ML20209B974
| ML20209B974 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 02/03/1983 |
| From: | Speis T Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Eisenhut D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20209B956 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-86-729 NUDOCS 8303030743 | |
| Download: ML20209B974 (3) | |
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,'q), UNITED STATES Enclosure #2 3 . y 3 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION g g, j W ASHINGTON. D. C. 20555
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February 3,1983 f J.T fNAK) b MEMORANDUM FOR: Darrell G. Eisenhut, Director Division of Licensing FROM: Themis P. Speis, Director
[ Division of Safety Technology
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SUBJECT:
COMMENTS ON PROPOSED LER RULE P
p P We' have review the proposed LER Rule and a marked up Draft is attached with i our recommendation. '
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- We note that changes could be made in the rule,which could significantly reduce the licensee's reporting requirements. This reduction could be achieved if reports were only required for failures clearly related to safety.
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Themis P. Speis, Director Division of Safety Technology
Enclosure:
As stated .
? cc: F. Rowsome ,
A. Thadani A. Buslik i Z. Rosztoczy y R. Cleveland W. Minners y G. Sege E 5. Newberry R. Mattson s
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Your memo of December 28, 1982 requested that we review the two proposed final
. rules and that we respond specifically to-two questions: (1)whetherthescope .
and content of these rules would meetSur needs for operational safety infor.
mation, and (2) what are our views on the three alternatives that are put forward, er Other ci t:~:ti /cc. We have reviewed the rules and offer the' fallowing comments. ,
We find that,by themselves,the proposed rules would not satisfy our
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infomational needs regarding operational safety. We are concerned about the advisabilit,y of eliminating the legal requirement for licensees to provide .
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'the needed information and depending on an industry system, which is voluntary and also contirtues to face difficulties in becoming operational.
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Ne believe that the " forward" of the LER rule must be revised to include -
a strong caveat which makes it explicitly clear that we are' relaxing the reporting requirements with the expectation that sufficient util.ity ,
cooperation, participation, and support of NPRDS will be forthcoming and that, , ,
if the system is not operational at a satisfactory level in a reasonable time, remedial NRC action in the form of rulemaking will become necessary.
We are in cautious agreement with the Alternative Number 3, i.e. g~oing forward with these rules
' at this time. We believe that the effective date ek! cd of the LER rule should be nde te ' q- _
ubsequent to its ,. -
publication, so as to mininize the data lost prior to HPRDS beccming,o eratibnal d
.fo, p r,1 A a ss.aws M an os h r>,r e ky os.e dd needs . Wm sa nJ ym -
"We note that the Commission's 1983 Policy and Planning Guidance indicates a N q
- desire-to go forward with an L' E R rule. We believe that the benefits of an a t.- a yt v, . av 9.y , '.
]ntegrated u:ms.6reporting ypeu 4, system are subs'tantialr "> ~N)_.mshe-4pecJ.f4e i a
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[ We are concerned about the present quality of the proposed rules. They seem to
, ... - lack a professional level of editorial clarity, need to be better coordinated, and may not be effective in accomplis,hing their objectives. We recommend extensive rework before proceeding to CRGR. Additionally, we find the -
Regulatory Analysis to be weak, especially in the areas of identifying what requirements the rules eliminate and explaining what NPROS will provide.
Our specific coments are provided by the enclosures to this memo.
We are available to discuss these proposed rules further if you wish.
- Please contact J. T. Beard on. extension 27465.
9
. . Harold Centon, Director - -
. Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation .
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I pn Rec o j ,c, UNITED STATES ft y NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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% %# # March 9, 1983 NEy.ORANDUM FOR: Eric Weiss' office of Inspection and Enforcement FROM: Joseph T. Cawley, II Rules and Procedures Branch Division of Rules and Records Office of Administration
SUBJECT:
DRR REVIEW OF FINAL I!CIEDIATE NOTIFICATION RULE (MARCH 4, 1983, VERSION)
Attached with required fomat and suggested style changes indicated are the Federal Register notice and the Regulatory Analysis for the final rule noted above.
The Regulatory Flexibility Act Statement, the words of issuance, and the citation of authority on pages 30 and 31 of the Federal Register notice should be revised as indicated. ~
the paragraph designation format for E 50.72 should be revised as shown. Note that the order of paragraphs has also been changed to maintain contimtity throughout the section (pages 34 and 35 of the Federal Register notice). Additional important format revisions have been made in the amendatory language and regulatory text of the amenc*ments.
As discussed during our March 8, 1983, phone conversation, I suggest that ycu contact OELD co clarify the need for the 5 50.54 provision contained in the rule.
Note that the new R 50.54 paragraph has been redesignated as paragraph (z). This designation may change depending upon the timing of publication for other rules containing new paragraphs for a 50.54.
Since paragraphs within E 50.72 have been redesignated to meet format requirements, you should check the paragraph explanation portion of the SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section of the rule and the Regulatory. Analysis for references to specific paragraphs which ray need revision.
Editorial changes have been made throughout the Regulatory Analysis. You should review them carefully as they add considerably to the clarity and effectiveness of the analysis.
Please call me on ext. 24269 if you have any questions concerning the matters discussed above.
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J eph T. Cawley,II
{BolesandProceduresBranch I
Division of Rules and Records l
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', E NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 cit $
.....p MAR 0 41983 ME'MORANDUM FOR: W. J. Olmstead, ELD
, D. G. Eisenhut, NRR FROM: Edward L. Jordan, Director Division of Emergency Preparedness and Engineering Response Office of Inspection and Enforcement
SUBJECT:
650.72, IMMEDIATE NOTIFICATION Pursuant to the discussion of the recent CRGR meeting, I proposed that we meet to discuss $50.72 on March 9 at 9:00 a.m. in my office.
Please find enclosed a copy of the revised 550.72 reflecting the course of action
- that I outlined in the CRGR meeting. .
q W' Edward L. Jordan,' Director Division of Emergency Preparedness and Engineering Response Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Enclosure:
Revised 550.72 cc w/ enclosure:
F. Hebdon, AE0D J. T. Beard, NRR J. Cawley, ADM C. J. Heltemes. AE00 e
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NUCl. EAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 10 CFR Part 50 Immediate Notification Requirement For Operating Nuclear Power Reactors AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission. ,
ACTION: Final dule.
SUMMARY
- The gulatory)Commissionisamendingitsregulationswhich require immediate notification of sigitificant events at licensed commercial
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. nuclear power plants in light of experience with existing requirements and public comments on a proposed revision of the rule. The existing regulation uses reporting criteria that licensees have sometimes found vague and that the
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, Comission has G&ietime) found t resuldinnotificationsoflittlevalue. The
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a nded regulation will clarify the list of reportable events and provide the Comission with more meaningful reports regarding the safety of operating nuclear power plants.
EFFECTIVE DATE:
I FOR FURTHER INFORMATI0M CONTACT: Eric W. Weiss, Office of Inspection and Enforcenent, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D. C. 20555; Telephone (301) 492-4973.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFCRMATION:
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I. BACKGROUND On December 21, 1981, the Commission published in the Federal Register a notice of proposed rulemaking (46 FR 61894), and invited public comment on that rulemaking. The proposed rulemaking considered: (1) The incorporation of the immediate notification requirements of 650.72 into 650.54.as a condition of -
every oper'ating license to implement the provisions. of section 201 of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Authorization Act for Fiscal . Year 1980 (Pub. L.
a 96-295),(2) certain clarifications and refinements of the reporting requirements contained in 650.72.
Licensees are now subject to certain notification requirements, both as to
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- thecontentsoftheirapplicationsforoperatinglicensesandfto' actions authorized by the operating licenses. All applications for licenses under sections 103 and 104b of the Atomic Energy Act (Act) of 1954;as amended, 42 U50
- 1 Mush 2 CL ; . ; .. n g. i c;d i,7 ;50.54 to include emergency plans that contain the 8
various elements set forth in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E. hes pection 103 and 104b faciliti are the commercial nuclear power facilities that produce electricity'for public consumption. Research and test reactors are not subject to these notification requirements hey are licensed under section 104a and t -
104c of the Atomic Energy Act). Section IV of Appendix E requires the plans (oY' include procedures for notifying local, state; and Federal of'ficials. Once an r ~
m operating license (under sections 103 and 104b.is grantedr,_the licensee is required by 10 CFR 50.72 to actuate immediate notification procedures upon the occurrence of any of the specific "significant events" described in 650.72.
Since the enactment of section 201, the NF.C has provided W guicance ,
k to (eperatindlicensees as to situations or events which require notification by l
he lice of RC tat and local response organizations and other emergency personnel. On August 19, 1980, the NRC published a final rule on eliiergency planning, effective on November 3, 1980 (45 FR 55402). This rule established a multifaceted emergency planning and preparedness program and, among other things, required procedures to be established for immediate notification of NRC Jtate, and local emergency response personnel in ,
certain situations.
Arb These situations ave- discussed in Revision 1 to NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, entitled " Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Plants" (hereinafter Revision 1"), which was issued in November 1980, shortly after the Emergency Planning rule became effective. Revision 1 specifie four classes of Emergency Action Levels involving notification actions--Notification of Unusual Event, Alert, Site Area Emergency, ano General Emergency. Revision 1 also set forth examples of initiating conditions for each of these four Emergency Classes.
AA Yefi veme) hr The rationale for thefnotification of Unusual Event is to provide early and prompt notification of minor events which could lead to more serious consequences
. St; occaYYtMo kg Seemk moky twy) given operator error or equipment failure o which ht be indicative of more fCopicsofNUREGdocumentsareavailableattheCommission'sPublicDocument Rcom 1717 H Street, NW, Washington, D. C. 20555. Copies may be purchased from the Government Printing Office. Information on current prices may be obtained by writing the U. 5. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D. C. 20555.
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serious conditions which are not yet fully realized. The Alert emergency class reflects events which involve an actual or potential substantial degradation of The Site Area Emergency class' reflects the level of the safety of the plant.d radiog4Wi conditionswheresomesignificantreleasesfarelikeyorareoccurringbutwhere a core melt situation is not indicated based on current inf rmation. In this site s situation)fullmobilizationofemergencypersonnelinthenea ,
indicatedaswellasdispatchofmonitoringteamsandlassociatedcommunicationstW .de,NA W .lJ b' The General Emergency class involves actual or imminent substantial core rl degradation or melting with the potential for loss of containment.
As discussed in the proposed rule, the criteria set forth in Revision 1 and the examples of events triggering the respective Emergency Classes (with attendantnotificationactions)provideadditionalguidancefor(everycieratin[sJ licenseesin the preparation, approval, and ultimately, the implementation of their A
emergency preparedness plans which must be submitted to NRC for evaluation pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47.
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W J.ha. revision of 550.72(promulgated by this rulemakindreflects a continuing e'ffort to achieve consistent terminology, phrasing, and thresholds in the reporting criteria of various portions of the Connission's regulations.
votsed ,j heldc es vnder Nevertheless t % : " lion-Emergency Events" some wh',c1 sdse b))his revision oJ150.72 -: pt"D : e eventsfa$ingwithinthe"UnusualEvent"categoryofthehergencyflasses o
to CFRW Par: Co%;u;o~ is inh sb.//gr ml c= hg50 yitrpr;. n d p.apeciq& reyW:m ir O
- defined inA 50, Appendix E.g=This _
w;y dy{hfrtpre+44VeVOrf we foundation , a new reporting scheme that r " f i j eliminate o
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" Unusual Event" as an Rmergency 11 ass. However,hce the subject of this)f U J
(^ anoth r ruiemak"ng will be required to rulemakingisnotemergencyplanning)h e is legirc y~-hLc WG. y)df is curie N b delete " Unusual Event" from 7mergency / lasses. _.cpc_ ' M m i ng ce s, ding-C
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-5 The NRC considers that incorporation of the immediate notification requirements of 550.72 into 550.54 as a condition in every operating license
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, granted under sections 103 and 104b of the Atomic Energy Act will implement the Congressional mandate in section 201 of the Authorization Act. Section 201, however, also provides that immediate notification of the NRC be made for "any accident which could result in an unplanned release of quantities of fission -
products in excess of allowable limits of normal operation established by the
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' mivd ed he provision .;;;id be implemented by th: ..: :gevistat n ;;;" r p ::Lto 950.72 thre-
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'P Besides ending6550.54 and Arw$ fc ;sru 50.72g'th; :;5jed; ef th 'mec oy Sbhis N A
b ./. ..... ; . ,.,,. th e NRC is de'veloping a new 550.73;" License'e Event Report System" (47 FR 19 The reporting requirementsof 550.72 are being coordinated with those of 550.73 A .
for botl -
in order to use similar phrasing and reporting thresholds infth: tuc regulations.
IIANALYSISOFCOMMENIS Twenty letters of comment were received in response to the Federal h
l Register %ticepublishedonDecember 21, 1981 (46 FR 61894)2 . This Federal Register notice described the proposed revision of 10 CFR 50.7 "Not'ification of Significant Events' and 10 CFR 50.54)" Conditions of LicenseA6s." discussion of the more significant comments follows:
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2 Copies of these documents are available for public inspection- and copying for a fee the NRC Public' Document Room, 1717 H Street, N. W., Washington, D. C. 20555 5
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General f 50 WeYes Yece\veb & Y CSc7 A few general comments p that the {ommission already has the ability t'o enforce its regulations and does not need to incorporate the items as now proposed into conditions of license h 668&/
The Commission has decided to promulgate e proposed revision of 550.54 QLicenseCondition in order to satisfy the intent of Congress as expressed in Section 201 of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Auth'orization Act for. Fiscal
~ -01s rulermKi>,n Year 1980 (Public Law 96-295). This Act and its relationship to !! !! are y discussed in detail in the Federal Register notice for the proposed rule (46 FR61894).
Coordmdica C::rd N t: with other Reporting Reauirements Seven commenters said that the NRC should coordinate the requirements of 10 CFR 50 Many of these CoMeNer.72 ! with other rules, NUREG-0654 and Reg. Guide P %*b'M 1.16.
-i c .cro identified overlap, duplicatio and inconsistency among NRC'sreporting 7'
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requirements.
hah Mrmhan is (oNich?h [nx Necesees kneh h vre The Commission is making a concerted effort to ensure onsisteht anc.
Y( D coordinated'reportingrequirements.fark The uire nents contained in he revisiof y.p;jec} S reyedinevt tre m,,vc M 65 j/
"rP 50.72 are being coordinated wi h revision of 50.73,050.55(e),ed
,,1^dt. Parts 0) As won Asio 65b 10 C fR -fwl traieepibec emfa;,.ed is A t :0 Appendix E 0.402,Q3.71andfPart21. TheArule & ;e also replaces Reg. Guide 1.16.
Euilding Evacuation gy povigodo[r p Ten commenters p that thefproposed650.72(b)(6)(iii) regarding d4
[is:. accidental, unplanned or uncontrolled release resulting in evacuation of a building as unclear and counter-productive in that it could cause reluctance to evacuate a building, tiany of these commenters stated that the reporting of
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was inconsistent with the general thrust of the rule to require reporting of
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jf; significant events. They noted that minor spills, small gaseous waste releases, ut
~3j or the disturbance of contaminated particulate matter (e.g., dust) may all a, .
~, require the temporary evacuation of individual rocms until the airborne concen-trations decrease or until respiratory protection devices are utilized. They noted that these events are fairly common and should not be' reportable unless the required evacuation affects the entire facility or a major portion thereof.
In response to these comments the wording of this criterion has been
~ changed to significantly narrow the scope of the criterion to include only those events which significantly hamper the ability of site personnel to p'erform safety-related activities.
The NRC has also revised this reporting requirement to eliminate reference
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- , to building evacuation and instead rely on specific radiological release rate criteria.
. Plant Operating and Emergency Procedures Several commenters said that the reporting criteria should not make reference to plant operating and emergency procedures because: '
a.' It would take operators too long to decide whether a plant condition was covered by the procedures',
- b. The procedures cover events that are not of concern to the NRC, and
- c. The procedures vary from plant to plant.
bd'itver The Commission thy that the plant's operating personnel should be familiar with their procedures. However, the wording of the reporting criteria 0
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$ has been modified-{(650.72(b)(1)(iih in the final rule to narrow the events 1
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~... ::N^ cd to those that significantly compromise plant safety. Notwithstanding "T the fact the procedures do vary from plant-to-plant, the Comissionbebva h ; fesid
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& cr Qevlin wsA E hhis':rit:rijresultgin notificatio indicative of serious events.
. Reactor Scrams
. Several commenters said reactor scrams, particularly those scrams below power operation, should not require notification of the the NRC within owc '
A hour.
In response to these coments, the Comission has changed the reporting deadline to four hours. However, the Comission does not regard reactor scrams as
, "non-events" as stated in some letters of coment Information related to reactor scrams has been useful in identifying safety related problems. The
[ Commission :grg:;&that
\leves fo'ur hours is an appropriate deadline for this reporting
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. requirement because 4uch. events arefno as_important to immediate safety as are ther events. -
Radioactive ~ Release hreshold cowm.vdur Severalmc.ta said that the threshold of 25% of allowable limits for radioactive releases was too low a threshold for 1-hour reporting.
, Based upon this comment and our experience, the Comission has changed the threshold of reporting to 2 times allowable limits. This will eliminate reports that have proved to be of little value.
Citing 10 CFR 50.72 as Basis for Notification A few comenters' objected to citing 650.72 as a basis when making a telephone notification.
Thelettersofcommentquestionedthepurpose,legaleffect)and burden on the licensee.
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- .y i The Comission does not believe that it is an unnecessary burden for a
/; licensee to know and identify the basis for a telephone notification required by 650.72. There have been many occasions when a licensee could not tell the 2
NRC whether the telephone notification was being made in accordance with ,
we technical specifications,10 CFR 50.72, some other requirement, orfjust a courtesy call. Unless the licensee can identify the nature of the report, it is difficult for the NRC to know what significance the licensee attaches to the report and it becomes more difficult for the NRC to respond quickly and properly to the event.
Personnel Radioactive Contamination
. Several commenters objected.to the use of vague terms such as " extensive o'nsite contamination" and "readily removed" in one of the reporting criterion of
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the proposed rule. -
Based on this comment new criteria have been prepared that do not use these
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terms. -
Notification Timing -
, The commenters generally had two points to r.ake regarding the timing of reports to the NRC. First, the comments siupported notification of t'he NRC after
. hk bov mt;[ icd Co p e M erf appropriate state or local agencie{. Second, two epts requested that there be a new four to six-hour report category for events not warranting a report z
with one hour.
Based on these comments and its experience, the NRC has established a
, "four-hour report" category titled "Non-Emergency Notification" as was suggested.
l Immediate Shutdown Several commenters objected to the use of the term "immediate shutdown" saying that technical specifications do not use such a term.
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Since the term is used in some;but not allj Technical Specifications, the Commission has revised the reporting criterion in question. The final rule requires a report upon the initiation of any nuclear power plant shutdown required by Technical Specifications.
Explicit Threats A few commenters said that the intent of the term " explicitly threatens" was unclear.
Those commenting wondered what level of threat was being referred to. The t'erm " explicitly threaten" has been deleted from the final rule.
h t, Instead,thewordingof)Ifinal rule refers to "any event that threatened the 8' .
safety of the nuclear power plant" (50.72(b)(1)(vi)) and gives examples so that it is clear the Commission is interested in real or actual threats.
. III. SPECIFIC' FINDINGS Overview of the Immediate Notification System -
When this final rule becomes effective, the immediate notification reporting requireme,nt will provide the NRC with timely reports of emergencies and other
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safety significant events.
This amendment of $50.72, " Notification of Signifi-cant Events" will result basically 'three types of improvements.
One improvement is that the NRC will receive notification of '
significant events that were not previously covered under the existing provisions of 550.72. For example, the final ryle requires reporting of any " major loss of emergency assessment or communications capability (e.g., significant portion of control room indicator, or Emergency Notification System)." This and other changes in reporting criteria will provide the NRC with a more complete Immediate l Hotification System.
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- A second improvement is that certain events that were previously reported,
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.v despite having little safety significance, will no longer be reported. For i.O example, 950.72 currently requires the reporting of any fatality or injury c l
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occurring on the site and requiring transport to an offsite medical facility. '
This has resulted in a large number of worker injury repo'rts. The new rule
-fhv of Aw requiresfreportin ransportofaradiepetive .wcont p 4minated person tofoffsite
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to other government agencies has been made.8 These changes and others are q expected to greatly reduce the number of inconsequential reportr;. ,
The third and perhaps mor$ t important improvement is that ,the E' FEE of jO C YLvis;on o- W opt.*p Ve M h O Oct 5 M Nk this iW S .
rule has been closely coordinlated 8 w,ith' jhey,cb.5:rrec Yrg d tr J, u cr.d P:rt 21. Many of the reporting
. yw Yt c} virewncriteria in the.n%'/ew ,NirM rule
.i wordingandintentto(reportingintheW650.73"LicenseeEventReportSystemd'f s--
r This should aid ease of interpretationdnd generall) improve coordination in
- the generation, ~
receipt; sand use of reports. @
Several substantive revisions of other sections of the Commission's' y regulations are underway that will like-wise use similar wording in their reportini
'equirements (e.g., 50.55(e) and 10 CFR Part 21 t'^n, . "c;;;; d " & d (Also3 m yroposed evig' .
which w vid s being pre)ared -cut ....., ..~ .mc....y . ., ., ... ... . previse emergency planning W criteriain10CFR50AppendixE/and10CFR50.47toeliminate"UnusualEvent"as l
(a an emergency class.
Paragraph-By-Paragraph Explanation of The Rule Paragraph 50.72 (a) states:
" General Requirements. (1) Each licensee of a nuclear power reactor licensed l under 550.21(b)'or 150.22 shall notify the NRC Operations Center via the Emergency i
! Notification System of: (1)ThedeclarationofanyofEmergencyClassesspecified l
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.inthelicensee'sapprovedEmergencyPlan;or(ii)Thosenon-Emergencyevents specifiedinparagraph(b)ofthissection.(2)IftheEmergencyNotification l
System is inoperative, the the licensee shall make the required notifications via l l
commercial telephone service, other dedicated telephone system or any other method
-which will ensure a report being made as soon as possible to th'e NRC Operations Center." ,
(3) The licensee shall notify the NRC immediately after notification of the appropriate State or local agencies and within one hour of the time the licensee declares one of the Emergency Classes."
(4) The licensee shall identify: (1) the Emergency Class declared, or (ii) either paragraph. (b)(1) "One-Hour Re' ports" or paragraph (b)(2) "Four-Hour Reports" as the paragraph of this section requiring a Non-Emergency Events Notification. , , , , ,
(b) Non-Emergency Events. (1)One-HourReports. If not reported as a declaration of.an Emergency Class under paragraph (a) of the section, the licensee shall notify the NRC as soon as possible and in all cases within one hour of the occurrence of any of the following:"
'This introductory paragraph reflects some consolidation of language that was repeated in various subparagraphs of the proposed rule. In general, the intent and' scope of this paragraph do not reflect any change from the proposed rule.
Several titles were added to this and subsequent sections. For example, paragraph 50.72(b) is titled "Non-Emergency Events" and this has two subpara-graphs (b)(1) titled "One-Hour Reports" and (b)(2) "Four-Hour Reports." The justification for a one-hour deadline is based upon the potential for these events to escalate to Emergency Class. The justification for a four-hour deadline is explained in the analysis of that paragraph. .
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i}y%Iy. The terms "immediate" and "imediately" used in this and suceeding
!?g{! g paragraphs refer to notifications that should be made as soon as possible.
M ki However, the Commission recognizes that some events have more safety signifi- l
- 9. ,q.v.e.5h
- 7 v cance than others and the various duties and exigencies associated with
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operating a nuclear power plant may mitigate against 'an innediate notification
, for less safety-significant events. Depending on the type of event, different l ",, .
absolute dead 1.ines are associated with each immediate notification. As stated in later paragraphs "non-Emergency events" may be reported within either one g.
hour or four hours depending on their significance, and all. declarations of an Q: Emergency Class must be reported within I hour.
. Paragraph 50.72 (b)(1)(i) requires reporting of: "The initation of any
';^
n'uclear plant shutdown required by Technical Specifications." While the intent
. j . .,
and scope has not chan~ g ed, the change in wording between the proposed and final
, i *. ; e *.
,l "J.l rule is intended to clarify that prompt notification is required once a shutdov is initiated. -
In response to public comment, the term "immediate shutdown" that was used in the proposed rule is not used in the final rule. The term was vague and
, unfamiliar to those licensees that did not have Technical Specificat' ions using
'I the term.
This reporting requirement is intended to capture those events for which Technical Specifications require the initiation of reactor shutdown. This will provide the NRC with early warning of safety significant conditions serious <
enough to warrant shutdown of the plant.
Paragraph 50.72(b)(1)(ii) [ encompassing events previously classified as Unusual Events and some events captured by proposed 50.72(b)(1)] requires reporting of: 4 e
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1 f the nuclear power plant, including its principal safety barriers, being serious 1.)
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(I'd degraded; or resulted in the nuclear power plant being in an .unanalyzed conditior i 9 .2 y . .. g that significantly compromises plant safety; in a condition that was outside the f,' .
.: design basis.of the plant; or 1'n a condition not governed by the plant's operatin and emergency procedures." This paragraph 'was added to provide for consistent,
$d[ coordinated reporting requirements between this rule'and 10 CFR 50.73 which has a 2
"k,;,
>? similar provision. Public comment suggested that there be similarity of termino '
g; di logy, phrasing and reporting thresholds on both 150.72 and 150.73. The intent M.k ' .
'Y, of this paragraph is to capture those events where the plant, including its.
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principal safety barriers, was seriously degraded or in an unanalyzed condition.
! "..y? . For example, small voids in systems designed to remove heat from the reactor core
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, which have been previously shown through analysis not to be safety significant
' so
. need not be reported. However, the accumulation of voids that could inhibit the
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ability to adequately remove heat from the reactor core, particularly under i l l.
natural circulation conditions, would constitute an unanalyzed condition and i ,- ,
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would be reportable. In addition, voiding in instrument lines that results in j
3 .-
1.i.e .n an erroneous indication cau.ing the operator to misunderstand the true condition y, , of the plant is also an unanaged condition and should be reported.
1 (, sE -
, 7, The Commission recognizes that the licensee may use engineering judgment i s
and experience to determine whether an unanalyzed condition existed.' It is not t
l ,
intended that this paragraph apply to minor variations in individual parameters,
,f or to problems concerning single pieces of equipment. For ' example, any time, one !
j or more safety-related components may be out of service due to testing, mainte-4 nance, or a fault that has not yet been repaired. Any trivial single failure or j minor error in performing surveillance tests could produce a situation in which 4 ,
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.c2 two or more often unrelated, safety-grade components are out-of-service. Techni-q ,
p cally, this is an unanalyzed condition. However, these events should be reported
- f O ,. f only if they involve functionally related components or if they significantly e..
- .3 compromise plant safety.
Finally, this paragraph also includes material (e.g., metallurgical,
.l chemical) problems that cause abnonnal degradation of the principal safety barrier!
(i.e., the fuel cladding, reactor coolant system pressure boundary, or the containment). Examples of this type of situation include:
,, (a) Fuel cladding failures in the reactor, or in the storage pool, that
. v3 n exceed expected values, that are unique or widespread, or that are caused by
. , unexpecte'd factors, and would involve 'a release of significant quantities of fission products..
.., (b) Cracks and breaks in the piping or reactor vessel (steel or prestressed n
'.' concrete) or major components in the primary, coolant circuit that have safety relevance (steam generators, reactor coolant pumps, valves, etc.).
(c) Significant welding or material defects in the primary coolant system.
(d) Serious temperature or pressure transients. '
(e) Loss of relief and/or safety valve functions during operation.
(f) Loss of, containment function or integrity including:
(1) containment leakage rates exceeding the authorized limits (ii) loss of containment isolation valve function during tests or operation, or (iii) loss of main steam isolation valve function during test or
. operation (iv) loss of containment cooling capability Paragraph 50.72(b)(1)(iii) [ encompassing a portion of proposed 50.72(b,)(2))
requires reporting of:
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f, 4..,. "Any natural phenomenon pr other external condition that posed an actual M,$m e,
threat to the safety of the nuclear power plant or significantly hampers site m.,u Ajid personnel in the performance of duties necessary for the safe. operation of the
.::}.ik plant." .
This paragraph was reworde'd to correspond to a similar provision of 10 CFR-
- .;, 50.73(a)(2)(iii). By making the requirements of 10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73 similar i language, when possible, the Commission hopes to increase the coordination
- between these rules.
A,- l,2 a.A The paragraph has also been reworded to make it clear that it applies only Q.
. . . to acts of nature (e.g., tornadoes) and external hazards (e.g., railroad tank l, car explosion). References to acts of sabotage havc been removed, since these are covered by 673.71. In addition, threats to personnel from internal hazards
] (e.g., radioactivity releases) are now covered by paragraph 50.72(b)(2)(vi).
I,",'
.: , This paragraph is intended to capture those events where there is an actual threat to the plant from an external condition or natural phenomenon, and where the threat or damage challenges the ability of the plant to continue to operate
'l '
in a safe manner (including the orderly shutdown and maintenance of shutdown
. conditions).Thelicenseeshoulddecideifaphenomenonorconditionactually threatened the plant. For example, a minor brush fire in a remote area of the site that was quickly controlled by fire fighting personnel and, as a result, did not present a threat to the plant should not be reported. However, a major for,est fire, large-scale flood, .or major earthquake that presents a clear threat to the plant should be reported. As another example, an industrial or transportic accident which occurs near the site creating a plant safety concern should be reported.
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One commenter was concerned that events occurring on land owned by the
'ty 3:py utility adjacent to the utility's plant, might be reportable. This is not the
. ;:i% -
$4 i intent of this reporting requirement. The NRC is concerned with the safety of t,y'.u- 3r plant and personnel on the utility's site and not with non-nuclear activities on
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.w land adjacent to the plant.
. Paragraph 50.72(b)(1)(iv) [ encompassing events previously classified as
. " Unusual Events"] requires the reporting of: ,
.- "Any event which results or should have resulted in Emergency Core Cooling
,. System (ECCS) discharge to the vessel as a result of a valid signal."
c,' This paragraph is intend,ed to capture those events that result in either
, automatic' or manual actuation. of the ECCS or would have resulted in activation of the ECCS if some component had not failed or an operator action had not been
[,.- taken. -
.' 1 One example of such an event would be if a valid ECCS signal were generated by plant conditions, and the operator put all ECCS pumps in pull-to-lock. Even
, . though no ECCS discharge occurred, the event would be reportable.
A " valid signal" refers to the actual plant conditions or parameters satisfying the requirements for ECCS initiation. Excluded from this' reporting requirement would be those instances where instrument drift, . spurious signals, human error, or other invalid signals caused ECCS. However, such events may be reportable under other of sections of the Commission's regulations based upon other details of the event. In particular, paragraph 50.72(b)(2)(ii) would require a report within four-hours if an Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) were actuated.
Experience with notifications made pursuant to $50.72 has shown that events involving ECCS discharge to the vessel are generally more serious than ESF
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'[ actuations without discharge to the vessel. Based en this experience, the 4%.b[
. . .rg Comission has made this reporting criterion a "One-Hour Report."
Paragraph 50.72(b)(1)(v) [ encompassing events previously classified as Unusual Events) requires reporting of:
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"Any event which results in major loss of emergency assessment or c; , communications capability (e.g., significant portion of control room indication,
.i: ,, Emergency Notification System").
This reporting requirement is intended to capture those events that would
,/j impair a licensee's ability to deal with an accident or emergency. Notifying
'S
- the NRC of these events may permit the NRC to take some compensating measures
, and to more completely assess.the consequences of such a loss should it occur during an accident or emergency.
Paragraph 50.72(b)(1)(vi)[encompassingsomeportionsoftheproposed 4
,il50.72(b)(2),(6)and(8))requiresthereportingof:
, "Any event that threatened the safety of the nuclear power plant or significantly hampered site personnel in the performance of duties necessary for
'." the safe operation of the nuclear plant including fires, toxic gases or radioac-
.tive releases." Adding the phrase " including toxic gases or radioactive releases" to paragraph 50.72(b)(1)(vi) of the final rule covers paragraph 50.72(b)(8) of the proposed rule and the " evacuation" portion of paragraph 50.72(b)(6)(iii)of the proposed rule. '
Since public comment was critical of' this " evacuation" reporting criterion in the proposed rule, the staff made this change in. wording for the final rule.
While paragraph 50.72(b)(1)(iii) of the final rule primarily captures acts of nature, paragraph 50.72(b)(1)(vi) captures other events, particularly acts' by personnel. The Comission believes this arrangement of the reporting criteria
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in the final rule lends itself to more precise interpretation and is consistent
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with those public connents that requested closer coordination between the
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, $g regulations.
- ,0 This reporting requirement'is intended to capture'those events, pa
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those, caysed by acts of personnel which endanger the safety of the plant o interface with personnel in performance of duties necessary for safe plant 1
h.; operations.
i Nevertheless, the licensee must exercise some judgment in reporting un
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this section.
For example, a small fire on site that did not endanger any n.
pla'nt equipment, that did not and could not reasonably be expected to end
,'t. the plant is not reportable.
, ;. .o l . . :; , , Paragraph 50.72(b)(2)requiresthat: -
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"If not reported under paragraph (a) on (b)(1) of this section, the licensee j ,%
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shall notify the NRC as soon as possible and in all cases, within four hours of
, ;- the occurrence of any of the following:"
t Although the reporting criteria contained in the subparagraphs that follow
.8;$ ' '
were in the proposed rule, public comment prompted the Commission to establish this "Non-Emergency" category for those events with slightly less urgency l,,
and less safety significance that may be reported within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> instead of 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.
l The rationale for not permitting reporting later than four hours is that the +
Comission wants to obtain such reports from personnel who were on shift at the time of the event when this is possible, because the personnel on shift at the time of the event will have a better knowledge of the circumstances associated with the event.
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Paragraph 50.72(b)(2)(1) [ encompassing some events captured by proposed 50.72(b)(1)] requires reporting of:
"Any event, found while the reactor is shutdown, that, had it been found while the reactor was in operation, would have resulted in the nuclear power plant, including .its principal safety barriers, being seriously degraded or in an unanalyzed condition that significantly compromises plant safety".
Based upon public comments that requested close' coordination be established between 150.72 and other rules, this reporting requirement is similar to a requirement in 150.73. Except for referring to a shutdown reactor, this reporting requirement is similar to an "One-Hour Report" in $50.72(b)(1)(ii).
Because this refers to a s. hut down reactor, events capt.ured by this requirement have less urgency and can be reported within four hours as a "Non-Emergency."
Paragraph 50.72(b)(1) of the proposed rule' was split into 50.72(b)(1)(ii) and 50.,72(b)(2)(i) in the final rule in order to permit some type of reports 'to be made within four hours instead of 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />, because these reports have less safety significance. In terms of their combined effect, the overall intent and scope of these paragraphs has not changed from that in the proposed rule. Since the types of. events intended to be captured by this reporting requirement are similar to 150.72(b)(1)(ii) except that the reactor is shutdown, the reader should refer to the explanation of $50.72(b)(1)(ii) for more details on intent.
Paragraph 50.72(b)(2)(ii)[ proposed 50.72(b)(5)]requiresreportingof:
"Any event or condition resulting in manual or automatic actuation of any EngineeredSafetyFeature(ESF),includingtheReactorProtectionSystem(RPS).
However, actuation of, an ESF, including the RPS, that resulted from and was part of the preplanned sequence during testing or reactor operation need not be reported."
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. :v, ej In response to public comments, this reporting requirement has been made a
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-QY4 "Non-Emergency" because the Commission agrees with the commenters that events
..M;:.?
' ,1 . captured by this requirement generally have slightly less urgency and safety
.a
.y significance than those events included in the "One-Hour Reports" paragraphs.
The intent and scope of this reporting requirement have'not changed from that
. in the prbposed rule.
This paragraph is intended to capture events during which an ESF actuates, either manually or automatically, or fails to actuate. It is based on the
.J- premi'se that the ESFs are provided to mitigate the consequences of the event;'
a .
therefore, (1) they should work properly when called upon and (2) they should
<1
, . not be ch'llenged a unnecessarily. Th'e Commission is interested both in events where an ESF was needed to mitigate the consequences of the event (whether or j.:r :
- f. I ' not the equipment performed properly) and events where an ESF operated unnacessarily.
" Actuation" of multichannel ESF Actuation Systems is defined as actuation of enough channels to complete the minimum actuation logic. Therefore, single channel actuations, whether caused by failures or otherwise, are not reportab*le if they do not complet,e the minimum actuation logic.
Operation of an ESF as part of a planned test or operational evolution need not be reported. However, if during the test or evolution the ESF actuates in a way that is not part of the planned procedure, that actuation should be reported. For example, if the normal reactor shutdown procedure requires that the control rods be inserted by a manual reactor trip, the reactor trip need not be reported. However, if conditions develop during the shutdown that require an automatic reactor trip, such a reactor trip should be reported. The fact that the safety analysis assumes that an ESF will actuate automatically
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[; during an event does not eliminate the need to report that actuation. Actuations
.- .that need not be reported are those initiated for reasons other than to mitigate the consequences of an event (e.g., at the discretion of the lic.ensee as part ofaplannedprocedure). ,
, Paragraph 50.72(b)(2)(iii)an'd(iv)[ proposed 50.72(b)(4)] requires reportjng of:
"Any event or condition that alone could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to:
, , (1) Shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe condition, (ii) Remove residual heat, (iii) Control the release of-radioactive material, or
. (iv) Mitigate the consequences of an accident.
Events covered in 650.72(b)(2)(iii) of this part may include one or more
, personnel errors, equipment failures .anif/or discovery of design, analysis, fabr'ication, construction, and/or procedural inadequacies. However, indi'vi-dual component failures need not be reported pursuant to this paragraph if redundant equipment in the same system was operable and avialble to perform the required safety function."
In response to public comments, the words "any instance of personal error.
equipment failure, or discovery of design or procedural inadequacies" that appeared in the proposed rule have been replaced by the words " event.or condition".
This simplification in language is, intended to clarify what was a confusing phrase to,many of those who commented on the proposed rule. Also in response to public comment, this reporting requirement ,is a "Non-Emergency" to be reported within four hours instead of within one hour.
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!& . -reporting requirements between 550.72 and 150.73.
.M
",'y In sumary, the wording of this paragraph has been changed to make 1t easier to understand, while the intent and scope of the paragraph have not been
- , , changed.*This paragraph is based on the assumption that safety-related systems
. and structures are intended to mitigate the consequences of an accident. While paragraph 50.72(b)(2)(ii) applies to actual demands for actuation of an ESF,
. :9,e) paragraph 50.72(b)(2)(iii) covers an event where a safety system could have
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faile,d to perform its intended function because of..one or more personnel errors,
. . including' procedure violations; equipment failures; or design, analysis.
'. fabrication, construction, or procedural deficiencies. The event should be c
. C.',?,' reported regardless of the situation or condition that caused the structure or j'- y;j'.-
system to be unavailable.
'. The applicability of paragraph includes those safety systems designed to
.. mitigatetheconsequencesofanaccident(e.g.,containmentisolation, emergency filtration). Hence, minor operational events such as valve packing leaks, which could, be considered a lack of control of radioactive material, shoul'd not be
- reported under this paragraph. ' System leaks or other similar events may, however be reportable under other paragraphs.
This paragraph does not include those cases where a system or coinponent is removed from service as part of a planned evolution, in accordance with an approved procedure, and in accordance with the plant's Technical Specifications.
for example, if the licensee removes part of a system from service to perform maintenance,.and the Technical Specifications permit the resulting configuration, O
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O and the system or c~otaponent ipreturned to service within tue time limit speci-c: ,
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idertifies a condition tha' could havt prevented #ihe system from performing its
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,_ sj intended function (e.g.,'theTicensee finds a set of relays that is wired incorrectly); that.:endition musde reported. '
Itshohdbenotedthattherearealimitednumberofsingle-trainsystems
. . \
l'inat perform safety furieth;ns (e.g., the High Pressure Coobnt Injection iNr
& stem I' o in BWRs).. For such syst! '
ems, loss of the'sfagle train would prevent :.
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't'1e fulfillment >of the safety */ function of tSt'sys' tem and, therefore, must
. ?
ybeyeported even thoudri the plant Technical Spe:ifications may allow such a
, condithn to exist for a specified 'fength of time, n' i
'It shruld also be noted that, if a potentially' serious human error is made i.
that could have prevented Tulfillment of a safety functioh bp, recovery. factors
- ,. s -
resulted in the error being corr'teted, the error is still rep [rtshle. i
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The, Commission reco'gnizes that the ap*,11 cation of this and other paragraphs of this section~ involves,t:1e use of engineering judgment on the part of ?
)dicensees. In this ca'se, a technical. judgment nest be made whether a failure
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. or operator. action that dis. abled',rr'c train of a safety system and could ha.a.
i but did not, 'affett a redundant t aia.j If so, this would constitute an event : -
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that "could have prevented" the fuit'illmere of a safety functjon, and, accordinglyr must be repor'ted. .
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!1f a temponent fails by an apparently random mechanism it m3y or may not ,
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be t enortable f f the functionally ndutdant '
component could fail by the same ,
- , i mech 5Msm. To be reportable,,it is necesury that the failure constitute a condition where tttre is reasonable dcub6. that the functionally redondant .
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J n y train >or' channel would remain operational until it completed its safety N functionor)isrepaired. For example, if a pump fails because of improper ys - lubrication, and engineering judgment indicates that there is a reasonable
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, expectation that the functionally redundant pump, which was also improperly
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lubricated, would have also failed before it completed its safety function,
- then the fa'iluie is reportable and the potential failure of the functionally
- redundant pump must be discussed in the LER.
m Interaction between system, particularly a safety system and a non-safety 1- ,
system, is also included in this criterion. For example, the, Commission is int:reasingly concerned about the effect of a loss or,. degradation of what had been assumed to be non-essential inputs tocsafety systems. Therefore, this paragraph also includes those cases where a service (e.g., heating, ventilation, l
I .and cooling) or input (e.g.', compressed ' air) which is necessary for reliab.e or long-term operation of a safety system is lost or degraded. Such loss or degradation is reportable 'tf the proper fulfillment of the safety function 'is not or can not be assured. Failures that affect inputs or services to systems that have no safety function need not be reported.
I Finally the Commission recognizes that the, licensee may also use engineering
judgment to decide when personnel actions could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function. For example, when an individual improperly operates or maintains a component, he might conceivably have made the same error for all of the functionally redundant components (e.g., if he incorrectly calibrates one bistable amplifier in the Reactor Protection System, he could conceivably incorrectly calibrate all bistable amplifiers). However, for an event to be
-reportable it is necessary that the actions actually affect or involve components in more than one train or channel of a safety system, and the result of the
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, Nil actions must be undesirable froE the perspective of protecting the health and ,
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pumps in different trains) or not functionally redundant (e,g., the operator
^
.rgei Jg.yff.) correctly stops a pump in Train "A" and, instead of shutting the pump discharge m '
,' valve in Train "A " he mistakenly shuts the pump discharge valve in Train "B").
. Paragraphs 50.72(b)(2)(v) and (vi) [ proposed 50.72(b)(6)] require reportir: !
, "(1) Any airborne radioactive release that exc6eded 2 times the applicabi I concentrations of 'the limits specified in Appendix B, Table II of Part 20 of f.. this chapter in unrestricted areas, when averaged' over a time period of one hou '
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(ii) Any liquid effluent release that exceeded 2 times the limiting combin Maximum Permissible Concentration MPC (see Note 1 of Appendix B to Part 20)
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ofthischapteratthepointofentryintothereceivingwater(i.e.,
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unrestricted area) for all radionuclides except ' tritium and dissolved noble gas
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when averaged over a time period of'one hour."
, Immediate notifications must be made to the Commission in accordance with 550.72(b)(2)(v). These immediate notifications also meet the requirements of 4
620.403(a)(2)ofPart20ofthischapter."
These paragraphs have been changed to clarify the requirements to report releases of radioactive material. The first of these two paragraphs is similar
- to $20.403 but places a lower threshold for reporting events at comercial powel.
reactors. The lower threshold is based on the significance of the breakdown of the licensee's program necessary to have a release of this size, rather than on the significance of the impact of the actual release.
i Based upon public comment, the reporting threshold has been changed from "25%" in the proposed rule to "2 times" in the final rule. Also, based on
, public comment, this has been made as a "Non-Emergency" to be reported within 4-hours instead of within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.. .
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Also based on public comment, this reporting requirement has been changed
' !.$( to make a more uniform requirement by referring to specific release criteria
- Xlil wlg . instead of referring only to Technical Specifications.
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This reporting requirement is intended to capture those events that
" 't constitute unplanned or uncontr'olled releases of a significant amount of radioac-tive material to offsite areas. Unplanned . releases should occur infrequently, c -
however, when they occur, at least moderate defects have occurred in the safety design or operational control established to avoid their occurrence and,
.( therefore, such events should be reported.
M Paragraph 50.72(b)(2)(vii) [ proposed rule 50.72(b)(7)] requires the reportin
. of: -
' '; "Any event requiring transport of a radioactively contaminated person to idi" an offsite medical facility for treatment." -
[ Three changes have been made to this reporting requirement. One is to eliminate the phrase " occurring onsite" because it is implied by the scope of the rule. The second change is to replace " injury involving radiation" with
" radioactively contaminated person." This change was made because of the difficulty in defining injury due to radiation and more importantly 'because 10 3
[. CFR Part 20 captures events involving radiction exposure.
The third change, in response to public comment, was to make this reporting requirement a four-hour notification, instead of one-hour notification.
Paragraph 50.72(b)(2)(viii) rnot in proposed rule] requires reporting of:
"Any event or situation related to the health and safety of the public or onsite personnel or protection of the environment and for which a news release is planned or notification to other government agencies -has been or will be made.
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2.yf4 Such event may include an onsite fatality or release of radioactively 'contami-k' 'N- nated n terials." Besides covering some situation such as radioactive releases
- &.y'i .:-
that warrent NRC attention, this criterion covers those events or situations
.. r @
- dD . that would not otherwise warrant NRC attention except for the interest of the
, ' news media, other government ' agencies, or the public. In terms of its effect c licensees, this is not a new reporting requirement because the threshold for
~
. reporting injuries and radioactive releases was much lower under the proposed rule. This criterion will capture those events previously reported under other
,. .; criteria when such events require the NRC to respond because of media or public
. 3;.
-A attention.
, , Paragraph 50.72(c) [ proposed 50.72(c)] concerning:
r .
" Followup Notification. With respect to the telephore notifications made
,.)
under paragraphs (a) an'd'(b) of this section, each licensee, in addition to
.. {.n
- , making the required notification, shall during the course of the event:
(1) Immediately report any further degradation in the level of safety of the plant or other worsening plant conditions including those that' require, or initiation of any of the Emergency Classes if such initiation has not been previously declared, or the change from one Emergency Class to another or a termination of the Emergency Class.
(2) Immediately report the results of ensuing evaluations or assessments of plant conditions, the effectiveness of response or protective measures taken, and information related to plant behavior that is not und.erstood.
(3) Maintain an open, continuous communication channel with the NRC Operations Center upon request by the NRC."
This paragraph has remained essentially unchanged from the proposed rule, except for addition of the title " Followup Notification" and some renumbering.
1 9 . - _ _ _ - . - -_ - ._
-7 .,.. ,
f
,w. . -s. .s {7590-01]
. r .
,~.
- f.F '
s I- N/' u.. , . .:
n:.3 .,
-f,;.[] . This paragraph is intended to provide the NRC with timely notification m.m ~
dim when an event becomes.more serious and additional information or new analyses Q.-G
,' d,'0j clarify an event.
w u.t This paragraph also permits the NRC to maintain a continuous communications channel because of the need for continuing follow-up information or because of telecomm'unication problems.
- f. -
N IV REGULATORY ANALYSIS i
4j The Commission has prepared a regulatory analysis on this regulation. The
- my, .
, j analysis examines the costs and benefits of the Rule as considered by the e
. . ,E.
. Commission. A. copy of the regulatory analysis is available for inspection and
!j .
copying for a fee at the NRC Public Document Room,1717 H Street, NW., Washingtoi
?, .
- D. C. Single copies of the analysis maf be obtained from Eric W. Weiss,.0ffice o-Inspection and Enforcement, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D. (
l, j; I 20555, Telephone (301) 492-4973.
V PAPERWORK REDUCTION ACT STATEMENT O,. .
.The information requirements contained in the regulation have b'een approved f by the Office of Management and Budget pursuant to the Paperwork Reduction Act, Pub. L.96-511(clearance number 3150-0011).
VI REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY CERTIFICATION In accordance with the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, 5 U.S.C. 605 (b), the Commission hereby certifies that this regulation will not have a signi-ficant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. This regulatig affects electric utilities that are dominant in their respective service areas
(7590-01]
.tk ' . ' . .-
$dik* 'i$h
_C#
and that own and operate nuclear utilization facilities licensed under Sections and 104b of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended. The amendments clarify
. ? :;
h and modify presently existing notification requirements. Accordingly, there is
-!g ne'w, significant economic impact on these licensees, nor do the affected licensees fall within the scope of the definition of "small entities" set forth in the Regulatory Flexibility Act or within the Small Business Size Standards t l*.I set forth in regulations issued by the Small Business Administration at 13 CFR Part 121.
.f ,
VII LIST OF SUBJECTS IN 10 CFR PART 50
, , , Antitrust, Classified information, Fire prevent, Intergovernmental
-k:.', relations, Nuclear power plants and reactors.
3, . Penalty, Radiation Protection, Reactor siting criteria,~ Reporting requirements.
[.)c ; Pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of .1954, as amended, the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended, and section 552 and 553 of Title 5 of the Unite ~d States Code, the following amendments to Title 10, Chapter I, Code of Federal Regulations, Par 0, and 73 are published as a document subject to codification.
PART 50 - DOMESTIC LICENSING OF PRODUCTION AND UTILIZATION FACILITIES
- 1. The authority citation for Part 50 continues to read as follows:
AUTHORITY:
Secs. 103, 104, 161, 182, 183, 186, 189, 68 Sta't. 936; 937, 948, 953, 954, 955,.956, as amended, sec. 234, 83 Stat. 1244, as amended (42 U.S.C 2133, 2134, 2201, 2232, 2233, 2236, 2239, 2282); secs. 201, 202, 206, 88 Stat.
C \
1242, 1244, 1246, as amended (42 U.S.C. p841, 5842, 5846), unless otherwise noted.
O
- __ _ _ - - - ^
. * . [7590-01]
Section 50.7 also issued under Pub. L.95-601, sec. 10, 92 Stat. 2951 (42 U.S.C. 5851).
~
Section 50.78 also issued under sec.122, 68 Stat. 939 (42 954; U.S.C.2152). Sections 50.80-50.81 alsoissuedundersec.184,68 Stat.fas amended (42 U.S.C. 2234). Sections 50.100-50.102 also issued under sec.186, 68 Stat. 955 (42 U.S.C 2236).
For the purposes of sec. 223, 68 Stat. 958, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2273),
5650.10(a),(b),and(c), 50.44,50.46,50.48,50.54,and50.80(a)areissued b
under sec.161b, 68 Stat. 948, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2201(b)); 5950.10(p) and (c) and 50.54 are issued under sec. 1611, 68 Stat. 949, as amended (42 U.S.C.
2201(i)); and 6650.55(e), 50.59(b), 50.70, 50.71, 50.72, and 50.78 are issued
. . under sec. 161o, 68 Stat. 950, as amended'(42 U.S.C. 2201(o)).
A new paragraph ) is added to $50.54 to read as folicws:
O 550.54 Conditions of licenses.
a
,f %
~~~
'W W . 'M 4 k N"'
) In the case of every utilization facility licensed pursuant to Section f 103 or 104 b of the Act, the licensee shall immediately notify the NRC Operations Center of the occurrence of the events specified in 550.72 of this part. od M #' Specc
- 3. Section 50.72 is revised to read as follows: '
650.72 Immediate notification requirements for operating nuclear power reactors.
1 (a) 1 E General Requirements.k:s(ya)vyach of- i i kwee vf nuclear /.power licensed under 550.21(b) or 650.22fshall notify the NRC Operations Center via
%e, the Emergency Notification System of: (i) The declaration of any of ergen'cy we direvsrch on k f W- Y W*
Q h O;s 6 fb S 4 A m dl ret ~I%
1 Itce+ue<s Other requirements for immediate notification of the NRC by M ic:=d operating nuclear power reactors are contained elsewhere in this chapter, in particular, 620.403, 650.36, and 673.71.
- j
< 5 D590-01] .
l l
4ime klasses specified in the licensee's approved Emergency Plan;2 or (ii) of e,
thosenon-fmergencyeventsspecifiedinparagraph(b)ofthissection. (2)If the Emergency Notification System is inoperative, the licensee shall make the required notifications via commerical telephone service, other dedicated telephone ed 'u .
system;or any other method which will ensurega report be4*g made as soon as possible to the 'NRC Operations Center.3 l
\
(3) The licensee shall notify the NRC immediately after notification of the appropriate State or local agencies and within one hour of the time the licensee l e c.
decghe^resoneofthegmergency lasses,
@ %, A a pd v* e v ymgr h (A).g g _yg;, ,,e4; ,,1 (4) he licensee shall identify: )the/mergency ass declared, or (ii) eitherparagraph(b)(1)"One-HourReport r paragraph (b)(2) "Four-Hour Repor g as the paragraph of this section requiring Non-EmergencyEvents) notification.
(b) Non-Emergency Events.' (1) One-Hour Reports. f not reported as a declaration of an hnergency flass under paragraph (a) of this section, the 1icensee shall notify the NRC as soon as possible, and in all cases within one hour of the occurrence of any of the following:
(lQ WThe initiation of any nuclear plant shutdown required by Technical Specifications.
(B) -fi+)- Any event or condition during operation that resulted in the condition of the nuclear power plant, including its principal safety barriers, being seriously degraded; or resulted in the nuclear power plant being:
2 These Emergency Classes are addressed in NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1 entitled
" Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants" Rev. 1, November 1980.
Copies of NUREG documents are available at the Commission's Public Document Room 1717 H Street,.NW, Washington, D. C. 20555. Copies may be purchased from the Government Printing Office. Information on current prices may be obtained by writing the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D. C. 20555.
Attention: Publications Sales Manager Coc.ercial telephone number of the NRC Operations Center is (202) 951-0550.
, _ . ..< D590-01]
, .- . s (f) -fA}- In an unanalyzed condition that significantly compromises plant safety;
-f6-)- In ahndition that was outside the design basis of the plant; or C5) (G) In a condition not governed by the plant's operating and emergency procedures.
(C) 4 ii)- Any natural phenomenon or other external condition that posed an actual threat to the safety of the nuclear power plant or significantly hampers site per-sonnel in the performance of duties necessary for the safe operation of the plant.
'(N 44w) Any event which results or should have resulted in Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) discharge to the vessel as a result of a valid signal.
h M Any event which results in a major loss of emergency assessment or mdie br:
. communications capability (e.g., signific' ant portion of control room N i n tir ,#
Emergency Notification Syste
~
4vt)-Any event t_ hat threatened the safety of the nucl' ear power plant or significantly hampered site personnel in the performance of duties necessary for the safe operation of the nuclear power plant including fires, and toxic gasy or radioactive relea'ses.
(2) Four-Hour Reports, f not reported under paragraphs (a) or (b)(1) of this section, the licensee shall notify the NRC as soon as possible and in all
/
cases, within four hours of the occurrence [of any of the following:
h)-{4}- Any event, found while the reactor is shutdown, that, had it been found while the reactor was in operation, would have resulted in the nuclear power plant, including its principal s.afety barriers, being seriously degraded or in an unanalyzed condition that significantly compromises plant safety.
(6) -f-14 Any event or , condition that resulted in manual or automatic actuation of any Engineered Safety Feature (ESF), including the Reactor Protection System (RPS). However, actuation of an ESF, including the RPS, that resulted from and
' ~ [7590-01] .
a,'
was part of the preplanned sequence during testing or reactor operation need not be reported.
[ -f+i+) Any event or condition that alone could have prevented the fulfill-ment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to:
D-fat-Shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition,
( 2 % Remove" residual heat, (3)M Control the release of radioactive material, or
( O fD-). Mitigate the consequences of an accident.
prw.A ((i)(O seclim
{c,} 4-it-) Events covered ing.7f(b)(2)@ of this y may include one or more personnel errors, equipment failures, and/or discovery of design, analysis, fabrication, construction, and/or procedural inadequacies. individual Howeve{, b sech o uder (6)(2)C)(C s, componentfailuresneednotbereportedy=caumttcthisparagr)aphifredunda equipment in the same system was operable and available to perform the required cbsafetyfunction.
.fe) (A} Any airborne radioactive release that exceeded 2 times the y applicable concentrations of the limits specified in Appendix B, Table II of
- Y
& Part 20 of this chapter in unrestricted areas, when averaged over a time period (2) j 4 of one hour. .,fe-)- Any liquid effluent release that exceeds 2 times the limiting 3Sh A combined Maximum Permissible Concentration (MPC) (see Note 1 of Appendix B to Part 20[of this chapter) at the point'of entry into the receiving water (i.e.,
unrestricted area) for all radionuclides except tritium and dissolved noble gases, whenaveragedoveratimeperiodofonehour.d x A
... .... u r .. a ,__ m .m nn+ m _ %v , ....
a_ m u-r__-
. ....- __a,, ,
wit. Z2.72(b)(2)(v). . mediate notification also meet he requirements of s20.403(a)(2) of.Part 20 of this chapter.
(6)rfvt44Anyeventrequiringthetransportofaradioactivelycontaminated person to, an offsite med'ical facility for treatment.
(7590-013 f~
f)-{ titi} Any event or situation related to the health and safety of the public or onsite personnel or protection of the environment and for which a news release is planned or notification to other government agencies has been or will be madeg
%g g events may include an onsite fatality o,n inadvertent release of radioactively contaminated materials.
4tt Followup Notification.(i)With respect to the telephone notifications Wit, hom ' madeunderparagraphs(a)and(b)ofthissection,JeachlicenseeJinaddition to making the required notification, during the course of the event:
[9 vb M)Immediately report any further degradation in the level of safety of
. the plant or other worsening plant conditions includin those that require g declcW44*,n c A de hydios f iti:ti rh6mof an of the erg c glassesifsuch'-ituicihasnot-been-
- tw eve h A, c_ b in OL event of previously(if a.qd orfthefchange from one jfmergency flass to another j orfa
. e e._ c termination of # e (mergency plass.
00
[*g']-@}--Immediately reportqhe results of ensuing evaluations or assessments of plant conditions the effectiveness of response or protective measures taken, an nformation related to plant behavior that is not understood.
(Ni)f4}- Maintain an open, continuous communication channel with the NRC Operations Center upon request by the NRC.
Dated at Washington, D.C., this .
day of 198 .
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Samuel J. Chilk Secretary of the Commission ,
[l a
REGULATORY ANALYSIS (650.72)
OBJECTIVE The objective of-the revised Immediate Notification System described in 10 CFR 50.72, "Immediate Notification Requirements for Operating Nuclear Power Reactors" is to ~ enhance the safety.of nuclear plants by providing for timely notification to the NRC should safety significant events occur at operating nuclear reactors.
' BACKGROUND e
The existing provisions of 1 C R 50.72 have generated basically three types of problems. One. problem isgcertain safety significant event are not required to be reported. A second problem is that certain events are insignifi-cant from the perspective of protecting the public health and safety [are
, -required to-be reported. The third and perhaps most important problem,is that existing reporting requirements are not coordinated; For example,10 CFR 50.73, the new " Licensee Event Report" rule and the existing 10 CFR 50.72 do not use similar terminology, phrasingj or reporting thresholds.
In addition to the reporting problem noted above, special consideration must also be given to Section 201 of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1980 (Pub. L.96-295). The intent of Congress as expressed
. )
in that law was that the Commission establish specific guidelines for identifying accidents which c uld result in an unplanned release of radioactivity.in excess of allowable limits at i to require immediate notification of these incidents. TW%S revision of6550.54 and .72 is consistent with the intent of Congress as
, A .
j expressed in the Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1980.
The NRC published a proposed rule in the Federal Register on December 21, 1981 (46 FR 81894) and subsequently received twenty letters of public comment.
i-
These letters were generally supportive of the proposed revision of 10 CFR 50.72 and these letters were most useful in the development of this final rule.
ALTERNATIVES At the outset of this rulemaking, a wide variety of regulatory alternatives was considered. One alternative that was rejected was the possibility of simply revising 10 CFR 50.72 without regard for coordination with other reporting requirements. The need for coordination with other provisions of 10 CFR, most notably the new LER system (10 CFR 50.73), resulted in the. selection of the approach defined in the final rule. Each of the reporting criteria adopted in the final rule was selected from a range of possible alternatives and each was considered carefully, usually by a committee representing the various elements re reb of the NRC staff familiar with the -^yirdinformation g and how the information could be collected from licensees in the least burdensom manner through a particular reporting requirement.
YYv 3>'n iht b,ydoNo Currh The three alternatives f jreportingfrequirements[contain in 650.72e:w%
, 1. have approximately the same number of reports.
R .
- 2. reduce the number of reports-) or^
1
- 3. increase the number of reports .
Mdd& cydre V Nii E licenseestutocul(m pcrmit
, Alternative 1 would y the -sji,melburden on h
, Otw d ^O Athe reporting criteria -t 5: "auhad in order to enchance clarity and increa,se the usefulness of the notifications obtained.
Alternative 2 would reduce the bu'rden on licensees but would also reduce- the ability of the NRC to have early notification of less significant events that
~
might develop into serious accidents. One of the reasons for a. W the/ reporting criteria :: th:; r.; ..va is to have precursor eve ts telephoned O the NRC so b l
'T4 M can be -^
^
- N-O
r -
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- e- ** . , , . ,
~
Alternative 3 is unwarranted because improvements can be made at the present level of reporting by eliminating unnecessary notifications and substituting mcyr n
useful notifications. There is no n g'" ;- reason 4ee increase s the
-M:r ;f r;;;rt;# torrerr - Icved 0 Ygoyh.; ,
Consequently, alternative I was selected.
BENEFITS AND COSTS -
The NRC staff weighe'd the costs and benefits associated with revising 10 CFR 50.72. The optimum benefit is derived by revising both 10 CFR 50.72 and related portions of other reporting requirements. Accordingly, revision of 10 6eal CFR50.72isbeingcoordinatedwithdevelopmentof[10CFR50.73. In addition, a number of substantive or administrative changes are being developed that will
'20 and 1.
.amendothersectionsof10CFRPartg50, j The value of revising 10 CFR 50.72 goes beyond dollar benefits. The capability of the NRC to make timely decisions and to provide adequate assurances.
regarding actual or potential threats to public health and. safety depends heavil on the rapidity with which significant events occurring at nuclear power power plants are communicated by nuclear power reactor licensees to NRC.
The majority ~of events occurring throughout the nuclear industry pose little or no serious or immediate threat h the public health and safety; however, certain events do pose such threats or geneiate fear or unusual concern.
1,,NRC has an obligation ,to collect facts quickly and accuratelyjabetet A
-e:w.;'i;;;;t :;;r'Nassess the facts
- take y necessary action
- and inform the '
V W y!iMi$ tem-l-tyeNT % r.
public about the extent of the threat, if any, to public health and safetyg Not only must NRC act promptly to prevent or minimize injury to the public, it must also take approprigte action to alleviate fear or concern ' created as a flu otuyrnes of S. n ;F;ea n-]
result of even .
The staff expects that there will be little significant additional cos to the NRC or to licensees associated with the cf c$$i er rul . .:; a. ,
Hec n I .
associated with
+'- :t:ff . =ld 1 Re to rui..t atThefcosts that 5::: 5 o,
establishing and implementing a " prompt notification system { Qhese cost) are 6 man-years per year of NRC staff effort for manning the telephones for notification and $1.5 million per year for dedicated telephone lines to each operi ting commercial power reactor facility.
Other Government Agencies Improvements to the immediate notification requirements would contribute to improved State and local emergency response around nuclear power reactors.
Applicant agencies (e.g., TVA, DOE) would be affected as presented under Section 1.3.3 below. .
~
Industry There should be little additional cost to the industry associated with implementing the final rulein:hr;=pi;fiort Add tt'c-M to those incurred in order to t.vyyeuV complywithNRC's[ emergency preparedness regulations.
The present cost of reporting under 550.72 for the. entire industry is estimated to be $46,000 per year exclusive of the costs incurred in order to comply with NRC's emergency preparedness regulationj ltda basis of this cost estimate is as follows: '
W isn The person the notification pursuant to 950.72 is usually the shift t . Md
- supervisor who is a licensed senior reactor operator, these taking into account L -6t.gerns't l -W salary, cost of training, and overhead, MsAtime is worth approximately i
S100 per hour.
Y Jgige v ,,Wfu u
l - ._
9 :
Each telephone notification to the NRC Operations Center pursuant to 650.72 Ierls Abd
-tee. on averagef15 minutes although most notifications take less time and a few take much more time.
The NRC Operations Center typically receives 5 telephone notifications.
pursuant to 950.,72,lper dayJ-A_
A computation at the present cost to the industry is: -
calls ) x ( 1_ hours ) x ( 365 days ) x 100 dollars = $45,625 (5
day 4 call year hour
% h)d( ' SN edi%Ie.f hd i b h h ! M C. .g fM the rc.i::d $50.72 thq costdof reporting it c:ti :ted 114 is promulgated;4c even - orien
+e remain unchanged. AsurveyofftelephonenotificationsmadetotheNRC Operations Center,during January 1983 :hc.;;d. 3 islded b - N0 Wig WhI/fJ wty& lite set whicM 95 g reports by rc::teg would still be reported under the revised 550.72.
were.- p( d 67 A reports 4would not be required by the revised 550.72.
e4 I ice *4 eel wcW 11 courtesy calls and other calls made by reacter: butAnotrequired by 650.72.
W et c..
6 A courtesy calls and other calls requesting assistance regarding events not related to powe. reactors.
O 179 - total event-oriented calls.
U& M reyu) %32. YL Nk This suggests thathpproximately 41% (
67 ) reduction in the number of 11 95+67 reports, c": y.-... w 3., v . m. . - However, a small countervailing increase in A SvA reporting could be expected from seeh new reporting criteria 4as'" loss of emergency
6-assessment or communications capability" (50.72 (b)(1)(v)) and " news release or notification to other government agencies" (50.72(b)(2.)(viii)).
Public Improvements to the immediate notification requirements would provide
~
increased confidence that the health and safety of the public would e protected during a radiological emergency because the State and local governments would be better informed.
Decision on the Action Since the final rule reflects many of public comments, and should improve the public health and safety, the final rule changes should be published in the Federal Register to become effective within 60 days of the date of publication.
SPECIFICATION OF CRITERIA Ce ivi c J.ec.; h t: l.m eiugu ed . b x;; r':d by puui ic commenc we. ; mde,
- audo -f ';tt;r; ;f puh't: ce"=ents #^"ad 't; .myiseu ou.72 cv 6-en4mpr.auau
. M4n ent.g of 'b prwistonr adopted for promulgation in the final rule reflect.mecy r Cohwg .
. .. blmn3c=b inbyfpublic ret ro)Nr,J
. changes recommended g u co ..un))fnft h f Vbber[;n ol k#A Grf The revised 50.72 should be a substantial improvement in terms of:
Clarity The final rule clearly and explicitly includes reporting criteria for events that were previously described by examples in NUREG-0654. ,
Order The order of the criteria in the ' final ruJ'e h9 s changed from that in the-
$rimh o *n N t;nal rde were proposed W;h a nor3 3 o rule.
w; eor 4t-+M .ganization Mec)
@he criteria)', impro gcortsistency2;t-^njgsimilar criteria inp10 CFR 50.73.
A
/. I
~ .,
, l The f4a*] k-]; jagg7pg,gt g m3 7 gf (',, x,,,, typg3 vf ,gpg7tjng-c7jtegjg
=;d in 10- CfR 50.73; Report timing K"vil,S.x4l Yv!c, th; prep;;cd)and ..r.d Pogtre rufq(On 7 .nce.pe.etm
{mliQ diPI k a provision that requires I ic wie e.s O 4eem to notify t,he NRC "as soon as possible and in all cases within one hour of the occurrence." In addition, the final rule incorporates a provision for -
reporting some occurrences within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> instead of 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. This is permitted because occurrences satisfying some of the criteria reflect less serious or less l ' : .'7:
immediate safety significance. The 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> reports are covered by.Secti m (b)(1)
~
_g $ S o .'72-. .-
(f the final ru} and the 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> reports are covered by S;;U un (b)(2) 6f the' A
Qal FINAL DECISION _
On -
B VhiIih ased Md'onOC the~ comments Careceived v.Wm on the proposed rule, and['its own assessment of th impact of this rule, the.staf4. has concluded that th revised 10 CFR Q ~
50.72:willq (1) not place an unacceptable burden on h+ icensees, (2)lhave wih A WI _ /\
signifi nt sa benefitsforthepublic,(3)freduce;g4reportingburdenon licensees, (4){ increase the effectiveness ,o[ the,-Imme iate Notification System.
C e % tri m -t h k h Therefore, theeta## concludes that 40 CP .0.L rule should be promulgated.
6
- , - ' Document Name:
NRC COMM--REG ANALYSIS Requestor's ID: *
~MICHELLE i
Author's Name:
E WEISS 9
Document Comments:
. REGULATORY ANALYSIS a
e
- O 9 9
em P
h 9
9 9
e S
6 I
I 4
9
--..m. - c. .,, , ,. _ , _ _ . . . . ,_. _ . _ ,_. , _.. . - . . . , ,,_., , ,m_._,. ,.. ,% _ . , - . _ _ , , _ ,,_ - _.-.-,_, . - , _ , , _ . , _ , , - -, , _
l'
[ %
N UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION g g ;E WASHINGTON. D. C. 20555
\...../
MAR 11 1993 MEMORANDUM FOR: Eric W. Weiss Office of Inspection and Enforcement FROM: John Philips, Chief Rules and Procedures Branch Division of Rules and Records Office of Administration
SUBJECT:
Review of Emergency Planning and Reporting Criteria rule - Part 50.
Enclosed is a marked-up copy of the above subject rule. The Division of Rules and Records has reviewed the rule and would like to call your attention to the following:
- 1. On p.1, the Summary paragraph has been rewritten to meet Federal Register (FR) requirements. The FR requires the Summary paragraph to answer (a) what the rule does, (b) why the action is necessary, (c) what is the intended effect of this rule, and (d) what class of licensees is affected by the rule.
- 2. Editorial and stylistic changes have been made throughout the rule.
Note particularly on p. 8 that we have combined amendments two and three. We have also updated the authority citation.
- 3. A copy of this rule has been sent to Brenda Shelton for Paperwork Reduction review. You should contact her for further instructions on the appropriate paperwork statement for this rule.
Enclosed is the revised Regulatory Analysis Guidelines for your use in completing the regulatory analysis for this rule. Cost data should be included in your analysis as you proceed with this rulemaking.
If you have any questions, please call John Phili s on extension 2-7086.
Philips, Chief Rules and Procedures Branch Division of Rules and Records Office of Administration
,, [7590-01]
k3 0 /'
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 10 CFR Part 50 Revise]d Emergency Planning and Reporting Criteria b (ory,in c<c / A/ Ala /eA/ k wtr ?ld #
AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Comission.
ACTION: Proposed /ulecp
SUMMARY
- The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is proposing to amend its regulations for operating commercial nuclear power plants to remove the
" Unusual Event" category from the emergency classes in a licensees' emergency plans. The " Unusual Event" category results in a licensec declaring an emergency (too low of a threshold. Removal of this category would raise the threshold at which a licensee declares an emergency, thus eliminating unnecessary activations of state, local, and Federal emergency plans.
DATE: The comment period expires . Coments received after this date will be considered if it is practical to do so but assurance of en or consideration cannot be given except as to coments received 4before this date.
ADDRESSES: Mail written coments to[Jhe Secretary j M tk R,,,
- ig, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Comission, Washington, DfCf 20555, Attention: Docketing and Service Branch.
m Deliver comments tol Room 1121, 1717 H St. NW., Washington, D.C., between 8:15 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. weekdiys.
Copies of the regulatory analysis, OMB clearance supporting statement, and coments received may be examined at(the NRC Public Document Room at 1717 H n
St. NW., Washington, DfC.
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a FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Eric W. Weiss, Office of Inspection and n
Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, Dp 20555, telephone (301)492-4973.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND The Nuclear Regulatory Comission is responsible for licensing and regulating nuclear power plants. Licensees are now subject to certain notifi-cation requirements, both as to the contents of their applications for operating licenses and to actions authorized by the operating licenses. All applications for licenses under sections 103 and 104b of the Atomic Energy Act (Act) of 1954 as amended, 42 USC 2133, are now required by 650.54 to include emergency plans that contain the various elements set forth in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E. These section 103 and 104b facilities are the commercial nuclear power facilities that produce electricity for public consumption. Research and test reactors are not subject to these notificatior requirements as they are licensed under section 104a and 104c of the Atomic Energy Act. Section IV of Appendix E requires the plans to include procedures for notifying local, state and Federal officials.
Once an operating license under section 103 and 104b is granted, the licensee is required by 10 CFR 50.72 to actuate immediate notification procedures upon the occurrence of any of the specific "significant events" described in 650.72.
Since the enactment of section 201, the NRC has provided further guidance to operating licensees as to situations or events which require notification by the licensee of the NRC and State and local response organizations and other
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emergency personnel. On August 19, 1980, the NRC published a final rule on emergency planning, effective on November 3,1980(45FR55402). This rule established a multifaceted emergency planning and preparedness program and, among other things, required procedures to be established for immediate notification of the NRC and tate, and local emergency response personnel in certain situations.
These situations were discussed in Revision 1 to NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, entitled " Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Energency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Plants" (hereinafter Revision 1"), which was issued in November 1980, shortly after the Emergency Planning rule became effective.1 Revision 1 specified four classes of Emergency Action Levels involving notification actions--Notification of Unusual Event, Alert, Site Area Emergency, and General Emergency. Revision 1 also set forth examples of initiating conditions for each of these four Emergency Classes.
As explained in Revision 1, the original rationale for the notification of Unusual Event was to provide early and prompt notification of minor events which could lead to more serious consequences given operator error or equipment failure or which might be indicative of more. serious conditions which are not yet fully realized. The Alert emergency class was supposed to reflect events which involve an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of the safety of the plant. The Site Emergency class was supposed to reflect conditions where some significant releases are likely or are occurring but where a core melt situation is not indicated based on current information. The General Emergency ICopies of NUREG documents are available at the Commission's Public Document Room 1717 H Street, NW, Washington, D. C. 20555. Copies may be purchased from the Government Printing Office. Information on current prices may be obtained by writing the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D. C. 20555.
Attention: Publications Sales Manager.
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class, the most serious class, was supposed to involve actual or imminent substantial core degradation or melting with the potential for loss of containment.
The criteria set forth in Revision 1 and the examples of events triggering
~ the respective Emergency Classes (with attendant notification actions) provide additional guidance for every operating licensee in the preparation, approval,
- and ultimately, the implementation of their emergency preparedness plans which must be submitted to NRC for evaluation pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47.
However, as a practical matter, the present emergency classification schemo has resulted in an unexpectedly large number of emergency declarations by rs
. licensees and the concogitpnt large number of needless activations of local, state, and federal emergency plans. For example during January 1983, there were c
163 telephone notifications to the NRC Operations Center pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72. Of these notifications l9j reported " Unusual Events" and 1 reported an
" Al ert. " Although the Commission has found these notifications to be useful for identifying generic issues, the Unusual Event class has not usually been " indica-tive of more serious conditions which are not yet fully realized." In other words, the Unusual Event notifications are useful to the Commission'as nonemer-Because gency reports but not as precursor notifications of serious accidents.
it would eliminate needless activations of the licensee's emergency plan, the Commission thinks that it would be in the interest of public health and safety to remove the Unusual Event class from the emergency classes leaving only three such classes: Alert, Site Area Emergency and General Emergency.
Needless activation of a licensee's emergency plan has several adverse impacts.
Besides the obvious waste of time, effort, and expense, needless activations of an emergency plan end to reduce the credibility of the emergency plan with the
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public and with government agencies directly involved. The public either becomes unnecessarily alarmed, or after several unwarranted activations, the public dismisses all activations as not really representing a true emergency. Similarly, state, local, and ederal agencies can become desensitized by needless activations.
. Overall the effect of needless activations of the licensee's emergency plan is to reduce safety by a process analagous to the proverbial " crying of wolf."
SPECIFIC CONSIDERATIONS In order to remove " Unusual Event" from the Emergency Classes, three steps must be undertaken. First, NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1 must be revised. The Commission and the Federal Emergency Management Agency will be undertaking this task in the near future. Second, the Commission's regulations on "Immediate Notification Requirement for Operating Nuclear Power Reactors" must be revised in order to cover as "Non-Emergencies" those events previously reported as " Unusual Events."
This has recently been accomplished on as described in the Federal Register (4 FR ). Third, both 10 CFR 50 Appendix E
" Emergency Planning u d Preparedness for Production and Utilization Facilities" and 10 CFR 50.47, " Emergency Plans" must be revised. This third step is the subject of this proposed rulemaking.
COMMENTS INVITED In light of the previous discussion, the NRC is particularly interested in receiving comments concerning the following:
- 1. What safety value, and dollar benefit is associated with removing Unusual Event from the Emergency Classes?
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- 2. What safety impact and dollar cost is associated with removing Unusual Event from the Emergency Classes?
- 3. What other changes should be incorporated in a revision 2 to NUREG-0654/
FEMA-REP-1?
- 4. Should any portion of NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, such as the examples for the various Emergency Classes be specifically incorporated into the Comission's
. regulations instead of referencing the document as is done now?
SUMMARY
A.
The Comission is proposingArulemaking that would change the number of Emergency Classes in licensee's emergency plans for operating nuclear power
- plants. The number of Emergency Classes would be reduced from four to three classes as a result of the elimination of the " Unusual Event" category. Reacto'r i events previously falling within the " Unusual Event" category would still be reported to be Comission but as non-Emergencies pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72.
REGULATORY ANALYSIS The Comission has prepared a regulatory analysis on this regulation. The analysis examines the costs and benefits of the fule as considered by the Comission. A copy of the regulatory analysis is available for inspection and copying for a fee at the NRC Public Document Room, 1717 H Street, NW., Washington, o
CjSinglecopiesoftheanalysismaybeobtainedfromEricW. Weiss,Officeof Inspection and Enforcement, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission, Washington, D. C.
20555, Telephone (301)492-4973.
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PAPERWORK REDUCTION ACT STATEMENT
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-The inf6FiE&TttnWeqtirements contain - :.:.c regulation have been approved p
b Y y the Office of M and Budget pur want.to ,the h Paperwork Reduction Act, Y P . .96-511(clearancenumber 3150-0011). ~
REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY CERTIFICATION In accordance with the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, 5 U.S.C. 605 g
(b), the Commission hereby certifies that this regulation will not have a signi-Y, ficant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. This regula-T
\, "' tion affects electric utilities that are dominant in their respective service s
$ areas and that own and operate nuclear utilization facilities licensed under
- [+ t Sections 103 and 104b of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended. The amend-g ments clarify and modify presently existing emergency planning requirements.
Accordingly, there is no new, significant economic impact on these licer. sees,
' it nor do the affected full licensees fall within the scope of the definition of "small entities" set forth in the Regulatory Flexibility Act of within the Small Business Size Standards set forth in regulations issued by the Small Business Administration at 13 CFR Part 121.
LIST OF SUBJECTS IN 10 CFR PART 50 Antitrust, Classified information, Fire preven tergovernmental relations, Nuclear power plants and reactorsj Penalty, Radiation Protection, Reactor siting criteria, Reporting requirements.
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[a,eyereasoe:rn:nt te the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the Energy
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Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended, and secticn 552-=d 553.oE Tith 5 cf
/J>e ##cis %Fvs: b- adc6 Par + 50.
he following amendments to-Titte 10g:pter ?, C:t cf the "r.ited StSte f, . . .
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f.2.' In 550.47, paragraph (b) (17) y,rdded and footnote 1 revised to read as follows:
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55B.47 Emergency Plan [
ib) The onsite'and, except as provided in paragrapn (d) of this section, offsite emergency response plans .for nuclear power reactors a '/
mustmeetthefollowingstandards4},
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'(17) The emergency gian must include three Emergency Classes:
(i) A1,ert. ,
(ii) Site Area Emergency'. t (iii) General Emergetct
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,- l 1 These standards are adon' esses ty specific criteria in NUREG-0654; FEMA 4tE?-l entitled " Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological?icergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants-For Interim Use and Dmment" January 1980.
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l However, 'the category " Notification' of Unusual Event" is no longer
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8-Federai Re plation:, "r.t 50 ;;d n; ;d'i d ;d ao a J& =:nt :df::t W%
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[ PART 50 - DOMESTIC LICENSING 0 C PRODUCTION AND UTILIZATION FACILITIES
- 1. The authority citation for Part 50 continues to read as follows:
- AUTHORITY: Secs. 103, 104, 161, 182, 183, 186, 189, 68 Stat. 936, 937, 948, 953, 954, 955, 956, as amended, sec. 234, 83 Stat. 1244, as amended (42 U.S.C.
2133, 2134, 2201, 2232, 2233, 2236, 2239, 2282); secs. 201, 202, 206, 88 Stat.
1242, 1244, 1246, as amended (42 U.S.C. 841,5842,5846), unless otherwise noted.
Section 50.7 also issued under Pub. L.95-601, sec.10, 92 Stat. 2951
('42 U.S.C. 5851). Section 50.78 also issued under sec.122, 68 Stat. 939 (42 96 6 U.S.C. 2152). Sections 50.80-50.81 alsoissuedundersec.184,68 Stat.Aas amended (42 U.S.C. 2234). Sections 50.100-5f.102 also issued under sec.186, 68 Y2-Stat. 955 @.S.C. 2236).
For the purposes of sec 223, 68 Stat. 958, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2273),
Sl50.10(a), (b), and (c), 50.44, 50.46, 50.48, 50.54, and 50.80(a) are issued under sec.161b, 68 Stat. 948, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2201(b)); 9Q50.~10( ) and (c) and 50.54 are issued under sec.161i, 68 Stat. L' t9, as amended (42 U.S.C.
l 2201(i)); and 5550.55(e), 50.59(b), 50.70, 50 1.,f- 72, and 50.78 are issued under sec.161o, 68 Stat. 950, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2201(o)).
l I sv4 M(re d 2. new aray 17) is added to 7 as follows-
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The emergency plan shall include three E sses: (i) Alert (ii)
Site. Area mergency.jnd(i enera- Emerg ncy kp [
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- 3. A new : ntc ce ia add: M footnote 1 Ate-15 k47 as follows:
Howeve e category " Notification of Unusual Event" is no longer
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con ered an emergency class.
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% fppndir [ fr S& SC, 3 ' aragraph IV. C. " Activation of Emergency Organization" is revised to 1
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L read as follows: x p ,s , % p o n of fw fyncy 0rf a ; i 2 ^ " ' '
g, The entire spectrum of emergency conditions that involve the alerting or activating of progressively larger segments of the total emergency organization shall be described. The communication steps to be taken to alert or activate emergency personnel under each class of emergency shall be described. Emergency action levels (based not only on onsite and offsite radiation monitoring information but also on readings from a number of sensors that indicate a potential emergency, such as the pressure in containment and the response of the Emergency Core Cooling System) for notification of off-site agencies shall be described. The existence, but not the details, of a message authentication scheme shall be noted for such agencies. The emergency classes defined shall include: (1)-set 4f4eaties-ef-unusual-events,-(2)(1) alert,(3)(2)sitearea emergency, and (4)(3) general emergency. These classes are further discussed in NUREG-0654; FEMA REP 1. However, the category " Notification of diusual
$ vent"isnolongerconsideredanemergencyclass.
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Y W- Y Dated at Washington, D C , thisAday of 1983.
f For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Samual J. Chilk Secretary of the Commission
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b) REGULATORY ANALYSIS (950.47 and Part 50 Appendix E)
BJECTIVE The objective of the proposed revision of 650.47 and Part 50 Appendix E is to remove the'" Unusual Event" category from the emergency classes in licensees' emergency plans. By raising the threshold at which the licensee declares an emergency, these proposed amendments will reduce the number of activations of state, local and federal emergency plans. These proposed ammendments should enhance public health and safety by increasing the credibi-lity of the licensee's emergency plan and reduc N the number of needless declarations of an emergency.
BACKGROUND Each operating commercial nuclear power plant licensed by the NRC must have an approved emergency plan. The present' emergency classification scheme has four classes: (1) Notification of Unusual Event (2) Alert (3) Site Area Emergency and (4) General Emergency. The class titled " Unusual Event" results in licensee declaring an emergency at too low of a threshold. These four emergency classes are described by examples in NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1.*
- NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1 entitled " Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants." Rev. 1, November, 1980. Copies of NUREG documents are avail-a at the Commission's Public Document Room 1717 H Street, NW, Washington, p, 20555. Copies may be purchased from the Government Printing Office.
ormation on current prices may be obtained by writing the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, Dj j 20555. Attention: Publications Sales Manager.
4 However, as a practical matter, the present emergency classification scheme has resulted in an un pectedly large number of emergency declarations by licensees and the concompitknt large number of needless activations of local, state, and federal emergency plans. For example during January 1983, there were 163 telephone notifications to the NRC Operations Center pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72. Of these notifications l9 j reported " Unusual Events" and 1 reported an
" Alert." Although the Commission has found these notifications to be useful for identifying generic issues, the Unusual Event class has not usually been
" indicative of more serious conditions which are not yet fully realized." In other words, the Unusual Event notifications are useful to the Commission as nonemergency reports but not as precursor notifications of serious accidents.
The Commission thinks that it would be in the interest of public health and safety to remove the Unusual Event class from the emergency classes leaving only three such classes: Alert, Site Area Emergency and j General Emergency.
! Needless activation of a licensee's emergency plan has several adverse impacts. Besides the obvious waste of time, effort, and expense, needless activations of an emergency plan tend to reduce the credibility of the emergency plan with the public and with government agencies directly involved. The public either becomes unnecessarily alarmed, or after several unwarranted activations, the public dismisses all activations as not really representing a true emergency.
Similarly, state, local, and federal agencies can become desensitized by nee'dless s
activations. Overall the effect of needless activation of the licensee's emergency plan is to reduce safety by a process analagous to the proverbial
" crying of wolf."
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BENEFITS AND COSTS The NRC is inviting industry and public comment on precisely what dollar benefits and costs are associated with eliminating " Unusual Event" from the emergency classes. This regulatory analysis will be revised to reflect the precise cost data obtained subsequent to the publishing of the proposed rule.
Industry The NRC expects there to be substantial expense associated with revision of the licensee's emergency plans. This would be at least partially offset over the life of the plant by the reduced costs associated with fewer activations of the' licensee's emergency plan.
Other government agencies Reducing the number of emergency plan activations should result in substantial savings for state, local and federal agencies who will not be responding to unwarranted declarations of emergencies. State, local, and federal emergency plans include activations or the placing on standby of various f
response teams.
Public The chief benefit should accrue to the public as a result of increased safety.
The public will not become unnecessarily alarmed as a result of unnecessary declarations of emergency and there should be less complacency on the part of those agencies responding to an emergency declaration because such a declaration will be more meaningful.
- 4-ALTERNATIVES The three alternative for modifying the emergency classes are:
, 1. have the same number of reports.
- 2. reduce the number of reports.
- 3. increase the number of reports.
Alternative I would impose the same burden on the licensees but would permit fewer emergency classes and thus fewer declarations of emergency.
Alternative 2 would reduce the burden on licensees but would impair the NRC's ability to identify generic issues and trends of plant performance related to safety.
. Alternative 3 is unwarranted because there is no compelling reason for increasing the number of reports.
Consequently, alternative 1 was selected.
SPECIFICATION OF CRITERIA The revision of 50.47 and Part 50 Appendix E that eliminate " Unusual Event" as an emergency class should raise the threshold at which a licensee declares an emergency. This will not change the number of reports received by the NRC but should eliminate unnecessary activations of emergency plan.
FINAL DECISION The proposed rule should, if promulated, enhance public health and safety and therefore should be published.
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REG ANALYSIS 50.47 & PART 50 Requestor's ID:
MICHELLE Author's Name:
Weiss Document Comments:
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