreWine the vietetten are described in detalt in the encteeed report. Please note that you are respired to reopend to this letter and should f ollow the instructions speelflod in the encteoed hetite een properirg your roepense. The htC ulLI use your response, in port to determine eether further enforcement actlen le necessary to ensure compliance with reewletery regdrenente.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the mac's acutes of Practice,e a sepy of thle letter and its onetesures wlLL be ptsced in the het Pelic Document team.

l l

i

Mr. Robert G. Byrom 3 Yewe cooperetten with w in thle metter is approcleted.

Ilneerely, ',.

CRisinAL SlamED Bfa tietter J. Peaclek, Chief I Reecter Projects Branch 4 l Divlelen of toector Projecte Decket mes. 50 M 7tl0 308 Inctosures 1 petite of Vietellen

2. hetite of Devletten

3. Costined mac inspectlen Report 50 M7/M Ol; H 306/96 01 l

Nr. Lebert G. Syram 3 cc w/sncle W. 4. Stanley, Vice President Wuclear Operattene s J. M. Kenny, mutteer Licensing s.1. Jones, Vice President mutteer Engineerire M. m. Urlaste, mucteer services menseer, Generet Etoctric C. D. Lopee, manager

• Wuclear Security Y. Surchltt, Mensper, Assessment Services

2. D. Woodeshlck, speclet Office of the Proeident R. R. Whey, Nucteer Licensing J. C. Titten, III, Attopheny Electric Ceeperative, Inc.

Wuclear Safety Infersetten Center (N81C)

Cassenwealth of Penneytvente

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Mr. Robert G. Byram &

Distribution w/enet Resten 1 Decket Rees (with concurrences) '

E. Gellagher, DRP D. Serencl PA0 ,

IIRC Resleent inspector i PUBLIC j Distributlen w/encts (Vie E melt)

W. Dean, CEDO C. Postunny, Project manager, mRR J. Stolt, PDl*2, NRR Inspection Program Branch, INtt (IPAS)

I l

DOCUMENT NAME: e:9601.eue To receive e copy of this document. indicate in the boa: T = Copy withota esechmerWendestas T Copy with eneenmeneenew.ues v Nocopy 0FFICE RitDRP l RI DRP l l [ ]

NAME RUrben WPesclek DATE 4/ /96 4/ /96 tdFICIAL RECORD 7 7

INCL 0sURE 1 l NOTICE OF V10LAflou .

u Fmneyiveele Fower and Light Campany Docket Be. 50*388 Swweheme Unit 2 License 50. WPF 22 During en haC inspectlen con &cted from February 6,1996

• tierch 18,1996, e vietetten of WRC re w irements was identified. In accordance with the *Generet Statement of Policy and Precobre for WRC Inforcement Actione (WUREG 1600)," the violetten is tieted betew 10 CFR S0, Appendia I, criterlen NVI, acorrective Actlen." rewires tioensees to oesure that ,

conditions eerse to welity, such as failures and selfunctlens, are preeptly identified and )

corrected. PP&L's bucteer Department Adelnistrative Prece&re IDAP*tA*0702, "Cendition Reports,"

Revielen 1, rewires identificetten of conditiers that eeutd ef fect the ability of the station to operate within the conditlens of the aperating License.

l l Centrary to the above, en February 15, 1996, the licensee felled to preuptly identify that secondary centsinnent isolatim deeper le 27564A wee not futty cleelm abring a Technical Speelfication

, survelttence test and returned it to service. Although the desper f ailed to c% an three successin etteopts abring the surveillence, no Cerulltlen Report wee inittsteo evid corretCve action was not token prior to ret.snire the deeper to service. On February 16, 1996, deeper MD*27564A l felled to close en a slynet from the control reen.

l This le a severity Level IV vio!stion ($gptement 1).

Pursuant to the provision of 10 CFR 2.201, Perywylvente Power and Light 16 hereby remJired to submit a weltten statement or exptenetten to the U.S. Wucteer reputatory Ceemissten, ATTN. Dwent Control Desk, Washington, D.C. 20555 with a copy to the negloral Adelnistrator, Region I, and a cw:y to the hat Resident inspector et the feeltity that is the s4 ject of this botice, within 30 days of the date of the letter trenomittfrw this botice of Vlotetten (Notice). This reply should be clearly aerked as e "seply to a Notice of Violation" and should include for each vlotettent (1) the ressen for the vlotetten, or, if contested, the bests for disputing the vintetton, (2) the corrective steps that have been taken end the results achieved, (3) the corrective steps that will be token to evold further vloteUen, and (6) the de** uhen futt conpliance will be schievvd. If en edewete reply is not received within the time specified in this hetice, en order or a Demand for Inforestion any be issued as to why the license should not be endifled, suspended, or revoked, or why such other action as any be proper should not be teken. Where god cause is shown, consideration witt be given to eatending the reopense time.

Deted at King of Prusale, PA this 9th day of Apelt, 1996

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR RESULATORT COS IS$10N ttGION I s

inspection .* 0 387/M 01; M MS/M 01 toport Nos.

License Nos. NPF 14; NPF 22 Llc m eet Pennsylvente Power and Light company 2 North Ninth Street Allentown, Pomeylvente 18101 facility Nemes les W enne Steen Electric Stetten Inspection Att Selon Township, Pomeytvente Irspectlen tonexted: esbruarv 6,19% . march 18,19%

inspector 4: M. Benerjee, tenf or teeldent Inspector, $8ts

! B. McDermott, Resident inspector, 8tE8 l T. Walker, Senior operstlens Ergineer DRS ORIGlWAL SIGNED 37: 4/9/96 Approved By:

W. Pescist, Chief Date Projects Branch No. 4 9

e

EXECUTIVE E804 ART Sunspacheme Inspectlen geports

• 50 387/g6 01; 50 348/96 01 "

february 6,1996 Morah 18,1736 Operations A performanced based inspectlen of the Licensed operator regJettfleetten training program Indicated that the i program was of high spaelity sw8 effectively evaluated rtereter obility to safety operate the plant. The l f actLity evetuaters condacted thorough evoluettens of crew and Indiviskaat performance, and operators were held to high standerde of performance en both the sleutator and welk through portlens of the operating test.

Operator perforuexe was strong en ett perte of the eneminetten with the exception of one of the two crews that demonstrated week team work.

An observed reshseste reteese operetten was perferend by knowledgeable operators with good precochare coeptience and effective s porvielen.

The licensee's practlee of eselening Wucteer Plant Operators (WPGs) to aperate the redweste (RW) control reen was acceptable based on their havire met the beelt tralning respairements for the required systems.

Oversight of RW reteeses by the Assistent Unit Superviser, e licensed Senter teactor Operator, prc..oed en additional assurance of safety. The inspector considered the Licensee's failure to evaluate the need for (splementing refresher training, prior to reeselgrusent of NPCs to this task, en eversight.

A violation is issued involving the licensee's felture to appropriately identify repeated dager strokes that indicated a secondary containment isolation deeper was not futty clostrg sharing a technical specification surveillance.

Melntenance/survelt tance A stensby pas system logic modification Installetlen wee well executed and perfonsed in accordance with the work plan. Go<d oversight by Guellty control (OC) persomet wee noted sharing the work. The scope of the

,- poet modification testing was appropriate end no problems w:th either the treteltetten or modification j design were IWntified.

Engineerirg/Technicet Sgport The Licensee identified that charing a design bests accident conditlen, the water seats for the foecNater lines as des;ribed la the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) was not achievable. As the past osatound Leekese results exceeded the criteria for maintelnire of f site doses within the regulatory limit the Licensee reported the conditlen to the WRC. Because of verlous modificettens made to the velves that leproved teekagt and ecceptable test date from the (Lat euteges, the condition was considered acceptable for continued plunt operation. The licensee is reviewnas verleus optlens to address the Long term corrective action for this lesue.

On February 29, 1996, charirg control red drive rebuild activities the rebuild room's nogetive pressure was Lost. Dirty enhoust Louvers and en atmost closed exhaust deeper was detensined to be the root cause.

Initiation of a condition report to identify corrective actlens to prevent recurrence and ecMress generic toplications was delayed.

Plant Support Weenth Physics swport of the control red drive rebuild activities was effective in identifyire spread of conteminetion out:ide the reen when ita negative pressura was Lset. The centeminstien speeed was tIntted to the second step-off ped.

Safety Assessment /Guellty Verificetlen The ticonsee's Inprocess Corrected Errors (ICE) program trending was a good initletive by DC, and the trends are consistent with the findirgs from the other corrective actlen recesses (e.g., conditlen reports). The trend reporte have mejor potential benefit to the Licensee because they capture the performance weeknesses et a such toiser threshold of safety significance, thus attowing en opportunity to resolve issues before they lepect plent performance.

1I V

TAALE W CONTEN18 EXECUTIVTSUMMALV........................................;... 11

• I

1. sL8stARY OF FACILITY ACTIVITIES ................................

2. PLANT OPERATIONS ....................................... 1 2.1 Plant operations Review ............................... 1 2.2 Operator Requellficetten Program .......................... 1 2.2.1 Review Of Uf 8AR Comenttmente ......................... 4 2.3 Lissid Recheeste Release ............................... 4 2.4 buttser Plant Operator Cro) Training ........................ 5 2.5 Secondary Centelruent lootetten Desper turvelttence ................. 6 l 2.6 Open Item Folteine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

3. mAluTENAuCE AND SURVEILLANCE ................................. 9 l 3.1 maintenance Observettens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 3.1.1 Installetten of asGT system Logic modifleetion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 3.2 Surveltlance observettene .............................. 10 i

4 ENGlhEERING ......................................... 10 l 4.1 fee &#eter Loop Seat ................................. 10 1 4.2 CRDN R etiul e d R oom Pressuci tet t en . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 l 5. PLAuf SUPPORT ........................................ 13 f 5.1 Radiological and Chemistry controts ......................... 13 j 5.2 Securits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 l

6. SAFETY ASSESSMENT /eUALITY VERIFICAfl0N (90700. 90712) .................... 14 6.1 self Assessment . Irprocess corrected Errors (ICE) Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

7. MAhAGEMENT AND EXIT MEETlWGS (71707) ............................. 15

. 7.1 Resident Exit and Periodic meetings ......................... 15 7.2 Exit Meettne . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 7.3 Other htC Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 lit s

DETAILS j J

1 StaguRT OF FACILITY ACTIvlTIES

]

Susqueheme Unit 1 Samery l At the etart of this report perlod Unit 1 was operating at 1001 power. On March 9, power was redJeed to 751 for main turbine volve testing, main steen isolation volve testing, centrol rod sospaence exchange and control red scram time testing. The mit wet maintained et 1005 power throughout the remainder of the re p t period.

Bungscheme Unit 2 84ausry Unit 2 began the report period at 1001 power. On the weekend of February 9, power was redaced to 40%

primarily to replace reactor recircutetten pump motor generator met brushes. euerterly turbine velve testing, main steem isolation volve testing, and seren time testirg were steo completed. The unit was returned to 1001 power en February 11 and wee maintained at this power levet for the remainder of the report period.

2. PLANT OPERATIONS (71707, 92901, 93702)*

2.1 Plant Operations Review using Inspection proce&re 71707, the inspectors routinely observed the conect of plant operations. The licensee operated the plant safety, and accordire to station procedares and regulatory respairements.

The Inspector observed plant housekeeptrg controls includire control and storage of flammable meteriet and other potentlet eefety hazards. In generet, ecceptable housekeeping practices were noted. However, certain areas in the Redweste building contained open chemical bees in carts, chemical begs en the floor, open chemical cens and meteriet on the floor, and transient materiet without control tags. The inspector concluded that housekeeping in certain areas of the Redweste building needed leprovement. Additionalty, posting and control of radiation, high radiation, and contaminetton areas when verified, were found to be

. appropriate.

2.2 Operator Be watification Program During the week of February 20, 1996, the NRC condacted a perforennee based inspection of the Susquehanna steam Electric station (SSES) Licensed operator regaellfication training (LORT) program, using NRC Inspection Proce&re 71001,

• Licensed operator Regaatification Program Evoluetten." The objective of the inspection was to verify that the LORT program ensures safe plant operation by evetusting how well indivi kels and crews have mastered the training objectives, evnant e a tmu n+ nr ham nations The inspector determined that the dynamic sleutator scenerlos were high spastity evolustion tools of appropriate complexity to ef fectively evetuate crew and individaat performance. Newever, the scenerlos generetty contained a Limited ruber of success poths and tittle verlation in event severDy. For exemple, the success path in 22 of the 27 rw.f anticipated transient witSout scram (ATWS) scenerlos was to rapidly depressurlae the reactor vessel. Only four * .hese scenerlos contained momentary electrical failures that prevented the reactor from scramming automt atty and/or manustly. hone of these scenarios contained a fatture in which ett the control rods did noe insert idsich would very the required operator actions. These limitettons could result in predictability, and decrease their effectiveness.

The f acility evoluetors performed thorough evoluettens of both crew and individaat perfomance. They were rlticet of operator actions or inactlans, and held the operatore to consistently high performance standards. Even though no critical tasks were elseed by either of the crews, the evoluetors determined that one of the crews demonstrated slenificant weaknesses in toenmerk that would regaire additional training.

They also evetuated one ef the sacs en the crew as maatisf actory in directtre shif t operettors. The other crew performed went without any notable wooknesses. The inspector agreed with the facility evoluators' evoluettene.

The facility evetustors focused their evetustisas of the crews and individuets en clearly defined criticet taska (CTS). However, the weltten performance standards for the cts were not etweys welt defined. Many cts relied on the judgement of the evoluetors to determine satisf actory or maatisf actory performance. The The inspection procedare from NRC nanuet chapter 2515 that the inspector used as guidance is parenthetically listed for each report section.

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ovetuators indicated that ery apostlenable performonse reteted to cts would be thoroughty discussed ty the evoluetlen team and the results of the evaluetten neutd be reviewed by trefning and operstlens management.

The inspector did not abeerve any inconeietoneles in the fecIL1ty evetusters8 assessmente of C1 perfornance.

Walk thraumh hominattana The inspector determined that the job perfernance sensures (Joete) were acceptable for evoluetten of operator i performance and that operators were held to high stenderes of performance en the welkathrough eneminetten.

The inspector noted minor problems with the identificetten of critical steps in the JpNs. Some steps that were critical for performance of the task were not designated as critical, and the performance atenderde for some critical stepra contained actlens that were not criticet to performance of the task.

Wrfttan Examinatlane The written eneminettens were judged to be effective evoluetten tests with operstlenstly oriented gaestions written et high cognitive lowls. Newever, the inspector noted that more ettentlen M a needed in the enen devotepsont and review process to ensure that Individaat gaaetlene and eneminettens of facttwty discrialnete between safe end Less then safe ereretors. Some gaaettens had distractors that were not pleustbte or prebtens that could ottow the operator to determine the correct answer by logic rather then knowledge or ablLity. Addittenelly, the static simulator eneminetlens contained some double josperdy gaestions and some spaestions that provided the snowers to other gaestions.

=-t e p t an/r-!nati nn nevet -e The mothee sed for enemination senple plan dowtopment ensured that the eneminettens adegantely sempted the itens speclihad in 10 CFR 55.41, 55.43, and 55.45. Esphasis was placed en evolustion of the tasks covered charing the prevleus year such that a comprehensive evaluetten would be eeninletared over the two year regaellficetten program.

The semple plans included ett portlens of the eneminetten; however, the dynamic stamatator scenerles did not appear to be ef fectively incorporated into the plans. The scenerles had been enetysed by the facility to determine the everage ruber of meersency, precedaral (off normal, norest, etere reopense, etc.) and edninistrative tasks that the crew woute be exposed to in a scenerie. These everage WLuos worst used in devoteping sosple plans to indicate the amount of coverage en the eneminetten to ensure that appropriate emphasis was placed en the poneret categories of emergency, precedaret, ed administrative tasks for the overal; taeminetten. Newever, the specific scenerlas were not selected during devotegument of the souple plans and no evoluetten was performed to ensure that the selected scenerles did not rsault in shelicotten of specific teoks or overemphasis of a system or precedaret topic. 30 d elicotten er overemphasis was identified on the eneminetlen semple plan that was reviewed by tl6e inspector.

The methodology iased to categorise test items and training tasks en the souple plan did not appear to adecpetely reflect areas covered sharing ressellficetten training and test item distributten en the eneminettens. Many tasks covered in training and rumorous test items were assigned to precederet categories (emergency, operettens, or edninistrative) rather then to systems categories. This resulted in more emphasis en procedares and Lees suchesis en systems kneutedge then was actuelty covered in training or tested on the eneminettens. Additlenetty, the methodology for linking test items to teoks was inconsistently applied suA that the semple plan did not accurately reflect the objective that each test item evalueted. For esemple, there were two passtlens on one of the written eneminettens that tested

. interpretation and applicotten of the power to flew map. One of the spaestions was identified as rotated to of f norant precedares. The other gaestion was identified as rotated to recircutetten system controls.

helther designetten accurately reflected the rotationehlp to the power to flow map, en eeninistretlw document. Those problems with the senple plan development methodetopy could Lead to everemphasis or wideremphasis of a category or specific task.

JPets were not etways selected en cLeer test objectives er for their benefit as evoluetten tools. For esemple, both of the in-plant Jptes edninletered to the Sg0s daring the inspectlen enty respaired the operator to instatt japers. Even though the japers had different factions, the JMes evetuated the same

3 ability to identify the correct tecetten and inetsLletten of the jmper. This provided a very limited evetustlin c1 the 3R0s' ability to perform In ptent activities.

pananament overaient The inspector concluded that trefning, operetters, and plant eenegement provided positive oursteht of involvement in the readellfleetion eneminetten process. ALL of the eneminetten esteriets and eneminetton results were reviewed by training management and severet vuaclear teelning agervisors were actively irrvolved in the evetuetlers. Operations management did not actiwty evoluete the operators, but provided en eversteht role in monitortrg the training deportment evoluettens and providing guidance en espected

. performance stendeeds when necessary. The plant annager else provided oversight by observing slaulator scenerlee.

caneIunien The inspector concluded that the regaellfleetten eneminettens were of high spaality and that they effectively evetuated operator ability to safely operate the plant. The dynamic simulator scenerlos were valid evaluetten teots of appropriate complealty to effectively evetw.tr crew and individuet performance. The facility evoluetore performed thorough evoluettens of both crew wwl Indivlakset performance. Operators were l held to high stenderds of performance on both the sleutator and walk through portlens of the operating test.

The written eneminettons were ef fective evetustion teots with operationally oriented spaestions written et -

i high cognitive levels. Operator performance was strong on att perte of the enemination with the exception l of one individaat and one crew on the emolc slaulator enemination. The method used for enemination sample l Plan developunt ensured that the eneminettens adegastely sempted the items specified in 10 CFR 55; however, the dynamic sinutetnr scenerles did not appear to be effectively incorporated into the plans.

2.2.1 Review of UFEAR Commitments A recent discovery of a licensee operating their facility in a semer contrary to the Updated Finet safety Anetysis (UFEAR) description highlighted the need for a speclat focused review that cooperes plant

, practices, procedsres and/or parameters to the UFSAR descriptions. While performing the inspections discussed in thle report, the inspectors reviewed the portlens of the UfSAR that related to Licensed operator training. The inspectors verlfled that the Uf 8AR wordirg was consistent with the observed plant practices and proce& area.

2.3 Liquid Redweste Reteese On flerch 14, 1996 the inspector observed the redweste (RW) centrol rose operators rettese the contents of the evaporator distillete semple tank to the Sus @eheme river through the cooling tower blowdown path, as allowed by the License. The release was made following proceskare OP 069 050, Rev W , Reteese of Liquid Redweste. Two Analtiery System Operators (A80s) perforimod the J

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speration from the W cent et roes and tecetty at the W building, with the Assistent Unit Superylsor (AUS) providing eversight and swervielen. g the inspector observed good owesight by the AUS uho 1.- _( 1 . tty verified some of the calculations in the roleese permit, good prece&re cespliance by knowledgeable and emperienced operators, and good coordinetton and cosamicetisn with the sein contrel reen. The inspector noted tlist a source check was performed for the timid rakeete (LW) redletten monitor, espected redletten mentter response woe estabtlehed, and the octuel response closely followed the espected roeperse.

The LW reteese evolutlen was wite detalled with many prece&re steps rewirleg coordination with the main control roes and the tecet aperator. Also, the tropector noted that the release peralt rowired certeln verification steps to be completed by shif t swervielen, and in this case the AuS provided very good involvement and oversight of thu release evolution.

The inspector concluded the redueste release aperetten was performed by knowledgeable operators with good proce ere cosettence and effective o w ervielen.

2.4 Nuclear Plant Operator (NPC) Training on February 5,1996, the licensee began assigning NPos to the W controt reos with the responsibility of monitoring W ef fluent reteeses. On merch 7, 1996, e p ostlen was raised within the Licensee's organitetton regarding the @ ellficetten of WPCs for these teoks since, in most cases, they have not had this responsibility for a rmaber of years. The W centret toe ernJ 4rees such as the aircutetste water pep house had previously been assigned to the junior non Licensed operators known se Asos. As en interim measure Operations management discontinued eselgruent of WP0s to A30 tasks pending a review of their mellfications. The inspector independently reviewed the Licensee's operettens instruction 01 AD 044, "geturn to on shif t Duty / Promotion (Operator guellfleetion)* and training records associated with nutteer

! training proce&re NTP gA 32.1, *ASC/NPC Operster Tretning And guellfleetion Program" to determine if the training rewirements had been met.

A prerequisite for the Initlet NP0 wellfication described in NTP eA 32.1, gevision 5, is e verification that att inttlet ASO quellfication rewirements have been met. Tretning records show that NPos have either completed this training or were wellflod prior to devotepnent of the ASO positten. The non Licensed operator refresher training program covers both WPos and A30s, providing the same review of systems and proce& res over a three year period. The regired in plant JPNs are different for the two gro w s of operators, however, in generet the WPos steo cesplete As0 JPets.

The inspector's review of W reteese perette ord training records found that the NPoe de participated in reteeses between February 5,1996, and march 7,1996, had received the stesoroom training, guitres and in-plant training f sr W releases, with one exception. One of the four NPCs did not complete ett portions of the ASO in-plant tralning rotated to W reteeses.

The rewirements for return to shif t htlos contelnad in Ot AD 064, gevisten 13, address sitrations where en operator has not been essigned responsibility for any eree for a minlaum of one 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> shif t per 6 week training cycle. Nowever, this prece&re does not restre fenllierisetten den operators are essigned to e new erse. The Operations manager indicated that the WPos are considered wellflod to perform the W control room hties but acknowledged tho' ref amillerizetten treintre for the NPCs would leprove the operator's ability to execute their responsibilities.

A January 23, 1996, Non Licensed operator Continuing freining Subcomeltte report (PLit 44560) recommended that "secouse many NPCs soy be performitg A80 tasks, the Subcamunittee reconnends that NPCs on shif t complete portitvis of the A80 guellfication Card on shif t utilising the AUS er incumbents as trainers /evetustors."

Although not regf red by the licensee's training program er proce&res, the need for refsellierlastion trefning had been recognised by the licensee but esse not acted won prior to assigning NPCs to ASO teoks.

The Licensee stated that the need for refenlliertsetten treintry was not eyeLunted when the decialen was made to reessign the NPCs.

The inspector concluded that the Licensee's practlee of assigning the NPCs to aparete the W centrol room was acceptsole based on their having met the basic trefnire rewirements for these systems as described in NTP gA 32.1. Further, the oversight of W reteesee by the Assistent Unit Swerviser provides en additionet eseurence of safety. The inspector considered the Licormee's felture to evetuate .the need for leptementing .

refresher training, prior to roerstgruent of WPCs, was en oversight.

2.5 Secondary conteltment f ootetton Desper survelliance on February 15, 1996, meing survelttence 30-034 001, secondary conteirment Zone lit supply f ootetton damper ND 27564A showed het indication when operators attempted to confire the desper's ability to close within the 14 seconds rowired by Technicet Specifications. Duel Indication (i.e., ember and red lights both n

5 Illeinsted) le representative of a eld stroke positten for the desper, Operators initially reported that dJring s4sewent strozos, the futt etened indicotten wee observed and that the de per strate time was '

. within the survettlance acceptance criterie. operators else Inttleted a work autherlastion for trwoetleetten of det they perceived to be en intermittent indtsetlen problem.

On February 16, durtre a enintenance Irweetigetlen of the deeper indleetten probles, workers femd that the deeper wee not futty closing. The desper wee declared inoperable and operators entered the action statement for Technicet speelficetten (Ts) 3.6.5.2, in discussions with she ghtft sneerviser, ghtft Technicet Advisor, and erstem Engineer, the inspector westlened the bests for cespletten of the survelttance as setlefactory en february 15. N Licensee's positten that there had been en intermittent peeltlen traficetten prebten was based en the deeper showire cLesed Inditetten skartrg ensement strokee, the stroke time belns within acceptance criterle, the operators poet emportense with tielt switches, and the verlatten of building differentist pressure accespanying the stroke.

Further Irweetteetten by the ghtf t sigervleer revoeted that the deeper had beun stroked twice with duel indicotten and that en the third ettempt, e non ticonsed operator had pushed on it. It was after the

• hende en" actlers of the non Licensed operator that the deeper shewed full cLesed. Subsepent strokes provided good centret team indicetten. This now Informetlen wee docusanted in a condit' ,- *gport (CR) on February 16, 1996.

During Irwoetteetion of the Cg, PP&L Identified that dast indicotten had been observed for deeper e 27564A ef ter en (nedvertent Zone III lootetten en October 10, 1995. An Indicotten problem was suspected and a work outhoritetlen was inittsted to check the positten Indicotten for proper operstlen. Newever, when the switches checked out setlef actorily, the !!censee felled to easetten iAether thle meant the denper had felled to stroke futt stooed. Deeper e 27564A was stroked three tiens between October 10, 1995 and March 15, 1996 with no problems identified.

The inspector noted that at the ties of this evcnt, neither the surveillence precedare nor edelnistrative procedares provide explicit guldence en the enpected operator reopense for a device ehet falls to meet acceptance criteria en the first ettempt.

The inspector concluded that en February 15,1996, the Licensee failed to appropelately identify repeeted deeper strokes that indicated secondary contalruent f ootetten desper e 27564A was not functlening property.

The felture to preuptly identify this canditlen reoutted in the degraded deeper being returned to service, ef ter which it felled to stroke closed en a enraJet stonet. The tropector considered the October 1995 work authorttetten a prior opport mity to identify the deeper probles. The failure to identify "canditlens that could effect the ability of the station to aperate within the sendittene of the operating Licensea le a vietetter, of PP&L's administrative prece6Jee SAP GA 0702, "Canditten Reports,* Revielen 1, and is also a violetten of 10 CPR 50, Appendia e, Criterien NVI, for sorrective action. (V10 50 348/96 0101) 2.6 Open Itne folleise (92901) ,

(Closed) URI 50 347/94 25 02 - Feedwater Transient on Novester 30, 1994 e feedweter transient occurred, uhlte Unit 1 use operating et 1001 power, when the control room operators ptoced the 125V DC bettery en omaalise. This wee in response to a bettery eenitor storm, and followed receanendettens f rom the nelntenance orpenlastion en prevleus steller Unit 2 eterns.

Nigher e@stine voltage caused e sener diede to short out, and a ;ensepentlet toes of a feed flew chamet trpt to the fee &seter Level centrol system started a feedseter transient. This item was left open pending the Licensee's review of the operetten ord enintenance interf ace to address the infocustity of the process used to respond to the bettery eenitor stars.

The Licensee corrected the design error in Unt: 1 by replacing the sener diedse with ser ventlenet enes. The Licersee else evetusted the other circuits powered by 125V DC, and the Generet Electric (gE) designed system circuits powered by AC sources for any elsepplication of aener diodes. The Licensee did not identify any other misapplicotten. The foodseter level centrol system was reviewed for setpoints and trip mergin edewecy. A review of the bettery monitor setpoint resulted in a setpoint eherge to eveld enecessary eterne. The revised eters response procedares new repaire operettens to sentact electricet anintenance to Irwestigete the etene. The plant staatster model was reviewed and no change was deemed necessary.

The inspector reviewed the Licensee's corrective actlens, and noted that the bettery e nitor eterm response procedare now forestined the operations and maintenance Inteface. Atoo, with the new setpoints, the frowency of bettery monitor eterm conditions are greatly (sdaced. The inspector concluded that the

-Licensee's corrective actlens were ado pete. This iten is stooed.

(closed) URI 50 347,348/93 06 01 ATW5 Strategy Differences This item was rotates to the SSES Emergency Procedere Guidelines (EPGs) ATW8 strategy which differed from

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the Bollig Weter teactor Owners Gre@ (DWROG) EPGs. The $sts EPGs centelnsd four slynificent devletions from the ATWS strategy defined in the SWQG EPGe. The most olynlficant of these devletions, the.tevel centrol strategy, hoe been ed>essed genericetty by the BWoG end the utC staff. The BWROG semitted a revision to the 8d00 EPGs, Rev. 4, elch laptesented the SSES EPG etretegy for level contret sharing on ATWS. The haC staff review of the revlelen concluded that the revloed strategy would re &ce the mcertelntles related to achievig reacter shutdown without depressuritetten eruf would re&ce everett core damete risk. The WaC staff informed PP&L that they soproved the SSES devletten from the BWROG EPGs at a meetig en Jme 13, 1995. Regieret impactor review of the safety evoluettens for the remaining three devlettens did ret identify any concems with PP&L's enelyste anthods.

In discussions with the unc Office of nuclear teacter Reguletten (Nat), the project manager indicated that the wat staf f had deteralned that the remaining three devlettens did not have generle lepticattens, and the mac staf f plane no further plant specific review en these issues. Thle item is etened based on NRC staff approval of the P9&L ATWE Levet centret strategy and apperently sound enslysis methods related to ATWs strategy.

(Closed) Unresolved Item 50 347,388/94 22 01 Use Of Operators in EP tuercise This item was rotates to the use' vf centret reas operators os referees shsring emergency reopense exercises.

The inspectors were concerned that this practice did not meet 10 CFR 50, Appendix E respirements for training and enercising of personnel responsible for eccldent essesement, including control roen shif t

! persomet. During this inspectlen, the nucleer trainig supervisor indicated that centrol room operators

! ere no longer used as referees kring emersoney response exercises. Discussions with the training swervisor Indicated that in addition to participetten it. emergency response esercises, perledic amini.

deltts" are rm on each shif t of Licensed operators bring respellficetten training. During the " mint

• drills," the Technicet $@ port Center (TSC) is manned erus operators practice their skills in responding to the accident and communicating with the TSC. Based on these discuselens, the a

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7 Impector concluded that the emergency reopense trainig provided to the operators usets the intent of to CFR 50, Appendia E. This item to cleoed. 3 (closed) VIO 50 348/93 01 01 Reactor Water surveltlance Ltc trackig During en 18 month cellbretten of the reactor water Level Lew tow tow trip ehemets, operators did not make a tog entry into the applicebte TS Llatting conditlen for operation (LCO). The survelltence procochse (SI-280 303) suggested, but did not regJire, the work gre@ to monitor and centrol out of service times for the indivlovel trip chamets. Durim review of a completed surveiltence, the inspector found no record of the out of service tlass for the reacter water town trip chamels sharig the 22 hours2.546296e-4 days <br />0.00611 hours <br />3.637566e-5 weeks <br />8.371e-6 months <br /> the survoittance paperwork was open. A vlotetten was lesund citig 10 CFR 50, Appendia B, criterien V, hosed en the inspector's conctuelen that the proceshare was inadegaste.

As corrective actlen the licensee revised the adminletrative proceshJre for tracking Loos to allow documentatten of the out of service tlas en the survelttance proceshare sever sheet. The surveittente cowr sheet, "Part V. Reserks," was revised to include verification of ediether the it surveittence ellowed performance time applies and a record of the start and step ties for the indiviskant trip chamets.

The inspector reviewed the precochare cherwee end a semple of completed survelliances. We problems were Identitled with tracking of sitewed outage times and the inspector concluded that the Licermee's corrective actions odegastety addressed the vlotetten. Sesed on the corrective actione taken this vlotation is closed.

3. MAINTENANCE AND suavEILLANCE (62703, 61724, 92902) 3.1 Maintenance Observettens The inspectors observed portlens of the followig work activities:

WA P52865 Arvust tving Bus MG set PM, en February 23, 1996 WA C60149 ssGT Logle Ndification Imtaltetten, February 28, 1996.

l The inspector noted that the limiting conditlens for operation tsere est while components or systems were removed from service, work ines consbacted f attowing the approved work package, regaired edelnistrative approvals were obtelned prior to initiating the work, safety permits were appropriately heg, technicians were experienced and knowledgeable, radiological controls were leptemented, one system engineers were inanitoring the job when regJired. Based on this aboervetten, the inspectors concluded that the jobs were completed appropriately, with shas concern for plant safety and precedures.

3.1.1 Instaltetton of 54GT System Logic Modification on February 28. 1996 the licensee installed a logic modificetten for the 'A' train of the stan &y gas treatment system. The inspector eserved portions of the fletd installation, wiri g checks, and post andlfication testing. The design of the logic modification la discussed in NRC Inspectlen Report 50 347,388/96-03.

The instellation esem well executed and performed in accordance with the work plan. Cold wrification of the wiring changes and multiple checks of the logic timer eftei instettetten provided en addittenet levet of assurance that the instettetton essa es designed. Good oversight try tuctity Centrol persomet was noted sharing the isork. The scope of the post modificetten testing uses appropelste and ne problems with either the Installation or modificetten design were identified.

The inspector conc 1uded thet the modifIcetien insta1Letten was weit executed and approprietety verifled.

3.2 surwittence camervettens The inspector observed and/or reviewed the following survelttance tests to determine tdiether the following criterle, if applicable to the specific test, isere mets the test conformed to Ts repairements; adelnistrettw eFprovals and tesouts were obtained before initiating the survelttance; testing was accomplished try spaattfled proomet in accordance with en approved proceskJre; test instrumentation was calibrated; Llatting Conditions for Operstlens were met; test dote were accurate and cesplete; removat and restorstion of the ef fected ccoponents were p operty accomplished; test results esere appropriately comenmicated with regard to is and precockaret regairements; deficiencise noted were reviewed and appropriately resolved; and the survelttance was completed et the regaired fregaancy.

survelttence absorvations and/or reviews incLimind:

30 250 002 Unit 2 BCIC cuarterly Flow Verification, February 29, 1996.

80 249 002 Unit 2 's' the euerterly Flow Verification, February 16, 1904 6 . _ . - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

8 90 235 005 mit 2 ana Fuel Poet Coettg Velve Test, Nord 12, 1996.

Sesed on ebeervetten of selected portlene of the ebeve survelttences, the inapoctor concluded that they were completed with appropriate canalderetten for esfe plant operetten and edninletrative centret.

4. ENGibtEtthG (71707, 37551, 92903) 4.1 f ee&seter Loop seat on January 15, 1996, the Licensee inittsted a CR ef ter they identified that the water seat for the feedveter Linee se described in the FSAR wee not achieveble, thus creating a potentist trypese toekoge path. Further Licersee review Indicated that poet feedwater penetretten high LLtf Lookope reautte, obtelned charing outsees, alpht have put the plant in a degraded conditten outelde the doelen beste. Nence, the licensee reported the firuling to the haC en March 6,1996 es e 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> non entreeney report.

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9 FSAR sectlen 6.2.3.2.3.1 stated that a water seet wee espected to reseln for a considerable length of time following en occident etit the operator remotely isolated the feechseter noter operated volve. The bypass teekage through the feeheter lines would then be ellaineW because of the water seat that would entst in the piping between the inboerd check valve and the remote manuet motor operated volve. Also, en additionet water seet would be maintained by the feechneter system outside the containment. The high pressure cootent injectlan (NPCI) and reactor core testation cooling (RCIC) pop discherpse are water sosted at the feedwater lines. The FSAR etto indicates that a volve nelntenance and testirg program will mesure that booss Leekage themagh the feedseter Line is restricted such that the ef felte dose and the centret room dose are maintained within regulatory Lielte.

In a letter deted Decesener 14e 1984 to the utC, PP&L stated that a eenoorvative water vetune calculation resulted in a alnleum 200 day water seet, based en the piptre poemetry back to the foschseter pwp discharge check volves. #ence, it woe PP&L's positten that aere Leekage eheute be attrtWted to the feesheeter system pathway.

During a design bests Lees of Costant Accident (LOCA) with less of offsite power, the water in the feedwater lines will be fleshing te steen resulting in water lose. Also the condensate and condensate transfer system wlLL be movellable to mainteln water in the feedwater lines, or the NPCI and RCIC keepflLL tines mtli eff site power le restored and ti.e erstems are returned to service.

During a review of the NPCI injectlen volve pressure Locking concerns, the licensee discovered that the FSAR was inconsistent with the design beels calcutetten that only justified a water poet et the feechester pwp discharge ; heck volves rather then within the contairement bowdery. A further review concluded that the feedpwp brpess line was not property evolunted. As e result of this, the water seat et the feedpap discherpe check velves and feedpap bypese Line will be exhausted in lose then alght hours. in addition to the NPCI and RCIC keepflLL tires, the water seet et the reactor water eteermap Line connection to the feedwater contelnment penetrstlen would also be test.

i The licensee's essessment of the keepflit Line indicated that the piping would remain intact and the suction i head of water from the condensate storage tank will keep the line futt in the turbine building thus effectively preventing bypass tookepe through this line.

The total bypeas tenkage for each unit must be Lees then 5 scfh D360 secm) esaused in the offsite dose enhiysis for a large break LIK.A. The plant TS Limit the Leeks g shrough each of the sein steem Line drain isolation vetves to 1.2 sefh. However, the TS does not address the contributions from the fee &seter Lines.

The Licensee justified that with the LLRT teek rates measured for each pinetretten sharing the test outages, the total es f amd and as tef t bypass teekage values for both mits were wett below 5 seth.

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I 10 The Licenece further contended Wt enthough e speelfic proceshare te replenleh the water seat in the feestseter penetration does not saf st, such a proceshare soutd osally be devoteped by W orgineering personnet to replanleh water within a few deve of the accident. After offette power is restored, espected within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, the condensate system will be evellable to fitt the feesheeter lines. The emergency plan procche for technicet ogport seerdinator esse revised to respJlre such a proceshare be developed and leptemented. The licensee is reviewing poselble orgineering modif tsettens to ereure a water seat, and le stee completing a sensitivity study of feesheeter penetretten bypees Leekage to effette dose vetues.

The inspector reviewed the poet LLRT reeutto for the Unita 1 and I feesheeter penettettene. Although the test as feed tenhages for the foesheeter penetretten toeletten volves were within the esseptance criterle, the prevleus history does not Indicate consistent performance. The inspector noted teekage volume leproved af ter oef t seat raptocament of the feestseter shock vetwee, rework of the NPCI injection volve, and instelletten of a second volve en some serywcted test Line. The inspector concluded that the licensee's operability evolustion, ehert term corrective actlen, and plan for Long term esseeseent er a modificetten were adequete. This ites ulLL remola apen etit the sempletten of Litensee's long term serrective ections.

(IFI 50 3871 388/96 01 02) 4.2 Caael Rebuild team preneurlastian The control red delve meshale (CaDG) rebulLd room to e potentietly contaminated eres in the reactor building that is maintained et a nogettve pressure coopered to the adjacent erees to ersure air flew is into the room and not out of the room. On f ebruary 29, 1996, sharirg Capet rebuild activltles, the licensee identified contamination outside the room. The ticonsee determined that air flow ises in the oppeelte directlen through l the bottom of the door. The licensee's survey confirmed that contaminetten woe centeined inside the tent l covered area between the two step off paca (30Ps). The adjacent steen eres in the roector building was not contaminated.

Att work inside the reen was stepped. The nucteer system engineer (ugt) wee contacted to eyetuote the situotien. Af ter taking onesurements with hand held instrnamente, the NSE determined that the eahouet air flew from the reen wee tower then respaired. One of the two eahoust critte into the room was dirty and had Its Lower bLede deeper s4etontieIty cLesed. The griLta were renowd, eLeened, and the deeper apened. The exhaust flow returned to normal. The NSE believes that vibretten inshaced by a crane menorell that shared the same apport as the gritt could have made the deeper ehenge peeltlen.

The inspector interviewed *he Neetth Phyelce (IIP) technic {ene s@ porting CRDIt rebulld octivities about the spread of contaminetten outelde the rebuild reen. The apread isos tielted to the 30P area and wee of low Level.

The inspector noted that the 8888 FSAR, Section 9.4.2.1.1 states that the reactor building ventitetton-system wee deeltnod to nelnteln air flew f rom erees of lesser centaminetten to erees of greater potentiel contaminetten. In this cose thle design beste respairement mee not met idien air flew isse feed to be from the CADM room (higher potential contaminetten) it,te the adjacent erees of the reacter building (Lower contaminetten levet). FSAR Sectlen 9.4.2.1.3 states that operettenet degradetlen of ventitetten system csoponente cen be detocted t#y diroct egalpeont atatus indicetien er can be conc luded based on abnormet temperature, dif ferentist pressure, alones and Indication, and corrective actlens can then be taken. FSAR Section 9.4.2.1.5 Indicates trot there le Lacet and centret roen storm capability on high or Lew pressure in the reactor building senee or one of the potentietly contaminated erees. The inspector noted that no such Indicotten or etere capability estated for the tapet rebuttd reen auch that corrective actions could have been taken before contaminetlen was spread outside the room.

The octuel safety lepect of the event wee miniest as spread of contaminetten esos Llalted. potentlet safety algnificance of the event is ement as the reacter buildire sense were amintelnad at a nogetive pressure.

During a design beels accident the stan6y see treeteent eyetens would be ovellebte to aminteln the reactor buildire et a negative pressure and provide for a filtered ventitetten path to Llelt effette doses.

The irspector else noted that the Licensee did not have any preventive usintenance en the exhaust deeper, truncatten of deeper positten, or any estabtlehod mothed of monitertre nogettve pressure in the reen. The Inspector discussed these concerns with the mucteer System Ergineer and spacettened if other slalter situations alpht enlet in any other rooms of higher pot 1ntlet contaminetten tr. the reacter building. The licensee initiated a conditten report (96 259) en March 12, 1996, to evolunte eruf decisment the root cause, needed corrective actions to prevent recurrence, and generic leptications.

The inspector concluded that the tiewnsee's up controls were effective, lamediate corrective actlens were appropriate, but initiation of a review for generic lepect and Longer term corrective actlen to onoure system design functlen was meintelned was deleyed.

5. PLANT SUPPORT (71750, 71707, 92904)

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l 11 5.1 Radiological and Chemistry Centrols , l Durtry routine tours of both mite, the inspectore observed the leptementatten of selected portions of PP&L's redlelogical controle progree dartre the cordact of enintenance and survelttence activities. During these seneret obserystione, the inspectors checked utilitetten and cooptience with radiological work permits (RWPs), descriptions of redlelogical conditions, and persomet meerence to RWP regJirements. No deficiencies were identlflod AJrire these seneral observettene.

During the report period severet conditlen reports were written try the licensee that identified high redletion tres posting deficiencies, contaminated esterlet (mostly eastt hand held tools) found outside the radiologically controtted eree, and e potentielty conteelruted tenker truck that wee returned to the vendor without appropriate survey. At the end of the irspection period, the licensee's Irwestlection and laptosentation of corrective actione, and haC Inspectlen of these Iseuse nee ergoing. The

12 results of the litC inspectlen will be peseented in a seperste inspectlen report.

5.2 Security pF&L's leptementatten of the physical security preerse was wrtfled en a perfec"c basis, including the ad= rey of staffire, entry centrol, alone stettens, and physical bomderlos. These inspection activities were ceruhacted in accordance with maC Inspection proceshare 71707. There were ne problems identified eksring perledic observetlen of access and egrese centrets this report perled.

6. BAFETT ASSEleMENT/eUALITY VEllFICAfl0N (90700, 90712) 6.1 telf Assessment Iryrocess Corrected Errors (ICE) Preprem The Licensee's precedere leeAP en 300, et tropectlen preeren, ettews for and respaires doceentation of the ICE. ICE reporte elocoont GC inspector identifled low levet eleficiencies that are corrected on the spot efter identificetten, and are below the threshold of the conditlen report process.

The GC gro w in Isueleer Assessment Services saintains en ICE database. Rettup reports identifying the probles erees and opr..mities for leprovement are provided to the factlenet mits mesed on perledic review of Itts generated spelnst that mit. OC reviews the database for developing trends, and the trends are of ten identified in rotte reports or periodic ICE review reports. Review reporte are distributed to the functionet mit's first and second line egervisors and to the fmetlenet mit sanagers (FUMs) based on the slenificence and extent of the report. For emenpts, the ICE review report for July and August was distributed to the maintenance and plomirg foremen level, derees the ICE review report for the Unit 2 7th refueling outsee was additionetty distributed to the F Ws.

The inspector reviewed severet ICE rollw and review reports. The inspector noted that consistent with a

(' recently completed Independent safety Evaluation system (Ists) survelltenes report (8 95), the ICE review report for the Unit 2 7th refueling outete identified a negative trend in truhestrict safety perfornience.

This ICE report etso identified the same overett ruber of precedJre rotated ICES genereted ebring the Lost Unit 1 and Unit 2 outeses in 1995. An ICE report for a two year period through Jee 26, 1995, included 162 procedJre rotated problems out of a total of 947 problems. The inspector etso noted that condition reports w:re being generated on ICE trends to address the root causes and corrective actions.

The inspector concluded the ICE trending was a good initiative by GC, and the trends are consistent with the findings f rom the other corrective action processee (e.g., conditlen reports). The trend reports have mejor potentist benefit to the Licensee because they capture the sees performance weaknessee et a such tower threshold of safety significance, thus allowing en opportmity to resolve issues before they impact plant performance.

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7. HAhAGElIENT AND EXIT MEETluGE (71707) ,

7.1 Reelsent talt ord Perledic lesettree The irspector discussed the findires of this inspectlen with PPR eletten annepenent throughout the irspectlen period to ersure timely comunasttetten of emerging concerne. At the conctuelen of the reporting perled, the reefdent irspection staff cer*cted en salt meeting omristre the prettninary findines of this inspection. Sesed en NRC Reglen I revios of thle report and discuselone held with liconoce representatives, it one determined that thle report slees ret conteln infermetten adject to 10 CFR 2.790 restrictione.

7.2 Exitsteetine A separate exit meeting wee conducted sh February 23, 1996, to discuse the licorsed operator respaettf tcation progran inspectlen scope and firWings. A pertlet tiet of PPR ettendees et the salt meetirg le attached.

7.3 Other NRC Activltles A redletion pentectlen tempectlen was eterted en inerch 18, 1996. The reoutte of this P .***tlen will be reported in a separete inspection report.

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ATTACMMENT 1 PAATI AL LIST OF PP&L ATTleEES AT TNE WRC EXIT IEETIN48

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N. G. Stanley, VP + Nucteer Operstlene G. Kucrynskt. Plant Nanocer K. Cheetist, Isenecer Operstlene A. Fitch, hucteor Training S@ervloor M. sIspeon, Manecer muc1eer leedtfIcetlors G. Mllter, menopor . sucteer Plant Services D. Reth, System Engineering R. Preto, Seervleer, Survellteree Services M. Friodtender, Melntenance J. Fritten, Sw ervleer

• Noelth Phyelce

1. Delpist, meneter

• Outoges I

I l

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE PRESIDING OFFICER Before Administrative Judge:

G. Paul Bollwerk, III (Thomas D. Mughy, Special Assistant)

In the Matter of )

) Docket No. 55 41425 FRANK J. CALABRESE JR.

)

)

(Denial of Senior Reactor )

Operator's License) )

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that copies of "NRC STAFF RESPONSE TO PRESIDING OFFICER'S

~ QUESTIONS" in the above-captioned proceeding have been served on the following by

. deposit in the United States mail, first class; or as indicated by an asterisk, through deposit in the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's internal mail system this 4th day of August 1997.

G. Paul Bollwerk, III** Office of Commission Administrative Judge Appellate Adjudication *

. Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Mail Stop: 0-16 G15 Mail Stop: T-3 F23 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 -

Washington, D. C. 20555 Fax: 301-415 5599 Adjudicatory File * (2)

Atomic Safety and Licensing Thomas D. Murphy" Board Panel Administrative Judge Mail Stop: T-3 F23 Atomic Safety and Licensing Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mail Stop: T-3 F23 Washington, D. C. 20555 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 . Atomic Safety and Licensing Fax:-301-415-5599 Board Panel

• Mail Stop: T-3 F23 Frank J. Calabrese U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 698 South Kennedy Drive Washington, D. C. 20555 McAdoo, Pennsylvania 15237 4

2-Secretary * (2) Alvin H. Gutterman**

Attn: Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff Morgan,12wis & Bockus, LLP Mail Stop: 016 GIS 1800 M Street, N.W. '

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20036 Washington, D. C. 20555

$ ';f Charles A. Barth Counsel for the NRC Staff m

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