Text

Proposed Tech Specs Clarifying Svc Water Pump Operability Requirements to Better Reflect Plant Design & Provide Operational Flexibility
	ML20205T255
Person / Time
Site:	Brunswick
Issue date:	11/03/1988
From:	; CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	;
Shared Package
ML20205T239	List: ML20205T236; ML20205T255;
References
	NUDOCS 8811140186
	Download: ML20205T255 (24)
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ENCLOSURE 5 BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT, UNIT 1 NRC DOCKET 50-325 OPERATING LICENSE DPR-71 REQUEST FOR LICENSE AMENDMENT SERVICE WATER SYSTEM TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PAGES E

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nG11140186{,.,gigg4 o3 L31 fD ADOCK g

o u t a ss eee i r

(BSEP-A-57)

INDEX LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SECTION PACE 3/4.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS (Continued) 3/4.6.2 Dr?RESSURIZATION AND COOLING SYSTEMS Suppression Pool........................................

3/4 6-9 Suppression Pool Cooling................................

3/4 6-11 3/4.6.3 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES....................

3/4 6-12 3/4.6.4 VACUUM RELIEF Dryvell - Suppression Chamber Vacuum Breakers...........

3/4 6-18 Suppression Pool - Reactor Building Vac'aum Breakers.....

3/4 6-20 3/4.6.5 SECONDARY CONTAINHENT Secondary Containment Integrity.........................

3'4 6-21 Secondary Containment Automatic Isolation Dampers.......

3/4 6-22 3/4.6.6 CONTAINMENT ATMOSPHERE CONTROL Standby 4 s Trestment System............................

3/4 6-25 Containment Atmosphere Dilution System..................

3/4 6-28 0xygen Concentration....................................

3/4 6-29 Cas Analyzer Systems....................................

3/4 6-30 3/4.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3/4.7.1 SERVICE WATER SYSTEMS Residual Heat Removal Service Water System..............

3/4 7-1 Service Water System - Operation with one or Both Units.

3/4 7-2 Service Water System - Shutdown of Both Units...........

3/4 7-2b 3/4.7.2 CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY FILTRATION SYSTEM................

3/4 7-3 3/4.7.3 FLOOD PROTECTION........................................

3/4 7-6 i

hRUNSWICK - UNIT 1 VII Amendment No.

(BSEP-1-57)

INDEX BASES i

SECTION PACE I

3/4.7 PLANT SYSTEMS (Continued) 3/4.7.3 FLOOD PROTECTION.......................................

B 3/4 7-2 3/4.7.4 REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING SYSTEM..................

B 3/4 7-2 3/4.7.5 HYDRAUIIC SNUBBERS.....................................

B 3/4 7-2 3/4.7.6 SZALED SOURCE CONTAMINATION............................

B 3/4 7-4 3/4.7.7 FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEMS...............................

B 3/4 7-5 3/4.7.8 FIRE BARRIER PEN 8TRATIONS..............................

B 3/4 7-5 3/4.8 ELECTRICAL Po'.ER SYSTEMS..................................

B/3/4 8-1 l

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3/4.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS 3/4.9.1 REACTOR H0DE SWITCH....................................

B 3/4 9-1 3/4.9.2 INSTRUMENTATION........................................

B 3/4 9-1 3/4.9.3 CONTROL ROD P0SITION..................................

B 3/4 9-1 i

3/4.9.4 DECAY TIME.............,...............................

B 3/4 9-1 3/4.9.5 COMMUNICATIONS.........................................

B 3/4 9-1 j

1/4.9.6 CRANE AND HOIST OPERABILITY............................

B 3/4 9-2 3/4.9.7 CRAN E TRAVEL-S PENT FUEL STORACE P00L...................

B 3/4 9-2 j

3/4.9.8 WATER LEVEL-REACTOR VESSEL and i

3/4.9.9 WATER LEVEL-REACTOR FUEL STORAbt POOL..................

J 3/4 9-2 3/4.9.10 CO NT R O L R O D R EM0VA L....................................

B 3/4 9-2 t

L 3/4.10 SPECIAL TEST EXCEPTIONS 3/4.10.1 PRIMARY CONTA!NNENT INTECRITY..........................

B 3/4 10-1 i

3/4.10.2 IOD SEQUENCE CONTROL SYSTEM............................

5 3/4 10-1 l

t 3/4.10.J

. LUTDOWN MARCI N DEMON STRAT ION S.........................

B 3/4 10-1 3/4.10.4 (CIRCULATION L00PS....................................

B 3/4 10-1 3/4.10.5 P LA N T S E R V I C E W A T E R....................................

B 3/4 10-1 i

BRUNSWICK - UNIT 1 XII Amendment No.

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(BSEP-1-57)

Pt.Adf SYSTEMS r

SERVICE WATER SYSTEM - OPERATION WL.1 ONE OR BOT.. UNITS LIMITINC CONDITION FOR OPERATION t

3.7.1.2.1 The service water system nuclear header shall be OPERABLE with at least the following four OPERABLE service water pumpst 4.

Two OPERABLE nuclear service water pursps per site which are capable of supplying service water to the diesel generators and are each i

powered from a different division and, in addition f

2.

Two OPERABLE Unit 1 service water pumps, conventional or nuclear, which are capable of supplying service water to the nuclear header and are each powered from a different division.

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APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, 3, 4* and 5*.

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I ACTION:

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In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1, 2, or 3:

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With only one OPERABLE nuclear service water pump per site capable of supplying service water to the diesel generators, restore at least two nuclear service eater pumps per site t

powered from different divisions to OPERABLE status within

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72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or 1,e in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and COLD SHUTDOWN the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

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2.

With only one OPERABLE Unit 1 service water pump, conventional

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or nuc4 car, capable of supplying the service water system j

i nuclear header (in addition to the two nuclear service water j

pumps per site), restore at least two service water pumps l

powered f rom dif ferent divisions to OPERABLE status within r

7 days or be in HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and COLD SHUTD1WN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

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b.

In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 4* or 5*

1.

With only one OPERABLE nuclear service water pump per site l

capable of supplying service water to the diesel generators,

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restore at least two nut. lear service water pumps per site

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powered from different divisions to OPERABLE status within 7 days or declare the diesel generators inoperable and take the ACTION required by Specification 3.8.1.2.

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2.

With only one OPERABLE Unit I service water pump, conventional or nuclear, capable of supplying the service water nuclear header (in addition to the two nuclear service water pumps per mite), re: store at least two service water pumps powered from

'Mith Unit 2 in OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1, 2, or 3.

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I BRUNSWICK - UNIT 1 3/4 7-2 Amendment No.

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(BSEP-1-57)

PLANT SYSTEMS LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION (Continued)

ACTION (Continued)

I different divisions to OPERABLE status within 7 days or declare the Core Spray System and the LPCI System inoperable and take the ACTION required by Specifications 3.5.3.1 and 3.5.3.2.

3.

With the service water system nuclear header inoperable, operation may continue providedt a)

The Unit 2 service water system nuclear header is OPERABLE with at least two OPERABLE Unit 2 nuclear service water pumps. Restore the service water system nuclear header to OPERABLE status within 14 ds"s or declare the diesel generators inoperable and take the ACTION required by Specification 3.8.1.2, end b)

The service water system conventional header is OPERABLE with at least two conventional service sater pumps OPERABLE powered from different divisions and capable of supplying the service water conventional header.**

Restore the i

service water system nuclear header to OPERABLE starup within 14 days or declare the Core Spray System and LPCI System inoperable and take the ACTION required by o

Specifications 3.5.3.1 and 3.5.3.2.

I SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.7.1.2.1 The service water system shall be demonstrated OPERABLEt j

a.

At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve (mar.us.1, power-operated, or automatic) servicing safety related equipment that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position, b.

At least once per 18 months during shutdown, by' verifying that each autoLatic valve servicing safety related equipment actuates to its correct position on the appropriate ECCS actuation test si gnal s.

c.

In OPERAT iNAL CONDITION 4 nr 5 with service water system nuclear

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header it. serable, verify that the service water system conventional header is lined up to supply cooling water to vital ECCS loads and i

that the Unit 2 nuclear header is lined up to supply cooling water I

for the diesel generators by verifying that each valve servicing the diesel generators that is not 'ocked open is administrative 1y controlled in the proper position.

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- See Special Test Exception 3.10.5.

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BRUNSWICK - UNIT 1 3/4 7-2a Am,ndment No.

1 (BSEP-1-57) e e

PLANT SYSTEMS SERVICE WATER SYSTEM - SHUTDOWN OF BOTH UNITS 1

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION I

3.7.1.2.2 The service water system nuclear he.dec shall be OPERABLE with at least the following three OPERABLE service water pumps:

1.

Two OPERABLE nuclear service water pumps per site capable of supplying service water to the diesel generators, each powered from a

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different division, and in addition 2.

One OPERABLE Unit 1 service water pump, conventional or nuclear, capable of supplying the service water system nuclear header.

APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 4* and 5*.

ACTION:

1.

With only one OPERABLE nuclear service water pump per site capable of supplying service water to the diesel generators, restore at least two nuclear service water pumns per site powared from different divisions to OPERABLE status

'hin 7 days or declare the dieset 3

generators inoperable and tak he ACTION required by Specification 3.8.1.2.

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With uo OPERABLE Unit 1 service water pump capable of supplying the service water nuclear header (in addition to the two nuclear service water pumps per site), restore at least one service water pump to OPERABLE status within 7 days or declare the Core Spray System and the LPCI System inoperable and take the ACTION required by Specifications 3.5.3.1 and 3.5.3.2.

3.

With the service water system nuclear header inoperable, operation ma; continue provided:

a.

The Unit 2 service water header is OPERABLE with at least two j

OPERABLE Unit 2 nuclear service water pumps.

Restore the service water system nuclear header to OPERABLE status with5n 14 days or declare the diesel generators inoperable and take the ACTION required by Specification 3.8.1.2, and I

b.

The service water system conventional header is OPERABLE with at least two ennventional service water pumps OPERABLE powered from different dtvisions and capable of supplying the service water conventional header.** Restore the service water system nuclear hesder to OPERABLE status within 14 days or declare the Ccre Spray System and the LPCI System inoperable and take the ACTION 3

l required by Specifications 3.5.3.1 and 3.5.3.2.

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With Unit 2 in OPERATIONAL CONDITION 4 or 5.

- See Special Test Exception 3.10.5.

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BRUNSWICK - UNIT 1 3/4 7-2b Amendtant No.

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(BSEP-1-57)

PLANT SYSTEMS SURVEILIANCE REQUIREMENTS l

4.7.1.2.2 The service water system shall be demonstrated OPERABLE!

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At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve (manual, I

power-operated, or automatic) servicing safety related equipment that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in tosition, is in its correct position.

f b.

At least once per 18 months during shutdown, by verifying that each automatic valve servicing safety-related equipment actuates to i st correct position on the appropriate ECCS actuation test signals.

c.

In OPERAT!ONAL CONDITION 4 or 5 with service water system nue17ar 1

header inoperable, verify that the service water system conventional l

header is lined up to supply cooling water to vital ECCS loads and j

that the Unit 2 nuclear header is lined up to supply cooling water for the diesel generators by verifying that each valve servicing the diesel generators that is not loched open is administratively controlled in the proper position.

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BRUNSkICK - UNIT 1 2/4 7-2c i

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(BSEP-1-57) 3/4.7 PLANT SYSTEMS i

BASES 3/4.7.1 SERVICE WATER SYSTEMS During a LOCA with a loss of off-site power, sereice water must be made immediately available to the diesel generators for cooling.

Due to the design which allows either unit's service water svotem to supply all the diesel generators, any combination of two nuclear service water pumps.4 0 acceptable, provided that they are powered from different divisions. The requirement to have each pump fed from a different division assures that the separation criteria is met.

Analysis has shown that one pump can supply all four diesel generatorst however, two pumps are required OPERABLE to meet the single failure criteria.

Approximately 10 minutes following a LOCA with a loso 91 cff-site power, the required operation of other equipment results in additiun:1 cooling loads on the service water system. These loads include Residual Heat Removal (RHR)

System pumps and the RHR and Core Spray room coolers in addition to RHR Service Water. To meet these additional loads (in excess of the diesel generatorn), one additional pump on the affected unit must be placed in service (manunt starting is analyzed).

In order to assure that the single failure and separation criteria are met, two service water pumps powered from 1

different divisions must be OPERABLE per unit in addition to the two nuclear service water pumps described earlier.

With both units in OPERATIONAL CONDITION 4 or 5, Technical Specifications l

(Swetion 3.8.2.2) require that one 4160 volt Smergency bus be OPERABLE per I

unit. The electrical power distribution system is such that with only one OPERABLE bus per unit, only one service water pump would be available to 1

j supply the service water system nuclear header (in ridition to the cwo nuclear service water pumps per site supplying the diavel generators). Therefore, the requirement to have only one service water pump per unit is established.

The ACTION requirements for the loss of the only required pump is established at 7 days.

This is consistent with the Appendix R criteria for a unit in OPERATIONAL CONDITION 4 or 5 in that only one service water pump per unit must be isolated from a fire hazard to ensure operability.

3/4.7.2 CONTROL ROOM EMERCENCY FILTRATION, S_YST]

The OPERABILITY of the control room ventilation system ensures that 1) the ambient air temperature doas not exceed the allowable temperature for continuous duty rating for the equipment and instrumentation cooled by thi9 system and 2) tha control room will remain habitable for operations personnel during and following all credible accident conditions. The OPERABILITY of this system in conjunction with control room design provisions is based on limiting the radiation exposure to pereennel occupying the control room to 5 rem or less whole body, or its equivalent. This limitation is caasistent with the requirements of General Design criteria 10 of Appendix "A",

10 CFR Part 50.

BRUNSWICK - UNIT 1 B 3/4 7-1 Amendment No.

(BSEP-1-57)

PLANT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.7.3 FLOOD PROTECTION The limitation on flond protection ensures that facility protective actions will be taken and operation will be terminated in the event of flood conditions. The limit of elevation 17'6" Hean Sea Level is based on the maximum elevation at which facility flood control measures provide prottetion to safety-related equipment.

3/4.7.4 REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLINC SYSTEM The reactor core isolation cooling system (RCICS) is provided to assure adequate core cooling in the event of reactor isolation from its primary heat sink and the loss of feedwater flow to the reactor vessel without requiring actuation of any of the Emergency Core Cooling equipment. RCICS is conservatively required to be OPERABLE whenever reactor pressure exceeds 113 psig even though the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system provides adequate core cooling up to 150 psig. The condensate storage tank provides sufficient water to reduce the reactor coolant temperature and pressure to permit the RHR system to be operated.

RCICS specifications are applicable during CONDITIONS 1, 2, and 3 when reactor vessel pressure exceeds 113 psig because RCICS is the primary non-ECCS source of emergency core cooling when the reactor is pressurized.

With RCICS inoperable, adequate core cooling is assurad by the demonstrated OPERABILITY of the HPCIS system and justifies the specified out-of-service period.

The surveillance requirements provide adequate assurance that RCICS

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and the condensate storage tank will be OPERABLE when required.

Although all active components are testable and full flow can be demonstrated by recirculation during reactor operation, a complete functional test requires reactor shutdown. The pump discharge piping is maintained full to prevent water hammer damage and to start cooling at the earliest moment.

3/4.7.h SNUBBERS All snuboers are required OPERABLE to ensure that the structural integrity of the Reactor Coolant System and all other safety-related systems is maintained during and following a seismic or other event initiating dynamic loads. Snubbers excluded from this inspection program are those installed on nonsafety-related systems and then only if their failure or failure of the systems which they are installed, would have no adverse effect on any safety-related system.

BRUNSWICK - UNIT 1 B 3/4 7-2 Amendment No.

(BSEP-1-57) i PLANT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.7.5 SNUBBERS _(Continued) l Snubbers are classified and grouped by design and manufacturer but not by size. For example, mechanical snubbers utilizing the same design j

features of the 2-kip, 10-kip, and 100-kip capacity manufactured by Company "A" are of the same type. The same design mechanical snubbers manufactured by Company "B" for the purposes of this Technical Specification would be of a i

different type, as would hydraulic snubbers from either manufacturer.

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A list of individual snubbers with detailed information of snubber location and size and of system affected shall be available at the plant in accordance with Section 50.71(c) of 10 CFR Part 50.

The accessibility of each snubber shall be determined and approved by the Plant Nuclear Safety Committee. The determination shall be basud upon the existing radiation levels and the expected time to perform a visual inspection in each snubber i

location as well as other factors associated with accessibility durink plant I

onerations (e.g., temperature, atmosphere, locations, etc.), and the re ommendations of Regulatory Guides 8.8 and 8.10.

The addition or deletion j

j of eny hydraulic or mechanical snubber shall be made in accordance with section 50.59 of 10 CFR Part 50.

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The visual inspection frequency is based upon maintaining a.onstant level of snubber protection to each safety-related system. Therefore, the required inspection interval varies inversely with the observed snubber l

failuras on a given system and is determined by the number of inoperable l

snubbers found during an inspection of each system.

In order to establish the inspection frequency for each type of snubber on a safety-related system, it was assumed that the frequency of snubber failures and initiating events are ccnstant with rime and that the failure of any snubber on that system could i

cause the system to be unprotected and to result in failures during an assumed initiating event.

Inspections performed before that interval has elapsed may i

be used as a new reference point to deteruine the next inspection.

However, j

the result of such early inspections performed before the original required time interval has elapsed (nominal time less 25%) may not be used to lengthen l

l the required inspection interval.

Any inspection whose results require s

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l shorter inspection interval will override the previous schedule.

l The acceptance criteria are to te used in the viawal inspecticn ::

I determine OPERABILITY of the snubbers.

For example, if a fluid port of a I

hydraulic snubber is found to be uncovered, the snubber shall be declared inoperable and shall not be determined OPERABLE via functional testing.

To provide assurance of snubber functional reliability one of three l

functional testing methods are used with the stated acceptance criteriat l

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Functionally test 10% of a type of snubber with an additional 10.

l tested for each functional testing failure, or

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P BRUNSWICK - UNIT 1 B 3/4 7-3 Amendment No.

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(BSEP-1-57) i t

PLANT SYSTEMS J

BASES 3/4.7.5 SNUBBERS (Continued)

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Functionally test a sample size and determine sample acceptance or f

i rejection using Figure 4.7.5-1, or L

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Functionally test a representative samnle size and determine sample acceptance o. rejection using the stated equation.

l Figura 4.7 5-1 was developed using "Wald's Sequential Probability 2atio Plan" as described in "Quality Control and Industrial Statistics" by

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Acheson J. Duncan.

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Permanent or other exemptions from the surveillance program for al' individual snubbers may be granted by the Commission if a justifiable basis i

for exemption is presented and, if applicable, snubber life destructive I

testing was performed to qualify the snubbers for the applicable design

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conditions at either the completion of their, fabrication or at a subsequent

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date. Snubbers so exempted shall be listed in the list of individual snubbers indicating the extent of the exemptions.

The service life of a snubber is established via manufacturer input and information through considvation of the snubber service conditions and 4

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associated installation and maintenance records (newly installed snubber, seal l

l replaced, spring replaced, in high radiation area, in high temperature area, etc.).

The requirement to monitor the snubber service life is included to l

l ensure that the snubbers periodically undergo a performance evaluation in view of their age and operating conditions. These records will provide statistical l

bases for future consideration of snubber service life.

3/4.7.6 SEAT.ED SOURCE CONTA!!! NATION l

The limitation on removable contamination for sources requiring leak j

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including alpha emitters, is based on 10 CFR 70.39(c) limits fcr

testing, I

plutonium. This limitation will ensure that leakage from by product, source, l

and special nuclear material sources will not exceed allowable intake

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values. Sealed sources are classified into three groups according to their

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use, with surveillance requirements commensurate with the probability of l

damage to a source in that group. Those sources which are frequently handled are required to be tested more often than those which are not.

Sealed sources l

which are continuously enclosed within a shielded mechanism, i.e., sealed sources with radiation monitoring or boron measuring devices, are considered to be stored and need not be tested unless they are removed from the shielding mechanism.

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t BRUNSWICK - UNIT 1 8 3/4 7-4 Amendment No.

I

(BSEP-1-57) 4 PLANT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.7.7 FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEMS The OPERABILITY of the fire suppression systems ensures that adequate fire suppression capability is available to confine and extinguish fires occurring in any portion of the facility where safety-related equipment is located.

The fire suppression system consists of the water system, spray and/or sprinklers, CO, and fire hose stations. The collective capability of 2

the fire suppression systems is adequate to minimize potential damage to safety-related equipment and is a major element in the facility fire protection program, In the event that portions of the fire suppression systems are 1

inoperable, alternate backup fire fighting equipment is renair14 to be made

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svailable in the affected areas until the inoperable equipment is restored to service.

In the event the fire suppression water system become inoperable, immediate corrective measures must be taken since this system provides the major fire suppression capability of the plat.t.

The requirement for a 24-hour report to the Commission provides for prompt evaluation of the acceptability of the corrective measures to provide adeouate fire suppression cr.pability for I

the continued protection of the nuclear plant.

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3/4.7.8 FIRE BARRIER PENETRATIONS i

j The functional integrity of the fire barrier penetrations ensures that fires will be confined or adequately retarded from spreading to adjacent potions of the fccility. This design feature minimizes the possibility of a single fire rapidly involving several areas of the facility prior to detection l

and extinguishment. The fire barrier penetrations are a passive element in j

the facility fi-e protection programs and are subject to periodic inspections.

1 The berrier penetrations, including cable penetration barriers, fire doors, and dampers, are considered functional when the visually observed 4

condition is the same as the as-designed condition.

For those fire barrier penetrations that are not in the as-designed condition, an evaluation shall be i

i performed to abow that the modification has not degraded the fire rating of

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the fire berrier penetration.

l During periods of time when the barriers are not functional, either

1) a continuous fire watch is required to be maintained in the vicinity of the affected barrier, or 2) the fire detectors on at least one side of the affected barrier must be verified OPERABLE and a hourly fire watch patrol

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established until the barrier is restored to functional status.

BKJNSWICI - UNIT 1 B 3/4 7-5 Amendment No.

t ENCLOSURE 6 BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT, UNIT 2 NRC DOCKET 50-324 OPERATING LICENSE DPR-62 REQUEST FOR LICENSE AMENDMENT i

SERVICE WATER SYSTEM i

a TECHNICAL SPEC lFICATION PAGES l

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6 E6-1 (5471**S/ebei

l (BSEP-2-52) e INDEX LIMITINC CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SECTION PACE 3.4.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS (Continued)

Primary Containment Structural Integrity.................

3/4 6-6 i

Primary Containment Internal Pressure....................

3/4 6-7 j

Primtry Containment Average Air Temperature..............

3/4 6-8 3/4.6.2 DEPRESSURIZATION AND COOLING SYSTEMS Suppression Pool.........................................

3/4 6-9 i

Suppression Pool Cooling.................................

3/4 6-11 3/4.6.3 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES.....................

3/4 6-12 3/4.6.4 VACUUM RELIEF Dryvell - Suppression Pool Vacuum Breakers...............

3/4 6-18 Suppression Pool - Reactor Building Vacuum Breakers......

3/4 6-20

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3/4.6.5 SECONDARY CONTAINMENT J

Secondary Containment Integrity..........................

3/4 6-21 f

Secondary Containment Automatic Isolation Dampers........

3/4 6-22 3/4.6.6 CONTAINMENT ATMOSPHERE CONTROL Standby Can Treatment System.............................

3/4 6-25 Containment Atmosphere Dilution System...................

3/4 6-28

)

Oxygen Concentration.....................................

3/4 6-29 Cas Analyzer Systems.....................................

3/4 6-30

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3/4.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 1

l 3/4.7.1 SERVICE WATER SYSTEMS l

Residual Heat Remcval Service Water System...............

3/4 7-1 Service Water System - Operation with One or Both Units..

3/4 7-2 Service Water System - Shutdown of Both Units............

3/4 7-2b BRUNSWICK - UNIT 2 VII Amendment No.

(BSEP-2-52) l t

INDEX l

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t BASES t

i SECTION PACE i

3/4.7 PLANT SYSTEMS (Continued) t 3/4.7.3 FLOOD PROTECTION...................................

,B 3/4 7-2 3/4.7.4 REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING SYSTEM.............., B.3/4 7-2 3/4.7.5 HYDRAULIC FNUBBERS.................................

B 3/4 7-2 1

3/4.7.6 S EALED SOURCE CONT AMINATION........................

B 3/4 J-4 l

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3/4.7.7 FIRE SUPPRE3SION SYSTEMS...........................

8 3/4 7-5 a

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3/4.7.8 FIRE BARRIER PENETRATIONS..........................

B 3/4 7-5 l

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3/4.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEM S...................................

B 3/4 8-1 I

i 3/4.9 REFUELINC OPERATIONS i

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3/4.9.1 REACTOR MODE SWITCH................................

B 3/4 9-1

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3/4.9.2 INSTRUMEMTATION....................................

B 3/4 9-1 l

l 3/4.9.3 CONTROL R0D P0$ITION...............................

B 3/4 9-1 j

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3/4.9.4 DECAY TIME.........................................

5 3/4 9-1

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3/4.9.7 C0KMUNICATIONS.....................................

B 3/4 9-1 i

l 3/4.9.6 CRANZ AND HOIST OPE 2 ABILITY........................

8 3/4 9-2 i

l 3/4.9.7 CRANE TRAVEL-SPENT FUEL STORACE P00L...............

B 3/4 9-2

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3/4.9.S WATER LEYF.L-REACTOR VESSEL. and e

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3/4.9.9 WATER LEVEL-SPENT FUEL STOR/CE P00L................

B 3/4 9-2 i

3/4.9.10 CONTROL ROD REM 0 VAL................................

B 3/4 9-2 1

3/4.10 SPECIAL TEST EXCEPTIONS j

i 3/4.10.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTECRITY......................

B 3/4 10-1 3/4.10.2 ROD SEQUENCE CONTROL SYSTEM........................

B 3/4 10-1

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3/4.10.3 SHUTDOWN MARCIN D EMON STRATION S.....................

B 3/4 10-1 3/4.10.4 RECIRCULATION L00PS................

B 3/4 10-1 j

3/4.10.5 PLANT SERVICE VATER................................

B 3/4 10-5 5

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RRUNSWTCV - UNIT 2 XII Amendment No.

(BSEP-2-52)

PLANT SYSTEMS SERVICE WATER SYSTEM - OP'.ATION WITH ONE OR BOTH UNITS LIMITINC CONDITION FOR OP AAT10N 3.7.1.2.1 The service water system nuclear header shall be OPERA')LE with at least the following four OPERABLE service water pumps:

1.

Two OPERABLE nuclear service water pumps per site which are capable of J

supplying service water to the diesel generators and are each powered l

from a different division and, in addition 2.

Two OPERABLE Unit 2. service water pumps, conventional or nuclear.

j which are capable of supplying service water to the nuclear header and are each powered from a different division.

'.PPLICABILITYt OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1. 2. 3. 4* and 5*.

1 l

ACTIONa a.

In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1, 2. or 3 1.

With only one OPERABLE nuclear service water pump per site capable of supplying service water to the diesel generators, restore at least two nuc!"1' service water pumps per site powered from different divisioas so OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or be in at least HCT SHU'DOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and COLD SHUTDOWN the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

2.

With only one OPERA 3LE Unit 2 service water pump, conventional or nuclear. capable of supplying the service water system nuclear header (in addition to the two nuclear service water pumps per site), restore at least two service water pumps powered from different divisions to OPERABLE c*.atus within ? days or be in HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hcurs and COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

b.

In OPERATIONAL CONDIT!ON 4* or 5*:

1.

With only one OPERABLE nuclear service water pump per site capable of supplying service water to the diesel generators.

eascore at least two nuclear service water pumps per site powered f rom dif ferent divisions to OPERABLE status within 7 days or declare the diesel generators inoperahle and take the ACTION required b) Specification 3.S.1.2.

2.

With only one OPERABLE Unit 2 service water pump, conventional or nuclear, capable of supplying the service water nuclear header (in addition to the two nuclear service water pumps per sit e).

restore at least two service water pumps powered from diffarent

With Unit 1 in OPERAi10NAL CONDITION 1, 2. or 3.

BRUNSWICK - UNIT 2 3/4 7-2 Amendment Fo.

(BSEP-2-52)

PLANT SYSTEMS LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION (Continued)

ACTION:

(Continued) divisions to OPERABLE status within 7 days or declare the Core Spray System and the LPCI System inoperable and take the ACTION required by Specifications 3.5.3.1 und 3.5.3.2.

3.

With the service water system nuclear header inoperable, operation may continue provided a)

The Unit I service water system nuclear header is OPERABLE with at least two OPERABLE Unit I nuclear service water pumps. Festore the service water sy.:en nuclear header to OPERABLE status within 14 days or declare the diesel generators inoperable and take the ACTION required by Specification 3.8.1.2, and b)

The service water system conventional header is OPERABLE with at least two conventional service water pumps OPERABLE powered from different divisions and capable of supplying the service water conventional header.**

Restore the service water system nuclear header to OPERABl.E status within 14 days or declare the Core Spray System and LPCI System inoperable and take the ACTION required by Specifications 3.5.3.1 and 3.5.3.2.

SURVE!LLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.7.1.2.1 The service water system shall be demonstrated OPERABLEt a.

At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve (manual, power-operated, or automatic) servicing safety related equipment that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position.

b.

At least once per 18 months during shutdown, by verifying that each automatic valve servicing safety related equipment actuates to its correct position on the appropriate ECCS actuatior test signals.

c.

In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 4 or 5 with service water system nuclear header inoperable, verify that the service water system conventional header is lined up to supply cooling water to vital ECCS loads and that the Unit i nuclear header is lined up to supply cooling water for the diesel generators by verifying that each valve servicing the diesel generators that is not locked open is administrative 1y controlled in the proper position.

- See Special Test Exception 3.10.5.

BRUNSWICK - UNIT 2 3/4 7-2a Amendment No.

(BSEP-2-52)

PLANT SYSTEMS SERVICE WATER SYSTEM - SHUTDOWN OF BOTH UNITS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.1.2.2 The service watn system nuclear header shall be 0 7 ABLE with at least the following three OPERABLE service water pumpst 1.

Two OPERABLE nuclear service water pumps per site capable of supplying service water to the diesel generators, each powered from a different division, and in addition 2.

One OPERABLE Unit 2' service water pump, conventional or nuclear, capable of supplying the service water system nuclear header.

APPLICABILITY OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 4* and 5*.

ACTION L

1.

With only one OPERABLE nuclear service water pump per site capable of supplying service water to the dierel generators, restore at least two nuclear service water pumps per site powered from diffe7ent divisions to OPERABLE status within 7 days or declare the diesel generators inoperable and take the ACTION required by Specitication 3.8.1.2.

2.

With no OPERABLE Unit 2 service water pump capabit of supplying the I

service water nuclear header (in addition to the two nuclear service l

water pumps per site), restore at least one service water pump to

[

OPERABLE status within 7 days or declare the Core Spray System and the i

LPCI System inoperable and take the ACTION required by Specifications 3.5.3.1 and 3.5.3.2.

I 3.

With the service water system nuclear header inoperable, operation may I

enntinue providedt a.

The Unit 1 service water header is OPERABLE with at least two OPERABLE Unit 1 nuclear service water pumps. Restore the service l

water system nuclear header to OPERABLE status within 14 days or 4

declare the diesel generators inopera' ale and take the ACTION required by Specification 3.8.1.2, and l

b.

The service water system conventional header is OPERABLE with at least two conventional service water pumps OPERABLE powered from l

dif ferent divisions and capable of supplying the service water l

conventional header.**

Restore the service water system nuclear i

header to OPERABLE status within 14 days or declare the Core i

Spray System and the LPCI System inoperable and take the ACTION t

required by Specifications 3.5.3.1 and 3.5.3.2.

l

With Unit 1 in OPERATIONAL CONDITION 4 or 5.

[

- See Special Test Exception 3.10.5.

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BRUNSWICst - UNIT 2 3/4 7-2b Amendment No.

(BSEP-2-52)

PLANT SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS l

4.7.1.2.2 The service water system shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a.

At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve (manual, power-t operated, or automatic) servici;ig safety-related equipment that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secuted in position, is in it s correct i

position, b.

At least once per 18 sonths during shutdown, by verifying that each automatic valve servicing safety-related equipment actuates to its correct positica on the appropriate ECCS actuation test signals.

c.

In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 4 or 5 with service water system nuclear header inope sble, verify that the service water system conver.tional header is lined up to supply cooling water to vita. ECCS lo. ids and that the Unit I nuclear header is lined up to supply coolirig water for the diesel generators by verifying that each valve servicing the i

diesel generators that is not locked open is administrative 1y controlled in the proper position.

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t BRUNSWICK - UNIT 2 3/4 7-2c Amundment No.

l' '.

(BSEP-2-52) 3/4.7 PLANT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.7.1 SERVICE WATER SYSTEMS During a LOCA with a loss of off-site power, service water must bs made immediately available to the diesel generators for cooling.

Due to the design which allows either unit's service water system to supply all the diesel generators, any combination of two nuclear service water pumps is acceptable, provided that they are powered from different divisions.

The requiremeat to 4

have each pu y fed from a different division assutes that ths separation criteria is met.

Analysis has shown that one pump can supply all foa* diesel generatorst however.. two pumps are required OPERA 3LE to mest the single failure criteria.

4 Approximately 10 minutes following a LOCA with a less of of f-ite posor, the required operation of other equipment results in additional cooling loads on the service water system. These loads include Residual Heat Removal (RHR)

System pumps and the RHR and Core Spray room coolers in addition to RHR Service Water. To meet these additional loads (in excess of the diesel generators),

one additional pump on the effected untt must be placed in service (manual starting is analyred).

In order to assure that the single failure and separation criteria are m(t, two service water pumps powered from different i

divisions must be OPERABLE per unit in addition to thz two nuclear service j

water pumps described earlier.

I With both units in OPERATIONAL CONDITION 4 or 5. Technical Specifications (Section 3.8.2.2) requit e that one 4160 volt emergency bus be OPERABLE per unit. The electrical power distribution system is such that with only one l

OPERABLE bus per anit, only one service water pump would be available to supply the service water system nuclear header (in addition to the two nuclear service water pumps per site supplying the diesel generators).

Therefore. the requirement to have only one service water pump p?r unit is established. The ACTION requirements for the Insa of the only required pump is established at 7 days. This is consistent with the Appendix R criteria for a unit in OPERATIONAL CONDITION 4 or 5 in that only one service water pump per unit must be isolated from a fire hasare to ensure operability.

3/4.7.2 CONTROL P.00rt EMERCENCY FILTRATION SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the control room ventilation system ensures tuar 1) the ambient air temperature does not exceed the allowable temperature far continuous duty rating for the equipment and instrumentation cooled by this system and 2) the cont:11 room will remain habit &ble for operations personnel during and following all credible accident conditions. Tho OPERABILITY of this system in conjunction with control room design provisions is based on liLiting the radiatier. exposure to personnel occupying the control room to 5 rem or less whole body, or its equivalent. This limitation is consistent with the requirements of Ceneral Design Criteria 10 of Appendix "A", 10 CFR Part 50.

1 i

BRUNSWICK - UNIT 2 B 3/4 7-1 Amendment No.

(BSEP-2-52) s PLANT _ SYSTEMS i

BASE,S 1

i 3/4.7.3 FLOOD PROTECTION The limitation on flood protection ensures that facility protective actions will be taken and oper.cion will be terminated in the event of flood conditions. The limit of elevation 17'6" Hean Sea Level is based on the maximum glevation at uhich f acility flood control measures provide protection to safety-related equipment.

3/4.7.4 REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING SYSTEM The reactor core isolation cooling system (RCICS) is provided to assure adequate core cooling in the event of reactor isolation from its primary heat sink and the loss of feedwater flow to the reactor vessel without requiring actuation of any of the Emergency Core Cooling equipment.

RCICS is conserratively required to be OPERABLE whenever reactor pressure exceeds 113 psig even though the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system provides adequate core cooling up to 150 psig. The condensate storage tank provides sufficient water to reduce the reactor coolant temperature and pressure to permit the RHR system to be operated.

RCICS specifications are applicable during CONDITIONS 1, 2, and 3 vhes reactor vessel pressure exceeds 113 psig because RCICS is the primary non-ZCCS source of emergency core cooling when the reactor is pressurized.

With RCICS inoperable, adequate core cooling is assure / by the demonstrated OPERAB:LITY of the HPCIS system and justifies the specified out-of-service period.

The surveillance requirements provide adequate assarance that PfdsS and the condersate storage tank will be OPERABLE when required. Althour.n all active components are testable and full flow can be demonstrated by recirculation during reactor operation, a complete functional test requires reactor shutdown. The pump discharge piping is maintained full to prevent water hammer damage and to start cooling at the earliest moment.

3[4.7.5 SNUBBERS All snubbers are required OPERABLE to ensure that the structural integrity of the Reactor Coolant System and all other safety-related systems is maintained during ar.d following a seismic or other event initiating dynamic loads. Snubbers excluded from this inspection program are those installed on nonsafety-related systems and then only if their failure or failure of the systems which they are installed, would have no adverse effect on any safety-related system.

BRUNSWIC).

WIT 2 B 3/4 7-2 Amendment No.

O'.

(BSEP-2-52)

PLANT SYS1 EMS BASES 3/4.7.$ SNCBBERS (Continued)

Snnbbers are classified and grouped by design and manufacturer but not by size.

For example, mechanical snubbers utilising the same design features of the 2-kip, 10-kip, and 100-kip capacity manufactured by Company "A" are of the same type. The same design mechanical snubbers manufactured by Company "B" for the purposes of this Technical Specification would be of a different type, as would hydraulic snubbers from either manufacturer.

A list of individual snubbers with detailed information of snubber location and size and of system affected shall be available at the plant in accordance with Section 50.71(c) of 10 CFR Part 50.

The accessibility of each snubber shall be determined and approved by the Plant Nuclear Safety Committee. The determination shall be based upon the existing radiation levels and the expected time to perform a visual inspection in each snubber location as well as other factors associated with accessibility during plant operations (a.g., temperature, atmosphere, locations, etc.), and the recommendations of Asgulatory Cuides 8.8 and 8.10.

The addition or deletion of any hydraulic or acchanical snubber shall be made in acce-dance with section 50.59 of IC CFP Part 50.

The visual inspection frequency is based upon maintaining a constant level of snubber protection to each safety-related system. Therefore, the required inspection interval varies inversely with the observed snubber f ailures on a given system and is determined by the numoer of inoperable snubbers found during an inspection of each system.

In order to establish the inspection frequency for each type of snubber on a safety-related system, it was assumed that the frequency of snubber failures and initiating events are constant with time and that the failure of any snubber on that system could cause the system to be unprotected and to result in failures during an assumed initiating event.

Inspections performed before that interval has elapsed may be ussa n; a new reference point to determine the next inspection. However, the result of such early inspections performed before the original required time interv01 has elapsed (nominal time less 25%) may not be used to tengthen the requireo inspection interval.

Any inspection whose results require a J

shorter inspection interval will override the previous schedule.

The acceptance criteria are to be used in the visual inspection to determine OPERABILITY of the snubbers.

For example, if a fluid port of a hydraulic snubber is found to be uncoverad, the snubber shall be declared inoperable and shall nor be determined OPERABLE via functioral testing.

l BRUNSWICK - UNIT 2 B 3/4 7-3 Amendmen t No.

P, (BSEP-2-!t)

I 1

PLANT SYSTEMS BASES i

i 3/4.7.5 SNUBBERS (Continued)

To provide assurance of snubber functional reliability one of three i

functional testing methods are used with the stated acceptance criterlat i

1.

Functionally test 10% of a type of snubber with an additional 10%

i tested for each functional testing failure, or J

Functionally test a sampli size and determine sample acceptance or g

j rejection using Figure 4.7.5-1, or

)

3.

Functionally test a representative sample site and determine sample acceptance or rejection using the stated equation.

l, Figure 4.7.5-1 was developed using "Wald's Sequential Probability l

Ratio Plan" as described in "Quality Control and Industrial Statistics" by

}

Acheson J. Duncan.

I l

Persanent or other exemptions from the surveillance program for individual snubbers may be granted by the Commission if a justifiable basis for exemption is presented and, 'f applicable, snubber life destructive testing was performed ta qualify the snubbers for the applicable design conditions at either the completion of their fabrication or at a subsequent date.

Snubbers so exempted shall be listed in the list of individual snubbers indicating the extent of the exemptions.

The service life of a snubber is established via manufacturer input and information through consideration of the snubber service canditions and associated installation and maintenance records (newly ins

..ed snubber, seal replaced, spring replaced, in high radiation area, in high temperature area, etc.).

The requirement to monitor the snubber service life is included to ensure that the snubbers periodically undergo a performance evaluation in view of their age and operating conditions. These records will provide statistical bases for future consideration of snubber service life.

3/4.7.6 SEALED SOURCE CONTAMINATION The limitation on removable contamination for sources requiring leak testing, including alpha emitters, is based on 10 CFR 70.39(c) limits for plutonium. This limitation will ensure that leakage from by-product, source, and special nuclear material sources will not exceed allowable intake values.

Sealed sources are classified into three groups according to their use, with surveillance requirements commensurate with the probability of damage to a source in that group. Those sources which are frequently handled are required r,o be tested more eften than these which are not. Sealed sources which are continuously enclosed within a shielded mechanism, i.e., sealed sources with radiation monitoring or boron measuring devices, are consit9ted to be stored and need not be tested unless the/ are removed from the shielding mechanism.

BRUNSWICK - UNIT 2 B 3/4 7-4 Amendment No.

(BSEP-2-52)

PLANT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.7.7 FIRE SUPPRESSION S'! STEMS The OPERABILITY of the fire suppression systems ensures that adequate fire suppression capability is available to confine and extinguish fires occurring in any portion of the f acility where safety-related equipmerit is located. The fire suppression system consists of the water system, spray and/or sprinklers, C03, and fire hose stations. The collective capability ot the fire suppression systems is adequate to minimize potertial damage to safety-related equipment and is a major element in the facility fire protection program.

In the event that portions of the fire suppression systems are inoperable, alternate backup fire fighting equipnent is required to be made available in the affec',ed areas until the inoperable equipment is restored to service.

In the orent the fire suppression water system become inoperabic, immediate corrective measures must be taken since this system provides the major fire suppression capability of the plant. The requirement for a 24-hour report to th, Cornission provides for prompt evaluation of the acceptability of the corrective measures to provide adequate fire suppression capability for the continued protection of the nuclear plant.

3/4.7.8 FIRE BARRIER PENETRATIONS The functional integrity of the fire barrier penetrations ensures that fires will be confined or adequately retarded from spreading to adjacent potions of the facility. This design feature minimizes the possibility of a single fire rapidly involving several areas of the facility prior to detection and extinguishment. The fire barrier penetrations are a passive element in the facility fire protection programs and are subject to periodic inspections.

The barrier penetrations, including cable penetration bar-iers, fire doors, and dampers, are considered functional when the visually observed condition is the same as the ms-designed condition.

For those fire barrier penetrations that are not in the as-designed condition, an evaluation shall be performed t' show that the modification has not degraded the fire rating of the fire barrier penetration.

During periods of time when the barriers sre not functional, either

1) a continuous fire watch is required to be maintained in the vicinity of the affected barrier, or 2) the fire detectors on at leart one side of the affected barrier must be verified OPERABLE and a hourly fire caten patrol established until the barrier is restored to f unctional st atus.

BRUNSVICK - JNIT 2 B 3/* 7-5 Amendment No.

_

ML20205T255

Text

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