ML20207E881
| ML20207E881 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | FitzPatrick  |
| Issue date: | 12/19/1986 |
| From: | POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (NEW YORK |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20207E827 | List: |
| References | |
| RTR-NUREG-0737, RTR-NUREG-737, TASK-2.E.4.2, TASK-2.K.3.28, TASK-TM NUDOCS 8701050183 | |
| Download: ML20207E881 (8) | |
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L ATTACHMENT I TO JPN-86 61
=
C Proposed Changes to the Technical Specifications Regarding Containment Isolation Valves (JPTS-66-017)
New York Power Authority James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant Docket No. 50-333 DPR-59 8701050183 861219 PDR ADOCK 05000333 p
JAFNPP Table 3.7-1 (Cont'd)
PROCESS PIPELINE PENETRATING PRIMARY CONTAlletENT
.(Numbers in parentheses are keyed to numbers on following pages: signal codes are listed on following pages)
Power Location Power Closing Drywell Valve Type to Open Ref. to to Close Isolation Time Normal Remarks and Line Isolated Penetration (6)
(5) (6)
Group Drywell (5) (6)
Signal (7)
Status Exceptions X-31Ac 1 Mini-purgeto recirc pump X-31Bc SO Valve Ac C
Outside Spring B,F RM Not applicat,le Open Mini-purge to X-31Ac recirc pump X-31Bc Check Process C
Inside Process Rev. flow Not applicable Open RHR Reactor Shut-down Cooling supply X-12 M0 Gate De A
Dutside De A,U,F,RM 38 Sec Closed RHR Reactor Shut-down Cooling supply X-12 M0 Gate Ac A
Inside Ac A,U,F,RM 38 Sec Closed RHR to Suppression Throttling Type Spray Header X-211 A,8 M0 Globe
. Ac B
Outside Ac G S.RM 10 Sec Closed Valve Note (2)
RHR - Containment spray X-39A,B M0 Gate Ac B
Outside Ac G S.RM 10 Sec Closed Note (2)
RHR - Containment Spray X-39A,B M0 Gate Ac B
Outside Ac G,5,RM 10 Sec Closed Note (2)
RHR - Reactor Head Spray X-17 M0 Gate Ac A
Inside Ac A,U,F RM 20 Sec Closed RHR - Reactor Head Spray X-17 M0 Gate De A
Outside Dc A,U.F.RM 20 Sec Closed RHR to Suppression Throttling Type Pool X-210A,B M0 Globe Ac B
Outside Ac G,RM 70 Sec Closed Valve Note (2)'
RHR - LPCI to Reactor X-13A,B M0 Gate Ac A
Outside Ac RM 120 Sec Closed Note (10)
RHR - LPCI to Throttling Type RIactor X-13A,B M0 Globe Ac A
Dutside Ac RM 90 Sec Open Valve Note (10)
RHR - LPCI to Testable check Raactor X-134,8 A0 Check A
Inside Process Rey, flow Not applicable Closed Valve (3,16)
RHR pump suction from suppression pool X-225A,B MO Gate Ac B
Outside Ac RM Not applicable Open AmendmentNo.pI,[
i i
JAFNPP Tabla 3.7-1 (C%t'd)
PROCESS PIPELINE PENETRATING PRIMARY CONTAINMENT (Numbers in parentheses are keyed to numbers on following pages: signal codes are listed on following pages) 4 Power Location Power Closing Drywell Valve Type to Open Ref. to to Cicse Isolation Time Norwal Recarks and Line Isolated Penetration (6)
(5) (6)
Group Drywell (5) (6)
Signal (7)
Status Exceptions Star.dby Liquid A
Outside Process Rev, flow Not applicable Closed Control X-42 Check Standby Liquid A
Inside Process Rev. flow Not applicable Closed C ntrol X-42 Check Reactor Water Clean-up from Reactor X-14 M0 Gate Ac A
Inside Ac A J.RM 30 Sec Open R; actor Water Clean-up from Reactor X-14 M0 Gate Dc A
Dutside Dc A.V,J,RM 30 Sec Open Reactor Water from Ruct:r Warm-up X-14 M0 Gate De A
Outside Dc A,V Y,J.RM 10 Sec Closed l Reactor Water 4
I Cleanup Return X-9A A0 Globe Air and Ac A
Outside Spring B.J.RM Not applicable Open RCIC - Turbine Steam Supply X-10 M0 Gate Ac A
Inside Ac K,RM 15 Sec Open
) Opens on Sig B,
) Line Break Sig K RCIC - Turbine
) overrides to Steam Supply X-10 M0 Gate De A
Outside De K,RM 15 Sec Open
) close valves RCIC - Turbine Closed Exhaust X-212 Che-k Fwd flow B
Outside Process Rev. flow RCIC - Minimurt Pump Flow X-210A MO Globe De B
Outside De K,RM 5 Sec Closed RCIC - Puup Discharge X-9A M0 Gate De B
Outside De RM Not applicable Closed RHR to Radwaste X-225A M0 Gate Ac B
Outside Ac A.F RM 24 Sec Closed RHR to Radwaste X-225A M0 Gate De B
Outside Dc A.F.RM 24 Sec Closed RCIC - Vacuum i
Pump Discharge X-226 Check Fwd flow B
Outside Proces2 Rey, flow Closed RCIC - Pump Suction X-224 M0 Gate De B
Outside Dc RM Not appitcable Closed RCIC - Pump Suction X-224 M0 Gate De B
Outside Dc RM Not applicable Closed Amendment No. [,[
200
g, JAFNPP Tabla 3.7-1 (Cont'd)
PROCESS PIPELIE PENETRATING PRIMARY CONTAIMENT (Numbers in parentheses are, keyed to numbers on following pages: signal codes are listed on following pages)
Power Location Power Closing Drywell Valve Type to Open Ref. to to Close Isolation Time Nonnal Remarks and Line Isolated Penetration (6)
(5) (6)
Group Drywell (5) (6)
Signal (7)
Status Exceptions C:re Spray Minimum Pump Flow X-210A,B MO Gate Ac 8
Outside Ac IIM Not applicable Closed Core Spray to React:r X-16A,8 M0 Gate
. Ac A
Dutside Ac RM Not applicable Open Note (10)
Core Spray to RIact:r X-16A,B MO Gate Ac A
Outside Ac RM Not applicable Closed Note (10)
C:re Spray to Testable Check React:r X-16A,8 A0 Check (3)
A Inside Note (3)
Rev. flow Not applicable Closed Valve Note (3,16)
Care Spray Test to Suppression Pool X-210A,B N0 Globe Ac B
Outside Ac G,RM 45 Sec Closed C:re Spray Pump Suction X-227A,B M0 Gate Ac 8
Outside Ac RM Not Applicable Open t
Drywell Equipment Drain Sump Discharge X-19 M0 Plug Ac B
Inside Ac A.F.RM 30 Sec Open Drywell Equipment Drain Sump Discharge X-19 A0 Plug Afr/Ac B
Outside Spring A F,RM Not Applicable Closed (17)
I Drywell Floor Drain j
Sump Discharge X-18 M0 Plug Ac B
Inside Ac A,F,RM 30 Sec Open Drywell Floor Drain Sump Discharge X-18 A0 Plug Afr/Ac B
Outside Spring A F.RM Not Applicable Open l
Traveling Incore Explosive One valve Probe X-35A B.C.D Shear De A
Outside De RM Not Applicable Open on each line One valve on Traveling Incore each line l
Probe X-35A,B.C.D 50 Ball Ac A
Outside Ac A.F.RM Not Applicable Open Note (14) 1TravelingIncore Probe Purge X-35B SO Valve Ac A
Outside Spring A.F.RM Not Applicable Closed 1
i HPCI - Turbire Steam Supply X-11 M0 Gate Ac A
Inside Ac L.RM 20 Sec Open
) Signal "G" opens
}
} valve.
) Signal "L" i
HPCI - Turbine Stzam Supply X-ll M0 Gate De A
Outside De L,RM 20 Sec Closed ) overrides and
) closes valve.
i Amendment No.((
201 1
JAFNPP Tabla 3.7-1 (Cont'd)
PROCESS PIPELINE PENETRATING PRIMARY CONTAllMENT (Numbers in parentheses are keyed to numbers on following pages: signal codes are listed on following pages)
Power Location Power Closing Drywell Valve Type to Open Ref. to to Close Iso 14 tion Time Nomal Remarks and Line Isolated Penetration (6)
(5) (6)
Group Drywell (5) (6)
Signal (7)
Stnus Exceptions closes on Rev.
HPCI - Turbine flow or low Exhaust X-214 Check Fwd flow B
Outside Process Rev. flow Not applicable Open exhaust pressure HPCI - Turbine Exhaust X-214 Chack Fwd flow B
Outside Process Rev flow Not applicable Open HPCI - Puup Suction X-226 M0 Gate De B
Outside Dc L,RM Not applicable Closed HPCI - Pump Suction X-226 MD Gate Oc B
Outside Dc L,RM Not applicable Closed HPCI - Pump Discharge X-98 M0 Gate Dc B
Outside Dc RM Not applicable Closed HPCI - Turbiw Exhaust Drais X-222 Stop Check Fwd flow B
Outside Process Rev. flow Not applicable Closed HPCI - Minim m Pump Flow X-210B Check Fwd flow B
Outside Process Rev flow Not applicable Closed HPCI - Minism Pump Flow X-210B M0 Globe De B
Outside De
..RM 10 Sec Closed DRYWELL ATMOSPHERIC CONTROL AND SERVICES Service Air to Drywell X-21 Check Process C
Inside Process Rev. flow Not applicable Closed Service Air to Net applicable Closed Drywell X-21 Hand Gate Hand C
Outside Hand Instrument Air to Drywell X-22 Check Process C
Inside Process Rev. flow Not applicable Open Instrument Air to Fall in open i Drywell X-22 50 Valve Spring C
Outside Ac RM Not applicable Open position to ensure adequate pneumatic supply Breathing Air to l
Drywell X-61 Check Process C
Inside Process Rev. flow Not applicable Closed Breathing Air to Not applicable Closed Drywell X-61 Hand Gate Hand C
Outside Hand Drywell Purge Inlet X-25, X-71 A0 Butterfly Air /Ac B
Outside Spring F.A,Z,RM 5 sec Closed F.A,Z,RM S sec Closed Drywell Purge Inlet X-25, X-71 A0 Butterfly Af r/Ac B
Outside Spring b
X-26A,B t.0 Butterfly Air /Ac B
Outside Spring F.A 2,RM 5 see Closed Amendment No. % M J#
202
JAFNPP Ti b12 3.7-1 (Cont'd)
PROCESS PIPELINE PENETRATING PRIMARY CONTAllfqENT (Numbers in parentheses are keyed to numbers on following pages: signal codes are listed on following pages) i Power Location Power Closing Drywell Valve Type to Open Ref. to to Close Isolation Time Normal Remarts and Line Isolated Penetration (6)
(5) (6)
Group Drywell (5) (6)
Signal (7)
Status Exceptions CAD Supply ts
) Fail in open I,Istrument Air to
) position to Drywell X-57c SO Valve Spring C
Outside Ac RM Not applicable Open
) ensure adequate
) pneumatic supply CAD Supply t2 Instrument Air to Drywell X-57c Check Process C
Inside Process Rev. flow Not applicable Closed i
l 1
)
1 1
1 I
j Amendment No. g g 205 e
l
]
ATTACHMENT II TO JPN-86-61 New York Power Authority James A.
FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant Docket No. 50-333 DPR-59 Safety Evaluation for Technical Soecification Chances Related to Containment Isolation Valves (JPTS-86-017 )
I.
Description of Chances This application for amendment proposes to revise Table 3.7-1,
" Process Piping Penetrating Primary Containment" of the James A. FitzPatrick Technical Specifications, to reflect modifications that will be completed during the refueling outage scheduled to begin in January 1987.
Five of the seven pages (199, 200, 201, 202 and 205) that make up Table 3.7-1 will be revised as part of this propoced amendment.
Specifically, the following six changes to Table 3.7-1 are proposed:
[a.] On page 199, the table entry associated with the
" Mini-purge to recirc pump" line (Drywell penetrations X-31Ac and X-31Bc) is changed as follows: Valve Type is changed from " Check" to "SO Valve"; Power to Open is changed from
" Process" to "Ac"; Group is unchanged; Location ref. to Drywell is unchanged; Power to Close is changed from " Process" to " Spring"; and Isolation Signal is changed from "Rev. Flow" to "B, F,
RM."
[b.] On page 200, the table entry associated with
" Reactor Water Cleanup Return" line (Drywell penetration X-9A), is changed as follows: Valve Type is changed from " Check" to "AO Globe"; Power to Open is changed from " " to " Air and Ac";
Group is unchanged; Location ref.
to Drywell is unchanged; Power to Close is changed from
" Process" to " Spring"; Isolation Signal is changed from "Rev. flow" to "A, J,
RM.".,
e 1
[c.] On page 201, the table entry associated with
" Traveling Incore Probe Purge" line (Drywell penetration X-,5B), is changed as follows: Valve Type is changed from " Check" to "SO Valve"; Power to Open is changed from " Fwd. Flow" to "Ac";
Group is unchanged; Location ref. to Drywell is unchanged; Power to Close is changed from
" Process" to " Spring"; Isolation Signal is changed from "Rev. flow" to "A, F,
RM."
[d.] On page 202, the table entry associated with
" Instrument Air to Drywell" line (Drywell penetetration X-22), is changed as follows: Valve Type is changed from " Hand Gate" to "SO Valve";
Power to Open is changed from " Hand" to " Spring";
Group is unchanged; Power to Close is changed from " Hand" to "Ac"; Isolation Signal is changed from " " to "RM"; and " Fail in open position to ensure adequate pneumatic supply." has been added in the Remarks and Exceptions column.
[e.] On page 205, a new table entry " CAD Supply to Instrument Air to Drywell," (Drywell penetration X-57c) has been added.
Valve Type is "SO Valve";
Open to Close is " Spring"; Group is "C"; Location Ref. to Drywell" is "Outside"; Power to Close is "Ac"; Isolation Signal is "RM"; Closing Time in "Not Applicable"; Normal Status is "Open"; and
" Fail in open position to ensure adequate pneumatic supply." has been added in the Remarks and Exceptions column.
[f.] On page 205, a new table entry " CAD Supply to Instrument Air to Drywell," (Drywell penetration X-57c) has been added.
Valve Type is " Check";
Power to Close is " Process"; Group is "C";
Location Rel, to Drywell is "Inside"; Power to Close is " Process"; Isolation Signal is "Rev.
Flow"; Closing Time is "Not Applicable"; and Normal Status is " Closed".
II. Purnose of the Pronosed Chances These changes are required to reflect plant modifications that will be completed during the Reload 7/ Cycle 8 refueling outage scheduled to start in January 2
1987.
These modifications are being made to fully implement the requirements of NUREG-0737 Items II.K.3.28 (ADS Accumulator Qualificatiens) and II.E.4.2 (Containment Isolation Dependability) at FitzPatrick.
Modifications to the ADS system will improve the system's long-term operability by providing a second, alternate source of pneumatic power to the ADS accumulators.
The modifications to the Reactor Water Clean-Up System, Traveling Incore Probe, and Recirculation Pump Mini-Purge Line will bring these systems into compliance with the applicable requirements of Appendix A to 10 CFR 50, General Design Criteria 54, 55, 56 and 57.
Containment Isolation Dependability (Item II.E.4.2)
The Authority completed a comprehensive review of the containment isolation dependability of the FitzPatrick plant in response to NUREG-0737 Item II.E.4.2, " Containment Isolation Dependability."
Item II.E.4.2 refers to Appendix A to 10 CFR 50 (General Design Criteria, GDC) for acceptance criteria.
In Reference 4, the results of this review were submitted to the NRC and the Authority committed to add automatic isolation valves, with diverse actuation signals, to three systems.
As a result, outboard containment isolation valves for the Reactor Water Clean-Up (RWCU),
Traveling Incore Probes (TIP), and Recirculation Pump Mini-Purge (RPMP) systems are being added, modified or l
replaced.
None of these systems were designated essential systems in Reference 1.
Technical specification changes [a], [b] and [c] are associated with this NUREG-0737 item.
Reference 1 defined the criteria used to classify a system as essential.
Essential systems are "...those systems which are required for, or could be of direct aid in mitigating the consequences of a postulated accident.
Systems designated in the FSAR as Engineered Safeguard, Nuclear Safety of special safety systems are essential since they have post-accident functions and are required for accident mitigation."
The Reactor Water Clean-Up, Traveling Incore Probe and Recirculation Pump Mini-Purge lines are non-essential because their operation is either unnecessary or..
undesirable in the event of an accident.
The paragraphs below summarize each of these modifications.
Containment Isolation DeDendability - RWCU As described in Reference 1, the present design of the RWCU does not comply with GDC 55 and the isolation valves do not receive a diverse isolation signal.
A new air-operated globe valve (12AOV-001) will be installed in the RWCU return line to the Feedwater System (change [b] described above).
The valve will fail-closed on loss of either instrument air or control power.
The valve will close (isolate) using the existing RWCU system isolation signals.
(The RWCU isolates on either low reactor water level, or RWCU high ambient temperature.
The high ambient temperature signal will isolate the RWCU on an RWCU line break.)
Valve position indication and remote manual control will both be provided in the Control Room for this valve.
Containment Isolation DeDendability - TIP System As described in Reference 1, the TIP system does not comply with GDC 57 since the nitrogen purge line of the TIP system has only one check valve outside containment.
(The TIP system includes in-core probes enclosed in dry tubes.
These dry tubes are not open to the containment atmosphere, nor do they contain reactor coolant.
Therefore, GDC 57 applies.)
A new solenoid-operated valve (27SOV-001) will be added upstream of the existing check valve in the Nitrogen Purge Line to the TIP system (change [c)).
27SOV-001 is supplied Emergency AC Power from the blue division and will fail closed on a loss of control power.
27SOV-001 will close on either a low reactor water level or high-drywell l
pressure isolation signals from the Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS).
The existing check valve will be replaced with a hand-operated globe valve.
(Both valves are located in the TIP room, outside containment, near penetration X-35E.)
Both valve position Indication and remote manual control will be provided on the Containment Air Dilution (CAD) \\
1
system panel in the Relay Room since nitrogen is supplied to the purge line from the CAD system.
Containment Inolation DeDendability - Mini Purgg The Recirculation Pump Mini-Purge lines are equipped with simple check valves, both inside and outside containment.
While this design complies with GDC 54, it does not comply with GDC 55 and the requirements for a diverse isolation signal.
This was described in Reference 1.
Two new solenoid valves (02-2SOV-001 and 02-2SOV-002) will be added to the reactor coolant recirculation pump mini-purge lines (change [a], as described above).
The two new solenoid valves will be supplied with Emergency AC Power and will close on a loss of control power.
Red division power will be supplied to the valve associated with recirculation pump A; blue division power will be supplied to the B pump valve.
These valves will close (isolate) automatically on receipt of either a low-low-low reactor water level, or a high drywell pressure signal.
The use of the triple-low (1.
e.
low-low-low) reactor water level signal will preclude the spurious isolation of these new valves during plant trips.
Valve position indication and remote manual control will both be provided in the Control Room for this valve.
The check valves inside containment will also be replaced to reduce leakage.
ADS Accumulator Qualifications (Item II.K.3.28)
In Reference 3, the Authority committed to upgrade the FitzPatrick "... ADS accumulator system to remain functional for periods up to one hundred days following a postulated accident.
This will be accomplished either by providing an environmentally and seismically qualified back-up system to recharge the accumulators for long-term operation or by.
providing redundant, safety-related pneumatic sources to actuate the ADS valves."
Technical specification changes
[d], [e] and [f] are associated with this NUREG-0737 item.
Nitrogen (or air when an inerted containment
.g_
atmosphere is not required) is supplied to the ADS accumulators through a ring header inside the drywell.
A single line penetrates containment to supply this pneumatic power to the ADS relief valves.
As part of modifications to improve the long-term operability of the FitzPatrick ADS, a second seismically qualified nitrogen supply line, redundant to the existing line, will be added.
When this addition is complete, the ADS ring header can be supplied nitrogen through either supply line.
Two new containment isolation valves will be included as part of a second ADS nitrogen supply line penetration (changes [e] and [f]).
In addition, the hand-operated containment isolation valve on the existing nitrogen supply line will be replaced with a remote manual solenoid-operated valve (change [d]).
The nitrogen supply lines for the ADS accumulators have been classified as essential using the criteria of Reference 1 because they could be of direct aid in mitigating the consequences of a postulated accident.
III. Impact of the Proposed Channes The plant modifications associated with the proposed changes will improve the long-term operability of the FitzPatrick Automatic Depressurization System through the addition of a second pneumatic power supply line.
The ability to isolate containment will be improved through the addition of new isolation valves, or the replacement of existing isolation valves, in the RWCU, TIP, RPMP and ADS systems.
These changes do not introduce new failure modes into these systems.
Three of the six changes proposed by this amendment involves the replacement of check valves with power-operated valves.
(Solenoid-or air-operated valves will replace check valves in the mini-purge to Recirculation Pump, TIP purge, and RWCU lines.)
Two of the remaining valves are required to isolate the new ADS pneumatic supply line.
The remaining three changes involve upgrades to the Automatic Depressurization System.
Loss of pneumatic power I
to the ADS (caused by either the spurious closing of an isolation valve or a line break) would not result in a loss of ability to depressurize the reactor using ADS.
Failure of the new solenoid-operated ADS nitrogen supply isolation valves, in either the open or closed position, will not introduce a new or different kind of accident because each ADS valve has an accumulator and redundant check valves.
A fail-open design ensures that the failure (i. e. opening) of these valves will not prevent the maintenance or reestablishment of pressure in the accumulators.
Each ADS valve is equipped with an accumulator, sized to store sufficient energy for two to five actuations of its associated ADS valve.
Appendix A to 10 CFR 50, General Design Criteria (GDC) 54, 55, 56, and 57 describe design features to help assure containment isolation dependability.
FitzPatrick was constructed and licensed before Appendix A became effective.
The addition (or replacement) of the valves associated with modifications [a], [b] and [c] will upgrade portions of FitzPatrick to GDC regulatory criteria.
The modifications associated with these changes to the Technical Specifications are being made to implement NUREG-0737 Items II.K.3.28 (" Qualifications of ADS Accumulator") and II.E.4.2 (" Containment Isolation Dependability") at the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant.
IV. Evaluation of SiantLicant Hazards Considerations Operation of the FitzPatrick plant in accordance with the proposed amendment would not involve significant hazards considerations, as defined by 10 CFR 50.92, since it does not:
(1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
These modifications were designed so that the active failure of any one valve will not increase the consequences of an accident or change the consequences of an accident previously analyzed in the FSAR.
As detailed above, these modifications will improve containment isolation dependabilty, and operability of the ADS.
The Reactor' Water Clean Up, Traveling Incore Probes and Recirculation Pump Mini-Purge Line are.
i non-essential and are automatically isolated in the event of an accident.
Therefore, accident analyses assume that these systems are not available.
The ADS is an essential system that 1
can be used to backup the HPCI system.
The ADS modifications will improve system reliability and long-term operability by adding a second, redundant nitrogen supply line.
(2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated because no new systems are introduced by these modifications and the active failure of single isolation valves in both essential and non-essential systems was considered during the design of these systems.
4 1
(3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
These modifications were designed to enhance safety by improving the system's long-term operability.
A second, pneumatic power line to the ADS ~ ring header will improve the-system's redundancy and reliability.
The modifications to the Reactor Water Clean-Up System, Traveling Incore Probe, and Recirculation.
4 Pump Mini-Purge Line will bring these systems into compliance with the appliciable requirements j
of Appendix A to 10 CFR 50, General Design Criteria 54, 55, 56 and 57, thereby improving the ability to isolate the primary containment.
l V. Imolementation of the Chances j
Implementation of these changes, as proposed, will not impact the ALARA or Fire Protection Programs at j
FitzPatrick, nor will the changes impact the environment.
VI. Conclusion The inccrportion of these changes:
- a. will not change the probability nor the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report; y J
- b. will not increase the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report;
- c. will not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any technical specification;
- d. does not constitute an unreviewed safety question as defined in 10 CFR 50.59; and e.
involves no significant hazards consideration, as defined in 10 CFR 50.92.
VII. References and Notes 1.
NYPA letter, J.
P. Bayne to T. A.
Ippolito, dated January 7,
1982 (JPN-82-005) regarding Containment Isolation Dependability, NUREG-0737, Item II.E.4.2.
Submits containment isolation study.
2.
NYPA letter, J.
P.
Bayne to D.
B. Vassallo, dated April 1, 1985 (JPN-85-024) regarding NUREG-0737 Item II.K.3.28, Qualification of Accumulators on Automatic Depressurization System Valves.
3.
NYPA letter, J.
P.
Bayne to D.
B. Vassallo, dated September 4,
1984 (JPN-84-058) regarding qualification of ADS accumulators.
Responds to NRC July 16, 1984 request for information.
4.
NRC letter, D.
B. Vassallo to J.
C.
Brons, dated July 24, 1985 regarding NUREG-0737 Item II.K.3.28.
This letter concludes that "the requirements of Item II.K.3.28 have been satisfactorily addressed and that qualification of ADS accumulators at FitzPatrick has been verified."
Includes a copy of NRC Safety Evaluation dated July 24, 1985..
-