ML20209E575
| ML20209E575 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crystal River  |
| Issue date: | 04/22/1987 |
| From: | Stetka T, Tedrow J, Wilson B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20209E463 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-302-87-10, IEIN-80-27, IEIN-82-06, IEIN-82-6, IEIN-86-108, NUDOCS 8704300077 | |
| Download: ML20209E575 (18) | |
See also: IR 05000302/1987010
Text
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UNITED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION 11
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101 MARIETTA STREET.N.W.
ATLANTA, GEORGI A 30323
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Report No:
50-302/87-10
Licensee:
Florida Power Corporation
3201 34th Street, South
St. Petersburg, FL 33733
Docket No:
50-302
Licensee No: DPR-72
Facility Name:
Crystal River 3
Inspection Dates: March 7 - April 9, 1987
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[)Date' Signed
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Inspectors: T.F.Steta,SeniorResident/nspector
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J. E. Tedrow, Resident InspYetai /
'Date 'Si gned
Approved by:
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B. A. Wilson, Section Chief
Date Signed
Division of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY
Scope: This routine inspection was conducted by two resident inspectors in the
areas of plant operations, security, radiological controls, Licensee Event
Reports and Nonconforming Operations Reports, licensee action on IE Information
Notices, preparations for refueling, and licensee action on previous inspection
items.
Numerous facility tours were -conducted and facility operations
observed.
Some of these tours and observations were conducted on backshifts.
Results: One violation was identified: (Failure to perform channel checks and
channel calibrations required by technical specification 4.3.3.6, paragraph
5 b(8)(a).)
8704300077 870423
ADOCK 05000302
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REPORT' DETAILS
1.
-Persons Contacted
Licensee Employees
J. Andrews, Nuclear Engineer II
S. Balliet, Nuclear Engineer I
J. Barrett, Principal Nuclear Mechanical Engineer
- J. Brandely, Nuclear Security & Special Projects Superintendent
M. Clary, Principal Nuclear Mechanical Engineer
- M. Collins, Nuclear Safety & Reliability Superintendent
- J. Cooper, Superintendent, Technical Support
- E. Ford, Nuclear Safety Specialist
- R. Fuller, Senior Nuclear Licensing Engineer
J. Gibson, Nuclear Technical Specification Coordinator
- V. Hernandez, Senior Nuclear Quality Assurance Specialist
- B. Hickle, Manager, Nuclear Plant Operations
- M. Mann, Nuclear Compliance Specialist
- P. McKee, Director, Nuclear Plant Operations
L. Mof fet, Nuclear Safety Supervisor
R. Murgatroyd, Nuclear Maintenance Superintendent
W. Neuman, Supervisor Inservice Inspection (ISI)
J. Payne, Nuclear Chemistry Supervisor
- J. Roberts, Nuclear Chemistry Manager
S. Robinson, Nuclear Waste Manager
- W. Rossfeld, Nuclear Compliance Manager
D. Wilder, Radiation Protection Manager
K. Wilson, Manager, Site Nuclear Licensing
- R. Wittman, Nuclear Operations Superintendent
Other personnel contacted included office, operations, engineering,
maintenance, chemistry / radiation and corporate personnel.
- Attended exit interview
2.
Exit Interview
The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph 1)
at the conclusion of the inspection on April 9,
1987.
During this
meeting, the inspector summarized the scope and findings of the inspection
as they are detailed in this report with particular emphasis on the
Violation and Inspector Followup Items (IFI).
The licensee representatives ackncwledged the inspector's comments and did
not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed
by the inspectors during this inspaction.
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3.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Items
(Closed) Violation 302/86-38-04:
The licensee has revised procedure
SP-421, Reactivity Balance Calculations, (revision 28 dated February 4,
1987) to clarify the method of calculating the reactor shutdown margin.
The inspector reviewed the procedure change and considers it sufficient to
preclude recurrence of this event.
(Closed) Violation 302/86-38-02:
The licensee initiated a Radiological
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Safety Incident Report (RSIR) #86-424 to document the failure to wear beta
protective glasses.
A management review board meeting reviewed this
matter with the personnel involved and their immediate supervision. This
board stressed the importance of strict compliance with radiological
controls.
(Closed) Viola + ion 302/86-38-05: The licensee requested and received a
NRC exemption from the 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix J requirement to pressurize
the air locks to the postulated peak containment internal pressure (Pa)
prior to entering an operational mode which requires containment
integrity. The licensee is now required to perform only an airlock seal
leakage test when the airlock is opened while the plant is in the cold
shutdown (Mode 5) or refueling (Mode 6) condition, provided no maintenance
has been performed on the airlock. The licensee has revisod procedure
SP-181, Containment Air Lock Test (revision 17 dated January 27,1987),to
reflect the Appendix J exemption and will perform the airlock seal leakage
tests in accordance with procedure SP-430, Containment Air Lock Seal
Leakage Test.
(Closed) Violation 302/86-23-03: The licensee has issued Drawing Change
Notice (DCN) 86-0241 and revised drawing FD-302-285 for the Emergency
Diesel Generator (EDG) lube oil system.
The drawing now depicts the
correct system configuration. In addition, the Field Problem Report (FPR)
process has been proceduralized by issuance of Administrative Instruction
(AI) 410, Preparation and Handling of FPRs, dated January 30, 1987. This
procedure will implerrent the DCN or modification design reviews if
required. The inspector reviewed this procedure and considers that this
action should be adequate to prevent similar violations from occurring.
(Closed)
Violation 302/86-20-01:
The licensee has completed and the
inspector has verified the completion of the following actions:
Item a
Procedure OP-404, Decay Heat Removal System, has been revised
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(revision 58, dated July 29,1986) to address the control of valves
DHV-110 and DHV-111 following restoration of reactor vessel level;
and,
All operations personnel have reviewed the response to this Viola-
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tion.
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Item b
A Short Term Instruction (STI) dated December 12, 1986, was issued to
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operations personnel directing operators to not adjust the packing on
safety related valves.
The licensee has initiated a policy to allow
only maintenance personnel to adjust valve packing on safety related
valves except in an emergency.
The licensee also revised procedure
AI-600, Conduct of Maintenance (revision 34 dated March 16, 1987) to
require documentation of valve packing adjustments.
Item c
The snubber was visually inspcted and fluid added.
Procedure
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SP-201, Accessible / Inaccessible Hydraulic Snubbers Visual Inspection,
has been revised (revision 19 dated September 23,1986) to allow the
addition of fluid during inspection and to document the addition of
any fluid during performance of the procedure.
(0 pen) Violation 302/86-04-03:
The licensee has completed and the
inspector has verified the completion of the following actions:
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By May 28, 1986, all licensed operators had received special training
to emphasize the requirement to push the reactor trip button after a
The licensee has revised procedure AP-580, Reactor Protection System
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Actuation, step 6, to allow permissible options for the restoration
of pressurizer level following a reactor trip;
As part of the annual requalification training program, all licensed
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operators received training on the proper use of emergency and
abnormal procedures; and,
Procedure AI 400, Plant Operating Quality Assurance Manual Control
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Document (P0QAM), has been revised (revision 67 dated December 9,
1986) to clarify the use of abnormal, emergency, and verification
procedures.
As part of their corrective action the licensee has committed to review
all plant Abnormal Procedures (AP) and Emergency Procedures (EP) to assure
immediate actions, remedial actions and followup actions are in conform-
ance with their revised Writer's Guide.
The licensee plans to have this
corrective action completed by November 30, 1987.
This item will remain
open pending the completion of the licensee's review of the APs and EPs.
evaluation for the stuck open discharge check valve (RWV-36)gineering
(Closed) IFI 302/87-04-05:
The licensee has completed the en
This
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evaluation compared the calculated flow rate through the nuclear services
seawater (RW) heat exchangers with the velve stuck open' with both
emergency pumps running with the design flow rate through the heat
exchangers. The evaluation concluded that even with the check valve stuck
open, the heat exchangers would receive adequate cooling flow.
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(Closed) IFI 302/86-35-06: The inspector reviewed the " Maximum Emergency
Feedwater (EFW) Flow Rate" calculations performed by Babcock & Wilcox on
12/10/86 for the Crystal River plant.
These calculations concluded that
the maxim',m EFW flow limit can be increased to 305 GPM per nozzle or
1830 GPM per generator.
Since this is in excess of the 1700 GPM expa-
rienced by the "B" Once Through Steam Generator (OTSG), this issue is
considered to be resolved.
(Closed) Violation 302/85-21-02:
In a letter dated June 21, 1985, that
transmitted NRC Inspection Report 50-302/85-21, the NRC stated that the
licensee's response to Violation 302/85-08-07 dated June 6,
1985, also
addressed this Violation. This response was considered to be satisfactory
and the corrective actions were verified as documented in NRC Inspection
Report 50-302/86-27. Action on this item is considered to be complete.
(Closed) IFI 302/85-04-03: As the result of an engineering review it was
determined that the modified governor design was not environmentally
qualified and that to perform this qualification would be cost prohib-
itive.
Therefore, the licensee has decided to not install the modified
governor.
To assure that the turbine shaft does not continue rolling
af ter operation, as could occur if a turbine stop valve were to leak by
the seat, the licensee requires operations personnel to verify that the
shaft is not rolling on a shiftly basis.
This requirement has been
incorporated into procedure SP-300, Operating Daily Surveillance Log.
(Closed) IFI 302/86-20-05:
The licensee conducted a walk down of the
systems affected by temporary modification T80-06-80 entitled, leave Non-Q
Gauges in System, and determined that four improper fittings were
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installed.
These fittings appear to have been installed during new
construction and not by subsequent plant modifications. The fittings have
been replaced with the correct fittings.
(Closed) IFI 302/84-09-01: Surveillance procedures SP-354A & B, Emergency
Diesel Fuel Oil Quality & Diesel Generator Test, have been revised to
require checking of the emergency diesel generator (EDG) fuel oil storage
tanks by sounding the tanks.
(Closed) UNR 302/81-02-06: The licensee decided to not revise system flow
diagrams and valve line-up check lists to include instrument valves. To
provide control over these instrument valves, the licensee developed and
implemented procedure SP-111, Valve Lineup Verification for Critical
Instrumentation, in 1981. This procedure provides control of instrument
isolation, equalization, drain, and vent valves af ter refuel outages and
after maintenance activities on the applicable instrumentation.
(Closed) IFI 302/84-21-07:
Procedure AP-1076, Violent Weather, has been
revised so that EDG operation is not required during periods of violent
weather.
The option to run the EDGs, if required, is available to the
Nuclear Shift Supervisor.
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(Closed)
IFI 302/80-39-04:
An engineering evaluation indicated that the
failure of the Auxiliary Building ventilation fan blades in 1978 and 1980
was caused by casting defects in the blades.
To prevent the use of fan
blades with casting defects, the licensee now performs Non-destructive
Examination (NDE) on the blades prior to acceptance by FPC.
No further
fan blade failures have occurred.
(0 pen)IFI 302/80-42-06: The licensee has decided to replace valve SWV-10
with a valve of a different design thus preventing the s. laming problem.
Modification (MAR) 83-02-10-01, Replacement of SWV-10, is scheduled to be
done during the refuel outage beginning September 19, 1987.
This item
remains open pending completion of this MAR.
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(Closed) IFI 302/84-09-07:
Surveillance procedure SPh456, Refuelirig
Interval ES Manual & Automatic Actuations Functional Test, was revised so "
that the nomenclature used for the Engineering Safeguards (ES) status
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lights between this procedure and procedure SP-417, Refueling Interval /;
Integrated Plant Response to Engineered Safeguards Actuation, are
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consistent.
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(Closed) IFI 302/86-31-02:
An engineering evaluation determined tha't a
tolerance of + 0.3% is acceptable for the hydrogen (H[bility Check of the
) test gas concen-
trations.
Procedures SP-160 A & B, Functional &'Oper
Containment Hydrogen Monitor WS-11-CE, have been revised to specify' the
use of this tolerance.
(0 pen) IFI 302/86-12-01:
As a result of engineering' reviews and testing
on both nuclear services closed cycle cooling pumps (SWP-1A and SWP-1B))',
the licensee determined that gas build-up in SWP-1B was occurring.
To
mitigate this build-up at the present time, vent valves were installed on
the pump casings for both pumps and procedure SP-300, Openting Daily
Surveillance Log, was revised so that operators are required ~to vent the
pumps on a daily basis.
A permanent solution will be' to install a
continuous venting system.
A MAR (E6-04-24-02) has been written to
install this system during the upcoming refuel outage. This item remains
open pending completion of this MAR.
(Closed) 302/86-27-01:
Review of the anunciator Equipment-Out-Of-Service
log was verified as accurate by the licerdee on 11/26/86. All open links
were properly addressed.
(Closed) 302/84-29-02:
The licensee's site engineering group has
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reviewed the Agastat relay failures in the reactor coolant pump power
monitor s (RCPPM) and have decided to not replace the relays.
Their
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investigation concluded that the failures were not generic to the relays
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and, based upon the fact that there have been no additional failures since
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January 1985, a relay replacement is not necessary.
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(Closed) Violation 302/86-38-09:
The inspector reviewed the licensce's
response dated March 6,1987, and verified that the following corrective
actions have been implemented:
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A list has been developed of the refueling interval and semi-annual
(or greater) interval procedures that includes the calculated due
dates and their appropriate windows;
Personnel monitoring the performance of surveillances are using the
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new surveillance listing until the new computer system is imple-
mented;
Licensee Event Report 86-20, revision 2, has b3en issued; and,
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Surveillance procedure SP-140, In-core Neutron Detector System
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Calibration, was completed by January 30, 1987.
(Closed) Violation 302/86-38-11:
The inspector reviewed the licensee's
response dated March 6,1987, and verified that the following corrective
actions have been implemented:
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LERs 86-26 and 86-27 were issued;
Procedures SP-347, SP-351, SP-365, and OP-408 were revised to include
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monthly valve position verifications;
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Technical Specification (TS) interpretations were issued to provide a
consistent interpretation of the TS surveillance requirements for
valve position verifications; and,
Compliance procedure CP-111, Procedure for Documenting, Reporting,
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and Reviewing Nonconforming Operations Reports (NCOR), was revised to
change the responsibility for determination of reportability.
(Closed) IFI 302/84-02-09: There are presently 53 NCORs that are back-
logged and are required to be reviewed by the Plant Review Committee
(PRC). Of these 53 NCORs, 18 are from 1986 and the balance are from 1987.
The oldest NCOR that must be reviewed is dated June 18, 1986.
Control
of the backlog and presentation of the NCORs to the PRC is made by the
Nuclear Safety Supervisor (NSS).
It is expected that this change in
control of the NCOR process will continue to reduce the backlog.
4.
Unresolved Items
Unresolved items were not identified during this reporting period.
5.
Review of Plant Operations
The plant continued in power operation (Mode 1) for the duration of this
inspection period.
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a.
Shift Logs and Facility Records
The inspector reviewed records and discussed various entries with
operations personnel to verify compliance with the Technical Speci-
fications (TS) and the licensee's administrative procedures.
The following records were revien d:
Shift / Supervisor's Log,i Reactor Operator's Log; Equipment Out-0f-
Service Log; Shift Relief Checklist; Auxiliary Building Operator's
Log; Active ; Clearance Log; Daily Operating Surveillance Log; Work
Request Log; Short Term Instructions (STI); and Selected Chemistry /
Radiation Protection Logs,f
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In addition' ko these record reviews, the inspector independently
verified clearance order tagouts.
No violations or deviations were identified.
b.
Facility Tours and Observations
Throughout the inspection period, facility tours were conducted to
observe operations and maintenance activities in progress.
Some
operations and maintenance activity observations were conducted
during backshif ts.
Also, during this inspection period, licensee
meetings were attended by the inspector to observe planning and-
management activities.
The facility tours and observations encompassed the following areas:
security perimeter fence; control room; emergency diesel generator
room; auxiliary building; intermediate building; battery rooms; and,
electrical switchgear rooms.
During these tours, the following observations were made:
(1) Monitoring Instrumentation - The following instrumentation or
indication were observed to verify that indicated parameters
were in accordance with the TS for the current operational mode:
Equipment operating status; area atmospheric and liquid radia-
tion monitors; electrical system lineup; reactor operating
parameters; and auxiliary equipment operating parameters.
No violations or deviations were identified.
(2) Safety Systems Walkdown - The inspector conducted a walkdown of
the Reactor Building Spray (BS) system to verify that the lineup
was in accordance with license requirements for system oper-
ability and that the system drawing and procedure correctly
reflect "as-built" plant conditions.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
(3) Shift Staffing - The inspector verified that operating shift
staffing was in accordance with TS requirements and that control
room operations were being conducted in an orderly and pro-
fessional manner.
In addition, the inspector observed shift
turnovers on various occasions to verify the continuity of plant
status, operational problems, and other pertinent plant informa-
tion during these turnovers.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Storage of material and
(4) Plant Housekeeping Conditions
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components and cleanliness conditions of various areas through-
out the facility were observed to determine whether safety
and/or fire hazards existed.
No violations or deviations were identified.
(5) Radiation Areas - Radiation Control Areas (RCA) were observed to
verify proper identification and implementation. These observa-
tions included selected licensee conducted surveys, review of
step-off pad conditions, disposal of contaminated clothing, and
area posting.
Area postings were independently verified for
accuracy by the inspectors.
The inspectors also reviewed
selected radiation work permits and observed the use of
protective clothing, respirators, and personnel monitoring
devices to assure that the licensee's radiation monitoring
policies were being followed.
No *'olations or deviations were identified.
(6) Security Control - Security controls were observed to verify
that security barriers were intact, guard forces were on duty,
and access to the Protected Area (PA) was controlled in
accordance with the facility security plan.
Personnel within
the PA were observed to verify proper display of badges and that
personnel requiring escort were properly escorted.
Personnel
within vital areas were observed to ensure proper authorization
for the area.
During plant tours the inspectors noted that the licensee was
having problems with the Closed Circuit Television (CCTV)
system. The licensee was aware of this problem, has instituted
compensatory measures as appropriate, and has developed a
modification to correct the problem.
IFI (302/87-10-01): Review the licensee's activities to correct
the problems with the security CCTV system.
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(7) Fire Protection
Fire protection activities, staffing and
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equipment were observed to verify that fire brigade staffing was
appropriate and that fire alarms, extinguishing equipment,
actuating controls, fire fighting equipment, emergency equip-
ment, and fire barriers were operable.
No violations or deviations were identified.
(8) Surveillance - Surveillance tests were observed to verify that
approved procedures were being used; qualified personnel were
conducting the tests; tests were adequate to verify equipment
operability; calibrated equipment was utilized; and TS require-
ments were followed.
The following tests were observed and/or data reviewed:
SP-112, Calibration of the Reactor Protection System
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(procedure review only);
SP-113, Power Range Nuclear Instrumentation Calibration
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(procedure review only);
SP-140, In-Core Neutron Detector System Calibration;
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SP-150, Operability & Functional Check of the Loose Parts
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Monitoring Subsystem;
SP-300, Operating Daily Surveillance Log;
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SP-317, [RC] Reactor Coolant System Water Inventory
Balance;
SP-340A, "B" Train [ECCS] Emergency Core Cooling System
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Pump & Valve Operability (for test of the 1A
Reactor Building Spray Pump);
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SP-605, Emergency Diesel Generator Engine
Inspection / Maintenance; and,
SP-702, Reactor Coolant & Decay Heat Daily
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Surveillance Program.
As a result of these reviews, the following items were
identified:
(a) After observing the performance of procedure SP-300, the
inspector checked the adequacy of the procedure to
implement Technical Specification (TS) required surveil-
lances.
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During this review it was noted that the procedure did not
require a channel check of the following post accident
monitoring instrumentation recorders:
Power Range Nuclear
Flux (NI-5-NR), Source Range Nuclear Flux (NI-9-NR),
Reactor Coolant Outlet Temperature (RC-4-TR) and Borated
Water Storage Tank Level (BS-65-PR).
A review of TS 4.3.3.6 indicated that these recorders are required to have
a channel check performed at least monthly.
From further review of the licensee's channel calibration
procedures SP-112 and SP-113, it did not appear. that
recorders N1-5-NR and RC-13-FR (Reactor Coolant Total Flow
Rate) were being calibrated at the quarterly and refueling
frequency specified by TS 4.3.3.6.
Procedure SP-112
specified that recorder NI-5-NR be calibrated on a
refueling interval basis instead of the required quarterly
interval and recorder RC-13-FR had apparently been omitted
from the calibration procedures.
This matter was discussed with licensee representatives who
were unable to provide the inspector with documentation
that the channel checks and calibrations were being
performed at the required frequencies. The licensee has
subsequently revised procedure SP-300 to include shiftly
channel checks for the recorders discussed above.
Failure to perform the required channel checks and channel
calibrations of post accident monitoring instrumentation
recorders is contrary to the requirements of TS 4.3.3.6 and
is considered to be a violation.
Violation (302/87-10-02):
Failure to perform the channel
checks and calibrations on post accident monitoring
instrumentation recorders as required by TS 4.3.3.6.
(b) While observing the performance of procedure SP-150 the
inspector noted that the newly installed Bently Nevada
vibration detectors for the Reactor Coolant Pumps (RCP)
were not included in this test. The licensee recently
installed this equipment during the RCP shaft replacement
outage which ended in June 1986. Although this instrumen-
tation is not required by TS the licensee nevertheless
takes routine shiftly readings on these detectors to
verify proper pump operation. The licensee's engineering
personnel were contacted to determine the required testing
of these instruments to ensure their accuracy.
It appears
that these detectors receive a direct output from the
vibration sensors mounted on the pump and are not
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electrically biased like the rest of the Loose Parts
Monitoring
System
instrumentation.
Therefore
these
detectors need only be calibrated on a refueling interval
basis to maintain their accuracy.
The licensee is
presently developing a maintenance procedure to perform
this calibration.
IFI (302/87-10-03):
Review the licensee's calibration
procedure to calibrate the reactor coolant pump vibration
detectors.
(9) Maintenance Activities - The inspector observed maintenance
activities to verify that correct equipment clearances were in
effect; work requests and fire prevention work permits, as
required, were issued and being followed; quality control
personnel were available for inspection activities as required;
and TS requirements were being followed.
Maintenance was observed and work packages were reviewed for the
following maintenance activities:
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Gage calibration for the
"A"
(EDG-1A) in accordance with procedure MP-407, Maintenance
of Switchboard Meters and Associated Transducers for EDGs;
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Inspection of the blower rotor to housing clearances on
EDG-1A in accordance with a Colt Information Letter and
approved work instructions;
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Replacement and testing of relief valve DFV-35 in accord-
ance with procedure SP-605;
Troubleshooting and repair of a main feedwater block valve
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(FWV-30) in accordance with procedure MP-531, Trouble-
shooting Plant Equipment;
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Troubleshooting and repair of a high pressure injection
throttle valve (MUV-25); and,
Inspection and ultrasonic testing of the "C"
high pressure
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injection pump (MUP-1C) in accordance with procedures
MP-122, Disassembly and Reassembly of Flange Connections,
and MP-126, Diassembly and Reassembly of Makeup Pumps.
During the inspection of the scavenging air blower on EDG-1A the
inspector noted that the clearances obtained were less than
those specified by the Colt Information Letter dated July 14,
1986. The scavenging air blower is used on the EDG to supply
air for combustion and remove hot gasses af ter combustion.
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This inspection was performed to detect unacceptable clearances
between the blower's rotor and housing which could cause blower
degradation and damage.
Review of the results of this inspec-
tion on EDG-1B revealed similar indications. The licensee is
contacting the manufacturer to determine if any corrective
action is required for this condition.
IFI (302/87-10-04):
Review the manufacturer's evaluation and
recommendations for EDG blower clearances.
(10) Radioactive Waste Controls - Solid waste compacting and selected
liquid releases were observed to verify that approved procedures
were utilized, that appropriate release approvals were obtained,
and that required surveys were taken.
No violations or deviations were identified.
(11) Pipe Hangers and Seismic Restraints - Several pipe hangers and
seismic restraints (snubbers) on safety-related systems were
observed to insure that fluid levels were adequate and no
leakage was evident, that restraint settings were appropriate,
and that anchoring points were not binding.
No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Review of Licensee Event Reports and Nonconforming
Operations Reports
a.
Licensee Event Reports (LERs) were reviewed for potential generic
impact, to detect trends, and to determine whether corrective actions
appeared appropriate. Events, which were reported immediately, were
reviewed as they occurred to determine if the TS were satisfied.
LERs 83-39, 83-49, 83-62, 86-20, 86-23, 86-25, 87-02, and 87-05 were
reviewed in accordance with current NRC policy.
LERs 83-39, 83-49,
83-62, 87-02, and 87-05 are closed.
(Closed) LER 83-49:
This LER reported the failure to calibrate the
temperature sensing elements for decay heat removal instrumentation
due to a procedure inadequacy.
The licensee has revised the
calibration procedure SP-161 (revision 9 dated March 14, 1984) to
include these elements.
(Closed) LER 83-62:
This LER reported that the reactor building
pressure recorder was inoperable following the performance of a plant
modification. The licensee attributed the cause for this event to
be an inadequate surveillance procedure SP-300, Operating Daily
Surveillance Log, which did not require channel checks for the
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recorder. Corrective action for this situation as stated in the LER
consisted of revising procedure SP-300 to ensure the recorders listed
in TS 3.3.3.6 are checked each shift.
The inspector checked the
current revision of procedure SP-300 to ensure that this action had
been taken. Although the procedure required the reactor building
pressure recorder to be checked on a shiftly basis, several other
recorders specified in TS 3.3.3.6 were omitted from the procedure as
discussed in paragraph 5.b(8)(a) of this report. When this matter
was brought to the attention of licensee management, procedure SP-300
was revised so that all of the recorders specified by TS 3.3.3.6 were
included.
(Closed) LER 87-05: LER 87-05 reported inadequacies in the surveil-
lance testing of the engineered safeguards actuation logic. This
matter was t reviously identified in NRC Inspection Report 50-302/
87-04 and is being tracked as an unresolved item (302/87-04-03).
LER's 86-20, 86-23 and 86-25 remain open for the following reasons:
(0 pen) LER 86-20: This LER reported the failure to meet the required
time interval for three consecutive 18 month surveillance tests. The
licensee has issued a supplement to this LER dated April 6,1987
which stated that the Master Surveillance Plan (SP-443) would be
revised to ensure that the applicable scheduling is not dependent
upon the prior performance date.
This LER remains open pending
revision to procedure SP-443.
(0 pen) LER 86-23:
This LER reported operation outside the design
basis of the plant due to the addition of unanalyzed D.C. loads. The
licensee has installed a new battery to supply all switchyard D.C.
loads important to the nuclear unit. The inspector observed part of
the installation and testing of this new battery. The licensee has
developed an administrative procedure (AP-18) for the non-nuclear
engineering organization requiring nuclear engineering to review
fossil plant modifications which may affect the operation of the
nuclear unit. The licensee will also issue a management directive to
groups that may interface with the nuclear plant to avoid impacting
the operation of the nuclear unit. This LER will remain open pending
the inspector's review of the management directive.
(0 pen) LER 86-25: This LER reported the lack of independent D.C.
power sources for the 230 KV switchyard protective relays.
The
licensee has completed a design review to ensure that the existing
design of the '30 KV switchyard meets the intent of the FSAR.
In
addition the FSAR will be revised to clarify the electrical system
design reliability considerations. This LER will remain open pending
revision to the FSAR.
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b.
The inspector reviewed Nonconforming Operations Reports (NCORs) to
verify the following: compliance with the TS, corrective actions as
identified in the reports or during subsequent reviews have been
accomplished or are being pursued for completion, generic items are
identified and reported as required by 10 CFR Part 21, and items are
reported as required by TS.
All NCORs were reviewed in accordance with the current NRC Policy.
(1) NCOR 87-55 reported that a wire was disconnected from the
control switch for a high pressure injection valve (MUV-25).
This prevented closing of the valve from the main control board
although local control and automatic engineered safeguards
control of the valve was still possible.
The licensee is
presently investigating the cause for this situation.
IFI
(302/87-10-05):
Review the licensee's findings and
corrective action for a disconnected wire from valve MUV-25.
(2) NCOR 87-45 reported a plant runback which occurred from
approximately 95% power during the performance of procedure
SP-332, Monthly Main Steam Line and Feedwater Isolation
Functional Test. This test actually strokes the main feedwater
isolation valves in the closed direction for a short period of
time. During this test a time delay relay failed to operate and
allowed the main feedwater pump suction valve to close thereby
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tripping the
"A" Main Feedwater Pump (FWP-2A).
To prevent
recurrence of this event the licensee plans to take the
following corrective action:
Change procedure SP-332 to require the operator to open the
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oower supply breaker to the suction valve at approximately
80% open to stop valve moticr. and thereby prevent tripping
the FWP;
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Writing a procedure to test the time delay relay prior to
the performance of procedure SP-332, and,
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Evaluating whether the feedwater isolation actuation matrix
should be changed to include a test light and signal
blocking contact in lieu of actually stroking the feedwater
valves.
IFI (302/87-10-06):
Review the licensee's implementation of
corrective action to prevent a plant runback during the
performance of procedure SP-332.
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(3) .NCOR 87-49 reported that chemistry calibration procedures were
inadequate to properly restore equipment taken out of service
for calibration. This resulted in a liquid radiation monitor
being returned to service without the proper flow lineup.
Although no TS requirements were missed in this case the
possibility exists that future inadequate equipment restoration
may violate TS requirements.
To provide for an independent
valve position verification the licensee plans to utilize
equipment clearances to remove and restore this equipment for
calibration.
IFI (302/87-10-07): Review the licensee's implementation of the
use of equipment clearances to remove / restore equipment which is
calibrated by chemistry procedures.
(4) NCOR 87-47 reported that surveillance procedure SP-216, Sample
Line Leak Rate Test, could not be performed due to a valve
failure (CAV-252) in the system.
This test was developed to
meat a commitment the licensee made to the NRC to prove the
leakage integrity of a system as discussed in section 2.1.6.a
of NUREG 0578.
This procedure performance was overdue as of
March 17, 1987. The licensee is presently proceeding with _the
necessary procedure changes to allow performance of this test.
IFI (302/87-10-08):
Review the licensee's progress for the
performance of procedure SP-216.
(5) NCORs 87 44 and 87-48 reported unmonitored releases to the
Intermediate Building (IB) via the Post Accident Sampling System
(PASS). Since the IB does not have monitors or filter systems
to prevent releases to the environment, releases to this
building are considered to be releases to the environment. The
licensce's analysis of the releases for each of these events
have indicated that no regulatory limits were exceeded.
To prevent recurrence of these events the licensee has isolated
the PASS ("nowever it is useable if necessary) and has performed
a low Pressure (LP) and High Pressure (HP) test in an attempt to
identify the leakage source.
The HP test did not identify any
leakage, however the LP test identified a possible body-to-
bonnet leak on relief valve CAV-491. The following actions are
presently being taken:
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A work request (WR) has been written to replace the
body-to-bonnet gasket, check for seat leakage, and check
the lift setpoint on CAV-491;
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Temporary ventilation hoods are being installed over
CAV-491 and a modulating valve, CAV-484, (which due to its
method of operation could be a leak source) to prevent
releases to the IB; and,
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A portable radiation monitor, RMA-15, will be moved to the
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IB near the location of these valves to assure any future
leaks are detected.
Further testing may be accomplished and a review remains in
progress in an attempt to positively identify the source of
leakage.
IFI (302/87-10-09):
Review the licensee's progress to
detect and repair leaks in the PASS.
7.
Review of IE Information Notices
The inspector reviewed the licensee's actions with respect to the
following IE Information Notices:
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80-27, Degradation of Reactor Coolant Pump Studs;
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82-06, Failure of Steam Generator Primary Side Manway Closure Studs;
and,- 86-108, Degradation of Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary
Resulting From Boric Acid Corrosion.
As a part of this review, the inspector also reviewed two Institute of
Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) Significant Operating Experience Reports
(SOER), 81-12 and 84-05, which also relate to the effects of boric acid
corrosion.
In response to these notices and the SOERs, the licensee has developed
procedures to periodically check the steam generator manway studs and
revised their reactor coolant system hydrostatic test procedure (SP-204)
to require the examination to include a check for the evidence of boric
acid corrosion.
Following review of SP-204, the inspector noted that while the procedure
requires a check for boric acid corrosion, the procedure may not detect
all of the corrosive effects because the piping insulation is not removed.
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This observation was discussed with licensee personnel at which time a
task force was formed by the licensee to determine whether the present
boric acid monitoring program is adequate.
IFI (302/87-10-10): Review the activities of the task force developed to
determine the adequacy of the boric acid corrosion monitoring program.
8.
Preparations for Refueling
The inspector observed the licensee's receipt of new fuel shipments in
preparation for the next refueling outage that is scheduled to begin in
September 1987. Activities reviewed included new fuel receipt inspection
and unloading and movement of the fuel assemblies to the dry fuel storage
area. The following procedures were reviewed:
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FP-302, New Fuel Assembly Unloading, Inspection, Storage, and
Container Reclosing; and,
FP-304, Receiving New Fuel.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
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