ML20207N950
| ML20207N950 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Brunswick  |
| Issue date: | 10/14/1988 |
| From: | Taylor J NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO) |
| To: | CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20207N949 | List: |
| References | |
| EA-88-131, NUDOCS 8810190494 | |
| Download: ML20207N950 (7) | |
Text
m . . _ . _ - . . . _ . - . ~ . .._ -
. . . . . ,, u . - - - -
'.qy: mr. '
,z ,
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION in the Matter of ) Docket No. 50-324 BRUNSWICK UNIT 2 ) License No. OPR-62 (Carolina Powei & Light Co.) ) EA 88-131 ORDER IMPOSING CIVIL MONETARY PENALTY I
Carolina Power and Light Company, Raleigh, flor *' Carolina (licensee), is the holder of Operating License No. OPR-62 (license) issued by the Nuclear Regulatory Connission (Connission/NRC) on December 27, 1974. The ifcense authorites the licensee to operate Unit 2 of the Brunswick facility in accordance with the conditions specified therein.
II .
NRC inspections of the licensee's activities under the license were conducted on April 1-30 and May 1-June 3,1988, respectively. The result of these inspections indicated that the licensee had not conducted its activities in full compliance with NRC requirements. A written Notice of Violation and ProposedimpositionofCivilPenalty(Notice)wasservedupontheifcenseeby letter dated July 25, 1988. The Notice stated the nature of the violations, the provisions of the NRC's requirements that the licensee had violated, and the amount of the civil penalty proposed for the violations. The licensee responded to the Notice by letters dated August 24 and September 26, 1988. In its response, the licensee admitted the violaticr.s but stated that escalation of the civil penalty under 10 CFR Part 2. Appendix C, is inappropriate. The licensee sutmitted a check for $5C,0CC and took sception to the $25,000 escalation.
8810190494 8G1017 PDR ADOCK 05000324 '
O PDC
o .
III After consideration of the licensee's response and the statements of fact, explanations, and argument for reduction contained therein, the Deputy Execu-tive Director fcr Regional Operaticns has determined, as set forth in the Appendix to this Order, that the violations occurred as stated and that the penalty proposed for the viola *'ans designated in the Notice should be imposed.
IV ,
In view of the foregoing and pursuant to Section 234 of the Atomic Energy Act :
of 1954, as amended (ACT) 42 U.S.C. 2282, and 10 CFR 2.205, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
The licensee pay the remainder of the civil penalty in the amount of Twenty Five Thousand Collars ($25,000) within 30 days of the date of this Order, by check, draft, or money order, payable to the Treasurer of the United States and mailed to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Conmission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington. 0.C. 20555.
V The licensee cay request a hearing within 30 days of the date of this Order. A rr.cuest for a hearing shall be clearly r.arked us a "Pequest for an Enforcer,ent Hearing" and shall be addretsed to the Director, Office of Enfor:erent,
j.%3:; c
' U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, D.C. 20555, with copies to the Assistant General Counsel for Enforcement, U. S. fluclear Regulatory Comission, Washington, D. C. 20555, the Regional Administrator, Region II, 101 Marietta Street, N.W., Atlanta, Georgia 30323, and the NRC Resident Inspector, Brunswick Steam Electric Plant.
If a hearing is requested, the Comission will issue an Order designating the time and place of the hearing. If the licensee fails to request a hearing within 30 days of thi. date of this Order, the provisions to this Order shall be effective without further proceedings. If payment has not been made by that time, the matter may be referred to the Attorney General for collection.
In the event the licensee reque:,ts a hearing as presided above, the issue to be considered at such hearing shall be whether the unpaid remainder of the civil penalty should be irrposed.
FOR THE ilVCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
, l
%%V Mr s M. Taylor eputy Executive Director or Regional perations Dated at Rockville, Maryland this lyMday of October 1988
e N
APPENDIX 4
EVALUATION AND CONCLUSION On July 25, 1988, a Notice of Violation and Proposed Imoosition of Civil Penalty was issued for violations identified during routine NRC inspections.
CP&L responded to the Notice on August 24, 1988 and September 26, 1988. In its response, the licensee admitted the violations, paid $50,000 of the proposed $75,000 civil penalty, but took exception to the $25,000 escalation as inappropriate and not justified. The NRC staff's evaluation and conclusion regarding CP&L's response is as follows:
I. Restatement of Violations A. Technical Specification (TS) 3.0.4 states that entry into an OPERA-TIONAL CONDITION or other specified applicability state shall not be made unless the conditions of the Limiting Condition for Operation are met without reliance on provisions contained in the ACTION statements unless otherwise excepted.
TS 3.5.3.2 requires independent in Operatior.al low pressure Conditions coolant injection (LPCI1,)2, and 3 that twosubsystems residual heat removal (RHR) system be OPERABLE with each subsystem comprised of two pumps and an OPERABLE flow path capable o' taking suction from the suppression pool and transferring the wa'er to the -
TS 3.6.1.1 requires in Operational Conditions 1, 2 and 3 that primary containment integrity be maintained.
TS 3.6.1.3 requires in Operational Conditions 1, 2 and 3 that the primary containment air lock be OPERABLE with: (1) both doors closed except when the air lock is being used for normal transit entry and exit through the containment, then at least one air lock door s'ali be closed; and (2) an overall air lock leakage rate of less than or equal to 0.05 La at P a' 49 psi 9' Contrary to the above, at 4: 35 a.m. on April 26, 1988, Unit 2 entered Operational Condition 2 when the unit's mode switch was placed in the "startup/ hot standby" without RHR Division 11 being aligned for automatic LPCI initiation, without primary containment integrity being established, and with the primary containment air lock doors open.
B. Technical Specification 6.8.1.a requires that written procedures shall he implemented for applicable procedures recommended in Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33, November 1972. Appendix A requires operating procedures for the RHR system. Operating Proce-dure, OP-17, P.HR System Operating Procedure, Revision 76, irplements this requirerent and requires that the RHR heat exchanger outlet valve (E11-F003A) be either in the fully open or closed position during the shutdrwn cooling ccde.
Contrary to the above, OP-17 was not fully implemented on fiay 11, 1988, in that valve Ell-FCC3A was used in a throttled position durirg the shutdown cooling rode on Unit 2.
& M--aw,__ , , - ,
W3 cva?
Appendix
- c. TS 3.3.1 requires, as a minimum, that the reactor protection system (RPS) instrumentation channals shewn in TS Table 3.3.1-1 be operable.
Accordingly, notatien "b" of TS Table 3.3.1-1 requires th
- while in Operational Condition 5, "shorting links" be removed from de RPS circuitry prior to and during the time any control rod is withdrawn.
Contrary to the above, from 3:50 a.m. until 7:48 p.m., on March 8, 1988, with the reactor in Operational Condition 5, Unit 2 control red 10-39 was in the fully withdrawn position and the shorting links were not removed from the RPS circuitry.
II. Summary of Licensee Response The licensee, in its response, admits the violations and agrees that the violations, when viewed together, identify an issue of critical importance to the safe operation of the Brunswick Plant and meet the criteria for imposition of a civil penalty.
The licensee makes the following arguments relative to the 50% escalation of the base civil penalty:
- a. Escalation of the civil penalty for an event lacking serious safety significance is not justified, simply because the event has been collectively incorporated with two other events.
- b. The three events were collectively categorized as Severity Level llI.
Combination of such events allows the overall safety significance of similar issues to be put into proper perspective. However, once these events have been ccmbined to represent a more significant concern, they lose their unique identity. Thus, considerations for escalation of the penalty must be evaluated against the violation as a whole (i.e., the combination of the three violations) since that is what provides the justification for the base civil penalty.
- c. The three violations cited individually do not have serious safety significance and, therefore, if cited individually, would not warrant a civil penalty. Considerations for escalation were based solely on Violation B; not on the violation as a whole. Thus, the escalation of the civil penalty based on past performance is inappropriate.
!!!. NRC Staff's Evaluation of Licensee Response in asserting that the NRC staff is escalating the civil penalty based on one of the events cited in the Itutice, the licensee demonstrates that basis for escalation was misunderstcod. The civil penalty was escalated for past peor performance in the area of control of operations. This past poor performance was specifically illustrated by a January 1988 heatup event which was not cited in this flotice but was similar to the fiay 11, 1988 event which was d ied.
The tGC staff agrees with the licensee that escalation of a civil renalty rust be considered in tne ccotext of the eserall problen. However, the f4RC staff does not agree that w ch an overall evaluation was not rade in this case. ,
n ., .
v,% .~ ~ w Appendix: Based on an event from the recent.past the NRC staff concluded that escalation for past pone performance was appropriate given that the licensee had not implemented earlier broad corrective it.tions to prevent future problems similar to those cited in the Notice. Further, though only one example of past poor performance was specifically noted, other events such as the mispositioning of an RHR minimum flow valve in Fcbruary 1987 were considered when the f1RC staff decided to escalate the civil penalty for past poor performance.
The licensee's argument that the considerations for escalation were based solely on Violation B and not on the problem as a whole is incorrect.
While Violation B is most similar to the previous event, each of the three violations were symptomatic of lack of awareness and attitude to detail for control room activities. The safety significance of the Severity Level III problem was derived from indications that lack of awareness and attention to detail for control room activities was not an' isolated problem in the operations staff. The escalation for poor past performance was based on a prior example of this problem, e.g., lack of attention to datail on the part of the operations staff, and NRC staff's conclusion that CP&L did not learn from the first esent and aggressively pursue the underlying cause.
IV. NRC Staff's Conclusion The licensee did not provide a sufficient basis for reduction of the proposed $75,000 civil penalty. Therefore, the NRC staff concludes that the unpaid balance ($05,000) of the civil penalty should be impc.ed.
.,,s,_ -
OCT 171988 -
7
- o Carolina Pon r & Light Co.
DISTRIBUTION:
bcc w/ enc 1:
NRC Resident Inspector Documrot Control Desk PDR LPDR SECY CA JTaylor, OEDRO MErnst, RI!
JLieberman, OE JLuchman, OE LChandler, OGC Fingram, PA GJohnson, RM TMurley, NRR Enforcement Coordinators RI, RII, RIII, RIV, RV BHayes , 01 SConnelly, OIA EJordan, AE00 EA File OE File 2005-OE$ RI! OG OE-JL e erman 0
Icir JLuehman HE LCh J 10/ ll /88 10/ll 8 10/f88 10 g /88 1 /)118
.