ML20209E575

Insp Rept 50-302/87-10 on 870307-0409.Violations Noted: Failure to Perform Channel Checks & Channel Calibrs Required by Tech Spec 4.3.3.6

ML20209E575
Person / Time
Site:	Crystal River
Issue date:	04/22/1987
From:	Stetka T, Tedrow J, Wilson B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20209E463	List: ML20209E458 ML20209E510 ML20209E575
References
50-302-87-10, IEIN-80-27, IEIN-82-06, IEIN-82-6, IEIN-86-108, NUDOCS 8704300077
Download: ML20209E575 (18)

See also: IR 05000302/1987010

Text

[.

UNITED STATES

4 H tog'D

. o NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

y" -^ , REGION 11

g j 101 MARIETTA STREET.N.W.

• * ATLANTA, GEORGI A 30323

\,*...+/

Report No: 50-302/87-10

Licensee: Florida Power Corporation

3201 34th Street, South

St. Petersburg, FL 33733

Docket No: 50-302 Licensee No: DPR-72

Facility Name: Crystal River 3

Inspection Dates: March 7 - April 9, 1987

Inspectors: Whh IL N b R[82'

[)Date' Signed

T.F.Steta,SeniorResident/nspector

k3 - D YhE

J. E. Tedrow, Resident InspYetai / 'Date 'Si gned

Approved by: A)^ ub . m 2 O

B. A. Wilson, Section Chief Date Signed

Division of Reactor Projects

SUMMARY

Scope: This routine inspection was conducted by two resident inspectors in the

areas of plant operations, security, radiological controls, Licensee Event

Reports and Nonconforming Operations Reports, licensee action on IE Information

Notices, preparations for refueling, and licensee action on previous inspection

items. Numerous facility tours were -conducted and facility operations

observed. Some of these tours and observations were conducted on backshifts.

Results: One violation was identified: (Failure to perform channel checks and

channel calibrations required by technical specification 4.3.3.6, paragraph

5 b(8)(a).)

8704300077 870423

PDR ADOCK 05000302

O PDR

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REPORT' DETAILS

1. -Persons Contacted

Licensee Employees

J. Andrews, Nuclear Engineer II

S. Balliet, Nuclear Engineer I

J. Barrett, Principal Nuclear Mechanical Engineer

• J. Brandely, Nuclear Security & Special Projects Superintendent

M. Clary, Principal Nuclear Mechanical Engineer

• M. Collins, Nuclear Safety & Reliability Superintendent

• J. Cooper, Superintendent, Technical Support

• E. Ford, Nuclear Safety Specialist

• R. Fuller, Senior Nuclear Licensing Engineer

J. Gibson, Nuclear Technical Specification Coordinator

• V. Hernandez, Senior Nuclear Quality Assurance Specialist

• B. Hickle, Manager, Nuclear Plant Operations

• M. Mann, Nuclear Compliance Specialist

• P. McKee, Director, Nuclear Plant Operations

L. Mof fet, Nuclear Safety Supervisor

R. Murgatroyd, Nuclear Maintenance Superintendent

W. Neuman, Supervisor Inservice Inspection (ISI)

J. Payne, Nuclear Chemistry Supervisor

• J. Roberts, Nuclear Chemistry Manager

S. Robinson, Nuclear Waste Manager

• W. Rossfeld, Nuclear Compliance Manager

D. Wilder, Radiation Protection Manager

K. Wilson, Manager, Site Nuclear Licensing

• R. Wittman, Nuclear Operations Superintendent

Other personnel contacted included office, operations, engineering,

maintenance, chemistry / radiation and corporate personnel.

• Attended exit interview

2. Exit Interview

The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph 1)

at the conclusion of the inspection on April 9, 1987. During this

meeting, the inspector summarized the scope and findings of the inspection

as they are detailed in this report with particular emphasis on the

Violation and Inspector Followup Items (IFI).

The licensee representatives ackncwledged the inspector's comments and did

not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed

by the inspectors during this inspaction.

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3. Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Items

(Closed) Violation 302/86-38-04: The licensee has revised procedure

SP-421, Reactivity Balance Calculations, (revision 28 dated February 4,

1987) to clarify the method of calculating the reactor shutdown margin.

The inspector reviewed the procedure change and considers it sufficient to

preclude recurrence of this event.

(Closed) Violation 302/86-38-02: The licensee initiated a Radiological i

Safety Incident Report (RSIR) #86-424 to document the failure to wear beta

protective glasses. A management review board meeting reviewed this

matter with the personnel involved and their immediate supervision. This

board stressed the importance of strict compliance with radiological

controls.

(Closed) Viola + ion 302/86-38-05: The licensee requested and received a

NRC exemption from the 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix J requirement to pressurize

the air locks to the postulated peak containment internal pressure (Pa)

prior to entering an operational mode which requires containment

integrity. The licensee is now required to perform only an airlock seal

leakage test when the airlock is opened while the plant is in the cold

shutdown (Mode 5) or refueling (Mode 6) condition, provided no maintenance

has been performed on the airlock. The licensee has revisod procedure

SP-181, Containment Air Lock Test (revision 17 dated January 27,1987),to

reflect the Appendix J exemption and will perform the airlock seal leakage

tests in accordance with procedure SP-430, Containment Air Lock Seal

Leakage Test.

(Closed) Violation 302/86-23-03: The licensee has issued Drawing Change

Notice (DCN) 86-0241 and revised drawing FD-302-285 for the Emergency

Diesel Generator (EDG) lube oil system. The drawing now depicts the

correct system configuration. In addition, the Field Problem Report (FPR)

process has been proceduralized by issuance of Administrative Instruction

(AI) 410, Preparation and Handling of FPRs, dated January 30, 1987. This

procedure will implerrent the DCN or modification design reviews if

required. The inspector reviewed this procedure and considers that this

action should be adequate to prevent similar violations from occurring.

(Closed) Violation 302/86-20-01: The licensee has completed and the

inspector has verified the completion of the following actions:

Item a

- Procedure OP-404, Decay Heat Removal System, has been revised

(revision 58, dated July 29,1986) to address the control of valves

DHV-110 and DHV-111 following restoration of reactor vessel level;

and,

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All operations personnel have reviewed the response to this Viola-

tion.

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Item b

- A Short Term Instruction (STI) dated December 12, 1986, was issued to

operations personnel directing operators to not adjust the packing on

safety related valves. The licensee has initiated a policy to allow

only maintenance personnel to adjust valve packing on safety related

valves except in an emergency. The licensee also revised procedure

AI-600, Conduct of Maintenance (revision 34 dated March 16, 1987) to

require documentation of valve packing adjustments.

Item c

- The snubber was visually inspcted and fluid added. Procedure

SP-201, Accessible / Inaccessible Hydraulic Snubbers Visual Inspection,

has been revised (revision 19 dated September 23,1986) to allow the

addition of fluid during inspection and to document the addition of

any fluid during performance of the procedure.

(0 pen) Violation 302/86-04-03: The licensee has completed and the

inspector has verified the completion of the following actions:

- By May 28, 1986, all licensed operators had received special training

to emphasize the requirement to push the reactor trip button after a

reactor trip;

- The licensee has revised procedure AP-580, Reactor Protection System

Actuation, step 6, to allow permissible options for the restoration

of pressurizer level following a reactor trip;

- As part of the annual requalification training program, all licensed

operators received training on the proper use of emergency and

abnormal procedures; and,

- Procedure AI 400, Plant Operating Quality Assurance Manual Control

Document (P0QAM), has been revised (revision 67 dated December 9,

1986) to clarify the use of abnormal, emergency, and verification

procedures.

As part of their corrective action the licensee has committed to review

all plant Abnormal Procedures (AP) and Emergency Procedures (EP) to assure

immediate actions, remedial actions and followup actions are in conform-

ance with their revised Writer's Guide. The licensee plans to have this

corrective action completed by November 30, 1987. This item will remain

open pending the completion of the licensee's review of the APs and EPs.

(Closed) IFI 302/87-04-05: The licensee has completed the en

evaluation for the stuck open discharge check valve (RWV-36)gineering

. This

evaluation compared the calculated flow rate through the nuclear services

seawater (RW) heat exchangers with the velve stuck open' with both

emergency pumps running with the design flow rate through the heat

exchangers. The evaluation concluded that even with the check valve stuck

open, the heat exchangers would receive adequate cooling flow.

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(Closed) IFI 302/86-35-06: The inspector reviewed the " Maximum Emergency

Feedwater (EFW) Flow Rate" calculations performed by Babcock & Wilcox on

12/10/86 for the Crystal River plant. These calculations concluded that

the maxim',m EFW flow limit can be increased to 305 GPM per nozzle or

1830 GPM per generator. Since this is in excess of the 1700 GPM expa-

rienced by the "B" Once Through Steam Generator (OTSG), this issue is

considered to be resolved.

(Closed) Violation 302/85-21-02: In a letter dated June 21, 1985, that

transmitted NRC Inspection Report 50-302/85-21, the NRC stated that the

licensee's response to Violation 302/85-08-07 dated June 6, 1985, also

addressed this Violation. This response was considered to be satisfactory

and the corrective actions were verified as documented in NRC Inspection

Report 50-302/86-27. Action on this item is considered to be complete.

(Closed) IFI 302/85-04-03: As the result of an engineering review it was

determined that the modified governor design was not environmentally

qualified and that to perform this qualification would be cost prohib-

itive. Therefore, the licensee has decided to not install the modified

governor. To assure that the turbine shaft does not continue rolling

af ter operation, as could occur if a turbine stop valve were to leak by

the seat, the licensee requires operations personnel to verify that the

shaft is not rolling on a shiftly basis. This requirement has been

incorporated into procedure SP-300, Operating Daily Surveillance Log.

(Closed) IFI 302/86-20-05: The licensee conducted a walk down of the

systems affected by temporary modification T80-06-80 entitled, leave Non-Q

Gauges in System, and determined that four improper fittings were l

installed. These fittings appear to have been installed during new

construction and not by subsequent plant modifications. The fittings have

been replaced with the correct fittings.

(Closed) IFI 302/84-09-01: Surveillance procedures SP-354A & B, Emergency

Diesel Fuel Oil Quality & Diesel Generator Test, have been revised to

require checking of the emergency diesel generator (EDG) fuel oil storage

tanks by sounding the tanks.

(Closed) UNR 302/81-02-06: The licensee decided to not revise system flow

diagrams and valve line-up check lists to include instrument valves. To

provide control over these instrument valves, the licensee developed and

implemented procedure SP-111, Valve Lineup Verification for Critical

Instrumentation, in 1981. This procedure provides control of instrument

isolation, equalization, drain, and vent valves af ter refuel outages and

after maintenance activities on the applicable instrumentation.

(Closed) IFI 302/84-21-07: Procedure AP-1076, Violent Weather, has been

revised so that EDG operation is not required during periods of violent

weather. The option to run the EDGs, if required, is available to the

Nuclear Shift Supervisor.

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(Closed) IFI 302/80-39-04: An engineering evaluation indicated that the

failure of the Auxiliary Building ventilation fan blades in 1978 and 1980

was caused by casting defects in the blades. To prevent the use of fan

blades with casting defects, the licensee now performs Non-destructive

Examination (NDE) on the blades prior to acceptance by FPC. No further

fan blade failures have occurred.

(0 pen)IFI 302/80-42-06: The licensee has decided to replace valve SWV-10

with a valve of a different design thus preventing the s. laming problem.

Modification (MAR) 83-02-10-01, Replacement of SWV-10, is scheduled to be

done during the refuel outage beginning September 19, 1987. This item

remains open pending completion of this MAR. ,

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t. <

(Closed) IFI 302/84-09-07: Surveillance procedure SPh456, Refuelirig

Interval ES Manual & Automatic Actuations Functional Test, was revised so "

that the nomenclature used for the Engineering Safeguards (ES) status s

lights between this procedure and procedure SP-417, Refueling Interval

Integrated Plant Response to Engineered Safeguards Actuation, are /;

consistent. '

>

(Closed) IFI 302/86-31-02: An engineering evaluation determined tha't a

) test gas concen-

tolerance

trations. of + 0.3% isSP-160

Procedures acceptable for the hydrogen

A & B, Functional &'Oper (H[bility Check of the

Containment Hydrogen Monitor WS-11-CE, have been revised to specify' the

use of this tolerance.

(0 pen) IFI 302/86-12-01: As a result of engineering' reviews and testing

on both nuclear services closed cycle cooling pumps (SWP-1A and SWP-1B))',

the licensee determined that gas build-up in SWP-1B was occurring. To

mitigate this build-up at the present time, vent valves were installed on

the pump casings for both pumps and procedure SP-300, Openting Daily

Surveillance Log, was revised so that operators are required ~to vent the

pumps on a daily basis. A permanent solution will be' to install a

continuous venting system. A MAR (E6-04-24-02) has been written to

install this system during the upcoming refuel outage. This item remains

open pending completion of this MAR.

(Closed) 302/86-27-01: Review of the anunciator Equipment-Out-Of-Service

log was verified as accurate by the licerdee on 11/26/86. All open links

were properly addressed.  ;

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(Closed) 302/84-29-02: The licensee's site engineering group has

reviewed the Agastat relay failures in the reactor coolant pump power i

monitor s (RCPPM) and have decided to not replace the relays. Their ,,

'

investigation concluded that the failures were not generic to the relays >

and, based upon the fact that there have been no additional failures since  ;

January 1985, a relay replacement is not necessary. '

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(Closed) Violation 302/86-38-09: The inspector reviewed the licensce's

response dated March 6,1987, and verified that the following corrective

actions have been implemented:

-

A list has been developed of the refueling interval and semi-annual

(or greater) interval procedures that includes the calculated due

dates and their appropriate windows;

-

Personnel monitoring the performance of surveillances are using the

new surveillance listing until the new computer system is imple-

mented;

-

Licensee Event Report 86-20, revision 2, has b3en issued; and,

-

Surveillance procedure SP-140, In-core Neutron Detector System

Calibration, was completed by January 30, 1987.

(Closed) Violation 302/86-38-11: The inspector reviewed the licensee's

response dated March 6,1987, and verified that the following corrective

actions have been implemented:

-

LERs 86-26 and 86-27 were issued;

-

Procedures SP-347, SP-351, SP-365, and OP-408 were revised to include

monthly valve position verifications;

-

Technical Specification (TS) interpretations were issued to provide a

consistent interpretation of the TS surveillance requirements for

valve position verifications; and,

-

Compliance procedure CP-111, Procedure for Documenting, Reporting,

and Reviewing Nonconforming Operations Reports (NCOR), was revised to

change the responsibility for determination of reportability.

(Closed) IFI 302/84-02-09: There are presently 53 NCORs that are back-

logged and are required to be reviewed by the Plant Review Committee

(PRC). Of these 53 NCORs, 18 are from 1986 and the balance are from 1987.

The oldest NCOR that must be reviewed is dated June 18, 1986. Control

of the backlog and presentation of the NCORs to the PRC is made by the

Nuclear Safety Supervisor (NSS). It is expected that this change in

control of the NCOR process will continue to reduce the backlog.

4. Unresolved Items

Unresolved items were not identified during this reporting period.

5. Review of Plant Operations

The plant continued in power operation (Mode 1) for the duration of this

inspection period.

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a. Shift Logs and Facility Records

The inspector reviewed records and discussed various entries with

operations personnel to verify compliance with the Technical Speci-

fications (TS) and the licensee's administrative procedures.

The following records were revien d:

Shift / Supervisor's Log,i Reactor Operator's Log; Equipment Out-0f-

Service Log; Shift Relief Checklist; Auxiliary Building Operator's

Log; Active ; Clearance Log; Daily Operating Surveillance Log; Work

Request Log; Short Term Instructions (STI); and Selected Chemistry /

Radiation Protection Logs,f

.

In addition' ko these record reviews, the inspector independently

verified clearance order tagouts.

No violations or deviations were identified.

b. Facility Tours and Observations

Throughout the inspection period, facility tours were conducted to

observe operations and maintenance activities in progress. Some

operations and maintenance activity observations were conducted

during backshif ts. Also, during this inspection period, licensee

meetings were attended by the inspector to observe planning and-

management activities.

The facility tours and observations encompassed the following areas:

security perimeter fence; control room; emergency diesel generator

room; auxiliary building; intermediate building; battery rooms; and,

electrical switchgear rooms.

During these tours, the following observations were made:

(1) Monitoring Instrumentation - The following instrumentation or

indication were observed to verify that indicated parameters

were in accordance with the TS for the current operational mode:

Equipment operating status; area atmospheric and liquid radia-

tion monitors; electrical system lineup; reactor operating

parameters; and auxiliary equipment operating parameters.

No violations or deviations were identified.

(2) Safety Systems Walkdown - The inspector conducted a walkdown of

the Reactor Building Spray (BS) system to verify that the lineup

was in accordance with license requirements for system oper-

ability and that the system drawing and procedure correctly

reflect "as-built" plant conditions.

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No violations or deviations were identified.

(3) Shift Staffing - The inspector verified that operating shift

staffing was in accordance with TS requirements and that control

room operations were being conducted in an orderly and pro-

fessional manner. In addition, the inspector observed shift

turnovers on various occasions to verify the continuity of plant

status, operational problems, and other pertinent plant informa-

tion during these turnovers.

No violations or deviations were identified.

(4) Plant Housekeeping Conditions -

Storage of material and

components and cleanliness conditions of various areas through-

out the facility were observed to determine whether safety

and/or fire hazards existed.

No violations or deviations were identified.

(5) Radiation Areas - Radiation Control Areas (RCA) were observed to

verify proper identification and implementation. These observa-

tions included selected licensee conducted surveys, review of

step-off pad conditions, disposal of contaminated clothing, and

area posting. Area postings were independently verified for

accuracy by the inspectors. The inspectors also reviewed

selected radiation work permits and observed the use of

protective clothing, respirators, and personnel monitoring

devices to assure that the licensee's radiation monitoring

policies were being followed.

No *'olations or deviations were identified.

(6) Security Control - Security controls were observed to verify

that security barriers were intact, guard forces were on duty,

and access to the Protected Area (PA) was controlled in

accordance with the facility security plan. Personnel within

the PA were observed to verify proper display of badges and that

personnel requiring escort were properly escorted. Personnel

within vital areas were observed to ensure proper authorization

for the area.

During plant tours the inspectors noted that the licensee was

having problems with the Closed Circuit Television (CCTV)

system. The licensee was aware of this problem, has instituted

compensatory measures as appropriate, and has developed a

modification to correct the problem.

IFI (302/87-10-01): Review the licensee's activities to correct

the problems with the security CCTV system.

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(7) Fire Protection -

Fire protection activities, staffing and

equipment were observed to verify that fire brigade staffing was

appropriate and that fire alarms, extinguishing equipment,

actuating controls, fire fighting equipment, emergency equip-

ment, and fire barriers were operable.

No violations or deviations were identified.

(8) Surveillance - Surveillance tests were observed to verify that

approved procedures were being used; qualified personnel were

conducting the tests; tests were adequate to verify equipment

operability; calibrated equipment was utilized; and TS require-

ments were followed.

The following tests were observed and/or data reviewed:

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SP-112, Calibration of the Reactor Protection System

(procedure review only);

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SP-113, Power Range Nuclear Instrumentation Calibration

(procedure review only);

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SP-140, In-Core Neutron Detector System Calibration;

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SP-150, Operability & Functional Check of the Loose Parts

Monitoring Subsystem;

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SP-300, Operating Daily Surveillance Log;

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SP-317, [RC] Reactor Coolant System Water Inventory

Balance;

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SP-340A, "B" Train [ECCS] Emergency Core Cooling System

Pump & Valve Operability (for test of the 1A

Reactor Building Spray Pump);

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SP-605, Emergency Diesel Generator Engine

Inspection / Maintenance; and,

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SP-702, Reactor Coolant & Decay Heat Daily

Surveillance Program.

As a result of these reviews, the following items were

identified:

(a) After observing the performance of procedure SP-300, the

inspector checked the adequacy of the procedure to

implement Technical Specification (TS) required surveil-

lances.

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During this review it was noted that the procedure did not

require a channel check of the following post accident

monitoring instrumentation recorders: Power Range Nuclear

Flux (NI-5-NR), Source Range Nuclear Flux (NI-9-NR),

Reactor Coolant Outlet Temperature (RC-4-TR) and Borated

Water Storage Tank Level (BS-65-PR). A review of TS 4.3.3.6 indicated that these recorders are required to have

a channel check performed at least monthly.

From further review of the licensee's channel calibration

procedures SP-112 and SP-113, it did not appear. that

recorders N1-5-NR and RC-13-FR (Reactor Coolant Total Flow

Rate) were being calibrated at the quarterly and refueling

frequency specified by TS 4.3.3.6. Procedure SP-112

specified that recorder NI-5-NR be calibrated on a

refueling interval basis instead of the required quarterly

interval and recorder RC-13-FR had apparently been omitted

from the calibration procedures.

This matter was discussed with licensee representatives who

were unable to provide the inspector with documentation

that the channel checks and calibrations were being

performed at the required frequencies. The licensee has

subsequently revised procedure SP-300 to include shiftly

channel checks for the recorders discussed above.

Failure to perform the required channel checks and channel

calibrations of post accident monitoring instrumentation

recorders is contrary to the requirements of TS 4.3.3.6 and

is considered to be a violation.

Violation (302/87-10-02): Failure to perform the channel

checks and calibrations on post accident monitoring

instrumentation recorders as required by TS 4.3.3.6.

(b) While observing the performance of procedure SP-150 the

inspector noted that the newly installed Bently Nevada

vibration detectors for the Reactor Coolant Pumps (RCP)

were not included in this test. The licensee recently

installed this equipment during the RCP shaft replacement

outage which ended in June 1986. Although this instrumen-

tation is not required by TS the licensee nevertheless

takes routine shiftly readings on these detectors to

verify proper pump operation. The licensee's engineering

personnel were contacted to determine the required testing

of these instruments to ensure their accuracy. It appears

that these detectors receive a direct output from the

vibration sensors mounted on the pump and are not

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electrically biased like the rest of the Loose Parts

Monitoring System instrumentation. Therefore these

detectors need only be calibrated on a refueling interval

basis to maintain their accuracy. The licensee is

presently developing a maintenance procedure to perform

this calibration.

IFI (302/87-10-03): Review the licensee's calibration

procedure to calibrate the reactor coolant pump vibration

detectors.

(9) Maintenance Activities - The inspector observed maintenance

activities to verify that correct equipment clearances were in

effect; work requests and fire prevention work permits, as

required, were issued and being followed; quality control

personnel were available for inspection activities as required;

and TS requirements were being followed.

Maintenance was observed and work packages were reviewed for the

following maintenance activities:

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Gage calibration for the "A" Emergency Diesel Generator

(EDG-1A) in accordance with procedure MP-407, Maintenance

of Switchboard Meters and Associated Transducers for EDGs;

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Inspection of the blower rotor to housing clearances on

EDG-1A in accordance with a Colt Information Letter and

approved work instructions;

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Replacement and testing of relief valve DFV-35 in accord-

ance with procedure SP-605;

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Troubleshooting and repair of a main feedwater block valve

(FWV-30) in accordance with procedure MP-531, Trouble-

shooting Plant Equipment;

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Troubleshooting and repair of a high pressure injection

throttle valve (MUV-25); and,

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Inspection and ultrasonic testing of the "C" high pressure

injection pump (MUP-1C) in accordance with procedures

MP-122, Disassembly and Reassembly of Flange Connections,

and MP-126, Diassembly and Reassembly of Makeup Pumps.

During the inspection of the scavenging air blower on EDG-1A the

inspector noted that the clearances obtained were less than

those specified by the Colt Information Letter dated July 14,

1986. The scavenging air blower is used on the EDG to supply

air for combustion and remove hot gasses af ter combustion.

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This inspection was performed to detect unacceptable clearances

between the blower's rotor and housing which could cause blower

degradation and damage. Review of the results of this inspec-

tion on EDG-1B revealed similar indications. The licensee is

contacting the manufacturer to determine if any corrective

action is required for this condition.

IFI (302/87-10-04): Review the manufacturer's evaluation and

recommendations for EDG blower clearances.

(10) Radioactive Waste Controls - Solid waste compacting and selected

liquid releases were observed to verify that approved procedures

were utilized, that appropriate release approvals were obtained,

and that required surveys were taken.

No violations or deviations were identified.

(11) Pipe Hangers and Seismic Restraints - Several pipe hangers and

seismic restraints (snubbers) on safety-related systems were

observed to insure that fluid levels were adequate and no

leakage was evident, that restraint settings were appropriate,

and that anchoring points were not binding.

No violations or deviations were identified.

6. Review of Licensee Event Reports and Nonconforming

Operations Reports

a. Licensee Event Reports (LERs) were reviewed for potential generic

impact, to detect trends, and to determine whether corrective actions

appeared appropriate. Events, which were reported immediately, were

reviewed as they occurred to determine if the TS were satisfied.

LERs 83-39, 83-49, 83-62, 86-20, 86-23, 86-25, 87-02, and 87-05 were

reviewed in accordance with current NRC policy. LERs 83-39, 83-49,

83-62, 87-02, and 87-05 are closed.

(Closed) LER 83-49: This LER reported the failure to calibrate the

temperature sensing elements for decay heat removal instrumentation

due to a procedure inadequacy. The licensee has revised the

calibration procedure SP-161 (revision 9 dated March 14, 1984) to

include these elements.

(Closed) LER 83-62: This LER reported that the reactor building

pressure recorder was inoperable following the performance of a plant

modification. The licensee attributed the cause for this event to

be an inadequate surveillance procedure SP-300, Operating Daily

Surveillance Log, which did not require channel checks for the

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recorder. Corrective action for this situation as stated in the LER

consisted of revising procedure SP-300 to ensure the recorders listed

in TS 3.3.3.6 are checked each shift. The inspector checked the

current revision of procedure SP-300 to ensure that this action had

been taken. Although the procedure required the reactor building

pressure recorder to be checked on a shiftly basis, several other

recorders specified in TS 3.3.3.6 were omitted from the procedure as

discussed in paragraph 5.b(8)(a) of this report. When this matter

was brought to the attention of licensee management, procedure SP-300

was revised so that all of the recorders specified by TS 3.3.3.6 were

included.

(Closed) LER 87-05: LER 87-05 reported inadequacies in the surveil-

lance testing of the engineered safeguards actuation logic. This

matter was t reviously identified in NRC Inspection Report 50-302/

87-04 and is being tracked as an unresolved item (302/87-04-03).

LER's 86-20, 86-23 and 86-25 remain open for the following reasons:

(0 pen) LER 86-20: This LER reported the failure to meet the required

time interval for three consecutive 18 month surveillance tests. The

licensee has issued a supplement to this LER dated April 6,1987

which stated that the Master Surveillance Plan (SP-443) would be

revised to ensure that the applicable scheduling is not dependent

upon the prior performance date. This LER remains open pending

revision to procedure SP-443.

(0 pen) LER 86-23: This LER reported operation outside the design

basis of the plant due to the addition of unanalyzed D.C. loads. The

licensee has installed a new battery to supply all switchyard D.C.

loads important to the nuclear unit. The inspector observed part of

the installation and testing of this new battery. The licensee has

developed an administrative procedure (AP-18) for the non-nuclear

engineering organization requiring nuclear engineering to review

fossil plant modifications which may affect the operation of the

nuclear unit. The licensee will also issue a management directive to

groups that may interface with the nuclear plant to avoid impacting

the operation of the nuclear unit. This LER will remain open pending

the inspector's review of the management directive.

(0 pen) LER 86-25: This LER reported the lack of independent D.C.

power sources for the 230 KV switchyard protective relays. The

licensee has completed a design review to ensure that the existing

design of the '30 KV switchyard meets the intent of the FSAR. In

addition the FSAR will be revised to clarify the electrical system

design reliability considerations. This LER will remain open pending

revision to the FSAR.

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b. The inspector reviewed Nonconforming Operations Reports (NCORs) to

verify the following: compliance with the TS, corrective actions as

identified in the reports or during subsequent reviews have been

accomplished or are being pursued for completion, generic items are

identified and reported as required by 10 CFR Part 21, and items are

reported as required by TS.

All NCORs were reviewed in accordance with the current NRC Policy.

(1) NCOR 87-55 reported that a wire was disconnected from the

control switch for a high pressure injection valve (MUV-25).

This prevented closing of the valve from the main control board

although local control and automatic engineered safeguards

control of the valve was still possible. The licensee is

presently investigating the cause for this situation.

IFI (302/87-10-05): Review the licensee's findings and

corrective action for a disconnected wire from valve MUV-25.

(2) NCOR 87-45 reported a plant runback which occurred from

approximately 95% power during the performance of procedure

SP-332, Monthly Main Steam Line and Feedwater Isolation

Functional Test. This test actually strokes the main feedwater

isolation valves in the closed direction for a short period of

time. During this test a time delay relay failed to operate and

allowed the main feedwater pump suction valve to close thereby

i tripping the "A" Main Feedwater Pump (FWP-2A). To prevent

recurrence of this event the licensee plans to take the

following corrective action:

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Change procedure SP-332 to require the operator to open the

oower supply breaker to the suction valve at approximately

80% open to stop valve moticr. and thereby prevent tripping

the FWP;

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Writing a procedure to test the time delay relay prior to

the performance of procedure SP-332, and,

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Evaluating whether the feedwater isolation actuation matrix

should be changed to include a test light and signal

blocking contact in lieu of actually stroking the feedwater

valves.

IFI (302/87-10-06): Review the licensee's implementation of

corrective action to prevent a plant runback during the

performance of procedure SP-332.

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(3) .NCOR 87-49 reported that chemistry calibration procedures were

inadequate to properly restore equipment taken out of service

for calibration. This resulted in a liquid radiation monitor

being returned to service without the proper flow lineup.

Although no TS requirements were missed in this case the

possibility exists that future inadequate equipment restoration

may violate TS requirements. To provide for an independent

valve position verification the licensee plans to utilize

equipment clearances to remove and restore this equipment for

calibration.

IFI (302/87-10-07): Review the licensee's implementation of the

use of equipment clearances to remove / restore equipment which is

calibrated by chemistry procedures.

(4) NCOR 87-47 reported that surveillance procedure SP-216, Sample

Line Leak Rate Test, could not be performed due to a valve

failure (CAV-252) in the system. This test was developed to

meat a commitment the licensee made to the NRC to prove the

leakage integrity of a system as discussed in section 2.1.6.a

of NUREG 0578. This procedure performance was overdue as of

March 17, 1987. The licensee is presently proceeding with _the

necessary procedure changes to allow performance of this test.

IFI (302/87-10-08): Review the licensee's progress for the

performance of procedure SP-216.

(5) NCORs 87 44 and 87-48 reported unmonitored releases to the

Intermediate Building (IB) via the Post Accident Sampling System

(PASS). Since the IB does not have monitors or filter systems

to prevent releases to the environment, releases to this

building are considered to be releases to the environment. The

licensce's analysis of the releases for each of these events

have indicated that no regulatory limits were exceeded.

To prevent recurrence of these events the licensee has isolated

the PASS ("nowever it is useable if necessary) and has performed

a low Pressure (LP) and High Pressure (HP) test in an attempt to

identify the leakage source. The HP test did not identify any

leakage, however the LP test identified a possible body-to-

bonnet leak on relief valve CAV-491. The following actions are

presently being taken:

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A work request (WR) has been written to replace the

body-to-bonnet gasket, check for seat leakage, and check

the lift setpoint on CAV-491;

-

Temporary ventilation hoods are being installed over

CAV-491 and a modulating valve, CAV-484, (which due to its

method of operation could be a leak source) to prevent

releases to the IB; and,

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A portable radiation monitor, RMA-15, will be moved to the i

IB near the location of these valves to assure any future

leaks are detected.

Further testing may be accomplished and a review remains in

progress in an attempt to positively identify the source of

leakage.

IFI (302/87-10-09): Review the licensee's progress to

detect and repair leaks in the PASS.

7. Review of IE Information Notices

The inspector reviewed the licensee's actions with respect to the

following IE Information Notices:

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80-27, Degradation of Reactor Coolant Pump Studs;

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82-06, Failure of Steam Generator Primary Side Manway Closure Studs;

and,- 86-108, Degradation of Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary

Resulting From Boric Acid Corrosion.

As a part of this review, the inspector also reviewed two Institute of

Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) Significant Operating Experience Reports

(SOER), 81-12 and 84-05, which also relate to the effects of boric acid

corrosion.

In response to these notices and the SOERs, the licensee has developed

procedures to periodically check the steam generator manway studs and

revised their reactor coolant system hydrostatic test procedure (SP-204)

to require the examination to include a check for the evidence of boric

acid corrosion.

Following review of SP-204, the inspector noted that while the procedure

requires a check for boric acid corrosion, the procedure may not detect

all of the corrosive effects because the piping insulation is not removed.

l This observation was discussed with licensee personnel at which time a

task force was formed by the licensee to determine whether the present

boric acid monitoring program is adequate.

IFI (302/87-10-10): Review the activities of the task force developed to

determine the adequacy of the boric acid corrosion monitoring program.

8. Preparations for Refueling

The inspector observed the licensee's receipt of new fuel shipments in

preparation for the next refueling outage that is scheduled to begin in

September 1987. Activities reviewed included new fuel receipt inspection

and unloading and movement of the fuel assemblies to the dry fuel storage

area. The following procedures were reviewed:

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FP-302, New Fuel Assembly Unloading, Inspection, Storage, and

Container Reclosing; and,

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FP-304, Receiving New Fuel.

No violations or deviations were identified.

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