ML20245G619

Order Imposing Civil Monetary Penalty in Amount of $50.000. Violations Noted:Licensee Did Not Have Wire Tested for Qualification or Documentation to Verify Qualification of Wire in Auditable Form

ML20245G619
Person / Time
Site:	Brunswick
Issue date:	06/26/1989
From:	Thompson H NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO)
To:	CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO.
Shared Package
ML20245G597	List: IR 05000324/1987022 ML20245G619
References
EA-87-165, NUDOCS 8906290196
Download: ML20245G619 (14)

Text

- - _ - _

- Ut'ITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION In the M6tter of ) Docket Nos. 50-325 and 50-324 Carolina Pcwer & Light Company ) License Nos. DPR-71 and DPR-62 (Brunswick Units 1 and 2) ) EA 87-165 ORDER IfiPOSING CIVIL MONETARY PENALTY I

Carolina Power and Light Company, Raleigh, llorth Carolina (licensee) is the holder of Operating License Nos. DPR-71 and DPR-62 (licenses) issued by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (Commission or NRC) on llovember 12, 1976 and i December 27, 1974, respectively. The licenses authorize the licensee to operate the Brunswick Units 1 and 2 in accordance with the conditions specified therein.

II NRC inspection of the licensee's activities under the licenses was conducted on July 6-10, 1987. The results of this inspection indicated that the licensee had not conducted its activities in full compliance with NkC requirements. A written Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty (Notice) was served-upon the licensee by letter dated May 5, 1988. The Notice stated the nature of _i the violations, the provisions of the NRC's requirements that the licensee had .

i l

violated, and the amount of the civil penalty proposed for the violations. The licensee responded to the Notice by letter dated July 1,1988. In its response, the licensee agreed that th'e deficiencies constituted violations of regulatory requirements. However, for a variety of reasons associated with the application .

of the NRC's " Modified Enforcement Policy Relating to 10 CFR 50.49" (Modified l l

Policy), the licensee contended that no civil penalty should be levied. I e906290196 890626 PDR ADOCK 05000324 PDC A

t.

i Ill A'fter consideration of the licensee's response and the statements of fact, )

explanations, and argument for mitigation contained therein, the Deputy Executive Director for Nuclear Materials Safety, Safeguards, and Operations Support (DEDS) has determined, as set forth in the Appendix to this Order, that the violations, )

with the exception of the violation involving Vulkene wire in a Unit 2 motor 3 I

operator, occurred as stated. The DEDS has also determined that the remaining violations still constitute a Category B problem under the Modified Policy and I that the penalty proposed for this problem in the Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of the Civil Penalty should be imposed.

IV In view of the foregoing and pursuant to Section 234 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2282, PL 96-295) and 10 CFR 2.205, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:

The licensee pay a civil penalty in the amount of Fifty Thousand Dollars ($50,000) within 30 days of the date of this Order, by check, draft, or money order, payable to the Treasurer of the United States and mailed to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, D.C.

20555.

m I w a- ,3, V

The. licensee may' request a hearing within 30 cays of the date of this Order. A request for a hearing shall be clearly marked as a " Request for en Enforcement .

Hearing" ano shall be addresseo to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, . ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, D.C. ,

20555, with copies to the Assistant General Counsel for Hearings and Enforcement,

,. at the same andress, the Regional Administrator, Region II, 101 Marietta Street, N.W., Atlanta, Georgia 30323, ano a copy to the NRC Resident Inspector at Brunswick.

If a hearing is, requested, the Commission will issue an Order designating the time and place of the hearing. If the licensee fails to request a hearing within 30 days'of the date of this Order, the provisions'to this Order shall be effec-tive without further proceedings. If payment has not been made by that time, the matter may be referred to the Attorney General for collection.

In the event the licensee requests a hearing as provided above, the issues to be considered at such hearing shell be:

(a) whether the licensee was in violation of the Commission's requirements as set forth in the Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty referenced in Section II as modified in Section III, and

, (b).whether,onthebasisofsuchaviolations,thisOrdershouldbesustained.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l/W Hu'h . Thompson, Jr. .

Delu Executive Dir et r fo Nuclear Materials Safety, eguards, and Operations Support Dateo at Rockville, Marylano this # cay of June 1989 t

4

l APPENDIX EVALUATIONS AND CONCLUSION Un May 5, 1988, the NRC issued a Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty (Notice) to Carolina Power and Light Company (CP&L or licensee) for deficiencies relating to the environmental qualification (EQ) of electrical equipment important to safety. On June 3, 1988, CP&L requested, and was granteo, a 30 day extension to respond to the Notice. By letter dated July 1,1988, CP&L responded to the Notice by stating that CP&L has reviewed the Notice and agrees that the violations occurred, with one exception. However, the licensee disagreed with the proposad civil penalty. Principally, the licensee argues that the NRC's " Modified Enforcement Policy Relating to 10 CFR 50.49" (Modified Policy) was misapplied. The NRC's evaluations and conclusions regarding CP&L's response follow. -

RESTATEMENT OF THE VIOLATIONS 10 CFR 50.49(d), (f) and (j), respectively, require, in part, that: (1) a list of electric equipment important to safety be prepared, and information concerning performance specifications, electrical characteristics and postulated environmen-tal conditions for this equipment be maintained in a qualification file, (e) each item of electric equipment important to safety shall be qualified by testing of, or experience with, identical or similar equipment, and qualifications shall include a supportin acceptab7e, and (3)g analysis a record of thetoqualification show that the equipment of the electricalto be qualified is equipment shall be maintained in a qualification file in an auditable form to permit verification that the required equipment is qualified and that the equipment meets the specifiea performance requirements under postulated environmental conditions.

Contrary to the above:

1. From November 30, 1985 to October 18, 1986, for Unit 1, and from June 15, 1986 to October 21, 1986, for Unit 2, the licensee did not have: (1) the Wooaward speed sensors for the High Pressure Coolant injection (HPCI) system on the list of electric e the speed sensors for HPCI turbines tested for qualified equipment),)(2)quipment qualification, and (3 documentation to verify qualification important of the speedto safety sensors in an auditable form.

2. From November 30, 1985 to September 1986, for Unit 2, the licensee did not have: (1) the Vulkene wire installed by the licensee, in valve actuators required to be environmentally qualified, on the Master List of qualified equipment, (2) the wire tested for qualification, and (3) documentation to verify qualification 0f the wire in an auditable form.

3. From Novenber 30, 1985, to July 1987, for Unit 1, the licensee did not have:

(1) the Whitney-Blake wire installed by the licensee, in valve actuators required to be environmentally qualified, on the Master List of qualified equipment, (2) the wire tested for qualification, and (3) documentation to verify qualificath of the wire in an auditable form.

l l'

Appendix (4) 1985 to November 21, 1986, for Units 1 and 2, the licensee From November did not have: (1) 30, the control relays for the Standby Gas Treatment (SBGT) skid on the Master List of qualified evipment, (2) the relays tested for qualification, ano (3) documentation to verify qualification of the releys in an auditable form.  !

(5) From November 30, 1985 to March 10, 1987, for Unit 1, the licensee did not have: (1) Kulka terminol blocks, for components requirec tc be environmen-tally qualified, on the !!oster List of qualified equipment, (2) the terminal block test for qualification, ano (3) documentation to verify qualification of the terminal block.

(6) From November 30, 1985 to July 7, 1987, for Unit 2, the licensee did not ,

have: (1) Cinch terminal blocks, for components required to be environmen-tally qualified, on the Master List of qualified equipment, (2) the terminal blocks tested for qualification, and (3) documentation to to verify qualifi-cation of the terminal blocks.

(7) From November 30, 1985 to March 11, 1987, for Unit 1, the licensee did not have: (1) unidentified teflon-type wire (used on the SBGT skid) on the Master List of qualified equipment, (2) the unidentified teflon-type wire tested for qualification, and (3) documentation to verify qualification of the unidentified teflon-type wire.

(8) From November 30, 1985 to July 1987, for Units 1 and 2, the licensee did not have: (1) documentation to verify that qualification of the HPCI condensate float switches was not required or (2) the HPCI condensate float switches on the Master List of qualified equipment with documentation of qualification in an auditable form.

(9) From November 30, 1985 to October 1987, for Units 1 and 2, the licensee did not have documentation to verify qualification of the following items used in Limitorque Motor Operators: Allen-Bradley nylon terminal blocks, GE phenolic terminal block, and electrical butt splices. Additionally, various motor operators containeo Collier PVC wire installed by the licensee for which qualification documentation was not available.

Summary of Licensee's Response CP&L contends that the Notice fails to establish that CP&L " clearly should have known" of the violations prior to November 30, 1985. CP&L maintains that the ,

Notice also (1) incorrectly alleges an EQ violation ir: the case of the Vulkene wire in the Unit 2 mutor operator, (2) incorrectly classifies the violations as significant, and (3) incorrectly groups the violations as an EQ Category B problem.

1. " Clearly Should Have Known" Test CP&L contends that the NRC staff failed to specifically analyze the factors set forth in the Modified Policy and has failed to describe in detail, for each alleged deficiency, the facts relied upon in concluding that CP&L

" clearly should have known" of the deficiencies. Additionally, CP&L stated that "A mere recitation of the conclusion that the licensee clearly should have known is not sufficient."

Appendix- '

CP&L states'it ir possible that NRC staff conducted a detailed inguiry. In this case,1however, the licensee concludes that the Notice provides only a cursory summary of the conclusions reached. Despite that conclusion, the licensee did provide arguments to support the position that CP&L should not clearly have known of these violations. The broadest of the arguments provided was the assertion that, based on previous NRC and NRC-sponsored reviews, CP&L had a reasonable basis to believe that compliance with 10 CFR 50.49.hao been achieved.

In summary, CP&L feels that the NRC failed to provide a legally sufficient factual basis. for each and every " clearly should have known" finding and, therefore, cannot conclude that CP&L " clearly should have known" of the violations. Thus, CP&L has been ' deprived of the opportunity to respono 1 meaningfully to the Notice. *

2. The Vulkene Wire in the Unit 2 Motor Operator Replaced Prior to Operation

,,, After the Deaoline CP&L contends that the violation involving the Vulkene wire should be withdrawn as the deficiency on Unit 2, although it existed. prior to the deadline, was corrected prior to Unit 2 operation after the deadline.

~

3. EQ Violations not Sufficiently Significant to Merit a Civil Penalty Under the Modified Policy CP&L contends.that violations 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 8, and part of violation 9 are in a category analogous to the category described in Part III of the Modified Policy, which addresses those violations of 10 CFR.50.49 found not to be sufficiently significant as to warrant a civil penalty under the Modified Policy. This contention is based on the predse that the only difference between the cited violations and the violations in the Modified Policy is that the cited violations were licensee-identified. CP&L maintains that it is inappropriate to apply escalated enforcement for each of the referenced licensee-identified violations. CP&L also maintains that, based on data available to the company, it was able to demonstrate that the components were qualified or qualifiable. CP&L also contends that the resolution to the deficiencies was performed in a time -

period commensurate with the time that a licensee would have had during an inspection to respond to an inspector.

Based on the above, CP&L contends that the referenced violations should be classified as not sufficiently significant for assessment of civil penalties.

'4. Categorization of the Violations l: As noted above, CP&L' argues that only violation 7 and part of violation 9 are significant deficiencies in accordance with the Modified Policy, affecting only two components in two systems. Therefore, the licensee contends that only two deficiencies should be considered in aggregate resulting in an EQ Category C problem for which full mitigation is warranted.

Appendix - 5. Other Reasons Why the Civil Penalty Should Not Be Imposed CP&L contends that the NRC is taking escalated enforcement for violations 1, 2, and 9 when the NRC is on record as saying that it would take no l' enforcement action for deficiencies involving Limitorque motor operator wiring qualification.

6. Summary l CP&L agrees that the deficiencies cited in the Notice with one exception constitute violations of 10 CFR 50.49. The licensee maintains, however, that due to the circumstances that apply to the specific deficiencies and following the guidance of the Modified Policy, no civil penalty should be levied for these EQ deficiencies.

i NRC's Evaluation o; Licensee's Response

1. NRC Evaluation of the " Clearly Should Have Known" Test Contrary to the licensee's arguments, the Notice and transmittal letter inued to CP&L contained all the necessary elements for assessing a civil penalty required by Section 234b of the Atomic Energy Act and as set forth in 10 CFR 2.205. The NRC staff, in the context of applying the Modified Policy, agrees that the licensee should be provided with sufficient information regarding the NRC staff's finding that the licensee " clearly should have known" of the unqualified equipment in order to provide the licensee with the opportunity to contest that finding. Several steps have been taken in this matter to provide the licensee with the appropriate information. First, the Modified Policy has been made available to the licensee. Second, the NRC inspection report, which has been sent to the licensee, and upon which the enforcement action is based, documents the NRC's findings from which the basis for the " clearly should have known" conclusion can be generally inferred. Third, an enforcement conference was held at which the inspection findings were discussed in depth. Finally, and most importantly, the NRC staff has articulated, in the cover letter which transmitted the Notice, the reasons why it believes the licensee

" clearly should have known" of the EQ deficiencies. In that letter, the NRC staff highlighted the significant facts supporting the staff's conclu-sion. The NRC staff disagrees that the cover letter's explanation must be exhaustive and include all the facts and factors considered. The NRC '

staff's approach is consistent with the approach taken under the General Enforcement Policy whenever the NRC discusses the determination of the severity level of a violation or application of the escalation and mitiga-tion factors. In such cases, the NRC staff provides the licensee wi'.

reasonable notice and a number of meaningful opportunities during tL enforcement process to respond.

In the NRC staff's view, the transmittal letter provided the licensee i with sufficient information regarding the " clearly should have known" l test. Based on the information provided, the licensee should have assessed l the items as shown below:

a. Woodward speed sensors for the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system: The licensee clearly should have known of this deficiency because of the information contained in a report provided to the

Appendix licensee in October 1985 by General Electric (f;EDC-31001-1) which specified that these sensors needed to be replaced.

b. Whitney Blake wire: The licensee clearly should have known of these deficiencies. The use of qualified wire in equipment that is important to safety is a basic requirement of any environmental qualification program. In this case, the licensee installed this type of wire in valve actuators which were important to safety without verifying the 4 wire's qualification and clearly its qualification should have been checked prior to use.

c. Standby Gas Treatment control relays and temperature switch leads:

As the licensee acknowledged in its response to the Notice, more '

thorough design interface control or field verification would have identified these problems. The question is whether these components were either so significant or obvious that the licensee should have

,. clearly recognized that they had not been accounted for in the environmental qualification record of Standby Gas Treatment System.

The NRC staff recognizes that the vendor, as well as the architect engineer, had extensive involvement in the development of the list of skid mounted subcomponents to be environmentally qualified. However, as discussed in the " Guidelines for Evaluating Environmental Quali-fication of Class IE Electrical Equipment in Operating Reactors" (Attachment 4 to NRC Bulletin 79-01B) reliance simply on a document such as an unsupported vendor certification is not considered adequate '

verification of qualification.

With respect to the control relays, the NRC staff concludes that these components are obviously necessary for the operation of the system and that should have warranted early consideration in ensuring that i the design control process and field verifications supported a complete record of environmental qualification. In the case of these components, it was not a question of 1a dequate qualification documentation, but the total lack of documentation. Clearly an knowledgeable individual with pertinent information on EQ issues should have discovered this problem because of the irportance of the components and the complete lack of a qualification record.

In the case of temperature switch leads, wire is such a basic component of any electrical system that it is clear that an adequate design verification program would have discovered the total lack of documen-tation for this wire which was used in a pcrtion of the electrical circuitry of the Standby Gas Treatment System. In addition, field verifications clearly shculd have recognized that the blue wire used on these temperature switches did not match the wire employed in I other similar applications and that in turn should have caused the l wire's environmental qualification record to be checked. j i

In neither of these cases is the NRC applying interpretations not i l

known prior to November 30, 1985.

d. Kulka terminal blocks, Cinch terminal blocks, and various other components in Limitorque operators: As discussed in the Notice and the flRC staff's June 13, 1988 letter regarding CP&L's response

s.

Appendix- to the Notice, the need to' qualify terminal blocks and wire has long been recognized as a necessary element of any EQ program. The NRC staff agrees with CP&L that it has never been required that a licensee perform inspection of every component in every vendor-supplied' assembly. However, the NRC does expect that a.certain number of assemblies would be inspected as part of the EQ walkdowns.

The scope of such' inspections would be determined by the-quality of qualification record available. Clearly in this case the qualification record for motor operators was not outstanding 01 ccmplete enough to warrant total reliance upon it without appropriate field verification.

Had such inspections been properly performed and the information in the NRC's generic issuances, such as Information Notice (IN) 83-72, been properly utilized, to determine the types of components of particular concern, CP&L would have clearly found these unqualified components. The position CP&L has taken relative to the information that was provided in IN 83-72 is overly narrow. The fact that the IN specifically cites the discovery of a Buchanan terminal block is not extremely important. The important issue raised by the Ih was the general one of unqualified components being found in equipment previously thought to be qualified.

The NRC staff has reviewed the letter Limitorque Corporation issued in response to IN 83-72 and found that the conclusion reached by Limitorque, in the last paragraph of the letter that licensees need take no action with respect to IN 83-72, is not supported by the body of the letter. Not only does the NRC staff reject the letter-as the basis for a licensee not pursuing the issues raised in the IN but the staff finds that the letter in its totality supports the NRC staff's " clearly should have known" finding. Consistent with that point, the NRC found that a number of licensees had acted upon the IN after reviewing the Limitorque letter.

The NRC staff was concerned that the Limitorque letter started out apparently intent on describing an isolated problem with terminal blocks at the Midland site and then abruptly went into discussing-the generic use of Buchanan 0824 terminal blocks in Westinghouse supplied equipment. The discussion of the Buchanan terminal blocks l

in Westinghouse equipment is, in the staff's view, significant for i both plants with such equipment and those without it. Most importantly, the Midland facility did not have Westinghouse supplied-equipment yet Limitorque chose to discuss this issue among a number of seemingly Midland specific issues. It is clear that the Buchanan terminal block information along with other discussion supplied in the letter about the Midland specific problems should have alerted licensees to the potential for environmental qualification deficiencies as the result of work performed not only by the vendor (Limitorque) but that performed by the nuclear steam supply system provider or the architect engineer. Therefore, it is clear that assurances from the vendor may not provide a sufficient basis for concluding that no problem existed with motor operators because changes to the motor operators may have been required or made by other organizations.

I

Appendix The letter then shifts back to problems characterized as Midland specific including a discussion of unidentifiable terminal blocks.

That discussion in the. Limitorque letter (#9 of the numbered items) does not provide adequate information to allow a knowledgeable reader to fully understand the situation including whether it was truly only a Mioland problem. First, given that the Limitorque qualification tests for motor operators used only certain types of terminal blocks, the letter did not provide a basis for assuring customers that these or other types of unidentifiable terminal blocks did not exist in motor operators at other plants. Second, the letter states that the unidentifiable terminal blocks were used in low voltage control circuits and were identified and found " suitable" for their appli-cation. The letter does not answer such questions as whether the '

terminal blocks were ultimately identified to be of the types that had previously been used in testing, whether they were " suitable" in all possible control circuit applications at Midland as well as at

- other plants, and if not of a type previously tested, how the suitability discussed in the letter equated to the record of qualification required by 10 CFR 50.49.

e. HPCI Condensate Float Switches: 10 CFR 50.49(b)(2) requi:es that nonsafety-related electrical equipment whose failure under postulated environmental conditions could prevent satisfactory accomplishment of various safety functions be qualified under those postulated environmental cenditions. Alternatively, the licensee can demonstrate by appropriate testing and analysis that the failure of the nonsafety-related electrical equipment would not prevent satisfactory accomplish-ment of the required safety functions of the HPCI system. In this case, it was clearly indicated on the design drawing that the HPCI float switches were powered from a safety-related power supply and as such, the failure of the float switches clearly could adversely affect the safety-related power supply. The failure of the power supply could have resulted in the HPCI system not performing its intended safety function, yet the licensee had neither qualified the float switches for the postulated environment nor provided an analysis that demonstrated their qualification was not required. Given the explicit nature of i 10 CFR 50.49(b)(2) and the fact that the switches were clearly indicated i on the drawing as being powered from a safety related power supply, a knowledgeable engineer with pertinent environmental qualification informtion clearly should have discovered the lack of qualification documentation for the float switches.

]

With regard to the licensee's contention that, based on various NRC and i NRC-sponsored review and audit activities conducted in the period 1980-1985, it had a reasonable basis to believe that the EQ program met applicable 1 regulatory requirements, three points should be made. First, the licensee has not provided specific information that demonstrates that any of the specific equipment discussed in the Notice was accepted as environmentally q qualified by the NRC. Second, the examination of progrom documents, which  ;

is largely what was accomplished by the NRC reviews and audits, could not verify proper program implementation. Such verification needed to be done by the licensee. Finally, during the period of 1980-1985, the NRC was periodically providing additional information ana guidance in the EQ area to the industry. Such information and guidance clearly could have affected j i

l

Appendix the validity of. earlier NRC acceptance of licensee programs. It was therefore incumbent upon the licensee to ascertain whether that was in' fact the case

~

for conclusions reached about its program. In summary, the NRC staff. finds that the licensee's_' reliance on NRC general programmatic reviews to serve as a basis for acceptance of the full EQ program, including implementation, was' unreasonable given the general nature of the NRC reviews and the potential that earlier conclusions reached by the NRC may have been invalidated by more current information provided to licensees by the NRC.

It is the hRC staff's conclusion that these examples meet the " clearly

. should have known" test and demonstrate a Category B problem under the Modified Policy.

2. NRC Evaluation of the use of Vulkene Wire The NRC concludes that the licensee is correct in its assertion that the o example involving the use et Vulkene wire in a Unit 2 motor operator .

should not be considered for enforcement under the Modifieo Policy. Given that the unit was shut down at the tine of the deadline and the ceficiency was corrected prior to operation after the deadline, usa of this example is inappropriate. It should be r,oted thet a similar problem was discovered on Unit I and that could have been included as an example in the proposed enforcement action.

3. _NRC Evaluation of Classification of Violation as Significant Part III of the Modified Policy is intended to address minor discrepancies and documentation problems in existing EQ files or records. For much of the equipment associated with the stated violations, the licensee did not have EQ files and construction of files for such equipment clearly consti-tutes more than correction of minor. file deficiencies. For the remaining equipment, N r which EQ files did exist, either additional testing and/or analysis bsyond that permitted by Part III of the Modified Policy was required in order to establish qualification or the licensee, after

. providing some arguments concerning qualifiability, chose to replace the equipment and never adequately demonstrated qualification. The NRC staff does agree that the licensee was able to subsequently demonstrate qualifi-cation of the Unit 1 SGBT control relays. However, the Unit I relay qualification was not made until well after identification and qualification was not demonstrated for the Unit 2 relays.

4. NRC Evaluation of CP&L's Position on the Categorization of the Problem As discussed Paragraph 3 above, the NRC staff concludes that the violations given in the Notice,.with the exception of the Vulkene wire, were properly evaluated as significant. Consequently, for these remaining violations, 4 classification as an EQ Category B problem is appropriate.

5. NRC Evaluation of CP&L's Position Regarding Limitorque Motor Operator Wiring Qualification CP&L references SECY 87-32 in an attempt to argue t";s point. The recommendation of this NRC staff document was that Je NRC staff should be l

i

1 Appendix allowed to exercise discretion and take no enforcement action for certain violations (Limitorque internal wiring). This position was subsequently i endorsed by the Commission.

CP&L also references the Memorandum from James Taylor, Director of the Office of Inspection and Enforcement, to Regional Administrators, dated April 10, 1987. This memorandum states: " Violations that involve deficiencies in the qualification of internal wiring for Limitorque motor operated valves should not be processed unless significant' programmatic weaknesses exist or inadequate licensee responses or corrective actions are identified."

It should first be noted that CP&L is attempting to claim that this position holds true for the speed sensor on the HPCI turbine (violation 1). This ,

violation is not related to the issue of the internal wiring and, as such, does not warrant discussion here. Given that the NRC staff's position relating to violation 2 has been modified as discussed above the discussion

> - below relates only to the internal wiring issue cited in violation 9.

SECY-87-32 states that discretion will be exercised for certain violations involving unqualified valve motor operator internal wiring. As noted by CP&L on page 6 of Attachment 1 to its July 1,1988 letter, discretion would be exercised due in large part to extenuating circumstances such as misleading and inadequ4te vendor-supplied documentation. In this case, as stated in the Notice, the NRC staff concludes that the licensee installed the wire. The licensee in responding to the violation did not dispute that statement, and therefore the use of enforcement dircretion as discussed in SECY-87-32 is inappropriate for this particular violation.

Conclusion The NRC staff has concluced that violation 2 should be withdrawn. The NRC l

staff further concludes that the remaining violations canstitute an EQ Category 8 problem and that they " clearly should have been known" ;o the licensee. No additional information has been provided that would altir the classification of the violation, or the imposition of the civil penalty. The Notice was issued in accordance with the regulatory requirements and the civil penalty was proposed ~~~

in accordance with the Modified Policy. Therefore, the NRC concludes the imposition of the $50,000 is proper.

-r g- - - , >

%- -.,4, nt '-

]

Q';3, E ' .;; .*,<

JUN 281989 '

i

^

k ~;-: -

Carolina Power & Light Co'.

DISTRIBUTION: /

PDR LPDR SECY

. CA-HThompson,.DEDS JMTaylor, DEDR:

JLieberman, OE SEbneter, RII:

LChandler, OGC~

JGoldberg, OGC-

. 7' TMurley, NRR'

JPartlow, NRR

' Enforcement

Coordinators-RI, RII, RIII, RIV, RV

' Resident Inspector FIngram, GPA/PA BHayes, 01-MMalsch, DIG EJordan,'AE0D JLuehman, OE DE:Chron OE:EA DCS

State of North Carolina GJohnson, RM 9hkSW .

),

O H. RA:RIIf GC iISSMg o ,, a #3 ' Li 0 .berman D ~7 JL man' SEbneter Hmompson 6//. /89 , 6/lt, /89 - 6//b/89 b/89 6 /89 w . s.f

__m____________ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _